DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982

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CREST

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General CIA Records

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2

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RIFPUB

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204

Document Creation Date:

December 20, 2016

Document Release Date:

October 15, 2007

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Case Number:

Publication Date:

April 27, 1981

Content Type:

REPORT

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CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2.pdf	12.23 MB

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Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Calendar No. 79 97TH CONGRESS 18t Session } SENATE { REPORT No. 97-58 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982 REPORT:. [To'accompany S. 815]. TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS AND MINORITY VIEWS COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE MAY 6 (legislative day. APRIL 27, 1981.-Ordered to be printed AUTHORIZING: APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR' 1982, FOR PROCUREMENT,', OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL AL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER WEAP- ONS, FOR RESEARCH;/DEVELOPMENT, TEST,,'AND-EVALUA- TION, AND FOR : OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE . FOR THE ARMED FORCES,' FOR- CIVIL DEFENSE,. TO. PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE DUTY COMPONE\Tl.AIND. THE.SELECTED ..RESERVE OF EACH RESERVE COMPONENT. OF?!THE ARMED FORCES AND FOR CI- VILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TO AUTHORIZE THE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND FOR OTHER'"PURPOSES U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 76-2440 WASHINGTO) : 1981 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN TOWER, Texas, Chairman STROM THURMOND, South Carolina BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia GORDON J. HUMPHREY, New Hamsphira WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine ROGER W. JEPSEN, Iowa DAN QUAYLE, Indiana JEREMIAH DENTON, Alabama JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada HARRY F. BYRD, JR., Virginia SAM NUNN, Georgia GARY HART, Colorado J. JAMES EXON, Nebraska CARL LEVIN, Michigan RHETT B. DAWSON, Staff Director and Chief Cbun8d JAMES F. McGovERN, General Counsel WH.LIAM L. BALL III, Chief Clerk Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 CONTENTS Page Committee amendment in the form of a substitute_______________________ 2 Purpose of the bill---------------------------------------------------- 2 Overall budget impact of committee bill________________________________ 2 Summary of funds and manpower authorized in the Committee bill ------- 3 Summary of funds recommended for authorization______________________ 4 Summary of recommended manpower authorization_____________________ 5 Highlights of Committee Action : Procurement changes--------------------------------------------- 6 Research and development changes________________________________ 7 Operation and maintenance changes________________________________ 10 Active duty military and power changes____________________________ 11 Selected reserve military manpower changes________________________ 11 Civilian manpower changes_______________________________________ 11 Military training load changes____________________________________ 12 Attack related civil defense change_________________________________ 12 General provision changes________________________________________ 12 Summary of reports or studies requested___________________________ 14 Summary of program initiatives----------------------------------- 15 Organization of the Committee________________________________________ 17 National Security Perspectives : Budget perspectives---------------------------------------------- 18 Global perspectives----------------------------------------------- 23 Strategic force perspectives--------------------------------------- 30 Seapower perspectives-------------------------------------------- 31 Force projection perspectives______________________________________ 36 Tactical warfare perspectives_____________________________________ 36 Preparedness perspectives----------------------------------------- 43 Force manning perspectives_______________________________________ 46 Title I-Procurement------------------------------------------------- 49 Background on procurement authorization__________________________ 49 Summary of recommended funding changes_________________________ 49 Tactical fighter/attack aircraft____________________________________ 50 Committee recommendations for changes_______________________ 50 AH-1S attack helicopter__________________________________ 50 A-7K --------------------------------------------------- 50 F-18 ---------------------------------------------------- 50 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 50 AH-64 attack helicopter__________________________________ 50 A-6E --------------------------------------------------- 50 AV-88 ------------------------------------------------- 50 A-10 ---------------------------------------------------- 51 F-14 --------------------------------------------------- 51 F-15 ---------------------------------------------------- 51 F-16 ---------------------------------------------------- 51 Strategic aircraft------------------------------------------------- 51 Committee recommendations for changes ------------------------- 53 B-52 companion trainer aircraft-------------------------- 51 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 52 Multirole strategic bomber------------------------------- Patrol/reconnaissance/electronic warfare aircraft----------------- 53 'CommitteeCommittee recommendations for changes------------- 53 P-3C _ 53 Recommended for approval as requested_____________________ 53 SH-60B ------------------------------------------------- 53 EA-6B -------------------------------------------------- 54 TR-1 --------------------------------------------------- 54 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Title I-Procurement-Continued Page Airlift/tanker aircraft__----------------------------------------- 54 Committee recommendations for changes_______________________ 54 C-9 ----------------------------------------------------- 54 C-130H ------------------------------------------------- 54 Recommended for approval as requested____ 54 KC-10A ------------------------------------------------- 54 Utility/support/other aircraft ____------------------------------- 55 Committee recommendations for changes_______________________ 55 UH-60 utility helicopter__________________________________ 55 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 55 CH-53E ------------------------------------------------- 55 EC-130Q ------------------------------------------------ 55 Aircraft modifications____________________________________________ 56 Committee recommendations for changes______________________ 56 F-106 modifications-------------------------------------- 56 B-52 modifications_______________________________________ 56 P-3 tactical navigation modifications______________________ 56 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 57 C-5, C-141, and C-130 modifications_______________________ 57 Civil Reserve Air Fleet enhancement______________________ 57 Summary of aircraft procurement________________________________ 57 Missile procurement______________________________________________ 59 Air-to-air missiles________________________________________________ 59 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 59 AIM-7M ------------------------------------------------ 59 AIM-9L/M Sidewinder___________________________________ 60 AIM-54A/C Phoenix ------------------------------------- 60 Air-to-ground missiles____________________________________________ 60 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 60 AGM-88 Harm------------------------------------------- 60 Surface-to-air missiles____________________________________________ 60 Committee recommendations for changes______________________ 60 Patriot air defense system________________________________ 60 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 61 Roland air defense system_______________________________ 61 Stinger air defense missile________________________________ 61 Rapier air defense system________________________________ 61 Surface-to-surface missiles________________________________________ 61 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 61 TOW missile--------------------------------------------- 61 Multiple launch rocket system____________________________ 61 Harpoon missile------------------------------------------ 61 Strategic missile------------------------------------------------- 61 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 61 Trident I missile----------------------------------------- 61 Air-launched cruise missile_______________________________ 62 Ground-launched cruise missile___________________________ 62 MK-12A --------------------------------------------- 62. Space programs-------------------------------------------------- 63 Global positioning satellites___________________________________ 63 Summary of missile procurement__________________________________ 63 Navy ships, torpedoes, and other weapons__________________________ 65 Navy shipbuilding and conversion____________________________ 65 Navy torpedoes and related support equipment------------------ 66 Navy other weapons_________________________________________ 66 Summary of recommendations________________________________ 66 Committee recommendation for changes_______________________ 66 Ohio class fleet ballistic missile submarine________________ 66 Aircraft carrier reactivation (USS Ori8kany) -------------- 67 Battleship reactivation___________________________________ 67 FFG-7 guided missile frigate_____________________________ 68 Landing ship dock (LSD-41) ----------------------------- 69 Hospital ship (T-AH)------------------------------------- 69 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Title I-Procurement-Continued page Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 70 CVN aircraft carrier (nuclear)------- SSN-688 class submarine_________________________________ .70 Fast logistics ship (T-AKRX)_______--------------------- 70 Maritime prepositioning ship (T-AKX)---------------------- 71 Landing craft, air cushion (LCAC)________________________ 71 Auxiliary lighterage ship (T-ALS)----------------------- 71 Salvage ship (ARS) ------------------------------------- 71 Fleetoiler (T-AO) -----------------72 Combat stores ship (T-AFS)----------------------------- 72 Mine counter measures (MCM) ship---------- ________ 72 Mark-48 torpedo----`=------------------------------------ 72 Mark-60 captor mine___________ 72 Mark-67 submarine launched mobile mine__________________ 72 Summary of Navy ships, torpedoes, and other weapons__________ 73 Ground combat vehicles and other weapons --- 74 ------------------------ Tracked combat 'vehicles ----------------------------------------- 74 Recommended for approval as requested_______________________ 74 M-1 main battle tank_____--------------- ---------------- 74 Fighting vehicle system_________________ Light armored vehicle__- 76 -------------- -- LVT-7A1 amphibious assault vehicle_____________________ 77 Other weapons--------------------------------------- Recommended for approval as requested-----------------------77 Division air defense gun__________________________________ 77 Firing port weapon---------------------------- ---- 77 M-240 machine gun-------------------------------------- 77 Bushmaster --------------------------------------------- 77 M-198 howitzer--------------- 77 Summary of ground combat vehicles and weapons procurement------- 78 National Guard equipment initiatives______________________________ 80 Report on inventories of major weapons____________________________ 82 Title II-Research and Development___________________ ----------------------------------- 82 Background on research and development authorization_____________ 82 Summary of recommended funding changes________________________ 82 Army research and development : Ballistic missile defense_____________________________ 85 Standoff target acquisition system (SOTAS)___________________ 86 Hellfire missile--.-------------------------------------------- 86 Fire and forget hellfire missile________________________________ 86 Corps support weapons system-------------------------------- 87 Navy research and development___________________________________ 87 Materials technology_________________________________________ 87 Trident II missile ------ ------------------------------------- 87 Extremely low frequency communication system_______________ 88 Blue-green laser--------------------------------------------- S!) F-18 fighter/attack aircraft___________________________________ 89 V/TOL aircraft development__________________________________ 89 Medium range air-to-surface missile/imaging infrared harpoon___ &9 Air-to-air ground weapon (IR Maverick) ---------------------- 91 VTXTS ----------------------------------------------------- 91 Light weight armored vehicle_________________________________ 91 High horsepower engines_____________________________________ 92 LHDX (VSS) ----------------------------------------------- 93 Full medical support for amphibious assaults------------------ 93 DDGX design------------------------------------------------ 93 FFX design------------------------------------------------- 94 Advanced weapons concepts___________________________________ 94 Advanced non-nuclear naval engines (electric drive) ------------ 94 Attack submarine development________________________________ 95 Ship development (engineering)_______________________________ 95 Light carriers (new class carrier design) ----------------------- 95 Diesel-electric submarines_____________________________________ 97 Ships, submarines and boats technology________________________ 97 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Title II-Research and Development-Continued Page Battle group AAW coordination_______________________________ 98 Air anti-submarine warfare (ARAPAHO) --------------------- 98 ,Ship systems engineering standards (SEAMOD) ---------------- 98 Defensewide mission support__________________________________ 98 Air Force research and development : B-52 research and development________________________________ 98 F-106 simulators--------------------------------------------- 99 MX missile and basing mode__________________________________ 99 ICBM enhancement------------------------------------------- 101 C-x -------------------------------------------------------- 101 F-15 air-to-ground enhancements______________________________ 102 Next generation trainer_______________________________________ 103 Medium range air-to-surface missile___________________________ 103 Wide area anti-armor munitions (WAAM)_____________________ 103 Advance medium range air-to-air missile_______________________ 103 Utah testing and training range_______________________________ 103 Fighter engine development___________________________________ 103 Tactical command and control modernization___________________ 104 Defensewide mission support__________________________________ 104 Strategic command, control, and communications : PAVE PAWS------------------------------------------------ 106 Communications propogation through scintillation effects -------- 106 EMP hardening of critical facilities____________________________ 106 Post-attack command and control EMP hardening_______________ 106 Satellite coverage continuity__________________________________ 106 Multi-mission satellite communications_________________________ 106 Improved TACAMO------------------------------------------ 107 Very low frequency/low frequency improvements_______________ 107 Defense satellite program ground station power and cooling------ 107 Electrical power modernization________________________________ 107 Mobile ground terminal_______________________________________ 108 Emergency rocket communication system_______________________ 108 Distributed missile attack conference__________________________ 108 AFSATCOM secure voice_____________________________________ 108 Air field locators--------------------------------------------- 108 Survivable, enduring communications__________________________ 108 Defense agencies research and development_________________________ 108 High energy laser weapon_____________________________________ 108 Particle beam technology______________________________________ 109 Other research and development provisions_________________________ 110 Requirement for annual report and independent R. & D. and bid and proposal costs------------------------------------------ 110 Title III-Operation and Maintenance_________________________________ 111 Background on operation and maintenance authorization ------------ 11l Operation and maintenance budget summary_______________________ 111 Recommended program changes (Army) ----------------------- 111 Supply and depot maintenance____________________________ 113 Real property maintenance________________________________ 113 General purpose forces____________________________________ 113 Force modernization______________________________________ 113 Guard and reserve________________________________________ 114 Civilians ------------------------------------------------ 114 Recommended for approval as requested____________________________ 114 Training ---------------------------------------------------- 114 Recommended for approval as requested (Navy) -------------------- 114 Oriskany ---------------------------------------------------- 114 Civilians ---------------------------------------------------- 114 Ship overhauls----------------------------------------------- 114 Aircraft maintenance_________________________________________ 114 Steaming days----------------------------------------------- 114 Flying hours------------------------------------------------- 115 Recommended program changes (Marine Corps)____________________ 115 General observations-budget planning and economic assumptions____ 116 Recommended program changes_______________________________ 115 Civilians ------------------------------------------------ 115 Strategic Command, Control, and Communications-___--__-- 115 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Title III-Operations and Maintenance-'Continued Page Recommended for approval as requested (Air Force) ---------------- 115 Flying hours------------------------------------------------- 115 Depot maintenance------------------------------------------- 11.1 Training ---------------------------------------------------- 116 Recommended program changes (Defense Agencies) ---------------- 116 Other committee recommendations---------------------------- 117 0. & M. reporting requirements--------------------------- 117 Authorization of O. & M. by component-------------------- 118 Authorization of other procurement and ammunition 118 Title IV-Active Force----------------------------- -------- 119 Background and active forces authorization------------------------ 119 Committee considerations----------------------------------------- 119 Committee recommendations-------------------------------------- 120 Army manpower--------------------------------------------- 121 Navy manpower--------------------------------------------- 121 Marine Corps manpower-------------------------------------- 122 Air Force manpower----------------------------------------- 122 Military manpower requirements report----------------------- 123 Quality of military personnel--------------------------------- 123 Title V-Reserve Forces---------------------------------------------- 125 Background on reserve personnel authorization--------------------- 125 Committee recommendations-------------------------------------- 125 Selected reserve manpower strength--------------------------- 125 Full time reserve manpower---------------------------------- 125 Trained manpower for mobilization--------------------------- 126 Title VI-Civilian Personnel------------------------------------------ 129 Background on civilian personnel authorization-------------------- 129 Categories of civilians included in the bill-------------------------- 129 Committee considerations---------------------------------------- 129 Committee recommendations-------------------------------------- 130 Committee recommendations by service components----------------- 130 Army civilian manpower------------------------------------- 130 Navy/Marine Corps civilian manpower ------------------------ 131 Air Force civilian manpower---------------------------------- 131 Defense Agencies civilian manpower--------------------------- 132 Authority to exceed civilian end strength----------------------- 132 Air National Guard conversion to full-time military manning_-__ 132 Contracting out proposals involving less than 50 Department of of Defense personnel--------------------------------------- 133 Title VII-Military Training Student Loans---------------------------- 134 Background on military training student loads authorization-----_-- 134 Committee recommendations-------------------------------------- 134 Separate authorization for one station unit training--------------- 135 Title VIII-Attack Related Civil Defense----------------------------- 136 Background on civil defense authorization------------------------- 136 Committee recommendations-------------------------------------- 136 Reduction of $4 million from Federal Emergency Management Agency ------------------------------------------------------- 136 Reduction of $2 million from emergency operating centers ----------- 136 Revision to statutory language concerning personnel administrative expenses ------------------------------------------------------ 136 DOD and NSC oversight of civil defense---------------------------- 137 Title IX-General Provisions----------------------------------------- 138 Sec. 902. Report on allied contributions to the common defense------ 138 Sec. 903. Authorization of other procurement and ammunition-------- 138 Sec. 904. Repeal of profit limitations on contracts for aircraft and Naval vessels-------------------------------------------------- 139 Sec. 905. Multiyear contracts involving the Department of Defense-- 140 Sec. 906. Prohibition on use of funds to relieve economic dislocations-_ 141 Sec. 907. Procurement of automatic data processing equipment------ 142 Sec. 908. Requirements relating to sole-source contracts------------ 144 Sec. 909. Contingent once-a-year adjustment of retired and re- tainer pay----------------------------------------------------- 144 Sec. 910. Requirement for reduction in senior grade civilian employ- ees of Department of Defense---------------------------------- 145 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 'Title IX-General Provisions-Continued Sec. 911. Department of Defense civilian personnel management con- straints ------------------------------------------------------- Sec. 912. Liability of the United States in tort for actions of National Guard members------------------------------------------------ Sec. 914. Requirement for annual report on National Guard and re- serve component equipment_____________________________________ Sec. 915. Authorization of military cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials ____________________________________________ Sec. 916. Enforcement of Selected Service System registration_______ Requirement for reduction in number of General and Flag Officers_______ Departmental recommendation________________________________________ Committee action---------------------------------------------------- Fiscal data---------------------------------------------------------- Congressional Budget Office cost estimates on authorization bill_________ Relationship of annual authorization to Department of Defense regula- tions - -- -- - -- --- -- -- -- -- - -- -------- -- - Regulatory impact--------------------------------------------------- Changes in existing law______________________________________________ Additional views of Mr. Hart_________________________________ Minority views of Mr. Levin__________________________________________ 148 149 151 153 163 163 1615 III 174 175 188 191 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Calendar No. 79 97TH CONGRESS I SENATE REPORT 1st Session No. 97-58 AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982, FOR PRO- CUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER WEAPONS, FOR RE- SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, FOR OPER- ATION AND MAINTENANCE FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR CIVIL DEFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE DUTY COMPONENT AND THE SE- LECTED RESERVE OF EACH RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES AND FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,- TO AUTHORIZE THE MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES MAY 6 (legislative day, APRIL 27, 1981.-Ordered to be printed Mr. TOWER, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the following REPORT together with ADDITIONAI. VIEWS and MINORITY VIEWS [To accompany S. 815] The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill (S. 815) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1982 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation, and operation and maintenance for the Armed Forces, for civil defense, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and the military train- ing student loads, and for other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon. with an amendment in the nature of a sub- stitute to the text of the bill and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 COMMITTEE AMENDMENT IN THE FORM OF A SUBSTITUTE The committee amended the bill by striking all after the enacting clause and substitutini a new bill reflecting changes as recommended by the Committee on Armed Services. PURPOSE OF THE BILL This bill would for fiscal year 1982: (1) authorize appropriations for (a) major procurement, (b) research, development, test and evaluation by the Department of Defense, (c) operations and maintenance, and (d) civil defense; (2) authorize the personnel end strength for each military active duty component of the Armed Forces; (3) authorize the personnel average strengths for the Selected Reserve of each of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces; (4) authorize civilian end strengths for each military depart- ment of the Department of Defense; (5) authorize the annual average military training student load for each of the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces; (6) impose certain reporting requirements; (7) impose certain limitations with regard to specific procure- ment and R.D.T. & E. actions and manpower strengths; provide certain additional legislative authority, make certain changes to existing law, and for other purposes. OVERALL BUDGET IMPACT OF COMMITTEE BILL The revised budget request for the National Defense function of the Federal budget for fiscal year 1982 is for $226.3 billion in budget authority. Of this total, $136.491 billion is requested for authorization of funds for procurement, research and development, operation and maintenance, and civil defense. The bill as reported by the committee includes a recommended amount of $136.521 billion for procurement, research and develop- ment, operation and maintenance, and civil defense, an increase of $29.9 million above the President's request. Changes in manpower strengths recommended in the bill will result in a decrease of $47.0 million below the President's request. The net impact of the bill is, therefore, $17.1 million below the President's request. Funds authorized for procurement, RDT&E, operation and maintenance, Millions and civil defense------------------------------------------------- -$29.9 Fund impact of manpower authorization--------------------------- -47.0 Total budget impact------------------------------------------ -17.1 An overall summary of the funding and manpower provisions of the bill are as follows : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 I Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 1982 March Committee 1981 authorization r amended request Change from request recommenda- tion Procurement_______________________________________ $35,770 $51,751 $-47 $51,704 R.D.T. & E_________________________________________ 16,888 21,324 -210 21,114 Operation and maintenance___________________________ (a) 63,283 +293 63,576 Civil defense_______________________________________ 120 133 -6 127 Manpower (in thousands): Active duty_____________________________________ 2,065.4 2,119.9 -5.3 2,114.6 Selected Reserve________________________________ 861.7 926.4 0 926.4 Civilian________________________________________ 986.0 1,024.9 -.7 1,024.2 r Does not include Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for fiscal year 1981, for procurement and R.D.T. & E. in the amount of $2,958,594,000 and for manpower totaling 37,900. 2 Prior to fiscal year 1982, authorization for operation and maintenance was not required. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 SUMMARY OF FUNDS RECOMMENDED FOR AUTHORIZATION [Dollar amounts in thousands; years are fiscal years[ revised 1 1982 Marc' Change current January amended from Recommenda- program request request request tion Procurement: Aircraft: Army________________________ $1,204,400 $1,361,700 $1,797,400 +$39, 300 $1 836 700 Navy and Marine Corps________ 6,254,307 6,960,300 9,352,500 -20,800 , , 9 331 700 Air Force_____________________ 10, 390, 768 9,469,900 14, 751, 898 +318,900 , , 15, 070, 798 Missiles: Army________________________ 1,546,800 1,650,500 2,842,500 -373,400 2,469 100 Navy________________________ 2,221,806 2,229,500 2,555,000 -------------- , 2 555 000 Marine Corps_________________ 102,289 88,200 223,024 _____ , , 223 024 Air Force_____________________ 3,350,286 4, 274, 600 4,658,246 x-60, 500 , 4,718,746 Subtotal___________________ 7,221,181 8,242,800 10,278,770 -312,900 9,965,870 Naval vessels_____________________ 7,801,300 6,639,600 10,290,100 -171,500 10,118,600 Tracked combat vehicles: Army________________________ 3.072.000 2,395 Orin 3 e97 ann +5n nnn Subtotal___________________ 3,129,929 2,676,000 3,769,039 Torpedoes: Navy__________________ 322,859 283,000 516,600 -------------- 516,600 Other weapons: Army________________________ 306,200 324,800 655,400 -------------- 655,400 Navy________________________ 193,467 205,300 200,200 -------------- 200,200 Marine Corps_________________ 42,149 56,900 136,344 -------------- 136,344 Air Force------------------------------------------------- 3,047 -------------- 3,047 Subtotal___________________ Army National Gnard equipment ---------------------------------------------- Research, development, evaluation: test, and 200 Army---------------------------- 3,166,257 3,577 3 905 200 -12 100 893 100 3 , Navy---------------------------- 25,042,009 35,869,371 , , 36 086 371 , +68 630 , , 26 155 001 Air Force_______________________7,106,711 8,669 400 , , 9 398 100 , -268 000 , , 130 100 9 , Defense agencies----------------- 1,295,602 1,674,800 , , 1,881,400 , +1,150 , , 1,882,550 Director, test, and evaluation-------- 42,100 53,000 53,000 -------------- 53,000 Operation and Maintenance:4 Army-------------------------------------------------------- N 17, 214, 300 +276,000 17, 490, 300 avy ----------------------------------------------- Air Force 21, 918, 049 +11,900 21, 929, 949 Defense agencies--------------------------------------------- 19249, 340 4:901,351 +25,080 -19,800 19, 274, 420 4,881,551 Total, operation and mainte- Total procurement, R.D.T. & E. and operation and maintenance- 53, 519, 239 117, 556, 071 136, 358, 409 +35,860 136, 394, 269 I Does not reflect congressional action on the Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for procurement and R.D.T. & E. for fiscal year 1981, in the amount of $2,958,594,000. 2Includes $2,760,000 in special foreign currency. ' Includes $3,083,000 in special foreign currency. 4 Prior to fiscal year 1982, authorization for operation and maintenance was not required. s The operation and maintenance request in the January submission was stated only as a total amount for the Depart- ment of Defense. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION The table below shows the changes from the requested strengths for each active, reserve, and civilian component recommended by the committee : ACTIVE DUTY MANPOWER, FISCAL YEAR 1982 [End strengths in thousands] Army Nevy --------------------------------------------------- Marine Corps----------------------------------------------- Air Force--------------------------------------------------- Total----------------------- March amended Committee rec- request, ommendation, Change from fiscal year 1982 fiscal year 1982 request 786.3 785.8 -0.5 554.7 554.3 -.4 192.1 192.1 0 586.8 582.4 -4.4 2,119.9 2,114.6 -5.3 SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1982 [Average strengths in thousands] March amended request, fiscal year 1982 Committee rec- ommendation fiscal year 1981 Change from request Army National Guard---------------------------------------- 392.8 392.8 Army Reserve--------------------------------------------- 235.3 235.3 Naval Reserve---------------------------------------------- 87.6 87.6 Marine Corps Reserve--------------------------------------- 37.6 37.6 Air National Guard------------------------------------------ 98.6 98.6 Air Force Reserve------------------------------------------- 62.8 62.8 Coast Guard Reserve---------------------------------------- 11.7 11.7 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1982 [End strengths in thousands] March amended request fiscal year 198 Committee rec- ommendation fiscal year 198 Change from request Army------------------------------------------------------ 381.7 381.2 5 - Navy/Marine Corps------------------------------------------ 313.0 312.6 . -.4 Air Force --------------------------------------------------- 247.4 249.0 +1.6 Defense agencies-------------------------------------------- 82.8 81.4 -1.4 Total ------------------------------------------------ 1,024.9 1,024.2 -.7 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 HIGHLIGHTS OF COMMITTEE ACTION The committee recommends a total of $136.5 billion to be author- ized for procurement, research and development, operation and main- tenance, and civil defense for the 1982 fiscal year. The amount recommended is an increase of $30 million to the request. Addition of 20 Army AH-IS Helicopters Addition of $64.4 million to procure 20 AH-1S attack helicopters. Reduction in Funds for Blackhawk Helicopters Reduction of $25.1 million for procurement of Blackhawk heli- copters. Deletion of 5 Navy F-18 Fighter Aircraft Reduction of $147.1 million to procure 58 rather than 63 F-18 fighter aircraft. Addition of 12 Navy C-9 Aircraft Addition of $50 million for procurement of 12 C-9 aircraft available as excess from commercial airlines. Addition of 2 P-3C Aircraft Addition of $46 million for procurement of 2 P-3C ASV patrol aircraft. Addition of 12 Air Force A-7K Aircraft Addition of $163.8 million for procurement of 12 A-7K combat trainer aircraft. Addition of 12 Air Force C-130 Aircraft Addition of $172 million for procurement of 12 C-130 transport aircraft. Reduction in Advance Procurement Funds and Bill Language . for B-52 Companion Trainer Aircraft Reduction of $2.9 million for advance procurement for B-52 Com- panion Trainer Aircraft and restriction on expenditure of program funds until source selection decision has been submitted to the Congress. Reduction in Funds for Modification of F-106 Interceptors Reduction of $15.6 million for modification of F-106 interceptors. Reduction in Funds for Modification of B-52 Aircraft Reduction of $12.1 million for modification of B-52 aircraft. Addition of Funds for Procurement of Mark-12A Warheads Addition of ' $53.7 million to begin procurement of 510 Mark-12A warheads for the retrofitting:- of-- Minuteman III missiles. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Reduction in Funds for Patriot Missile System Reduction of $373.4 million for procurement of the Patriot air de- fense missile system. Reduction in Funds for an Ohio-class Submarine Reduction of $985.8 million for procurement of the tenth Ohio-class Trident submarine. Retains $75 million in additional long-lead funds. Addition in Long-Lead Funds for the Eleventh Ohio-class Submarine Addition of $35 million in long-lead funding for the eleventh Ohio- class Trident submarine. Deletion of Funds for Reactivation of USS Oriskany Reduction of $364 million in procurement to reactivate USS Oris- kany (CV-34) aircraft carrier. Addition of Funds for Reactivation of USS New Jersey Addition of $79 million to fund fully reactivation of TJSS New Jersey (BB-62) battleship. Addition of Funds for FFG-7 Class Frigates Addition of $700 million to procure three additional FFG-7 class frigates. Addition of Funds for LSD-41 Class Dock Landing Ships Addition of $301 million to procure one LSD-41 in fiscal year 1982 and the addition of $73.3 million in advance procurement to support construction of two LSD-41's in fiscal year 1983. Deletion of Funding for a Hospital Ship (T-AH) Conversion Deletion of $10 million requested for advance procurement to con- vert the SS United States to a hospital ship. Addition of Funds for Fighting Vehicle System Addition of $50.0 million to evaluate a second source producer for the Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Addition of Funds for Army National Guard Addition of $50 million for Army National Guard equipment pro- curement. Addition of Funds for Procurement Relating to Strategic Com- mand, Control and Communications Addition of $20.3 million in support of procurement initiatives re- lating to strategic command, control and communications. RESEARCH AND. DEVELOPMENT CHANGES Addition of R. & D. Funds for Materials Technology Addition of $2 million for development of Navy materials tech- nology. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Strategic Technology Addition of $2 million for research on carbon-carbon materials by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 8 Reduction of R. & D. Funds for Experimental Evaluation Reduction of $8 million in DARPA program for experimental evalu- ation of major innovative technology. Reduction of R. & D. Funds for Strategic Technology Reduction of $10 million in DARPA strategic technology programs. Reduction of R. & D. Funds in Materials Processing Technology Reduction of $3 million for DARPA materials processing technol- ogy. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Blue-Green Laser Addition of $20 million for DARPA blue-green laser initiatives in strategic technology. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Advanced Non-Nuclear Engine Designs Addition of $5 million to support hardware demonstrations of advanced non-nuclear ship propulsion designs. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Strategic Command, Control and Communications Research and Development Addition of $82.45 million for research and development initiatives relating to strategic command, control and communications systems. Reduction in R. & D. Funds for Advanced Warning Systems Reduction of $2.4 million for advanced warning systems. Reduction in R. & D. Funds for Testing of B-52 Aircraft Reduction of $16.6 million for EMP testing of B-52 intercontinental bombers. Addition of R. & D. Funds for V/STOL Aircraft Research Addition of $10 million to continue component testing of the AV- 8B + concept. Addition of R. & D. Funds for F-18 Addition of $51.5 million for F-18 research and development. Reduction of R. & D. Funds for F-15 Air-to-Ground Enhance- ments Reduction of $27.3 million for F-15 air-to-ground enhancements. Retains $5 million. Reduction of R. & D. Funds for C-X Aircraft Reduction of $244.7 million for full-scale development of C-X airlift aircraft. Retains $1.0 million. Deletion of R. & D. Funds for Navy Infra-Red Maverick Program Deletion of $19.7 million requested for Navy development of IR Maverick. Navy peculiar requirements are to be developed under Air Force IR Maverick program. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Air Force IR Maverick Addition of $17 million to Air Force IR Maverick program for development of Navy peculiar requirements, Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Reduction of R. & D. Funds for Navy Medium Range Air-to- Surface Missile (MRASM) Reduction of $19.1 million for the Navy's MRASM program. Addition of R. & D. Funds for PR HARPOON Addition of $38 million for development of an 12R seeker for the Harpoon missile. Restoration of R. & D. Funds for Weaponizing (Prototype) Restoration of $2.044 million for Weaponizing (Prototype). Reduction of R. & D. Funds for Ship Development (Engineering) Reduction of $22.8 million in ship contract design R. & D. for ships that have been deleted by the committee or are undefined. Reduction of R. & D. Funds for Advanced Submarine Develop- ment Reduction of $13.771 million for future and follow-on attack sub- marine development. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Diesel-Electric Submarine Re- search Addition of $5 million for research into conventional submarine design and basic propulsion component technology. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Light Carrier Designs Addition of $23 million to continue design and component work on a new class aircraft carrier. Reduction of R. & D. Funds for FFX Advanced Frigate Design Reduction of all but $1 million requested for design of FFX class advanced frigate. Addition of R. & D. Funds for LHDX (VSS) Amphibious As- sault Ship Design Addition of $4.0 million for preliminary design of a new amphibious assault ship, LHDX (VSS), incorporating enhanced V/STOL sup- port capabilities. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Anti-Submarine Warfare (ARAPAHO) Addition of $3 million for continued research on the ARAPAHO concept of containerized ASW support for merchant ships. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Ship Systems Engineering (SEAMOD) Addition of $8 million for continued research into the integration of modular system concepts into Navy ships. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Battle Group Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (BGAA WC) Addition of $10.6 million to continue research in Battle Group AAW Coordination. Addition of R. & D. Funds for High Horsepower Engine Addition of $9.46 million for Marine Corps development of high horsepower. engines for advanced combat vehicles. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Reduction in R. & D. Funding of the Army's Mobile Protected Gun (Far-term) Reduction of $17.8 million in the Army's Mobile Protected Gun (Far-term) R. & D. program. Reduction of Navy R. & D. Funds (Undistributed) Undistributed reduction of $19 million in overall Navy R. & D. programs. Addition of R. & D. Funds for Full Medical Support for Am- phibious Assaults Addition of $1.0 million to study alternative programs to provide full medical support for amphibious assaults. Reduction of Navy Defense-wide Mission Support R. & D. Funds (Undistributed) Undistributed reduction of $23 million in Navy Defense-wide mis- sion support R. & D. programs. Reduction in R. & D. Funds for F-106 Interceptor Simulators Reduction of $9.6 million for F-106 simulator development. Reduction of R. & D. Funds for Utah Test Range Reduction of $10 million for range facilities expansion. Reduction of Air Force Defense-wide Mission Support R. & D. Funds (Undistributed) Undistributed reduction of $23 million in Air Force Defense-wide mission support R. & D. programs. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE CHANGES Addition of O. & M. Funds for Army Real Property Maintenance Addition of $100 million for Army real property maintenance to reduce the current backlog of maintenance and repair. Addition of O. & M. Funds for Army Depot Maintenance and Supply Activities Addition of $143 million for Army maintenance, industrial pre- paredness, and transportation activities. Addition of O. & M. Funds for the Army Guard and Reserve Addition of $40 million for procurement of organizational clothing and equipment. Reduction of O. & M. Funds for the USS Oriskany Reduction of $8 million associated with reactivation of the Oriskany air wing. Addition of O. & M. Funds for the Marine Corps Addition of $24.7 million for real property maintenance, medical and dental supplies, and a repair program for tracked vehicles. Additional O. & M. Funds for the Air Force Addition. of $25.08 : mil. lion for additional civilians and in support of strategic command, control, and..communications.,initiatives. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Reduction of O. & M. Funds for Defense Agencies Reduction of $19.8 million for civilian support and efficiencies. Denial of the Request for Repeal of the Annual O. & M. Report Requirement The committee denied DoD's request that the requirement for an annual O. & M. report be repealed. Flexibility to the Appropriations Committee The committee authorized the Appropriations Committee to make other O. & M. appropriations, above the amount authorized in this bill, as necessary to meet unbudgeted inflation and fuel cost increases. ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY MANPOWER CHANGES Army Decrease of 500 in various management and operational headquar- ters below the requested end strength of 786,300. Navy Decrease of 400 in various management and operational headquar- ters below the requested end strength of 554,700. Marine Corps Approval of the requested end strength of 192,100. Air Force Decrease of 4,400 from the requested end strength of 586,800, includ- ing 3,400 military personnel positions which are to be converted to civilian positions, 700 in the medical support area, and 300 in training associated with the requested increase in medical support. Restriction on the Number of Recruits Without High School Diplomas Approval of an amendment that renews for fiscal year 1982 the re- quirement that at least 65 percent of new Army male recruits be high school graduates. SELECTED RESERVE MILITARY MANPOWER CHANGES Reserve Component Strengths Approval of the requested levels for Selected Reserve manpower of all the Reserve components. Full-Time Reserve Manpower Approval for all service components of the requested levels of full- time active duty Reserves who support the Reserve forces. CIVILIAN MANPOWER CHANGES Army Decrease of 500 in various management and operational headquar- ters from the requested end strength of 381,700. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Navy/Marine Corps Decrease of .400 in various Navy management and operational-head- quarters from the requested end strength of 313,000. Air Force Net addition of 1,600 to the requested end strength of 247,400, includ- ing an increase of 2,200 for civilian functions formerly performed by military personnel, a decrease of 300 from the Foreign Military Sales program, and a decrease of 300 from commissary positions. Defense Agencies . Decrease of 1,400 from the requested end strength of 82,800, includ- ing a-reduction of 1,000 for overhead in the Office of the Secretary of Defense-and a decrease of 400 in various management and operational headquarters. Contracting Out Proposals Approval of an amendment that exempts contracting out proposals involving functions of less than 50 Defense Department personnel from several reporting requirements. Training Load Levels Approval of the requested training loads, except for an increase of 647 for the Air National Guard and an amendment to provide a sep- arate authorized training load to be used solely for Army One Station Unit Training. Authorizes $126.842 million for attack-related civil defense pro- gram, a reduction of $6 million. GENERAL PROVISION CHANGES Restriction of Funds for Long-Range Combat Aircraft Restricts the use of funds for the full-scale engineering develop- mentor procurement of a long-range combat aircraft until the Presi- dent -submits a written report to the Congress containing his decision on a specific program for the development or procurement of a long- range combat aircraft and the Secretary of Defense submits a written report justifying the President's decision. Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense Requires a report by the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which non-U.S. NATO nations and Japan. have assumed fair and equitable shares of the mutual defense burdens. Authorization of Other Procurement and Ammunition Requires authorization of Other Procurement and Ammunition ac- counts beginning in fiscal year 1983. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Increase in the Contract Cancellation Ceiling of Multiyear Procurement Contracts Increases the contract cancellation ceiling imposed on multiyear contracts by section 810 of the Department of Defense Appropria- tions Authorization Act of 1976 by increasing the current $5 million ceiling to $50 million ; and invites the Secretary of Defense to submit a report identifying specific programs which, in his judgment, are suitable candidates for multiyear contracts and which may require an exemption from the restrictions of section 810. Prohibition on Use of Funds to Relieve Economic Dislocations Prohibits the Department of Defense from using funds for the pro- curement of goods and services for the purpose of relieving economic dislocations. Procurement of Automatic Data Processing Equipment Requires that Department of Defense procurement regulations alone shall govern the acquisition of automatic data processing equip- ment and services used for specified, critical national security missions. Requirements Relating to the Award of Sole-Source Contracts Requires the Department of Defense to give a 30 day public notice prior to awarding certain sole-source contracts and also requires that the Secretary of Defense submit an annual report to Congress set- ting forth various statistics relating to awards of sole-source contracts. Cost-of-living Adjustment of Military Retirement Pay Approval of an amendment to provide a once-a-year cost-of-living adjustment in military retirement pay contingent upon a similar change in current law for Federal civil service retirement pay. Civilian Personnel Management Prohibits application of work-year ceiling by Department of De- fense and requires that the Department of Defense submit a report by 15 December 1981 analyzing the potential impact of such controls on industrially funded, and other Department of Defense activities. Liability of the United States in Tort for Certain Actions of Mem- bers of the National Guard Imposes liability on the United States in tort for certain actions of members of the National Guard,while such members are performing within the scope of their official duties. Established by Law the Position of Director of the Defense Se- curity Assistance Agency Requires that the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Requirement for Annual Report on National Guard and Reserve Component and Equipment Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to Congress concerning the equipment of the National Guard and the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 14 Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials . Authorizes the Secretary of Defense, at his discretion, to permit military personnel to provide indirect assistance to Federal, State and local civilian law enforcement officials when such assistance does not adversely affect military preparedness and is conducted in the normal course of military operations and training. Amendments to the Military Selective Service Act Permits the Director of the Selective Service System to have access to certain personal information about individuals in order to provide better enforcement of the registration requirement of the Military Selective Service Act. Senior-Grade Civilians Deferral of the scheduled 6 percent reduction in senior-grade civilians until the end of fiscal year 1982 with specific mar..',gement directives. Flag and General Officers Denial of the requested repeal of the reduction in the number of flag and general officers. Assistance to Yorktown Bicentennial Celebration Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to provide certain assistance in connection with the observance on October 19, 1981 of the 200th anniversary of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis to General George Washington at Yorktown, Virginia. SUMMARY OF REPORTS OR STUDIES REQUESTED Procurement 1. A comprehensive acquisition strategy for additional airlift capability. 2. A report from the Secretary of the Navy regarding steps being taken to eliminate and prevent the further occurrence of problems with the construction of Trident and attack submarines. An interim report is also requested. 3. A source selection decision by the 'Secretary of Defense on the B-52 Companion Trainer Aircraft. 4. A report by the Secretary of Defense providing justifications for the required presidential decision on the Long Range Combat Aircraft. Research and Development ? 1. A review by the Secretary of Defense of ongoing military laser programs analyzing means of improving the effectiveness of the man- agement of these programs and reducing the length of time involved in bringing laser weapons on line. 2. A study by the Secretary of Defense of the alternatives to the present means of performing the TACAMO mission. 3. An assessment by the Secretary of Defense of the feasibility and cost effectiveness of using the Maverick Tri-service laser seeker on the Army's Hellfire missile. 4. A report from the Secretary of Defense by 15 December 1981 on the cost effectiveness of the development of the SOTAS system as compared with other reasonable alternatives. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 5. A report from the Navy on available light carrier designs. 6. A report from the Navy on the progress of diesel-electric sub- marine technology research, including program recommendations. 7. A study by the Navy of alternative programs to provide full medical support for amphibious assaults. 8. A study by the Marine Corps of high horsepower engine options for use in advanced combat vehicles. 9. A study by the Secretary of Defense concerning the costs and other requirements of handling and disposing of the obsolescent U.S. chemical warfare stockpile. 10. A study by the Secretary of Defense as to whom among his senior subordinates should be charged with unified responsibility for strategic command, control and communications policy, research and development and procurement. 11. A study by the Secretary of Defense as to whom among his senior subordinates should be charged with unified responsibility for chemical warfare policy, research and development and procurement. 12. A report by the Secretary of Defense providing justifications for the required presidential decision on the MX missile basing mode. Operation and Maintenance A report from the Department of the Army by 15 December 1981 describing the Army's plan for execution of fiscal year 1982 budget increases in the area of real property maintenance. Manpower 1. A report by the Department of Defense by February 1, 1982, on the requirement and supply of trained manpower for mobilization. 2. A report by the Secretary of Defense by October 1, 1981, on the recommendations of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. 3. A report by the Department of Defense by December 31, 1981, on the implementation of the new position management program of the Department of Defense for senior-grade civilians. 4. A report to be included in the fiscal year 1983 Manpower Require- ments Report on the long-term manpower needs of the Navy. 5. A report by the Department of the Army by September 30,1981, on the allocation of civilians in replacement of borrowed and diverted military manpower. SUMMARY OF PROGRAM INITIATIVES Procurement 1. Urges Air Force to re-evaluate its decision not to procure A-10 aircraft after fiscal year 1982. 2. Expects Air Force to structure future procurement requests for F-16 aircraft to take maximum practicable advantage of efficient production rates. 3. Expects Air Force to reduce the scope of the B-52 modification program so as to lower the level of effort on the B-52D aircraft. 4. Urges the Air Force to proceed with modifications and upgrades required to improve the effectiveness of the Minuteman II and III missiles and to fund adequately the Minuteman Extended Survivable Power program. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 5. Assigns to the Secretary of the Navy responsibility for manage- ment and direction of the program for procurement of Light Armored Vehicles. 6. Expects the intelligence community to. invest greater resources in the collection and analysis of intelligence regarding the chemi- cal warfare threat. 7. Recommends that war reserve spares for new Army equipment receive funding in the early phases of modernization. 8. Directs that the Navy and Department of Defense provide con- sistent funding to meet War Reserve Munitions shortfalls. 9. Urges the Air Force and Department of Defense to begin fund- ing of Other War Reserve Material in fiscal year 1983. 10. Restricts the expenditure of funds for Long-Range Combat Air- craft, until stipulated requirements are fulfilled. Research and Development 1. Indicates the committee's desire that the EC-130Q, overweight condition be addressed. promptly. 2. Expects to have at least $5 million expended for concept valida- tion of a transportable submarine communications system utilizing ELF technology: 3. Urges the maximization of Air Force and Navy cooperation in design and development of Adaptive High Frequency communications techniques. 4. Recommends cooperative development to insure inter-service op- erability of Extremely High Frequency terminals and communica- tions packages. 5. Expects the. particle beam weapons development program to focus on those technologies having the most promising military appli- cations. 6. Directs the Department of Defense to proceed with development of a Trident II missile designed for maximum performance at a pace consistent with an orderly. moderate risk program and leading to an initial operational capability in 1989. 7. Expects a minimum of $6 million to be dedicated to research on hardened ballistic missile defense materials. 8. Requests Air Force provide complete. justification for improv- ing the air-to-ground capabilities of the F-15. 9. Advises Navy and Air Force that the committee discourages the development of exclusive-use aircraft to replace current jet trainers. 10. Expects Army to pursue the development of the Fire and Forget capability for the Hellfire missile. 11. Insists on strong oversight from the Secretary of Defense of the various anti-armor, stand-off weapons including Assault Breaker, Wide Area Anti-armor Munitions and Corps Support Weapon sys- tem. 12. Assigns to the Secretary of the Navy full responsibility for the program for development of lightweight armored vehicles for use by ground combat forces. 13. Restricts the expenditure of funds for the MX missile until stipulated requirements are met. . 14. Restricts funds for ship, submarine, and boats technology until receipt of requested report on survey of diesel-electric submarine designs. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 15. Restricts funds for ship contract design R. & D., until receipt of requested report on light carrier designs. 16. Restricts funds for DDGX design until Navy provides the com- mittee with a concise program definition. Operation & Maintenance 1. Urges the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enforce joint service priorities in the budget and defense planning process. 2. Encourages the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop.more compre- hensive and accurate measurements of force capability. Manpower 1. Requests that no further changes be made in categories used in the annual Manpower Requirements Report until the effects of such changes have been fully explored: with the committee. 2. Expects the Secretary of Defense to use his discretion to exceed the authorized civilian end strength by up to 2 percent to accommodate the delayed conversion of 467 Air National Guard civilian positions to full-time military positions. 3. Expects that the Selective Service System will begin without further delay its registration enforcement program. 4. Recommends that the Department of Defense revise its Position Management Directive to encompass certain guidelines for senior- grade civilians. 5. Expects that the Defense Department will conduct simplified cost comparisons for contracting out proposals involving fewer than 50 Defense Department personnel. 6. Expects that the new enforcement authority recommended by the committee for the Selective Service will beused to conduct only face- to-face registration. Attack Related Civil Defense 1. Raises limit on annual Federal contributions to the States for personnel and administrative expenses from $40 million to $45 million. 2. Urges the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Depart- ment of Defense, and the National Security Council to work together to find a meaningful way'to identify and to measure the progress of the civil defense program. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES In January 1981 at the beginning of the 97th Congress, the com- mittee reorganized its ad hoc subcommittees to permit analysis on a continuing basis of those broad areas which have the most direct im- pact on the national security of the United States. The committee believed that it could better carry out its responsibili- ties if key defense mission areas were fully encompassed in the char- ter of appropriately organized subcommittees. To that end the com- mittee organized four new subcommittees, three of which reflected a mission orientation. These three mission oriented subcommittees are : -Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee with re- sponsibility for U.S. nuclear forces; Tactical Warfare Subcommittee with respoiisibility for tactical air a3id~grouhd*forces; and Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 -Sea Power and Force Projection Subcommittee with responsi- bility for the shipbuilding program and the projection of force to distant places. A. major change from past practice was that these three mission- oriented subcommittees were assigned responsibilities for both R&D and procurement for their areas. This change has enabled them to examine more effectively the overall- program for= countering existing and emerging threats in each mission area. Beginning with. the 97th. Congress, the Operation and Mainte- nance (O&M) account was included in the defense authorization re- quest; in response, the committee formed a Preparedness Subcommit- tee. One of the primary responsibilities of the Preparedness Subcom- mittee is to provide the full committee with general oversight of readi- ness and sustainability issues. Finally, the committee, given the continuing importance of cer- tain resource areas, retained two resource-oriented subcommittees : Manpower and Personnel and Military Construction. This new subcommittee structure has served the committee well in its review of the defense authorization request for fiscal year 1982. It has provided new and valuable perspectives on key missions and issues. Moreover, it has provided the opportunity for full integration of R&D and procurement programs in the hope of fielding weapon systems more rapidly and more efficiently. This reorganization reflects the committee's effort to insure that the budget authorization process is even more closely linked to im- provements in force capability and the pursuit of overall national security objectives. NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES . Budget Perspectives President's Amended Budget Request President Reagan's March amended fiscal year 1982 defense budget request and 5-year defense projection is indicated in table 1 in com- parison to President Carter's budget submitted in January, 1981. TABLE I (in billions of dollars, except percent; fiscal years) President Reagan's March budget: TOAr--------------------------------------- 178.0 222.2 254.8 299.2 326.5 367.5 Outlays____________________________________ 158.6 184.8 221.1 249.8 297.3 336.0 TOAgrowth (percent)---- _------------------ 12.4 14.6 7.3 7.0 7.0 7.0 President Carter's January budget: TOA1--------------------------------------- 171.2 196.4 224.0 253.1 284.3 318.3 Outlays____________________________________ 157.6 180.0 205.3 232.3 261.8 293.3 TOA growth (percent)----------------------- 7.8 5.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 Reagan budget over Carter budget: TOAL_____________________________________ 6.8 25.8 30.8 36.1 42.2 49.2 Outlays____________________________________ 1.0 4.8 15.8 17.5 35.5 42.7 TOA=total obligational authority. The March amended fiscal year 1982 request is $25.8 billion in ob- ligational authority above the January submission, and the total 5- year projection contains $184.1 billion more for defense through fis- cal year 1986. Actual defense expenditures are estimated to be $4.8 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 billion greater for fiscal year 1982 and $116.3 billion greater through 1986. This significant and sustained commitment to increased funding for defense is consistent with the concern expressed last year by this committee and the Senate that the U.S. defense budget was not suffi- cient. In fact, last year the Senate adopted a First Concurrent Budget Resolution for fiscal years 1981, 1982, and 1983 with report recom- mendations by the Budget Committee through 1985 that projected $117.6 billion more for the National Defense Function through fiscal year 1985 than President Carter's proposal. The committee thus ap- plauds this requested increase in defense spending. Defense vs. Non-Defense Spending Figure 1 illustrates the growth in U.S. non-defense spending rela- tive to defense spending since fiscal year 1950 and projected through 1986. In 1955 defense spending equaled non-defense spending, where- as for 1980 nondefense spending was more than three times defense. FEDERAL OUTLAYS (Current Dollars) S BILLIONS 800r-- Human Resources Education Health Income Security Employment Training Veterans Benefits Social Services DOD MILITARY 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1986 FISCAL YEARS Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 20 Figure 2 shows Department of Defense expenditures as a per-. tentage of total Federal expenditures and as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) from 1950 to 1980, with estimates through 1982. As a percentage of GNP, defense spending decreased from a level over 10 percent in the early 1950's to 5 percent in the late 1970's. DOD expenditures for fiscal year 1982 as amended are estimated to be less than 6 percent of the GNP. PERCENT PERCENT 60, 60 G12JP ..................... ,. ................ 0 I I I I I I I I I t I I I I' I 0 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1930 1962 1964 1966 1938 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 FISCAL YEARS Soviet versus U.S. Defense Spending A comparison since 1960 of U.S. defense spending (excluding Southeast Asia expenditures) with the estimated dollar cost of So- viet defense program is included in figure 3. COMPARISON OF U.S. DEFENSE OUTLAYS AND ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAMS NOTES: 1. U.S. OUTLAYS EXCLUDE RETIREMENT PAY. INCLUDE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND COAST GUARD DEFENSE OUTLAYS. 2. ESTIMATED SOVIET COSTS ARE BASED ON WHAT IT WOULD COST THE U.S. TO PRODUCE AND MAN THE SOVIET MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATE IT AS THEY DO. 3. PROJECTIONS ARE BASED UPON THREE PERCENT ANNUAL REAL GROWTH FOR USSR. FOR U.S.,'REAL GROWTH IN OUTLAYS IS PROJECTED AT ABOUT NINE PERCENT FOR REAGAN PROPOSAL. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 By 1970 the cost of the Soviet defense effort had surpassed the U.S. effort and in 1980 exceeded the U.S. program by over $70 billion. Even with the revised 5-year defense projection recommended by President Reagan, the estimated cost of the Soviet program will continue to exceed planned U.S. defense expenditures. Moreover, the projected disparity through 1986 between the United States and Soviet defense programs, persists to an even greater degree when a comparison of actual military investment (procurement, research and development, military construction) is made, which excludes costs of manpower and operations (Figure 4). From 1970 to 1980, the total cost of the Soviet defense program exceeded the U.S. program by $532 billion, including $350 billion more for military investment. The value of the Soviet re- search and development effort alone-which reflects an investment in tomorrow's defense systems-was $90 billion more than the U.S. effort. COMPARISON OF U.S. MILITARY INVESTMENT OUTLAYS AND ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET MILITARY INVESTMENT NOTES: 1. INVESTMENT INCLUDES RDTBE, PROCUREMENT, AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. 2. PROJECTIONS ARE BASED ON FIVE PERCENT ANNUAL REAL GROWTH FOR USSR. FOR U.S.. REAL GROWTH INVESTMENT OUTLAYS PROJECTED AT ANNUAL RATES OF ELEVEN PERCENT FOR REAGAN PROPOSAL. Impact of Inflation on Defense Programs The committee is convinced that a sustained and increased defense effort is required. Moreover, it is the commitment to defense pro- grams-not to a defense funding level-that is essential. In this re- gard, the committee is concerned about the potential impact of under- estimates in inflation on the execution of defense programs. The President has embarked on an ambitious economic recovery program intended to curb the increase in inflation. There is substantial dis- agreement, however, between the inflation projected by the Congres- sional Budget Office (CBO) and that of the President. Based on the Congressional Budget Office estimates of inflation, additional spend- ing as indicated in table 2 will be required to execute the President's Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 planned defense programs. The committee found no basis for accepting the CBO estimates of inflation instead of the President's estimates. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have committed to fully support- ing the programs if estimates in inflation do not prove accurate. The committee accepts this commitment and intends to insist that these vitally needed programs are executed. TABLE 2.-DIFFERENCES IN DEFENSE BUDGET WITH CBO ESTIMATES OF INFLATION ]In billions of dollars, fiscal years] National defense function: Budget authority____________________________ 2.1 6.7 13.9 22.7 34.1 48.7 Outlays____________________________________ 1.0 3.6 8.9 15.5 24.3 35.8 Defense Outlay Estimates There is also considerable disagreement in _the defense outlays or expenditures estimated by the Congressional Budget Office and those estimated by the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (table 3). Methods for estimating out- lays are not exact, and the resulting estimates of out.year expenditures are historically inaccurate. Projected expenditures depend on the rate of spendout assumed and on the assumed composition (for example, procurement, research and development, operating expenses, pay) of the budget. TABLE 3.-NON-ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES IN DEFENSE OUTLAYS WITH-CBO ESTIMATING METHODS ]In billions of dollars. fiscal years] 1981 1892 1983 1984 1985 1986 It is important to emphasize that the Congress authorizes and ap- propriates funds consistent with the obligational or budget authority required to implement programs. Actual expenditures or outlays, on the other hand, are a product of the rate-of-spendout of obligated funds and of the exact program content of the defense requests. Defense spending in a given year is in large part due to the expendi- ture of funds obligated in prior years for programs already author- ized. Estimates of current year defense spending, and especially pro- jected defense spending, are uncertain. Moreover, current defense "expenditures" do not reflect new commitment to defense but are the result of past commitments. Fluctuations in defense spending can re- sult simply from changing spending patterns, reflecting no change in defense programs. As previously stated, the committee is strongly committed to the execution of defense programs and will insist on the budget authority to execute these programs. Nonetheless, the differences between CBO and OSD/OMB estimated outlays are a concern to the committee. The contribution of defense spending to total. Federal spending must be Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 accounted for in the attempt by the President and by Congress to bal- ance the Federal Budget. The committee considered the difference in outlay estimates but found no better basis of estimating defense out- lays than that provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is clear, however, that future coordination between CBO, OSD, and the Office of Management and Budget will improve the ability of each to arrive at a common method of estimating outlays. Introduction Global Perspectives American military strength postured against that of the Soviet Union both. in reality and perception eroded significantly during the 10-year period ending in 1980. In this period, the United States : -lost the superiority of her strategic forces and faced the cer- tain loss of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union; -lost theater nuclear superiority in Europe; -permitted an unfavorable shift in the overall U.S.-U.S.S.R. conventional balance as the Soviets surpassed U.S. defense spend- ing early in the 1970's and built a sizable advantage during the remainder of the decade; -suffered a devastating loss in Vietnam causing both friend and foe to perceive flaws in America's strength and a deterior- ation of her commitment and resolve; -became vulnerable to disruptions in the supply of foreign oil and experienced the use of "hostile oil" as a weapon against America's foreign policies and interests; -suffered with the revolution in Iran the collapse of the U.S. security policy in the Persian Gulf region; -lost the initiative in Third World affairs to a bolder, more adventuresome Soviet Union assisted by aggressive proxies; and -lost a united front in NATO for dealing with critical East- West issues. There were signal offsetting successes for the United States during this period. Normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, with its dramatic implications for the global equilibrium of power, was one of the most significant events of the 1070's.. In the Middle East, precluding a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli peace process served U.S. interests as did improved rela- tions with militarily strong Egypt. Also on the positive side, gaining access to military facilities in Oman, Somalia, and Kenya improved the military potential of the United States in the critical Persian Gulf region. Trends in the International Security Environment The world has become a much more dangerous place in which to live. Increasing terrorism, regional arms races, and nuclear prolifera- tion are all symptoms of rising world militarization and instability. At the same time, economic interdependence gives international im- pact to regional crises. The delicate balance of the supply and demand for oil causes events in oil-rich nations to be of critical concern to the entire world, but especially to industrialized nations. The free flow of other raw materials and trade is also of vital importance to nearly every world region, especially in light of the world's economic slow- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 down. Disruptions of this free flow can have substantial economic, and hence political, repercussions. The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for power and influence has become global in nature. Growth in Soviet military strength, especially in capabilities for distant naval deployments, has enabled Moscow to challenge Washington in areas long dominated by American forces and in areas where neither super- power previously had a sizable military presence, like the Indian Ocean. These new Soviet challenges have been supported by : -a new Soviet boldness and adventurism in Third World affairs ; -a successful Soviet use of proxies in Africa; Latin America, the Near East, and Southeast Asia; and -American restraint in Third World affairs attributable in part to the Vietnam experience. Given that these Soviet and Soviet-sponsored threats are emerging in world regions not covered by Western alliances and given the new economic vulnerabilities of the industrialized world, the geographic scope of U.S. security challenges has grown substantially. The political cohesion that previously characterized old alliances has lessened. In America's case, the strains of the crises in Southwest Asia during 1979 accelerated this process. Although lessening of Soviet control has not yet been felt, the unrest in Poland is a key example of the critical problems that the Soviets are likely to face in the near future. In addition to a weakening in the political cohesion of major al- liances, power in the world has also been somewhat diffused by : -the Sino-Soviet geopolitical rivalry ; -the economic wealth of the oil-producing states and their influence over the world's economy ; -growth in the military strength of regional powers; and -an increase in nationalism in Third. World countries serving to lessen traditional influences. In sum, the international security environment that faces us has the following characteristics : -rising militarization ; -increasing instability ;, -increasing exposure of the West's economic vulnerabilities; -expanding geographic scope of U.S.-U.S.S.R. military competition ; -reduced level of cooperation by the Western alliances; and -increasing diffusion of nower and influence. For the United States, these characteristics have produced a situ- ation where: -the limited numerical strength of U.S. military emits--espe- cially naval units-has been stretched thin to cover expanding geo- graphic resnonsihilities: -the United States has been forced to assume the greatest sharp of the burden of meeting challenges to Western interests outside traditional alliance areas: and -the United States has had to develop the capability to take Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 25 rapid military action to protect vital, distant areas from sub- stantiel threats. Soviet Union The disparity in the resources committed by the two super- powers to defense spending in recent years has ominous implications for the world, especially when available evidence suggests that Soviet defense spending will continue to grow for the next 5 years at approxi- mately the same rate as it has in the past. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Soviet military buildup during the past decade is the degree to which the Soviets have sac- rificed the well-being of their economy to sustain it. The Soviet econ- omy's rate of growth-measured by increases in the gross national product (GNP)-has continuously declined since the 1950's. The average annual rate of about 6 percent during the 1950's declined to 5.2 percent in the 1960's, to 3.8 percent from 1971-1975, and to 3.1 per- cent from 1976-1979. A further slowdown of the Soviet economy is expected in the future. By the mid-1980's, the rate of growth may drop to only 1 or 2 percent. The plunging performance of the Soviet economy is attributable to growing energy constraints, labor shortages, and to lagging produc- tivity. Energy and manpower constraints have a great impact on the growth of the Soviet economy because growth in the Soviet Union has been fostered by a simple expansion in resources rather thanproductivity. In fact, overall Soviet productivity with the exception of defense industry is declining and prospects for a turnaround are bleak. In this regard, Soviet economic development differs from that of other modern industrial nations, whose growth has been sustained by increases in productivity. Leonid Brezlhnev, now 74, has led the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for almost 17 years and for at least 10 years has been the nation's undisputed leader. The widely held expectation that Brezhnev, whose health is poor, will leave the Soviet political scene within 2 years has focused attention on his replacement. Brezhnev has prevented any of his colleagues from acquiring the status or power necessary to have a claim on his position. The succession crisis in the Soviet Union will be further complicated by the fact that most of the members of the Politburo are likely to be replaced over the next 5 years due to their advanced age. It is unlikely that replacement of so many key leaders in so short a time will create a political climate that will lead to a stable consensus on Soviet poli- cies. Given the range and seriousness of political and economic problems facing the Soviet Union during the 1980's, the likely absence of a strong, unified leadership may preclude effective action on controver- sial issues. While much attention has been focused on the eroding American position, in the world, Soviet problems have not been extensively ad- dressed. Given recent world events especially in the last 2 years, the Soviets may see themselves as surrounded by hostile forces with no strong allies to assist them. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Of the 16 nations with the largest defense budgets as of 1978, seven, including the United States, are members of NATO, one (Japan) has a bilateral defense treaty with the United States, and three (China, Saudi Arabia and Israel) are strongly anti-Soviet or pro-Western in orientation. Only three of these countries (U.S.S.R., East Ger- many, and Poland) are members of the Warsaw Pact, another (India) is pro-Soviet in orientation. The sixteenth nation-Iran-is both anti- Western and anti-Soviet; moreover, her defense efforts and strength have been greatly reduced since 1978. Of the nations allied with or leaning toward the Soviet Union, East Germany ranks highest in defense spending in twelfth place, just behind the Netherlands. Soviet fears of the People's Republic of China (PRC) have grown in the last 3 years as the PRC improved her relations with Japan and the United States. These developments are likely to be seen as highly unfavorable to the Soviets. Moreover, the Soviets have failed to im- prove their cool relations with Japan which has been a major foreign policy setback for them. Afghanistan has become a quagmire. It is draining Soviet military resources and attention. It has caused some discontent at home. More- over, it has strained Soviet relations with the Islamic world, includ- ing possibly Soviet Muslims, and the West. Much of the Muslim world is already strongly opposed to "godless" communism. To the West, developments in East Europe must be of concern. La- bor unrest and economic problems, especially in Poland, are challeng- ing East European governments and Communist ideology. Should events there create domestic turmoil, it could destabilize an area that has long been relatively passive from the Soviet viewpoint. Combined with her own economic problems and her impending lead- ership crisis, the Soviet Union may see these international setbacks as posing serious challenges. NATO The United States and most of her European allies have come to hold divergent views on the world situation and on strategies for counter- ing the Soviets' military buildup. Many Americans have concluded that the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of detente and that there are troublesome connections between Soviets in Afghanistan, Cubans in Africa, Vietnamese in Cambodia, and Libyans in Chad. The United States has awakened to the real threats to Western in- terests in the Persian Gulf region. Concern and alarm over these real- izations have been translated into a determined revitalization of U.S. defense capabilities and a more confrontational approach to destabi- lizing Soviet behavior. The mood in NATO Europe is quite different. While there is clearly concern, the threats to European interests are seen as less ominous. Many Europeans continue to have unrealistic expectations of detente. Western Europe does not now appear to be prepared to deal with the stratefric vulnerability of its exep?sive dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Clearly the costs and risks to Western Europe of a more confronta- tional approach to Moscow are greater than for the United States. Their economic and human ties to the east are more widespread. More- over, should this strategy backfire, the resulting battleground will include Western Europe. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 27 Given this context, strong anti-defense sentiment have made them- selves felt on the security policies of leading European member states of NATO. There are even troubling undercurrents of neutralism and pacifism. Progress on important NATO military initiatives-in par- ticular real growth in annual defense spending and theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization-has been slowed by these political forces. Clearly, the greatest challenge confronting the Alliance is imple- mentation of the TNF modernization decision of December 1979. That decision called for the pursuit of arms control in parallel with modernization. The limited prospects for initiation of meaningful arms control negotiations have substantially weakened the European commitment to modernization. Of all volatile issues in the European region, the form that the resolution of Poland's domestic problems takes will have by far the greatest implications for the future direction of West-East relations. Soviet intervention in Poland would be likely to produce dramatic changes in Western European opinion on many security issues. On a positive note, the strength of the southern flank of NATO has improved markedly in the past year. Greece has been reintegrated into NATO's military command structure. The military government in Turkey has restored order and has made progress on the, nation's economic difficulties. Turkey continues, however, to require substan- tial economic assistance. Persian Gulf and Middle East The release on January 20, 1981 of American hostages held captive by Iran has enabled the United States to turn her attention to other critical issues in the region. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf region have been plagued by instability for an extended period of time. The Arab-Israeli disputes have been a major source of instability. In the past year, the region's instability has been heightened by conflicts and disputes among Muslim nations : the Iran-Iraq war, con- troversies involving Syria and Jordan, Libyan-Egyptian animosities, and escalating internal strife in Lebanon to name a few. These clashes and serious differences have provided new openings for the Soviets and others who seek to destabilize the region. Moderate Arab states, recognizing this fact, have given increased attention to the threat from the Soviet Union and her regional proxies. Effective resistance to Soviet control of Afghanistan continues. The Islamic world has continued heavy criticism of the Soviet inva- sion. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has been particularly troublesome to Pakistan, now a front-line state bordering Soviet con- trolled territory. Indo-Pak relations have not improved, further add- ing to Pakistan's anxieties. Implementation of the Camp David Accords has continued rela- tively smoothly thus far. The final withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982 requires the formation of a multina- tional force to insure the peace between Egypt and Israel. U.S. par- ticipation in this multinational force is likely. Negotiations on Pales- tinian autonomy have failed so far. Progress may be possible after the Israeli national elections in June 1981. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 In the past year, Libya's behavior has become markedly more ag- gressive. The Libyan-backed raid into Gafsa, Tunisia in January 1980 was the first major indication of Libya's expansionist activities. In late 1980, Libyan troops intervened in Chad's protracted civil war, and in January 1981, Colonel Qadhafi announced a merger of the two states. While this merger has been put aside, many African and non- regional states have come to believe that Libya's intention is to create a Pan-Islamic state in Saharan Africa under Libyan control. Libya's efforts to extend her influence, financed by her vast oil revenues, repre- sents a serious threat to regional stability and to American interests. In early 1981, fighting in Lebanon intensified further destroying the fabric of this nation. The complex domestic situation and the presence of Syrian forces have precluded the formulation of effective and lasting solutions to Lebanon's problems. In February 1981, six Persian Gulf states-Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar-completed the formation of a Gulf Cooperation Council. This effort at regional coop- eration is an important step in the enhancement of the region's secu- rity and stability. East Asia and the Pacific East Asia continues to be vital to U.S. interests. U.S. trade with this area is greater than with any other world region. Japan con- tinues to be the largest overseas trading partner for the United States and economically our most powerful ally. The military relationship between Japan and the United States continues to improve although the relationship has been plagued by the American disappointment in the modest increases in Japan's low level of defense spending. South Korea has completed a troubled period of transition follow- ing the assassination of President Park. A new constitution has been ratified by the public and President Chun and a new National Assem- bly have been elected. While stability has been restored, economic stagnation, resulting primarily from the worldwide economic reces- sion, continues. Relations 'between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have steadily improved. The United States has also continued to fulfill her moral obligation to the well-being of the people of Taiwan without damaging her important strategic relationship with the PRC. The human tragedy of Indochina continues. Vietnam and her Kam- puchean surrogates have been unable to eliminate the resistance of the remnants of the Pol Pot regime. The United States and other con- cerned nations have sought to strengthen Thailand against further Vietnamese aggression. Sub-Saharan Africa Like North Africa, the portion of the continent south of the Sahara Desert has been the target of Soviet-instigated military activity. Sub- Saharan Africa provides strategic materials that are critical to the Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 industrial and defense efforts of the Western World. Left unattended, southern Africa could become the next "Persian Gulf" for the West with access to the region's resources placed at considerable risk. Soviet strategic aims in southern Africa benefitted from American restraint in the Third World in the period following the fall of Saigon and from the stultifying inhibition of the Clark amendment. There is growing concern that Soviet and Cuban excesses in Africa will seriously endanger access to essential minerals and the important shipping lanes from the, Persian Gulf around Africa. There are an estimated 46,000 Cubans today operating on the African continent, primarily in Angola and in the Horn of Africa. The Republic of South Africa represents one of the most delicate political issues in Africa now facing the United States. This is so because South Africa, a long-time U.S. ally and source of vital stra- tegic minerals, maintains a highly volatile legalized policy of racial discrimination. Given the importance of the region, the United States and other western nations must develop effective strategies for countering So- viet efforts in Africa and for finding peaceful solutions to southern Africa's problems. Latin America El Salvador has become the benchmark of a new determined effort by the United States to resist the spread of Soviet-backed, Cuban- inspired insurgency throughout Latin America. Like Africa, Latin America has suffered through a prolonged period of relative inatten- tion by the United States. Given that many societies in Latin America are unstable and vulnerable to insurgent activities, the United States must increase her 'attention to the security situations of her Western Hemisphere neighbors. On the whole, the 1970's saw a net erosion of the U.S. position in the world. Combined with growing international instability and the geographic expansion of threats to Western interests, this erosion has magnified challenges to our security efforts in the 1980's. The next several sections provide additional insights into challenges that the United States faces in key force and resource areas. U.S. Military Force Structure The following table shows the force structure of U.S. active mili- tary forces for selected years, in order to provide perspective on the budget for fiscal year 1982. Estimated figures are given for the end of the current fiscal year and for the end of fiscal year 1982. For comparison, similar figures are provided for fiscal years 1964 and 1980. To complete this general overview of the size and structure of American active military forces, a summary of inventories of major equipment is provided for each year. The summary shows graphically that few changes in the level of our active forces have occurred in recent years, and the U.S. forces are well below 1964 levels in many categories. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 June 20, 1964 Sept 30, 1980 Sept 30, 1981 Sept 30, 1982 Strategic forces: Intercontinental ballistic missiles: Minuteman--------------------------------- 600 1,000 1,000 1,000 Titan II------------------------------------ 108 54 54 54 Polaris-Poseidon-Trident missiles----------------- 336 576 496 544 Strategic bomber squadrons---------------------- 75 25 25 24 Aircraft(PAA)r ----------------------------- 1,115 376 376 376 Manned fighter interceptor squadrons------------- 40 6 6 5 General purpose forces: Land forces: Army divisions----------------------------- 16 16 16 16 Combat brigades------------------------ 56 52 50 50 Marine Corps divisions---------------------- 3 3 3 3 Regiments----------------------------- 12 12 12 12 Tactical air forces: Air Force wings----------------------------- 21 26 26 26 Aircraft (PAA)t------------------------- 1,712 1,680 1,692 1,732 Navy attack wingsI ------------------------- 15 12 12 12 Aircraft (PAA)1------------------------- 1,212 914 978 980 Marine Corps wings------------------------- 3 3 3 3 Aircraft (PAA)r------------------------- 510 406 406 406 Naval forces: Attack and ASW carriers--------------------- 24 13 12 13 Attack submarines-------------------------- 104 79 88 95 Other warships----------------------------- 279 177 188 195 Amphibious ships--------------------------- 133 63 59 60 Airlift and sealift forces: Strategic airlift squadrons: C-5A squadrons---------------------------- 0 4 4 4 Aircraft (PAA)r------------------------- 0 70 70 70 C-141 squadrons---------------------------- 0 13 13 13 Aircraft (PAA)r------------------------- 0 234 234 234 Tactical airlift squadrons: C-130 squadrons---------------------------- 28 14 14 14 Aircraft (PAA)r------------------------- 436 218 218 218 Troopships, cargo ships, tankers------------------ 100 49 47 47 Equipment inventories: Total Army tanks------------------------------- 2,205 8,049 8,545 8,545 Total Navy active fleet--------------------------- 917 456 469 487 Total Nary aircraft-. ---------------------------- 7,595 4,708 4,809 4,803 Total Air Force aircraft-------------------------- 12,689 7,034 7,133 7,265 Strategic Force Perspectives The strategic nuclear forces of the United States consist of in- tercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles with the nuclear-powered submarines which launch them, long-range bomb- ers and the sophisticated warning and communications system which support the offensive forces. Today these forces are at a cross- roads. The Nation faces difficult choices about expensive long-term programs which are required if America's nuclear deterrent is again to meet stated requirements and counter Soviet forces and capabilities. For much of the last two decades, planned modernization of these systems has been reduced in scale, delayed, deferred or canceled out- right. Consequently, weapon systems designed in the 1950's and 1960's have served as the backbone of the U.S. strategic deterrent into the 1980's. While it is true that important modifications to these systems have been undertaken, the Nation's nuclear Triad nonetheless consists of aging ships, bombers and missiles. During the same period, Soviet strategic forces have undergone a systematic, comprehensive and continuing modernization program. One recent study by the Rand Corporation concluded that the U.S.S.R. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 had outspent the United States by $104billion in strategic arms alone during the period 1968-1978. Over the past decade as a result of this level of investment, successive generations of increasingly capable and ever more numerous Soviet nuclear systems have been introduced. Today, the U.S.S.R. has hundreds of modern, reliable, large throw- weight ICBM's; their new SLBM's feature MIRVed warheads, im- proved accuracies and great range; and the Soviet Union is produc- ing substantial quantities of sophisticated bombers fully capable of performing intercontinental missions against the United States. Fur- thermore, the U.S.S.R. has diversified and improved the endurance of most of its strategic command, control and communications system as it has improved its capabilities. Current static measurements of United States vs. Soviet strategic forces-while more alarming than those of past years-continue to understate the worsening imbalance which clearly favors the Soviet Union. For example, the American advantage in intercontinental bombers is increasingly offset by advances in Soviet air defenses. Similarly, the apparent U.S. lead in numbers of warheads fails to reflect adequately the disparity which exists in numbers of time-urgent, hard-target kill capable warheads deployed by each side. The large number of these ICBM-delivered warheads deployed in the Soviet arsenal, their high levels of readiness, and the relative probability of them reaching and destroying their targets constitute an important advantage for the U.S.S.R. The increasing numbers and improved capabilities of the warheads in the Soviet ICBM force have now made adoption of a survivable basing mode for the U.S. land- based deterrent force a fundamental requirement. The United States-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship is evolutionary, with no guarantees that a balance can be maintained. Over the past 13 years, due in no small part to the disparity in the levels of resources allocated by the United States and the Soviet Union to strategic force modernization, the strategic balance has evolved in favor of the U.S.S.R. Other factors contributing to this evolution have been uni- lateral U.S. decisions to exercise restraint in support of arms control initiatives and the tendency to undersize our strategic forces as a result of underestimating elements of the Soviet's massive military buildup. The cumulative effect of these decisions and the changing strategic balance which they have promoted have presented the United States with major-and very expensive-programmatic choices in the stra- tegic area. The Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces held a series of hearings on these issues and, based on these hearings. the committee has made specific recommendations which are contained elsewhere in this report. The committee believes, however, that testimony presented to the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Subcommittee coupled with the funding requests found in the fiscal year 1982 budget amendments reflects a new commitment to moder- nize and upgrade U.S. strategic forces. Sea Power Perspectives Rebuilding American Sea Power Geographic Perspective. The United States exists today as an island-nation. That is a fact of geography and economics. As an Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 island-nation, America is dependent on the trading nations of the world and on the free use of the seas for the daily sustenance of its commerce and industry. Without that free use of the seas, our ability to survive militarily and economically would be in serious jeopardy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is and remains a potentially absolute autarky-economically self-sufficient and dependent for trade on no one but itself-a true continental power. They have expanded from their Russian center outwards over land routes, not sea routes, gathering essential resources from within their own borders or those of their contiguous buffer states. The Soviets, theoretically at least, have no need for a navy or a merchant marine. And yet, the naval forces of the Soviet Union have been expanding in scope and mission ever since the Second World War. From relatively humble beginnings as a force useful only for protecting the nation's few exposed coastal waters, the Soviet Navy has grown increasingly powerful, operating more and more frequently in the open ocean areas of the world to better support the exploits of its political leaders in distant parts of the world. With each passing year the Soviets have been able to provide an increasingly more viable threat to America's free and essential use of the seas at the time and place of their choosing. Moreover, the Soviet merchant marine has grown so remarkably that in 1978 it ranked seventh in terms of dead weight tonnage among all of the merchant marines of the world. By contrast, the merchant marine of the United States, a nation absolutely dependent on seaborne commerce, ranked only ninth. On the basis of numbers of ships over 1,000 gross tons, the Soviets ranked 2d while the United States ranked 11th.1 A very real challenge of this decade, therefore, is the rebuilding of America's essential naval and maritime strength. U.S. sea power must once again become capable of providing an unambiguously positive force to improve the national defense and strengthen the national will; it must once again be capable of providing naval support to its friends and allies in order to deter its potential adversaries from attempting to deny the free and peaceful use of the seas. Reversing the Trend.-Accomplishing that task will not be easy. By 1980, depending on how ships are counted, the Soviet Union had three times as many total naval vPCsels as the United States, even though total Soviet naval tonnage was less than that of the United States. But of concern for the future is the fact than the Soviets are delivering more ships to their fleet annually than the United States is delivering to her fleet. Over the past 5 years the Soviet Union delivered two major surface combatants for every one constructed by the United States, five submarines for each U.S. submarine, and 29 "other" naval ships for every U.S. ship. It was not surprising, therefore, that this year the Chief of Naval Operations stated in his posture statement before the committee that : While I am pleased with the high quality of the ships, air- craft, and weapons entering the fleet, my enthusiasm is not- ably tempered by the pace of modernization displayed by the 1 Heine, I. H. "The U.S. Maritime Industry in the National Interest," National Maritime Council, 1980, pp. 259-260. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Soviets. On a comparative basis I would have to say that while we had a very good year in 1980, the Russians had a spectacular one. Further, the Chief of Naval Operations stated : This year I have very carefully reassessed the state of the naval balance, in consultation with my senior operational commanders. The judgments that emerged from that process have led me to conclude that it would be misleading to con- tinue speaking of a "narrow margin" (of superiority over the Soviet Union) when, in fact, we have entered a period in which any reasonable estimate of the balance falls within the range of uncertainty. In other words, the situation today is so murky one cannot, with confidence, state that the U.S. posses- ses a margin of superiority. If we do, it is so cloudy and tenu- ous as to be unreliable-both as a deterrent, and as assurance of our ability to prevail at sea in a conflict with the Soviets. In spite of these problems, the turn-around for American sea power has begun, due in part to the concerns of this committee and the Con- gress. In the original fiscal year 1981 budget approved by the Congress last year, this committee was responsible for supporting the addi- tional procurement of three new naval combatants, eight sealift ship conversions, and advance procurement funds for several other ships. In total, in fiscal year 1981 the committee recommended the addition of over two billion dollars in the Navy shipbuilding and conversion procurement requests alone. In the original Defense Department request for fiscal year 1982, a shipbuilding plan was proposed that included $6.6 billion for eighteen ship procurements and conversions. The amended request has added about $3.7 billion for an additional 15 procurements and conversions for a total request for 33 ships and $10.3 billion. The committee applauds and supports this obvious change in the direction of the Nation's defense posture. Potential Obstacles.-In view of the recent history of Navy ship- building, however, expanding the size of our naval forces significantly has at least three potentially serious problems-4he affordability of future shipbuilding plans, the sustainability of the growth in the ship- building budget, and the capability of the American shipbuilding industrial base. First, the basic affordability of a particular shipbuilding plan is primarily a function of controlling unprogramed cost growth and in- flation. Within a fixed budget for some number of ships, inflation that is greater than what is planned will naturally cause the planned num- ber of ships within the program to be decreased. Similarly, unpro- gramed cost growth can erode a shipbuilding-program equally as fast. Unprogramed cost growth is also undoubtedly more responsible than any other factor for causing "bow waves" of unrealistic planning for the later years of the five-year defense plan. The solutions to both problems lie in increased management attention within both the De- partment of Defense and industry. The administration's stated desire to experiment with multiyear contracting is one encouraging sign. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 The second major problem area is the ability of the administration to sustain the planned real growth in the levels of defense spending in general, and in the Navy shipbuilding account specifically. Since the 1950's, defense spending has been an ever decreasing portion of both total federal spending and the GNP. Not until the past year or two has that trend been reversed. And in an era where the growth of do- mestic spending now faces constant attack, concentrated and continu- ous attention will be required to keep that trend from reverting to its old ways. Finally, there is the question of the nation's shipbuilding capability. In response to a request by this committee, Defense Secretary Wein- berger forwarded an Institute for Defense Analyses study entitled, The Shipbuilding Industries of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as Bases for National Maritime Policies: Current Capabilities and Surge Demand Potential. The study was, in part, a comprehensive. examination of the U.S. shipbuilding industry and its possible response to several levels of Navy shipbuilding effort required to achieve four separate fleet sizes : a 500-, 600-, 700- and an 800-ship Navy. The study's results hold several important implications for the plans of the current administration : It is concluded that shipbuilding, due to the unprofitable nature of its product, is an industry which survives in the U.S. only because of direct and indirect subsidization and naval work. Indications are that the continuation of recent trends (less than a 500 ship Navy) will lead to attrition of yards from the industry in the next decade. Increased profit margins on naval work and more stable yard workloads might reduce this risk. It appears that sufficient facilities exist to accommodate a substantial surge in overall demand.... (R)egional short- ages (of labor) could occur over the short-to-medium term. Priorities, incentives, or outright government production might be necessary to ensure provision of materials, compo- and weapon systems. (T)he current U.S. industry is capable of effecting sig- nificant increases in Navy force levels, although such buildups would require at least ten to seventeen years, depending on assumptions.... Large or rapid buildups would require re- entry of naval and many repair-only yards into new construc- tion work due to a shortage of nuclear, complex-combatant, and large hull capacity. Thus, the U.S. shipbuilding industry does appear capable of sus- taining the growth to a 600-ship navy currently envisioned. In fact, anything less will apparently force some yards out of the new con- struction business. Without proper planning, even the 600-ship goal does not insure against that. Recently, both the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense have spoken of even higher goals for Navy force levels. While the study did not address the affordability of building a 700- or 800-ship Navy, it did say they were industrially achieveable within certain limitations. Therefore, if the results of this study are correct, the adminis- tration can achieve its shipbuilding goals, in terms of capacity, Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 but areas of concern exist that must be addressed. At the very least, the study indicates that no matter what final goal is chosen, the administration must improve the methods used to conduct long- term shipyard workload planning and the subsequent awarding of shipbuilding contracts. It must also exercise better management control of financial and overall incentive policies. A realistic. examina- tion of the long-range affordability of the nation's shipbuilding plans and improved management of the nation's private and. public ship- yard resources could, however, produce the results. that ;are necessary to insure that America regains its essential maritime role in the world. Conclusion.-The necessity for a strong U.S. Navy is absolute, given American dependence on overseas mineral and energy resources and on the trading patterns of the Nation's industries. With this and last year's defense authorizations and the entire thrust of the new ad- ministration's defense policies, the reversal in the downward trend in U.S. naval sea power has begun. The trend will remain positive, however, only if the potential obstacles of affordability, sustainability, and industrial capability are fully understood and overcome. Navy Ship Inventory The Navy ship operating forces at the end of fiscal year 1981 will total 542 ships. This compares to a fiscal year 1964 ship operating force of 1,003. During fiscal year 1982, there is estimated to be a net gain of 13 ships; this includes a gain of 18 ships in the active force, a loss of three in the reserves, and a loss of two in the Fleet Auxiliary force. The active force increases will be led by the addition of an attack carrier and a net gain of seven attack submarines. There will also be small net gains in destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and patrol combatants. The only net losses will occur in the Strategic Submarine Force in Auxiliaries. Stratepicsubmarine (SSBN)----------- 21 0 41 0 36 0 34 0 General purpose forces---------------- 896 85 935 75 433 45 453 42 Attack submarines (nuclear and diesel)------------------------ 104 0 105 0 88 0 95 0 Attack carriers___________________ 15 0 15 0 12 0 13 0 ASW carriers-------------------- 9 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 Other combatants: Cruisers-------------------- 28 0 34 0 27 0 27 0 Destroyers------------------ 213 13 222 16 82 9 84 4 ates_____________________ Fri 40 27 50 19 79 0 84 4 g Amphibious--------------------- 133 0 157 0 59 6 60 6 Patrol combatants________________ 6 9 9 6 1 0 6 0 Mine warfare____________________ 85 13 84 12 3 22 3 22 Auxilaries----------------------- 263 23 251 22 82 8 81 6 Total ships____________________ 917 85 976 75 469 45 487 42 Fleet auxiliary force ------------ 1 4 28 26 Total ship operating force ------- 1,003 1,055 542 555 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Force Projection Perspectives Force projection is an important instrument of foreign policy. It encompasses the projection of military power-by various means- to distant areas. Traditional power projection forces include : Airborne and amphibious forces; Military and commercial airlift and sealift, prepositioning of military equipment and supplies, and amphibious shipping; Sea-based tactical air, naval gunfire, out-of-area deployments of combatants, and underway replenishment ships and other auxiliaries to support these naval forces ; and Inflight refuelable bomber, attack, and fighter aircraft and tankers to support them. In addition, there are less direct means of projecting power: Military support of allies and friends such as military assist- ance, sales, advisors, and training; Use of proxy forces; Treaties and other security agreements; Basing rights and facilities access agreements; and Unconventional warfare. Since World War II, the United States has maintained impressive traditional force projection capabilities and has at times projected formidable military power to distant world areas. In contrast, Soviet traditional force projection capabilities have, until recently, been limited to areas contiguous to the Soviet Union. Moreover, there are no examples to date of the Soviets projecting a major Soviet fighting force to a world region remote from their borders although the Soviets have supported major power projection efforts in distant areas by their proxies. At the present time, the United States has substantial advantages over the Soviet Union in traditional power projection forces. The United States is far more capable of inserting and sustaining a mili- tary force in distant areas. While the Soviets have larger airborne forces and a militarily more capable merchant marine-especially in terms of its coordination with naval forces-the majority of Soviet forces suitable for power projection are embryonic compared to U.S. forces. The U.S. advantages in sea-based tactical air, amphibious forces and shipping, airlift, and inflight refuelable aircraft are sub- stantial. However, some of these advantages are offset, at least in part, by the greater proximity of the Soviet Union to key world trouble spots-the Persian Gulf, Middle East, and Korea. In projecting power in the past, the Soviets have sought to main- tain a relatively low, military profile and have effectively used proxy states to achieve their objectives. They have maintained substantial stockpiles of war materials that could be rapidly transferred to na- tions seeking assistance. The aggressive activities of Soviet surrogates have in recent years seized the initiative despite American strengths in traditional power projection capabilities. While the power projection balance now favors the United States. there is substantial evidence that the Soviets have embarked upon a determined effort to substantially improve their. projection forces. Much like the increasing reach of her sea power, the force projection Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 capabilities of the Soviet Union have received increasing attention in the Soviets' drive to become a true worldwide power. The Soviets seem intent on developing force projection capabilities that enable them to effectively compete for power and influence in critical world areas and to challenge Western interests anywhere in the world. This effort by the Soviets has added a new and troublesome dimen- sion to the military competition between the West and the Soviet Union. The decade of the 1980's is likely to see substantially increased competition with Moscow, not in traditional alliance areas, but in Third World areas. It is in these areas where the Western World has recently recognized the seriousness of its strategic vulnerabilities with respect to access to oil and other essential raw materials. Moreover, the West has not previously had to contend with the relatively new as- pect of Soviet power projection capabilities. The task confronting the United States is to devise an effective strategy to meet this emerging Soviet threat. In recognition of this need, the committee has formed a Sea Power and Force Projection Subcommittee to review the entire force projection mission which not only cuts across all Service lines in the Department of Defense but also involves the programs of other Departments. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was an important step in revitalizing U.S. force projection capabili- ties. Given the importance of the Persian Gulf region, the efforts of the RDJTF have been formally directed to that region. The commit- tee is concerned, however, about the absence of an organized effort to plan and provide for possible power projection requirements in other Third World areas which are also critical to U.S. interests. In addition, the committee is concerned about the present command and control relationships of the RDJTF with the National Command Authority. There is widespread belief that the current relationships are unwork- able and ineffective. In this regard, the committee views with favor the Secretary of Defense's announcement on April 24, 1981 that the RDJTF should evolve within several years into a separate unified command with its own geographic responsibilities, Service compo- nents, forces, intelligence, communications, logistics facilities and other support elements. While the creation of a separate unified com- mand in the future will solve current deficiencies, the committee remains concerned about what command and control relationships will apply in the interim. Tactical Warfare Perspectives The committee's review of the tactical air forces has revealed im- provements in both force modernization and projected readiness levels for most weapons systems. With a few notable exceptions, such as F- 16 aircraft procurement, the amended fiscal year 1982 request restores modernization rates to earlier projections, and provides increased funding for spare parts and support equipment which should enhance operational readiness and combat sustainability. The committee remains determined to ensure that future defense authorizations ad- dress with equal concern the needs of modernization, readiness and combat sustainability. Modernization should proceed concurrently Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 with improvements to readiness levels, not at the expense of readiness, or vice versa. Industrial Base The committee strongly endorses the Administration's efforts to procure aircraft and other weapons at efficient production rates. Years ? of inefficient procurement rates and unreliable forecasts of outyear production plans have caused the subcontractor base to atrophy and have led to unacceptably long lead times for such vital components as castings, forgings and micro-circuitry components. Increased weapon system procurement rates along with an unequivocal commitment to outyear plans should help to revitalize and stabilize our industrial base. This committee believes it is essential to the defense posture of the United States to increase both the capacity and stability of the plete understanding of its ramifications. Accordingly, the committee will conduct a special series of hearings to assess the state of our industrial base and to formulate recommendations. Cost Growth The committee continues to be concerned over the excessive cost growth reflected in revised estimates of total program development and procurement costs for many of our major weapon systems. It is recognized that a substantial portion of "cost growth" is due to revised inflation estimates, the effect of which is particularly apparent for those programs just entering production and therefore facing exten- sive outyear procurement. However, cost growth has also been appar- ent in some programs that are in more mature stages of procurement. The Blackhawk helicopter for example is entering its fifth year of production and has experienced a program cost growth (from the fiscal year 1981 budget submit to the fiscal year 1982 projection) in excess of $2.5 billion. In general, the factors contributing to cost growth other than revised inflation assumptions, include changes in requirements, changes in program scope, revised engineering and production estimates, and schedule changes. Whatever the cause, such significant cost growth discredits the defense establishment and jeopardizes the future of vital programs. While the responsibility for controlling cost growth is shared equally by the services and industry, each service and the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense bear a responsibility for increased management atten- tion at every stage of the acquisition process. At the minimum this increased management attention should ensure (1) the complete and accurate determination of system requirements, (2) a realistic pro- jection ? of cost and development schedule, (3) close monitoring of actual development and production costs, and (4) the earliest possible identification of problem areas. When cost growth is excessive it is the responsibility of each service in conjunction with OSD to re-examine its requirements and re-assess Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 the capabilities of alternative systems. A less capable alternative, when it is also less expensive, may be preferable to a program develop- ment so distended with cost growth that it can be continued only at the expense of other vital requirements. Commonality In addition to seeking economies in cost-effective alternatives, the services should pursue commonality in systems and subsystems to the greatest extent practicable. At a minimum, this effort should include missile systems and subcomponents, aircraft subsystems and major combat vehicle subsystems. Expensive, unique systems with only lim- ited applications can expect only unique and limited support from Congress. Equipment Readiness Low mission-capable rates continue to plague our tactical air forces. This situation is due largely to inadequate funding of spares and sup- port equipment in prior years, and the difficulty each of the services has experienced in retaining skilled maintenance personnel. Addi- tionally, the pursuit of incremental gains in performance through development of systems on the leading edge of technology has, in iso- lated instances, led to unacceptable system reliability and durability. The problems of spares funding, personnel retention and support equipment maintenance are being addressed. The problems associated with highly sophisticated technology, however, are more elusive and cannot be solved simply by increasing expenditures. This committee believes that the U.S. must continue to exploit its technological ad- vantage over the Soviets-the numerical superiority enjoyed by Soviet forces compels this decision. But in order to obtain the full benefit from this technological advantage, industry and the Services must strive to improve not just capability, but reliability and maintainability as well, through the application of sophisticated technology. Technology should be applied to build in reliability and simplify maintenance, not just to improve performance. Stand-Off Weapons The committee believes that future developmental efforts should continue in the direction of improving standoff capability in both tar- get detection and weapons delivery. Such programs as NATO Identifi- cation, Advanced Identification Techniques, SOTAS and Pave Mover are all designed to enable the early detection or identification of enemy forces. This long-range detection capability is essential against a nu- merically superior threat. Moreover, standoff weapons, such as cruise missiles and precision guided munitions, are necessary to insure the survivability of launch platforms or reduce risk to ground forces. The Tomahawk, MRASM, WAAM. Harpoon, Maverick, GBU-15, and Copperhead are all de- signed for stand-off delivery with the intent to reduce exposure to enemy defenses. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Aircraft and Helicopter Inventory The following table summarizes Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft and helicopter inventories : Army attack helicopters___________ 0 0 304 0 950 31 951 43 Navy/Marine Corps aircraft-------- 2, 907 342 2, 786 279 1,796 282 1,812 273 Air Force aircraft_________________ 2, 586 464 3, 406 300 2,750 974 2,839 1,031 Air Force: Bombers___________1,509 2 779 0 412 409 ----- Strategic interceptors952 591 579 444 139 175 146 116 Patrol/reconnaissance/electronic war- fare ----------------------------- 1,772 461 2,099 400 890 393 901 372 Army aircraft____________________ 164 0 211 0 165 62 163 61 Navy/Marine Corps aircraft-------- 1, 013 269 879 233 399 140 399 139 Air Force aircraft_________________ 595 192 1,009 167 326 191 339 172 Navy/Marine Corps aircraft-------- 444 71 400 75 115 49 108 42 Air Force ai'craft ................. 3,325 1,011 3,025 752 1,378 559 1,380 523 Utility/support/other------------------ 12,122 1,384 16,593 1,205 9,169 3,560 9,257 3,524 Army:. Aircraft_____________________ 2,062 663 1,772 397 231 122 228 124 Helicopters__________________ 3,107 342 7,294 487 4,311 2,969 4,393 2,956 Navy/Marine Corps: Aircraft_____________________ 2,088 103 2,308 86 1,311 79 1,294 85 Helicopters__________________ ? 1,143 11 1,4 1 1 34 1,188 148 1,190 138 Air Force Aircraft 3, 321 265 3, 343 201 1, 898 207 1,923 187 Helicopters__________________ 401 0 465 0 230 35 229 34 Total, aircraft______________ 20, 966 3,973 20, 497 2,934 10,920 2, 840 11, 040 2, 813 Total, helicopters---------- 4,651 353 9,474 521 6,679 3,183 6,763 3,171 Ground Forces Balance and Capability As a result of funding constraints in prior years there exist short- falls in the inventory of ground combat vehicles for both the active and reserve forces. War reserve stocks, required to ensure sustainability in the event of conflict, are also deficient. And finally, the surge capac- ity of the defense industrial base has been allowed to atrophy to the point where the nation's ability to meet war time equipment demands with new production hardware is in serious question. When considered in context with the steadily expanding capability of Soviet forces confronting NATO forces in Europe these shortfalls are of great concern. The Soviets now enjoy a numerical advantage in ground combat vehicles which the United States is not expected to overcome. Instead, the United States must rely on technological superiority to offset this numerical disadvantage. However, an examination of the Army's current ground combat weapon system assets reveals not only a quantitative disadvantage but a qualitative disadvantage as well. Unlike our naval and air forces, which have in general maintained some technological or performance advantage over their Soviet counterparts, Army and Marine Corps Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 inventories of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other tracked and rolling stock are not only outnumbered but are also technologically outmatched by Soviet hardware (see Table I). According to Army testimony, it will take several years for the United States to regain this qualitative edge. TABLE I.-COMPARISON OF QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE BETWEEN U.S.-U.S.S.R. LAND FORCES WEAPON CATEGORIES CURRENT ADVANTAGE US USSR TANKS ........>>....>.>..>>..>>..>>.>.>. >>>>....>.>.>.. Raft P ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILES FIELD ARTILLERY (CANNON).---- FIELD ARTILLERY (ROCKET) ATTACK HELICOPTERS ...i' INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES..... -a Mini AIR DEFENSE GUNS >..>.>-....._ ...............>.>....> SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES Ground Forces Modernization Table II provides a break-out of active and reserve inventories of ground combat vehicles and artillery for fiscal years 1964, 1968, 1981, and 1982. The near-term fielding of the M-1 Main Battle Tank and the In- fantry Fighting Vehicle will initiate major modernization improve- ments of the Army's inventory of ground combat vehicles. These systems are considered equal or superior to their Soviet counterparts. The procurement of a family of in-production lightweight armored vehicles in the early 1980's will further enhance the combat capability and deplorability of both Army and Marine forces. For the late 1980's the committee supports the development by the Marine Corps of a new Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 generation of advanced lightweight armored vehicles for use by the ground combat forces of the United States. These efforts, together with improvements in anti-armor precision guided weapons and with the fielding of the Patriot, Roland, and Divad air defense systems are expected to restore a margin of quali- tative superiority in U.S. ground forces over that of the Soviet Union. Army------------------ 12,205 ---------- 13,121 --_--_-_-- 8,545 2,936 8,545 2,936 Marine Corps_---------- 467 70 467 70 453 123 453 123 Armored personnel carriers 8, 487 144 10, 364 144 8, 288 4, 042 8, 288 4,042 Army------------------ 17,803 ---------- 19,680 -__---_--- 7,461 3,938 7,461 3,938 Marine corps ----------- 684 144 684 144 827 104 827 104 Artillery------------------- 4, 619 1, 758 6,327 1, 901 4, 028 1, 919 4, 314 1, 917 Army---------------- -- 4,313 1,650 5, 859 1, 793 3, 452 1, 806 3,643 1,804 Marine Corps ----------- 306 108 468 108 576 113 671 113 1 A breakout of Active and Reserve equipment is not available. Chemical Warfare The committee has become increasingly concerned about the serious imbalance which exists in United States versus Soviet chemical war- fare capabilities. In connection with action on the fiscal year 1981 Military Construction Authorization bill, the committee heard testi- mony which graphically depicted the severity of that imbalance and the urgent need for a modern, effective U.S. offensive chemical capa- bility to offset the current Soviet advantage. Subsequently, the Con- gress enacted legislation providing funds for construction of a binary chemical weapons production faciity at Pine Bluff, Ark. This action was a necessary urst step toward restoring credibility to the U.S. chemical deterrent. The committee is pleased to note that the Reagan administration has included a request for $20 million to procure equipment needed for this facility. It is the hope of the committee that affirmative congres- sional action will t,e ft i ilcoming. While the committee supports the various initiatives contained in the January and amended Presidential requests for chemical defensive systems, it recognizes that in no other area of weaponry is the cost ef- fectiveness ratio more skewed to the advantage of the offense. Whereas millions of dollars can be spent trying to provide chemical protection to a command post, an air base, or an aircraft carrier, it will only cost a few thousand dollars to produce and deliver a chemical weapon which will result, at the very least, in a reduction of the mission effec- tiveness of these critical facilities and systems. Consequently, the com- mittee believes that it is essential for the United States to have the capability to deter tie first use of chemical weapons by any adversary. Only a credible, effective retaliatory capability provides such a deterrent. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 The committee also believes that several important steps must be taken in the area of chemical warfare by the Department of Defense and other Government agencies. A greater allocation of resources to the collection and analysis of intelligence about the chemical warfare capabilities` of our potential adversaries is essential. Whatever con- fidence we.have in our chemical defensive capabilities is, and must be, directly related to olzr confidence in understanding the threat. The committee endorses the finding of the 1980 Defense Science Board Summer Study on chemical warfare issues, which concluded that a critical need exists for a single focal point for chemical policy, R. & D., and procurement in the senior levels in the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense. A study is now underway to determine which official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be tasked with this responsibility. The Secretary of Defense should inform the Senate Committee on Armed Services of the results of such study as soon as is practicable, but certainly not later than at the time of submission of the fiscal year 1983 authorization request. The committee is gravely concerned about the Nation's imminent need to begin to dispose of thousands of tons of obsolete chemical agents in a program which will take a decade to complete. The need for and difficulty in disposing of these highly toxic. chemicals makes manifest the desirability of introducing binary weapons into the stock- pile both from the standpoint of improved safety and ease of dis- posal. The pressing demilitarization problem also requires that the Q.S. proceed promptly with binary production so as not to put the Nation in a position of unilaterally disarming as it disposes of its obsolescent chemical stockpile. The committee regards the chemical demilitarization problem as a national issue which will require the devotion of substantial resources over the next decade. While the Army has been charged with manag- ing and controlling this lethal stockpile, the cost attending the needed demilitarization program is clearly beyond the Army's ability to ab- sorb within its budget. The committee requests that a study be con- ducted by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the committee by December 1, 1981. This study should examine the total costs and other requirements of handling and disposing of the United States' obsolete chemical stockpile together with a funding plan and profile for accomplishing this necessary action within the next 10 years. Preparedness Perspectives One of the primary interests of the committee this year was to focus on readiness and sustainability issues. The development of this interest reflects the commnittee's increasing desire to relate more effectively the budget authorization process to improvements in overall force capability. The committee's hearing structure was designed to assess the in- dividual Services' ability to identify readiness problems experienced by major field commands; to formulate priorities and to develop solu- tions to these problems within the budget planning and programing process; and to execute Service priorities within a time frame relevant to the field commander. The subcommittee received testimony on the operational readiness of major commands, on the budget program- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 jug and resource allocation process, and on the operation and mainte- nance budgets. The subcommittee's assessment of this testimony was measured against the broad categories of force structure. moderniza- tion, readiness, and sustainability. Without question, the testimony received regarding the operational readiness of U.S. forces is cause for concern. Senior commanders testi- fied that the Army is incapable of executing a one-and-one-half war strategy; fleet commanders confirmed that today's Navy is not capable of fulfilling all of its peacetime missions simultaneously; and Air Force generals testified that current shortages in spare parts and selected munitions would seriously constrain combat sustainability in the event of conflict. While the Army and Navy face serious personnel problems, under- lying deficiencies in material and force structure also degrade readi- ness. The Army has critical shortfalls in war reserve stocks for major end items which, in the event of a sudden emergency or mobilization, cannot be overcome within a revelant time frame.* In addition, the extreme shift in combat service support from the active force to the Reserve forces raises the sensitive question of how active Army units can receive adequate combat service support short of mobilization. The current operational tempo within the Navy is high and the fleet is stretched thin. Very little surge capability remains, and a con- tinuation of the current operating tempo will inevitably degrade man- power and material readiness. The only solutions to this problem ap- pear to be an increase in the number of ships in the inventory, a reduc- tion in stated foreign policy and national security requirements, or some combination of the two. Apart from the limitations on our capability to quickly deploy balanced and prepared units, and engage hostile forces wherever nec- essary, the current lack of combat sustainability among U.S. land, sea, and air forces requires the attention of the highest levels of the defense establishment. Across the board, the testimony received supports the view that past budgetary pressures to meet current operational requirements, and the desire to expand force structure and/or pursue modernization, have undercut or even eliminated funding for various war reserve stocks, spares, and munitions. A truly balanced defense effort cannot develop without consistent attention to war reserve requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must continue to identify key joint serv- ice requirements and shortfalls, but must improve their capability to enforce joint service priorities, and to impose these priorities, dur- ing the budget and defense planning process. Strategic lift, fuel handling and distribution support, munitions, and command/control/communications, are examples of factors which widely impair effective and sustained joint service operations. How- ever, the committee has noted that the priority of these issues in serv- ice budgets varies considerably. The committee is also concerned about potential inconsistencies between the combat sustainability of dif- ferent services within the same theaters of operation. If joint plan- ning is to produce the desired results, then national military priorities and objectives must be more clearly delineated and enforced in the budget process. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 The committee recognizes the Unit Status Report (C-Ratings) sys- tem as a helpful but inherently limited management tool in assess- ing unit readiness. While providing vital information on the personnel and equipment strength of individual units, the Unit Status Reports cannot (and were not intended to) reflect other operational factors of circumstances which can potentially enhance or degrade unit perform- ance in combat. The committee encourages the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue efforts toward development of more comprehensive and ac- curate measurement of force capability. Specific Conclusions and Recommendations Based upon testimony identifying key readiness and sustainability problems, the committee makes the following conclusions and recom- mendations : Army.-The committee noted that an increasing demand for re- sources within the Army budget has reduced the funding available for necessary war reserve spares. The.committee also noted that a contin- uing rise in the average age of wheeled combat and administrative use vehicles has increased the Army's demand for peacetime operating stocks of spare parts, further reducing the resources available for war reserves. The committee thus concluded that the Army's combat su- stainability is seriously constrained by insufficient war reserve stocks. The committee will continue to scrutinize increases in the procure- ment of major end-items to insure that they are accompanied by in- creased procurement-of secondary and support items. The committee recommends that war reserve spares for new equipment receive con- sideration in the early phases of modernization, consistent with the deployment priority of the receiving units and the rate of introduction of new equipment in the inventory. The committee will also con- sider further hearings to assess the availability and distribution of war reserve munitions and material, especially in light of new RDF re- quirements. Navy.-The committee is aware that high operating tempos and lack of sufficient maintenance and repair support are driving continued cannibalization of major end items throughout the fleet. The committee is concerned about the lack of sufficient accountabil- ity for Navy spares, and the. lack of responsiveness of the supply sys- tem to operational deficiencies. The committee is also concerned over the Navy's ability to track spare parts through revolving accounts. It is recommended that funding for aircraft spares receive more bal- anced and consistent attention in future Navy budgets. In assessing war reserve munitions, the committee reviewed the availability of selected missiles against war reserve requirements. The committee' identified significant shortfalls in Standard and Harpoon missiles. Harpoon shortfalls are of particular concern. The committee is also concerned over the continuing shortfall in war reserve torpedoes, and directs the. Navy and the Department of Defense to provide more consistent funding to address this shortfall. Navy/Air Force.-Both the Navy and Air Force have severe short- falls in key war reserve munitions, including Sparrow and Side- winder missiles. The committee is concerned that these shortfalls would significantly degrade Navy and Air Force sustainability in Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 air-to-air cambat, and believes that such shortfalls should be redressed as soon as practicable. Air Force.-The committee noted that the increasing average age of aircraft and expanding operational requirements have had a nega- tive impact on material readiness and have produced a significant near-term demand for spares. The committee fully endorses current Air Force efforts to redress readiness deficiencies through timely and full funding of Peacetime Operating Stocks and War Readiness Spares Kits requirements. However, the committee is concerned over the seri- ous sustainability problems implied by the recent lack of attention to Other War Reserve Materiel funding. The committee urges the Air Force and Department of Defense to extend the current commitment to Peacetime Operating Stocks and War Readiness Spares Kits fund- ing to the Other War Reserve Materiel area in the fiscal year 1983 budget. Civilian Personnel.-The committee received strong testimony em- phasizing the importance of civilian personnel support to military manpower and material readiness. Requests for additional civilian personnel in the amended budget were thus evaluated against the major civilian-related readiness de- ficiencies identified by the services in their testimony on the fiscal year 1982 (January) budget. For the Army, these deficiencies centered around borrowed and diverted military manpower; for the Navy and Air Force, depot maintenance activities. Based upon this gross analysis, the committee was satisfied that the emphasis and direction of requests for additional civilian personnel is consistent with the manpower and material readiness deficiencies identified in testimony. The committee therefore endorsed the DOD request for additional civilian personnel with only minor changes. Force Manning Perspectives The United States began the All-Volunteer Force era in 1973 with certain strategic and political factors underlying the conceptual and ideological bases for its military manpower policies. For the most part these fundamental assumptions remain valid. The principal potential manpower-intensive military emergency involving U.S. forces which has formed the planning base for man- power requirements since the transition to an All Volunteer Force began is a major war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, with ancillary action worldwide. Such a war would require the concomi- tant mobilization of civilian industry, massive manpower mobiliza- tion-particularly to meet ground force requirement for replace- ments-and force expansion to continue the war as long as necessary. Using this scenario as a starting point, a series of assumptions shaped current military manpower policies since the early 1970's. -The United States needs enough conventional forces to permit responses to threats without resorting to strategic nuclear war. -The United States faces a long-term challenge from the presence of large Soviet conventional forces in Europe and the USSR that are configured to pose a direct threat to NATO forces in Europe, the Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, and to U.S. national interests in the Middle East and East Asia. -Active duty military strength needs to be maintained at least at 2.2-2.3 million, along with combat-ready and responsive Reserve components, to ensure a prudent minimum level with which to meet initial U.S. national security commitments worldwide. -Major military manpower assets would be required and furnished by our NATO allies in the event of a conflict in Europe. -The manpower requirements for any contingencies more limited than a full-scale United States/Soviet conflict would be less than those for the broader contingency. -Any military action anywhere in the world other than a compara- tively minor show of force would probably require the augmentation of active duty forces with Reserves and/or draftees; a NATO/War- saw Pact conflict is projected to require immediate reinstitution of conscription. When the All Volunteer Force began in 1973, the basic strategy of policies designed to provide adequate military manpower to meet antic- ipated contingencies was that of manning both the active and Reserve forces with volunteers in peacetime, with a standby Selective Service System theoretically capable of quick reactivation to provide draftees in an emergency. Several of the underlying assumptions on which those manpower policies are based, however, have changed since the AVF began in 1973. Soviet military capabilities have increased substan- tially, in terms of : quantity and quality of manpower; quantity and sophistication of material; command, control, communications, and intelligence capability. In light of these increased Soviet capabilities, as well as other doctrinal and technical reevaluations of NATO/War- saw Pact war scenarios, the projected tempo, intensity, and duration of such a war have all increased. At the same time, U.S. active duty military strength has dropped from the levels envisioned when the transition to an All-Volunteer Force began. Reserve force strengths have also declined-in the case of the Individual Ready Reserve, the drop has been drastic. The current shortage of over a quarter of a million trained people could result in the utilization of Selected Reserve assets as "fillers" rather than as cohesive units. Finally, the United States has acquired military and strategic re- sponsibilities in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean-Southwest Asia re- gions which it did not have in the early 1970's. The likelihood of mili- tary action in these areas, which are in general those least accessible from North America, has greatly expanded the scope of contingencies which the U.S. Congress must take into account in evaluating man- power requirements. The Armed Services Committee is particularly concerned about the Navy's ability to man the increasing number of ships with the required number of personnel, particularly in the tech- nical and supervisory positions, to meet its increased commitments. The Navy is already short a significant number of petty officers. If the shortages persist the Navy will be unable to man the new ships enter- ing the fleet. The committee believes that the greatest challenge for the Services in the years ahead will be to man an increasing force structure with a shrinking pool of service eligible youth. The male youth population is Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 .projected to decline 16 percent during the decade of the 1980's. To meet this challenge the Services must successfully compete with the civilian marketplace to attract qualified individuals into the Armed Forces. Such successful competition will require establishment and continuous maintenance of adequate levels of military compensation relative to competing employers for the limited quality youth market. Various compensation initiatives last year have had a positive impact on near term recruiting and retention. The committee believes, however, that further future adjustments and initiatives will be required to sustain current favorable manning trends. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Background on Procurement Authorization In 1959, section 138, title 10, United States Code, was amended by enactment of section 412(b) of Public Law 86-149, which required an- nual congressional authorization of appropriations for the procure- ment of aircraft, missiles and naval vessels. Over the years, the law has been amended to require annual authorization of additional items such as tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes and related support equip- ment, and various other weapons. During the period January 28, 1981 through March 30, 1981, the committee and its various subcommittees held hearings on the Depart- ment of Defense fiscal year 1982 procurement request. Based on sup- porting testimony and other information provided to the committee, an exhaustive review of the many procurement programs and related requirements has been made. The committee's recommendations ap- pear in subsequent pages of this report. Summary of Recommended Funding Changes The tables below show comparisons of the amounts appropriated (revised current program) for procurement for fiscal year 1981 with itmounts requested for authorization in the President's budget for fis- cal year 1982 and those recommended by the committee. SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENT TO FISCAL YEAR 1982 PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST BY WEAPONS CATEGORIES 1981 revised 1982 March current amended Change from Committeerec- programI request request ommendation Aircraft____________________________________________ $17,849,475 $25,901,798 +$337,400 $26,239,198 Missiles____________________________________________ 7,221,181 10,278,770 -312,900 9,965,870 Naval vessels_______________________________________ 7,801,300 10,290,100 -171,500 10,118,600 Tracked combat vehicles_____________________________ 3,129,929 3,769,039 +50,000 3,819,039 Torpedoes__________________________________________ 322,859 516,600 -------------- 516,600 Other weapons______________________________________ 541,816 994,991 -------------- 994,991 Army National Guard equipment__________________________________________________ +50,000 50,000 I Does not reflect congressional action on the Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for procurement for fiscal year 1981, In the amount of .$2,360,294,000. SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENT TO FISCAL YEAR 1982 PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION REQUEST BY SERVICE [Dollar amounts In thousands; years are fiscal years) 1981 revised 1982 March current amended Change from Committee rec- program r request request ommendation Army______________________________________________ $6,129,400 18,782,600 -$234,100 $8,548,500 Navy (including Marine Corps)________________________ 16,996,106 23, 555, 507 -192,300 23, 363, 207 Air Force__________________________________________ 13,741,054 19,413,191 +379,400 19,792,591 ,1 Does not reflect congressional action on the Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for procurement for fiscal year 1981 In the amount of $2,360,294,000. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 50 TACTICAL FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT Committee Recommendations for Changes AM-IS (Cobra) Attack Helicopter The Army made no request for procurement of AH-1S attack helicopters for the Army National Guard. The AH-1S Cobra is the only deployable anti-armor attack helicopter in the Guard inventory, yet the Guard currently has on-hand only 12 percent of its requirement for this aircraft. The com ittee recognizes and fully supports the need for a strong National Gua d and consequently recommends authoriza- tion of $64.4 million for .he procurement of 20 AH-1S helicopters. A-7K (Corsair!!) Attack Aircraft The Air Force requested no funding for A-7K attack aircraft for the Air National Guard. The committee has consistently supported the Guard's requirement for the two-seat, combat-capable A-7K trainer aircraft and recommends authorization of $163.8 million for the pro- curement of 12 A-7K aircraft. This recommended procurement com- pletes the purchase of the final aircraft needed to meet the Guard requirements. F-18 (Hornet) Fighter/Attack Aircraft The committee continues to support the F-18 fighter/attack air- craft. Reliability and maintainability demonstrations and engine per- formance have been most encouraging. However, as with any test program, certain technical problems have been encountered. Aircraft range in the attack configuration has yet to be demonstrated and solu- tions are being sought to resolve software problems associated with the radar and aircraft computer. These considerations, along with continued program cost growth, warrant a cautious approach in pro- duction rate build-up. The March amended procurement authorization request was $1,890.1 million for 63 F-18 aircraft, an increase of $147.1 million for pro- curement of 5 additional aircraft above the January request. The committee recommends the deletion of $147.1 million for the pro- curement of the 5 additional aircraft. This would result in the pro- curement of 58 aircraft in fiscal year 1982 as per the January request. Recommended for Approval as Requested AH-64 Attack Helicopter The AH-64 Advanced Attack Helicopter will be the Army's quick- reacting, mobile, anti-tank weapon. The AH-64 will be capable of low-level navigation and attack at night or in adverse weather, and will be the Army's primary attack helicopter in the future. A-6E (Intruder) Attack Aircraft The A-6E Intruder is a two place, carrier based, medium attack aircraft. It is the Navy's only all-weather attack aircraft. AV-8B (Harrier) V/STOL Attack Aircraft The AV-8B is a V/STOL aircraft designed for light attack and close air support missions with the Marine Corps. The AV-8B rep- resents significant improvements in performance over the AV-8A. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 A-10 Attack Aircraft The committee endorses the Air Force request for 60 A-10 aircraft, 14 of which will be two-seat models for use in training. The A-10 is a single seat, close-combat support aircraft designed primarily for anti- armor attack. The Air Force has requested no long lead funding to continue the procurement of A-10 aircraft beyond fiscal year 1982. The committee is concerned over the termination of production of this low-cost, capa- ble aircraft at a time when the Air Force is actively seeking to con- vert the very expensive F-15 air superiority fighter into a ground attack aircraft. The committee encourages the Air Force to re-evalu- ate its future requirements for tactical aircraft and to reconsider the advisability of terminating A-10 production. F-14 (Tomcat) Fighter Aircraft The F-14 Tomcat is a two place, variable geometry, fleet defense fighter. With its long range Phoenix missiles, the F-14 is capable of protecting the fleet from the threat posed by Soviet Backfire bombers. F-15 (Eagle) Fighter Aircraft The F-15 is an air superiority fighter with a potential secondary ground attack mission. In testimony before the Tactical Warfare Subcommittee, the Air Force indicated that it plans to procure 42 F-15's in fiscal year 1982 with advance procurement for another 42 F-15's in fiscal year 1983, an increase of 24 aircraft above the original program buy of 729 aircraft. The Air Force has stated these addi- tional aircraft are intended for the air defense mission. The commit- tee recommends authorization of this request with the understanding that the additional 24 aircraft are to be dedicated to the air defense mission and are not to be used to augment currently authorized tac- tical fighter forces. F-16 (Falcon) Fighter/Attack Aircraft The F-16 is a highly maneuverable, fly-by-wire, air superiority fighter. In fiscal year 1981,.the committee authorized the advance pro- curement of 180 F-16 aircraft. This procurement level was supported by the Air Force and was selected because it was more efficient than any lower production rate. Nonetheless, the Air Force has chosen to request only 120 F-16's in fiscal year 1982. The committee approves the request for 120 F-16 aircraft but expects the Air Force to structure its future procurement plans to take the greaitest practicable advantage of economies available from efficient production rates. STRATEGIC AIRCRAFT Committee Recommendations for Changes B-52 Companion Trainer Aircraft The fiscal year 1982 amended authorization requests $18.7 million in R.D.T. & E. and $3.9 million in advance procurement funding for the Air Force B-52 Companion Trainer Aircraft (CTA) program. This authorization would permit concept design and would fund ad-'. vance procurement for-22 aircraft in fiscal year 1983. The CTA pro-' gram was initiated by the Air Force to provide greater in-fight train. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 ing for Strategic Air Command combat crews in the face of rising fuel costs. CTA would be off-the-shelf, commercial jet aircraft modi- fied to replicate B-52 flight operations for pilots, navigators, and other crew members. The Air Force believes that the CTA program would extend the service life of the aging B-52 aircraft and might save as much as one hundred million gallons of fuel per year. In its CTA R. & D. program, the Air Force seeks to evaluate the effectiveness of B-52 substitute training in a smaller aircraft and will clarify its CTA requirement in the context of possible commonality with a new tanker/transport/bomber trainer and a T-39 replacement. The B-52 CTA selection process is likely to be highly competitive with aircraft companies from around the world offering different purchase and lease options. The committee believes that the Air Force should carefully refine its requirements to achieve the most cost effective program possible. The committee recommends approval of the $18.7 million requested for R.D.T. & E., but recom- mends a reduction of $2.9 million for advanced procurement and will review reprograming requests after a CTA program has been de- fined. The committee also recommends that the Department of Defense be prohibited from obligating or expending any funds for advanced procurement until 60 days after a source selection decision has been submitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Recommended for Approval as Requested Multirole Strategic Bomber Last .year, the Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue vigorously full-scale engineering development of a strategic multirole bomber. Such a multirole aircraft is expected to maximize range, pay- load and capability to perform the missions of a conventional bomber, a cruise missile launcher, and a nuclear weapons delivery system in both the tactical and strategic role. The Congress authorized $300 million in R.D.T.&E. for that purpose and called for an initial operational capability as soon as possible, but in no case later than 1987. Candidate aircraft were to include the B-1 bomber or a B-1 derivative and a stretched FB-111B/C aircraft as well as advanced technology designs. A mid-March 1981 status report was required of the Secretary of Defense. The new administration has not yet made a recommendation for a new multirole bomber, but the administration's fiscal year 1982 defense budget amendment requests $2.1 billion in procurement and $302 mil- lion in R.D.T.&E. for a Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA). The committee believes that a new manned strategic bomber is needed not only to replace the aging B-52 bombers as penetrating bombers for the strategic Triad, but also in demanding conventional roles. Further- more, controversy over the future reliability and pre-launch surviva- bility of B-52 aircraft may make it prudent to have a follow-on cruise missile carrier airframe, particularly since air-launched cruise missiles are to become an indispensable part of our strategic nuclear deterrent. A mixed force of cruise missile carriers and penetrating bombers makes the bomber leg of the Triad a strong and flexible force. Concern over the future of the ICBM and SLBM components of our strategic forces Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 makes it all the more urgent that our strategic bomber force be mod- ernized. A bomber force capable of escaping attacks on its home bases and carrying weapons with a high probability of reaching their tar- gets is a powerful deterrent force. It is also a stabilizing force in that the long flight times required to reach intercontinental distance permit the bombers to be recalled, thus reducing the chance of an accidental confrontation. The committee supports the development and procurement of a new manned bomber and recommends approval of the authorization re- quested. However, the committee believes that the decision to procure a new strategic aircraft involves one of the largest investment decisions of this decade. For this reason, the committee recommends the adoption of a statutory provision which requires the President to submit to Congress his decision on the development and/or procurement of a long range combat air craft and requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a justification of such decision. The President's decision may be reversed by a resolution of disapproval in both Houses of Congress. PATROL/RECONNAISSANCE/ELECTRONIC WARFARE Committee Recommendations for Change P-3C (Orion) Patrol Aircraft The committee recommends the -addition of $46 million for the pro- curement of two additional P-3C aircraft to be used by the Naval Air Reserve. The Reserve Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) squadrons perform operational missions on a routine basis and are charged with providing qualified P-3C aircrews to regular Navy ASW squadrons upon mobilization. The reserve inventory consists primarily of older and less capable P-3A/B aircraft, although initiatives have been taken by the committee to upgrade the avionics configuration' of these aircraft. Procurement of two new P-3C aircraft for the Reserves will further improve their capabilities and will provide them with dedi- cated platforms to better perform operational missions and train reserve aircrews. Recommended for Approval as Requested SH-60B (ASW HELO) Seahawk The committee supports the LAMPS III procurement request of $585.6 million for 18 LAMPS III helicopters and $155.3 million for advance procurement. Nevertheless, the program's long history of sig- nificant cost growth, coupled with recent and dramatic cost increases, has caused the committee to give this program a detailed review prior to recommending this funding authorization. The committee's continued support for the program is based on several important factors : (1) the Navy has been forthright in its explanation of the problems and sincere in its effort to find solutions; (2) R. & D. costs for the LAMPS III program have closely adhered to original forecasts; (3) the helicopter and its equipment have per- formed with near perfection during tests; and (4) the capabilities of this system are critically needed in the fleet. Without LAMPS III, Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 the Navy's anti-submarine warfare capability will be. seriously com- prom: ised vis-a-vis the enormous qualitative improvements which the Soviets have made in.their submarine force. With it, the full potential of U.S. escort ships can be realized, and they will be able to keep pace with the developing Soviet threat. This does not mean, however, that the. committee believes that the rapidly rising program costs are justified or that future increases will be tolerated. To the contrary, the committee is very concerned about the performance of the two major contractors, IBM and Sikorsky. Future program cost increases which cannot be justified may compel the committee to recommend a delay or cancellation of the program. EA-6B (Prowler) Electronic Aircraft The EA-6B Prowler is a carrier based, electronic jammer aircraft designed to protect strike- aircraft by jamming enemy radars. TR-1 Surveillance Aircraft The TR-1 is a single crew, single engine, fixed wing aircraft de- signed as a platform for high altitude standoff surveillance. AIRLIFT/TANKER AIRCRAFT Committee Recommendation for Change C-9 (Skytrain) Airlift Aircraft The Naval Reserve seeks to replace its old and inefficient C-118's. The Navy intends to procure 12 aircraft described as "airline excess" which are available at a considerable savings over new procurement aircraft. The committee recommends the authorization of $50 million for the procurement of these 12 C-9 aircraft. C-130H (Hercules) Airlift Aircraft The committee recommends the addition of $172.2 million for the procurement of 12 C-130H aircraft for the Air National Guard and Air Reserve. These aircraft are needed to replace older, less capable tactical airlift aircraft. Recommended for Approval as Requested KC-10A The KC-10A Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft (ATCA) is a mili- tary derivative of the commercial DC-10 wide-body aircraft. Authori- zation for $437.0 million to procure eight KC-10A's is requested. As a tanker, its primary mission will be to support long-range, non-stop deployments of tactical fighter and strategic airlift forces. Its cargo capabilities also enable the KC-10A to augment U.S. strategic airlift forces. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 55 UTILITY/SUPPORT/OTHER AIRCRAFT Committee Recommendation for Change UH-60 (Blackhawk) Utility Helicopter The UH-60 Blackhawk is the Army's squad-carrying helicopter designed to lift an infantry squad of 11 combat equipped soldiers in tactical assaults and related combat support missions. Inaccurate cost estimates and failure to achieve projected efficiencies with program maturity have resulted in significant and continued cost increases in the Blackhawk program. This cost growth, occurring in the fifth year of aircraft production, raises serious questions about the performance of the contractor, and the program management of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. Since versions of the Blackhawk are intended or are being considered for use in several helicopter programs (e.g. SOTAS, H-X, Quick Fix, LAMPS III) the committee expects considerable improvement in program management in order to stabilize cost and protect the future of the Blackhawk program. The committee has learned that as a result of recent negotiations with the prime contractor, and a favorable "Should Cost" study con- ducted by the Army, a surplus in the Blackhawk program of $11 mil- lion in fiscal year 1981 and $14.1 million in fiscal year 1982 is expected. The total surplus, $25.1 million, is therefore deleted from the fiscal year 1982 authorization for Blackhawk procurement with the under- standing that $11.0 million is a recoupment from the fiscal year 1.981 authorization. Recommended for Approval as Requested CH-53E (Super Stallion) Helicopters Seven of the force of 17 Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) RH-53D helicopters were lost in the raid into Iran. Four of the CH- 53E's to be procured in fiscal year 1982 will be equipped and dedicated for the AMCM mission. Three additional AMCM helicopters are planned for procurement in fiscal year 1983 to fully replace the losses. At a later date, these seven helicopters will be further modified to an MH-53E configuration with improved AMCM capabilities. EC-130Q Aircraft The EC-130Q is a C-130 airframe modified and equipped with advanced communication gear used to provide airborne communica- tion linkage between national command and control authorities and Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 the strategic submarine force. The committee recommends authoriza- tion of the $74.9 million requested for procurement of two additional EC-130Q aircraft in= view of the requirement to provide greater TACAMO coverage for Atlantic and Pacific Ocean operations. The committee believes, however, that the current EC-130 airframe is only marginally capable of performing this important command, control and communications mission due to the fact that the present TACAMO payload exceeds the maximum weight permitted by such EC-130 aircraft. The electromagnetic pulse hardening program now underway adds additional weight which further aggravates this prob- lem. The committee believes that the Navy should proceed expedi- tiously to resolve these' difficulties and, in conjunction with other strategic command.. control and communication initiatives recom- mended by the committee, has requested a report on improved TACAMO options. AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS Committee Recommendations for Changes F-106 Modifications The Air Force requested $35.9 million in fiscal year 1982 to initiate a new program to modernize the radar, Instrument Landing System, and X-band transmitter assembly of existing F-106 strategic inter- ceptors and to make. various reliability improvements. This program is scheduled to take several years to complete and will cost over $115 million. In the amended fiscal year 1982 request, the Air Force pro- poses to increase its buy of F-15 aircraft and now plans to introduce this modern aircraft into the strategic defense mission in the next few years, thus permitting the earlier, retirement of the aging F-106 air- craft. The committee, therefore, recommends a reduction of $15.6 mil- lion in the request for F-106 modifications which do not involve safety related improvements. B-52 Modification In 1978 the decision to terminate B-1 bomber production was accom- panied by a large supplemental authorization request for air-launched cruise missile development and for B-52 modifications. These modi- fications were to provide a mixed bomber force containing both stand- off B-52 cruise missile carriers and enhanced B-52 penetrators. In light of the fiscal year 1982 budget amendment requesting procure- ment authorization for a long range combat aircraft, the committee recommends a reduction in the scope of the B-52 modification pro- gram for B-52D model aircraft which are not included in the Air Launched Cruise Missile program and recommends an authorization reduction of $12.1 million. P-3 Tactical Navigation Modification The effectiveness of the Naval Reserve P-3A antisubmarine warfare aircraft is limited by the older configuration of its avionics suite. The Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 committee recommends the addition of $30.3 million to continue to upgrade the Reserve fleet to the P-3C avionics configuration. This modification will significantly improve the current capability of Re- serve P-3's and ensure operational compatibility with active force assets. Recommended for Approval as Requested C-5, C-141, and C-130 Modifications The committee supports the modification programs to improve the capabilities and to extend the life of the fleet of existing strategic and tactical airlift. Key among these programs is the, C-5 wing replace- ment and the C-130 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The authorization request includes $384.5 million for these modification programs. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) Enhancement Under the CRAF program, there are 231 passenger aircraft and 111 cargo-carrying aircraft from U.S. commercial airlines committed to use by the Department of Defense in time of war or national emer- gency. The CRAF Enhancement program would modify wide-body passenger aircraft to enable them to carry cargo in.a crisis. This pro- gram is the least costly method of increasing U.S. cargo airlift capa- bilities, costing only 10 percent of the cost of acquiring and operating dedicated military airlift. For this reason, the committee recommends authorization of the requested funding and supports the Department of Defense's plans to modify new and inservice wide-body aircraft. FISCAL YEAR 1982 ARMY AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST [Amount In millions of dollars( Fiscal year 1982 amended request Change from request Recommendation Rotary: AH-64 attack helicopter ---------------------- 14 $415.8 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ -50.8 ________________________________________ Net------------------------------------------ 365.0 ---------------------- 14 $365.0 AH-64 attack helicopter: Advance procurement(CY) ----------------------- 64.4 ------------------------------ 64.4 AH-1S attack helicopter_________________________________ 0 +20 +$64.4 20 64.4 UH-60A (Black Hawk) ---------------------- 96 532.2 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- -23.5 ---------------------------------------- Net- ------------------------------------------ 508.7 ---------- -25.1 96 483.6 UH-60A (Black Hawk): Advance procurement (CY)_______________________ 60.6 ------------------------------ 60.6 Modification of aircraft__________________________________ 449.8 ------------------------------ 449.8 Aircraft spares and repair parts_____________________________ 220.7 ______________________________ 220.7 Aircraft support equipment and facilities_____________________ 128.2 ------------------------------ 128.2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 5`8 FISCAL YEAR 1982 NAVY AIRCRAFr PROCUREMENT REQUEST Amount in millions of dollars] Fiscal year 1982 amended request Change from request Recommendation Combat aircraft: A-6E (attack) Intruder_______________________ 12 $281.7 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ -11.8 ---------------------------------------- Net-------------------------------------------- 269.9 ---------------------- 12 $269.9 A-6E (attack) Intruder: Advance procurement (CY)_________________________ 7.3 ----------------------------------- 7.3 EA-6B (electronic warfare) Prowler___________ 6 244.7 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- -15.2 ---------------------------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- 229.5 ---------------------- 6 229.5 EA-68 (electronic warfare) Prowler: Advance procurement (CV)_________________________ 16.8 ---------------------------------- 16.8 AV-8B (V/STOL) -------------------------- 12 663.9 ---------------------------------------- -- Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- -88.7 ---------------------------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- 575.2 ---------------------- 12 575.2 AV-88 (V/STOL): Advance procurement (CV)_________________________ 49.0 ---------------------------------- 49.0 F-14A (fighter) Tomcat______________________ 30 1,034.5 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PV)_________ -145.8 ---------------------------------------- Net-------------------------------------------- 888.7 ---------------------- 30 888.7 F-14A (fighter) Tomcat: Advance procurement (CV)_________________________ 159.1 --------------------------------- 159.1 F-18 Hornet -------------------------- 63 2,016.7 --------------------------------------- ------ Less: Advance procurement (PV)___________________ -126.6 ---------------------------------------- Net - 1, 890.1 -5 -$152.0 58 1, 738.1 -- F-18 Advance procurement --------- 236.4 ---------- +4.9 ---------- 241.3 CH-53E (helicopter) Super Stallion ------------ 14 250.3 ---------------------- 14 250.3 Advance procurement (CV)_________________________ 22.8 ---------------------------------- 22.8 SH-60B Seahawk --------------------------- 18 690.6 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ -105.0 ---------------------------------------- Net 585.6 --------------------- 18 585.6 ---- SH-SOB 155.3 --------------------------------- 155.3 i n P 3C l) O t 427.1 ------------------------------------ ro r o (pa - ..------------------------ Less: Advance procurement (PV)------------------- -46.9 ---- ---------------------------------------- Net ----------------------------------------- 380.2 +2 +46.0 14 426.2 P-3C (patrol) Orion: Advance procurement (CY)_________________________ 84.3 ---------------------------------- 84.3 E-2C (early warning) Hawkeye------- 6 246.1 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement -19.8 ---------------------------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- 226.3 ---------------------- 6 226.3 E-2C (early warning) Hawkeye: Advance procurement( CV)_________________________ 20.5 ---------------------------------- 20.5 SH 2F S rite 232.3 ---------------------------------------- easp - ---------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PV)------------- ------ -19.7 ---------------------------------------- - Net ------------------------------- - 212.6 ---------------------- 18 212.6 ----------- - SH-2F Seasprite: Advance procurement (CV)_____________ 20.0 ---------------------------------- 20.0 Airlift aircraft: ------------------------------ C-9 transport aircraft--- 0 +12 +50.0 12 50.0 - UC-12B ------------------------------- .2 ------------------------------------ .2 --------------- C-2 Advance procurement (CV) 32.0 ---------------------------------- 32.0 ___________________- -0 Trainer aircraft: T-34C ------------------------------ ---- ----------- ------ TH-57------------------------------------- 30 15.8 -------------------- -- 30 15.8 Other aircraft: EC-130Q (TACAMO) Hercules________________ 2 74.9 ----------------------- 2 74.9 ____________________________________ Modification of airs aft 977.3 ---------- +30.3 ---------- 1,007.6 _ Aircraft spares and repair pal- --------------------- 1,546.9 ------------------------------- 1,546.9 Aircraft support equipment and facilities_____________________ 372.3 --------------------------------- 372.3 9,352.5 +9 -20.8 292 9, 331.7 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Tactical forces: A-7K trainer aircraft___________________________________ $0 +12 +$151.6 12 $151.6 A-10-------------------------------------- 60 Less: Advance procurement(PY)------------------- 624.2 -81.8 ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- F-5 F -------------------------------------- 3 23.7 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- -7.0 ________________________________________ F-15A/B/C/D---------------- 42 - - - ---- -- 1,232.0 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)_ - - - - ---------- -130.2 ---------------------------------------- Net ------------------------------------------- 1,101.8 -------------------- 42 1,101.8 F-15A/B/C/D: Advance procurement (CY)________________ 125.4 ------------------------------ 125.4 F-16A/B---------------------------------- 120 1,555.1 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- -166.8 ---------------------------------------- Not ---------- --------------------------------- 1,388.3 -------------------- 120 1,388.3 F-16A/B: Advance procurement (CY)____________________ 268.6 ------------------------------ 268.6 Strategic offensive: Long range combat aircraft_____________________________ 1,632.0 ------------------------------ 1,632.0 LRCA: Advance procurement( CV)______________________ 310.0 ------------------------------ 310.0 Survivable enduring communications____________________ 0 ------------ +3.5 -------- 3.5 AFSATCOM Terminal_________________________________ 0 ------------ +10.0 -------- 10.0 Other combat aircraft: FISCAL YEAR 1982 AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT REQUEST [Amount in millions of dollars[ Fiscal year 1982 amended request Change from request Recommendation KC-10A (ATCA)---------------------------- 8 437.0 -------------------- 8 437.0 MC-130H: Advance procurement (CY)___________________ 33.3 ------------------------------ 33.3 E-3A-------------------------------------- 2 236.0 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ -66.0 ---------------------------------------- Net---------------- ------------------------ 170.0 -------------------- 2 170.0 E-3A: Advance procurement (CY)_______________________ 100.0 ------------------------------ 160.0 Trainer aircraft: B-52 companion trainer________________________________ 3.9 ---------- -2.9 ---------- 1.0 Helicopters: UH-60A helicopter -------------------------- 12 63.0 ------------------ 12 63.0 Tactical airlift: C-130H aircraft--------------------------------------- 0 +12 +163.4 12 163.4 Other aircraft: TR-L------------------------------------- 6 Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- Net ----------------------------------Net............................................ TR-1: Advance procurement (CY)_______________________ Modification of Inservice aircraft____________________________ Aircraft spares and repair parts___;____ Aircraft support equipment and facilities 111.2 ---------------------------------------- -7.1 ---------------------------------------- 104.1 ------------------ 6 104.1 9.6 ------------------------------ 9.6 2,132.1 ---------- -27.7 ---------- 2,104.4 4, 266.1 ---------- +21.0 ---------- 4,287.1 2,041.3 ------------------------------ 2,041.3 MISSILE PROCUREMENT AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES Recommended for Approval as Requested AIM-7M Sparrow The AIM-7M Sparrow missile is a joint Navy/Air Force medium- range, air-to-air missile with semi-active radar guidance. To address inventory shortfalls, both the Navy and the Air Force have increased Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 their procurement rates for the AIM-7M missile which incorporates the latest technical improvements. AIM-9L/M Sidewinder The Sidewinder is a joint Navy/Air Force short range, air-to-air missile with heat-seeking (infrared) guidance. The AIM-9M is the newest version of the Sidewinder missile. It incorporates an improved infrared (IR) seeker which is less susceptible to countermeasures. AIM-54AIC Phoenix The AIM-54A/C Phoenix is the Navy's long range air-to-air inter- ceptor missile employed by the F-14 fighter. The AIM-54C will incor- porate advanced digital electronics and an improved target detector designed to enhance current operational capabilities. AIR-TO-GROUND MISSILES Recommended for Approval as Requested AGM-88 HARM The HARM missile is an air-to-ground defense suppression weapon designed to destroy enemy radar units. Both the Air Force and Navy will procure the HARM missile in fiscal year 1982 at a total authoriza- tion level of $243.6 million. The HARM missile is the only lethal defense suppression missile now in production and represents a con- siderable extension of present capability. The committee strongly supports the procurement of this weapon. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES Committee Recommendation for Change Patriot Air Defense System The Army's Patriot Air Defense Missile System is a surface-to-air missile system intended to provide for low and medium altitude area air-defense coverage for ground combat forces. Million January request--------------------------------------------------- $527.1 March request----------------------------------------------------- 900.5 Recommended authorization---------------------------------------- 527.1 Change------------------------------------------------------ -373.4 The committee recommends denial of the amended budget request for an additional $373.4 million for the procurement of the Patriot air defense system. The Patriot system has experienced reliability and maintainability difficulties as well as problems wtih the fire control software. Last year, the committee asked the Secretary of Defense to certify to the Congress prior to commitment of production funding that the Patriot system was suitable for hardware production. Sub- sequently, the Secretary of Defense notified Congress on November 17, 1980, that the Patriot system would be released only for limited pro- duction with additional testing required prior to a decision to increase production. The amended budget request would restore funding to a level beyond that which is required for "limited production." The committee fully supports the requirement for the Patriot air defense system but believes that only limited production funding should be Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 approved since further specified testing must be completed to resolve existing problems. Recommended for Approval as Requested Roland Air Defense System The Roland is an all weather, short-range surface to air missile system designed for point defense of rear areas against low altitude targets. Stinger Air Defense Missile The Stinger is a short range, clear weather, shoulder fired surface- to-air missile (SAM) that will replace the Redeyb missile. Stinger is being procured by both the Army and Marine Corps. Rapier Air Defense System In a joint program with the British government, the Air Force will procure the Rapier air defense system for defending U.S. air bases in the United Kingdom. It is the committee's understanding that the Air Force will procure the missile systems and the British will provide and pay for the manpower to operate the Rapier units. The com- mittee fully supports this cooperative effort to provide improved air defense for these bases. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES Recommended for Approval as Requested TOW Missile The TOW is a guided, anti-tank assault weapon system intended to provide a heavy fire capability against armored vehicles and forti- fied point targets. TOW missiles are being procured by both the Army and Marine Corps. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) The Multiple Launch Rocket System consists of a tracked, self- propelled vehicle, fire control equipment, and disposable pods of 230mm rockets. The MLRS will supplement conventional artillery in attack- ing area targets. Harpoon Missile The AGM-84A Harpoon Missile is an air/surface/sub-surface- launched antiship missile with radar guidance. Propelled by a turbo- jet engine, Harpoon provides an all-weather, standoff capability against enemy surface ships. STRATEGIC MISSILES Recommended for Approval as Requested Trident I Missile The Trident I missile is the latest generation of strategic submarine- launched ballistic missiles developed by the United States. The Tri- dent I provides a significant improvement in range and accuracy over its predecessors, the Polaris and Poseidon missile systems. While the Trident I was originally intended to be deployed onboard Ohio- class submarines, delays in deliveries of Ohio-class submarines have Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 resulted in the Trident I missile going to sea first on backfitted Posei- don submarines. The completion in fiscal year 1982 of this retrofit program with the outfitting of a squadron of 12 Poseidon submarines will represent a significant enhancement of the U.S. sea-based strategic deterrent. Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) In fiscal year 1982 the air-launched cruise missile will become opera- tional with America's strategic bomber forces. The ALCM is the major American strategic initiative of the early 1980's and, because of un- certainties in the modernization programs for the other legs of our strategic Triad, a successful ALCM program is a critical element of our effort to avoid any further deterioration in U.S. strategic nuclear forces relative to those of the Soviet Union. Uneven results in the ALCM test program both prior to the selection of a production model and in the follow-on extended test program are cause for concern. While the committee recommends approval of the funding request for the program as submitted, it intends to monitor closely the results of the testing and development of the air-launched cruise missile program. Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) The committee fully supports the theater nuclear forces moderni- zation agreement reached within the NATO alliance in December 1979, which will result in 464 GLCM's being operationally deployed in Europe. The committee believes that this agreement is immutable. This 'agreement was reached because the Alliance members recognize the threat posed to their security by the current imbalance in theater nuclear forces and because such member nations are determined to redress this imbalance. Cost overruns have resulted from technical problems with the launcher and from underestimates of training hard- ware requirements, but actual costs of the missile itself are lower than predicted. The committee believes this program deserves the highest priority and therefore recommends approval of the administration's funding request of $329.2 million for GLCM missile procurement. MK-12A Warhead The Mark-12A warhead is designed to replace the MK-12 war- heads deployed on the MIRVed Minuteman III force. The Mark- 12A's higher yield gives these missiles significantly greater damage expectancy. Currently, the Air Force has programed only 300 Minute- man IIIs for retrofitting with the Mark-12A. The MX is also slated for deployment with the MK-12A. While deliveries of the Mark-12A for the presently planned Minuteman retrofit will be completed in mid-1982, the committee notes that production for the MX program will not start until early 1985. The committee has learned that the Strategic Air Command has requested that an additional 150 Minuteman Ills be configured with Mark-12A warheads. In light of this requirement for additional Mark-12A warheads and in view of the need to maximize the capabil- ities of our existing IOBM force, the committee believes that a 34-month gap in the production line is undesirable. Apart from these operational considerations, a substantial cost penalty would result Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 63 from a suspension of the MK-12A warhead production effort. The committee, therefore, recommends the addition of $53.7 million to continue Mark 12-A production at a reduced rate. These funds will initiate the procurement of an additional 510 warheads for 150 addi- tional Minuteman III retrofits, plus the necessary test warheads and spares. At the same time, an active production line for MX warheads will be maintained. SPACE PROGRAMS Global Positioning Satellites In the past, the committee has expressed its support for the NAVSTAR/Global Positioning Satellite system. The committee con- tinues to believe that the NAVSTAR/GPS system holds real promise as a device which can significantly enhance the mission effectiveness of U.S. strategic and tactical forces. The deployment of the full satel- lite constellation originally planned will optimizes the Global Position- ing Satellite system's capabilities. The committee believes that NAVSTAR/GPS may be a candidate for multi-year procurement which could result in substantial savings over the life of the presently planned program and/or an acquisition strategy which could support procurement of the full 24 satellite system for approximately the cost of the 18 satellites presently planned. SUMMARY OF MISSILE PROCUREMENT FISCAL YEAR 1982 ARMY MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQUEST [Amount in millions of dollars[ Surface-to-air missiles: Chaparral (MIM-72-A/C)_______________________________ n3 -------------------------------- $4.3 Hawk (MIM-23-B)------------------------------------ .7 -------------------------------- 4.7 U.S. Roland-------------------------------- 795 477.0 -------------------- 795 477.0 Patriot (SAM-D)---------------------------- 364 820.8 -234 -$334.7 130 486.1 Stinger------------------------------------ 2,544 223.9 -------------------- 2 544 223.9 Air-to-surface missile: Hellfire------------------------------------ 1,075 128.4 , -------------------- 1 075 128 4 Antitank/assault missiles: TOW (BGM-71A)---------------------------- 12,000 96.6 , -------------------- 12,000 . 96.6 Pershing----------------------------------- 39 191.8 ____________________ 39 191.8 Multiple launch rocket system________________ 2,496 179.3 -------------------- 2,496 179.3 Modifications--------------------------------------------- 440.8 -------- ------- - --- -- 440.8 Spares and repair parts____________________________________ 234.1 __________ -38.7 --- - - 195.4 Support equipment and facilities____________________________ 40.8 ---- -------------------------------- 40.8 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84MOO715ROO0100010002-2 64 FISCAL YEAR 1982 NAVY MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQUEST Fiscal year 1982 amended request Change from request Recommendation Ballistic missiles: UGM-73A (C-3) Poseidon______________________________ UGM-96A (C-4) Trident I-------------------- 72 Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- UGM-96A (C-4) Trident is Advance procure- men:(CY)--------------------- -------------------- UGM-73A (C-3) Poseidon (modification)__________________ Support equipment and facilities________________________ Strategic missiles: BGM-109 Tomahawk`_______________________ 88 Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ Net BGM-109 Tomahawk: Advance procurement ----------- (Cy) ----------------------------------------------- $18.7 ------------------------------ $18.7 783.2 ---------------------------------------- -118.1 ---------------------------------------- 665.1 ---------------------- 72 665.1 244.8 ------------------------------- 244.8 10.1 ------------------------------ 10.1 20.2 ------------------------------ 20.2 224.9 ---------------------------------------- -14.0 ---------------------------------------- 1 actical missiles: AIM/RIM-7 F/M Sparrow_____________________ 905 144.7 --------------------- 905 144.7 AM/9L/M Sidewinder_______________________ 910 49.5 --------------------- 910 49.5 AIM-54 A/C (Phoenix)_______________________ 72 Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ Net -------------------------------------------- AIM-54A/C (Phoenix): Advance procurement (CV)---------------------------------------------- AGM-84A Harpoon__________________________ 340 AGM-84A Harpoon: Advance procurement (CY)___-_______ AGM-88A Harm_____________________________ 134 RIM-66B Standard MR_______________________ 600 RIM-66C Standard MR_______________________ 120 RIM-67B Standard ER_______________________ 375 Other missile support---------------------------------- Laser Maverick..-------------------------------------- Aerialtargets---------------------------------------- Modification of tactical missiles __-______________________ Support equipment and facilities________________________ 146.4 ---------------------------------------- -5.6 ---------------------------------------- 140.8 ---------------------- 72 140.8 26.2 --- - ------------------------- 26.2 282.7 --------------------- 340 282.7 18.0 ------------------------------ 18.0 107.6 --------------------- 134 107.6 164.8 --------------------- 600 164.8 61.6 --------------------- 120 61.6 215.0 --------------------- 375 215.0 3.8 ------------------------------ 3.8 5.0 5.0 67.9 ------------------------------ 67.9 39.7 ------------------------------ 39.7 43.9 ------------------------------ 43.9 2,555.0 --------------------- 3,616 2,555.0 FISCAL YEAR 1982 MARINE CORES MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQUEST [Amount in millions of dollarsi Fiscal year 1982 amended request Change from request Recommendation Guided missiles: Improved Hawk_____________________________ 440 Improved Hawk (modification)__________________________ Stinger missile system_______________________ 700 TOW missile-------------------------------- 2,666 Improved TOW PIP----------------------------------- Cutlass spirit----------------------------------------- Dragon---------------------------------------------- Spares-------------------------------------------------- Modification kits__________________________________________ $85.1 ------------------- 440 18.4 ------------------------------ 38.9 ------------------- 700 45.7 ------------------- 2,666 23.1 ------------------------------ 2.9 ------------------------------ 5 ------------------------------ 4.7 ------------------------------ 3.8 ------------------------------ $85.1 18.4 38.9 45.7 23.1 2.9 .5 4.7 3.8 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84MOO715ROO0100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 FISCAL YEAR 1982 AIR FORCE MISSILE PROCUREMENT REQYTEST (Amounts in millions of dollars Program Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Ballistic missiles: LGM-30F/G-MM II/III________________________________ Less: Advance procurement(PY)____ Net ICBM C3integration ------------------------------------ MK-12A reentry vehicle_______________________________ Strategic missiles: Air launch cruise missile______________________ 440 Less: Advance procurement (PY)____________________ Net Air launch cruise missile: Advance procurement (Cy) ----------------------------------------------- Ground launch cruise missile__________________ 54 Less: Advance procurement (PY)____________________ Net Ground launch cruise missile: Advance procure- ment (CY)------------------------------------------ Emergency rocket communication system---------------- Tactical missiles: AIM-7F/M Sparrow__________________________ 1,560 AIM-9L/M Sidewinder_______________________ 1,800 AGM-65D Maverick__________________________ 490 AGM-88A Harm----------------------------- 136 Rapier----------------------------------------------- Targetdrones-?