HORN OF AFRICA: CONTINUED TENSIONS IN 1983

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000100090003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence -f-'
Horn of Africa:
Continued Tensions in 1983
rap-seemL
March 1983
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Directorate of Too Secret
Intelligence
Horn of Africa:
Continued Tensions in 1983
This assessment was prepared by
the Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, West-East Africa Division,
ALA,
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and with the National Intelligence
Council.
ALA 83-10031 C
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Horn of Africa:
Continued Tensions in 1983
Key Judgments The major countries of the Horn of Africa-Ethiopia and Somalia-face
Information available serious security problems that pose political challenges to their governments
as of 15 February 1983 and problems for their superpower allies. Much of the region's trouble
was used in this report.
derives from Ethiopia's efforts to unify forcibly a multiethnic state under a
Marxist political and economic system, and Somalia's irredentist struggle to
regain Somali-inhabited territories controlled by Ethiopia. These regional
conflicts and the threats they pose to US interests have been intensified by
massive Soviet military aid to Ethiopia, which shares Moscow's hostility
toward US influence in the region and toward the pro-Western regime in
Somalia.
We believe that the Soviets' substantial influence with the Ethiopian Gov-
ernment will remain undiminished over the next year as a result of shared
ideological views, Moscow's desire to strengthen the Marxist regime in
Addis Ababa, and Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu's continuing need for
massive military aid to support the campaigns against Ethiopia's domestic
insurgents and against Somalia. Moscow will continue to provide only
limited economic aid, however, and this will cause continued tension in the
relationship. Cuba's 9,000 to 11,000 troops appear likely to remain inactive
in the disputed Ogaden region, serving as a reserve against a possible Somali
attack.
Libya, working through the tripartite alliance signed in 1981 with Ethiopia
and South Yemen, is virtually certain in 1983 to continue its attempts to
undermine moderate governments and US influence in the area. Although
both Ethiopia and Libya have been disappointed with some aspects of the
implementation of the 1981 accord, it has resulted in the provision of over
$224 million in Libyan aid to Ethiopia and joint subversive activities against
Sudan and Somalia.
Ethiopia's attacks and occupation in mid-1982 of Somali-controlled towns in
the disputed border area-constituting the most recent military clashes
between the two sides-had the effect of temporarily strengthening the
domestic political position of Somali President Siad, who was bolstered by
military assistance from the West, including the United States. Siad's hold
on power prior to the attacks had been declining as a result of his diminished
willingness and ability to manipulate tribal politics and because of the
country's military weakness and economic difficulties. With Somalia unable
to drive out the Ethiopians, we expect that Siad in 1983 will face renewed in-
ternal dissidence and a new deterioration of his position.
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ALA 83-10031 C
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In Ethiopia, Chairman Mengistu has used repressive policies to eliminate all
organized opposition, and his position-barring assassination-seems se-
cure over the coming year. The greatest challenge to the regime will come
from the militarily, economically, and politically debilitating insurgencies in
Eritrea and Tigray Provinces. Mengistu probably will continue efforts to
organize a Communist party at home and is unlikely to reorient his foreign
policy away from close relations with the Soviets despite his efforts to elicit
increased economic assistance from Western Europe.
We believe US interests in the Horn during 1983 will be challenged by the
most powerful state in the region, Ethiopia, and by its Soviet, Libyan, and
Cuban backers. These governments will attempt to expand their own
influence in the region, undermine support for US military access agree-
ments in the area, and weaken or overturn the Governments of Somalia and
Sudan. This, we believe, will result in continuing pleas from pro-Western
states in the region for increased US military and economic aid.
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Key Judgments
Ethiopia's Challenge to Regional Stability
7
Continued Skirmishing Likely
9
Impact on Domestic Politics of Key States
13
Siad's Position: A Temporary Improvement
13
Challenges to the United States
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Horn of Africa:
Continued Tensions in 1983
Tensions continue to run high in the Horn of Africa as
a result of longstanding ethnic disputes accentuated
by increased superpower competition. This competi-
tion, we believe, traces its roots in part to Soviet
military assistance to Somalia during the 1960s and
early 1970s and to Moscow's large-scale military aid,
begun in 1976, to Ethiopia. Superpower competition
has accelerated as US interest in the region-part of
Washington's larger strategy for the defense of West-
ern interests in the Persian Gulf area-has drawn
Soviet efforts to destabilize pro-Western regimes
there. These Soviet efforts, we believe, have taken the
form of continuing aid to their most important region-
al client, Ethiopia, which in turn has cooperated with
active Libyan subversive efforts against Mogadishu
and Khartoum. Soviet aid to Ethiopia, in our view,
also is directed at the internal stabilization of Addis
Ababa's Marxist regime and at the consolidation of
Soviet influence there.
Since 1976 the Soviets, according to US Embassy and
other reporting, have provided Addis Ababa with
$2.6 billion of such assistance and committed them-
selves to extend an additional $1.4 billion.' In addi-
tion, the US Embassy reports that 1,700 Soviet
advisers are currently stationed in Ethiopia and that
they continue to play an active role in assisting the
Ethiopian Army in its campaigns against several
internal insurgencies and its continuing occupation of
two Somali border villages taken in June and July
1982.
Furthermore, Cuba maintains 9,000 to 11,000 troops
in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and at a military
camp near Addis Ababa, according to Embassy re-
ports. The Cubans have not participated actively in
local conflicts since 1978, however, and we believe
they currently serve as a strategic reserve against a
renewed Somali invasion or an internally generated
effort to overthrow the Mengistu regime; they also
might, at some point, be transported to other places in
Africa, such as Mozambique.
Soviet Aid to Ethiopia
We believe that Ethiopia's alliance with the Soviet
Union is firm because of Addis Ababa's requirement
for continued outside military aid to deal with domes-
tic insurgencies and Ethiopia's recognition that such
aid is likely 'to be available only from Moscow. Soviet
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views also contribute to the overall stability of the two
countries' occasionally contentious alliance.
