INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00395R000600120005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 21, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Irec r en ra n e ngence
Washinaton. D.C 20905
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
DCI/ICS 82-4220
21 April 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Acting Chairman
Lritical-Intelligence Problems Committee
SUBJECT: International Terrorism (U)
1. In late February 1982, in response to a request from the Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, you asked the CIPC to review the
Intelligence Community's present efforts against the problem of international
terrorism and to develop proposals for upgrading this effort as appropriate.
The attached study is in response to your request. An interim reply was
forwarded to Judge Clark on 13 March 1982 highlighting in summar fashion
improvements undertaken in this regard within the last year. rY I
2. No issues arose during CIPC deliberations concerning the terrorism
problem that were not resolved within the Committee. The publication of NSDD-
30, Manaoing Terrorist Incidents, occurred as we were applying the final
touches to the study. In restructuring the paper to reflect the existence of
the Directive--which is vague and ambiguous in some respects--the Committee
accepted the contents of the Directive at face value. Thus, we may have
attributed more potential for good to its existence than will actually be the
case over time. To do otherwise however, would have put us in the position
of pre-judging its success.
3. You will recall that the CIPC request for agency/departmental
representatives for this study used the NFIC mechanism. With your
concurrence, copies of the study will be forward to NFIC principals with a
short deadline for review and response. This approach should alleviate the
need for convening the NFIC for the sole purpose of addressing the paper. (U)
Attachment:
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PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS
. DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... i
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 1
PROGRESS SINCE 1977 ............................................ 1
PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ............................ 4
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONCERNS AND INFORMATION GAPS........... 7
Concerns .................................................. 7
Gaps ...................................................... 8
CURRENT PRIORITY LEVELS ........................................ 9
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ........................................ 10
Analysis .................................................. 21
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
International terrorism, which- is both an intelligence and a
counterintelligence problem, poses a complex collection and analytic challenge
for the Intelligence Community. The numbers and diversity of terrorism
groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational flow of terrorist group
activities, and the worldwide dispersion of terrorist group operational areas,
makes it an elusive target. Because international terrorism is a government-
wide problem, it also poses an equally imposing management challenge--one
which has grown steadily as the Washington counterterrorism network
particularly the non-intelligence portion of it, has expanded.
The individual departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community are
better equipped today to address the problem of international terrorism than
they were five years ago when the first study of this type was undertaken.
This has been a slow process, however, impeded to a considerable degree both
by organizational shifts in the Community and by inertia with regard to the
management aspects of the problem, the latter fueled by a lack of firm
guidance based on a well-defined national counterterrorism policy. The
increased priorities accorded the problem since 1979, as well as increases in
the threat itself, have fostered organizational shifts that have tended to
focus departmental efforts more on international terrorism and paved the way
for the direction of additional collection and analytic resources against the
problem. Moreover, a wide-ranging series of additional pertinent
enhancements, primarily in the collection arena, are presently either under
way or planned. I
Despite these improvements, the Community's overall capabilities with
regard to international terrorism remain limited. This is due in large part
to the scope and nature of terrorism itself, but also to some extent to the
fragmented approach the Community continues to take to the problem. To be
sure, collection and analytic problems abound which additional resources, both
manpower and dollars, would alleviate. But there are long-standing questions
of coordination of effort--both within and outside the Community--that should
be resolved first in order to promote improved effectiveness and better use of
existing resources against the terrorism problem. The study group's
recommendations in this regard are outlined below:
A. The Development of a Mechanism by Which Reporting From Non-
Intelligence Agencies is Routinely Made Available to the Intelligence
Community. The Community has spent considerable effort devising ways
in which its products can be sanitized for use by non-intelligence
elements of the US Government in support of counterterrorism. Many
of these elements, in carrying out their operational
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responsibilities, obtain information on international terrorist
activities which is not routinely made available to the Community.
