CHAD: THE GROWING THREAT TO HABRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000100060003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chad:
The Growing Threat
to Habre
ALA 83-10016
February 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Chad:
The Growi~Threat
to Habre
An Intelligence Assessment
Africa Division, AL~
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, with
a contribution by~Office of Central
Reference. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be addressed to the Chief, West and East
This paper was prepared by
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
ALA 83-10016
February 1983
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Chad:
The Gr?wg~ng Tha~eat
t? Habre'
Key Judgments We believe Chadian President Habre faces a serious and growing threat to
/nlormation available his still fragile government from Libyan-backed dissidents who may soon
as ojl4 January 1983 launch a guerrilla offensive. Habre, opportunistic but generally pro-
was used in this report.
Western, wrested control from President Goukouni's Libyan-backed re-
gime last June but was able to assert his authority over southern Chad
three months later, after defeating factional leader Kamougue. Libya has
enlisted Goukouni and Kamougue to unseat Habre and install another pro-
Libyan regime in N'Djamena. If Chadian dissidents fail to inflict sufficient
damage on Habre, or, if Chad's Libyan-occupied Aozou strip in the north
is attacked by Habre, Qadhafi, in our view, could be tempted to mount a
second invasion of Chad despite the unpopularity of such a move among his
troops and the opposition of black African states.
In our judgment, Habre's government would be hard pressed to survive in
the face of major dissidence on two fronts. Northerners form Habre's only
reliable source of support, and his army is lightly equipped, overextended,
and suffers severe transport, communications, and logistic deficiencies.
Although Habre controls most of Chad and has formed a government with
representation from all regions, we believe renewed outbreaks of factional
strife would shatter this fragile cooperation. Just the threat of dissident
activity and renewed Libyan intervention is diverting Habre from the tasks
of reconciliation and reconstruction and may scare off some of the foreign
donors who have pledged $185 million in economic aid.
We estimate that France, Chad's traditional supporter, will be less
generous than in the past because of previous disappointments and
lingering distrust of Habre among some French socialists. Still, we believe
French concern over the potential spread of Libyan meddling among
neighboring francophone states will cause them to move slowly toward
providing more, albeit still limited, military and economic support for
iii Secret
ALA 83-10016
February 1983
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Chad. Moreover, should a Libyan invasion appear imminent, we believe
Paris would quickly step up aid to Habre and rally francophone African
diplomatic support for a more active French role.
We believe Habre's ouster would cause moderate Africans to question
Western resolve to curb Libyan expansionism and increase their hesitation
about standing up to Qadhafi in the future. Even though Habre's removal
would be likely, in our view, to plunge Chad into renewed factional
squabbling, Qadhafi would still try to use Chad as a base for encouraging
dissidence and fomenting instability in the region. If Habre is not killed, we
would expect him to revert to guerrilla operations with help from moderate
Arabs to keep any new Chadian regime weak and on the defensive.
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Chadian dissident
~ camp
- Chadian refugee
camp
MIMI Selected Muslim
tribe
SARA Selected Animist-
Christian tribe
Road
Railroad
LIBYA
Gouro~.
Lake
Chad
N'Ujam~rna Bokor
AI\
Junaynah
Ndele~ CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
505676 (A00109) 2-83
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NIGER
seasot
highwa
R A B
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Chad:
The Growing Threat
to Habre ~~
President Hissein Habre-a moderate northerner-
wrested control of strife-torn Chad last June from a
coalition led by President Goukouni, a pliant north-
erner backed by Libyan leader Qadhafi. Three
months later, Habre asserted his authority over
Chad's economically vital non-Muslim south after
defeating the regional forces of former Vice President
Kamougue and remnants of pro-Libyan northern
factions that fled to the south after the fall of
N'Djamena. In our view, Habre has the potential to
restore a measure of peace and stability to Chad, a
starkly poor country that has been beset by civil war
for most of the period since it achieved independence
from France in 196Q. We note, however, that his
position is tenuous and vulnerable to both domestic
and foreign pressures.