Since 1976, when the Soviets agreed to meet Ethio-
pia's military needs in an effort to replace the US 25X1
presence, Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu has often
publicly expressed his political affinity for Moscow.
We believe he sees the Soviet Union as a model of the
successful consolidation of a multiethnic empire under
strong central government and of economic modern-
ization and industrialization. Indeed, the Ethiopian
Chairman's personal contacts with the Soviets predate
his consolidation of power in 1977; he led the Ethiopi-
an delegation to Moscow in 1976 that negotiated the
original Soviet arms commitment to Addis Ababa.
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The Soviets, in our view, continue to see Ethiopia as
their most important Sub-Saharan African client and
a place from which to assert regional influence. We
believe this attitude stems from Ethiopia's political
importance within Africa, its economic and military
potential, and its location across the Red Sea from the
Arabian peninsula. The Soviets also enjoy limited
military access to Ethio is
The Soviets in the past have requested more extensive
access to Ethiopian facilities, but the US Embassy
reports they are not now pressing for it. We believe
this may be in part because of clear Ethiopian
sensitivities to a foreign military presence, as well as
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the Soviets' own concerns about the security situation
in Eritrea Province, which encompasses Ethiopia's
entire seacoast. Rather than immediately pursuing
expanded access for their own military forces, the
Soviets, in our view, would first prefer to consolidate
their position in Ethiopia by helping the central
government expand its control over the country and
by increasing their influence at all levels of the
government. In our view, this strategy is directed at
the goal of a stable Ethiopian ally for the Soviet
Union which would then be more amenable to serving
as a base for Soviet activities in the region;
Moscow also shares regional political goals with Ethi-
opia and Libya, and we believe the Soviets have
adopted a policy of arming these client states and
helping them pursue these shared aims; the Soviets
thus avoid potentially embarrassing direct involve-
ment in efforts to destabilize pro-Western regimes.
The Governments of Sudan and Somalia have told US
Embassies in their capitals that they view subversive
efforts directed against them by Ethiopia and Libya
as part of Moscow's regional policies even in the
absence of evidence of direct Soviet,involvement in
could become a reservoir of alternative leaders lest
Moscow eventually find itself tempted to support one
against him.
Embassy reporting indicates the Ethiopian leader has
also found the Soviets to be a convenient scapegoat for
the failure of the 1982 anti-insurgent offensive in
Eritrea Province. Embassy reports indicate that, al-
though Mengistu has laid most of the blame on
alleged Sudanese support for the rebels, Ethiopian
military leaders also have registered complaints about
the quality of Soviet equipment and advice. In our
view, Soviet apprehensions regarding this tendency
were one reason for the two-month visit to Eritrea by
the Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, Mar-
shal Petrov, at the height of the offensive in the spring
of 1982. Petrov, who, according to press accounts,
played a major role in directing Ethiopia's successful
counteroffensive against the Somali invasion of the
Ogaden in 1978, appears to have recommended a
reorganization of the Eritrean campaign after a care-
ful study and may have suggested breaking off the
campaign, which ended shortly after he left Ethiopia.
these schemes
Despite the mutual advantages of the relationship for
Moscow and Addis Ababa, it continues to exhibit
strains that we believe stem largely from Ethiopian
nationalism and Moscow's attempts to shape the
political complexion of the regime. Embassy and press
observers note that in personal relationships, cultural
differences between Soviet and Ethiopian officials and
military officers have led to frequent and acrimonious
disputes, with both sides generally holding the compe-
tence and intelligence of the other in low regard.
Mengistu himself, despite his political affinity for
Moscow, has proved to be a less than pliable client.
he has consistently resisted
Soviet pressure to move quickly to form an Ethiopian
Communist party. Much of his reluctance, we believe,
may derive from his memory of the radical civilian
parties that threatened the military regime during the
power struggles following the 1974 revolution; Men-
gistu, in our view, is striving for absolute control over
the party when it is finally created. Mengistu proba-
bly also is reluctant to allow the formation of what
We believe these strains do not presage a breakdown
or even a serious deterioration of the Soviet-Ethiopian
alliance during 1983. Indeed, the tone of the public
statements issued following Mengistu's visit to Mos-
cow in October 1982 and the agreement signed at that
time calling for close ties between the Soviet Commu-
nist Party and the commission set up to establish a
Communist party in Ethiopia indicate that the two
regimes remain close. Mengistu is the final arbiter of
Ethiopian foreign and security policy, and, as long as
he believes the Soviet connection is irreplaceable as a
source of critical military aid, he is unlikely-in our
view-to allow tensions in the relationship to flare out
of control.
We believe that, from Moscow's point of view as well,
good relations with Ethiopia are too valuable to risk
by making an issue of the minor irritations produced
by Addis Ababa's independent tendencies, and, in our
view, the Soviets will remain committed to the Men-
gistu regime. Although the Soviets are not above
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occasional demonstrations of their own displeasure,
they seem to recognize that Mengistu's basic commit-
ment to the alliance is firm and that his untimely
removal would precipitate political instability with an
uncertain outcome.2
Cuban Involvement
Cuba, in concert with the Soviets, continues to back
Mengistu. Havana and Addis Ababa share many
anti-Western foreign policy goals in the Nonaligned
Movement. An estimated 9,000 to 11,000 Cuban
troops and advisers remain in Ethiopia, primarily in
the northern part of the Ogaden region where we
believe they constitute a strategic reserve against the
possibility of a major Somali thrust into Ethiopia
similar to that during the 1977-78 Ogaden war. A
small Cuban unit is stationed near Addis Ababa
where it could come to Mengistu's aid quickly in case
of an internal challenge to his rule. Cubans do not
participate in the counterinsurgency campaigns in
northern Ethiopia. In addition, approximately 1,000
Cuban civilian advisers are stationed throughout Ethi-
opia, working on several agricultural, medical, and
small industrial projects
In view of Somalia's present military weakness, Ethio-
pia's currently fairly firm control of the Ogaden, and
the prolonged inactivity of Cuban troops garrisoned in
the northern Ogaden, we believe there is little military
need for the continued large Cuban military presence
in Ethiopia. In our judgment, most of the Cuban
forces could be transferred to Cuba or elsewhere in
Africa-for example, Mozambique-without damag-
ing Cuban-Ethiopian relations. We do not see signs,
however, that such a move from Ethiopia is currently
being planned.