Some of this information would probably fill gaps in the Community's
overall understanding of the problem. Resolution of this problem,
should it prove difficult, would be somewhat beyond the control of
the Intelligence Community. Until the promulgation on-10 April 1982
of National Security Decision Directive Number 30, which, inter alia,
establishes a national-level focal point for handling such
organizational issues, there existed no effective, authoritative
central mechanism to bring the intelligence and non-intelligence
elements of the government together to work out mutually supportive
programs such as this. This responsibility apparently now falls
within the purview of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism
chaired by the Department of State. 25x1
B. Establishment of a Community-wide Program to Exchange Intelligence
Production Plans on Terrorism. The production of comprehensive
studies and assessments of various aspects of the international
terrorist threat is essential to provision of a sound and uniform
basis for both short-term and long-term US Government decisionmaking
in response to and control of the terrorist problem. The CIPC study
group believes that the timing is right for establishing a formal
program to exchange production plans among Community members. It
would provide a focal point for the diverse terrorism-related
production activities of the Community but still preserve a healthy
level of competitive analysis. Such a program would tend to
distribute intelligence production across the Community to reduce
unproductive redundancy and create channels for consensus on threat
analysis and crisis management. This program should be coordinated
by the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism to ensure that.
production plans are geared to policy-level needs. 25x1
C. Data Base Development. There is a need for early interagency
consideration of the Intelligence Community's overall data base needs
with regard to international terrorism and the degree to which these
needs can be met by common or shared data base facilities. As
Intelligence Community involvement in counterterrorism has grown, and
in the absence of any coordinated Community counterterrorism program,
there has been a proliferation of computerized data bases on
terrorism tailored to support departmental collection and analytic
needs. More are under development. These systems are largely,
incompatible, impacting seriously on data sharing with regard to the
terrorism problem. There is general recognition at the working level
that considerable benefit could be derived from access to one
another's data base, or possibly from a computerized Community data
base on terrorism. It is also recognized that important departmental
and legal considerations will have to be addressed carefully in order
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to implement this recommendation. ^
E. Development of Community Contingency Plans. Little effort has been
devoted to the development of Community contingency plans for
handling either the collection or analytic aspects of a terrorist
event. The Dozier kidnapping pointed up the need for increased
interagency coordination in this area. A logical starting point in
such an effort would be to assign the DCI's Senior Review Panel the
task of doing a post-mortem on the Community's ability to respond to
that event, drawing, inter alia, from the various "lessons-learned"
studies and reviews undertaken by various departments. ^
F. Vigorous Follow-Up With Regard to ItemsA through E. The recent
establishment by the DCI of an Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism (IICT) fills a long-standing need for a Community
coordinating body to link together the diverse Community interests
concerning international terrorism. It should be the mechanism
through which the Community pursues items A through E. A major
weakness in past attempts to address similar issues has been lack of
follow-up. The Chairman of the IICT should be charged with reporting
monthly to the DCI, through the DDCI cerning progress and
problems associated with the above. 1
G. Elevation of the DCI's Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism to the Status of a Permanent Committee of the National
Foreign Intelligence Council. Obtaining Community agreement on a
more coordinated approach to the terrorism problem will be
difficult. Many equities are involved and, despite being
specifically identified in NSDD-30 as the organization responsible
for focusing and coordinating interagency intelligence efforts to
counter terrorist threats, the Committee will not have the authority
to resolve the really "hard" issues. Elevating the IICT's status to
a permanent committee of the NFIC will enhance Community focus on the
problem, and give Committee efforts visibility at the highest levels
of Community management where resolution of the more difficult issues
should ultimately take place.
F
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PROPOSALS FOR UPGRADING INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFORTS
DIRECTED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INTRODUCTION
In late February 1982, in response to a request from the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence asked the Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) to
review the Intelligence Community's present efforts against the problem of
international terrorism and to develop proposals for upgrading these efforts
as appropriate. This study responds to that request. It assesses the
Community's progress in implementing improvements contained in an earlier
study bearing DCI approval, summarizes current strengths and weaknesses in our
present ability to support policymaker interests with regard to international
terrorism, and recommends specific measures that could be taken to further
enhance the Community's ability in this regard. 0
All NFIC principals with the exception of the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy and the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce were
represented in Committee deliberations. The three Collection ces of the
Intelligence Community Staff also participated in the study.
