SUB-SAHARAN AFIRCA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOOD CRISIS

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• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Sub-Saharan Africa.:M....;_..-.-
Implications of the
Food Crisis
ALA 83-10058
May 1983
copy 318
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Implications of the
Food Crisis
This paper was prepared byl Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
and the National Intelligence Council. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be addressed
to the Chief, West and East Africa Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10058
May 1983
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Implications of the
Food Crisis
Key Judgments Food has become one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most pressing problems as
Information available most countries face a declining ability to meet their food needs. Food
as of 18 March 1983 production in Sub-Saharan Africa is increasing at less than half the rate
was used in this report., for all developing countries, and far below the area's yearly population
growth rate.
Food shortages and increases in food prices have helped trigger civil
disorder in Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, and
Zambia in recent years. We believe that politically volatile urban Africans,
faced with rising living costs and declining living standards, will be even
less inclined in the future to tolerate food shortages. They will hold the
regimes in power responsible for food supply failures because of govern-
ments' intimate involvement in all phases of food production, procurement,
and distribution. Food problems will increasingly serve as flashpoints for
civil unrest and as rallying points for opposition challenges to governmental
authority.
Government policies common to most African states have contributed to
the decline of African food production. Government pricing programs have
discouraged domestic production of staple foods by keeping official prices
low in order to subsidize urban consumers. These policies also have
accelerated the migration of young male farmers to African cities and
thereby contributed to the production decline as well as added to urban
food demand. In most countries, marketing and distribution of foodstuffs
and agricultural materials and equipment are the responsibility of govern-
ment-owned corporations, whose performance has been marked by mis-
management, shortages of technical and administrative expertise, inade-
quate financing, and corruption.
African governments are increasing food imports to close the widening gap
between production and demand. Grain imports alone in 1981, the most
recent year for which information is available, were seven times the annual
volume of the early 1960s. The increase in cost of grain during the same
period was even more dramatic-nearly $2.5 billion annually, or 20 times
the level of the early 1960s-according to the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization. Paying for food imports has become increasingly difficult for
these governments, with some countries spending as much as one-fourth of
their foreign exchange on food.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10058
May 1983
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Reversing these production and import trends, however, requires financial
resources far beyond regional capabilities, as well as policy changes that
could be politically risky to many fragile regimes. Reducing consumer
subsidies could result in increases in food prices unacceptable to city
dwellers, and we believe that leaders will be reluctant to dismantle
government organizations that control food production and distribution
because they provide an important source of employment and patronage.
Although it is technically feasible to increase substantially the overall
agricultural output of the region, this is extremely unlikely to occur with
any substantial speed because even the more prosperous states lack the
massive technical, financial, and managerial resources necessary for
increased use of fertilizers, irrigation, and other technical means to
improve yields, and foreign assistance to make up the difference is
stagnating.
We anticipate that African leaders, at least for the rest of this decade, will
turn increasingly to traditional Western donors for assistance in meeting
their food needs. In our judgment, the United States, the world's foremost
food exporter and the principal source of food aid to Africa, will receive
more frequent requests for larger volumes of assistance through bilateral
agreements and multilateral programs. We expect that Africans will
continue to seek financial and technical assistance to revive domestic food
production and will encourage greater investment by foreign private
agrobusinesses. We believe that Washington's response to aid requests will
be an important factor in determining the closeness of US-African
relations.
The Soviet Union and Libya-never significant sources of food aid for
Africa-will be deterred by their own food problems and foreign exchange
priorities from expanding their food assistance to the region, in our opinion.
We believe that they will attempt to exploit for propaganda purposes
instances of Western failure to respond positively to African requests for
food aid. These outside powers, more than the West, stand to benefit
politically from instances in which food-related civil unrest threatens to
undermine weak regimes.
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Government Pricing and Marketing Policies 9
Sub-Saharan Africa: Population Indicators 19
1. Indexes of Per Capita Food Production for Selected Regions, 2
1972-81
3. Annual Rates of Population Increase for Major Regions of the 8
World, 1950-2000
4. Sub-Saharan Africa: Rural-Urban
Population Balance, 1950-2000
5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Areas Suitable for Rain-Fed Wheat
Production
6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Volume of Wheat
and Rice Production and Imports
7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Average Annual Grain Import Dependency, 13
1979-81, and Urban Growth Trends
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3. Population Indicators for Selected Regions of the World 7
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Sub-Saharan Africa:
Implications of the
Food Crises
Introduction
Despite commercial imports and aid, African govern-
ments have periodic difficulty meeting the food needs
of their urban consumers.' Popular reliance on gov-
ernment-subsidized food complicates the supply prob-
lem. In recent years, food shortages or sharp increases
in food prices have threatened political stability in
several countries by serving as a catalyst for civil
unrest. This paper examines the dimensions of Afri-
ca's food problem, paying particular attention to the
political challenges that African leaders face during
the next decade in responding to consumer demands
for a reliable supply of cheap food.
Declining Self-Sufficiency
The growth rate of food production in Sub-Saharan
Africa, already the lowest of any region in the
developing world, is declining (figure 1). The average
annual rate of increase in food production in the
1970s was 1.5 percent-down from about 2.0 percent
during the preceding decade and less than half the
rate for all developing countries, according to the
World Bank. Per capita production has dropped even
more, as a result of an accelerating population growth
rate. By 1981, overall per capita food production in
the region had fallen 14 percent below the 1969-71
average level, according to the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA). Per capita production in several
countries dropped by 15 percent or more in the last
decade while even the most productive countries
generally managed only to record low growth during
the same period-4 to 8 percent in Liberia, Niger,
and Rwanda and 25 percent in Ivory Coast (table 1).
Production Slowdown. The slow growth of food pro-
duction stems from a number of factors common to
most African states. According to academic research-
ers, postindependence African leaders tended to view
' Unless otherwise specified, the terms Sub-Saharan Africa and
Africa are used in this paper to refer to all of the African continent
with the exception of South Africa and the North African states
with Arab-controlled governments (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauri-
Political Impact of Food Shortages
Press and Embassy reports document numerous in-
stances of unrest related to food problems in Sub-
Saharan Africa in recent years:
? In April 1979, Liberian dissidents exploited public
opposition to government plans to raise the price of
rice-an urban dietary staple-by organizing an
antiregime demonstration. The demonstration esca-
lated into two days of rioting and looting, leaving
scores dead, before being suppressed by the army. 25X1
? Shortages of staple foods and high food prices
during the preharvest "lean season" in Ghana were
factors in antigovernment student demonstrations
and labor strikes in 1977 and 1978.