Ethiopian Alliance With Libya
Another Ethiopian alliance that is hostile to Western
interests is that with Libya. Ethiopia and Libya, in
our view, diverge in political outlook, with the former
being a self-proclaimed Marxist state and the latter
deriving its policies from Libyan leader Qadhafi's
brand of radical Islam. Thus, even as allies in the
Aden Pact of August 1981, they are deeply mistrust-
ful of each other. We believe, however, that they
share a common fear of and hostility toward the
United States and a mutual desire to topple the
Somali and Sudanese regimes, which they view as
collaborating with Washington. In addition, each sees
a number of potential advantages in the friendship of
the other, and they have thus formed a stable working
alliance and are reluctant to let persistent differences
get out of control.
Moscow for several years has publicly urged closer
cooperation among the Aden Pact's three members,
Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, and we suspect
the Soviets played a supporting role in the formation
of the Pact. These statements, other public pro-
nouncements since the formation of the Pact, and the
general congruence of Soviet and Aden Pact objec-
tives in the Near East and East Africa lead us to
-believe that Moscow will closely monitor the Pact's
activities, privately encourage the ironing out of occa-
sional differences within the alliance, and push for
still closer cooperation against Sudan and Somalia.
The alliance's high point to date occurred during 1981
and early 1982. At that time, Libyan leader Qadhafi
apparently believed that he had gained a valuable ally
in his search for political prestige and military influ-
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Figure 2
Horn of Africa: Military Agreements
Syria
AMASCU
Niger
NIS It 4 ` o p
AtklS
Maita*
VALLETTA
sia NICOSI
g Cyprus
Military access agreement
with the United States
Leban
BEIRUT)
Red \ Saudi
`Sea Arabia
iADDIS ABABA
Ethiopia
KUWA
wait
Pa. an
Galt
MANAM
Bahrai atar Gat of orean
DOHA ABU HABI
MUSCAT
MOGADISHU
C 'Socoba
rpuct Y)
Soviet
Union
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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While Mengistu may never have believed
a a i would provide all the promised aid, we
believe the Ethiopian leader probably reasoned that
even a substantial part would help make up for
Moscow's failure to provide significant economic aid.
Mengistu also probably reasoned that Libyan funding
and armament of joint subversive enterprises against
Ethiopia's neighbors would relieve Addis Ababa of
that financial and military burden.
Addis Ababa's desire to assure Qadhafi of its revolu-
tionary credentials played a role in its threat to sever
relations with Washington in November 1981 in
response to the US Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force exercise Bright Star 1982.
In late 1981, however, the Libyans began to exhibit
increased concern over the potential cost of the Pact,
and Tripoli eventually lost interest in the deployment
of Ethiopian troops to Libya following the return
home in November 1981 of Libyan forces from Chad.
We believe Qadhafi's back tracking was primarily
caused by Libya's mounting economic problems
As a net result, we believe that while the Pact has
proved to be less extensive than its signers may have
originally hoped, it has developed into an increasingly
firm agreement among its members to cooperate for
common objectives.
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Incursions Into Somalia
A major common objective of the Aden Pact allies is
the overthrow of the regime of Somali President
Mohamed Siad Barre. During 1982 Addis Ababa
substantially accelerated this effort.
(Ethio-
pian forces attacked the Somali-held border town of
Balenbale in June.' Several other Somali border com-
munities were shelled by the Ethiopians, and military
camps near the border were hit by airstrikes and
artillery. These attacks were followed in July by an
incursion by Ethiopian forces and members of the
Libyan-funded Somali Democratic Salvation Front in
the vicinity of Goldogob in Somalia.' The attacking
forces pushed well into Somalia along the road to the
key town of Galcaio before being turned back. Ethio-
pian and Somali dissident forces continue, however, to
occupy both Goldogob and Balenbale.
In our view, Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu and his
associates are motivated to mount such attacks by the
historical animosities that divide Ethiopia and Soma-
lia, as well as by a desire to avenge Siad's initially
successful invasion of eastern Ethiopia in 1977, con-
tinued raids by Somali regular forces into the Oga-
den, and Mogadishu's continued aid to ethnic Somali
insurgents inside Ethiopia. Somalia's 1977 invasion-
eventually turned back by Ethiopian and newly ar-
rived Cuban troops-was intended by Siad to pursue
Mogadishu's longstanding claims to the ethnic Soma-
li-inhabited Ogaden region while the Ethiopian mili-
tary was still weak from purges and other excesses of
the revolution.
We believe the Ethiopians realize that Somalia's
military forces have deteriorated to the extent that
they are incapable of defending Somalia's long border
and are unable to challenge Addis Ababa on its own
soil. Our belief, however, based upon the statements
of Somali officials, is that Siad remains committed to
pursuing Somalia's old territorial claims. The Ethiopi-
ans probably fear that he will use his improving
relations with the United States and other Western
powers to obtain new weapons for use in another
attempt to take the Ogaden. They are also aware of
Somalia's continuing, but necessarily limited, support
for the ethnic Somali guerrillas of the Western Somali
Liberation Front (WSLF) who are harassing Ethiopi-
an convoys and military patrols inside the Ogaden.[
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'The Somali Democratic Salvation Front, an exile dissident group
based in Ethiopia, boasts a military wing of approximately 3,500
fighters. Most of its membership is drawn from the Majertain clan,
whose members resent the. dominance of Somali politics by Siad's
Marehan clan. As a result of its ethnic exclusivity and close
identification with Addis Ababa, however, the SDSF enjoys little
popular support within Somalia. The Front is ideologically ambigu-
ous, although Washington's support for Siad has made the group
violently anti-United States. It has repeatedly threatened to attack
US personnel stationed in Somalia, but it has been unable to date to
carry out these threats. In 1981 the group incorporated several pro-
Soviet Marxists into its ruling council under pressure from the
thiopia may have seized upon a large raid by
Somali-backed Ogaden insurgents near a Soviet oil
exploratory project in the Ogaden in June 1982 to
initiate plans to unseat President Siad. Indeed, mili-
tary activity by Somali regulars and Ogadeni guerril-
las had been increasing since early 1982, and the US
Embassy reports that some of its Somali contacts
believe that Balenbale was used as a staging base by
the insurgents. We believe the ease with which Balen-
bale was taken may have been seen by Addis Ababa
as confirmation of the weakness of the Somali Army,
thus prompting an expansion of the fighting.