PROGRESS SINCE 1977
The Intelligence Community has studied the problem of international
terrorism in considerable detail over the past five years. The common theme
of such efforts has been that, although terrorism poses a complex collection
and analytical challenge for the Community, it poses an equally challenging
management problem for the US Government--one which has grown steadily as the
Washington counterterrorism network has expanded and as Agencies which
formerly had no stake in the business of counterterrorism are now very much
involved. International terrorism is both a foreign intelligence and a
counterintelligence responsibility. It is also an area in which foreign
aspects can have direct and serious repercussions in the domestic sphere,
especially on matters of concern to US agenci ith protective security, law
enforcement, or regulatory responsibilities. II
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A baseline study of intelligence activities directed against the
terrorism problem was undertaken in 1277 by the DCI's interagency Critical
Collection Problems Committee (CCPC). It found the Community's effort
against international terrorism to be ". . . a fragmented one, neither tightly
organized nor closely coordinated in either its collection or analytical
aspects." According to the CCPC study, a more coordinated Community approach
would: provide much needed focus to departmental programs; promote better
organization of Community resources involved; enable rationalization of the
Community's work efforts; yield a better and more useful product at both
departmental and national levels; and result in improved and more
comprehensive su ort to US Government efforts to combat international
terrorism.
Progress toward achievement of these goals over the past five years has
been uneven at best, frustrated at the outset by internal Intelligence
Community events. Central to the course of action recommended by the CCPC in
1977 was the establishment under the CCPC of an interagency subcommittee on
terrorism devoted to addressing the most serious of the weaknesses identified
in the study. Though established in 1977, the subcommittee's efforts were cut
short by the formation of the National Collection Planning Office (NCPO) in
1978, an element of the then newly reorganized Intelligence Community Staff.
The NCPO charter was similar to that of the CCPC and the latter--which then
served the DCI through the Collection Tasking Staff element of the IC Staff--
was viewed as redundant and soon became moribund. Although it was recommended
at the time that the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism be kept intact and report
directly to the DCI, deliberations concerning its future were clouded by the
delay in formally disestablishing the parent CCPC, and the subcommittee
withered from negle NCPO had no dedicated effort directed against the
terrorism. problem. III
Factors external to the intelligence process contributed to the inertia
induced by the withering of the CCPC subcommittee on terrorism, thus providing
a further impediment to the establishment of the desired Community approach to
the problem. International terrorism is a government-wide problem. While
intelligence support is central to any successful counterterrorism effort, the
quality of such support is affected directly by the extent of cooperation and
coordination attained with the many non-intelligence elements of the US
Government having vested interests in--and the ability to report on--the
problem. There was during this period no effective, authoritative, central
mechanism to give national direction to an overall counterterrorism program
* Intelligence Activities Against International Terrorism, CCPC-D-3/77
June 1977.
** The CCPC was formally disestablished in December 1981.
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and bring the intelligence and non-intelligence elements of the government
together to work out mutually supportive programs. With no one focusing on
the management aspects of the problem at the national level, there was little
impetus to focus on them at the Community level, particularly prior to 1980
when international terrorism still a relatively low-priority item for the
Intelligence Community. II
In addition, there was during the period continued focusing-of
policymaker attention on the crisis management and foreign policy aspects of
the terrorism problem almost to the exclusion of consideration of the need for
the establishment and maintenance of a credible threat assessment capability.
With policymaker attention thus riveted, there developed within the
Intelligence Community a perception ofa lack of national-level concern with,
and policy for, a comprehensive US counter-terrorism program. This
perception, coupled with the low priority accorded the terrorism problem until
1979, resulted in limited resources being applied to the problem, and the
intelligence effort continued to be largely event-oriented and reactive in
nature. As a result, in the absence of a Community focus on the threat
assessment aspects of the terrorism problem, Intelligence Community
organizations tended to go their individual ways in development of
counterterrorism capabilities tailored to support for the most part
departmental needs. The scope and nature of terrorism--the numbers and
diversity of terrorism groups, the often sporadic nature and transnational
flow of terrorist group activities, and the worldwide geographical dispersion
of terrorist group operational areas--makes such an unfocused appr a h inst
an inherently difficult target less than efficient and effective.