? Efforts by Guinean police to confiscate illegally
marketed food in 1977 led to demonstrations by
market women, resulting in several deaths. Two
years earlier, an acute food shortage in the coun-
try's second-largest city helped trigger a military
protest against President Toure's economic policies.
? Public unhappiness with a six-month rice shortage
in Sierra Leone in 1979 led to violence at govern-
ment-controlled rice distribution centers in Free-
town. In 1981, President Stevens declared a state of
emergency in response to a general strike called by
trade unions seeking economic reforms, including
reduced food prices.
? Workers at Zambia's economically strategic copper
mines went on strike three times in 1981; grievances
included discontent over high food prices.
? Several thousand people protesting shortages of
food and other commodities rioted in cities in
northern Madagascar in March 1982. Rioters
attacked government buildings and military bases
and several civilians were killed.
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Figure 1
Indexes of Per Capita Food Production for
Selected Regions, 1972-81
Latin America South Asia
Developed World Sub-Saharan Africaa
I I I I I I I I I I
the agricultural sector as a source of surplus revenue
to finance what they perceived as more important
industrial development. Consequently, most African
governments devoted few resources to the production
of food for consumption, preferring to focus their
agricultural development programs on export crops,
which have been major sources of foreign exchange
(table 2). An extension of this attitude has been the
decision by almost all African governments to keep
producer prices of food crops low in order to subsidize
food for the politically volatile urban consumer. We
and other government and private-sector economic
analysts believe that these price policies have been a
major constraint on food production because producer
prices are often not enough even to cover the farmers'
costs, let alone provide incentives for increased pro-
duction. Many farmers circumvent official marketing
channels and obtain higher prices for their crops from
private traders, but official restrictions on such activi-
ties limit their usefulness as a reliable alternative.
Agricultural output is also affected by resource and
technical problems in increasing yields of most major
African staples, which, according to data provided by
the World Bank, are among the lowest in the world
(figure 2). Africa's rice and sorghum yields, for in-
stance, are half the world average, while maize (corn)
productivity is one-third the global level. Yields of
maize, millet, sorghum, wheat, roots, and tubers have
remained stagnant or have declined since 1970
A prime reason for low yields is the nature of
cultivation methods in Africa. The majority of food
production is carried out on small plots by farmers
who have little access to modern agricultural ad-
vances, such as improved seeds, fertilizers, machinery,
irrigation systems, or extension services, that could
raise yields. Modern large-scale commercial agricul-
ture makes a significant contribution to food produc-
tion in only a few countries in the region, including
Zambia, where 30 large commercial farmers produce
80 percent of the wheat, and Zimbabwe, where
commercial farmers produce about one-half of all
marketed maize. Also affecting productivity is the
migration of young males to the cities in search of
better employment opportunities, which has created
rural labor shortages and resultant prohibitive wage
rates of farm labor.
Government investment in food production in the
1960s and 1970s was low and tended to emphasize
subsidization of large-scale, government-operated
agricultural schemes, according to the World Bank.
This trend reflected the notion that large Western-
style schemes would most readily overcome the stag-
nation associated with traditional agricultural meth-
ods. Moreover, the heavy mechanization involved in
these schemes seemed to promise a solution to the
seasonal labor shortages arising from the accelerated
rural-urban migration of the past two decades. While
typically consuming a large proportion of the public.
investment in agriculture, these projects generally
account for only a small proportion of total food
production. We believe that poor administration,
overstaffing, and failure to maintain equipment and
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Table 1
Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Supply Indicators
Index of Per Percent of Self- Average Daily per
Capita Food sufficiency in Capita Caloric
Production, Annual Grain,a Annual Intake as Percent-
Average, 1979-81 Average, 1979-81 age of Require-
(1969-71 = 100) ments,b 1976-78
72
Burundi 90
Cameroon 98
Cape Verde NA
Gambia, The NA
Ghana 69
Guinea 95
Kenya 99
Lesotho NA
Liberia 104
Madagascar 88
Malawi 99
Niger 104
Nigeria 85
Rwanda 108
Sao Tome and Principe NA
Senegal 75
58
69
94
106
87
101
7
77
62
101
76
84
77
83
62
100
91
96
71
95
70
97
91
107
97
93
83
85
82
86
70
82
NA
62
108
S
eychelles
NA
NA
Sierra Leone
86
Somalia
45
Swaziland
83
Togo
82
85
Uganda
78
97
Upper Volta
86
94
Zaire
86
66
Zambia
94
73
Zimbabwe
82
105
NA
97
77
94
95
80
71
83
95
109
a Percent of grain self-sufficiency=(grain production)/(grain production + net grain
imports) x 100.
b Per capita food intake was calculated as the quantity of food available for human use
at the retail level after provision was made for change in food stocks and the supplies of
food traded, fed to livestock, used as a seed or for individual purposes, or lost in collec-
tion, processing, or marketing. Recommended caloric intakes are those established by
FAO and WHO in 1973.
Includes aid only from signatories of the Food Aid Convention of 1980. FAC
members include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, the European Community,
Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Food aid
from Communist countries in 1981 included 3,000 tons of wheat flour from Bulgaria to
Ethiopia and 1,000 tons of rice from the USSR to Guinea-Bissau.
Annual Average, 1976-78
1981
(thousand tons)
(thousand tons)
Grain
Food Aid,
PL 480 Aid,
Grain Food Aid,
PL 480
Imports
Grain
Grain
Imports Grain ~
Aid, Grain d
153.7
8.0
1.2
244.3
21.8
4.1
30.5
7.8
3.1
18.5
7.2
7.2
104.6
4.8
2.5
106.0
10.1
7.7
NA
34.8
11.9
46.5
36.0
20.9
40.9
10.5
3.2
48.4
5.0
1.2
211.9
63.8
15.0
256.0
52.7
42.5
54.8
39.3
7.8
134.2
29.9
22.2
NA
27.7
6.1
26.5
12.6
10.1
43.1
8.8
3.1
533.9
173.7
134.4
63.3
19.1
13.0
95.1
28.0
23.2
61.3
1.2
0.6
110.9
31.9
31.3
174.6
9.3
1.3
267.8
28.9
17.9
40.2
2.6
0.6
113.3
14.5
14.4
23.4
43.2
12.9
89.1
7.6
2.6
925.0
0.4
0.4
2,440.5
0
0
6.5
12.8
4.5
15.9
8.3
5.4
NA
NA
NA
7.9
1.1
0.4
154.4
89.1
28.0
458.3
92.4
45.2
NA
6.9
1.3
0.5
37.7
8.5
4.18
57.5
10.9
6.9
73.9
1.2 e
12.2
432.0
203.3
142.0
13.0 e
NA
0.5
20.0
0.3
0.3
NA
12.0
8.1
62.0
2.0
2.0
15.3
NA
0.1
36.9
37.6
29.7
39.0
35.8
20.2
71.4
'34.3
25.3
381.6
29.3
1.1
538.3
64.2
56.2
61.8
17.4
2.3
295.0
101.4
73.4
NA
NA
NA
20.9
18.9
14.7
d October 1980-September 1981.
e 1976-77 average.