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Subsequent attacks by the SDSF in the central sector
of Somalia were turned back in July, according to
press reports, and the Ethiopian incursions failed to
set off mutinies within the Somali military. While we
believe Addis Ababa may have been surprised by this
resiliency on the part of the Siad regime in the wake
of their attacks, in our view, Mengistu continues to
believe that the Somali Government is unsteady.
Addis Ababa probably recognizes its limited ability to
impose a government on Mogadishu. Nonetheless, in
our judgment, Ethiopian officials believe that they
can create enough chaos inside Somalia to render
whatever government emerges incapable of actively
pursuing its claims on the Ogaden for several years.
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Continued Skirmishing Likely
Judging from the deployments of their forces, which
are widely dispersed through most of the Ogaden
region, and their public statements, the Ethiopians
and their Somali insurgent allies seem reluctant to
incur the financial, political, and military expense of
pushing deeper into Somalia. Beyond logistic consid-
erations, we believe the Ethiopians probably reason
that such a thrust also would belie their contention
that the fighting in Somalia is a purely internal affair
and that Ethiopian troops are not involved.
Despite recent shipments of Western equipment, in-
cluding US-made M-47 tanks from Italy, Soviet-
made T-54 tanks from Egypt, and armored personnel
carriers mounted with TOW' antitank missiles from
the United States, we judge that the Somali forces
facing the Ethiopians at Balenbale and Goldogob are
too poorly armed and organized to mount counterat-
tacks with any assurance of success, at least during
the first several months of 1983. Mogadishu is eager
to project an active image, however, and may employ
harassing raids and artillery barrages from time to
time in the areas of the Ethiopian incursions while it
plans major counterattacks. Although such a strategy
probably is designed to bolster frontline morale, we
believe that unsuccessful attacks might be counterpro-
ductive and result in unaffordable losses of equipment
and troops. A less immediate danger noted by the US
Embassy in Mogadishu is that a successful Somali
counterattack at either Balenbale or Goldogob could
unleash wider Ethiopian retaliatory attacks against
which Mogadishu would have little defense.
We believe that, during 1983, Ethiopia, with Libyan
aid, will adhere to its goal of overthrowing the Siad
regime but that Addis Ababa will pursue this objec-
tive subtly to minimize expenses and international
reaction. The Ethiopians-according to their own
protests-view with consternation the sealift and air-
lift of armor and other military equipment to Somalia
that followed last summer's border incursions. In our
judgment, they would be reluctant to risk stimulating
further Western and conservative Arab rearmament
of Somali forces. Instead, we believe the Ethiopians
and Libyans will continue to support the forces of the
SDSF and the rival dissidents of the Somali National
Movement.' Furthermore, Ethiopia probably looks
upon Goldogob and Balenbale as platforms for 25X1
launching further dissident attacks and, we believe,
will try to involve the guerrillas as much as possible in
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We are skeptical regarding the prospects for a negoti-
ated settlement of the dispute during 1983.
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however, Siad and his immediate advisers rely too
heavily on the political support of clans inhabiting the
Ogaden to espouse openly such a view. The Ethiopi-
ans, for their part, now enjoy the military upper hand
in the region and probably have little incentive to
back off their longstanding demand for Somalia's
unconditional recognition of Ethiopian sovereignty
over the Ogaden.
Tension With Sudan
Traditionally tense Ethiopian-Sudanese relations were
even more deeply strained during 1982
6 The Somali National Movement, a conservative Islamic group
formally established in London in April 1981, enjoys some popular
support amon northern Somalis
IIn early 1982
the SNM moved its headquarters to Ethiopia where it tried to gain
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Figure 4
Ethiopia: Disposition of Military Forces
Uganda
Alena
k
ERITREA
Kara
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d
eha/ak'
)
f
oo f Asmara, h (Dahlak Isfand)
i^~~
Linda
'~elaseAdwa; ~?
TIG,RAV
Mek'eI
e.j
GON9, R
Gonder If'
GAMO
GOFA
Lake
Rudolf
f Army division
4 Air force combat unit
,y, Naval combat unit
ARSi Province with insurgent
Y.A.R.
(N. Yemen)
/
Kebri DeharI r Uardere > Goldogob
`/
Galcaio
11* d e II
~I /
0 9 aShilabe
Gods Balenbale
Indian Ocean
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Longstanding ethnic tensions, in our view, have
led Ethiopia and Sudan to support insurgent move-
ments against each other sporadically over a period of
several years:
? In the 1960s and early 1970s, Sudan, which es-
poused a generally leftist variant of Arab national-
ism, openly supported the Eritrean insurgency
against a pro-Western Ethiopia.
? Following a brief period of detente growing out of
Emperor Haile Selassie's efforts to mediate Sudan's
southern insurgency in 1972, the increasingly mod-
erate government in Khartoum accused the Marxist
successor regime in Addis Ababa of supporting a
Libyan-sponsored coup attempt in 1976.
? In early 1977 Sudanese President Nimeiri publicly
threatened to renew support for the Eritreans, and a
series of subsequent border clashes raised the dan-
ger of full-scale warfare between Ethiopia and
Sudan.
? Later in 1977 relations gradually improved and
were cemented in 1980 when Nimeiri visited Addis
Ababa.