-------- Modification of inservice missiles___________________________ Spares and repair parts____________________________________ Other support-------------------------------------------- $37.9 -3.6 34.3 -------------------------------- $34.3 56.1 - - - --------------- 56.1 0 +544.7 +510 44.7 589.7 -1.0 ---------------------------------------- 588.7 -------------------- 440 588.7 1.2 -------------------------------- 1.2 313.3 -13.9 299.4 -------------------- 54 299.4 29.8 -------------------------------- 29.8 0 ------------ +6.8 ------------ 6.8 227.0 -------------------- 1,560 227.0 132.5 -------------------- 1,800 132.5. 232.3 ____________________ 490 232.3 89.1 -------------------- 136 89.1 133.0 -------------------------------- 133.0 17.2 -------------------------------- 17.2 139.7 ---------- +9.0 ------------ 148.7 203.5 -------------------------------- 203.5 2,474.4 -------------------------------- 2,474.4 NAVY SHIPS, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER WEAPONS Navy Shipbuilding and Conversion The amended authorization request for fiscal year 1982 is for 19 new surface combatant ships and 14 ship acquisitions, reactivations, or conversions. The total shipbuilding and conversion funding request is for $10,290.1 million in fiscal year 1982. Major combatant requests included a Trident submarine, two SSN-668 attack submarines, and three Aegis equipped CG-47 class cruisers. Also included were requests for three frigates, the first MCM-1 class mine countermeasures ship, two salvage ships, the first of a new class of Military Sealift Command (MSC)-manned fleet oilers, four TAGOS class surveillance ships, and the first new construction maritime prepositioning ship. The re- quests also included the reactivation of the U.S.S. Oriskany (CV-34) and U.S.S. New Jersey (BB-62), as well as the acquisition and con- version of a number of ships to support sealift and maritime pre- positioning forces or to serve as auxiliaries for the combatant forces. Advance procurement is requested for a follow-on Nimitz class nuclear- powered aircraft carrier (CVN), a follow-on LSD-41 class dock land- ing ship, and a hospital ship, as well as funds for the other categories Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 of landing craft, service craft, outfitting, poet-delivery, cost growth and escalation. Most important among these was a request under land- ing craft for the first three Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC). Navy Torpedoes and Related Support Equipment Authorization in the amount of $516.6 million is requested for fiscal year 1982. The request was approved without change. Navy Other Weapons In fiscal year 1982, the $200.2 million requested for authorization for other weapons was approved. Summary of Recommendations Millions Navy shipbuilding and conversion (SCN) -------------------------- $10, 118.6 Navy torpedoes and related support equipment---------------------- 516. 6 Navy other weapons---------------------------------------------- 200.2 The above recommended totals reflect changes to the amended request as follows : Oriskany reactivation--------------------------------------------------------- -1 -5364.0 New Jersey reactivation-------------------------------------------------------------------- +79.0 0 0 FFG-7 frigates-------------------------------------------------------------- +3 . +70 -------------------------------------------------- LSD-41 dock landing ship- +1+LL +374.3 : TAn hospital ship conversion------------------------------------------------ -LL -10.0 Trident SSBN submarine---------------------------------------------------- -1+LL -950.8 Committee Recommendation for Changes Ohio Class Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (Trident) The committee is most concerned about problems and delays in deliveries of the Ohio class (Trident) submarines now under construc- tion. Only one shipyard is currently qualified to build Trident sub- marines and it now has contracts for eight SSBNs. This contractor recently advised the Navy that still further delays are to be expected in the lead and follow-on Trident ships. Subsequently the Navy failed to exercise the control option for the ninth Trident submarine, thus necessitating new contract negotiations with an uncertain impact on the Trident schedule. The shipbuilder alleges that faulty government- furnished equipment (GFE) and changes by the Navy in design specifications for the submarines late in the construction cycle of the lead ship are principally to blame. The Navy alleges that poor work- manship and management practices on the shipbuilder's part have resulted in a failure to build submarines efficiently, on time, and ac- cording to specifications. Regardless of where the blame lies, the com- mittee finds the continuing construction difficulties in the Trident sub- marine program to be unacceptable. The American people expect the Congress to require wise manage- ment of our increasing defense investment. Consequently, as important as the Trident submarine program is, the committee believes that sound congressional oversight practice would be undermined by authorization of the tenth Trident prior even to the delivery of the first Trident in Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 this trouble-plagued program. The committee is, therefore, recommend- ing the deferral of authorization for the tenth Trident submarine. The committee is, however, authorizing an additional $75 million for procurement of prefabricated sections and components for this vessel.. Authorization of these funds, together with the $207.8 million previously authorized for long-lead items, should insure that this ship could be delivered to the Navy at approximately the same time as if it had been fully authorized in fiscal year 1982. This addi- tional funding will also maintain the integrity of the present workforce and subcontractor structure. The committee also recommends a further $35 million for procurement and prefabrication of similar items for an 11th Trident submarine in order to preserve the currently planned submarine construction schedules and achieve economies of scale. The committee requests that the Secretary of the Navy provide a report accompanying the fiscal year 1983 five-year shipbuilding program which fully assesses the production situation for both Trident and SSN-688 submarine construction. In addition, in view of the urgency the committee attaches, to resolving submarine construc- tion problems, an interim progress report should be submitted before the end of fiscal year 1981. The Secretary's report should describe the steps being taken by the Navy to reduce delays in submarine deliveries, minimize workmanship, managerial and other deficiencies and reduce costs of submarine construction. Aircraft Carrier Reactivation (USS Oriskany) The committee recommends that the administration's request for $364 million for the reactivation of the U.S.S. Oriskany be denied. As stated in the committee's report on the fiscal year 1981 Supple- mental Authorization Request, the 34 to 42 months required to fully reactivate the U.S.S. Oriskany does not constitute a creditable near- term improvement to the Navy's offensive 'capability. Moreover, the modest improvement in capability that would be provided by the re- activation of the U.S.S. Oriskany with its proposed airwing of A-4M aircraft does not justify the. added strain that will be placed on the Navy personnel system, nor does it justify the rapidly rising cost esti- mates that are reflected in the total request. Battleship Reactivation The committee fully supports the administration's fiscal year 1982 procurement request of $158 million to reactive the U.S.S. New Jersey. The committee also recommends approval of the Navy's most recent re- quest for an additional $79 million to provide for increased weapons modernization initiatives. This additional request would bring the total cost ($89 million in fiscal year 1981 and $237 million in fiscal year 1982) for reactivating the New Jersey to $326 million-still far less expenive than that required to construct a new ship with a compar- able offensive capability. The committee also approves the request for $88 million for advance material procurement to begin the work required to reactivate a second Iowa-class battleship. The reactivation of the New Jersey will take 21 months (15 months of industrial effort following a 6-month planning Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 period). Because the three remaining battleships in the Iowa-class have not been reactivated as recently as the New Jersey, the procure- ment costs for reactivation of each will increase to $392 million in fiscal year 1982 dollars. The time required to reactivate each ship will in- crease from 21 to 24 months. The Navy's weapons system modernization plan for the Iowa class battleships, as provided to the committee, includes the addition of : -a larger steel helicopter platform aft -32 Tomahawk cruise missiles (300 to 900 mile range) in armored box launchers -16 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles in four quad-canisters -4 CIWS/Phalanx automatic rapid-fire guns -an AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare equipment package -an updated, modern communications package -a new air search radar The current offensive capability of the Iowa-class is embodied.in the substantial destructive power of their nine highly accurate 16- inch guns (with its 2,700 pound shell) and their 5-inch guns, as well as in the many survivability features inherent in a class of ship that is better armored below and above the water-line than any of their predecessors or any Navy ship constructed since. When the weap- ons system modernization improvements are coupled with the ship's impressive basic combat capability, the Navy will gain an extremely credible near-term offensive addition at a cost roughly equivalent to that now required for a frigate. FFG-7 Guided Missile Frigate The administration has requested $971.9 million to procure three FFG-7 guided missile frigates. The committee supports the Adminis- tration's request and recommends that the request be increased by $700 million in order to procure three additional guided missile frigates. Thus, the total request recommended by the committee is $1,671.9 million for a total of six FFG-7 class frigates. The FFG-7 class guided missile frigate has proven to be an effective and relatively low cost naval escort vessel for defense against surface, sub-surface, and air attack in a low to moderate threat environment. The requested procurement rate of three frigates is, however, insuf- ficient. The Navy's stated minimum goal for frigate force levels is 101, which will be exceeded with the ships requested in fiscal year 1981. The Navy, however, indicates that it plans to procure frigates for the next several years, and that it will phase out FFG-7 production in favor of an equal annual procurement request for FFX's, a ship whose design, proposed mission, and estimated costs are unknown to this committee. Since the Navy has not explained satisfactorily how frigate procure- merit efficiencies can be transferred to other ship types, nor has it presented sufficient justification for a less costly and supposedly less effective FFX, the committee recommends increasing the fiscal year 1982 authorization for the FFG-7 by three ships to a total of six. Since the Navy was already planning on continued procurement of frigates, ,this recommended action would not increase the force levels over Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 those planned. It would, however, provide for a more rapid delivery schedule and would maintain the more industrially efficient procure- ment rate of last year. Landing Ship Dock (LSD-41) The LSD-41 class of amphibious ships is a replacement program for 8 LS.D-28's which will be retired during the 1984-1987 period. In fiscal year 1981, Congress appropriated $340.7 million to construct the lead-ship of the LSD-41 class. In addition, long-lead funds were appropriated to support the construction of the follow-on ship in fiscal year 1982. In testimony received on the fiscal year 1981 request, the Navy stated that it was not necessary to skip a year between the lead and follow-on LSD-41's, as is the procurement practice for more com- plex ships. In more recent testimony on the fiscal year 1982 request, the Navy stated a preference to follow the normal ship procurement prac- tice. Accordingly, the authorization request does not include funds for construction of one LSD-41 in fiscal year 1982. However, $34.0 million is requested.for long-lead funding of one LSD-41 in fiscal year 1983. By combining this amount with long-lead funds appropriated in fiscal year 1981, the long-lead requirement of $56.0 million would be fully funded. The committee continues to believe that the LSD-41 program should be expedited given the requirement to revitalize U.S. amphibious war- fare capabilities. For years, the committee has been disturbed by the comparative programmatic inattention that has been accorded by the Department of Defense to the steadily widening gap between actual levels of amphibious shipping and requirements postulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee believes that the present level of amphibious shipping-capable of lifting the assault echelons of 1.15 Marine Amphibious Forces-is inadequate, especially in the light of emerging new strategic requirements in the Persian Gulf and in other areas of the world where the United States does not enjoy secure mili- tary access ashore even in peacetime. The committee hopes that the Department of Defense will review the 5-year amphibious shipbuild- ing plan with the aim of reducing the disparity between the actual level of amphibious shipping and the stated requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With these thoughts in mind, the committee recommends procure- ment of one LSD-41 in fiscal year 1982 at a cost of $301 million. In addition, the committee favors procurement of two LSD-41's in fiscal year 1983. To support procurement of two ships in fiscal year 1983, the committee recommends authorization of $107.3 million in long- lead funds in fiscal year 1982. Hospital Ship (T-AH) Advance procurement funding of $10.0 million is requested in fiscal year 1982 for the activation, modernization, and conversion of the pas- senger ship, SS United States, into a Navy Hospital Ship. Total pro- gram cost in fiscal year 1983 is currently estimated to be $380.0 million. This ship is to provide full medical support on a worldwide basis in Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 support of amphibious assaults by Rapid Deployment Force units. The committee is concerned about the absence of firm cost estimates for this program and about testimony which suggests that medical support alternatives to the Hospital Ship have not been fully explored. For this reason, the committee has deleted advance procurement funds for this program. However, in recognition of the urgent requirement for full medical support for amphibious assaults, the committee has added $1.0 million in R. & D. funds to support detailed analyses of alternative programs. Recommended for Approval as Requested CVN Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear) The committee fully supports the request for $658 million for ad- vance procurement of another follow-on Nimitz class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. . As the locus of the modern battle group, the Nimitz-class carrier is one of the most effective, flexible, and survivable warfare platforms in this nation's defense arsenal. Its procurement is the most effective and expeditious means of achieving 15 carrier battle groups, which the Navy. has indicated is a prerequisite to its ability to satisfy in- creasing naval commitments and to keep pace with the alarming qual- itative and quantitative advancements which the Soviet navy has made in recent years. SSN-688 Class Submarine The committee supports the current request for $1,013.1 million for two SSN-688 class attack submarines. The committee is most concerned about problems which have oc- curred in the construction of both strategic and attack submarines. In view of the large and growing threat from the Soviet Navy, and the U.S. Navy's requirement to build to and maintain a minimum force of 100 attack submarines, the necessity to achieve a construction rate of three to four submarines per year takes on added urgency. The committee has requested a study by the Secretary of the Navy that analyzes the problems which have been encountered in construct- ing submarines of the Ohio and Los Angeles classes. The committee looks forward to receiving the Secretary's study. In the event satis- factory progress toward resolving difficulties in submarine construc- tion is not forthcoming, however, the committee may.be compelled to seek alternative solutions. Fast Logistics Ship (T-AKRX) Funds appropriated in fiscal year 1981 for this program are to be used to buy six of eight available SL-7 containerships. The fiscal year 1982 request will support procurement of the remaining two ships and conversion of all eight ships to a roll-on/roll-off configuration. When converted, the Fast Logistics Ships, which have a speed of 33 knots, will permit rapid transportation of armored and mechanized combat forces. These ships will be manned by civilians, maintained in reduced Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 operating status in the United States, and be ready for deployment in 5 days. Given the current plan to fully convert all eight ships in fiscal year 1982, the committee recommends that none of the Fast Logistics Ships undergo mini-modification as previously proposed but not now plan- ned by the Navy. Statutory provisions prohibiting mini-modification have been recommended by the committee. Funds appropriated for conversion in fiscal year 1981 should be used as advance procurement for the fiscal year 1982 conversion program. Maritime Prepositioning Ships (T-AKX) There are two Maritime Prepositioning Ship programs in the au- thorization request. The first is for the lead-ship of a 6-ship new con- struction program for which $195.0 million is requested. The second program is for the acquisition and conversion of two existing U.S.-flag roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships at a cost of $197.0 million. Four addi- tional RO/RO ships are planned for acquisition-and conversion in the future. These 12. Maritime Prepositioning Ships will provide afloat prepositioning of equipment for three Marine Amphibious Brigades. The committee believes that the Navy should use the advance pro- curement funds of $53.0 million appropriated in fiscal year 1981 for the new construction Maritime Prepositioning Ship to insure that the ship authorized in fiscal year 1982 can be efficiently constructed. Stat- utory provisions requiring this action by the Navy are recommended by the committee. Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) The authorization request is for 3 LCAC's costing $76.1 million. The committee views the LCAC program as critical to revitalization of U.S. amphibious warfare capabilities. The LCAC will permit high- speed assaults from extended standoff distances and will greatly in- crease worldwide beach areas over which amphibious assaults could be conducted. Auxiliary Lighterage Ship (T-ALS) One Auxiliary Lighterage Ship is requested for authorization in fiscal year 1982. An existing U.S.-flag Sea Barge ship will be acquired with the requested $54.0 million. Capable of carrying significant numbers of barges, this ship would facilitate the ship-to-shore move- ment of cargo and equipment in undeveloped areas. Salvage Ship (ARS) In fiscal year 1981, the lead-ship of a 5-ship ARS program was au- thorized. Two additional ARS's are requested in fiscal year 1982 at a total cost of $160.5 million. ARS's provide salvage, rescue towing, diving, and rescue services to the fleet. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Fleet Oiler (T-AO) The lead-ship of a new class of fleet oilers is requested in fiscal year 1982. Procurement of more than 20 ships of this class is planned. The fleet oiler operates as a unit of an underway replenishment group, furnishing petroleum products to operating forces at sea. The fleet oiler will be built to commercial specifications and manned by a civilian crew. Combat Stores Ship (T-AFS) The $37.0 million requested for this program will fund the acquisi- tion of two existing stores ships from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary of the British Navy. If newly constructed, these T-AFS's would cost about $200 million each. T-AFS's furnish refrigerated, dry cargo, and repair parts to the fleet. Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Ship The lead-ship of a 14 MCM ship program is requested in fiscal year 1982. U.S. MCM forces are inadequate by a wide margin. This ship construction program is urgently needed to counter the mine threat. The wooden-hulled MCM ship will conduct mine clearance operations in maintenance of sea lines of communications, in defense of ports and harbors, and in support of fleet operations. Mark-48 Torpedo For the first time in several years, the administration has requested funding to procure Mark-48 torpedoes. This weapon system is the only heavy torpedo presently in production in the Free World. The committee notes that had it not been for congressional initiatives, there would have been no warm production base for such a torpedo in the United States. The committee applauds the new administration recog- nition of the requirement for additional heavy torpedoes and recom- mends the approval of the $133.5 million requested to procure 144 Mark-48 torpedoes. Mark-60 CAPTOR Mine CAPTOR is an antisubmarine warfare mine consisting of a MARK- 46 torpedo placed in a cylinder and moored in deep water. CAPTOR will interdict and restrict the movement of submerged submarine forces and is capable of attacking even the most advanced diesel and nuclear submarines. The request is for 400 CAPTOR mines at a total cost of $116.9 million. Mark-67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine The Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM) is a shallow-water, bottom mine designed for covert deployment by a submarine using a converted torpedo. Procurement is to begin in fiscal year 1982 with the request for 119 SLMM's at a total cost of $11.1 million. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 73 - SUMMARY OF NAVY SHIPS, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER WEAPONS FISCAL YEAR 1982 NAVY SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION PROCUREMENT REQUEST Fleet ballistic missile ship: Trident (nuclear)---------------------------- 1 $1,268.6 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PV)------------------- -207.8 ---------------------------------------- Net - ------------------------------------------ 1,060.8 -1 -$985.8---- --- 0 $75.0 Trident (nuclear): Advance procurement (CV)------------ 230.7 ---------- +35.0 ---------- 265.7 Other warships: CVN aircraft carrier (nuclear): Advance pro- cu rement(CV)-------------------------------------- 658.0 ------------------------------ 658.0 CV reactivation (U.S.S. Oriskany)____________ 1 503.0 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ -139.0 ---------------------------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- 364.0 -1 -364.0---------- 0 SSN-688 class submarine (nuclear)____________ 2 1,163.5 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)___________________ -150.4 ---------------------------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- SSN-688 class submarine (nuclear): Advance procurement (CY) ---------- ------------------------ New Jersey reactivation______________________ i Less: Advance procurement(PY)-------------------- Net ------------------------------------------- Battleship reactivation: Advance procurement (CV) CV SLEP: Advance procurement (CV) ___________________ CG-47 Aegis cruiser_________________________ 3 Less: Advance procurement (PY)------------------- Net --------- ---------------------------------- 2,925.6 --------------------------- 3 CG-47 Aegis cruiser: Advance procurement (CV)---------- 20.7 _____________________________ 1,013.1 --------------------------- 2 213.9 ----------------------------- 1, 013.1 213.9 247.0 ---------------------------------------- -89.0 ---------------------------------------- 158.0 --------- +79.0 -------- 1 237.0 88.0 ----------------------------- 88.0 100.8 ----------------------------- 100.8 3,054.6 ---------------------------------------- -129.0 ---------------------------------------- Amphibious ship: LSD-41 landing ship dock______________________________ Advance procurement (CY)_____________________________ Mine warfare & patrol ships: FFG guided missile frigate____________________ 3 MCM mine countermeasures ship______________ 1 Auxiliaries & craft: Maritime prepositioning ship (T-AKX)---------- 1 Less: Advance procurement (PV)-------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- Maritime propositioning ship (T-AKX) RO/RO (conversion)______________________________ 2 T-AO-------------------------------------- 1 T-AGOS Surtassship ------------------------ 4 T-ALS------------------------------------- 1 Fast logistic ship (T-AKRX)(conversion)------- 8 T-AH (conversion): Advance procurement (CV)___________ T-AFS (acquisition)_________________________ 2 ARS--------------------------------------- 2 Service craft------------------------------------------ Landingcraft ----------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)-------------------- Not -------------------------------------------- Outfitting------------------------------------------------ Postdelivery --------------------------------------------- Costgrowth ---------------------------------------------- Escalation on prior year programs---------------------------- 2,925.6 20.7 0.0 +1 +301.0 1 301.0 34.0 ---------- +73.3 ________ 107.3 971.9 +3 +700.0 6 1, 671.9 99.7 --------------------------- 1 99.7 248.0 ---------------------------------------- -53.0 ---------------------------------------- 195.0 --------------------------- 1 195.0 197.0 --------------------------- 2 197.0 200.0 --------------------------- 1 200.0 156.5 --------------------------- 4 156.5 54.0 --------------------------- 1 54.0 668.4.--------------------------- 8 668.4 10.0 ------------- -10.0-------- 0 37.0 --------------------------- 2 37.p 160.5 --------------------------- 2 160.5 42.4 ----------------------------- 42.4 133.7 ---------------------------------------- -35.1 ---------------------------------------- 98.6 ----------------------------- 98.6 73.0 ----------------------------- 73.0 146.5 ----------------------------- 146.5 88.0 ----------------------------- 88.0 224.0 ----------------------------- 224.0 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 74 FISCAL YEAR 1982 NAVY TORPEDO PROCUREMENT REQUEST [Amount in millions of dollars] Fi 1982 l sca year amended request Change from request Recommendation Quantity Amount . Quantity .Amount Quantity Amount Navy torpedoes: MK-48---------------------------- Torpedo 144 $133.5 ------------------- 144 $133.5 , Torpedo, MK-46---------------------------- 288 65.0 ------------------- 288 65.0 MK-60 Captor Mine_________________________ 400 116.9 ------------------- 400 116.9 Mobile target, MK-30 ------------------------ 7 18.7 ------------------- 7 18.7 MK-38 mini-mobile target______________________________ .7 ----------------------------- .7 ASROC---------------------------------------------- 3.9 ----------------------------- 3.9 Modifications of torpedoes and related equipment_____________ 141.4 ----------------------------- 141.4 Support equipment---------------------------------------- 36.5 ----------------------------- 36.5 FISCAL YEAR 1982 NAVY OTHER WEAPONS PROCUREMENT REQUEST [Amount in millions of dollars] Other weapons: MK-15 close-in weapon system_______________ 50 $134.7 ___________________ 50 $134.7 MK-75, 76-mm, gun mount___________________ 1 4.5 ------------------- 1 4.5 Modification of guns and gun mounts________________________ 26.7 -------------------------- 26.7 Support equipment---------------------------------------- 34.3 -------------------------- 34.3 200.2 ___________________ 51 200.2 GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES AND OTHER WEAPONS TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES Recommended for Approval as Requested M-1 Main Battle Tank The Army has requested $1,924.0 million for the procurement of 720 M-1 Main Battle Tanks, an increase of $577.2 million and 151 vehicles more than the January budget request. Since last year's fiscal 1981 budget submission, the Army has identified an additional funding requirement for fiscal years 1981 and 1982 of almost $1 billion in order to fund the planned procurement quantities (569 vehicles in fiscal year 1981 and 720 vehicles in fiscal year 1982). This significant increase in program funding is due in part to re- vised inflation indicies; however, much of the increase is directly attributable to revised engineering estimates. In addition to this sig- nificant cost growth, the M-1 Main Battle Tank has suffered from reliability and durability problems. Of particular interest to this committee has been the problem of transmission durability. In the fiscal year 1980 authorization report, the committee requested addi- tional operational testing after the M-1 failed to demonstrate ade- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 quate reliability and transmission durability. Last year, the commit- tee again expressed its concern regarding the durability of the tank's power train. The committee is advised that while many of the prob- lems affecting reliability have been satisfactorily addressed, it ap- pears that transmission durability is still an issue. In addition, the Army has expressed serious concern with respect to quality assurance procedures used. during assembly of the tank. Nevertheless, the committee appreciates the necessity of equipping our ground forces with this vitally needed system. Therefore, the com- mittee recommends the authorization of the full request for $1,924 mil- lion for the procurement of 720 tanks but with the stipluation that the additional funding requested in the revised March budget of $577 million for the procurement of 151 tanks may not be obligated or expended until the Secretary of Defense certifies in writing to this committee that he is satisfied with the results of the additional RAM-D durability testing to be conducted by the Army. The committee's review of the M-1 program this year took place against the backdrop of the Army's 18-year effort to field a tank to replace the M-60 series of tanks that our ground-combat forces now employ. The tortured history of the unsuccessful MBT-70 and the XM-803 tank development programs, together with the less-than- desired performance of the power train of the M-1 in recent testing, clearly calls into question the approach we have taken to provide modern equipment to our combat forces. We have accented revolutionary rather than evolutionary improve- ments in our tank development programs-while the Soviets have taken a more evolutionary approach that has been supported by a steady level of effort among competing design teams. In some instances, our approach has encouraged the incorporation of immature technol- ogies in key components of our. weapons which has contributed to un- acceptable combat readiness rates. The committee believes that terminating the M-1 program, as some have advocated, is not in the best interest of our military forces and, therefore, our national security. On the other hand, while some prob- lems have been resolved, the remaining shortcomings of the M-1 tank are serious, and the committee believes that the Army must take delib- erate and long-term action to bring the M-1 to its full combat potential. The Secretary of the Army is directed, therefore, to provide a writ- ten report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, not later than January 30, 1982, that de- scribes a plan for long-term evolutionary improvement of the M-1. This plan shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following aspects. -Side-by-side tests of the M-1 with other tanks, both U.S. and foreign, in field exercises. These exercises should closely simulate actual combat employment of tanks to obtain a real-world assess- ment of M-1 operational capabilities and shortcomings relative to those of other first-line tanks (such as speed and durability dur- ing a long-distance road march on secondary roads, off-road mobility when under attack and performance as a machine-gun platform during an attack). These tests should be structured to Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 determine those changes in the M-1 that are most urgently. needed to improve its operational effectiveness... -Comprehensive vulnerability tests : (1) to include live-fire tests of tanks fully combat-configured with fuel and ammunition and (2) to determine the shortcomings of the current M-1 that most directly threaten survival of. tank, crews when the M-1 is hit and penetrated by hostile fire. -A process through which evolutionary development of the M-1 can best be achieved, preferably through competition among several design teams and through design, development and tests of evolutionary prototypes based on the M-1 design. Fighting Vehicle System The Army requested $809.8 million to procure 600 fighting vehicles. The committee recommends that the request be approved so that the badly needed modernization of first-line Army .forces can continue. However, the committee is concerned about the continued cost growth in this program. In part, this concern is generated by the cost growth reflected in the December 1980 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) in which the pro- jected program cost of the Fighting Vehicle System increased from $7.8 billion (December 1979 SAR) to $13.1 billion (December 1980 SAR). In its efforts to control this cost growth, the Army is investigating the potential benefits of competition through the development of a second source for manufacture and assembly of the Fighting Vehicle System. The Army does not anticipate second source funding until fiscal year 1983, but the potential savings from competition may be great enough to justify accelerating this decision. Therefore, the committee recommends approval of a statutory pro- vision which would provide $50 million to prepare a second-source producer for the Fighting Vehicle System if the Army so chooses. Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) In fiscal year 1981, the Congress appropriated $17.0 million in R. & D. funds for the Marine Corps to test and evaluate in-production LAV's. This effort was to equip in the near-term a rapidly deployable Marine Corps unit with currently available LAV's. The Marine Corps expects to complete source selection during fiscal year 1981 and has requested $36.2 million to procure 72 LAV's in fiscal year 1982. The committee fully. supports this program and is encouraged by the progress that has been made. The Army now plans to initiate procurement of a light armored vehicle, entitled the Mobile Protected Gun (Near-Term), in the next several years. The committee recommends authorization of the re- quested R. & D. funding of $1.0 million for the Army to actively moni- tor the Marine Corps development and procurement efforts. In recognition of the urgent requirement, the committee directs that the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) program be executed in the most timely manner possible. In furtherance of this directive, an Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 acquisition strategy that results in production commencing in fiscal year 1982 is required. Since the Marine Corps' acquisition strategy is one that meets this directive and results in initially equipping the LAV's purchased with the best available weapons system, the Marine Corps shall continue to manage and direct the acquisition of LAV's. At such time that the U.S. Army determines its requirements, the program acquisition management plan should be reevaluated. The statutory provision recommended by the committee requires such ac- tion. In addition, the committee believes that only one near-term light armored vehicle design should be procured for use by both the Marine Corps and the Army. This vehicle should be designed such that one can be lifted by a CH-53E helicopter and two can be carried by a C-130 transport aircraft. LVT-7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle In fiscal year 1982 the Marine Corps will procure the first 30 LVT- 7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicles. Procurement of these new assault vehicles along with the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) designed to upgrade existing LVT vehicles will significantly improve our amphibious assault capability. OTHER WEAPONS Recommended for Approval as Requested Division Air Defense Gun (DIVAD) The DIVAD is to be an all-weather short-range air defense system composed of multiple 35 or 40mm cannon with search and track radar mounted on an M-48A5 tank chassis. It will have the capability to move rapidly with forward elements providing air defense fire support against low altitude ground attack aircraft and attack helicopters. DIVAD will replace the Army's present air defense gun, the Vulcan, which lacks the lethality, accuracy, mobility and armor protection of the DIVAD system. Firing Port Weapon The Firing Port Weapon is a 5.6mm automatic weapon, a deriva- tive of the M-16 rifle, which provides secondary armament for the Fighting Vehicle System. M-240 Machinegun The M-240 is a 7.62mm machinegun used as secondary armament on armored vehicles. Bushmaster The Bushmaster, a 25mm automatic cannon, is the main armament of the Fighting Vehicle System. M-198 Howitzer The M-198 155mm Medium Towed Howitzer is designed for use by artillery battalions supporting airborne and air assault divisions. It replaces the smaller 105mm Howitzer and will be procured by both the Army and Marine Corps. . Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 SUMMARY OF GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES AND OTHER WEAPONS PROCUREMENT FISCAL YEAR 1982 ARMY TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLE PROCUREMENT REQUEST Program Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Quantity Amount Tracked combat vehicles: Fighting vehicle system ---------------------- 600 Fighting vehicle system: Advance procurement (CY)--------------- ----- -------------------------- 59.1 ----------------- 59 1 Field artillery ammunition support vehicle: Advance procurement (CY)--------------------------- 4.0 ------------- ------------------------------ . 4.0 R ecovery vehicle, med,ft,M88A1-------------- 180 Tank combat 105-mm ft un MI serie 72 153.0 -------------------- 180 153.0 , , , g , s-------- 0 Less: Advance procurement(PY)-------------------- 1,759.9 -135.9 ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------- Net -------------------------------------------- 1,624.0 -------------------- 720 . 1 624.0 Tank, combat, ft, 105-mm gun, M1 series: Advance procurement(CY)__________________________ 212.1 ------------------------------ , 212.1 Training equipment forXM-1 series tank ______________ 50.6 ----------------------------- 50.6 Modification of tracked combat vehicle------------------------ 203.1 ------------------------------ 203.1 Support equipment and facilities_____________________________ 371.6 ------------------------------ 371.6 FISCAL YEAR 1982 MARINE CORPS TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLE PROCUREMENT REQUEST (Amount in millions of dollarsi Tracked combat vehicles: LVF7AI------------------------------------ 30 $55.6 --------------------- 30 $55.6 LVT7 service life extension program ----------- 393 173.6 --------------------- 393 173.6 Light armored vehicle_______________________ 72 Spares and repair parts 36.2 9 --------------------- 72 36.2 ________________________________ Modification kits (tracked vehicles)__________________________ .4 1.3 ------------------------------ ---------- - 9.4 1 3 Modification kit, F-8-in howitzer, M11OA2____________________ 5.6 - ------------------ ------------------------------ . 5.6 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84MOO715ROO0100010002-2 FISCAL YEAR 1952' ARMY OTHER WEAPONS PROCUREMENT REQUEST (Amount In millions of dollars] Fiscal ear 1982 y amended request Change from request Recommendation Weapons and other combat vehicles: D4VAD gun---------------------------------- 50 $292.9 ---------------------------------------- Less: Advance procurement (PY)____________________ -10.9 ---------------------------------------- Net------- ------------------------------------ 282.0 -------------------- 50 $282.0 DIVAD gun: Advance procurement (CV)_________________ 53.5 ------------------------------ 53.5 Howitzer, med, towed, 155 mm, M198_________ 200 72.2 -------------------- 200 72.2 Armor machinegun coaxial, M240_____________ 5,400 26.3 -------------------- 5,400 26.3 Squad automatic weapon (SAW) 5.56 mm______ 4,600 14.2 -------------------- 4,600 14.2 Radar chronograph net M90 120 120 3.3 -------------------- 120 3.3 Mortar, 81 mm, XM25r1________ ____60 1.9 -------------------- 60 1.9 Vehicle, rapid fire weapon system Bushmaster__ 720 31.3 -------------------- 720 31.3 Firing port weapon-IFV--------------------- 18,850 M di i i 19.4 -------------------- 18,850 19.4 o ficat ons of weapons and other combat veh cles___________ Suppcrt equipment and facilities for weapons and other combat vehicles__________________________________ 13.9 ------------------------------ 13.9 FISCAL YEAR 1982 MARINE CORPS OTHER WEAPONS PROCUREMENT REQUEST Fiscal ear 1982 y amended request Change from request Recommendation Other weapons: Howitzer, M198, 155 mm____________________ 159 $58.3 ---------------------- 159 $58.3 Spares and repair parts________________________________ Modification kits (artillery, others)______________________ 12.9 1.1 ------------------------------ ------------------------------ 12.9 1.1 Items less than $900,000_______________________________ 3.7 ------------------------------ 3.7 Machinegun .50 cal__________________________ 408 3.7 ---------------------- 408 3.7 Machinegun light squad automatic____________ 2,117 6.4 ---------------------- 2,117 6.4 Rifle 5.56 mm M16A1_______________________ 55,604 18.1 ---------------------- 55,604 18.1 Machinegun,4o mm, MK-19 ------------------ 792 20.6 ---------------------- 792 20.6 Machinegun,7.62 mm M60___________________ 3,598 11.5 ---------------------- 3,598 11.5 Fiscal year 1982 amended request Change from request Recommendation Other weaponrens: M-203 grenade launcher_____________________ 189 Mach inegun,7.62 mm, M-60 ----------------- 63 40-mm machinegun, MK-19 ------------------ 177 $0.1 ---------------------- 189 $0.1 .1 ---------------------- 63 .1 2.9 ---------------------- 177 2.9 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84MOO715ROO0100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 National Guard Equipment Initiatives The Army National Guard represents some 46 percent of the total ground combat power of the United States Army, as measured, by the number of combat division bridgades and battalions. It includes 57 percent of the infantry battalions, 50 percent of the artillery bat- talions and 43 percent of the armored battalions of our ground forces. The Army National Guard is short some of the total equipment it is authorized in peacetime. These shortages include over 2,300 personnel carriers, 2,000 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, substantial quantities of modern communications and computer equipment and a large amount of the common, everyday equipment it takes to make an Army unit function. The National Guard estimates the dollar value of the equip- ment shortage to be about $2.6 billion. The National Guard has over 130 units assigned to the Rapid De- ployment Force (or which are planned to deploy within 30 days in an emergency) which are short over $100 million worth of everyday equipment. All eight National Guard divisions and 17 of the 26 sepa- rate brigades/regiments are at the lowest readiness rating for equip- ment on hand. This situation has existed for some time. While there has been a substantial increase in the defense budget in recent years, there has not been a corresponding increase in the procurement of equipment for the Army National Guard. In an effort to improve the equipment situation of the Army Na- tional Guard, the committee recommends a plan for a $400 million addition to the total Army procurement budget to be used for the National Guard in the next few years. As an initial step, the committee recommends the authorization of an additional $50 million in fiscal year 1982 to the Army procurement budget for the Army National Guard. The Army and National Guard leaders should allocate the additional funds to equip units in a way that will provide the most military ca- pability for the money. The recommended $400 million plan includes items that are author- ized annually as well as items that are not. The following items are included in each appropriation category covered by the plan : Tracked combat vehicles and other weapons (authorized annually) : Minions Tracked carriers------------------------------------------------- $101 Artillery pieces-------------------------------------------------- 16 Tank recovery vehicles------------------------------------------- 43 Other tracked vehicles and equipment----------------------------- 25 Missile procurement (authorized annually) : Tow carriers----------------------------------------------------- Shop and test equipment----------------------------------------- Other procurement (not authorized annually) : Night vision equipment------------------------------------------- 60 Chemical alarms------------------------------------------------- 6 Communications and electronic equipment------------------------- 30 Automatic data processing equipment----------------------------- 6 Trucks ---------------------------------------------------------- 45 Other tactical vehicles-------------------------------------------- 16 Other support equipment----------------------------------------- 22 Total --------------------------------------------------------- 185 Total (approximate) ------------------------------------------- 400 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 81 Report on Inventories of Major Weapons The committee requests the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report by January 30th of each fiscal year on the past and present inventories of major weapons that equip U.S. forces. Such report shall contain tables identical in format to those printed in the Senate Committee on Armed Services Report Number 96-826 on the following pages: Aircraft and Helicopter Inventory-page 40. Navy Ship. Inventory-page 35. .Ground Combat Vehicles and Artillery Inventory-page 42. The data shall be reported for each fiscal year from fiscal year 1964 through the fiscal year in which the report is made. In addition, such report shall contain a projection of inventory data, in the same format as that for the other fiscal years reported, for one year beyond the then current fiscal year. The historical inventory data reported by the Secretary shall be consistent with those printed in Report 96-826 and shall include, for all appropriate types of weapons for which a report is required, the total inventory of all such weapons in service-to include, for exam- ple, those used for training and maintenance-pipeline purposes. Weapons in storage in inactive-inventory status, shall not be counted in the reported data. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 TITLE II-RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Background on Research and Development Authorization Annual authorization of appropriations for all research, develop- ment, test and evaluation conducted by the Department of Defense has been required by law since 1963 (Public Law 88-174). Appropriate subcommittees of the full committee conducted hearings and reviewed information on various research and development program requests in- cluding, but not limited to, the following : Army General Purpose Programs; the M-X Program and Ballistic Missile Defense; tactical and strategic aircraft and associated systems; Army Anti-Tank Weapons and Electronic Warfare; the Trident and various other sub- marine programs; the Rapid Deployment Force; the C-X aircraft; New Ships and Related Ship Programs; lasers and particle beam tech- nology; Strategic Command, Control and Communications (Ca) ; and various land, air, and sea-launched missiles and missile systems. The committee's recommendations appear in subsequent pages of this report. Summary of Recommended Funding Changes The tables below show comparisons of the amount authorized and appropriated (revised current program) for research, development, test and evaluation for fiscal year 1981 with the amounts requested for authorization in the President's budget for fiscal year 1982 and those recommended by the committee. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION-COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF ACTIONS ON AUTHORIZATION REQUEST [In thousands of dollars] Authorization Revised current program r March amended request* Committee recommen- " ~ Batton Army______________________________________________ $3,248,005 $3,166,257 $3,905,200 $3,893,100 Navy(including Marine Corps) ----------------------- 35,112,775 25,042,009 36,086,371 36,155,001 Air Force__________________________________________ 7,159,857 7,106,711 9,398,100 9,130,100 Defense agencies___________________________________ 1,325,702 1,295,602 1,881,400 1,882,550 Test and evaluation_________________________________ 42,100 42,100 53,000 53,000 Total________________________________________ 16,888,439 16,652,679 21,324,071 21,113,751 I Does not reflect congressional action on the Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for R.D.T. & E. for fiscal year 1981, in the amount of $598 300, 000 2 Includes $2,760,000 in special foreign currency. I Includes $3,083,000 in special foreign currency. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 83 SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENT TO FISCALYEA.R 1982 R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST BY BUDGET ACTIVITY [Dollar amounts in thousands; years are fiscal years] 1981 revised 1982 March current amended Change from Committee rec- program I request request ommendation Technology base____________________________________ _$2,554,777 a $3, 098,397 +$3,000 =$3,101,397 Advanced technology development________ 600,092 760,528 +5,000 765,528 Strategic programs__________________________________ 3,524,933 4,952,463 +33,600 4,986,063 Tactical programs___________________________________ 6,162,361 7,548,160 -191,470 7,356,690 Intelligence and communications____________________ __ 1, 550,325 2,109, 086 +4,150 2,113, 236 Defensewide mission support ______________ ___________ 2,260,191 2,855,437 -64,600 2,790,837 I Does not reflect congressional action on the Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for R.D.T. & E. for fiscal year 1981, in the. amount of $598,300,000. - Includes $2,760,000 in special foreign currency. I Includes $3,083,000 in special foreign currency. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENT TO FISCAL YEAR 1982 R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST BYSERVICE [Dollar amounts in thousands; years are fiscal years] 1981 current revised program t 1982 March amended request Change from Committee rec- request ommendation Army--------- ----------------------------------- Navy (including Marine Corps)________________________ $3,166,257 25 042,009 $3,905,200 301 +68, +68 630 a 6,155, 001 Air Force------------------------------------------- 7,106,711 9,398,100 , -268, 000 9,130, 130,100 Defense agencies____________________________________ 1,295,602 1,881,400 +1,150 1 882 550 Test and evaluation_________________________________ 42,100 53,000 -------------- , , 53,000 I Does not reflect congressional action on the Mar. 11, 1981, supplemental authorization request for R.D.T. & E. for fiscal year 1981, in the amount of $598,300,000. 2 Includes $2,760,000 in special foreign currency. I Includes $3,083,000 in special foreign.currency. ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1982 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE [In thousands of dollars] Fiscal year 1982 March amended request Change from request Committee recommendation R.D.T. & E. Army: Technology base________________________________________ $628,598 ---------------- $628 598 Advanced technology development_______________________ 232,120 ---------------- , 232.120 Strategic programs: Electric power modernization_________________________ 0 +$500 500 Other programs approved____________________________ 428,568 ---------------- 428,568 Tactical programs: Multi mission SATCOM------------------------------- 15,600 +1,200 16,800 Light arm red vehicle (mobile protected gun-far term)_ 19, 800 -17,800 2 000 Other programs approved____________________________ 1,750,420 ---------------- , 1,750,420 Intelligence and communications: SATCOM ground environment_______________________ 0 +4,000 4 000 Other programs approved____________________________ 68,299 ---------------- , 68,299 Total, intelligence and communications ------------- 68,299 +4,000 72,299 Defensewidemission support---------------------------- 761,795 ---------------- 761,795 Total, R.D.T. & E. Army________________________________ 3,905,200 -12,100 3, 893,100 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 84 -. ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1982 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE-Continued Fiscal year 1982 March amended Change from Committee request request recommendation R.D.T. & E. Navy: Technology base: Materials technology_________________________________ Other programs approved___________________________ Total, technology base_____________________________ Advanced technology development: Advanced nonnuclear naval engine (electric drive) ------- Other programs approved____________________________ Total, advanced technology development_____________ Strategic programs: Survivable, enduring communications (GRYPHON) ------ Other programs approved____________________________ Total, strategic programs___________________________ Tactical programs: V/STOL aircraft development (AV-8B+)_______________ Airborne antisubmarine warfare system (ARAPAHO)____ Air-to-ground weapons (IR Maverick)_________________ Advanced weapons concept (weaponizing prototype) ----- Medium-range air-to-surface missile__________________ Iz R Harpoon--------------------------------------- Ship system engineering standard (SEAMOD)___________ Diesel electric submarine design______________________ FFX design (ship development)_______________________ LHDX(VSS) (ship development)_____ Light carrier design (ship Attack submarine development_______________________ High horsepower engine Marine Corps)_______________ Navy air combat fighter( -18)________________________ Battle group AAW coordination (area air defense) ------- Shipdevelopment (engineering)---------------------- Satellite communications (Multi-mission SATCOM EHF)__ Other programs approved____________________________ Total, tactical programs____________________________ 550 +5, 000 5, 550 166,758 ---------------- 166,758 0 +3,500 3,560 540,611 ---------------- 540,611 14,960 +10,000 24,960 0 +3, 000 3,000 19,700 -19,700 0 0 +2,044 2,044 38,100 -19,100 19,000 0 +38, 000 38, 000 1, 999 +8, 000 9, 999 0 +5,000 5,000 15, 603 -14,603 1, 000 6, 000 +4, 000 10, 000 0 +23, 000 23,000. 19,468 -13,771 5,697 0 +9, 460 9, 460 173,312 +51,500 224,812 0 +10, 600 10,600 30, 800 -22, 800 8, 000 12, 386 +24, 500 36, 886 3,376,945 ---------------- 3,376,945 Defensewide mission support: Medical support for amphibious assaults_______________ 0 +1 000 1,000 Undistributed reduction______________________________________________ -23,000 -23,000 Other programs approved____________________________ 662,357 ---------------- 662,357 Total, defensewide mission support _________________ 662, 357 -22,000 640,357 Undistributed reduction__________________________________________________ -19,000 -19,000 Total, R.D.T. & E. Navy__________________________ 6,083,288 +68,630 6,151,918 R.D.T. & E. Air Force: Technology base________________________________________ 637,700 ---------------- 637,700 Advanced technology development________________________ 361,100 ---------------- 361,100 Strategic programs: Advanced warning systems__:________________________ 12,40 B-52 squadrons (EMP hardening)__26,60 SLBM radar warning systems--: _______________________ EMP hardening-Critical facilities_____________________ PACCS EMP hardening______________________________ AFSATCOM system (EHF)____________________________ MEECM (VLF/LF improvements)______________________ Other programs approved____________________________ 3,826,90 -2, 400 10, 000 -16,600 10,000 +3, 800 3, 800 200 200 +2 000 2,000 +37, 000 37, 000 5600 ----------5, 600 3, 826, 900 Tactical programs: C-X program---------------------- --------------- Close air support weapons systems (IR Maverick)_______ Air-to-ground enhancement (F-15)____________________ Other programs approved____________________________ 245,700 -244,700 1,000 14,600 +17,000 31,600 32,300 -27,300 5,000 1,760,467 ---------------- 1,760,467 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1982 RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE-Continued In thousands of dollars) Fiscal year 1982 March amended request Change from request Committee recommendation R.D.T. & E. Air Force-Continued Defensewide mission support: Flight simulator development_________________________ $26,500 -$9, 600 Ut h T i d $16 900 a est ng an Training Range______________________ 11,800 -10,000 , 1 800 Undistributed reduction______________________________________________ -23,000 , -23 000 Other programs approved____________________________ 1,285,600 ---------------- , 1,285,600 Total, defensewide mission support_________________ 1,323,900 -42,600 1,281,300 Total, R.D.T. & E. Air Force ------------------------ 9,398,100 -268,000 9, 130,100 R.D.T. & E. Defense agencies: Technology base: Strategic technology, DARPA------------------------- 131, 231 131,231 -10,000 121 231 Carbon-carbon materials_______________________ 0 +2 000 , 2 000 Blue-green laser____________________________________ 20, 200 , +20, 000 , 40 200 Materials processing technology_____----------------- 13,500 -3,000 , 10 500 Experimental evaluation of major innovative technology.- 279, 640 -8, 000 , 271 640 Other programs approved---------------------------- ___________________________ 576,023 ---------------- , 576,023 Total, technology base_____________________________ 1,020,594 +1, 000 1,021,594 Strategic programs -------------------------------------- 117,384 ---------------- 117,384 Intelligence and communications: Long-haul communications (DCS)_____________________ 0 +150 150 Other programs approved____________________________ 689,037 ________________ 689,037 Total, intelligence and communications______________ 689,037 +150 689,187 Defensewide mission support ____________________________ 54,385 ---------------- 54,385 Total, R.D.T. & E. Defense agencies_________________ 1,881,400 +1, 150 1 882 550 Director, test, and evaluation_____________________________ 53,000 0 , , 53,000 Grand total, R.D.T. & E________________________________ 21, 320, 988 -210,320 21,110, 668 ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Ballistic Missile Defense Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) R.D.T. & E. is the responsibility of the United States Army. In fiscal year 1982, the Army Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program seeks authorizations of $126.8 million for the Advanced Technology Program and $301.7 million for BMD Systems Technology which, along with the Kwajalein Missile Test Range, results in an Army BMD program now over half a billion dol- lars per year. The committee has consistently supported the Army's BMD program both as a promising military technology and as an R. & D. effort needed to avoid technological surprise from what ap- pears to be vigorous Soviet ABM development efforts. The committee is also interested in the prospects for the development of non-nuclear kill mechanisms for intercepting ballistic missiles both in the atmos- phere and in space. The committee, which has expressed serious con- cern over the status of our current strategic command, control, commu- nications (C3), and intelligence network, also believes that the Army's ballistic missile defense research program can make significant tech- nological and systems contributions in this area, especially using tech- nologies associated with the Forward Acquisition Sensor (FAS) pro- gram. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 The committee continues to support exploratory research in the area of strategic missile materials. The Hardened Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Materials Program supports the necessary materials technol- ogy base by developing specialized materials and technologies and by continually assessing U.S. materials capabilities and limitations vis-a- vis Soviet capabilities. The committee recognizes the potential that this research offers to programs such as BMD and strategic systems and believes that a minimum of $6 million in program funding should be dedicated to hardened BMD materials research. This materials research is to be coordinated in conjunction with the Army's Research in Materials program. Standoff Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) The estimated program cost for the Army's SOTAS has more than doubled in one year. In the December 1979 Selected Acquisition Re- port (SAR), the total program cost estimate for SOTAS was $968.8 million. A year later in the December 1980 SAR, the program cost had risen to $2,446.6 million despite a reduction in procurement quan- tity from 24 to 16 division sets. The committee strongly endorses the Army's requirement for such a targeting system, but it is concerned that the rapidly rising cost of the SOTAS development program may render the system prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the committee approves the authorization of $71,735,000 with the stipulation that no more than $20,000,000 of. this amount may be obligated or expended prior to the receipt by the Committees on Armed Services by December 15, 1981, of an analysis by the Sec- retary of Defense of the cost and effectiveness of the development SOTAS compared with that of other reasonable alternatives. Hellfire Missile The Hellfire missile has experienced significant cost growth since last year's budget request, with the total program cost increasing over 50 percent and the unit cost of the missile increasing 65 percent in constant fiscal year 1982 dollars. In development of its laser Hellfire missile, the Army rejected the Tri-Service laser seeker as being more sophisticated than required and, hence, more expensive than the Army alternative seeker selected. The Marines are developing the Tri-Service seeker for their Maverick missiles, and the cost of that seeker is now projected to be considerably less than the cost of the Army Hellfire seeker. The committee has been advised that the Laser Maverick seeker can be adapted for use with the Hellfire missile. The committee requests the Secretary of Defense to assess the feasi- bility of using the Maverick Tri-Service seeker on the Laser Hellfire. This assessment should consider potential cost savings of such a pro- posal as well as the effectiveness of the two seekers. Fire and Forget Hellfire Missile The Army has testified that because of the technological problems encountered in the development of the Fire and Forget seeker for the Hellfire missile, and the substantial increase in the program cost of the Hellfire missile they have chosen to cancel the development of the Fire and Forget seeker. The committee believes that this was a proper program management decision. However, the committee's Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 support for development of the Fire and Forget capability 'remains undiminished. The committee expects the Army to continue to explore methods of obtaining the Fire and Forget capability. This effort should be funded under existing technology development programs. Corps Support Weapon System The Army has requested funding in fiscal year 1982 for a Corps Support Weapon System as an anti-armor assault weapon. The com- mittee has viewed with concern over the past three years the simul- taneous development of several anti-armor concepts. The Air Force is developing the Wide Area Anti-armor Munition (WAAM). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is conduct- ing advanced development of its Assault Breaker anti-armor system using a Patriot missile as the air delivery vehicle. The Assault Breaker program was originally proposed with the intent of having both Air Force and Army involvement. It . is apparent, , however, that the Air Force is now committed only to an air launched demonstration of the Assault Breaker, but does not appear actively interested in pursuing the concept. The Army's interest in the Assault Breaker program appears minimal with the , apparent intent of developing a Lance follow-on as its Corps Support Weapon System with one derivative having an anti-armor capability. The Army is also pursuing the develop- ment of a Terminally, Guided' uided Submunition for its Multi-Launched Rocket System (MLRS) that would provide yet another anti-armor weapon. The committee has recommended the full authorization re- quest for these various efforts but in so doing insists on close OSD oversight in the management of these competing anti-armor efforts. The committee, in its consideration of the fiscal year 1983 request, will view with interest the degree to which these various programs have been coordinated. NAVY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Materials Technology The committee recommends the authorization of $34.4 million for the Navy's Materials Technology program. This represents an increase of $2. million above the administration's request and is intended to expand the Navy's development effort on metal matrix composites and to support the development of substitutes for critical strategic mate- rials. This program should also provide the technology base necessary to develop advanced, high performance materials and design concepts for both strategic and tactical systems. Trident II Missile The committee believes that a requirement exists fora submarine- launched ballistic missile with substantially improved payload and accuracy characteristics over those of the Trident I (C-4) missile. By developing a missile optimized for the Ohio-class launcher enve- lope, the United States improves future survivability of our ballistic missile submarines and provides a greater hard target destructive - capability. An enhanced Trident missile when combined with a sur- vivable-based MX missile system, would dramatically increase the deterrent posture of the U.S. and seriously complicate the problems Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 of those who would consider launching a preemptive attack. The com- mittee believes that the Trident II program should emphasize maxi- mizing missile performance capabilities rather than accelerating de- livery schedules. Also, in pursuing development of a Trident II missile configured so as to maximize its performance characteristics in the key areas of range, accuracy and throw-weight (known as the D-5 missile), it may be possible to realize significant economies over the life of the Trident program by reducing the number of Ohio-class submarines required. Consequently, the committee directs the Department of Defense to proceed with development of the Trident II missile with maximum performance at a pace consistent with an orderly, moderate risk pro- gram and leading to an Initial Operational Capability in 1989. Fur- ther, the committee acknowledges receipt of the requested Defense Department report on increasing competition during Trident II pro- curement and will evaluate the Navy's future procurement program in comparison with other ballistic missile programs such as MX. Extremely Low Frequency Communications System (ELF) Last year, in its review of the fiscal year 1981 Department of Defense Authorization bill, the committee directed that an Extremely Low Frequency submarine communications system (ELF) be developed and that a decision on where to locate such a system be made by the President by April 1, 1981. The committee's action was based upon a decade of testimony in support of the requirement for such a system which would enhance significantly our ability to communicate with our ballistic missile submarine force. In the course of congressional action on this legislation, the statutory direction was changed to require simply a Presidential decision as to whether or not to proceed with ELF. The new Administration in its amendment to the fiscal year 1982 Department of Defense Authorization request sought $34.9 million to permit continued development of an ELF system. Despite a Navy de- cision to reduce ELF's priority relative to some other strategic com- mand, control and communications modernization requirements, President Reagan has decided to proceed with reactivation of the Wisconsin ELF Test Facility and has directed the Department of Defense to make no reduction in the R. & D. funding level requested for this program. The President has postponed a final decision on ELF deployment until September 1981, pending completion of a DOD review of overall C3 capabilities and requirements. The committee continues to believe that ELF offers a unique and essential communications capability which will play an important role in preserving the survivability of our strategic submarine force. Testi- mony this year, as in the past years, strongly supports the operational necessity for developing an ELF communications system. The com- mittee finds that no changes have occurred in the operational need for an ELF system, the technical characteristics of planned austere ELF systems, or in the level of the threat to our strategic submarine force which would justify further reductions in or termination of Project ELF. Consequently, the committee recommends authorization of the full $34.9 million requested by the President for ELF in fiscal year 1982. These funds are to be used exclusively for the purpose of completing Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 development of the Extremely Low Frequency communications system. In addition, the committee recommends that not less than $5 million of these funds be used for research and development on transportable ELF transmitters and related technology required to validate the feas- ibility of deploying a mobile strategic submarine communications sys- tem. Such a system holds particular promise for reconstituting stra- tegic command, control and communications with the fleet ballistic missile submarine force following a nuclear attack. The committee supports vigorous development of advanced com- mand, control and communications systems designed to provide needed connectivity with the strategic submarine force. A technology which seems to hold particular promise for performing this mission within the next decade is a system utilizing blue-green lasers for message transmission. Considerable uncertainty remains about the ability of the blue- green laser communication system to realize its technical promise. Should it eventually do so, the committee believes that the blue-green laser will effectively complement the nearer-term capabilities pro- vided by the extremely low frequency (ELF) system. In an effort to support an expanded research and development effort on blue-green laser technology, the committee has this year recom- mended an increase in the President's request, as it did last year. It is the committee's intention that the $20 million in additional funds authorized by this bill will be expended so as to permit research to continue on all three prospective means of deploying such a laser com- munications system, namely, space-based, ground-based with in-orbit reflectors, and airborne. The funding of this $20 million increase in blue-green laser research is to be financed through directed reductions in other Defense Ad- vanced Research Projects Agency activities. F-18 (Hornet) Fighter/Attack Aircraft The Navy requires an additional $51.5 million for research and development of the F-18 aircraft. This additional funding will be used to complete roll rate modifications and weight reduction pro- grams, address inflationary increases and offset costs associated with the slippage in the flight test program. The committee has maintained that all significant technical prob- lems must be resolved prior to committing to higher aircraft pro- duction rates. To accomplish this, the committee is determined to ensure that the F-18 research and development effort remains prop- erly funded and therefore recommends the authorization of an addi- tional $51.5 million. V/STOL Aircraft Development The committee fully supports the administration's request for $14.960 million for research in advanced Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing aircraft, and recommends the addition of $10 million for radar and other weapons systems engineering and design work that will lead to the modification of an AV-8B aircraft to the AV-8B+ avionics configuration. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 This proposed weapons system modification of the AV-8B has the potential of providing the only V/STOL fighter/attack aircraft for naval service before the 1990's. It could substantially enhance both Navy and Marine air capabilities, operating from non-CTOL capable ships such as LHAs, LPHs, and the proposed LHDX (VSS) . The $10 million recommended by the committee is provided for the detailed design and engineering work, including mock-up and bench tests, which will be necessary to confirm that the APG-59 radar can be installed in the AV-8B, to document the performance of the radar in that configuration, and to design and confirm the feasibility of other associated weapons systems modifications (e.g., Sparrow missile car- riage and wiring system changes). A .two-phased program. is envisioned for fiscal year 1982. Phase I will generate an aircraft description document which identifies the changes to the AV-8B program schedules and costs. Phase II will gen- erate the detail engineering and test validation of all changes defined in Phase I on which aircraft prototyping could be based. Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missile (MRASM)/Imaging Infrared Harpoon Fiscal year 1982 Recommended Recommended amended request change authorization MRASM---------------------------------------------- 38.1 -19.1 19 I2R Harpoon------------------------------------------------------------ +38.0 38 General reduction------------------------------------------------------ -19.0 -19 In response to congressional insistence that the development of a Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missile be a joint-Service program, the Navy ,and Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement dated April 30, 1980. Nonetheless, the Navy decided on January 15, 1981, to cancel its participation in this joint development program and pursue instead the independent development of an Imaging Infrared J2 R) Harpoon missile. The I2R Harpoon missile does not meet the identified Navy Operational Requirement for -a Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missile. The total cost now projected for the development of the 12R Harpoon is $151 million, over three times the cost presented to the camn- mittee last year when the intent was to pursue this capability in con- junction with the joint Navy/Air Force MRASM program. The Navy decision to withdraw from the congressionally mandated joint MRASM program was made without consultation with this committee. The Navy later indicated that its decision was based in part on the deci- sion of the former Secretary of Defense to restructure the MRASM program and cancel the 12R version of MRASM. Yet, in the Navy's January 15, 1981, request to cancel its participation, no appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense was made to restructure the MRASM program. Moreover, the Navy expressed a clear interest in eventually developing its own version of MRASM. The committee believes that the independent Navy development of an I2R Harpoon followed by the independent development of a Navy MRASM is not warranted. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIAIRDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 The Office of the Secretary of Defense has now indicated that the joint MRASM program is a.high priority and that it will be restruc- tured to allow Navy participation. In addition, it is the intent that the 12R seeker and data link developed will be compatible with both the MRASM and the Harpoon missile. The Navy has now indicated that, along with development of the 12R Harpoon missile, it will participate in the joint MRASM program and has provided the committee with a funding profile consistent with this participation which calls for $19 million in fiscal year 1982. This OSD and Navy agreement with respect to Navy participation in the.joint MRASM program is consistent with the previous committee direction. The committee, therefore, recom- mends that $19 million be authorized for Navy participation in the MRASM program and that $38 million be authorized for the 12R Har- poon programs, coupled with a $19 million general reduction to Navy R.D.T. & E. Air-to-Ground Weapon (IR Maverick) MZZZion& Fiscal year 1982 amended request------------------------------------ $19.68 Recommended change------------------------------------------------ _ 19.68 Committee recommendation ------------------------------------------- . 0 The Navy is planning to develop the IR Maverick missile for. use by the Navy/Marine Corps. Since the Air Force already has a pro- gram to develop this system the committee has recommended for the past two years that Navy funding be shifted to the Air Force to develop the Navy/Marine Corps unique features under the single Air Force program. The committee again recommends deletion of the requested funding and transfer of $17.68 million to the Air Force to continue development of Navy peculiar requirements. The full re- quest is reduced by $2 million in anticipation of savings from consolidation. VTXTS The Navy is proceeding with the VTX program to replace its basic and advanced jet trainers. While the committee endorses the Navy's proposal to replace two jet trainers with one, it remains con- cerned over the development of yet another exclusive-use training aircraft. The committee discourages the development of such exclu- sive-use aircraft and expects the Navy to continue to seek cooperative solutions with the Air Force in its efforts to develop future training aircraft. Lightweight Armored Vehicles In fiscal year 1981, the Congress appropriated $48.3 million for the Marine Corps' Assault Vehicle R. & D. program to support, in part, development of near-term and long-term lightweight armored vehicles. The Marine Corps was directed to test and evaluate in-production Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) for near-term procurement. In addi- tion, the Army and the Marine Corps were directed to undertake a joint development of high technology lightweight armored vehicles to be fielded in the late 1980's. The joint Armored Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT) program, which supports the Marine Corps' Mobile Protected Weapon System (MPWS) and the Army's Mobile Protected Gun (Far-Term), fulfills this congressional direction. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 The committee believes that the early acquisition of substantial num- bers of lightweight armored fighting vehicles for selected ground combat units assigned to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force should be accorded the highest priority. The committee believes that lightweight armor capabilities could prove critical in meeting the re- quirements of potential contingencies m the Persian Gulf and other areas where propositioning of equipment ashore is denied to the United States. The committee notes that .lightweight armored fighting vehicles are far more compatible with existing U.S. airlift capabilities, including tactical C-130's, than are main battle tanks and associated heavy armored fighting vehicles now being procuredby the U.S. Army. The committee continues to support both the near-term (LAV) and long-term programs. The near-term program is progressing as planned with a procurement request by the Marine Corps for 72 vehicles in fiscal year 1982. The committee is concerned, however, about the pace and direction of the long-term program. Given the urgency of this pro- gram, the committee recommends that the Marine Corps be given the sole responsibility for development of lightweight combat vehicles for use by the combat forces of the United States. They recomtimenda., tion by the committee includes specific congressional direction of this assignment. In accordance with the assignment of development responsibilities to the Marine Corps, the committee recommends reduction of the Army's R. & D. funding request for the Mobile Protected Gun (Far-Term) from $19.8 million to $2.0 million. This $2.0 million will permit the Army to actively monitor the Marine Corps' development effort. The committee believes that only one long-term lightweight armored ve- hicle should be developed and procured for use by both the Marine Corps and the Army. Furthermore, the committee believes that such a vehicle should be capable of being lifted by a CH-53E helicopter and two such vehicles should be capable of being transported by a C-130 aircraft. High Horsepower Engines In the amended authorization request, $9.46 million was deleted from a Marine Corps R. & D. program for the stratified charge rotary combustion engine. The committee recommends the addition of $9.46 million for this R. & D. program, but directs a broadening of the effort to consider other high horsepower engines. For the past decade, the Marine Corps has undertaken development of a stratified charge rotary combustion engine intended to provide a high horsepower-to-weight ratio. While high power-to-weight ratios are desirable, and engines with such ratios offer potential advantages for the Landing Vehicle Tracked (Experimental) and the Mobile Protected Weapon System (should an all-new vehicle be chosen for that role), the complex technology of the stratified. charge rotary com- bustion engine raises serious questions about reliability, maintainabil- ity, logistics implications, and readiness. Accordingly, the $9.46 mil- lion is recommended for the study of several optional engines offering high power-to-weight ratios, including the stratified charge rotary combustion engine, but also to include lightweight, high RPM diesel engines and other potential technologies. Before requesting additional development funds for any specific type of engine, the Marine Corps Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 shall address and report on the reliability, maintainability, and logis- tics aspects of its prospective choice. LHDX (VSS) In fiscal year 1981, the committee recommended $18.0 million in R. & D. funds for the Department of Defense to initiate design of a new class of air-capable, amphibious ships which would incorporate the capabilities of the LHA for deploying helicopters and landing craft, but also capable of employment as a VSTOL Support Ship (VSS). Funding of $9.0 million for this program, entitled the LHX (VSS), was authorized, but not appropriated in fiscal year 1981. In its R. & D. program for Advanced Ship Development for Multi- Mission Naval Ships, the Navy initiated preliminary design work on a new Amphibious Assault Ship (LHDX) with $1.0 million in fiscal year 1981. In fiscal year 1982, $6.0 million is requested to con- tinue preliminary design work. The LHDX is viewed as a replacement ship for LPH's and LPD's. Concepts for the LHDX envision an austere capability to support VSTOL aircraft. Consistent with its position last year, the committee recommends the addition of $4.0 million to provide enhanced VSTOL support capa- bilities for the LHDX (VSS) . Since the current amphibious force will face a bloc obsoles- cence problem during the 1990's, the committee believes that consid- eration should be given to a ship that can replace additional classes of retiring amphibious ships. Such an approach would permit a long production run of one ship design with all of the resulting economies. In addition, consideration should be given to the economies of scale afforded by large amphibious ships. Full Medical Support for Amphibious Assaults The committee recommends the addition of $1.0 million for a detailed study of programs to provide full medical support for amphib- ious assaults. In a related recommendation, the committee deleted $10.0 million requested in advance procurement for reactivation of the S.S. United States as a hospital ship. This study should include evaluation of other existing ship candidates and new ship construction as well as a more detailed analysis of the costs of converting the S.S. United States. DDGX Design The committee recommends approval of the request of $121 million for R.D.T. & E. for a new guided missile destroyer (DDGX), but also recommends that none of these funds be obligated or expended until the Department of the Navy presents the committee with a written report defining the specific performance and engineering goals of the program. The committee agrees with the need for a new surface combatant in the 1980's as older guided missile destroyers and cruisers reach the end of their service lives; however, the DDG.X program goals are not sufficiently defined. Unless it can be shown that the design goals and expected performance parameters of this new ship are substantially greater than those of escorts currently or recently under construction (DD-963 and CG-47), or that current proven escort performance cri- teria can be achieved at significantly less cost, then there is no reason Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 to proceed further with this DDGX design effort. Design funds could be better spent procuring additional platforms and proven designs. The committee agrees with the concern expressed in the House Report on the fiscal year 1981 Supplemental Authorization request, that the DDGX is being designed to meet a cost constraint exclusively, rather than being designed primarily to meet a set of capability requirements. FFX Design The committee recommends that all but $1 million of the total request for $15.603 million to design a follow-on frigate be denied. ? The requirement for such a ship remains undefined, particularly in view of the performance of the FFG-7 class and repeated statements that the frigate force will soon be above the minimum levels desired. If, as has been stated, the Navy requires extra frigates to transfer to the Naval Reserves, they should consider increasing the procurement of FFG-7 class ships and transfer older ships to the Naval Reserve Force, or they should procure modified or simplified FFG-'i class ships for direct transfer to the Reserves. The remaining $1 million should be used to define the Navy's frigate procurement policy over the next twenty years. Advanced Weapons Concepts [Weaponizing (Prototype)] The committee recommends the restoration of $2.044 million to the Weaponizing (Prototype) R. & D. program. The Navy's definition of this program is : "The program verified promising combat system concepts from industry and Navy labora- tory efforts through proof-of-principle hardware demonstrations (e.g. Vertical Launch)." It is inconceivable that a program of such small fiscal magnitude that helped produce such sweeping improvements in capability as are present in Vertical Launch could be canceled. The full magnitude of the weapons revolution being wrought !by Vertical Launch has yet to be realized; suffice it to say that Vertical Launch is being installed, retrofitted, or considered for use in every surface combatant and attack submarine in the Navy's current or planned inventory. According to Navy budget documents, the fiscal year 1982 request was to be used to test such promising concepts as Flexible Adaptive Radar, Expendable Remotely Piloted Vehicles, and the Modular Ship Defense System. The committee fully supports these efforts. Advanced Non-Nuclear Naval Engines (Electric Drive) The committee recommends the addition of $5 million to the $550,000 requested by the Administration. The $5.550 million should be used to assist in the advanced development of promising engine concepts from industry and Navy laboratories and to accelerate development efforts on Electric Drive. Currently, there are some electric ship designs which show general promise in improving non-nuclear ship propulsion performance. If propulsion efficiencies can be improved as anticipated, a surface ship could be driven by electric motors powered by gas turbines that are not attached directly to the ship's propulsion mechanism. Without direct drive, the existing gas turbines can be run at more fuel efficient engine speeds. When less power is needed, rather than throttle back on the engines, one or more engines can be shut down completely. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Moreover, gas turbines that are not direct drive may be located in the engine room in a more efficient mariner requiring less space. This concept, however, is currently associated with the new DDGX design. Should that program be canceled or a decision made to go to some other propulsion concept, the R. & D. effort may be terminated as well. By institutionalizing this design work in a separate R. & D. item, electric drive and other engine concepts can be pursued without the need of the sponsorship of a large procurement program. Attack Submarine Development The Administration requests $19.468 million for attack submarine development in fiscal year 1982. The committee recommends that $13.771 million requested for "Follow-on Attack Submarine" and for "Future Attack Submarine" be denied. The committee supports the authorization of the $5.697 million for "Submarine Cost Reduction." In light of the Submarine Alternatives Study results which indi- cated that the SSN-688 design with evolutionary improvements would be sufficient for the foreseeable future, and in light of the many other attack submarine engine, component, and weapons systems research efforts aimed at dramatically improving all aspects of SSN-688 class performance (e.g., SSN-688 VLS, SSN-688 Nuclear Propulsion Re- actor, Submarine Advanced Combat System, etc.), no justifiable need exists to examine follow-on or future attack submarine designs. Ship Development (Engineering) The committee recommends that the ship contract design funding requests totaling $22.8 million for the Oriskany, the TAH conversion, the CGN-38 conversion, and the CGN-42 procurement be denied. Design funds of $8 million for Oriskany are unnecessary as the committee has proposed to deny the Administration's procurement request to reactivate the Oriskany. The request for $1.9 million for the design of a conversion of a hospital ship (TAH) is unnecessary, since the committee has recommended denial of such request until the program is redefined and a proper candidate is chosen. The committee recommends denial of the $12.9 million requested for the design of a new nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser class CGN- 42 and the conversion of the Virginia-class cruiser, CGN-38. The committee has not received a 5-year shipbuilding plan or testi- mony that would indicate that these programs are part of the Navy's future plans. Without considerably more information from the Navy, the committee is unable to make an informed decision about either of these programs. The committee recommends that the remaining $55.1 million be approved ; however, none of these funds shall be obligated or expended until the committee receives a complete presentation and written re- port on existing light carrier designs and those that could be avail- able within the next few years. The presentation must include a pro- gram for design and development of a light carrier that could be authorized in fiscal year 1983. Light Carriers (New Class Carrier Design) This committee has supported the exploration of alternative ship designs that have the potential of adding to. the capabilities of the current force. Moreover, the committee fully supports the Navy's cur- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 rent 600 ship goal with 15 carrier battle groups and has expressed its support for further increases in the force, as they can be justified with- in given fiscal constraints. The committee has expressed its concern that there are an insufficient number of platforms in the fleet (even with 15 carriers) to support seabased aviation and has consistently urged that smaller, lighter, less expensive carrier designs be examined. Such carriers should be easier to build, should be capable of being built in a greater number of shipyards, and should be able to serve as an adjunct to the large deck carriers which remain the nucleus of the battle group. The committee emphasizes once again its firm desire to have the Navy move expeditiously to complete preparation of a New Class Carrier Design. The committee recommends the addition of $23 million to fund the research associated with this design effort. This funding should also illustrate the committee's genuine interest in exploring this concept of being able to expand our seabased avi- ation assets using the most effective means available. Correspondence available to the committee indicates that a design selection for a light carrier could be made in June 1981. This is what the committee has sought for some time, and yet it has never been presented with a reasonable, detailed description of the alternatives available. The Navy's refusal to present these alternatives is in direct contravention to the expressed desires of the committee. The commit- tee directs the Navy to submit a written report and make a complete presentation to the committee on various light carrier alternatives. This report and presentation should be made to the full committee and should include a program for design and development of a light carrier that could be authorized in fiscal year 1983. Until these stipula- tions are met and until the Navy has received a letter from the com- mnittee chairman acknowledging that such stipulations have been met, no R. & D. funds may be obligated or expended in P.E. 64567. Ship Development (Engineering) for fiscal year 1982. Moreover, the committee, in recognition of the propensity for growth in the size, complexity, and cost that occur when a shin pro- gram moves through the various review cycles, believes that the fol- lowing general guidelines should be established for the light carrier program : 1. Size.-Every effort should be made not to exceed 40,000 tons full-load displacement. 2. Aircraft complement.-Ship should be capable of launching and recovering most (but not necessarily all) existing or planned CTOL and V/STOL aircraft. In this regard ski jump technology should be aggressively pursued. Should actual testing verify current analysis, ski jump should be considered for use rather than catapults because of ease of construction and simplic- ity of operation. 3. Life-cycle costs.-Emphasis during ship design should be placed on minimizing the personnel requirements and reducing life-cycle costs. Attention should be given to 'ship modularity to permit mission change without major and costly conversion. 4. Vulnerability.-Attention should be given to minimizing the vulnerability of the light carrier and weapons systems by such means as location of key equipments in less vulnerable areas of Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIAIRDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 the ship, armor plating of vital areas, and silencing to reduce acoustic signature. 5. Acquisition cost.