Even without an external threat, US Embassy report-
ing indicates that Habre faces the daunting tasks of
reconciling Chad's 200 ethnic groups, integrating
factional forces into a national army, and restoring
the war-disrupted economy. This paper examines the
current Libyan and Chadian dissident threats to
Habre, briefly considers his ability to deal both with
them and the regime's other pressing problems, and
reviews the implications of failure for US regional
We believe that Qadhafi's previous direct involvement
in Chad, from October 1980 when he intervened with
7,000 troops until his pullout in November 1981, was
a failure that the Libyan leader would like to erase
from the books. According to his own public state-
ments, Qadhafi views Habre as an unacceptable
"tool" of Western interests-particularly the United
States, France, Sudan, and Egypt. We believe he is
also concerned that if Habre is allowed to consolidate
his position Chad could become a center of Libyan
opposition activity. Moreover, in our judgment,
Chad-because of religious and cultural ties estab-
lished in the 19th century by the Libyan-based
Senoussi Islamic order-remains a key target in
Qadhafi's larger dream of eventually creating apan-
Islamic state across the Sahara.
In our judgment, Qadhafi prefers to foment atwo-
front insurgency against Habre rather than commit
Libyan ground forces to a second invasion to topple
the Chadian leader. US Embassy reporting
indicate that Tripoli, 25X1
not ong a ter Habre's entry into N'Djamena, began
to organize Chadian dissidents-both northerners and
southerners-under the leadership of ex-President
Goukouni. We believe that Qadhafi demonstrated his
determination to oust Habre at the second abortive
OAU summit in Tripoli last November by trying to
seat Goukouni as Chad's representative. This action
doomed the meeting and the Libyan leader's much
coveted assumption of the OAU chairmanship.
Although Qadhafi may be tempted to invade Chad at
some point, we believe a direct military move would
be unpopular with his militar and could
for a coup attempt.
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In our view, the Libyan
leader may now pay more attention to that discontent
than has been the case in the past. He is becoming 25X1
increasingly unpopular and faces a growing problem
of military unrest as reflected by fairly regular at-
tempts by military dissidents to overthrow the regime.
Moreover, Qadhafi appears to us to be concerned that
any large-scale Libyan move against Chad might
elicit a strong response from Egypt, the United States,
and France
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Antigovernment Activity
Dissidents and Libyans Threaten in the North
According to Radio Tripoli, the Libyans have brought
former Chadian President Goukouni back to his
native territory in Chad's rugged and remote Tibesti
mountains and installed him as the head of a provi-
sional government, with Kamougue as his deputy. The
Libyan press has indicated that Goukouni's headquar-
ters is located in Bardai, a town near Chad's Libyan-
occupied Aozou strip (see map). We believe Gou-
kouni's so-called government of national unity
represents nothing more than the remnants of north-
ern and southern Chadian factions previously allied
with him and defeated by Habre last year.
~he US defense attache
in Paris indicates that Gou ouni may now have as
many as 1,000 men in the Tibesti area, supported by a
small number of Libyan advisers.
these men were organized and equipped with
small arms in Libya, where they received some train-
ing in small unit tactics before being sent into Chad.
US Embassy reporting indicates that Goukouni's
force is being augmented by dissident Chadians clan-
destinely recruited among refugees in Nigeria, Cam-
eroon, and the Central African Republic. ~
US Embassy in Benin reports the Chadians are
gathered in Cotonou before traveling on special Liby-
an flights and the weekly Soviet Aeroflot service to
Tripoli for training and subsequent infiltration into
northern Chad.
The Tibesti area-located in the far northwestern
corner of Chad-is ideal as a base for guerrilla
operations. Close to sources of supply in southern
Libya, the Tibesti is an underpopulated area of
rugged volcanic mountains in the Saharan desert,
being the home only of the nomadic Teda branch of
the Toubou tribe that inhabits both sides of the
Libya-Chad border. The Tibesti, historically a center
of Toubou rebelliouness, necessitated continued
French military administration of the region for five
years uJ'ter Chad's independence in 1960.
The Aozou strip-a 200-mile-deep strip below
Chad s border with Libya that includes most of the
Tibesti region-was occupied by Libyan troops in
1972. Libya claims sovereignty based upon precolo-
nial religious ties by the Libyan-based Senoussi
Islamic order to the area and an unratified 1935
treaty under which France was to cede the strip to
Italy in exchange for territorial concessions else-
where. The Chadian central government believes the
Aozou strip is rich in resources, such as uranium, oil,
and gold, and claims that Libya wants to exploit the
area's wealth. The actual resource base is unknown,
however, due to the years of cortfTict and inadequate
exploration. According to old and incomplete French
surveys, the area may contain some iron and low-
grade uranium ore.
tlements in southern Libya.