? During 1981 and 1982, however, Ethiopian suspi-
cions of continuing Sudanese support for the north-
ern insurgencies led Addis Ababa, in our view, to
agree to longstanding Libyan requests for coopera-
tion in Tripoli's anti-Sudanese efforts.
Mengistu and other top Ethiopian officials ascribe
their failure to suppress the northern rebellions to
alleged Sudanese aid to the insurgents. Moscow has
publicly sought to reinforce the belief among Ethiopi-
an leaders that Washington is encouraging Khartoum
to aid the insurgents in an effort to bring down the
Addis Ababa regime
make clear that Sudan does, in fact, harbor
some of the guerrillas among its Ethiopian refugee
population. Even when Khartoum attempted to re-
strict the activities of these rebels during the past year
or two in order to improve relations with Ethiopia,
enhance its own security by lowering the level of
violence among rival organizations, and encourage
negotiations between Addis Ababa and the rebels,
Embassy reporting indicates that it was unable to do
so completely. The US Embassy in Khartoum notes,
furthermore, that the Sudanese privately acknowledge
their continuing hope that the "Eritrean card" repre-
sented by these exiled rebels can be used eventually as
a bargaining chip against Ethiopia's support for Suda-
During 1982 Ethiopia, for its part, continued to
publicize its efforts to forge a detente with Sudan,
including a call for joint border patrols to cut guerrilla
supply routes. These efforts, in our view, were moti-
vated by a desire to encourage continued Sudanese
restrictions on the exiled Eritreans and to discourage
any Sudanese effort to countermand Addis Ababa's
support of Sudanese dissidents by playing the "Eritre-
ya's anti-Sudanese campaign increased.
according to US Embassy sources, Khartoum con-
fronted the Ethiopian Government with evidence of its
anti-Nimeiri plotting and demanded an end to the
schemes. Addis Ababa responded belligerently, accus-
ing the Sudanese of supporting the Eritreans, but
followed up with some publicly conciliatory gestures.
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against cross-border violence. But as Mengistu be-
comes increasingly frustrated by his failure to defeat
the Eritreans and Tigreans, and, as his conviction
grows that Nimeiri is responsible for his problems,
these efforts will become more a matter of buying
time than an effort at compromise. We believe Men-
gistu will use this time to mount an even more serious
effort, with continued Libyan participation, to over-
throw Nimeiri. In our view, he is likely to support a
series of guerrilla raids whose objectives will be
economic disruption through attacks on industrial
targets and possibly further efforts to assassinate the
Sudanese President.
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Impact on Domestic Politics of Key States
Siad's Position: A Temporary Improvement
We believe tliat recent events, including the 1982
military engagements with Ethiopia, have temporarily
strengthened Siad's political position; over the long
term, however, substantial reforms will be required to
reestablish the regime's stability.
We believe Siad's current problems are traceable to
the defeat of his Ogaden invasion in 1978 and his
failure over a period of several years to keep tribal
fences mended.7 Since a coup attempt in 1978 by
members of the Majertain clan-the dominant politi-
cal force before Siad came to power-Siad has relied
almost exclusively on his fellow Marehans, his moth-
er's Ogaden clan, and personal proteges in governing
the country. The Marehans particularly benefited by
insinuating themselves throughout the nation's gov-
ernment and economic structures and by engaging in
increasingly widespread and blatant corruption.
The US Embassy reports these trends have been
deeply resented by Somalia's other clans, and at least
one northern tribe resorted to rioting in early 1982
and during January 1983. Siad's harsh response,
including the arrest of over 1,000 alleged antigovern-
ment demonstrators, generated more dissidence and a
series of desertions and defections by ethnic northern
officials and military officers to Ethiopia and the
dissident Somali National Movement.
Still, the US Embassy in Mogadishu reports that the
erosion of Siad's position was temporarily arrested by
his ability to attract aid from the United-States, Italy,
and Egypt in the wake of the Ethiopian and dissident
incursions in the summer of 1982. Siad generated
some nationalistic support by closely identifying many
of his leading opponents with Ethiopia. In addition,
the incursions apparently reawakened Siad to the
necessity of rebuilding his political support as evi-
denced by several reportedly successful political trips
to central and northern Somalia and some limited
conciliatory gestures by the President to his critics.
'Although Somalia is one of Africa's few ethnically unified nations,
its people are divided into six major tribes and numerous clans and
We believe, however, that Siad's basic problems will
continue unabated unless he supplements his current
political efforts with major internal political and
economic reforms. The US Embassy reports he is
unwilling to follow such a course because reforms
could erode his personal style of rule.-
With virtually no hope fora dramatic improvement in
Somalia's battlefield fortunes against Ethiopia, we
believe that the popular view of Siad's weakness will
persist during the coming year and increase chances
for his overthrow. It has already resulted in an
escalation of tribal demands upon Siad, as the diverse
clans seek to obtain as many concessions as possible
when they feel Siad can least afford to resist. Further-
more, the US defense attache in Mogadishu
tions, the strain of maintaining a constant alert status,
and tribal tensions have undermined morale and
report that poor equipment, poor living condi-
triggered desertions.
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Over the next year, we believe the most likely pros-
pects for a coup will come from within the Army,
perhaps by officers sympathetic to the Somali Nation-
al Movement. Siad also is vulnerable to a palace coup
by his own supporters trying to preempt externally
induced change. In either event, such a new govern-
ment would probably be preoccupied for several
months negotiating a new tribal coalition. For a time
this would distract attention from the Ogaden dispute
and the Ethiopian military challenge, although any
successor government would eventually renew efforts
to remove the Ethiopians from the border areas they
currently occupy.
In our view, these military goals would require con-
tinuing foreign assistance and would push a successor
regime to seek links with a superpower. In the near
term, this is likely to be the United States. We believe
the present high level of Soviet military support for
Ethiopia would preclude a successor government in
Mogadishu from arranging an early rapprochement
with Moscow. In addition, strong anti-Soviet senti-
ment based on strains during Somalia's close alliance
with Moscow during the 1970s is widespread in the
Army and government.