As reported. Actual quantities are probably higher.
e Figure does not include $1.3 million of commodities for which the tonnage is
unknown.
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Table 2
Sub-Saharan Africa: Resources for Agriculture
Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
CAR
Chad
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Percentage
Crop Land
Irrigated
of Labor
as a
Land as a
Force in
Percentage
Percentage
Agriculture,
of Total
of Crop Land,
1980
Land,1978
1978
85
34
80
79 a
79 a
53
Kilometers
of Roads
per 100 sq
km of Total
Land,1982
Fertilizer
Tractors
Official
Nutrient
per 100
Commitment
Use, 1979
Hectares
to Agriculture,
(thousand
of Arable
$ US per capita,
tons)
Land,1979
1979
0.1 1.9 2.1 2 NA
0.4 27.4 0.6 NA 12.5
0.01 2.1
NA 2.4
0.4 3.8
NA 2.6
10.0 29.8
0.7 13.5
2.3
49.6
15.7
9.9
Ivory Coast 79 28.8
Kenya 78 4.0
Lesotho 87 11.7
Liberia 70 3.9
0.3 14.2
1.9 9.0
fA 13.3
0.5 7.7
6.6 NA 19.7
2.4 1 16.7
28.0 NA 7.9
0.9 3 31.3
3.0 NA 190.8
25.1 1 4.3
42.6 1 97.5
52.7 3 93.3
1.4 2 NA
4.7 1 256.4
Niger 91 11.8
Nigeria 54 26.3
Rwanda 91 38.3
Senegal 76 12.5
Sierra Leone 65 57.2
Somalia 82 1.7
Swaziland 52 a 9.7
Tanzania 83 5.8
Togo 67 42.6
Uganda 83 27.7
Upper Volta 82 20.5
Zaire 75 2.7
0.6 0.8
11.6 76.5
34.7 10.7
7.1 45.0
10.3 2.0
2.4 0.05
16.4 5.2
3.6 34.6
12.3 2.4
2.9 2.1
3.0 6.7
7.2 10.7
106.2
12.1
11.0
59.8
88.7
109.5
NA
161.3
74.1
0.3
41.8
11.0
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Developing countries
world
infrastructure are the primary reasons for this disap-
pointing performance. In our judgment, for instance,
rice production on Mozambique's state farms, estab-
lished in the late 1970s, has been declining due to
equipment breakdown and the absence of worker
incentives. The USDA believes that Ethiopia's state
farms have suffered from being managed by military
officers without agricultural expertise, while Congo-
lese authorities publicly admit that their state farms
are plagued by chronic equipment problems.
Environmental and political factors frequently worsen
the food production record in a number of countries.
Drought is a constant threat to much of the continent,
particularly the Sahel' and eastern and southern
Africa. Floods, crop diseases, and infestations of
locusts, army worms, or other pests also reduce crop
yields. Widespread trypanosomiasis carried by tsetse
flies limits livestock raising and the use of draft
animals. Political turmoil associated with guerrilla
activity and refugee movements frequently disrupts
normal planting and harvesting schedules and mar-
keting patterns.
Rising Demand. The slowdown in the growth of food
output has been accompanied by a rapid escalation in
the volume of aggregate food demand due primarily
to the high rate of population growth. Sub-Saharan
Africa's population-estimated by the United Na-
tions to have been 330 million in 1980-is increasing
at the rate of about 3 percent per year, the highest for
any region in the world (table 3 and figure 3).
Urban food demand, buoyed by an urban population
growth rate of 5.9 percent, is growing more rapidly
than overall food demand and is far outstripping the
1.5-percent annual growth rate of food production
(figure 4). Growing urbanization of the African popu-
lation has created a food demand structure that is
difficult to supply from local resources in the best of
circumstances. Urban incomes are generally higher
than rural incomes, and academic studies suggest that
as incomes rise, people in lower income brackets
2 The Sahel is a geographic belt that extends along the southern
edge of the Sahara from Chad to the Atlantic Ocean. In this paper,
we define the Sahel as including Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia,
589333 4-83
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Table 3
Population Indicators for Selected Regions of the World
World
More developed regions
Less developed regions
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America
South Asia
Population
Annual
Annual Average, 1980-85
Total
Urban Proportion of
Annual
(million persons)
Growth
(per thousand persons)
Fertility
Population (percent)
Urban
Rate
Rate
Growth
1980
2000
,
1980-85
Birth
Death
,
1980
1980
2000
Rate,
(percent)
Rate
Rate
1980-85
(percent)
4,432
6,119
1.70
27.5
10.1
3.8
41.0
51.0
2.83
1,131
1,272
0.67
15.8
9.6
2.0
70.9
79.4
1.33
3,301
4,847
2.04
31.4
11.0
4.4
30.7
43.7
3.95
330
612
3.06
47.7
17.2
6.6 a
21.8
35.5
5.89
364
566
2.38
32.3
8.2
4.3
64.7
75.1
3.60
1,404
2,075
2.17
34.8
13.2
5.0
24.8
37.1
4.30
purchase greater quantities of food and diversify their
diets. Moreover, taste preferences of Africans change
when they move to cities because of the higher status
associated with certain foods and the easier prepara-
tion and storage of some nontraditional foods. As a
result, urban Africans tend to turn away from local
grains, roots, and tubers in favor of such foods as
higher quality imported rice and Western-style bread
made of wheat flour. In the case of wheat, a crop that
is not suited for production in much of Africa, we
believe that demand has been fueled in part by the
availability of imported wheat for purchase on conces-
sional terms (figure 5).
Growing Dependence on Food Imports. Academic
studies indicate that during the 1960s, when African
cities began to grow rapidly and world grain prices
were low, governments found that the food needs of
urban populations could be satisfied more easily with
cheap imported grains than with locally produced
foods. Subsidies on imported foods have reinforced
consumer preference for imported rice and wheat,
dampening demand for substitutable local staples.