The Tibesti region and Aozou strip have traditionally
been more closely tied to Libya than to the rest of
Chad. The Teda Toubou belong to the Senoussi
Islamic order which originated in Libya, while the
Daza Toubou and most of Chad's other Muslims
belong to a rival order. This part of northern Chad
also has traditionally had better transport links-the
remains of ancient trans-Saharan routes-with set-
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~ecre~
Libyan-supplied four-wheel drive trucks mounted with light multi-
ple rocket launchers and heavy machineguns are very effective in
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The
US Embassy in N'Djamena reports Libyan reconnais-
sance aircraft are overflying Faya Largeau, Chad's
largest northern town and Habre's regional headquar-
ters, and other outposts presumably gathering intelli-
gence for Goukouni's forces.
Libyan officials have repeatedly stated in speeches
and press releases that the Aozou strip is an integral
part of Libya and will be forcefully defended. In our
judgment, if Habre were to attempt to take any part
of the Aozou strip by force, this could give Qadhafi an
excuse to commit Libyan forces to another interven-
tion in Chad. According to the US Embassy, Habre is
preparing to ask the UN Security Council to take up a
resolution calling for Libya to withdraw from the
disputed Aozou strip and condemning Tripoli's hostile
behavior toward Chad. Such a development, in our
view, will increase tensions, and Tripoli could respond
by pressuring Goukouni's forces to launch major
guerrilla activity
No Chadian dissident attacks against Habre's major
outposts in northern Chad have occurred, although we
believe the risk is growing. We know that both sides
operate reconnaissance patrols in outlying areas and
that some small clashes have occurred that could
escalate into broader fighting. The US Embassy has
reported that Habre's forces mounted an unsuccessful
strike in late December against the buildup of Chad-
ian dissidents near Gouro. That failure and the
continuing dissident buildup have led the Chadian
Government to conclude that a dissident offensive
may not be far off.
In answer to the northern threat, Habre has rein-
forced Chad's nearby outposts, leaving few of his loyal
forces to protect N'Djamena and maintain order in
the south. The US defense attache in Paris reports
that Habre now has approximately 1,500 lightly
armed men in the north.
only 200 of Habre's most reliable troops
remain in the south and 300 in N'Djamena. Another
2,000 are reportedly dispersed throughout the rest of
Chad. Radio N'Djamena has announced that Egyp-
tian instructors are helping to train a new civil police
force, a development that may eventually free some
additional loyal troops for strictly military duties.
In our judgment, recent shipments of ammunition and 25X1
small arms from Egypt and Sudan will help alleviate
Habre's shortages until major fighting erupts.
forces will increasingly suffer from transport, commu-
nication, and supply problems as hostilities increase.
troops in the far north, and
breakdowns, parts short-
ages, an a scarcity o _ ots have further restricted
Chad's limited airlift capability and were reventin
deliveries of supplies to the north.
Potential Dissident Threat in the South
We believe Habre faces an additional threat in the
south because of Libyan activities in the neighboring
Central African Republic (CAR). The US Embassy
reported last October that the Libyans introduced
some 75 military advisers into the CAR, ostensibly to
train the country's soldiers in the use of recentl
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Habre believes-as we 25X1
do-that the Libyans' real mission in the CAR
probably is to try to encourage and assist Chadian 25X1
refugees in the country to mount a campaign of
harassment in southern Chad. The US Embassy in
Bangui speculates that, to this end, the Libyans may
even try to engineer the overthrow of President
Kolingba, who is a strong supporter of Habre, by
bribing dissident CAR military officers.
The US Embassy in Bangui reports that at least 1,600
former military followers of southern Chadian leader
Kamougue are in CAR refugee camps near the
southern Chad border.Z
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that these forces may be receiving supplies and en-
couragement from the Libyan mission in the Central
African Republic. Moreover, according to the US
Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroonian authorities in
mid-December detained a clandestine Libyan truck
convoy that was on the way to the CAR.
According to S Embassy
reporting, the French military contingent in the CAR
is trying to monitor Chadian dissident and Libyan
activities and is keeping both Presidents Kolingba and
Habre informed.' In our judgment, however, French
capability for monitoring the CAR-Chadian border
region is limited.
Most observers agree that Chad and its leaders will
find it extremely difficult, even under the best of
circumstances, to cope with the problems posed by the
country's poverty and deep-seated regional, tribal,
and religious rivalries. In our view, Hissein Habre
offers the best hope for breaking Chad's repetitive
cycle of civil war and achieving some measure of
internal stability.
