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Document Creation Date:
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Publication Date:
March 1, 1983
Content Type:
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Guinea:
Looking to the West
ALA 83-10034
March 1983
Copy 298
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Intelligence
Guinea:
Looking to the West
This paper was prepared b}
Office of African and Latin American Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, West-East Africa Division,
ALA
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council.[
Secret
ALA 83-10034
March 1983
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Guinea: 1
--
Looking to the West
F
]
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Key Judgments Over the past several years, Guinea's President Sekou Toure, long one of
Information available Africa's most vociferous radicals and strongest supporters of Moscow, has
as of 1 March 1983 expressed growing frustration with the Soviet Union and has established
was used in this report.
closer ties with the United States and other Western governments. He is
also improving relations with estranged moderate African neighbors and is
playing an active role in Third World and Islamic politics. We believe
Toure's altered behavior is designed to elicit substantial Western economic
aid and does not reflect an ideological commitment to the West.
Toure first made clear his displeasure with Moscow in 1977-78 when he
withdrew landing rights to Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft and refused
transit privileges for Soviet planes transporting Cuban troops to Ethiopia to
stem a Somali invasion. The US Embassy reports that since then he has
sharply reduced the number of Soviet military advisers-which now stands
at around 40 to 50-and refused repeated Soviet requests for the use and
construction of naval facilities.
As Toure has loosened his ties to Moscow, he has become a vigorous
spokesman for moderate West African states concerned about Libyan
leader Qadhafi's interference in regional affairs. He has been tentatively
scheduled to head the Organization of African Unity beginning in mid-
1983-although the OAU's present organizational problems seem likely to
delay this-and would like to chair the Nonaligned Movement's summit in
the mid-1980s. In our judgment, Toure's ambition to exercise a prominent
role in African affairs and his distrust of Qadhafi's intentions will continue
to bring him into conflict with the Libyan leader.
We believe Toure's foreign policy initiatives are driven by problems on the
home front. Although Toure still maintains tight control of the principal
centers of power in Guinea, such as the bureaucracy and the military, he is
encountering unprecedented public dissatisfaction with his record of nearly
25 years of rigid and generally unproductive state socialism. His policies
have made a shambles of a once-promising economy and have kept Guinea
within the ranks of the world's poorest countries. We estimate real GDP
growth since independence from France in 1958 has lagged behind
population growth, and Guinea's $221 per capita income is one of the
lowest in the world. Although more than 80 percent of the population is en-
gaged in agriculture, official data indicate that marketed production of
crops has declined continuously over the last 20 years and accounts for
about one- fourth of real GDP. Bauxite, the country's major export and
iii Secret
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principal foreign exchange earner, is now facing a weakening market. To
revive the economy, Toure is making some major adjustments in its
socialist orientation and is seeking massive infusions of financial aid and in-
vestment principally from moderate Arab states and the West.
US Embassy reports indicate that Moscow's failure to provide adequate
economic help has contributed to Toure's strong dissatisfaction with the
Soviets. He is particularly critical of what he views as the USSR's paltry
and inappropriate economic and military aid programs, upon which Guinea
has depended since independence. In the past 24 years the Soviets have
provided Conakry a total of $215 million in economic aid and almost $97
million in military assistance, including arms, training, and advisers. In
recent years, however, Moscow has tightened the terms of its assistance
and has refused to continue extending general trade credits to Guinea.
Toure is anxious to secure Western, particularly US, aid and investment to
get the economy back on track. We believe, however, that his expectations
exceed what Western financial institutions are willing to provide as a result
of the financial crises in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.
We believe that, in the near term, Toure's policies will remain generally
compatible with US interests in Africa. He will support Moroccan King
Hassan against Algeria and the Polisario insurgency, promote the influ-
ence of moderate states in the Organization of African Unity, oppose
Libyan activities south of the Sahara, and turn aside Soviet requests for a
greater presence and influence in Guinea. Over the longer term, however, if
US and other Western assistance does not materialize as Toure hopes, we
believe he could again adopt a strident tone toward the West and
reconsider his willingness to act as a bridge between Washington and leftist
Third World states. In addition, he will be particularly sensitive to what he
might see as an infringement of his independence in foreign policy and
especially to anything that might increase his vulnerability to charges that
he is an instrument of US policies.
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To Moscow and Back: A Difficult Disengagement
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Figure 1
Guinea: Economic Activity
Dakar
Ban * The Ga b
rte.