-In order to acquire a number of light car- riers, cost is a matter of singular importance to the committee. Therefore, a target of $1.2 billion in 1982 dollars is suggested for follow-ship costs. Diesel-Electric Submarines The committee recommends that $5 million be added to examine both diesel-electric submarine designs and the advanced engineering of the major diesel-electric submarine components (i.e., electric motor, battery, and diesel engine technology). The committee also recom- mends that no R. & D. funds be obligated or expended in program element 62543 (Ships, Submarines and Boats Technology) until the report on diesel-electric submarines requested in last year's commit- tee report (Report No. 96-826) is received. The committee fully supports construction and maintenance of a force of 100 nuclear powered attack submarines. At the same time, to increase the total submarine force level, the committee desires for its consideration, the option of the construction of diesel-electric sub- marines. This does not constitute a decision by the committee to sup- port construction of non-nuclear attack submarines, but rather a recognition of the need for a greater range of Navy shipbuilding options. Accordingly, the $5 million in R. R D. for conventional submarines recommended by the committee is intended to be used to develop a conventional submarine design sufficiently detailed to permit authori- zation should the committee recommend that option, and to initiate research into conventional submarine battery, diesel, and motor technology. The committee requests that the Navy study options for such designs, including both new designs and adaptations of existing foreign and domestic designs, and report to the committee no later than February 1, 1982, informing the committee of the Navy's progress in the diesel-electric submarine technology research efforts and providing the committee with the Navy recommendations on the over- all Research and Development program, including its cost, that would lead to a design suitable for authorization. Furthermore, in last year's report the committee asked the Navy to survey existing diesel electric submarine designs, both United States and foreign (to be built in U.S. shipyards), and report to the commit- tee not later than March 1, 1981, as to which design or designs would best fulfill U.S. requirements within the above context of a mixed force. The Navy was also to address the question of the potential and prospects for non-nuclear, non-diesel electric submarines. That report has not been received. Therefore, the committee recommends that no R. & D. funds be expended or obligated in Program Element 62543, (Ships, Submarines, and Boats Technology), in fiscal year 1982 until that report is received by the committee chairman. Ships, Submarines and Boats Technology The committee recommends that the request for $40.953 million in R. & D. funds for Ships, Submarines and Boats Technology be ap- proved; however, the committee also recommends the incorporation of Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 bill language that stipulates that no funds be obligated or expended until the committee has received the survey of diesel-electric sub- marines requested in last year's committee report and the Navy, in turn, has received a letter from the committee chairman acknowledg- ing its receipt. The survey was due on March 1, 1981, and is still not forthcoming. Battle Group AAW Coordination (Area Air Defense) The committee recommends the addition of $10.600 million in R. & D. funds to continue work in the field of Battle Group AAW coordi- nation (BGAAWC). Poor correlation of targets between ships has long been recognized as a serious fleet deficiency resulting in false targets and dual target designation. This program pursues corrections to those problems and also has the potential to provide excellent battle management by permitting electronic response coordination between AEGIS and non-AEGIS units. Air Anti-Submarine Warfare (ARAPAHO) The committee recommends the addition of $3 million to continue the examination of containerized helicopter ASW support for mer- chant ships. The program is currently finishing initial tests, and these funds would be used to expand upon the results of those tests, including at-sea tactical testing. Ship Systems Engineering Standards (SEAMOD) The committee recommends the addition of $8 million to continue to advance the integration of modular system concepts into Navy ships. While considerable work has been done to incorporate this philos- ophy into the new DDG-X class destroyer design, additional work is necessary. Modular concepts for weapons launch and other combat systems are necessary for use in the full range of surface ships and submarines, including aircraft carriers, cruisers, amphibious ships, and auxiliaries. Defensewide Mission Support The committee recommends an undistributed reduction of $23.0. million to Defensewide Mission Support research and development. AIR FORCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT B-52 Research and Development The original fiscal year 1982 defense budget submission by the former administration requested authorization for funds to explore modifications related to extending the reliability and modernization of the B-52 into the 1990's and beyond the turn of the century. The com- mittee has recommended a reduction of $16.6 million for B-52 elec- tromagnetic pulse (EMP) R.D.T. & E. in recognition of increased au- thorization for such testing in the fiscal year 1981 supplemental and uncertainty about the desired magnitude of this program, given the new administration's budget amendment request which calls for the procurement of a new long range combat aircraft to replace many of the existing B-52 aircraft. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 F-106 Simulators In fiscal year 1982, the Air Force will begin a new initiative to up- date existing simulators for the C-135, B-52 and F-106 aircraft. F-106 simulators would be converted from an analog to a digital computer system. The fiscal year 1982 amended request is to procure 12 additional F-15 aircraft, reflecting an increased buy of F-15s which will lead to their early introduction into the strategic air defense role. For this reason, early replacement of the F-106 interceptor force is anticipated and the priority for F-106 simulator modernization is greatly lowered. Therefore, the committee recommends the deletion of $9.6 million in- tended for flight simulator development for the F-106. MX Missile and Basing Mode The fiscal year 1982 defense request as amended contains $2.4 billion for R.D.T. & E. related to the MX intercontinental ballistic missile and its mobile basing system. For many years, America's land-based deter- rent force consisting of Minuteman and Titan missiles has been the most cost effective component of the U.S. strategic Triad. Since the late 1960's, the United States has been working toward development of a new land-based missile, not only to replace our aging Titan and Minuteman missiles, but also to achieve greater capabilities and growth potential. The need for a new missile to maintain the balance of power was given greater impetus as a result of the development and deployment by the Soviet Union of new, large, land-based missiles such as the SS-17, SS-19 and SS-18. The SS-18 today carries as many warheads and has almost twice the throw-weight that the MX missile will have when it is deployed in 1986. The large modern Soviet ICBM force has also placed another burden on our land-based missiles. Recent improvements in the accuracy of Soviet warheads and the great increase in their numbers have created the so-called "window of vulnerability" in which a larger and larger portion of our land- based missiles may be vulnerable to attack. Thus a major goal of the U.S. ICBM modernization effort is to reinforce the strategic Triad by reestablishing a survivable land-based missile force. America's intercontinental ballistic missiles provide about half the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in the U.S. Triad and about a quarter of the warheads. Although the U.S. Triad is built upon the principle that security and stability are increased by some redundancy, the U.S. ICBM force also has unique characteristics and today provides our only time-urgent hard target kill capability. Based in the United States, but only minutes away from targets in the Soviet Union, American land-based missiles remain a powerful component of deterrence. In static comparisons, ICBM forces are a central meas- ure of the military balance and in dynamic analysis such as that con- ducted by the Strategic Air Command, the survivability of the ICBM force proves to be the key factor in evaluating whether or not "essen- tial equivalence" exists in this age of super-accurate, multiple war- head ICBM's. Survivable land-based missiles are no longer signifi- cantly less expensive than the other legs of the Triad but, for the price, they continue to add significant diversity to the Triad. Providing a modern ICBM with a survivable basing mode has not been an easy task. Since 1972 when the Strategic Air Command vali- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 dated the formal requirement for a new ICBM survivable basing mode, study after study has sought the optimal missile in the optimal basing system. Missile designs substantially larger and others sub- stantially smaller than our existing Minuteman were examined, and 30 or more alternative basing methods investigated, each with count- less variations. Rail, highway, and of-road mobile systems were com- pared with shell-game multiple protective structures, super hardened silos, and exotic schemes such as mesa basing, siting in pools, and deep underground basing. Air mobile and sea-based systems were examined to determine whether or not they could provide the strategic Triad advantages comparable to those provided by a land-based system of comparable cost. Reliance upon launch on warning or launch under attack policies were also examined. Today, the budgeted Air Force program calls for the deployment of 200 operational, 190,000-pound MX missiles in a Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) system of 4,600 horizontal shelters. This basing con- cept is similar to the horizontal loading dock MPS system which was the backup approach contained in the horizontal trench program of 1976, recommended by the Ford Administration. Two years later, following a Defense Science Board review of MX basing, the Air Force rejected the trench concept for cost and technical uncertainties, but retained the MPS approach, this time recommending vertical shelters because of the similarity to existing silo characteristics and anticipated cost savings. In order to enhance verifiability under the SALT II Treaty and to add mobility to concealment as a mode of survivability, the Carter Administration returned to the horizontal MPS concept in 1979. Initially, the Carter Administration proposed a horizontal MPS system whose shelters could house both the missile and the transporter together so that they could dash from shelter to shelter around a "race- track" road system provided for that purpose. Thus, if concealment should be lost, survivability through "shelter-to-shelter dash on warn- ing" could be restored. Again, costs and technical difficulties resulted in extensive simplification of the system. The present horizontal MPS program relies mainly on concealment for survivability, as would vertical shelters, but retains sufficient mobility to change hidden loca- tions quickly and could "hide on warning" under some circumstances. The committee believes that further simplification could reduce the ultimate cost of the system by another several billion dollars. Last year the Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed with full-scale development of the MX missile and an MPS basing mode in a manner that would achieve an Initial Operational Capa- bility for both missile and basing mode of not later than December 31, 1986. Defense Secretary Weinberger has stated that he will continue the MX program while conducting a study which includes considera- tion of sea as well as land basing and also ballistic missile. defense options. A draft Environmental Impact Statement has been promul- gated and is currently in the comment period. Also, the Congress has received a split basing study which concludes that split basing offers no overriding advantages or disadvantages over the active MPS system in one region basing and costs about $3.5 billion more in acquisition costs and about $19 million more each year in operating costs. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 101 Section 202(a) of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981 (Public Law 96-342) states that Congress is committed to the development and deployment of the MX missile system, consisting of 200 missiles and 4,600 hardened shelters, with deployment of the entire MX system as soon as practicable. The committee recommends ap- proval of the entire $2.4 billion MX R.D.T. & E. program as requested. Nevertheless, the critical importance of the MX program and the enormous costs involved, no matter what the basing decision, man- dates that the Congress provide guidance for this vital national secu- rity program. Congress should review and evaluate all changes in the MX basing program which involve the expenditure of any authorized fund. In authorizing the funds requested for the MX program, the committee is aware that the on-going review of the MX basing plan being conducted by the current Administration could result in a deci- sion to pursue a basing mode other than that now mandated by Con- gress. Therefore, the committee recommends a statutory provision which would prohibit the obligation or expenditure of authorized funds until- (1) the President submits to Congress a specific MX basing program which provides for, among other things, a particular basing mode and a location; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits a justification for the President's decision along with a comparison of alternatives; and (3) 60 days have passed in which both Houses of Congress do not adopt resolutions of disapproval. ICBM Enhancement The committee finds that the. Minuteman force which has served the U.S. strategic deterrent since its deployment starting in the early 1960's, will continue to have an important strategic mission even after the MX is operational. Consequently, the committee urges the Air Force to proceed with modifications and upgrades required to im- prove the effectiveness of the Minuteman Its and Ills. An example of one such upgrade is the Minuteman Extended Survivable Power pro- gram, which lengthens significantly the Minuteman's operating time in the event that its external power source is disrupted. Initiatives such as the MESP should continue to receive adequate funding from the Department of Defense. As is noted elsewhere in this report, the committee is concerned about the imminent closure of the MK-12A production line. The disruption to qualified producers of components, including nose-tips, entailed in such a closure at a time when U.S. strategic warhead futures increas- ingly orbit around the MK-12A seems to be undesirable and avoidable. The committee also notes that competition for scarce resources has re- sulted in greatly reduced advanced ICBM concepts and technology research, reduced interest in alternative warhead designs, and uncer- tain outyear funding for the Advanced Ballistic Reentry System pro- gram. The committee believes the strategic future is not so clear that these options should be reduced. C-X The Congress appropriated $35.0 million in R. & D. funds in fiscal year 1981 to begin full-scale development of a new strategic airlift Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 aircraft, designated C-X. In the fiscal year 1981 Defense Authorization bill, the Secretary of Defense was directed to conduct a study of over- all U.S. military mobility requirements which would provide the basis for congressional review of the C-X authorization request in fiscal year 1982. This study was to include an analysis of the total mix of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning programs to enable the United States to respond to military contingencies during the 1980's. The Sec- retary of Defense was to submit this study, entitled the Congression- ally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS), to the Congress by Feb- ruary 1, 1981. The Executive Summary of the CMMS was received by the com- mittee on April 16, 1981. The detailed study report has not yet been received by the committee. In the absence of the requested study, limited new information is availaible to dispell the committee's con- cerns, expressed last year, about the C-X program. The authorization request for the C-X R. & D. program in fiscal year 1982 is for $245.7 million. The committee recommends the authoriza- tion of only $1.0 million for the ,C-.X program. This limited funding authorization will permit continuation of the C-X source selection process. The committee is not prepared to recommend additional fund- ing until such time as a definitive analysis of our airlift and other mobility needs is available. This analyses will hopefully provide a clear rationale for the direction and pace of the C-X program. The com- mittee's action is also based upon the funding needs of other rapid deployment programs for which the requirements are well-defined. In addition to the above considerations, the committee is concerned with what appears to be a substantial increase in the anticipated costs of a new-design C-X aircraft. Moreover, the Air Force continues to stress design parameters resulting in a compromise between tactical and strategic airlift which the committee found to be unwise last year. The committee believes that optimizing the design of the proposed C-X aircraft to lift a limited amount .of heavy armor into remote, aus- tere fields is not militarily valid. Accordingly, the committee encour- ages Air Force initiatives that would provide additional strategic air- lift by utilizing existing aircraft designs and resources and minimiz- ing R. & D. costs. Specifically, the committee requests that the Air Force provide a comprehensive acquisition strategy for additional air- lift that gives full consideration to the costs and benefits of procuring additional C-5's, additional KC-10's, 747's and other existing com- mercial aircraft, and a new-design C-X aircraft. The Air Force should also consider an expanded CRAF Enhancement program as 'a part of this acquisition strategy. F-15 Air to Ground Enhancements The committee favors the enhancement of inventory aircraft when the requirements for those enhancements are firmly established, and the costs are commensurate with the increased system capability. The committee also believes that before embarking on an expensive aircraft enhancement program the cost of such a program must be thoroughly justified and all reasonable alternative programs should be carefully examined. Since the IOC of the F-15E (with enhanced air to ground capabili- ties) is not projected until FY 87 the committee is reluctant to endorse Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 this effort prior to the consideration of all suitable alternatives. The committee therefore requests the Air Force to provide complete jus- tification for this program, a thorough explanation of the cost analy- sis, and assurance that all reasonable alternatives have been considered. This response is expected to consider potential candidates from the Combat Aircraft Prototype and Advanced Tactical Fighter pro- grams. The committee recommends deletion of $27.3 million from this pro- gram and directs the remaining $5 million be applied to determining requirements, cost analysis and evaluation of alternatives. Next Generation Trainer The committee has repeatedly expressed its interest in achieving some measure of commonality in the training aircraft of both the Navy and Air Force. Procurement of an Air Force-exclusive NGT will continue to frustrate this effort. The committee discourages the development of exclusive-use training aircraft and expects both Navy and Air Force to continue to explore cooperative solutions to the problem of replacing training aircraft. Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missile (MRASM) The committee recommends full authorization of the Air Force re- quested funding for participation in the Medium Range Air-to-Surface Missile (MRASM) program. In so doing, the committee endorses the development of both a land attack (anti-airfield) and a sea control version of MRASM. The sea control version of MRASM should be developed so as to ensure that it is aircraft carrier compatible. OSD and the Air Force are directed to pursue, with the Navy, application of the MRASM I2R seeker to the Navy Harpoon missile. Wide Area Anti-Armor Munitions (WAAM) The committee will view with special interest the degree to which OSD applies management attention to coordinating the various Air Force and Army Anti-Armor initiatives. (See Corps Support Weapon System, Army R&D) Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Technical problems related to transmitter power are currently being worked by both development contractors. The committee supports this effort to produce a follow-on to the Sparrow missile, and will continue to monitor the program's technical progress. Utah Testing and Training Range The Air Force has requested $11.8 million to upgrade the capabili- ties of the Utah Test and Training Range. $10 million of this request is identified for expanding range facilities in the event an opera- tional utility evaluation of the Air Force/Navy Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile is required. The committee is advised that neither service supports nor anticipates such an operational evaluation. The committee, therefore, recommends the deletion without prej- udice of $10 million from this request. Fighter Engine Development The Air Force has requested $25,100,000 under the Engine Model Derivative (EMD) program to evaluate improvements to in-service Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84MOO715R000100010002-2 fighter engines. Under this program $9.8M is for a 50 hour accelerated Mission Test which will be conducted on the F-100 Derivative Fighter Engine (DFE) to certify that engine for flight on the F-15 and F-16 aircraft. At the same time, under the Alternative Fighter Engine pro- gram, $35,000,000 has been requested for the evaluation of the F-101X engine as a competitor to the F-100 DFE. Congress has repeatedly stated that the development of a future fighter engine must be conducted on a competitive basis. The commit- tee recommends authorization of the requested funds, but reaffirms the Congressional intent that there be full and fair competition between competing engine designs for any follow-on engine. Consistent with past Congressional direction, this committee will not be inclined to authorize any funds for full scale engineering development of an alter- native fighter engine unless full and fair competition is maintained with all alternatives given full consideration. Tactical Command and Control Modernization Recent operational exercises have identified deficiencies in the Air Force's present tactical command and control capability. The commit- tee is concerned that these deficiencies may adversely impact the tacti- cal air control mission. The Air Force has no improved command and control system under development although a Required Operational Capability (ROC) for an improved Tactical Command and Control System has been defined. To meet this requirement the committee rec- ommends the Air Force evaluate ongoing efforts to develop an im- proved Tactical Command and Control System at the earliest possible date. The development of such a system should be coordinated with the other Services as well as with our allies to ensure operational com- patibility with future command and control systems. Defensewide Mission Support The committee recommends an undistributed reduction of $23.0 million to Defensewide Mission Support research and development. STRATEGIC COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) Overview The committee is concerned that a key element of the U.S. strategic deterrent, namely the systems needed to insure effective, reliable, and endurant command, control, and communications (C3) for the strategic Triad, have received inadequate attention and funding in the past. As national policy involving the deployment of nuclear weapons has evolved in recent years, the need has grown dramatically for strategic C3 systems which combine an ability to operate effec- tively and reliably in the pre- and trans-attack phases with an ability to endure in the post-attack period. At the same time, the ability of the Soviet Union to attack, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the U.S. strategic C3 network-consisting of warning radars, satellites, airborne and fixed command posts, and message relay devices-has expanded to the point where the C3 system must now be significantly upgraded to assure its ability to perform the mission despite the increased threat. The Reagan administration, in its fiscal year 1981 supplemental and the fiscal year 1982 amended Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 request, has proposed important steps along these lines. The commit- tee fully supports these initiatives and applauds the genuine. concern and increased attention which the new administration is giving .to our strategic C3 capabilities. The committee believes, however, that further improvements are re- quired to insure that the United States has a strategic C3 capability which provides a credible deterrent to our potential adversaries. The costs associated with the necessary upgrading of strategic C3 systems are substantial but are hardly disproportionate to the level of invest- ment planned for modernization of the nuclear Triad over the next 10 years. The Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that a com- prehensive strategic C3 improvement program-involving both pro- gramed and unprogramed initiatives-would amount to only 12.5 per- cent of the expected cost of the planned strategic force upgrade. When one considers the degree to which the Triad's ability to perform its mission is dependent upon the reliable performance of the strategic C3 system, it is evident that the United States must bear the costs asso- sociated with enhancing this system's ability to operate reliably and effectively. Recommendations Consequently, the committee is recommending a number of initia- tives to improve key elements of the U.S. strategic C3 capabilities in addition to those requested by the administration. These initiatives are the product of close consultation with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command and North American Air Defense Command and with the Director of Command, Control, and Commu- nications, Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff. These consultations have identified the top additional priorities which these senior officers believe need to be addressed in fiscal year 1982 if the United States is to maintain a reliable strategic C3 capability. The committee recom- mends the authorization of a total of $108.63 million above the Presi- dent's request to fund these urgent strategic C3 priorities. Addition- ally, the committee is recommending to the Appropriations Commit- tee the funding of an additional $233.08 million in accounts not pres- ently authorized in support of these C3 initiatives. In view of the nature of these initiatives-which cut across the Department of Defense's funding accounts-the committee has elected to present the language pertaining to these initiatives as a separate and unified section at this point in the report. The funds recommended for authorization in connection with these strategic C3 add-ons, how- ever, appear in the appropriate research and development, procure- ment and operation and maintenance accounts in this bill. While many of the committee's recommendations regarding C 3 systems require increases in the funding levels sought by the Reagan Administration, one of the most important committee initiatives in- volves a change in Defense Department management procedures which may not require any increase in funding. Specifically, the committee believes that strategic C 3 is an issue of such importance that it requires oversight and management by a single, designated official serving in one of the highest positions of authority within the Department of Defense. The committee directs that a study be conducted by the Secretary of Defense to determine which official within his Office should be tasked Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 106 with unified responsibility for strategic C3 policy, associated R.D.T. & E. and procurement. The committee expects to be informed promptly of the results of such a study. In addition, the committee anticipates that appropriate authority will be vested in the designated individual in advance of the submission of the fiscal year 1983 authori- zation request. PAVE PAWS The committee recommends the authorization of $38 million for re- search and development associated with acquisition of a PAVE PAWS strategic warning site to be located in the southeastern United States. These phased array radars provide important detection capa- bility for surface launched ballistic missiles. The committee recommends that the Appropriations Committee ap- prove the necessary $71.0 million required by-these authorizations for Other Procurement (Air Force) funding associated with the radar system for the southeastern site. In order to insure the resiliency against electro-magnetic pulse ef- fects of the existing PAVE PAWS radars located in Massachusetts and California, the committee recommends authorization of $1 million in Research and Development funds for system testing. Communications Propagation through Scintillation Effects The committee authorizes $5.55 million to support research and de- velopment of advanced modulation techniques needed to permit satel- lite communications systems to propagate through scintillation effects expected as a result of nuclear detonations. EMP Hardening of Critical Facilities In view of the requirement for key C3 facilities to withstand electro- magnetic pulse effects, the committee recommends that $800,000 be authorized for conducting research and development on the present EMP vulnerabilities of those facilities. A further $1.0 million is au- thorized in operations and maintenance funds in support of this effort. The Appropriations Committee is requested to fund $5.2 million in Other Procurement (Air Force) to accomplish this needed enhance- ment. Post-Attack Command and Control System EMP Hardening A similar critical need exists for hardened airborne command posts. Additional testing of the EC-135 aircraft used in the Post-Attack Command and Control System is required to verify their EMP hard- ness. Two million dollars in R.D.T. & E. is authorized for that purpose. Satellite Coverage Continuity The committee seeks to insure that adequate communications satel- lite capability will exist in the mid-1980s in support of strategic mis- sions. The committee requests that the Appropriations Committee ap- propriate $90.2 million to procure three additional AFSATCOM/ FLTSAT systems as a needed enhancement to other satellites expected to be in operation in the middle of the 1980's. Multi-Mission Satellite Communications (EHF) The committee strongly supports the development of a new architec- ture, multi-mission satellite intended to augment and/or replace key Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 communications functions in the later part of the 1980's. Progress has been made in refining earlier concepts for such a satellite and the committee believes that the consensus now forming around the new design seems to address many of the congressional and executive branch concerns about system survivability and capabilities which have impeded development of previous systems architectures. Accordingly, the committee recommends the authorization of $61.2 million for research and development on a new generation, multi- mission satellite and associated terminals for strategic and tactical missions. These funds are also to be expended for development of an Extremely High Frequency (EHF) package for host Air Force and Navy communications systems. It is the committee's intention that the Services endeavor to emphasize cooperative development of this EHF package in order to maximize inter-service system operability. Improved TACAMO As is noted elsewhere in this report, the committee regards the cur- rent operating condition of the TACAMO strategic submarine com- munications system as being unacceptable. EC-130Q aircraft are over- loaded today and the requirement for EMP hardening these airframes will aggravate the present situation in the near future. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct a thor- ough examination of alternatives to the present TACAMO system. Among the options which should be considered are : (1) modernizing the TACAMO comunications suite to reduce its weight; (2) decreas- ing the weight of the EC-130 airframe; (3) replacing the EC-130s with a new or modified aircraft; and (4) accelerating development and deployment of advanced communications technologies which may re- place the TACAMO fleet altogether. This report, including life cycle cost estimates for alternatives considered, should be provided to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Repre- sentatives not later than January 20, 1982. Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency (VLF/LF) Improvements The committee supports the vigorous search for technologies capa- ble of enhancing Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency communica- tions. Of particular interest are developments aimed at producing new mini-receive terminals for bombers, new trailing wire transmit antenna, and trans-magnetic receive antenna for the airborne national command posts. For this research and development effort, the com- mittee recommends authorization of $5.6 million. Defense Satellite Program (DSP) Ground Station Power and Cooling The committee recommends that $1 million in operation and main- tenance funds be made available to upgrade the power and air condi- tioning to support programed new ground station computers associated with DSP system. Electrical Power Modernization In view of the requirement which exists for high reliability elec- trical power sources for key C3 facilities, the committee recommends the authorization of (1) $5 million for Research, Development, Test and Engineering associated with power upgrades for these facilities Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 108 (2) $380,000 for associated operations and maintenance support. Addi= tionally, appropriation of $380,000 for related personnel costs is recommended. Mobile Ground Terminal Number Six The committee recommends the funding by the Appropriations Committee of $32 million for the acquisition in fiscal year 1982 of the sixth Mobile Ground Terminal (MGT). These units are designed to provide enhanced survivability and endurability in U.S. strategic warning capabilities and this action will permit MGT's to be procured at the pace recommended by the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. Emergency Rocket Communications System The Committee recommends that $6.8 million be authorized for the Emergency Rocket Communications System. Distributed Missile Attack Conference The committee recommends the addition of $2 million in operation and maintenance funding to lease a multi-point, distributed network for voice conferencing between participants in the critical missile at- tack conference. This conference joins key commanders sand civilian authorities after a nuclear attack has been launched against the United States. The recommended action will provide a significant enhance- ment to existing capabilities. AFSATCOM Secure Voice The committee recommends authorization of $10.0 million for the procurement of secure voice terminals-independent of land-based nodes-for strategic connectivity of selected users. This $10 million, together with $4.5 million in Other Procurement, which the committee suggests be appropriated for the Air Force by the Appropriations Committee, will permit significant improvements in the endurable connectivity of the U.S. strategic C3 system. Airfield Locators The committee believes $5 million should be appropriated for pro- curement of airfield radio beacon systems capable of assisting Air- borne National Command Post air crews in identifying operating airfields following a nuclear attack on the Continental United States. The committee recommends the funding of this item by the Appro- priations Committee. Survivable, Enduring Communications The committee supports research on technologies aimed at develop- ing reconstitutable high frequency communications. Particularly promising are meteor burst (Navy) and adaptive high frequency (Navy and Air Force) R. & D. programs now underway. The com- mittee recommends addition of $7 million to these development efforts and expresses its interest in seeing cooperation maximized between the Services in the field of adaptive high frequency. DEFENSE AGENCIES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT High Energy Laser Weapons The laser (Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radia- tion) is a device which generates and focuses a narrow beam of Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 coherent light to great distances. Although laser technology really began in the mid-1960's, tremendous progress has been achieved in recent years applying laser technology to military applications. Lasers are widely used to guide conventional artillery, bombs and missiles and are playing an increasingly important role in defense communi- cations. High energy lasers, because of their ability to transmit large amounts of energy at the speed of light and potentially with great precision, have captured the public's imagination and seem to offer great promise as weapon systems. Last year, motivated by reports of a vigorous Soviet laser program, the committee considered the possibility of accelerating de- velopment of space laser weapons. The Congress authorized an addi- tional $20 million for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency space laser technology program and requested that the Secretary of Defense provide a detailed program plan for the earliest feasible on- orbit deployment of a space laser weapon, along with an analysis of the technical and cost risks of accelerating our space laser pro- gram. The Secretary of Defense has delayed submission of the final laser report and recommendations until the study can be reviewed by the Defense Science Board. The new administration has not re- quested additional funding for space lasers either in the fiscal year 1981 supplemental request or in the fiscal year 1982 budget amend- ment. The committee believes, however, that the space laser study requested will clarify the technological and weapons issues and will be a useful framework within which to evaluate future investment strategies. Testimony indicates that there remains within the scientific and military communities significant disparity in views as to the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of space laser weapons, especially for the ballistic missile defense role. For these reasons the committee is not now prepared to undertake major initiatives in the space laser weapon program, but has added $2 million for carbon-carbon materials re- search aimed at producing lightweight materials for large optics. Despite keen interest in the application of space-based lasers to the ballistic missile defense mission, testimony indicates that nearer term applications for high energy lasers exist both in strategic and tactical roles, such as ground-based laser anti-satellite systems. Concern has also been expressed in the Congress over the organization and man- agement of the military laser programs. Therefore, the committee asks that the Secretary of Defense review on-going military laser pro- grams and provide to the Senate and House Armed Services Com- mittees his analysis, with recommendations, for improving the effec- tiveness of military laser management and for reducing the lead time necessary for the deployment by American military forces of high energy laser weapons. Particle Beam Technology Directed energy weapons, like lasers and particle beams, destroy their targets with energy rather than with a projectile. Whereas lasers employ an intense beam of light, a particle beam consists of atomic or subatomic particles, such as protons, electrons, or ions, flowing in a highly energetic stream. Despite the fact that research in particle beam technology has been pursued since 1958, the committee recognizes that basic problems of physics and other technical problems remain to be solved. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 110 The fiscal year 1982 budget amendment requests an additional $17 million for particle beam technology programs in the Defense Ad- vanced Research Projects Agency. This level of funding reflects the recommendations contained in a recent Defense Department review of particle beam programs. The committee recommends approval of the $17 million. The committee believes, however, that the program should focus on particle beam technologies having the most promising mili- tary application. At the same time, a balanced program should be maintained in funding support technologies as well as particle beam feasibility experiments. OTHER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROVISIONS Requirement for Annual Report on Independent Research and De- velopment and Bid and Proposal Costs The committee recommends denial of the administration's request to repeal the requirement to submit an annual report on independent, research and development and bid and proposal costs as required by section 203 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1971 (Public Law 91-441). The committee is of the view that such report provides a valuable documentation of the level and scope of the independent research and development effort. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 TITLE III-OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE Background on Operation and Maintenance Authorization Fiscal year 1982 marks the first year that Operation and Mainte- nance (0. & M.) funding has required authorization from the Com- mittee on Armed Services. The purpose of this requirement was to pro- vide the authorizing committee a more balanced perspective of the Nation's total defense requirements. The committee's first look at the recent history of O. & M. funding has confirmed the need for such perspective. Testimony presented before the committee confirmed that while adequate O. & M. funding is vital to successful execution of the defense budget and overall force capability, it is also the O. & M. accounts that are most flexible and therefore subject to alteration within both the planning and execution phases of the budget. Thus, chronic underfunding, continual adjustments, and unprogramed operational requirements have typically undermined adequate fund- ing for necessary spares and maintenance activities. This pattern of spending has produced a steady decline in the material readiness of our forces and visible deterioration of the physical environment in which civilians and soldiers work and live. The committee recognizes that there are many budgets and pro- grams which contribute to force readiness, and that readiness is only one of several factors to consider in assessing overall force capability. Nevertheless, O. & M. funding represents the "glue" which holds to- gether the bulk of our total defense effort. Force structure, moderniza- tion, readiness, and sustainability cannot be maintained at acceptable levels without adequate attention to O. & M. funding. The March Amendment indicates that the services have taken. steps to provide greater attention to readiness deficiencies. In this process, 0. & M. funding has increased. While the committee favors such in- creases, overall force capability and balance within the defense budget will not be well served if O. & M. increases are not sustained in future budgets. The committee will direct its energy toward insuring that operations, maintenance, and support costs are adequately addressed and accounted for in the fiscal year 1983 Five Year Defense Plan. 0. & M. Budget Summary The revised O. & M. request totals approximately $63.283 billion, an increase of $1.791 billion over the January request, and approxi- mately $3 billion above the revised fiscal year 1981 budget. The distribution of the fiscal year 1982 amendment is outlined below : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 FISCAL YEAR 1982 MARCH AMENDMENT [Dollar amounts in millions] Army---------------- ------------------------------- Navy------------------------------- ------- -------- Air Force--------- ---------------------------------- Defense agencies_____________________________________ --------------- 0. & M. centage of net Net additions additions additions $6,459 $89977 14 8,453 323 4 2, 184 31 1 The March Amendment, which added $25.8 billion for fiscal year 1982, produced a net increase of $1.791 billion for 0. & Al. Thus, only 7 percent of the fiscal year 1982 amendment goes to 0. & M. As a result of the March Amendment, the relative percentage of the fiscal year 1982 Department of Defense Budget devoted to 0. & M. thus dropped from 31 percent to 28 percent. Because the March Amendment was heavily weighted toward in- creased procurement, the percentage of service budgets devoted to 0. & M. has also been decreased. Fiscal year 1982 January request Fiscal year 1982 revised request Percent of DOD 0. & M. budget Percent of service budget Percent of DOD 0. & M. budget Percent of service budget Army------------------------------ 27 35 27 33 Navy------------------------------ 33 35 33 32 Marine Corps----------------------- 2 22 2 21 Air Force___________________________ 31 32 30 29 Defense agencies_______________ 1 16 1 15 The distribution of the administration 0. & M. request by component is as follows : OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE AMENDED REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982 [Budget Authority in millions of dollars[ Fiscal year 1982, January March amendment Fiscal year 1982 revised total Army ---------------------------------------------- $14,766 $14,766 $787 $15,553 Army National Guard__________________________________ 979 65 1,044 Army Reserve ---------------------------------------- 572 45 617 Navy --------------------------- -------- ----------- 19,593 503 20 096 Navy Reserve----------------------------------------- 579 7 , 586 Marine Corps----------------------------------------- 1,128 68 1 196 Marine Corps Reserve_________________________________ 32 8 , 40 Air Force--------------------------------------- 16,569 313 16,882 Air Force Reserve___________________________________ 671 10 681 Air National Guard____________________________________ 1,686 ------------------ 1,686 Defense agencies______________________________________ 4,672 31 4 703 Defense claims________________ 244 -48 , 196 Court of Military Appeals______________________________ 3 ------------------ 3 Adjustments due to rounding--------------------------- __________________________ - -2 +2 ------------------ Total ------------------------------------------ Total----------------------------------------- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Committee Recommendations Army For the Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard, the com- mittee recommends the authorization of $17,490,300,000, an increase of $276 million above the administration request. Recommended Program Changes Supply and Depot Maintenance.-The committee noted that tracked vehicles and aircraft have been preferentially funded in the past in order to reduce the maintenance backlog in major end-items. This backlog should be eliminated if the administration request is approved. The committee authorizes an additional $143 million to reduce an identified shortfall in the single manager (ammunition) inventory, improve industrial preparedness operations, meet line haul and RDF transportation objectives, and meet other supply support requirements. Real Property Maintenance.-This area continues to be a significant management and quality of life issue. The committee is deeply con- cerned over the material readiness and morale implications which fol- low from prolonged inattention to the living and working conditions our soldiers now experience. In particular, the committee perceives this problem to be at a critical stage for the -United States Army in Europe. Even with the administration's request for an additional $245 million above the January budget, the committee believes that the projected backlog of maintenance and repair Army-wide remains unac- ceptably high, and the committee recommends that an additional amount of $100 million be authorized to further reduce this backlog. The Army's real property maintenance accounts for fiscal year 1982 have been increased by more than $500 million over the amounts pro- jected in December 1980 planning documents. It is the committee's rec- ommendation that these funds be used only for reducing the current backlog of maintenance and repair projects, and that they not be di- verted for other uses. Because of the committee's concern for the care- ful and effective execution of this increase during fiscal year 1982 the Army is directed to forward a report to the committees on Armed Services, not later than December 15, 1981, indicating the Army's real property maintenance priorities and how such priorities are deter- mined, the Army's plan for meeting these priorities within the fiscal year 1982 budget, and the proposed allocation of these funds which will. be applied against the current backlog. General Purpose Forces.-The Armv has identified a shortfall in re- pair parts stockage and uniforms. The committee recommends the authorization of an additional amount of $27 million for these pur- poses. Force Modernization.-The administration included $232 million in its March Amendment to provide 0. & M. support for procurement initiatives. Based on reductions to the procurement package contained elsewhere in this report, a reduction of $28 million in 0. & M. support is recommended. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 114 Guard and Reserve.-Guard and Reserve forces continue to have fundamental shortfalls in basic organizational equipment such as clothing and defensive enemical equipment. An additional amount of $40 million has been included for these purposes, of which $33 million is intended for the Army National Guard. Civilians.-A recommended reduction of 500 civilians, discussed later in this report, is reflected in a decrease of $6 million. Recommended for Approval as Requested Training.