Currency overvaluation in many countries acts as an
additional, implicit subsidy by lowering import costs
relative to domestic prices. As a result, the role of
imported foodstuffs has assumed increasing impor-
tance in urban markets as a means of meeting both
rising aggregate demand and changing tastes (figure 6
and figure 7). By the late 1970s, according to data
from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), wheat constituted about 48 percent of Sub-
Saharan Africa's net grain imports by volume, while
rice accounted for about 34 percent and maize about
12 percent. Total grain imports exceeded 8.6 million
tons in 1981, compared with 1.2 million tons in the
early 1960s.
An FAO study of African food trade patterns indi-
cates that most imported grain comes from the United
States, Western Europe, Canada, and Australia. The
United States supplied some 30 percent of Africa's
imported grain in the late 1970s, according to data
from USDA, with the remainder primarily from the
European Community (EC), Japan, and Thailand. US
grain exports to the region in 1981 totaled $750
million, with Nigeria alone accounting for nearly two-
thirds.
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Figure 3
Annual Rates of Population Increase for Major
Regions of the World, 1950-2000
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America
South Asia
North America
Europe
With the exception of maize exported from South
Africa, the volume of grain trade among African
countries is very low. Poor transport links, inadequate
storage facilities, tariff barriers, and lack of foreign
exchange are the primary obstacles. Nevertheless,
price differentials between countries spur considerable
illegal grain trading in some regions, mostly in West
Africa. According to USDA, for example, crops
traditionally grown for subsistence in Benin and Cam-
eroon have become important cash crops raised for
illegal export to northern Nigeria.
Paying for imported food has become a significant
burden for the majority of African governments, in
our judgment. According to FAO, the value of
Africa's total annual food import bill averaged $2.5
billion in 1977-79-the last period for which data are
available-compared with $274 million per year in
1961-63. We estimate that Africa's food import cost
for 1982 was on the order of $5 billion. USDA
reporting in 1982 indicates that food imports consume
more than 25 percent of export earnings in The
Gambia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Togo.
The financial bind has become particularly acute
during the past three years. The surge in world oil
prices not only boosted the cost of nonfood imports
but also contributed to the current international eco-
nomic recession that has affected demand for African
agricultural and mineral exports.
As a result of their increasingly precarious financial
positions, most African nations rely on Western do-
nors for food aid in the form of concessional sales or
grants to meet normal import requirements as well as
emergency needs. We estimate that over 40 African
nations received a total of about $500 million worth of
food aid from Western donors in 1981 alone. The
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Rapid population growth over the next two decades
will be the primary factor determining Africa's food
requirements. The current population growth rate-
already the highest of any region in the world-is
projected by UN demographers to rise from 3 percent
to a high of 3.1 percent in 1990 before declining.
Seventeen countries, mostly in East and West Africa,
have growth rates well over 3 percent, and Kenya's
growth rate of 4.1 percent is one of the highest in the
world. The United Nations projects that the area's
population of 330 million in 1980 will grow to 612
million by the year 2000. Nearly one-fourth of the
population lives in a single country-NigeriaF--]
Demographers believe that Africa's growth rate will
stay high because Africans traditionally have placed
high value on fertility-the desired number of chil-
dren per family ranges from seven to 10. Governments
of 22 countries with growth rates ranging from 2.5 to
3.7 percent see their population growth as being
satisfactory or too low. Low population density in
much of the region and shortages of agricultural
labor mask the seriousness of the population/re-
source balance problem and generally repress any
sense of urgency on the part of local governments in
curbing growth. Politicians also are reluctant to
United States was the largest single supplier of this
assistance, with over 60 percent of the total, according
to the US Agency for International Development
(AID).
Communist countries are not an important source of
food aid to Africa. China (the main donor), the Soviet
Union, and other Communist countries provided a
total of $103.5 million to 17 countries from 1970 to
1981. Most of this assistance has gone to leftist
regimes including Madagascar, Mozambique, Mali,
Somalia (before Siad's break with Moscow in 1977),
Ethiopia, and Guinea (before Toure's decision in the
late 1970s to develop closer ties with the West). The
Soviets tend to support client states, while Chinese aid
is more widely distributed. Because of their own food
promote family planning policies that could upset
tribal balances. Some leaders-President Moi of
Kenya and former Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon
and Senghor of Senegal-have warned of potential
demographic problems, but this awareness has not
filtered down to lower levels of their bureaucracies.
Compounding the impact of population growth on
food availability is Africa's growing urban popula-
tion. Africa is one of the least urbanized regions of
the world, with 22 percent of its people living in cities
in 1980. But the urban growth rate is high-5.9
percent-because of the high rates of natural increase
and rural-urban migration. UN demographers project
that 36 percent of the population will live in urban
areas by the year 2000 (figure 4). In 1980, Sub-
Saharan Africa had 11 cities of more than I million;
in 20 years, the region will have 41 such cities, 12 of
which will be in Nigeria, according to UN projections.
Based on historical evidence, we believe that this
rapid increase in urban population will be accompa-
nied by income growth and changing taste prefer-
ences. These in turn will contribute to increasing
aggregate food requirements with a particularly
strong demand for imported wheat and rice.
problems and foreign exchange priorities, China and
the Soviet Union have chosen not to make food
assistance a more important element in their aid
programs in Africa, in our opinion.
Government Pricing and Marketing Policies. Most
African specialists believe, and we concur, that the
most important factor in Africa's current food situa-
tion is government pricing and marketing policies
regarding agricultural commodities. Governments set
official producer and consumer prices on major sta-
ples and attempt to regulate crop procurement and
food marketing through government-controlled
boards known as parastatals.
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Figure 4
Sub-Saharan Africa: Rural-Urban Population
Balance, 1950-2000
Urban
Since 1980, several countries have raised producer
prices of staple foods above world market levels in
order to encourage production, but USDA reporting
notes that the results of these moves have been mixed.
Maize farmers in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and
Zimbabwe, for example, responded to recent price
increases with substantial increases in production.
Zimbabwe's 1981 maize crop was nearly double the
previous year's production because farmers reacted
positively to record-high preplanting prices and bene-
fited from good weather as well. Over the longer term,
however, the attractiveness of higher producer prices
is frequently undercut by other factors such as high
production costs, lack of necessary materials, and
adverse weather. In Zambia, where a 15-percent price
increase for maize in 1981 brought about a boost in
the acreage planted, USDA analysts warn that price
incentives could be dampened by shortages of agricul-
tural materials and equipment, transportation prob-
lems, and unavailability of credit. Wheat growers in
Zimbabwe are being paid more than twice the world
market price but have not expanded plantings because
of what they claim is an even greater cost of irriga-
tion. Analyses of rice growing in West Africa suggest
that rising labor costs may be cutting into the incen-
tive of price increases, according to USDA.