Kankan
Offshore oil concession limit
Major fishing grounds
200-nm limit
Hypothetical equidistant line
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
Freetown \ , ` r J
North
Atlantic
Ocean
MonroviaL}fb e r i a
Buchanan,
Monts
Nimba
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Guinea:
Looking to the West
To Moscow and Back:
A Difficult Disengagement
When Sekou Toure broke with France at the time of
Guinea's independence in 1958, most observers
agreed that the Soviets saw in Guinea an opportunity
to establish a foothold in Africa.' Guinea was agricul-
turally self-supporting, had a relatively modern gov-
ernmental structure, and had won international pres-
tige as the first French-speaking, Sub-Saharan
African country to claim independence. We believe
Moscow reasoned that Toure's Marxism and vocal
support for African unity would make him a useful
spokesman for Soviet interests. The Soviets sought
and obtained access to Guinea's air and naval facili-
ties as well as its rich natural resources, particularly
bauxite. We believe Toure had little choice but to turn
to the Soviets, because Western countries, under
pressure from France, had turned aside his requests
for aid.
The Soviets moved quickly to strengthen their position
with Conakry. Within six months of Guinea's inde-
pendence, Moscow and its allies had guaranteed to
purchase all of its agricultural exports and had of-
fered short-term trade credits, which permitted Cona-
kry to import more consumer goods than it could
cover with its exports. The Soviets soon followed with
military aid commitments and with medium- and
long-term loans to finance the purchase of capital
equipment and the construction of development proj-
ects. Since 1958, according to US Government fig-
ures, the Soviets have committed an estimated $215
million in economic aid to Guinea spanning the
agricultural, minerals, health, and education sectors.
' When France granted Guinea independence in October 1958,
Toure voted against membership in the French community under
President de Gaulle's new constitution, the only head of state
among France's ex-colonies to do so. Toure believed the Franco-
African tie infringed on African independence and unity. He paid
dearly for this gesture. The French ended all aid and took with
them all movable equipment associated with their administration-
US Embassy sources indicate that by 1961 Commu-
nist countries accounted for nearly one-third of Guin-
ea's total foreign trade derived mainly from exploita-
tion of Guinean bauxite. The US Embassy reports
that the $100 million Kindia bauxite mine has become
a major Soviet economic project in West Africa-
second only to the $1.2 billion Ajaokuta steel mill in
Nigeria-and that Guinea is the USSR's major over-
seas supplier of bauxite.
During the 1970s the trade and capital commitments
of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries
increased at a steady, although modest, rate. In
exchange for aid from Moscow, Toure allowed Soviet
naval TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft to use Guinean
facilities for flights over the northern Atlantic and
granted the Soviet Navy logistic su ort at the port of
Conakry.
During this period Soviet technicians performed some 25X1
useful services-and they still do. For example, over
250 Soviet professors teach in Guinean universities,
Soviet doctors and technicians staff sections of several
hospitals, and Soviet scientists run a large oceano-
graphic research center in Conakry. 25X1
Still, Toure's relations with Moscow were not smooth.
Following Toure's receipt of the Lenin Peace Prize in
1961, a wave of Soviet propaganda aimed at young
Guineans provoked him to criticize Moscow and
briefly to seek better relations with the United States.
In 1965 Toure veered back to a closer alignment with
the Soviets, then turned on them in 1967 when
Moscow began to increase pressure for repayment of
Guinea's debts. Relations with the Eastern Bloc again
took a turn for the better when Toure blamed the
West for the exile invasion in 1970 and the Soviets
agreed to Toure's request for a small Soviet naval
patrol to operate off the Guinean coast.
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In our view, Sekou Toure's political maneuvering
reflects his commitment to independence for Guinea
and black Africa and his concept of absolute equality
between states. Toure's desire to follow a truly
independent course, however, is affected by Guinea's
economic weakness and the need for foreign assist-
ance. He has expressed his frustration by reacting
strenuously-and often paranoically-to pressure
from foreign creditors and Guinean exiles and to
what he believes are imminent invasions by mercenar-
ies. These factors also have affected Conakry's rela-
tions with both the East and West Blocs and with
neighboring states
Toure has been head of state longer than any other
Sub-Saharan African leader, largely, in our view, as
the result of a repressive security apparatus and his
political skills, oratorical gifts, and personal charm.
US Embassy reporting indicates that Toure remains
intensely preoccupied with his job, regularly putting
in 20-hour days. According to US officials and
academic observers, Toure trusts no one, particularly
those who are closest to the center of power. Al-
though now anxious to court international public
opinion, he controls all expressions of domestic opin-
ion, and tolerates no dissent. Nevertheless, Toure has
managed to balance his tough style of rule and
personal whims with an ability to maintain support
for his personal power and status.