-The committee recognizes and endorses the Army's in- tent to increase the length of Individual Entry Training, expand Unit Training to the Brigade level where possible, and increase en- vironmental training. However, the committee also recognizes that significant improvements and initiatives in training will not be possi- ble without concurrent improvements in civilian end strengths, the availability of suitable training areas, and the availability of training ammunition. The committee expects these issues to be developed fur- ther in the fiscal year 1983 five-year defense plan. Navy For the Navy and Naval Reserve the committee recommends the authorization of $20,669,410,000, a decrease of $12.8 million below the administration request. Recommended Program Changes Oriskany.-Based on committee action elsewhere in this budget, a decrease of $8 million is programed to account for unnecessary 0. & M. costs associated with reactivation of an air wing for the car- rier Oriskany. Civilians.-The programed reduction of 400 civilians, discussed later in this report, is reflected in a decrease of $4.8 million. Recommended for Approval as Requested Ship Overhauls.-The number of overhauls in fiscal year 1982 in- creases by 4 ships, from 61 in the January budget to 65 in the March Amendment, reflecting a decision to retain and renovate 4 diesel sub- marines. The backlog of ships due for overhaul will increase to 16 ships. However, concern for lack of yard capacity to meet scheduled overhaul requirements is dissipating since the Navy is retaining these ships in active service anyway to meet high operational tempos. In this context, fiscal year 1982 capacity and funding are considered suffi- cient to meet the Navy's overhaul requirements. Aircraft Maintenance.-Equipment readiness, particularly for F- 14s, has recently suffered due to serious backlogs in air rework facili- ties. Funding profiles for fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1982 in spares procurement and civilians are now consistent enough for the Navy to project elimination of all backlogs in airframe, engine, and component reworks by the end of fiscal year 1982. Steaming Days.-The major operational change from the January to March budget is funding for a second carrier battle group in the Indian Ocean throughout fiscal year 1982. Accordingly, Atlantic Fleet ships days increase from 44 to 55.5 per quarter. Operating levels within other fleets remain constant. The steaming budget increases by $82 million, to a total of $2.347 billion, to reflect this change. An addi- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 115 tional $42 million to support Indian Ocean operations for the second carrier battle group is funded in other O. & M. Navy accounts. Flying Hours.-The flying hour program increases from 1.781 mil- lion hours in the January budget request to 1.9 million hours in the March budget for a net increase of approximately 120,000 hours. This increase reflects air operations in support of additional Indian Ocean deployments, and the add-back of hours in support of helicopter pilot training. In fiscal year 1982 the Navy expects to achieve a Primary Mission Readiness rating of 88 percent, vice 86 percent in fiscal year 1981. Marine Corps For the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve the committee authorizes $1,260,539,000, an increase of $24.7 million above the admin- istration request. Recommended Program Changes The committee's additions include : (1) $12.7 million to accelerate the reversal in the Marine Corps backlog of maintenance and repair toward the, congressional goal of a backlog not to exceed $106 million by fiscal year 1985; (2) $3.9 million to complete procurement of modern medical/ dental supplies against total USMC requirements; and (3) $8.1 million to support a repair-as-necessary program for tracked landing vehicles. Air Force For the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard the committee recommends authorization of $19,274,420,000 an amount $25.08 million above the Administration request. Recommended Program Changes Civilians.-The committee recommends later in this report an in- crease of 1,600 civilians above the level requested by the administra- tion. The committee recommends that $19.2 million be added to the administration's request in order to support this recommended in- crease in civilian end strength. Strategic Command, Control, and CO7nmvunieatiOns.-An increase of $5.88 million over the administration request is the amount recom- mended by the committee to support program initiatives in the area of strategic command, control, and communications. Recommended for Approval as Requested Flying Hours.-The fiscal year 1982 flying hour program increases modestly from 2.211 million hours in the January budget to 2.232 million in the March request, at a net cost of $39 million. More sig- nificant increases in flying hours are planned for future Air Force re- quests in order to attain greater pilot proficiency. However, skilled manpower and spares constraints must be relieved before a larger flying hour program could be supported. Depot Maintenance.-Heavy Air Force investment in civilians and spare parts during fiscal year 1981 and fiscal year 1982 is expected to eliminate the depot maintenance backlog for airframes and engines. The committee fully endorses this effort. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Training.-The Air Force expressed some concern for the decline in training loads for initial Skill Training and Skill Progression Training. The amended fiscal year 1982 budget request provides for a significant increase in Skill Progression Training loads, but this in- crease is essentially dependent on fuel cost and travel assumptions contained in the budget. The net increase in the average course length for Initial Skill Training is one-half week. The Air Force considers the current rate of growth in these areas to be consistent with planning objectives. Though no significant shortfalls exist in the amended fiscal year 1982 Air Force program, the committee is aware that successful exe- cution of the Air Force O. & M. budget is highly dependent on accu- rate fuel and inflation assumptions, and minimal disruption from unprogramed deployments. Defense Agencies Defense Agencies and other Defense-wide Activities.-For 'De- fense Agencies and other Defense-wide activities the committee recom- mends authorization of $4,881,551,000, an amount $19.8 million less than the Administration request. Recommended Program Changes The recommended reduction of $3 million is to be directed toward the Defense Logistics Agency, the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, based on the Administration's intent to provide greater management responsibilities to the Services. The committee recommends a reduction by $16.8 million to account for its recommendation (discussed later in this report) to decrease civilian strength by 1400 positions below the Administration request. General Observations-Budget Planning' and Economic As- sumptions The committee reviewed the recent history of O. & M. budgets and, after assessing fiscal year 1982 requirements, has authorized $63,576,- 220,000. This is $293.18 million above the revised fiscal year 1982 request of $63.283 billion. The committee has taken note of the special conditions which al- lowed significant additions to the Defense budget in a relatively short period. of time. These conditions permitted each Service to review its budget planning and programing process, and to reconfirm Service re- quirements and priorities. The committee thus considers the budget amendment to be a reflection of Service and DOD views regarding the proper direction of increased defense spending. The committee is concerned over the cyclical nature of the budget process. Lack of proper balance between readiness-related accounts, and procurement or modernization accounts, has produced alternating conditions of declining readiness and sagging modernization efforts. Neither of these conditions is acceptable. Recent testimony concerning the reformulation of fiscal year 1982 service budgets indicates that. having had the opportunity to review requirements, the services now believe that a proper balance exists between force structure, moderni- Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 zation, readiness, and sustainability within the revised fiscal year 1982 budget. The committee is generally aware that the procurement, moderni- zation, and force structure initiatives now under consideration within the next Five Year Defense Plan will require significant increases in 0. & M. funding throughout the decade of the eighties. The commit- tee considers it the responsibility of each service to insure that out- year O. & M. costs are adequately considered and funded in future budgets so that readiness does not suffer in the process. The committee regards this budget as a "clean slate". The services have had an unprecedented opportunity to fund O. & M. and other re- quirements, and the committee is providing them the opportunity to do so. The services should make every effort to enforce budget discipline and balance in future submissions. The committee will do its best to in- sure that serious maintenance backlogs, from which we are just now beginning to recover, do not recur. While performing this oversight function, it is the committee's intention to provide the services the flex- ibility and discretion necessary to manage O. & M. accounts under dynamic operational and economic conditions. However, the desire to maintain flexibility for service managers should not be misconstrued. The committee received convincing testi- mony indicating the extent to which a lack of stability within the budget has prevented orderly execution of O. & M. programs. In part, management flexibility is necessary to compensate for the inaccurate economic assumptions that are the root cause of budget instability. The committee believes it to be the responsibility of the Department of Defense and the administration to provide sound economic assump- tions from which accurate estimates of DOD's fixed-cost requirements can be made. Budget stability and an orderly execution of O. & M. programs-many of which have a direct impact on readiness--can- not be achieved unless the fixed costs of doing business are plainly recognized and adequately funded. With the above considerations in mind, the committee has recom- mended a statutory provision which would authorize the Appropria- tions Committee to make additional appropriations for inflation and fuel cost increases above the total amounts authorized under this title. It is the purpose of this provision to allow the Appropriations Com- mittee sufficient flexibility to compensate for changed economic cir- cumstances or assumptions, and/or unbudgeted requirements that may arise during the fiscal year. The committee recognizes the uniqueness of this provision and is opposed to the extension of such authority to other titles within this bill. This provision is considered necessary only in light of the special nature of O. & M. accounts and their demonstrated impact on the readiness posture of the armed forces. Other Committee Recommendations 0. & M. Reporting Requirements The amended fiscal year 1982 DOD request contains a repeal of the requirement for annual O. & M. reports. The O. & M. and readiness reports are viewed as a logical counterpart to the annual Manpower Requirements Report and a useful reference. Fiscal year 1982 is only Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 118 the first year of this requirement; and the request for repeal is there- fore denied. Authorization of O. & M. by Component The amended fiscal year 1982 DOD request would authorize the total O. & M. request as a single amount. The committee believes it more useful to present such requests by component (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Agencies), and such change is reflected in this bill. Authorization of Other Procurement and Ammunition Because of strong testimony linking a shortfall of secondary items and ammunition to poor combat sustainability, the committee recom- the first year of this requirement ; and the request for repeal is there- fore denied. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 TITLE IV-ACTIVE FORCES Background on Active Forces Authorization Since fiscal year 1972, Congress has been required by law (Public Law 91-441) to authorize annually the active duty strength of each component of the Armed Forces. This provision was included in the Senate version of the Department of Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1971, and was designed to enhance congressional oversight of the military manpower requirements of the Department of Defense. This year the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel held six hearings in open session and heard testimony from Defense Depart- ment manpower experts on active duty military personnel end strengths requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1982. Based on this information, the information provided in the Military Manpower Requirements Report and the Military Manpower Train- ing Report for fiscal year 1982 submitted by the Department of Defense and_other information provided to the committee, a thorough review and analysis of fiscal year 1982 manpower requirements has been completed. The committee's recommendations concerning active duty manpower end strengths are reflected below. Committee Considerations In determining the appropriate military end strength levels for each of the Services, the committee examined the Department of De- fense's Total Force policy, the force structure necessary to imple- ment that policy, the manpower required for support and overhead functions, and associated personnel policies. The committee reviewed each of the major functional categories of military manpower de- picted in the following table : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT MILITARY MANPOWER REQUEST, FISCAL YEAR 1982 [End strength in thousands) Strategic --------------------------------------- Tactical/mobility________________________________ 1982 March 1964 1979 1980 1981 amended actual actual actual request reques Land forces________________________________ 605 536 545 560 558 Tactical Air Force___________________________ 145 170 167 179 191 Naval forces -------------------------------- 255 175 176 190 196 Mobility forces______________________________ 55 38 37 37 39 Intelligence________________________________ 76 34 32 31 31 Communications____________________________ 43 32 32 32 32 Research and development___________________ 49 27 23 24 24 Geophysical activities________________________ 18 10 10 10 10 Base operating support ______________________ 433 289 305 299 299 Medical support .____________________________ 84 41 40 40 42 Personnel support --------------------------- 18 30 31 31 32 Training (includes transients)________________ 519 438 453 443 469 Logistics___________________________________ 33 21 19 19 20 Other centralized support____________________ 48 45 44 45 45 Management headquarters____________________ 83 38 39 39 38 Federal agency support______________________ 2 3 3 3 3 Army------------------------------------------ Navy Marine Corps Air Force--------------------------------------- 973 758 777 775 786 667 522 527 541 555 190 185 189 191 192 857 559 558 569 587 I Subtotals may not add to totals due to rounding. The Department of Defense has requested a total active-duty end strength of 2,119,900 for fiscal year 1982. This request represents an increase of 69,800 over the actual end-strength in fiscal year 1980 and an increase of 44,500 over the level requested by the President in his fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. The force structure for which the manpower is requested consists of 16 Army Divisions, 26 Air Force Wings, 3 Marine Divisions, and 493 Ships. Committee Recommendations For the reasons set forth below, the committee recommends approval of an active duty end strength of 2,114,600 for fiscal year 1982, which represents an increase of 39,200 personnel from the fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. The committee recommendation on the active duty end strength for each military service is shown below : ACTIVE DUTY MANPOWER, FISCAL YEAR 1982 [End strengths in thousands) Actual strength, March amend- ed request, Change from Committee rec- ommendation Jan. 31, 1981 fiscal year 1982 request fiscal year 1981 Army______________________________________ 773.9 786.3 -0.5 785.8 Navy______________________________________ 532.5 554.7 -.4 554.3 Marine Corps__________________________ 187.8 192.1 0 192.1 Air Force___________________________________ 561.5 586.8 -4.4 582.4 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 As noted in the above chart, the committee recommends a decrease of 5,300 active duty military personnel from the requested manpower level. This modest reduction is due to a number of factors discussed under the appropriate Service manpower section below. Army Manpower The committee recommends a reduction of 500 in the requested Army end strength of 786,300. This will result in an increase of 10,500 over the President's fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. The reduction of 500 active duty personnel is to promote efficiency in various man- agement and operational headquarters. The increase in the Army's active duty force is designed to : --Support an 18-month tour in Europe and Japan for un- married first-term soldiers and -Acid one week to Initial Entry Training to improve the sol- dierization process. Expansion of enlisted Initial Entry Training commenced in fiscal year 1981 with full implementation scheduled in fiscal year 1982. De- tailed analyses have shown the necessity for additional initial training to improve soldier performance in basic skills essential for battle- field survival. A more demanding program of instruction has been developed which extends the basic training portion of Initial Entry Training by one week, lengthens the training day, specifies new train- ing tasks, provides for needed repetitive instruction, and establishes a more comprehensive final test. Navy Manpower The committee recommends approval of an end strength of 554,300 for the Navy. This represents a decrease of 400 from the Navy's request for an additional 14,200 since the fiscal year 1981 supple- mental request. The 400 decrease is to be applied to various manage- ment and operational headquarters to achieve greater efficiencies. The fiscal year 1982 increase reflects the continued growth in the size of the active fleet and increased manning of tactical naval air forces. The active fleet is projected to increase from 468 ships in fiscal year 1981 to 493 ships in fiscal year 1982. Attack submarines and sur- face combatant ships account for the major portion of the force in- crease. Included in the fiscal year 1982 DOD proposal is a request for additional military personnel to man the battleship New Jersey and to provide a pre-commissioning crew for the aircraft carrier Oriskany. It also includes an increase in the pilot training rate to accommodate an additional air wing. The specific increases for military personnel associated with the reactivation of the carrier Oriskany and the battleship New Jersey are as follows : Oriskany------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 100 New Jersey----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,562 Total---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,662 If the reactivation of the New Jersey and Oriskany are not approved, an adjustment should be made in the authorized active duty end strength for fiscal year 1982. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 122 The committee is well aware of the substantial amount of time required to construct modern combatants. It is also aware that it will be many years before our active fleet will have the number of ships needed to satisfy our increasing naval commitments. It is in recogni- tion of the significant lead time required to construct modern com- batants that the committee believes that the Navy cannot afford to delay its shipbuilding initiatives until it solves its manpower prob- lems. Nevertheless, the committee remains very concerned about the Navy's ability to man the increasing number of ships with the re- quired number of personnel, particularly in the technical and super- visory positions. Navy projections that take into account the positive impact of increased retention rates and a relatively successful recruit- ing effort still indicate that the Navy may be short 24,000 personnel by fiscal year 1985. The shortage of experienced petty officers could be even larger-about 35,000. If these shortages occur, the Navy will be unable to adequately man the new ships entering the fleet. Increasing supervisory demands and sea duty can have an adverse effect on reten- tion and morale. The committee believes that the Navy will have the manpower needed to meet its operational requirements in fiscal year 1982, but it is skeptical about the Navy's ability to meet significant increases re- quired in the future as the number of operating ships is substantially increased. The Navy can now project the number of experienced petty officers it will need in 1985 and beyond. Petty officers who will have over ten years of experience by 1990 have already enlisted in the Navy. Much of the Navy's ability to meet this manpower challenge depends on its ability not only to retain substantial numbers of existing junior enlisted personnel, but also to recruit more Navy veterans back into the Service. The committee expects the Navy to give serious attention to this long-term manpower need and to address comprehensively the manpower needs of the Navy through 1990 in next year's Manpower Requirements Report. This analysis should include the impact of per- sonnel policy changes, including planned increases in compensation, improved management policies based on a more extensive use of civil- ians and contract personnel when feasible, the impact of a draft on the Navy, and other personnel-related initiatives currently under consideration. Marine Corps Manpower The committee recommends approval of the Marine Corps requested end strength of 192,100, an increase of 1,500 from the fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. This proposed higher end strength is due prin- cipally to the Marine Corps' ability to recruit and retain additional personnel. Specifically, the proposed increases support higher manning levels in combat service support (engineer, maintenance, supply, and landing support), tactical aviation, air defense, and avia- tion maintenance units. Air Force Manpower The committee recommends an end strength of 582,400 for the Air Force. This figure reflects a decrease of 4,400 in the requested 17,800 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 increase from the fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. The committee believes that of the proposed 4,400 man reduction, 3,400 military per- sonnel positions should be converted to civilian positions in order to achieve greater cost efficiencies. These positions include such func- tions as computer and supply operations, administration, communi- cations, education and training. The committee recommends a con- current increase of 2,200 in the civilian strength of the Air Force. The balance of the proposed reductions are 700 positions representing a partial denial of the requested increase in medical support and a reduction of 300 in associated training. The proposed Air Force increase is designed to accomplish the following : -Improve readiness in strategic offensive forces by expanding support to new systems in B-52 aircraft; -Increase tactical forces to support two AWACS aircraft, four KC-10's, TR-1 squadrons, EF-111's and other tactical fighter force increases; and -Increase mobility forces to support expanded aerial post requirements. Military Manpower Requirements Report The committee requests that the Department of Defense make no changes in the categories used in the Manpower Requirements Report and the accompanying Unit Annex until such changes have been fully reviewed by the committee, and. a detailed explanation of changes from the current to the proposed categories has been provided for current and prior years and for prior years' manpower requests. The committee expects this reporting system to continue measuring manpower utilization and plans in a stable, consistent manner and to avoid unnecessary or confusing accounting changes. Quality of Military Personnel The committee recommends the enactment of a statutory provision which continues the current restriction on the number of new Army male recruits who are not high school graduates. This provision would preserve for another fiscal year the 65 percent floor on the high school graduate content of Army male non-prior service accessions. During its consideration of the fiscal year 1981 Defense Department Authorization Act, the committee expressed its deep concern with declining trends in the quality of the services' new recruits..The com- inittee noted that the percentage of high school graduates enlisting in the military in fiscal year 1979 had dropped 5 percent from the pre- vious fiscal year. Perhaps even more worrisome was the discovery that many recruits placed in Mental Category Group III as a result of miscalibrated mental tests should have been recorded in Mental Cate- gory Group IV. In response to these and other troubling signals, the Congress has directed the Department of Defense to improve the quality of its recruiting. In fiscal year 1982, the services as a whole may not enlist more than 25 percent of their new accessions from personnel whose test scores would place them in Mental Category Group IV. In addi- tion, because the Army had experienced particularly serious quality Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 problems, the Congress required that at least 65 percent of its male non-prior service accessions be high school graduates. Although this floor on high school graduates was scheduled to expire after fiscal year 1981, the limitation on Mental Category Group IV accessions was to continue with lower ceilings in fiscal years 1982, 1983, and beyond. Since the Congress enacted these restrictions into law, the commit- tee has had an opportunity to review the recruiting results of fiscal year 1980. Unfortunately, the unsatisfactory trends of previous years continued through the most recent fiscal year. The percentage of high school graduates among DOD recruits declined an additional 5 per- cent to 65 percent. Moreover, the percentage of Army non-prior service accessions whose test scores placed them in Mental Category Group IV dramatically increased to over 50 percent. These statistics confirm the need for the Congress to maintain and even enhance its firm policy of recruiting quality personnel. It is for this reason that the committee recommends, as indicated above, an extension of the fiscal year 1981 65 percent floor on the high school graduate content of new Army recruits through fiscal year 1982. Testimony from Defense Department witnesses confirms the fact that the attrition rate of non-high school graduates is twice the attrition rate of those who are high school graduates. In addition, commanders in the field have reported their general perception that high school graduates display other characteristics of good military service. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff emphasized the importance of a high school diploma when he testified before the committee this year: . The only firm gradient we have at the present time is that we know that a high school graduate attrites at a rate of one-half of a non-high school graduate and it makes sense to re'ruit as many high school graduates as you can. Secondly, he learns faster; he is more trainable, and we are even seeing new indications that we have less disciplinary problems with the high school graduate. Given the proven value of the high school diploma in predicting mili- tary performance, the committee believes that the current restriction on the recruitment of non-high school graduates should be continued. Last year, the committee noted that "the true measure of quality is the ability to perform assigned tasks and to maintain military discipline." The relaxation of quality standards required of new re- cruits makes this basic objective difficult. The committee's recommenda- tion to provide a statutorily imposed restriction on the accession of non-high school graduates signals its continuing commitment to pro- vide quality personnel for our Nation's Armed Forces. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Background on Reserve Personnel Authorization Congress is required by law (Public Law 90-168) to authorize an- nually the average personnel strengths of the Selected Reserves (re- servists organized in units) of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces. Congress must, therefore, specify the desired force levels for major portions of the reserve establishment. This year the Subcommit- tee on Manpower and Personnel held six hearings in open session and heard'testimony from Defense Department manpower experts and out- side witnesses on the Selected Reserve average strengths requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1982. Based on this testimony of various Defense Department experts. the information provided in the Military Manpower Requirements Report and the Military Man- power Training Report for fiscal year 1982 submitted by the Depart- ment of Defense and other information provided to the committee, a thorough review and analysis of Reserve manpower requirements has been completed. The committee's recommendations are reflected below. Committee Recommendations Selected Reserve Manpower Strengths The committee recommends that the requested levels for Selected Reserve manpower in all Reserve components bapproved. The rec- ommended strength levels provide increases in all components except tho Coast Guard Reserve. The committee's recommendation is as follows : SELECTED RESERVE PERSONNEL [Average strengths I n thousands] March amended Committee Authorized, request, recommendations, fiscal year 1981 fiscal year 1982 fiscal year 1982 Army National Guard________________________________________ 371.3 392.8 392.8 Army Reserve----- ---------------------------------------- 204.5 235.3 235.3 Naval Reserve---------------------------------------------- 87.4 87.6 87.6 Marine Corps Reserve_______________________________________ 33.7 37.6 37.6 Air National Guard__________________________________________ 94.3 98.6 98.6 Air Force Reserve___________________________________________ 58.8 62.8 62.8 Coast Guard Reserve________________________________________ 11.7 11.7 11.7 Full-Time Reserve Manpower The committee recommends that the requested levels for full-time Reserve personnel be approved. The committee's recommendation is as follows : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 FULL-TIME RESERVE MANPOWER [End strengths March amended Committee Authorized, request, recommendations, fiscal year 1981 fiscal year 1982 fiscal year 1982 Army National Guard________________________________________ 10,159 11,439 11,439 Army Reserve______________________________________________ 5,400 6,285 6,285 Naval Reserve______________________________________________ 708 208 208 Marine Corps Reserve_______________ 67 447 447 Air National Guard__________________________________________ 3,207 3,312 3,312 Air Force Reserve___________________________________________ 698 701 701 The committee further recommends that the number of E-8's and E-9's who may be on active duty in support of the Reserve components during the period. October 1, 1981 through September 30,1982 shall be: E-9--------------------------------------- 222 146 76 4 E-8--------------------------------------- 908 319 307 12 The committee also recommends that the number of Army and Air Force Reserve officers in certain grades who may be on active duty in support of the Reserve components during the period Octo- ber 1, 1981 through September 30, 1982 shall be : 0-a 0-5----------------------------------------------------------------------- 0-6----------------------------------------- 1,105 189 551 194 171 147 Trained Manpower for Mobilization The committee is very concerned about the great disparity between the actual end strengths of the various Selected Reserve components and the wartime requirement. It is very conceivable that a future mili- tary conflict will begin with little or no warning. Indeed, there may be very little time to augment from our authorized manpower strength to a wartime strength. Many Selected Reserve units are already ear- marked for early deployment in a NATO or Rapid Deployment Force contingency. Half of the nation's combat capability and two thirds of the support capability of our armed forces is with our Reserve and National Guard units. The Total Force policy has been jeopardized because the overall Selected Reserve forces would simply not be able to meet their requirement on M-Day. The following Defense Department chart displays the disparity which causes the committee great concern : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 127 TRAINED STRENGTH MOBILIZING WITH SELECTED RESERVE UNITS Percent of fiscal year 1982 wartime Fiscal year requirement 1982 wartime Actual end, Programed - structure fiscal year end, fiscal End, fiscal End, fiscal requirement 1980 year1982 year 1980 year 1982 Army National Guard------------------ 446.1 336.9 367.5 76 82 Army Reserve------------------------ 285.8 196.2 217.5 69 77 Naval Reserve 2----------------------- 120.6 96.2 94.0 80 78 Marine Corps Reserve----------------- 42.0 35.1 37.5 84 89 Air National Guard-------------------- 100.8 92.1 94.2 91 93 Air Force Reserve--------------------- 352.5 48.8 52.3 95 100 ,Army Inactive National Guard (ING) not included (5,534 in 1980 and 20,610 in 1982). ING mobilization with units depends on scenario. 2 Includes active component unit full-time support in wartime structure, actual and programed strengths including commissioned units in the NRF. 3 Air Force Reserve structure is end fiscal year 1983 requirement. This next chart displays the Army requirement versus the supply of trained manpower for mobilization : ARMY REQUIREMENTS AND SUPPLY OF TRAINED MANPOWER FOR MOBILIZATION, [in thousands) Manpower available from:2 Active and Reserve units--------------------------------- 1,250 1,296 1,383 IRR/ING/IMA ------------------------------------------ 140 149 264 (325) Standby Reserves--------------------------------------- 20 9 5 Retirees ----------------------------------------------- 40 40 120 Total ------------------------------------------------ Shortfall: Number------------------------------------------------ 270 249 111 (49) Percent of requirement---------------------------------- 16 14 6 (3) , Data jointly developed by OSD and the Army. 2 Assumes different rates of availability from each manpower source. Note: Numbers in parentheses represent a potential higher yield from improvements in management. The current total shortage of 249,000 trained people, or 14 percent of the requirement, is unacceptable. Even under the Defense Depart- iment's optimistic calculations, by 1986 the shortage will still be 1.11,000-taking into account the planned recall of 1.20,000 retirees. Assuming the validity of the stated requirement, this current and projected personnel shortfall-especially in the Individual Ready Reserve-will lead inevitably to the undesirable practice of utilizing Selected Reserve assets as "fillers" rather than cohesive units. A post- mobilization draft would not be able to deliver replacement personnel until well after casualty replacements would be needed. The Army would have no choice but to turn to its Reserve and Guard personnel to fulfill this function with all of the adverse effects that would result. The committee believes that better management alone will not solve this problem. The committee requests that the Department of Defense submit to the Congress not later than February 1, 1982, a report, which provides the following information : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 128 (a) a detailed justification of the total number of trained per- sonnel required in the event of full mobilization ; (b) several optional plans for eliminating by fiscal year 1984 the shortfall of trained manpower; and (c) a plan for implementation of a draft for the Individual Ready Reserve or alternative plan to meet these requirements whenever necessary and the effect that plan will have on eliminat- ing the shortages in the trained manpower in addition to the short- ages of Selected Reserve and active duty personnel. The Reserve Forces Policy Board is a, board established by a law that operates within the Department of Defense. According to the law, "The Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, is the principal policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to Reserve components." The Board has 21 members-one Coast Guard officer is appointed by the Secretary of Transportation; one Regular officer is appointed by each Secretary of the Military Departments; the. Assistant Secretary for Manpower of each Service is a member of the Board ; and the remaining 14 members are appointed by the Secretary of Defense. The Board has recently issued its annual report for fiscal year 1980 and a readiness assessment of the Reserve components. According to the readiness assessment report : The Board continues to recommend reinstitution of in- voluntary active service, the draft, as the only means to cor- rect serious manning problems. This readiness assessment report is incorporated in the annual report which is signed by all 21 members. The Board recommends a specific program-that qualified per- sonnel be drafted to a six-month training program. After an orien- tation phase, each individual should be given three choices: (1) join the active forces with maximum GI benefits and a military service obligation that is dependent on the training received; (2) join the Selected Reserve with reduced GI benefits and a longer military serv- ice obligation ; or (3) complete the six-month program with an em- phasis on a ground-combat role and then join the Individual Ready Reserve. This choice results in the least GI benefits and the longest military service obligation. The committee requests the Secretary of Defense to provide his evaluation of the Board's recommendation, along with an analysis of the likely impact of the Board's specific program, by October 1, 1981. Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Background on Civilian Personnel Authorization Congress is required to authorize the civilian personnel end strength of the Department of Defense. This requirement affords the Congress the opportunity to oversee the entire defense manpower program and the interrelationship of each component in the Total Force structure. The committee held hearings in open session on February 24, 26, March 3, 5, 10 and 12 and received testimony on the civilian person- nel strengths requested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1982. Based upon these hearings, numerous briefings by Defense De- partment manpower experts, annual reports and other available data, the committee has conducted a thorough review of civilian personnel requirements. Categories of Civilians Included in the Bill The civilian end strength figures authorized by Congress represent direct and indirect hire employees, both permanent and temporary, in- cluding full-time, part-time and intermittent employees paid from ap- propriated funds, who are employed to perform military functions ad- ministered by the Department of Defense. Indirect hire employees are hired by the host nation in support of U.S. forces stationed abroad. They are estimated to be approximately 78,900 in fiscal year 1982. The following categories of civilian employees are excluded from the strengths recommended : (1) Employees performing civilian functions administered by the Department of Defense, the largest of which is the Corps of Engineers Civil Works activities. For fiscal year 1982, the end strength for this function is approximately 33,000. (2) Employees in special employment programs for students and disadvantaged youths, such as the stay-in-school campaign and the temporary summer aid program. The end strength for this program is approximately 8,500. (3) Employees of the National Security Agency who are ex- cluded because employment statistics are classified information. (4) Employees paid from nonappropriated funds are not in- cluded. The approximate number of such employees is 185,000 for fiscal year 1982. Committee Considerations The Department of Defense has requested a civilian manpower end strength of 1,024,900. This represents an 11,000 increase from the levels requested in the fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. The following table shows the Department of Defense request for civilian personnel by major mission categories : Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT CIVILIAN MANPOWER REQUEST, FISCAL YEAR 1982 [Direct and indirect hire; end strength In thousands; fiscal year] 1982 March 1964 actual1 1979 actual 1980 actual 1981 request amended request Strategic_______________________________________ 15 11 10 10 10 Tactfcal/mobillty -------------------------------- 67 51 57 60 63 Land forces________________________________ 30 16 23 24 26 Tactical airforces___________________________ 7 14 14 15 16 Naval forces ------------- (2) I 1 I 1 Mobility 229 20 19 20 20 Auxiliary activities______________________________ 123 105 95 92 91 Intelligence________________________________ 11 7 7 7 7 Communications____________________________ 14 12 10 11 11 Research and development___________________ 87 76 68 64 63 Geophysical activities ------------------------ 12 10 10 10 10 Base operating support ______________________ 357 305 342 ' 345 347 Medical support ____________________________ 32 32 20 21 21 Personnel support __________________________ 6 18 20 22 23 Training___________________________________ 25 26 26 26 26 Logistics_____________ ____________________ 451 354 334 345 352 Other centralized support ____________________ 34 54 53 56 57 Management headquarters___________________ 65 34 35 37 37 Army__________________________________________ 452 359 361 371 382 Navy__________________________________________ 328 290 289 298 294 Marine Corps___________________________________ 19 20 20 20 20 Air Force______________________________________ 338 245 244 244 247 Defense Agencies_______________________________ 38 77 77 82 83 I Includes civilian reserve technicians not on the federal payroll in 1964. 2 Under 500 personnel. 2 Subtotals may not add to totals due to rounding. Committee Recommendations For the reasons discussed below, the committee recommends reduc- tions totaling 700 from the requested Department of Defense civil- ian strength for the end of fiscal year 1982. The committee recom- mendations on the civilian end strengths for each military service are set forth below : CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1982 ]End strengths in thousands] March amended request fiscal year 1982 Committee rec- ommendation fiscal year 198 Change from request Army---- - 381.7 381.2 -.5 : Navy/Marine Corps__________________________________________ 313.0 312.6 -.4 Air Force--------------------------------------------------- 247.4 249.0 +1.6 Defense agencies____________________________________________ 82.8 81.4 -1.4 Committee Recommendations by Service Components Army Civilian Manpower The committee recommends a decrease of 500 in the requested Army civilian end strength of 381,700. This will result in an increase of 21,300 over the original Defense Department budget submission for Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 fiscal year 1982. The reduction of 500 is to be made in various manage- ment and operational headquarters to promote greater efficiencies. The increase in the Army's civilian manpower strength is designed to : -Return borrowed and diverted military manpower to their operating units; -Improve depot maintenance and supply capabilities; and -Increase support for procurement actions for force moderniza- tion. The Army's emphasis on improving combat readiness requires more soldiers in units. The most immediate way to achieve improved oper- ational readiness and sustainability is to replace with civilian man- power those soldiers who have been borrowed and diverted from their units to perform civilian functions. Readiness also requires increases in the traditional civilian functions of depot maintenance, supply operations, and procurement. The civilian strength request as recom- mended by the committee will not only return borrowed and diverted military manpower to their units but will also provide logistical sup- port and more adequately support procurement actions for modern- ization. In order to make an immediate and effective improvement in readi- ness, the committee authorizes 16.800 of the increase of 21,300 civilians to be used in the replacement of military manpower. No more than 5,000 of these 16,800 civilians may be indirect hires. The committee also requests the Department of the Army to submit a report by Sep- tember 30, 1981, on the planned allocation of the 16,800 .civilians. The report should also examine the extent to which these civilians fill or will fill positions previously occupied by non-commissioned officers and the number of non-commissioned officers who were or will be returned to combat units after their replacement by these additional civilians. Navy/Marine Corps Civilian Manpower The Nsvv/Marine Corps civilian end strength request reflects an in- crease of 3,700 from the original fiscal year 1982 budget submission. The committee recommends a reduction of 400 civilian positions from various Navy management and operational headquarters to promote greater efficiency. The committee also approves the authorization of the requested Marine Corps civilian end strength. The additions to the Navy civilian strength are primarily in support of readiness-related workloads in the Navy Shipyards and Naval Air Rework Facilities to accelerate the overhaul of surfsce ships and diesel submarines and to reduce aircraft maintenance backlogs. Air Force Civilian Manpower The Air Force request for fiscal year 1982 of 247,400 represents an increase of 3,600 over the fiscal year 1981 supplemental request. The committee recommends an increase of 2,200 to this request for the con- version of military personnel positions to civilian positions. In addi- tion, the committee recommends a reduction of 300 civilian positions for the Foreign Military Sales Pronram and a decrease of 300 civilian positions programed for commissaries. Th,,, Air Force remiests an increase in civilian positions in order to sunnort lonistios requirements generated by the additional flying hours programed in fiscal year 1982. The in-house capability of Air Force Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 Approved For Release 2007/10/19: CIA-RDP84M00715R000100010002-2 depots, modernization and force structure adjustments in the Air Reserve Forces require increased support. The Air Reserve Forces mili- tary technicians-members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve who serve in their units on a full-time basis as civilians in peacetime and become active duty military members upon mobiliza- tion-account for the major portion of the civilian end strength in- crease and provide a direct contribution to Air Force readiness. Defense Agencies Civilian Manpower The Defense Department has requested a civilian end strength of 82,800 for the Defense Agencies in fiscal year 1982. This request repre- sents an increase of 900 over the President's supplemental request for fiscal year 1981. The committee recommends a reduction in the DOD request of 400 positions in various management and operational headquarters and a decrease of 1,000 positions in overhead for the office of the Secretary of Defense, including the administration of DOD schools. Authority to Exceed Civilian End Strength The Secretary of Defense shall be authorized to exceed the total civilian end strength by 2 percent when in the national interest or if any anticipated conversions in fiscal Year 1982 of commercial and indus- trial type activities are deemed to be inappropriate. Air National Guard Conversion to Full-Time Military Manning The fiscal year 1979 Defense Appropriations Act initiated a test to determine the ability of the Reserve components to attract and hire Guard and Reserve personnel in an active duty status to meet full-time unit support requirements. The test ended June 30, 1980, and the De- partment of Defense has submitted its report to the Congress. Pending review of the test results, congressional guidance allowed the Air National Guard an additional full-time military authoriza- tion to fill growth positions authorized for employment subsequent to September 30, 1980, or new positions resulting from conversions in weapon systems or mission changes. The Air National Guard has other full-time requirements which are military in nature and do not fit the purpose and intent of the technician program, which is training, administration, and mainte- nance of equipment for mobilization. Accordingly, the fiscal year 1981 budget identifies military personnel resources for certain'

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982