We believe that in his short tenure as President,
Habre has proved a stronger and more capable leader
than any of his predecessors or rivals. He has success-
fully gained control-albeit tenuous-of most of the
country and included Chadians from most regions in a
national government. Habre, moreover, has been ac-
cepted as Chad's legitimate head of state by a major-
ity of OAU members.' Because Habre has no appar-
ent successor, his death or removal from the scene
would, in our judgment, again plunge Chad into
chaos.
problems at a conference in Lagos, Nigeria by creating an "inter-
im" government under President Goukouni representing various
Chadian factions. This government was given a mandate to govern
for I8 months during which the groundwork was to have been laid
for the holding of national elections, the establishment of a
government of national unity, and the formation of an integrated
army. But Goukouni's OAU mandate expired without any progress
being made toward the process of reconciliation. Tripoli's sponsor-
ship of Goukouni as the legitimate leader of Chad is ostensibly
based upon this expired mandate. Qadhafi chooses to ignore the
acceptance of Habre at the recent Francophone African Confer-
ence in Zaire and by the majority of OAU members, including
Regional Problems
Governing the non-Muslim south poses one of Habre's
most delicate regional problems. More than half the
country's 4.5 million population and almost all impor-
tant economic and educational functions are centered
there, making the region Habre's major resource pool
for skilled technicians, civil servants, and tax reve-
nues. The south, however, remains a tinderbox, ac-
cording to the US Embassy, and Habre needs more
time-without foreign interference-to overcome the
fear and distrust that the largely Christian and
animist southerners feel toward a northern Muslim
president. US Embassy officials report continuing
tension in the south between Habre's northern admin-
istrative officials on the one hand and local civilian
authorities and remnants of the southern gendarmer-
ie, which opportunistically rallied to Habre after his
takeover. 5 Habre has invoked draconian penalties for
misbehavior by his own northern troops against the
local populace.
occasionally with small roving bands of armed men
once loyal to Kamougue and various other opposition
factions. While we believe actual incidents have been
limited in frequency and severity,
the level of tension is sufficient to cause
the local population in Kamougue's old stronghold of
Moundou to vacate the city at night.
Economic Problems
US Embassy reporting indicates that the years of civil
war and Sahelian drought have had a devastating
effect on Chad's already feeble economy. b
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the national treasury was
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looted by Goukouni's regime. The Habre government
needs significant external assistance to pay civil serv-
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ants and soldiers, to carry out essential governmental
' Estimates of the personnel strength for the gendarmerie ranged
from 3,000 to 10,000 before Habre's takeover. We believe the
higher number includes unarmed militia and various hangers-on,
while the lower number probably reflects the actual number of
available troops. The number of these troops that have accepted
Habre or remain at ]arse in the countrvcide is unclear ~
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services, and to begin economic reconstruction. UN
officials estimate $370 million is required over the
next two years. While Habre's loyal northern follow-
ers support him at least for now, we believe others-
particularly southerners-will continue to back him
only if they can be assured of fairly regular pay and
supplies of essentials. Since his takeover last June,
Habre has limped along with about $22 million in
economic aid from Saudi Arabia, France, and the
United States-plus emergency food assistance from
UN agencies.
Habre's short-term financial problems are increasing.
Chadian authorities have told US officials that the
government has enough money to pay salaries through
March or April and that the problems will become
critical after that if no additional help is received. '
Although Chad received important pledges of aid for
future economic development at a UN-sponsored
donors conference in Geneva last November, the US
Embassy reported that Chadian representatives were
disappointed with their failure to receive promises of
immediate budgetary support to meet the govern-
ment's monthly payroll.
At the Geneva conference, Chad received pledges
totaling approximately $185 million for food and
reconstruction needs, which if honored should begin
flowing some time later this year. The most substan-
tial pledges were made by Saudi Arabia ($59 million),
' Constraints on issuing domestic currency arise from N'Djamena's
special relationship with France. Along with all ex-French territo-
ries in west and central Africa except Guinea, Mali, and Maurita-
nia, Chad participates in the French franc zone through the
multilateral African Financial Community. A central bank located
in Cameroon issues currency (CFA francs) used by Chad and four
other central African states. The Africans benefit from relative
monetary stability as a result of following conservative French
monetary and banking policies; in exchange, zone arrangements
protect France's privileged trade by setting effective ceilings on
imports by Africans from outside the zone and the European
Community, and minimum levels for certain imports from France.
