MEMORANDUM TO MR. CARVER [AND OTHERS} FROM H. STOERTZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84R01033R000100100012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 13, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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DRAFT: HS
16 June 1975
Chapter 1 on fundamental issues (page 3). The President has summarized
the task of intelligence as that of protecting our national interest and
helping avert armed conflicts without impairing our democratic institutions
and fundamental freedoms.
1. It must be made clear to all Agency officers that their
individual responsibility includes alertness to potential impairments.
So far, the requirement communicated to individuals has been limited
to an instruction to surface actions which might be, or might be
perceived to be, beyond CIA's charter. This is not adequate.
Compliance with other laws and Constitutional obligations must be
brought within the scope of this instruction.
2. The principle of individual responsibility must be communicated
clearly down from top, in part by explicit acceptance of this principle
by the leadership of the Agency. Assigning full responsibility for
projects to higher authority outside the Agency, even the White House,
is not adequate.
3. The climate in the Agency must be such that, on a sustained
basis henceforth, officers at all levels must know that they can get
receptive hearing for expressions of personal concern and responsibility
without fear of adverse affect on their careers. A strengthened I.G.
function might help, but the creation and sustaining of such a climate
is primarily a task of top leadership.
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4. One way for top leadership to foster the sense of responsibility
destribed above is for top leadership to articulate its own view of the
reasonable lines between legitimate intelligence needs and the erosion
of individual liberties and Constitutional government. What general
guidelines should be used in judging whether activities proposed from
above or below are proper? What individual liberties of US citizens
at home and abroad should be considered inviolate? What are judged to
be the American standards of conduct, within and beyond our shores,
that should be upheld as a matter of principle? In short, where
between the extremes of "Gentlemen don't read other people's mail" and
"All's fair in love and war" does top leadership believe is the proper
limitation of intelligence activity? In view of the difficulty of
such an inquiry--recognized but left unresolved in Chapter 1 of the
Commission's report--it would seem that a dialogue on this subject
within the Agency, begun and encouraged by top leadership, could lead
to the kind of helthy consideration of the problem that could help
each individual to clarify his own understanding of his responsibility
in this area.
Recommendations. The DCI should go on the public record with respect
to his views on each recommendation in the Commission's report. My comments
address only the recommendations about which I have an opinion.
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Recommendations 3-6 on external control.
1. (Recommendation 3.) A joint Congressional committee on
intelligence would certainly provide more oversight than the
existing subcommittees. It could also be better forum for such needs
and concerns as the Agency may need to bring to the attention of the
Congress, such as the need for more effective laws to protect
legitimate secrets. Within the Congress itself, such a committee
could be a vehicle for seeking to insure Congressional responsibility
in the protection of intelligence information, sources and methods.
2. (Recommendation 4.) A line item in the budget should deal
with intelligence as a whole, not just the CIA. The Commission's
purpose in suggesting that the budget of the CIA be more public to at
least some extent is to alleviate the problems confronting the CIA
because its operations have been conducted in a pervading atmosphere
of secrecy. Secrecy has come to be associated in part with dishonest
coverup. The public would not be honestly and fully informed about
its government's intelligence expenditures if only that part of the
budget expended by CIA were disclosed. In addition, the DCI's full
responsibility would not be adequately portrayed. The existence of
such an item could help the DCI to strengthen his ability to oversee
the intelligence community, since presumably he would have to be
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the chief defender of the item. There would thus likely be a further
increase in the pressures on non-CIA intelligence components to
justify their proposed expenditures to the DCI, and to submit them
to his effective scrutiny, so that the elements comprising the
overall budget would have his full understanding, approval, and support.
This would enhance his ability to manage the allocation and use of
all US intelligence resources.
3. (Recommendation 6.) The existence and use of independent
authority to prosecute by the Department of Justice would contribute
to the acceptance of individual responsibility for compliance with
the laws referred to in the section on fundamental issues, above.
Recommendations 7-12 on internal controls.
1. (Recommendation 8.) From the national intelligence point of
view, the desiderata relevant to the question of whehter an administra-
tive deputy should be appointed include the degree to which such an
appointment could assist the DCI to spend more time on substantive
matters and on intelligence community matters. The experience of
this past spring certainly demonstrates that the DCI needs additional
top-level assistance.
2. (Recommendation 12.) As indicated in the discussion of
fundamental issues, above, the issuance of guidelines by top management
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is one of several potentially useful steps in communicating throughout
the Agency an active employee consciousness of what is proper and an
active sense of employee responsibility for compliance with American
laws and standards.
Recommendation 21 on unauthorized disclosure.
Legislation such as that endorsed by the Commission should extend
to all officers of each branch of government, and not be limited to
CIA employees. While noone can say with certainty, the content and
circumstances of many of the leaks which have plagued the government
strongly suggest that employees or ex-employees of CIA were not the
sources. The sense of responsibility toward security of CIA employees
is generally quite high. For these people to be singled out by
legislation under circumstances in which it is by no means clear
that they are the culprits would seem unfair as well as unlikely to
get at the root of the problem. Nevertheless, it does seem clear that
the tools available for protection of sensitive information, sources
and methods are quite inadequate. The inconvenience of compartmentalization,
for example, to the people who are attempting to integrate intelligence
findings from all sources, hardly seems worth it when even the
compartmentalized projects are so often the subject of sensational
leaks to the press. Disclosure legislation applicable to all officials
of each branch of government who have access to properly classified
information would seem appropriate in the present circumstances.
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