INDICATION AND WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP
(Name. office symbol, room number,
building. Agency/Post)
ICS Recistry
Initials
Date
2.
2.
4.
ss.
on
File
Note and Return
roval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
Requested
For Correction
Prepare Reply
irculate
formation
For Your In
See Me
omment
e
investigate
Signature
Coordination
Just!
00 NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals.
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
Room No.-Bldg.
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
P"Mrrib~d bY GSA
FPMR (41 CFR3 101-11.206
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
LO E
DCI/ICS 82-3923 i /
27 September 1982
Acting Director, Office of Assessment and Evaluation
Office of Assessment and Evaluation
SUBJECT: Indication and Warning
1. You asked if there was something we -- the IC Staff and OA&E in
particular -- might profitably be doing in the field of I&W. My answer is
yes. Let me amplify with a few of my personal observations about the
intelligence business.
2. I believe the production community, of which I&W is a part, suffers
from over-specialization. That proverbial little old lady in tennis shoes who
has spent her entire career on the esoterica of South Pacific ports, really
does exist. In some respects she is probably better informed on maritime
matters in the target country than indigenous authorities. But developing
that intense expertise has cost her an understanding of the broader aspects of
political, economic and military matters. She cannot see warning implications
because such matters are usually rooted in military, political or economic
considerations. In varying degrees, that same problem obtains throughout the
production community. Indeed, our various career development and promotion
systems stress depth, not breadth.
3. The price for overspecialization is exacted in the timeliness of the
intelligence process. If we had to rely on standard intelligence techniques
to perceive and correlate indications of a Warsaw Pact attack, the Soviets
might well be in Brussels before we were on the wire to NATO. We therefore
have created elements variously called I&W centers, alert centers, ops
centers, fusion centers, warning staffs, etc., which are intended to handle
these faster developing situations. Their purpose is to filter out of the
mass of incoming information those bits of information that are "indicative",
correlate them with related data, infer conclusions, and warn U.S. decision
makers of developing threats in sufficient time for meaningful counteraction.
4. I&W centers differ from the Production Community at large in that
their personnel are specialized along a different plane. They emphasize
breadth of knowledge rather than depth. Each analyst covers a vast geographic
and subject area, e.g., all political and military affairs in the Middle East
and Africa. Of course, one cannot be a very discerning observer of events of
CONFIDENTIAL.
1
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
 LUI1rIUtNI1HL
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
SUBJECT: Indication and Warning
that scope. As a result, I&W analysts tend to be "underspecialized" just as
conventional production analysts are overspecialized. An example of the
practical impact is seen in the Mayaguez situation. Its seizure was preceded
by ample indicators, but no I&W analyst recognized them. The more specialized
analysts who might have recognized the abnormality did not get involved until
too late.
5. Of course, a lot of effort goes into equipping the I&W analyst to be
a more discriminating observer. Indicator lists, contingency collection sets,
abnormal activity thresholds, etc., are all tools intended to enable the I&W
analyst to take advantage of the greater expertise of more specialized
analysts. These tools have a significant drawback, however. They can be
employed only for situations we can anticipate. For example, we can decompose
a Soviet mobilization scenario -- a foreseeable possibility -- into discrete
events, and then infer indicator lists for each of those events. But how can
you draw up an indicator list for an event you don't anticipate? As Richard
Betts ably points out, you cannot, by definition, anticipate surprise.
6. You might conceive of the I&W mission therefore as dealing with a
spectrum of events ranging from readily apparent contingencies such as set-
piece military threats, to matters we simply cannot foresee such as
spontaneous border clashs or palace coups. The effectiveness with which I&W
centers can prepare for these events varies directly with their relative
"expectability". The centers are geared up for early detection of a Warsaw
Pact attack, but have to "wing it" on matters which arise abruptly in the
Third World.
7. Hence, I&W's prime problem is dealing with the latter category. Our
dilemma seems to be that conventional Community analysts seems able to
recognize fine grain indicators but are not properly organized to correlate
and assemble them into a coherent, timely warning. I&W analysts, on the other
hand are spread too thin and, unless aided by indicator lists or other such
aids, can only recognize the most obvious of indicators.
8. Is there a solution? Certainly not a total one because advantage
will always accrue to the engineer of surprise. But I believe measures are
possible to improve warning performance. Our thrust should be to improve
communications, foster Community interdependence, and contrive to focus all
available information and talent on a given problem as it develops.
9. One specific prescription might be to create a widespread analyst-to-
analyst communication system, perhaps incorporating a "bulletin board"
concept. For example, an analyst who sees something -- anything -- which he
suspects may have warning significance, would simply forward a capsule summary
of his concerns via a communication terminal to an electronic bulletin
board. Other analysts, similarly equipped with communication terminals, would
be able to read the bulletin. board, respond directly, amplify, or take other
appropriate actions. The system would be inexpensive, yet have the capability
to surface isolated anomalies and focus Community attention on them.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
SUBJECT: Indication and Warning
10. Naturally, this would have to be accompanied by a different
organizational approach to I&W -- a "holistic" approach, to borrow a term from
medicine. It would stand in marked contrast to those who would develop an
impressive new National Alert Center with its own computer support, data
bases, dedicated communication nets, etc. My approach would be to create a
"Wired Community", to paraphase the James Martin title, which could network
together existing Community elements which might contribute to a warning
situation. We would create a specialized task force, physically dispersed but
electronically co-located, for each warning situation. That electronic task
force would contain all the requisite talent and information for the problem
at hand, and serve as a base for follow-on crisis management, should that
prove necessary.
11. As to OA&E's role in this matter, I would think we would articulate
the concept, demonstrate its potential contribution, foster a consensus for
its need, and generally act as Community sponsor.
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
 Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6
Approved For Release 2007/06/14: CIA-RDP84M00395R000800160001-6