We believe that domestic inflation and currency
overvaluation also have cut into the effect of govern-
ment-implemented price increases. Nigeria, for exam-
ple, increased official producer prices on staple foods
substantially in 1980, with rice prices rising 24 per-
cent, maize 38 percent, sorghum 73 percent-all well
above world market prices. Prices have not risen
significantly since then, however, while the cost of
living has more than doubled. Similar situations have
occurred in Tanzania and Senegal.
Low official producer prices and higher consumer
demand have encouraged the development of private
marketing structures operating parallel to official
marketing channels in much of Africa. The World
Bank estimates that private traders, who often offer
producer prices two to three times as high as official
prices, control over half the marketed production of
cereals throughout the region, although their presence
varies considerably among countries. Where private
traders operate illegally, as in much of the Sahel, their
activities cut into government efforts to enforce offi-
cial producer and consumer prices.
We believe there are several factors that hamper
operations of the parastatals. The leading problem on
the procurement side is that they usually offer low
prices that provide farmers with little incentive to sell
to the government. On the marketing side, the in-
creasingly severe financial situations of African
governments have had an impact on the availability of
funds needed to build and maintain adequate trans-
port and storage facilities. Kenya's maize surplus in
1978 was more than the government could afford to
store, and, according to USDA, Nairobi decided to
hold down production the following year by lowering
the producer price. The plan worked, but unfor-
tunately the reduction in planting coincided with a
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Figure 5
Sub-Saharan Africa: Areas Suitable for Rain-Fed Wheat Production
:Cape
Verde
Wheat production prospects
Very suitable
n Marginally suitable
Unsuitable
Suitable
Outside study area
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Food consumption patterns in Africa exhibit regional
and rural-urban differences, with grains, roots, and
tubers being the major sources of calories. Meat
consumption is low, except among pastoralists in
East Africa and upper income groups in Zimbabwe
and South Africa. In the Sahel, millet and sorghum
are the traditional staples, but rice and wheat, mostly
imported, are increasingly preferred by urban resi-
dents for taste and convenience of preparation. In the
rest of West Africa, millet and sorghum are con-
sumed in areas bordering the Sahel, while local rice,
roots, and tubers are the main staples nearer the
coast. As in the Sahel, rice and wheat are replacing
traditional foods in urban areas, and many urban
consumers prefer higher quality imported rice to the
types produced locally. Cassava is the main staple of
Central Africa, and maize is also widely consumed.
Urban demand for imported wheat and rice is signifi-
cant in the region. In East Africa, diet composition is
more varied than in other regions. Maize. is the main
staple of Kenya and Tanzania in both rural and
urban areas and is important elsewhere in the region.
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda all have
several locally produced staples. Wheat consumption
is substantial in urban areas of Kenya, Ethiopia, and
to a lesser extent, Tanzania. Maize is the major
staple of most of southern Africa for both rural and
urban residents, with the exception of Madagascar,
where rice dominates. Wheat is popular in cities in
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, and Mozambique
Figure 6
Sub-Saharan Africa: Volume of Wheat and
Rice Production and Importsa
Wheat
- Production
Rice
- Production
aL
alncludes Sudan and Mauritania.
b Annual average.
food distribution as evidence of government indiffer-
ence to constituents' welfare. For example, the late
Liberian President Tolbert and his family were popu-
larly believed to be among the prime potential benefi-
ciaries of the proposed rice price increases that led to
antigovernment rioting in Monrovia in 1979. Govern-
ments, too, use allegations of corruption to discredit
drought, forcing the government to import maize
shortly after it had finished exporting the previous
year's surplus.
Misuse and Corruption of the Food System. In our
opinion, the development of large institutional struc-
tures responsible for the production, procurement,
distribution, and pricing of food has created abundant
opportunities for various forms of corruption. With
much of urban Africa struggling against record food
prices and declining living standards, opposition
groups are increasingly tempted to point to abuses in
ed to damage the reputation of one of President
Mobutu's critics by accusing him of diverting rice for
his own financial gain, a charge the US Embassy
believes is inaccurate.
Evidence available to us indicates a number of ways
in which African food needs have become a profitable
source of illegal income. Government regulation of
crop purchases, transport, and storage, for instance,
allows functionaries to exact bribes in return for
services rendered. US Embassy reports note that
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Figure 7
Sub-Saharan Africa: Average Annual Grain Import Dependency, 1979-81, and Urban Growth Trends
Average annual grain import dependency, 1979-81'
Percent
under 10- 25- over
10 25 50 50
Urban proportion of total
population, 1980
Percent
under 15 0
15to30 0
over 30 ?
data
unavailable
outside
study
area
Projected average annual
urban growth rate,
1980-85
Percent
under 5
5to6
over 6
a Percent import dependency- Net grain imports x 100
Grain production+Net grain imports
1000 2000
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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corruption in Senegal's now-defunct grain-marketing
board extended from weighers and truckers to senior
officials, including former President Senghor's
nephew. market-
ing officials in Tanzania who control access to rela-
tively scarce subsidized food curry favor by selling in
bulk to influential customers who resell the commod-
ities to consumers at higher prices.
The allocation of agricultural materials, equipment,
and farm credit often becomes a source of graft for
parastatal officials and a means of distributing politi-
cal patronage in rural areas. Academic studies claim
that farm loans made through the Tanzania Rural
Development Bank in the 1970s were sometimes used
to build peasant support for local politicians. The
Nigerian press has frequently charged that agricul-
tural loans are not allocated on the basis of need and
that the money often is not invested in farming.
According to academic observers, the Senegalese
Government co-opted rural leaders in the 1970s by
giving them access to subsidized agricultural produc-
tion material.
Food imports also are avenues for graft. The Nigerian
press has reported extensively on irregularities in the
issuance of rice import licenses, and in 1981 the
National Assembly published a list of President Sha-
gari's supporters and cronies who received licenses.'
The US Embassy reports widespread rumors that the
head of Zaire's largest commercial bakery was using
payoffs late last year to circumvent stiff government
restrictions on imported wheat flour
There are problems as well with deliveries of food
project managers frequently diverted or illegally sold
donated food. US Embassy officers in Kinshasa have
noted frequent instances in recent years of diversion
of US Public Law (PL) 480 rice aid by functionaries
at all levels of government for illegal resale at inflated
prices.