Over the long run, however, we believe a new regime,
if disappointed by the level of US and Western aid,
might seek an accommodation with Moscow. It could
try to take advantage of strains in the Ethiopian-
Soviet relationship to pursue a rapprochement with
the Soviets in hopes of restoring the Soviet military
aid program that existed in the early 1970s. Post-Siad
leaders also might believe that their cooperation with
refusal to compromise on the territorial question
Moscow would be helpful in bringing Soviet leverage
to bear on Ethiopia to reach a negotiated settlement
of the Ogaden dispute. While Moscow might be
tempted again to encourage a political solution to the
problem, we believe this approach would ultimately
founder on both Addis Ababa's and Mogadishu's
remain in control for the next several years.
Mengistu's Prospects: Intimidation Works
In Addis Ababa, Mengistu has moved ruthlessly to
make his position virtually unassailable, and we be-
lieve that, barring mishap or assassination, he will
Since 1977 Mengistu has consolidated final decision-
making authority in his hands and is now rarely, if
ever, challenged in policy matters by his subordinates,
according to US Embassy sources. Since the 1974
revolution, Mengistu has outmaneuvered, intimidat-
ed, or eliminated all significant internal opponents.
Embassy reports indicate that other members of
Ethiopia's leadership are either functionaries without
independent power bases or military men who have
learned to submerge their personal ambitions and are
loyal to Mengistu
Mengistu enjoys
little popularity outside the government, political in-
stitutions, and the Army and is even hated in many
quarters. Nonetheless, he continues to keep this oppo-
sition intimidated and quiescent; we believe that even
military leaders who might be capable of marshaling
sufficient force to challenge Mengistu have been well
aware since the 1977 reign of terror of his willingness
to respond brutally to political challenges. We believe
that for this reason, as well as from fear of a repetition
of the chaos that followed Haile Selassie's overthrow,
Mengistu's opponents will continue during 1983 to be
reluctant to mount a meaningful challenge to his rule.
Embassy reports indicate Mengistu has made consid-
erable efforts, including the use of political officers, to
check on the loyalty of military personnel.
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Mengistu's occasional difficulties are thus insuffi-
cient, in our judgment, to unleash a new revolution.
Embassy reporting indicates that elements of the
Army are unhappy over the relationship with the
Soviet Union and the protracted military struggles
against the insurgents, but we believe that over the
next year Mengistu will continue to stifle grumbling
either through repression, personal persuasion, buying
off the military with small pay raises, or a combina-
tion of these strategies.
We believe that the most likely cause of an early end
to the Mengistu regime will be either the assassina-
tion of the chairman or an unforeseen accident.
Persistent rumors of varying reliability transmitted by
the US Embassy indicate that he is the target of
frequent assassination attempts, most of which are
acts of individuals motivated by the desire to revenge
the loss of friends and relatives during the officially
sanctioned Red terror of 1977-78 rather than politi-
cal efforts by organized groups. Mengistu's highly
personalized rule leaves the country with no apparent
successor, and he has ensured that there are no
influential figures with enough power either to chal-
lenge him or to emerge as a dominant leader should
he be removed from the scene.
Our assessment is that Mengistu's early departure
would result in a widespread power struggle and score
settling reminiscent of the chaos of 1974-77 from
which no certain victor would readily emerge. We
believe the military would play a critical role in such a
struggle. Contending factions would probably be or-
ganized on both personal and ideological lines and
represent a wide political spectrum. We believe the
Soviet Union and its East European and Cuban allies,
who have had five years to insinuate themselves into
the political structure in Addis Ababa, would have
some influence over the outcome of such a struggle.
Their efforts would be backed if necessary by the
9,000 to 11,000 Cuban troops we estimate to be still
stationed in Ethiopia. We thus believe that whatever
group or individual emerges on top will almost cer-
tainly be guided by the recognition that the support of
Moscow and Havana will remain critical to the
pursuit of Ethiopia's various, continuing military
struggles, especially in the likely event the Eritreans,
Tigreans, and Somalis take advantage of any post-
The Challenge in Eritrea. Continuing regional insur-
gencies throughout Ethiopia constitute a potential
threat to Mengistu's position and are an important
factor behind his dependence upon Soviet military
aid. Mengistu's effort to supress these rebellions by
military means-regardless of the political, military,
and economic costs-remains the central aim of his
domestic and foreign policies.
The most intractable of Ethiopia's insurgencies is
based in Eritrea, where a seesaw conflict has been
under way for over 20 years! In February 1982 Addis
Ababa launched the unsuccessful "Red Star" cam-
paign. This campaign is
designed to combine:
? Major military operations aimed at cutting rebel
supply lines across the Sudanese border and captur-
ing remaining guerrilla concentrations such as the
mountain stronghold of Nakfa.
? A reconstruction campaign directed toward building
a provincial infrastructure adaptable for both eco-
nomic and military uses.
Addis Ababa concentrated over 120,000 troops in the
province, but the campaign has been a military
disaster.
Mengistu believed the rebel stronghold of Nakfa
could be taken in a matter of weeks and that this
victory would quickly be followed by a series of
sweeps in the region of the Sudanese border to pick up
remaining guerrilla groups. In months of heavy fight-
ing, however, government troops proved incapable of
dislodging several thousand Eritrean defenders from
the town.
' Eritrea is a former Italian colony that was federated with Ethiopia
under a UN decision in 1950 and incorporated into the empire of
then Emperor Haile Selassie in 1962. A low-level rebellion contin-
ued in the province throughout the 1960s, but it gained consider-
able ground in the wake of Ethiopia's chaotic revolution that saw
the end of the monarchy in 1974. By 1977 Eritrean rebels
controlled virtually all of the province. Moreover, the insurgency,
which originally maintained close ties with Arab and other Islamic
states, was radicalized as its most extreme Marxist faction gained
the upper hand in internecine fighting. A central government
offensive in 1978 forced the rebels to abandon most of Eritrea's
cities and towns but did not crush them. In 1979 Addis Ababa tried
again unsuccessfully to end the insurgency with yet another
Mengistu chaos by intensifying operations.