The African issuing bank must hold its member countries' pooled
currency reserves and foreign exchange earnings in French francs
in a French treasury account into which receipts are credited and
payments debited. African franc zone states ordinarily cannot
impose exchange controls or revalue their currencies without the
consent of all parties, and they are obliged to follow the lead of
France in these areas. Franc zone restrictions prevent governments
France ($35 million), and West Germany ($20 mil-
lion). Several potential donors, including Japan, have
declared their intention to provide aid but are still in
the process of examining Chadian needs and prospects
for stability before committing themselves les
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The Limited French Response
France's basic interests in Chad parallel those of the 25X1
United States, namely to keep the Libyans out. Even
so, US Embassy reporting from Paris indicates that
French policy toward Habre has been a contentious
issue within President Mitterrand's government.
When Habre announced his new government, the US
Embassy in Paris reported that the French Govern-
ment-which was strongly committed to Goukouni-
only reluctantly accepted Habre as the de facto leader
of Chad. In our judgment, however, advocates of
closer French ties with Habre now have the upper
hand in the Mitterrand government.
We know from US Embassy reporting that the Mit-
terrand government played a leading role in pressing
former President Goukouni to distance himself from
Qadhafi's embrace and to ask Libya to remove its
troops from Chad. In doing so, the French gave heavy
economic backing to Goukouni. French aid ended
when Habre seized power last June and was not
resumed for several months until Paris was satisfied
that Habre had provided adequate representation in
his government for the non-Muslim south, where
French interests center.
According to US Embassy reporting, French unease
with Habre stems from a variety of factors. Unlike
the southerners who quickly accepted French ways,
northerners-especially Toubou tribesmen like
Habre-have traditionally rejected and resisted
French culture and domination. Memories linger in
Paris of Habre's anti-French actions as a guerrilla
fighter in the 1970s against Chad's French-backed,
southern-dominated government
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France has provided humanitarian aid to Habre's
government, according to the US Embassy in
N'Djamena, along with $1.7 million in direct budget-
ary assistance and $1.2 million in general develop-
ment funds allocated in 10 separate areas
the French bud-
getary assistance currently being provided is sufficient
to cover less than half of the government's require-
ments. This assistance is subject to renewal in March.
Although we believe Paris is providing modest quanti-
ties of arms, ammunition, and equipment to Habre,
we do not believe that France wishes to become his
major military supplier.
Athough Paris appears to us to be hesitant to resume
its traditional level of involvement in Chad because of
past disappointments and lingering distrust of Habre,
we believe the Libyan dissident threat is nudging
France in the direction of providing moderately in-
creased economic and military support for his regime.
Moreover, the US Embassy in Paris reports that
should Libyan troops directly attack Chad, the Mit-
terrand government probably would feel compelled to
quickly step up aid to Habre. Paris would, in our view,
conclude that any perceived complacency on its part
would seriously undermine French credibility among
moderate francophone states in the region.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We believe Qadhafi is determined to overthrow
Habre, but we do not expect direct Libyan troop
intervention in the near term. Tripoli probably will
continue to support Libyan-supported Chadian dissi-
dents to undermine Habre. If this proves insufficient
to achieve his goal, Qadhafi, in our judgment, may
resort increasingly to aggressive direct action, such as
using Libyan ground support aircraft to aid the rebels.
In our estimate, barring a direct Libyan incursion,
Habre's forces can probably cope with limited insur-
gent attacks in the north. We do not believe Habre
would receive help from the OAU-which provided a
3,500-man peacekeeping force from November 1981
to June 1982-because Qadhafi's behavior and two
abortive OAU summits in Tripoli have effectively
If Libya succeeds in fomenting dissident activity in
the south, we believe Habre's position will become
much more tenuous. We believe the present level of
tension in southern Chad makes it extremely vulnera-
ble to Qadhafi's machinations in the neighboring
Central African Republic. Any renewal of fighting or
heightened suspicion and fear created by a few care-
fully planned incidents could seriously undermine
Habre's control and encourage renewed civil war.
Habre's forces are already stretched to the limit, and,
in our judgment, cannot face both the northern threat
and serious unrest in the south at the same time.
In our view, even in the absence of fighting, Habre's
regime is being damaged by the threat of Libyan-
backed dissidence. The threat is diverting attention
and resources from the all-important tasks of national
reconstruction and getting the new government func-
tioning. It also complicates the task of forming an
integrated national army because southerners resist
being sent to defend the Muslim north.