Prospects for Improvement
African policymakers have shown some promising
signs in recent years of moving in the direction
necessary to provide improved incentives to farmers.
On balance, however, we believe that much remains
to be done to ameliorate African food production and
that the decline in Africa's ability to feed itself is
unlikely to be significantly reduced in the next
decade.
Signs of Change. Some governments are trying to
stimulate production by liberalizing marketing prac-
tices and giving freer rein to private traders. Senegal,
for instance, has abolished the official cereals market-
ing board and eliminated government procurement of
cereals. Mali has relinquished its monopoly control on
sorghum and millet, in partial response to IMF
insistence on grain marketing liberalization as a pre-
condition for a standby accord. In 1981, Somalia
abolished several parastatals and turned their func-
tions over to the private sector. Zambia has reduced
the role of its agricultural marketing board, allowing
cooperatives in some provinces to become the official
maize buyers. During the past two years, Upper
Volta's grain marketing parastatal has attempted to
encourage production by setting floor prices for grain
and sorghum higher than those offered by private
traders and by entering the market only when it can
offer a better price than private traders.
Constraints on Future Food Production. We believe
that the financial, physical, and human resource
problems that have constrained African agriculture
during the past two decades cannot be redressed
significantly during the rest of the 1980s. Productivity
will remain low. Modern agricultural materials and
equipment, such as imported seeds, fertilizers, chemi-
cals, and machinery, are too costly for most farmers,
and budgetary problems will constrain government
subsidization of such materials. The migration of
young males to urban areas will raise rural wage
rates, pushing production costs too high for most
farmers unless producer prices are raised adequately.
Moreover, African governments will have difficulty
funding the research necessary to adapt high-yield
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technology to local conditions and will have trouble
supporting extension services to disseminate this tech-
nology to farmers
In our view, an inadequate system of transport and
storage facilities will hinder the marketing and distri-
bution of both foodstuffs and agricultural materials.
US agricultural attache reporting on Zaire has noted,
for example, that the major obstacle to improvement
of Zaire's agricultural sector is the country's rapidly
deteriorating road system, which prevents many farm-
ers from getting their produce to market centers, a
problem shared by many other African countries.
Improving these roads, however, will be made difficult
by high construction and maintenance costs. Auster-
ity measures imposed in conjunction with debt re-
scheduling may also lead many African governments
to reduce substantially foreign exchange allocations
for trucks and spare parts, reducing the availability of
vehicles to bring crops to market.
A study by the US National Academy of Sciences
indicates that the potential for increasing food pro-
duction in Africa by bringing new land into cultiva-
tion is large, but preparing these lands for food crops
will require high levels of investment. USDA esti-
mates, for example, that the clearing of tropical rain
forests costs about $3,000 per hectare. Once land is
ready for planting, labor shortages necessitate invest-
ment in expensive, imported machinery, adding to an
already heavy import burden of most African govern-
ments. Development of marginal lands, moreover,
frequently requires greater use of costly fertilizers and
irrigation. Analysis by USDA suggests that irrigation
projects entail development costs of $5,000 to $6,000
per hectare.
We believe that conditions in Africa over the next
decade do not favor a "Green Revolution" in food
production such as occurred in Asia in the 1960s. The
Green Revolution was made possible by a combina-
tion of factors: the existence of an extensive irrigation
network, the development of high-yield varieties of
rice and wheat suitable to areas with access to
controlled water supply and fertilizer, and relatively
good transportation links between producers and mar-
kets. None of these requirements currently exist in
Africa. In addition, development of high-yield plant
varieties suited to African rain-fed agriculture must
take into account widely varying soil and climatic
conditions. Rice breeders have developed some suit- 25X1
able high-yield varieties, but, according to USDA,
their use is limited by disease and other environmen-
tal problems. Neither does USDA foresee a techno-
logical breakthrough for millet or sorghum. Use of
existing improved plant varieties is hampered by the
logistical difficulties in distributing hybrid seeds,
adulteration of seeds by farmers, and storage prob-
Government Options Limited. We believe that Afri-
can governments face difficult policy choices in the
years ahead as they attempt to ensure adequate food
supplies, reduce import dependence, and lower con-
sumer subsidies. Although African leaders are likely
to try to solve their food problems by allocating an
increasing share of investment to food crop produc-
ciated with slowed economic growth and rising trade
deficits will keep disbursements below what is neces-
sary to raise yields, encourage surplus production, or
bring more land into cultivation. Moreover, we believe
that in some countries, decisions on how to allocate
scarce resources may require tough choices between
export-oriented cash crops-important sources of for-
eign exchange-and import substitution programs in
the food sector.
Perhaps most difficult, in our judgment, would be the
politically risky pricing and trade policy reforms
necessary to improve incentives to farmers. Although
essential in the long run to help solve the problem of
food shortages, such reforms will come at the expense
of urban consumers. We believe that African leaders 25X1
view food disruptions in major cities as potential
challenges to political stability and prefer not to
antagonize urban residents by lowering food subsidies,
despite recommendations by economic advisers and
foreign creditors. Governments that have little choice
but to lower consumer subsidies may still try to
protect the interests of key groups, such as the
military or personnel in vital export-oriented sectors.
Mali, for instance, has loosened its control on grain
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marketing and has raised consumer prices, as stip-
ulated in an agreement with the IMF, but noted in
late 1981 that it would still try to provide cheap grain
for certain categories of public employees. Late last
year Zimbabwe announced with some reluctance its
plan to raise retail prices on maize meal. While citing
that the increases were necessary to cover higher
operating costs of maize millers following increases in
producer prices, the government noted its awareness
that the decision will hit directly the politically vocal
lower income consumers. Zambia, under pressure
from Western donors to reduce consumer subsidies,
announced last December that it was abolishing price
controls on all goods except major staples.
A number of countries face particularly troublesome
choices in coping with the food problem. Zimbabwe
faces the difficult task of moving ahead on promised
land reform without risking the departure of white
farmers who dominate the country's commercial agri-
cultural sector and produce most of the country's
marketed maize. Failure to satisfy the land demands
of rural blacks-an important element in the inde-
pendence movement-could undermine support for
Prime Minister Mugabe at a time when he is consoli-
dating his position. Any disruption in commercial
agricultural production, on the other hand, would hit
the country's primary source of both export earnings
and food crops and jeopardize economic progress. The
government plans to resettle about 160,000 black
families on land purchased from whites on a "willing
buyer, willing seller" basis within three years, but so
far only about 15,000 families have been resettled.