Toure's domestic political philosophy is based on his
version of socialism that combines both private enter-
prise and traditional African systems of rule. He
holds on to many of the symbols of power once 25X1
associated with precolonial Malinke paramount
chiefs-such as settling private disputes and person-
ally distributing money and other favors to his
followers. In our view, Toure has permitted the
transformation of elements of his Malinke tribe into
a national elite, even though he is personally commit-
ted to social equality
According to US Embassy officials,' Toure signaled a
major shift away from the East in 1977. Much of
Toure's disenchantment with the USSR stems from
Moscow's failure to help Guinea halt an increasingly
serious economic decline. Moscow has done nothing to
increase its low levels of aid; indeed, it has tightened
the terms for its assistance.
The first indication of Toure's disaffection was his
decision to withdraw the Soviets' longstanding privi-
lege of landing their reconnaissance aircraft at Cona-
kry airbase. The following year, Toure refused transit
privileges to Soviet planes carrying several thousand
Cuban troops to Ethiopia to help turn back a Somali
invasion. US Embassy reports indicate that in 1978
the Guineans began to reduce the number of Soviet
advisers attached to the Guinean armed forces, and
since then Toure has rejected repeated Soviet propos-
als to construct naval facilities on Tamara Island in
Conakry harbor and to renew landing rights for the
TU-95 flights. In 1981 Toure publicly condemned the.
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Despite Guinea's change in policies, however, US
Embassy sources report that Conakry continues to
depend on the Soviets for its military needs, as
Western donors are unwilling to provide arms on the
concessionary terms Moscow offers, and imports from
the Eastern Bloc consist almost entirely of military
supplies.
IIn December 1982 the Soviets sent
a repair ship to Conakry to provide some much-
needed military maintenance, and Toure still sends
some Guinean military to the USSR for training. In
return, the Soviets are allowed the use of air and
naval facilities at Conakry in support of their activi-
ties along the West African coast: a number of Soviet
naval vessels, including several submarines, visited
Conakry during the past year. Guinea continues to be
used as a transshipment point for Soviet military
equipment destined for Mali.
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Economic and Military Points
of Friction With the Soviets
Western journalists have reported that the Guineans
are increasingly dissatisfied with the terms of their
bauxite contracts with Moscow. Guinea's payments
on development loans to the USSR are made largely
in bauxite and take the lion's share of profits-about
$24 million annually from the Soviet-managed Kin-
dia mine. In 1980 Guinea supplied 2.4 million tons of
bauxite to the USSR, all of it from Kindia. The US
Embassy reports that Toure has publicly criticized
the Soviets at Kindia for what he sees as their poor
direction and unfair price scales. Nevertheless, we
believe that despite Toure's unhappiness, he is not
willing to bar the Soviets from the Kindia project
because he knows that the mine is not an economical-
ly attractive investment for Western firms. Industry
officials allege that the quality of Kindia ore is low
and probably could not command better terms else-
where.
US Embassy sources indicate that Conakry is also
unhappy over Soviet use of Guinea's fishing grounds
under the terms of their agreement.
With little hope of gaining the substantial infusion of
aid from Moscow he believed necessary to revive the
Guinean economy, Toure in the late 1970s began to
seek better relations with the United States and other
Western countries and with moderate Arab states. At
the 11th Congress of his Democratic Party of Guinea
(PDG) in November 1978, Toure emphasized a new
policy of negotiation and cooperation with the West.
Since then, he has systematically visited Western and
Arab leaders, renewed political ties, and actively
sought Western business investment. Although Toure
still occasionally criticizes Western positions on south-
ern Africa, in general he no longer censures the
Western presence and influence in Africa and, ac-
cording to US Embassy reports, has welcomed some
The Guineans, moreover, have become dissatisfied in
recent years with their military arms supply, training,
and maintenance relationship with Moscow. The
Soviets have been Guinea's major military benefac-
tors since 1958, furnishing almost $97 million in
equipment, training, and advisory support. According
to US Embassy sources, Conakry complained to the
Soviets in early 1982 that most of the military
equipment they had provided was now unusable
either because of obsolescence or lack of spare parts.
About $30 million in military equipment on order
since the late 1970s remains undelivered)
in 1982.
the Soviets asked for $225,000 in advance to service
one of two AN-12 military transport aircraft in
Guinea's inventory. Although Soviet maintenance
and supply of spare parts normally are provided
through cash agreements separate from general mili-
tary accords, US Embassy sources report that the
Guinean Air Force saw this demand as further proof
that Conakry's dependence on the Soviets adversely
affects the military. Reflecting this and other dissat-
ifactions, Toure has cut the number of Soviet advis-
ers in Guinea from 115 in 1977 to between 40 and 50
US initiatives in the region, such as US aid to
Morocco during its war in the Western Sahara. As a
result, it is our judgment that Guinea's relations with
the United States, France, and the other Western
powers are now at their warmest in over 20 years.