Some of the problems identified in the 1977 study have, of course, been
tackled successfully. Several legal issues relating to Intelligence Community
collection of intelligence information concerning international terrorism
identified in the 1977 CCPC study were examined by a panel of representatives
from the appropriate departments and agencies. By and large, those issues
were based upon ambiguities in the Executive Order and guideline provisions
that governed US intelligence activities at that time, as well as the then
uncertain application of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Since
that time, there have been two revisions of the Executive Order and its
implementing procedures and guidelines, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court has been created by law to authorize electronic surveillance for
intelligence purposes in the US, the Government's understanding of and ability
to deal with the requirements of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts
has much improved, and the Classified Information Procedures Act and various
agreements and understandings have been developed to regulate the handling and
use of intelligence information in law enforcement investigations and
proceedings. There are still rough points in existing implementing procedures
and these are being considered in the revision process that is now under
way. As a consequence of these developments, while the Constitution and
relevant statutes impose outside limits on the extent to which the
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Intelligence Community may collect and disseminate information by certain
techniques in particular circumstances, legal issues now appear to be of less
concern. Many of the legal considerations that were perceived to be
impediments have now been resclv4 and the adverse impact of those that remain.
seems capable of resolution.
In addition, international terrorism assumed a much more prominent place
in the DCID 1/2 priorities listing, and since 1979 the priorities accorded the
problem increased substantially. Guidance to field collection elements also
underwent considerable improvement, and CIA initiated a conscientious effort
to reduce to the extent possible the tight controls on clandestinely acquired
information in order to provide wider dissemination to non-agency elements
co
cerned with terrorism. Some basic data base improvements also were made.
n
PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
National Security Decision Directive Number 30, dated 10 April 1982, in
addition to establishing a national-level mechanism for managing individual
terrorist incidents, specifically identifies the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, as the national-level
organization responsible for developing overall US policy with regard to
international terrorism.* The IG/T presently consists of representatives from
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Federal agencies with direct responsibility for anti-terrorism programs,
including the FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury and
Energy, the CIA, the FAA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NSC Staff and the
Vice President's office. The IG/T, in its policy development role, will be
addressing--inter alia--policy directives, organizational issues, legislative
initiatives, and interagency training programs. Moreover,. as the primary
mechanism within the US Government for planning and policy recommendations
regarding terrorism, the IG/T is also charged with ensuring the development of
an effective, coordinated interagency exercis ram geared to ensure
effective management of terrorist incidents. I
With regard to crisis management, the coordination of federal response to
terrorist incidents is the responsibility of that agency with the most direct
operational role in dealing with it. The lead agency will normally be either
the State Department, the FBI/Justice, or the FAA, depending respectively on
whether the incident takes place beyond or within US territory or involves a
highjacking within the special jurisdiction of the US. NSDD-30 also
establishes the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG). Although the wording
in NSDD-30 is vague in some respects with regard to the TIWG, it apparently
will be activated under NSC auspices during especially grave incidents to
support the Special Situation Group (SSG) when the latter is convened at the
direction of the Vice President. The White House Operations Group (WHOG),
chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office, will have
responsibility for issues relating to threats or acts of terrorism directed
against the President, the Vice President or nior US officials and
protectees as directed by the President. I 25X1
Within the Intelligence Community, the DCI recently established an
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) to focus and coordinate
Intelligence Community efforts to counter the terrorist threat. Chaired by
CIA, the Committee includes representatives from the Department of State, the
Secret Service, the FBI, DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force. The chairman
has been representing CIA at IG/T sessions and presumably will continue to do
so, although this relationship is not identified in NSDD-30. The IICT will
also provide intelligence support to the TIWG and the SSG and, presumably, to
the WHOG, although the latter relationship may be via either the TIWG or the
IG/T. The Committee, cited specifically in NSDD-30 as the element responsible
for focusing and coordinating interagency intelligence efforts to counter
terrorist threats, is to concentrate on threat alerts, usessments, and
required procedural improvements within the Community. 25X1
There have also been unilateral efforts within the Community,
particularly among the major intelligence collectors and producers, to better
focus individual departmental efforts against international terrorism. For
example, within CIA's Directorate of Operati (CIA/DDO). the
Counterterrorism Group is being restructured 25X1
The Chief of the Counterterrorism roup is currently
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Chairman of the aforementioned Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism. Similarly, CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (CIA/DDI) has focused
its analytic effort in an Instability and Insurgency Center. Plans are now
under way to collocate the DDI and DDO elements to optimize the coordination
of terrorism-related collection and analysis within CIA. NSA also employs a
single organization--to be upgraded to office level--to coordinate its SIGINT
efforts against the problem, and DIA has established a dedicated effort,
principally to support the multi-service Counter-Terrorist Joint-Task Force.