Further progress will be limited by lack of funds,
especially if the current economic recession continues.
Nigeria's insatiable appetite for imported goods-
including rice and wheat-is being threatened by a
dramatic reduction in foreign exchange reserves as a
result of the slump in oil earnings. According to US
Embassy reporting, Lagos wants to cut import spend-
ing by at least one-third, a move that could have an
impact on the availability of food imports, almost all
of which go for urban consumption and cost over $3
billion last year.
sector. Food production has grown at the rate of just
over 1 percent annually since 1970, while government
spending on agricultural projects consistently falls
well below projected outlays. Current economic devel-
opment priorities indicate no significant change in this
direction, suggesting to us continued stagnation of
food production, and increased demand for food
imports.
Barring an unexpected surge in international demand
for Nigerian oil any time soon, Lagos will have to
balance its available foreign exchange against the
country's requirements for food and other essential
imports. Cutting into industrial imports risks a sharp
rise in business and urban unemployment as well as
further delays in government efforts to diversify the
economy before current oil reserves are depleted by
the end of this century. Reducing food imports, on the
other hand, will have an immediate impact on supplies
and prices in urban areas, increasing the likelihood
that food could be a catalyst for widespread popular
unrest. Food import licenses also provide an important
source of illegal income for favored politicians, and we
anticipate considerable pressure on the government
not to tamper with this lucrative arrangement.
Kenya faces the long-term challenge of trying to
match food production with one of the world's highest
population growth rates. Nairobi's efforts will be
hindered by the limited amount of additional fertile
land available for cultivation. US Embassy assess-
ments note that import policies designed to keep
consumer food subsidies intact have become a heavy
financial burden for the government, while discourag-
ing domestic production. In our judgment, cutting
these subsidies will entail significant political risk in
light of the inevitable sharp increase in urban food
prices. Closing the import gap, however, requires
major changes in land use policy to increase the share
of land devoted to food production. Such a move could
reduce production of exportable cash crops such as
coffee and tea at a time when Kenya is in desperate
need of additional foreign exchange. Efforts to reduce
local demand necessitate slowing the rate of popula-
tion growth, but widespread preference for large
families suggest that this will not be easy in the near
term.
Low public investment in agriculture has been a
major factor behind the stagnation of Nigeria's food
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Ethiopia's difficulties in the agricultural sector stem
from the decision by Addis Ababa to organize the
countryside by establishing Communist-style state
farms and peasant collectives. Farmers have resisted
these moves, according to USDA, because they view
them as a return to the feudal system of agriculture
that prevailed under the regime of Emperor Haile
Selassie. This problem has been exacerbated by a lack
of trained managers to oversee operations and Addis
Ababa's consequent use of military officers-who are
reluctant to identify themselves with rural interests-
to administer farm policy. Productivity also is ham-
pered by frequent drought, continuing shortages of
agricultural materials and equipment, and military
operations that not only disrupt production and trans-
portation but also result in a sizable refugee popula-
tion.
Stimulating food production would force the Ethi-
opian Government to reevaluate its ideologically in-
spired goals of collectivization and necessitate greater
investment in agriculture at the expense of other,
more influential interest groups such as the military.
These choices will be all the more difficult because of
what we anticipate as a tight financial position result-
ing from continued low export prices for coffee-the
main foreign exchange earner.
Impact on Import Requirements. Barring major
changes in policies, we believe that food imports will
have to increase substantially to satisfy politically
important urban consumers. USDA, FAO, and the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
have projected that annual demand for food imports
in Africa will reach 10 to 12 million tons in 1990 if
production and consumption trends of the 1970s
continue. More recent data, however, suggest to us
even faster growth of imports during the past few
years. According to FAO, grain imports alone totaled
8.6 million tons in 1981, compared with 3.5 million
tons annually, on average, from 1976 to 1978. We
believe that income growth in certain countries, par-
ticularly Nigeria, may have fueled this recent rapid
growth of imports. This trend may moderate when oil
price declines force exporters-like Nigeria and Cam-
eroon-to reduce imports. Still, USDA, FAO, and
IFPRI estimate that Africa's unmet nutritional needs
will amount to the equivalent of 8 to 13 million tons of
grain in 1990
The ability of Africans to pay for their external food
needs will be limited by the increasing burden of
servicing foreign debts and paying for oil and other
essential nonfood imports, and poor prospects for any
significant increase in world prices for African ex-
ports. Relying on international financial institutions
for funding is, in our opinion, not a realistic alterna-
tive. International bankers are taking a hard look at
Third World borrowers in light of the financial crises
in Brazil and Mexico. Prospects for concessional
financing also are uncertain because of economic
conditions in the major donor countries. The IMF
decided in May 1981 to extend its compensatory
financing facility to provide assistance to members
having balance-of-payments difficulties as a result of
increasing costs of cereal imports. Malawi and Kenya
have been helped by the program and we anticipate
that other African states will also turn to the IMF for
assistance. The facility's resources are too limited,
however, to cover more than a fraction of the region's
food needs.
Implications for the United States
We believe that few African countries will escape
food shortages in the 1980s. Urban Africans, increas-
ingly beset by rising prices and declining living stand-
ards, will be especially hard hit and may be less 25X1
inclined to tolerate food shortages in the future. Food
supply problems are likely to serve as flashpoints for
urban unrest directed against government authorities.
Even if violence does not erupt, a serious food short-
age could become a rallying point for political opposi-
tion, which is likely to point to the shortage as a
failure of government policies. In our judgment, few
regimes would be able to survive the cumulative
political erosion of a series of food crises or of a
prolonged urban food shortage.
We believe that African leaders, faced with growing
food deficits, will look increasingly to external sources
for food and for financial and technical assistance in
building domestic food production capabilities. We
anticipate that Africa will increase requests to the
United States, as well as to other traditional Western
donors, for sales of food on concessional terms. We
believe that requests will cite humanitarian concerns,
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the possible threat of urban unrest to political stabil-
ity, and the potential for Soviet or Libyan exploitation
of discontent. Governments may interpret the nature
of Washington's response as a gauge of our commit-
ment to Africa's needs and of our reliability as an
ally. African leaders will be seeking direct assistance
and US pressure on EC donors and the IMF to
expand their funding of food imports.