The West
According to a US Embassy study, the West has
responded to Toure's changes in policy since the mid-
1970s with growing development aid, which in the
past several years has totaled about $100 million
annually-compared with an average of $40 million a
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year between 1960 and 1976. Most non-Soviet aid
comes from the European Community (EC) which
provided a total of about $84.2 million during the
period 1976-80. It consists mainly of technical assist-
ance for agriculture, mining, and Guinea's neglected
power, communications, and transportation networks.
The United States, the only Western donor whose
program has continued without interruption since
Guinea's independence, has provided nearly $120
million of aid for food since 1958 and a slightly larger
amount for other purposes.
Toure's attempt to improve bilateral political relations
with individual Western countries has so far produced
mixed results. Ties with France, restored in 1975 after
a nearly 20-year hiatus, were developed further dur-
ing a visit to Conakry by French President Giscard
d'Estaing in 1978 and by the resumption of French
assistance. US Embassy reporting indicates, however,
that the relationship has cooled somewhat since then
because of French Socialist Party criticism of Guin-
ea's record on human rights. In September 1982, after
more than a year of negotiation, Toure finally visited
Paris. Despite official Guinean statements that the
visit was a success, the US Embassy in Conakry
reported that Toure was angered by criticism in the
French press. The US Embassy in Paris also reported
that Toure was unable to persuade the French to
increase substantially their bilateral economic and
technical assistance beyond the current level of about
$10-15 million per year
Toure visited Washington in 1979 and again in June
1982 to solicit private and government support for
Guinean development plans. In February 1982 US
Steel agreed after lengthy negotiations to provide 10
percent of the $200 million startup funding for ex-
ploiting the Mifergui-Nimba iron ore deposits in the
Nimba Mountains near the Liberian border. Toure
also hopes to develop Guinea's offshore oil resources
with the help of Union Texas Oil Company, and US
firms are involved in the exploration of what industry
officials believe are promising diamond deposits.
Since Toure's latest visit, however, few US firms have
expressed interest in going beyond their existing
investment commitments in Guinea, and available
information indicates similarly limited results from
Toure's other state visits to Bonn in 1981 and to Spain
The US Embassy reports that, in an effort to attract
Western aid and investment, Toure has attempted to
change Guinea's image as a backward, dictatorial
regime. He has eased state control of the economy
and has offered duty and tax exemptions for potential
investors in priority ventures such as mining, agricul-
ture, and manufacturing. Although Toure has re-
tained the country's authoritarian political structure
and his one-man style of rule, over the last few years
he has resorted less often to charges of plotting as
pretexts for arbitrary arrests, a pattern common in the 25X1
earlier years of his presidency. He has offered amnes-
ty to thousands of Guineans who fled abroad, freed
many political prisoners, and allowed Amnesty Inter-
national to visit some of Guinea's refurbished deten-
tion camps in the last year.
US Government data indicate that Western trade and
investment have clearly increased as a result of
Toure's initiatives. With $332 million total trade in
1981 compared with $118 million in 1975, the EC is
Guinea's largest trading partner. The Community
takes nearly 40 percent of Guinea's exports-predom-
inantly bauxite-and provides approximately 55 per-
cent of Guinea's imports-primarily machinery and
other industrial goods. This compares with a 14-
percent and 49-percent share, respectively, as late as
1973. On the investment side, Western interest has
concentrated on mining
The Arabs
Toure-a Muslim-has also taken steps to lessen his
isolation from the Islamic world community and has
established ties with moderate Arab states. He has
made several pilgrimages to Mecca and has attended
many Islamic conferences and meetings of Islamic
chiefs of state in the role of a senior Muslim states-
man-usually seeking aid for Guinea. In our judg-
ment, he has met with some success. According to
press sources, Guinea has become one of the major
Sub-Saharan African recipients of Arab economic aid
during the last decade with more than $600 million in
commitments, although we estimate that Conakry
received only about one-fourth of that amount. To
date, Saudi Arabia is by far the leading donor. In
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Table I
Guinea: Receipts of Economic Aid
From Arab OPEC States, 1978-80
the Guinean Government after Toure is gone.
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Iraq 15.3 9.3
Kuwait 11.5 3.1 5.5 2.9
Libya 31.3 1.3 10.0 10.0
Qatar 9.0
Qadhafi has offered both economic development aid
and military training.
October 1981 the US Embassy reported that a visit-
ing Saudi delegation signed agreements establishing
the Islamic Bank of Guinea, the Islamic Investment
Company of Guinea, and the Guinean Islamic Society
for Solidarity. As of July 1982 the OPEC Fund
reported that its loans to Guinea over the last few
years have totaled $22 million.
At the same time Toure's moderate stance has
brought him into conflict with Libyan leader Qadhafi.