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Addis Ababa has been raising new local militia forces
in Eritrea to release regular Army units from security
duty and reorganizing its troops with the objective of
renewing the military offensive. This revival of the
campaign, however, may be delayed by fighting in
neighboring Tigray Province, which has increased
recently, according to Embassy reporting. We believe
the next phase of the Eritrea campaign will consist
largely of sweep operations in northern and western
Eritrea against both the guerrillas and their supply
Ethiopian hints over the past few years of interest in
negotiations with the rebels, we believe, have been
designed to present a reasonable front to other govern-
ments and to sound out Eritrean willingness to end the
fighting on Addis Ababa's terms rather than to
routes from Sudan.
Despite the efforts of the government, we believe it is
unlikely to defeat the insurgency by military means
during 1983. Over the past 20 years, the insurgency
has grown to command widespread support among the
Eritreans. Open sources indicate that the largest rebel
group, the EPLF,9 is also the most self-reliant and
therefore the most resistant to the current Ethiopian
strategy.
the core of the EPLF's fighters are highly
motivated, while morale among Ethiopian troops in
Eritrea, many of them conscripts from the more
primitive and disaffected southern provinces, appears
to be lowJ
Neither is there, we believe, much prospect of a
political settlement. While all the Eritrean movements
support the goal of regional independence, the EPLF,
according to its public statements, is the least inclined
to compromise and the most confident of its eventual
'The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) draws its support
primarily from the Christian communities of Eritrea. Its estimated
20,000 to 24,000 fighters are largely self-sufficient, benefiting from
captured Ethiopian weapons, the cooperation of the Eritrean popu-
lace, and sanctuary in Sudan. A second group, the Eritrean
Liberation Front (ELF), is Muslim dominated and pro-Arab. It has
about 5,000 armed members and has received funds and other
aid-most of it by way of Sudan-from Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,
and other Arab states. A third group, the Eritrean Liberation
Front/Popular Liberation Forces (ELF/PLF), with only a few
hundred armed men, plays a minor political role but has no
Addis Ababa was preoccupied in Eritrea, the ethni-
cally based Tigrean People's Liberation Front
(TPLF), which claims to incorporate both Marxists
and non-Marxists in its leadership and consists of
around 8,000 guerrillas, slowly but steadily expanded
its area of operations to cover more than half the
province as well as the Tigrean-inhabited portions of
two neighboring provinces. This development has
added to the regime's problems in Eritrea. The gov-
ernment's principal supply line to Eritrea runs
through Tigray, and rebels there frequently interdict
military convoys. Probably for this reason, the Army
shifted some 10,000 troops from Eritrea to the Tigray
We believe the TPLF, which maintains close ties with
both the EPLF and Sudan, enjoys popular support in
Tigray Province. The Front has capitalized on tradi-
tional Tigrean dislike for the rival Amhara, who
retain the political supremacy in Addis Ababa that
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they enjoyed under Haile Selassie. The TPLF's lead-
ers claim that their policy of redistributing land in the
areas it controls on the basis of private family owner-
ship also has swelled the ranks of the Front's support-
ers. The TPLF's goals, as outlined in public state-
ments, are less clear-cut than those of the Eritreans,
however, and appear to shift between demands for full
independence, greater regional autonomy, and the
solution of provincial grievances. Its leadership cur-
rently advocates the formation of an Ethiopian federal
government representing all ethnic groups. We believe
a determined drive by the Ethiopian Army in the
coming year might restrict TPLF military operations
but is unlikely to end the insurgency.
Most observers agree, however, that the Tigreans are
less hostile toward the central government than the
Eritreans have become. We believe a more lenient
administration of their province, the granting of
greater internal and cultural autonomy, and a deter-
mined campaign of economic investment could ulti-
mately reduce the rebellion to more manageable
proportions. As with the Eritreans, however, the
Mengistu regime shows no signs of willingness to
compromise.
Despite occasional and halfhearted peace feelers by
the various combatants in the region, we do not expect
a serious diminution in the level of conflict in the
Horn of Africa during 1983. We expect Ethiopia to
launch at least one new offensive aimed at suppressing
the Tigrean and Eritrean rebellions and believe that
Ethiopia will continue its effort to overthrow the
Somali and Sudanese Governments. Addis Ababa
probably will continue its reluctance to commit its
own troops far beyond the immediate areas of its
borders with those two countries. Its destabilization
efforts are more likely to take the form of continued
aid to dissident groups.
This high level of tension in the area, coupled with the
key location of the Horn of Africa, ensures that the
Horn will remain a focus of superpower competition
in 1983 and for the foreseeable future. We believe
that the Soviet Union will devote considerable effort
to consolidate its influence in Ethiopia. The Soviets
clearly want to continue their naval access to Ethio-
pia's Dahlak Island to supplement their floating logis-
tic support system in the northwest Indian Ocean.
Their use of the Ethiopian facilities, together with
access to Aden, contributes to their Indian Ocean
squadron's ability to monitor US and Western naval
movements in the region.
Most of the Soviet effort will consist of military aid,
an area in which the Soviets already have demonstrat-
ed an unusual measure of generosity and efficiency,
and continuing political pressure on the Mengistu
regime to establish institutions, such as a Communist
party, through which long-term Soviet influence can
be ensured. Moscow may cautiously increase the level
of this pressure prior to 1984, when large payments
for Ethiopia's military debt, averaging over $200
million per year, begin to come due.