US relations with strategically important countries
such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Somalia could be weak-
ened if Washington is not viewed by their leaders as
sensitive to their food needs. Kenya's President Moi
and Somalia's President Siad, for example, place
particular emphasis on US food aid, and their anxi-
eties about the usefulness of their decision to open
their military facilities to US forces may increase if
they believe US food aid, as well as other assistance,
is inadequate. Nigeria, whose membership in OPEC
precludes its qualifying for PL 480 aid, will be in the
market for other kinds of financial assistance to help
cover its food gap. Embassy reporting indicates that
the request might include a barter arrangement in-
volving US food and Nigerian oil or concessional
financing of US agricultural investments.
We believe that food deficits and related unrest could
provide opportunities for exploitation by the Soviet
Union and Libya. In our opinion, the Soviets and
Libyans could benefit from instances in which such
unrest fans popular dissatisfaction, thereby undermin-
ing weak, pro-Western regimes. The Soviet Union and
Libya probably will take advantage of opportunities to
ingratiate themselves with troubled states by offering
small but timely food donations. Libya, for instance,
gave rice and other foodstuffs to Ghana in January
1982 to ease food shortages following the coup. The
Soviet Union donated 6,000 tons of food to Malian
drought victims in February 1983. We believe that
the Soviets and Libyans will try to exploit the propa-
ganda value of any instances of Western failures to
supply food aid
The Soviet Union and Libya are, however, neither
able nor willing to go further and play a major role in
solving Africa's food crisis. Their own food problems
and foreign exchange priorities preclude significant
increases in food aid to Africa, in our judgment. The
two countries' past aid programs suggest that neither
Moscow nor Tripoli has the willingness or resources to
plan and support agricultural development projects at
a level adequate to have a significant impact on
African food production.
25X1
I- I
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Secret
Appendix
Sub-Saharan Africa: Population Indicators
Population
Annual
Annual Average, 1980-85
Total
Urban Proportion of
Annual
(thousand persons)
Growth
(per thousand persons)
Fertility
Population (percent)
Urban
Rate,
Rate,
Growth
1980 2000
1980-85
Birth Death
1979
1980 2000
Rate,
(percent)
Rate Rate
1980-85
(percent)
Botswana
807
1,597
3.18
50.5
15.6
6.7
Burundi
4,241
7,207
2.57
46.8
21.1
5.9
Cameroon
8,444
13,937
2.47
42.2
17.6
5.7
Cape Verde
324
427
1.57
23.8
8.1
NA
CAR
2,294
3,914
2.45
44.7
20.2
5.9
Chad
4,455
7,063
2.12
44.5
23.2
5.9
Comoros
358
620
2.88
46.0
17.2
NA
Congo
1,537
2,717
2.71
44.2
17.2
6.0
Djibouti
310
526
2.68
NA
NA
NA
Equatorial Guinea
363
613
2.47
42.2
17.6
NA
Ethiopia
31,468
54,666
2.49
49.7
23.1
6.7
Gabon
548
754
1.52
35.3
20.1
4.3
Gambia, The
603
1,046
2.58
47.5
21.7
6.4
Ghana
11,679
22,348
3.27
48.2
15.5
6.7
Guinea
5,014
8,823
2.69
45.7
18.8
6.2
Guinea-Bissau
573
859
1.82
39.2
21.1
5.5
Ivory Coast
8,034
14,775
3.18
46.4
16.4
6.7
Kenya
16,466
37,138
4.10
53.5
12.7
7.8
Lesotho
1,341
2,222
2.50
39.7
14.7
5.4
Liberia
1,967
4,002
3.60
48.4
12.4
6.9
Madagascar
8,742
15,208
2.76
44.8
17.2
6.5
Malawi
6,162
12,014
3.36
50.8
17.2
7.0
Mali
6,940
12,620
2.83
49.4
21.2
6.7
Mauritius
959
1,248
1.63
26.1
7.2
3.0
Mozambique
10,473
18,701
2.74
44.6
17.2
6.1
Namibia
1,009
1,822
2.97
43.2
13.6
NA
Niger
5,318
10,045
3.04
51.8
21.4
7.1
Nigeria
77,082
149,965
3.36
49.5
16.0
6.9
Reunion
525
685
1.40
20.5
6.5
NA
29.47 62.98 10.20
2.30 4.13 4.46
34.57 56.44 6.08
5.80 9.32 2.00
40.86 57.77 4.71
17.80 33.45 6.35
11.58 22.97 5.75
37.30 49.52 3.72
73.70 84.25 3.53
53.65 70.87 4.48
14.47 28.21 6.60
35.76 53.77 4.03
18.53 30.70 4.89
35.86 51.23 5.13
19.06 33.19 5.60
23.76 38.60 4.59
37.63 55.24 5.55
14.17 26.19 7.08
4.51 10.70 7.10
32.95 48.56 5.42
18.42 31.46 5.51
33.60 68.02 10.35
19.85 33.76 5.64
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Sub-Saharan Africa: Population Indicators (continued)
Population
(thousand persons)
Annual
Growth
Rate
Annual Average, 1980-85
(per thousand persons)
Total
Fertility
Rate
Urban Proportion of
Population (percent)
Annual
Urban
Growth
1980
2000
,
1980-85
(percent)
Birth
Rate
Death
Rate
,
1979
1980
2000
Rate,
1980-85
(percent)
Rwanda
4,797
9,333
3.21
49.4
17.4
6.9
4.29
8.83
6.49
Sao Tome and Principe
85
88
0.47
NA
NA
NA
32.75
50.54
3.29
Senegal
5,661
9,747
2.68
47.9
21.1
6.5
25.35
36.73
4.04
Seychelles
65
98
2.05
NA
NA
NA
27.35
38.63
3.08
Sierra Leone
3,474
6,090
2.80
45.3
17.4
6.1
24.54
40.20
5.61
Somalia
4,637
7,156
3.73
46.3
20.8
6.1
30.16
46.18
5.35
Swaziland
557
1,020
3.01
47.3
17.3
6.4
8.86
15.90
5.34
Tanzania
17,934
34,031
3.21
46.2
14.2
6.5
11.81
24.98
7.78
Togo
2,625
4,844
3.07
47.8
17.1
6.5
17.41
30.33
6.02
Uganda
13,201
25,396
3.18
44.6
12.8
6.1
11.93
23.53
6.95
Upper Volta
6,908
11,895
2.68
47.9
21.1
6.5
8.49
15.83
5.75
Zaire
28,291
49,982
2.87
45.4
16.8
6.1
39.53
56.30
4.96
Zambia
5,766
11,276
3.35
49.0
15.5
6.9
38.05
54.13
5.30
Zimbabwe
7,396
14,726
3.49
47.2
12.4
6.6
22.96
38.17
6.20
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