We believe that Toure is suspicious of Qadhafi's
motives and wants to limit Libyan influence in Sub-
Saharan Africa. In recent years Toure has publicly
criticized Libyan intervention in the Western Sahara
conflict and Chad, refused to grant diplomatic status
to a Libyan People's Bureau (resident mission), and
brought home Guinean civilian and military students
from Libya, claiming they were being trained for
subversive purposes. In retaliation, Qadhafi canceled
a proposed $33 million loan for the construction of the
Conakry oil refinery in 1980 and has held back fuel
shipments to Guinea.
Nevertheless, Qadhafi is continuing to maintain some
ties with Guinea. We believe that Qadhafi sees Guin-
ea as a useful staging area for regional subversion
and-in view of Toure's age-may hope that contin-
ued Libyan aid will give Tripoli some influence over
Libya has also
taken a share in Guinea's most ambitious develop-
ment project, the Mifergui-Nimba complex, in return
for guaranteed access to supplies of iron ore mined
there.
African Neighbors
Toure's turn toward moderation has been accompa-
nied by an effort to establish a new image as a
respected African elder statesman. As dean of Sub-
Saharan chiefs of state after nearly a quarter of a
century in power, Toure wants a place in history. In
addition, Toure-who almost certainly realizes that
other African states are unlikely sources of economic
aid for Guinea-probably hopes that any incremental
prestige he may gain in Africa will be, among its
other effects, conducive to obtaining yet more help
from the West and the Arabs. In our view, he sees the
chairmanship of the OAU (he hopes to host the next
summit and to be named chairman as a result of an
informal agreement) as potentially one of his greatest
achievements. He is equally eager during the next
several years to become chairman of the Nonaligned
Movement; he was one of the movement's founders.
As a result, Toure has made some effort to resolve
disputes between moderate and radical African gov-
ernments over the admission to the OAU of the
Polisario-backed Saharan Democratic Arab Republic
(SDAR), as well as discord over which Chadian
delegation should be accredited by the OAU. These
issues contributed to the failure to hold an OAU
summit in 1982, and Toure recognizes that they could
scuttle his chance at the chairmanship and possibly
destroy the organization itself.
In keeping with his new role as senior statesman and
spokesman for African unity, Toure has begun to end
his self-imposed isolation from his moderate African
neighbors and is adopting a more moderate stance on
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regional issues. This change was accelerated at a
meeting in Monrovia in 1978 where he renewed
friendly relations with Senegal and Ivory Coast after
a 20-year estrangement caused by Toure's distorted
perception of these governments' support of Guinean
dissidents. He has since traveled widely in the region
and has been well received by other heads of state. He
has tried to mediate territorial disputes between Mali
and Upper Volta, as well as political differences
between several other West African countries.' He
has joined regional groups, such as the Organization
for the Development of the Gambia River and the
Mano River Union, and has been a vocal supporter of
the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). Toure is again trying to promote a
Guinea-Mali union, despite two unsuccessful attempts
in the past.
In our view, Toure's efforts to realign his foreign
policies have been facilitated by his continuing firm
grasp on power at home. His harsh style of rule and
the country's economic decline have generated some
opposition, but we believe Toure, a spellbinding orator
and master of political maneuver, still commands
respect from most Guineans. Academic studies and
US Embassy reports indicate that Toure over the
years has neutralized, imprisoned, or executed virtual-
ly all opponents. He also has the firm support of his
security forces, which, together with a pervasive party
apparatus, control all aspects of public life. All Guin-
eans over 15 belong to the Democratic Party of
Guinea-the country's only party-or to one or more
state-sponsored mass organizations that cater to la-
bor, women, youth, and other interest groups. The
7 In April 1982 Toure mediated longstanding differences between
President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, whose son-in-law was
executed in 1980 during the Liberian coup, and Liberian Head of
State Doe who has been barred from visiting family members in
Ivory Coast. He brought together the Presidents of Senegal, The
Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau the same month to ease tensions
between them after Guinea-Bissau granted refuge to Gambian coup
leader, Kukoi Samba Sanyang, in 1982. More recently, he offered
his services to head off a possible outbreak of hostilities between
Liberia and Sierra Leone after Doe sent troops to the border in
response to claims in a Freetown newspaper that he murdered his
President exercises authority largely through the par-
ty Politbureau, which transmits presidential decisions
to the parallel hierarchies of the government and
party. Politbureau members are closely tied to Toure
by family and tribal origin
Dealing With Opposition
Despite his tight control of the political apparatus, the
President has been the object of three assassination
attempts over the last two years-the latest in April
1982. In the past, Toure utilized genuine or fictitious
plot scenarios to divert attention from staggering
economic problems and to intimidate potential rivals.