The Terrorism Section within the FBI's Criminal Investigation Division
orchestrates the Bureau's counterintelligence efforts with regard to
international terrorism and provides representatives to pertinent Intelligence
Community fora. Efforts elsewhere in the Community are less structured and
intense. State/INR currently has one analyst covering international terrorism
who draws on the expertise of INR regional analysts. Individual country
analysts also follow carefully terrorist activities in their areas of
responsibility. In addition, INR has designated a Special Coordinator for
Intelligence on International Terrorism who will report to INR's Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Assessments and Research. The Services' efforts
against the problem focus predominantly on departmental counterintelligence
and physical security concerns. The Departments of Treasur y are
primarily consumers of the Intelligence Community product.
The recent establishment by the DCI of the Interagency Intelligence
Committee on Terrorism fills a long-standing need for a Community coordinating
body to link together the diverse Community interests concerning international
terrorism, and should pave the way for a concerted effort to develop more
efficient and effective internal Community operating procedures with regard to
the terrorism problem. Until the recent promulgation of NSDD-30, there was
considerable potential for Committee deliberations in this regard to have been
conducted in a vacuum. The IG/T, which for some time has been the principal
national-level organization the Community could look to for specific guidance
with regard to its efforts against international terrorism, had no apparent
authority prior to NSDD-30 to establish overall government policy or programs
relating to the problem that would tie together the intelligence and non-
intelligence efforts and provide a baseline against which the Intelligence
Community might better structure both its short- and long-term efforts. Thus,
until now, the Community, in the absence of any firm direction based on
policy, has been left to its own devices to focus its efforts and structure
its counterterrorism intelligence support mechanism. With the charter
provided the IG/T in NSDD-30, and assuming that there will be a continuing
dialogue between IICT and the IG/T there is now considerable potential for
alleviating this situation.[ I
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 SUBJECT: Proposals for Upgrading Intelligence Community Efforts Directed
Against International Terrorism
Distribution
Copy 1 - DDCI
2 - CIA
3 - NSA
4 - State (Kuser)
5 - NSC (DeGraffenreid)
8 - Army/ACS (boss)
6 - DIA/DC-3
7 - DIA/OS1
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9 - Army/ITAC (Wylie)
10 - Navy/NIS (Watson)
11 - AF/INT (Barger)
12 - HQ/USAF/OSI (Banker)
13 - USMC (Greisen)
14 - DOJ/OIPR (Cinquegrana)
15 - Treasury (Dana)
16 - DOE/Semiritv Sion (Ritchie)
17 - SAFSS
18 - OHC (miner)
19 - OSC (Berghoff)
20 - OICE (Schadegg)
21 - FBI (L'Allier)
22 - State/INR (Fitzpatrick)
23 - NSC (North)
24 - Army/ITAC (Dehmelt)
25 - Army/ITAC (Mortensen)
26 - OP (Schmitt)
27 - OP (Alexakos)
28 - OP Chrono
29 - ICS Registry
DCI/ICS/OP
(21 April 1982)