In our judgment, the United States, other Western
nations, and moderate Arab states will continue to be
faced with requests from Chad for both military and
economic assistance. The major burden of organizing
support for Habre will be left to the United States if
France continues to delay. The United States provid-
ed $10 million in humanitarian, food, and develop-
ment aid to Habre's regime in fiscal year 1982 and
has budgeted another $9.3 million for these areas for
1983. In addition, the United States is initiating a
$50,000 military educational training program for
Chadian military officers. A permanently staffed
office of the US Agency for International Develop-
ment was opened in N'Djamena in early January
1983.
If the West is perceived as not adequately supporting
Habre, we believe moderate African regimes will
question Western resolve and be more hesitant in the
future to counter Libya as they did at the two
attempted summits of the OAU in Tripoli. Should
Habre be toppled by Libyan subversion, we believe
neighboring African states have good reason to fear
paralyzed the organization.
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further Libyan meddling in the region. Qadhafi has
made no secret of his desire to undermine moderate
pro-Western governments, realign borders imposed
during the colonial era, and unite the region's Mus-
lims under his leadership. He will only be encouraged
in this desire if he succeeds in Chad. Five moderate
pro-Western countries-Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, and Sudan-share borders
with Chad that are largely open and unprotected, and
all but the Central African Republic have sizable
Muslim populations. While we do not believe Qadhafi
could make immediate inroads in the region, he could
use Chad as a base from which to encourage dissent
and instability in the area
In our judgment, however, aLibyan-sponsored regime
would probably not be able to unify or control all of
Chad's traditionally fractious population. The previ-
ous regime of President Goukouni continued to be
racked by serious factional strife even while Libyan
troops occupied the country. We believe the only
source of unity among Chadian dissident forces today
is the shared goal of getting rid of Habre and
exploiting Tripoli's current willingness to provide
money and arms. If Habre is removed from the
political scene, we believe it will be a long time before
Chad again has a chance at peace. If Habre were to
be defeated militarily by Libyan-backed dissidents,
Chad would, in our judgment, quickly revert to
factional squabbling. We believe Habre-if not
killed-would retreat to his old stronghold in the
Biltine region bordering Sudan and its cross-border
sanctuaries, regroup, and once again begin guerrilla
operations.
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Appendix
Key Chadian Leaders
President Hissein Habre is the first Chadian leader to
combine ambition and military strength with a dedi-
cation to national reconciliation and reconstruction.
He is a tough soldier and an effective administrator.
Habre is striving to overcome his reputation for
ruthlessness and opportunism, having repeatedly
shifted alliances in the past. A staunch nationalist, he
has been implacably hostile to Libya since Qadhafi's
annexation of the Aozou strip in 1972.
Born in Faya Largeau, the 44-year-old Habre is a
shepherd's son and a member of the Daza clan of
Toubou tribe-the largest branch of this northern
Muslim ethnic group. He was educated as a lawyer in
France and speaks fluent French in addition to local
Chadian languages. Habre is often described as sin-
gle-minded, intelligent, and articulate.
Goukouni Weddeye is the leader of aLibyan-backed
Chadian government in exile with its headquarters
near Chad's Libyan-occupied Aozou strip. He headed
a Chadian government from November 1979 to June
1982 that Habre overthrew. This has left Goukouni
dependent on Tripoli, which has supported him for
over a decade because he is easily manipulated.
Goukouni, about 39 years old, was born in Zouar and
is the last surviving son of the Derde, the Toubou
tribal spiritual leader. Essentially a simple desert
warrior, he is a devout Muslim with some secondary
education. Not a striking figure, Goukouni is a quiet
man of Spartan tastes who feels ill at ease around
better educated people. He had proved an indecisive
leader whose decisions tend to reflect the last strong
advocate who has seen him on a particular matter.
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Col. Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue is the number-
two man in Goukouni's government in exile, and he
served as vice president in Goukouni's 1979-82 regime
in N'Djamena. He
accepts Libyan largess in hopes of regaining control
over Chad's non-Muslim south. The 44-year-old
Kamougue, a Catholic from the large, Western-
influenced Sara tribe, was trained by the French
military and at one time was considered one of Chad's
most competent officers.
Following Habre's takeover last June, Kamougue
refused to reconcile with the President despite the
wishes of many southerners who were tired of conflict,
and he fled to the Congo when most of his troops
rallied to Habre. As the south's one-time military
strongman, Kamougue reportedly exploited the region
for personal gain and has been largely discredited as a
leader, although elements of his former factional
forces remain loyal to him.
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