We believe that Toure's failure publicly to identify
and purge the instigators of the recent incidents-
despite recurring rumors of high-level government
volved could again make Toure a target
and military involvement-suggests that those in-
We believe there are many ranking members of
Toure's government who would like to see him ousted.
All have family, friends, or associates who have
suffered torture, imprisonment, or death during past
purges. No one among Guinea's ruling class has been
left untouched by Toure's repressive policies. Many
feel threatened by his whimsical and arbitrary means
of moving people in and out of power. In 1982, for
example, Toure's campaign against public immoral-
ity-corruption, crime, alcohol, and drug abuse-
resulted in the dismissal of three ministers. These
changes-and the reassignment of the Naval Chief of
Staff-seem to have been sparked by the President's
unhappiness with the success some members of the
Politbureau have had in establishing support among
the armed forces.
Tribal problems, by contrast, have not played a large
part in Guinea's postindependence history. During the
colonial period, Guinea was ruled by the Fula under
French tutelage. With the election of Toure, a
Malinke, to the presidency in 1958, the Malinke have
become preeminent in politics and in the economy,
and the President depends upon them for support.
Although academic observers report that the Fula
resent their loss of power, they lack the means to do
anything about it
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Keeping an Eye on the Military
We believe that the armed forces also are infected by
growing discontent. US Embassy reports indicate that
since the late 1970s many members of the 13,000-
man armed forces have become unhappy with their
personal status and with the state of the country's
economy. They are particularly dissatisfied with un-
fulfilled government promises of prosperity and with
slow promotions, late pay, and the poor quality of
Soviet-supplied military equipment.
Nonetheless, we believe that for the present Toure has
the military under control. He has replaced career
officers with party loyalists and has attached party
committees to each military barracks, using them to
expose "plots" against his regime. At one time in the
1970s, according to published sources, over a third of
the officer corps was under arrest.
In an effort to preserve his control, Toure offers a
measure of conciliation along with heavyhanded retri-
bution. In March 1982, for example, the government
announced promotions for approximately 200 officers,
the first in several years and the largest list in recent
memory. Over 70 percent of the promotions went to
members of Toure's Malinke tribe. At the same time,
the US Embassy reports he has intensified surveil-
lance of military officers, tightened up reporting
procedures on alleged seditious activities, and ordered
wholesale military reassignments and detentions. F_
Exile Groups
We doubt that any of the several groups of Guinean
exiles are sufficiently organized to pose a serious
threat or alternative to the government, although the
potential for assassination of Toure exists. The num-
bers of exiles are formidable-according to academic
sources, over half a million live in Senegal and Ivory
Coast alone-but they are divided and without broad-
ly based leadership. Still, according to US Embassy
reports, Toure is unnerved by exile claims of responsi-
bility for at least one assassination attempt and is
concerned about infiltration of terrorist groups from
abroad. He continues to negotiate with Liberia, Ivory
Coast, and France for the return of exile leaders
accused of hostile acts toward his government. One of
Toure's major disappointments during his visit to
Paris in September 1982 was his failure to obtain a
promise from President Mitterrand to muzzle Guin-
ean dissidents living in France.
Succession
Domestically, Toure's past performance indicates to
us that he will continue his unyielding style of rule
with few if any changes. His government has been
relatively stable for a quarter of a century, and Toure
seems, for now, to be securely in place. With the
advantages of tight control of the military, divided
internal foes, and an impotent exile opposition, Toure
is unlikely to face a serious challenge, at least over the
short term. However, he remains vulnerable to an
isolated assassination attempt, which could come with
little or no warning.
If Toure were removed from the scene there is no
clear choice of a successor. The constitution provides
for an interim government by the Cabinet until a
president is elected by universal suffrage. In our
judgment, a struggle for power within the government
elite or a military coup would be likely and would risk
spreading disorder through Guinea's highly central-
ized institutions. We lack information to predict the
outcome of such a development, but possible conse-
quences include the ascendancy of a compromise
candidate to preserve the present elite's power, or a
takeover by a part of the military. No one now in the
leadership is likely soon to alter the present pro-
Western swing in Guinea's foreign relations. All the
potential contenders for the presidency have shown a
pragmatic understanding of Guinea's need for West-
ern assistance. Nevertheless, in our judgment, faction-
al disputes during the succession period could make
Guinea more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Most
younger government and military leaders have studied
either in Communist countries or at Guinean universi-
ties with expatriate staffs from the Soviet Bloc and we
suspect that some might look to the Soviets for
guidance.