In our judgment, Ethiopia, for its part, probably will
concentrate its efforts over the next year on improving
the capabilities and possibly further expanding its
military forces in an effort to solve its complex
regional problems by force. Since the military seized
power in 1974, Ethiopia's armed forces have mush-
roomed from 45,000 to approximately 200,000 men,
presently the largest and best equipped force in black
Most of Ethiopia's new troops probably will join
existing units that are preoccupied with combating
local rebellions, keeping pressure on Somalia, and in
military-economic construction projects, but an ex-
panded force could pose long-term dangers for West-
ern interests. In his recent speeches, Mengistu has
begun to paint himself and his regime as an important
revolutionary force on the world stage. We believe
that, should Ethiopia succeed over the next several
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years in suppressing or easing some of its regional
rebellions, it might be tempted to use some of its
armed forces for intervention elsewhere in Africa.
Addis Ababa might be even more receptive to such a
move if it were accompanied by Soviet economic
encouragement-such as promises of relief from the
military debt.
Western Europe in the Middle
West European nations led by Italy, the former
colonial ruler of parts of Ethiopia and Somalia, have
tried to maintain a balanced approach to the disputes
in the Horn of Africa in the hope of facilitating
detente between the antagonists and encouraging an
Ethiopian realignment away from the Soviets. These
governments have achieved a rough equivalence in
economic aid to both countries, valued in 1980 at
$68.8 million for Ethiopia and $76.5 million for
Somalia, according to OECD figures.
Mogadishu, which trades primarily with Saudi Ara-
bia and Italy, has been consistently eager to expand
its trade and aid relations with the West and the
conservative Arab states, particularly with regard to
funding for a dam construction project. Somalia's
dearth of known economic resources and the general
European pessimism regarding its economic prospects,
as reported to US Embassies, remain, in our view,
major stumblingblocks to expanded economic ties.
Ethiopia, for its part, attempted during 1982 to
maintain and expand economic links with the West,
but was unwilling to make significant political conces-
sions on matters such as the expansion of the Western
diplomatic presence in Addis Ababa or a reduction of
tensions with Somalia and Sudan in exchange. In
conversations with US diplomatic personnel, many
Ethiopian leaders claim to recognize that the coun-
try's hopes for expanding trade and outside economic
aid, and thus for long-term economic development,
remain with the West rather than the USSR. The
United States alone purchases nearly a third of
Ethiopia's exports, and the West, including the Unit-
ed States, has provided Addis Ababa with $770
million in foreign aid since the revolution in 1974. In
the same conversations, these officials also claim to
believe that maintaining reasonably good ties with th_
West provides them with significant flexibility in their
dealings with Moscow. We believe the Ethiopians see
this as enhancing their ability to extract concessions
from the Soviets on matters such as the rescheduling
of their military debt, where their efforts to date have
been unsuccessful.
As a result, Ethiopia accelerated efforts during 1982
to strengthen ties with several West European states,
including Italy and France, and with Japan and to
gain more aid from these sources. The Ethiopians'
approach has generally consisted of assurances to
each potential benefactor of Addis Ababa's long-term
interest in working closely with it and the West in
general-including the implication that Ethiopia may
eventually move away from Moscow. An Ethiopian
Foreign Ministry official revealed recently that Addis
Ababa is settling compensation claims by foreign
corporations for assets nationalized after the revolu-
tion on the basis of which of the corporations' home
governments are most likely to provide substantial
aid. For example, the US Embassy in Addis Ababa
reports that Ethiopia agreed in 1982 to settle all
Italian compensation claims for $6.5 million in ex-
change for increased Italian aid commitments totaling
$190 million. The Embassy believes that similar
settlements during 1982 of outstanding Dutch and
West German claims were motivated by similar
hopes, as yet unrealized.
Based on previous behavior, we believe Ethiopia will
continue efforts to strengthen relations with several
Western nations, particularly Italy and France, dur-
ing the coming year. Addis Ababa's concentration on
these two governments is based, in our view, on its
hope to take advantage of Rome's desire to establish a
special relationship with Ethiopia and Paris's current
policy of increasing aid to leftist Third World regimes
in the hope of prying them away from dependence
upon Moscow. Ethiopia has shown a persistent belief
that its interests are best served by as balanced a
foreign policy as possible within the context of a close
alliance with the Soviet Union and a firm commit-
ment to Marxist ideology.
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Challenges to the United States
Moscow is eager to undermine Western defense,plans
for the Persian Gulf area and to weaken Western
influence in the Indian Ocean. One means of achiev-
ing this appears to be Soviet encouragement of Somali
dissident groups in the hope that demonstrations of
Mogadishu's political instability will discourage
Washington from commiting itself to Somalia's pres-
ent regime and the use of its military facilities.
Ethiopia, for its part, believes the US presence
strengthens its regional foes and is thus inherently
hostile to Addis Ababa. In view of common Ethiopian
and Soviet interests, Washington is likely to find its
friends and political influence in the Horn of Africa
region challenged by Moscow and Addis Ababa for
the foreseeable future, with the challenge occasionally
taking on military or paramilitary dimensions. F_
Mengistu apparently does not hold much hope of
significantly improved relations with the United
States in the near future. He keeps the US official
presence in Addis Ababa small, and, as reflected in
US Embassy reports, issues protests on the occasion of
US military exercises in the region and deliveries of
US military equipment to Somalia. In our view, the
Ethiopians probably do not wish to sever ties with
Washington completely, due to their general reluc-
tance to burn diplomatic bridges with any nation.
Their selective courting of West European nations is,
we believe, intended in part to bring European pres-
sure on Washington to moderate what Addis Ababa
sees as US hostility to its regime and to limit US aid
to Somalia.
The threat to Western interests and to pro-Western
states in the area will inevitably result in persistent
pleas from Somalia-and from other pro-Western
states such as Kenya and Djibouti-for increased
military and economic aid. The Somalis have already
indicated that they will seek a range of Western
weaponry, such as tanks, military aircraft, antiair-
craft weapons, and armored personnel carriers during
These pleas are likely to continue to receive support
from other states on the periphery of the Horn of
Africa, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which view
with alarm' both Ethiopia's growing military potential
and its ties to Moscow. These states and others in the
area understand, we believe, that persistent instability
and conflict in the Horn offer the Soviet Union one of
its best opportunities for increased political penetra-
tion and influence in the Near East and Africa.
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