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In the event of Toure's passing from the scene under
circumstances other than those of a military coup, we
believe the Cabinet would be the likely source of a
successor. The Cabinet has evolved into two major
groups, leftist and moderate. According to US Em-
bassy officials, President Toure does not seem to
favor one or the other but allows each limited
influence and then punishes each in turn as he sees it
becoming a threat to his own position.
The leftist group centers on Mamadi Keita, Minister
of Higher Education and the President's brother-in-
law, and the President's nephew, Siaka Toure, Minis-
ter of Transport and former director of the Deuxieme
Bureau, the powerful state security organization that
is now in the hands of the President's moderate
brother, Ismael Toure. US officials report that this
group has favored a Soviet presence in Guinea and
that Keita, long an associate of the President's, fears
that too rapid a rate of liberalization could threaten
the government's political control. Keita reportedly
sees Toure's opening to the West as a threat to the
ideological base of the regime. Nevertheless, US
officials report that he is cooperative in his dealings
with them and may be beginning to appreciate the
usefulness of Western aid.
The moderate group is dominated by the President's
brother, Ismael Toure, the moving force behind Guin-
ea's industrial and mining development and the new
The increased unhappiness among both military and
civilian elites with Toure's rule is in large part
attributable to the country's disastrous economic
state. Although Guinea has the potential to develop
one of the strongest economies in black Africa,' the
' Data from US Government and international financial institutions
show that Guinea's mineral wealth includes one-third of the world's
known reserves of high-grade bauxite and sizable deposits of high-
grade iron ore and diamonds. The country's hydroelectric potential
is over 62 billion kilowatt-hours, and the Guinean watershed can
support the cultivation of a variety of tropical agricultural products.
director of the state security organization. Once at
the top of the government hierarchy, and potentially a
strong contender to succeed his brother, Ismael was
demoted in 1979 when he openly challenged some of
Sekou Toure's economic policies. Ismael has since
regained favor, but he has not yet been given the
wide-ranging responsibilities he had held as Minister
of Finance. Ismael is widely disliked by Cabinet
members for his abrasive, ruthless style, and he
would probably find it difficult to establish a domi-
nant position in the post-Sekou Toure era without a
widespread government purge. Although we believe
Ismael Toure favors a far more rapid rate of liberal-
ization than Keita's group would permit, most ob-
servers agree that both Cabinet factions regard for-
eign aid and investment for development from a
pragmatic rather than an ideological point of view.
Abdoulaye Toure, Guinea's able Foreign Minister, is
also mentioned by foreign observers as a possible
successor to the presidency. We believe, however, he
would be unlikely to achieve more than a figurehead
position. An effective administrator and bureaucrat,
he is not firmly identified with either the leftists or
moderates.
economy is foundering after nearly 25 years of mis-
management. We estimate that real GDP growth
from 1958 to 1982 averaged 1.3 percent a year, less
than half the rate of increase in population. As a
result, per capita income is just under $221, making
Guinea one of the world's poorest countries. IMF
reporting indicate that Guinea also had persistent
current account deficits the past several years. To
finance these deficits, Conakry has resorted to exten-
sive overseas borrowing that has pushed the external
debt to over $1.5 billion.' We estimate that servicing
this debt now consumes 18 percent of Guinea's annual
foreign exchange earnings.
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Table 2
Guinea: Selected Socioeconomic Indicators
Guinea
Average for
Average for
Sub-Saharan Less
Africa
Developed
Countries
Adult literacy, 1977
(percent)
20
27
48
Urbanization, 1980
(percent)
19
21
32
Life expectancy at
birth, 1979 (years)
44
47
53
Population growth rate,
1971-80 (average annual
percent)
2.8
2.8
2.4
(US $)
Labor force in agricul-
ture, 1979 (percent)
World Bank analysis and US Embassy reporting show
that Toure reorganized a once-promising colonial
economy into a number of unproductive state enter-
prises operating under highly centralized control.
These concerns have become crushing liabilities, ab-
sorbing scarce financial resources while offering no
workable programs to invigorate the economy. Agri-
culture has been especially hard hit, the result of poor
planning, inefficient government schemes to control
both production and distribution of foodstuffs, and
artificially low producer prices. According to press
sources, at least half of the country's crops are
smuggled out of the country or sold on the black
market, transforming Guinea from a position of near
self-sufficiency in food production to a net importer.
Public services are also in shambles, as Conakry has
' This includes: $200 million from multilateral Western sources;
$900 million from bilateral Western sources; $200 million from
private creditors; and around $200 million from the Eastern Bloc.
not replaced roads, telecommunication facilities, in-
dustrial plants, and public buildings built by the
French more than 25 years ago. Soaring food and fuel
costs have pushed inflation to more than 25 percent
annually for the past few years. The cost of living
probably has increased even more, as US Embassy
reporting shows that most commercial transactions
occur on the black market, where the value of the syli
is as little as one-sixth the official exchange rate.
Over the longer term, we anticipate a continued
decline in urban living standards unless Toure modi-
fies his policies of centralized socialism. He made
some changes in 1977, when market women, who
control trade in Conakry's central market, marched
on the presidential palace to protest the government's
ban on private enterprise. The government conceded
by allowing private retail and wholesale trade in all
products except essential foodstuffs and later ended
the state monopoly of import and export trade. In
1981 the government created the Ministry of Small-
and Medium-Sized Enterprises to encourage more
private-sector involvement in the economy. We ex-
pect, however, that implementation of these revisions
will be hampered by the same bureaucratic inefficien-
cies that have held back economic progress so far.
Even if Toure succeeds in opening up the economy,
there is a chance the effort could backfire. State
control of the economy has been a hallmark of Toure's
political philosophy, and a wholesale dismantling of
parastatal corporations could be resisted strongly by
influential hardline Marxist elements within the gov-
ernment. They could be joined by other officials who
would view the elimination of these institutions as a
loss of a major source of political patronage and
employment. We also anticipate that his reform pro-
posals will almost certainly result in higher consumer
prices, which Conakry will be hard pressed to offset
with increased wages. Failure to reverse the economic
slide could increase support for a move to push Toure
aside, either through a coup or assassination.
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Figure 2
Guinea: Key Economic Indicators
Bauxite Production
Thousands of metric tons
a Estimated.
b Projected.
cIncludes crop production, livestock, fisheries, and forestry.
Average Value of Bauxite Exports
to the United States
US $ per metric ton
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Table 3
Current Account
Balance of trade
-40.8
63.7
60.5
61.5
131.1
Exports (f.o.b.)
252.6
293.3
327.9
363.7
521.9
Bauxite
175.2
205.0
232.8
247.4
339.2
Alumina
71.5
72.8
88.2
100.3
139.4
6.8
16.0
43.3
267.4
302.2
390.8
Net services and private
transfers
-76.5
-102.7
-130.4
-156.3
-176.9
a Estimated.
b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
Implications for the United States
For the next few years at least, we expect Toure will
continue to pursue better relations with the West. He
is likely to intensify efforts to attract higher levels of
Western investment in developing Guinea's iron ore
and other mineral resources. In addition, he will look
for greater levels of economic development, particu-
larly in agriculture, and will approach private West-
ern financial institutions for loans to help with Guin-
ea's cash flow problems. To improve his prospects for
Western aid and investment, Toure-in our view-
will continue to work against Libyan activities in
Africa, to act as a useful bridge between the West and
radical Third World governments, and to deny the
Soviets access to Guinean air and naval facilities.F-
In our judgment, a positive response by the West to
Toure's requests for financial and technical aid-such
as Western support for the Mifergui-Nimba iron ore
project-would help convince him and other influen-
tial Guineans of the wisdom of moving away from the
Soviets and toward the West. We believe such a trend
could be further reinforced by offers of an increased
Western military aid program as an alternative to
Soviet assistance, which is Moscow's primary remain-
ing source of influence with Toure. Evidence available
to us suggests that Moscow does not plan at present
any major new commitments of military aid. We
believe that prospects for greater US influence with
Toure would be enhanced if, as we expect, he ap-
proaches the International Monetary Fund for addi-
tional financial support. He would then probably seek
US assistance in persuading the IMF to provide funds
without requiring politically risky conditions such as
devaluation
If Toure's expectations on this or other issues are not
met, however, it is our judgment that he would begin
to have second thoughts about the benefits of closer
ties with the West. Toure's previous responses, when
faced with a setback or increased economic pressures,
suggests to us that he will respond by threatening to
turn again to the East in search of benefactors. He
could again allow Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance air-
craft landings at Conakry or indicate a willingness to
open negotiations with Moscow on a long-desired
Soviet naval installation on Tamara Island outside
Conakry. Toure would probably step up his criticism
of US policies and back off from his denunciations of
Libyan activity in Africa. In these circumstances, we
would anticipate a more difficult climate for US
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businesses could occur, including the possible cancel-
lation of operating permits for those firms already in
the country. During a chill in bilateral relations in
1966, Toure expelled the Peace Corps and a major US
business concern and harassed US nationals in the
country.
Moscow's ability to take advantage of these develop-
ments, however, will be limited. The Soviets will be
unable to provide the level and kind of economic
assistance that Toure will want. Toure also will resist
any efforts by Moscow to put him in a position where
he perceives his freedom of action is threatened or his
policy positions can be seen as dictated by a super-
power. Nevertheless, Toure will continue to maintain
some ties with the Soviets both to sustain his non-
aligned credentials and to maintain access to Soviet
military equipment
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