(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200110004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Senegal: Outlook
for the Diouf Government
An Intelligence Assessment
ALA 83-10077
May 1983
Copy 2 7 3
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Senegal: Outlook
for the Diouf Government
This paper was prepared b he Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with a
contribution from the Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, West-East Africa Division,
ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10077
May 1983
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Secret
Senegal: Outlook
for the Diouf Government
Key Judgments The pro-Western government of Abdou Diouf, who was elected President
information available in February 1983 after a two-year interim presidency, is in financial crisis
as of 30 March 1983 and under growing pressure to improve living conditions. The US Embassy
was used in this report.
points out that Diouf must prepare the public for painful economic
sacrifices, just after raising unrealistic expectations for improvement
during the national elections. We believe Diouf must move toward
promised reform or risk popular disillusionment with his leadership. In our
view, unrest inspired by deteriorating economic conditions could provoke
upheaval potentially detrimental to the regional interests of the United
States and other West African states friendly to Washington.
The US Embassy reports that because of recurrent drought, recession in
key foreign markets, falling commodity prices, and high interest rates, the
five-year recovery program that Senegal launched in 1979 has succeeded
only in slowing the decline in living conditions rather than arresting or
reversing it. Large infusions of outside financial aid have been necessary to
avert disaster and to allow Diouf to implement much-needed reforms. We
believe that to get the country's seriously troubled economy in order will
require substantial increases in foreign assistance and entail sharper cuts in
the standard of living of a large portion of the population in the near term.
We believe that Diouf's ability to protect his position will depend on his
skill in distributing increasingly scarce resources among a few key interest
groups. He must meet the minimal demands of the powerful Islamic
brotherhoods and the military, limit urban dissent among students and
workers, and preserve a consensus among young leaders and the old guard
of the ruling party. We concur with the US Embassy view that popular re-
action to eroding living standards will continue to be muted over the next
two years but that Diouf will be held increasingly responsible for a
continued decline in living conditions as his term in office progresses.
In our view, the traditionally apolitical Senegalese military is likely to
intervene only if economic conditions provoke widespread public disturb-
ances that threaten the country's stability or if the military's own material
needs are seriously neglected. We believe that over the next 12 to 18
months neither condition will be met. Thereafter, the risk that the military
will intervene will rise if the economic program is not scoring significant
gains.
iii Secret
ALA 83-10077
May 1983
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A military takeover by senior officers who are members of the current elite
probably would be designed to restore order and maintain Senegal's
moderate policies. A less likely-and a worst case-possibility is that lower
ranking military personnel, motivated by opportunism or ambition, would
exploit a period of turmoil to seize power. That sort of coup would pose the
greatest risk that domestic political or religious radicals, with Libyan or
Soviet backing, would gain influence.
In our view, the Diouf government will continue to work assiduously to
prevent Tripoli and Moscow from expanding their contacts with domestic
religious and political dissidents, increasing their funding of leftist opposi-
tion parties, or multiplying recruitment efforts among disgruntled students
and intellectuals. Senegal's conservative Muslim brotherhoods have tradi-
tionally used their influence to ensure domestic stability, but we believe
that young Muslim radicals, seeking a greater share of power, could
become susceptible to Qadhafi's proselytizing.
We concur with the US Embassy that the Diouf government will hold to its
moderate, pro-Western foreign policy out of a critical need for continuous,
large-scale economic assistance. The maintenance of close ties to France,
Senegal's largest aid donor and guarantor of national security, will remain
the cornerstone of Dakar's foreign policy. At the same time, we expect that
Diouf will work to strengthen Senegal's relations with Washington to
ensure an additional source of economic and security assistance. Diouf will
also continue to foster strong ties with the conservative Persian Gulf states,
particularly Saudi Arabia, on which Senegal increasingly depends for
generous aid donations.
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Key Judgments
The Diouf Era: Change Within Continuity
1
The Five-Year Program
3
Muted Popular Reaction
5
Party and Bureaucratic Responsiveness
5
The Pivotal Role of the Military
9
Libyan and So
viet Meddling
12
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Figure 1
Senegal
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Saint-I
Louis
i
Ling
uB
l.o
Cap Vert u
T i T hies ( ? 5.~~
* l Dio: rb~et_`f
DAKAR j Thies t~ _ -- tt Diourbel i
BANJUL T
Kaolack
Sine-Saloum
Senegal
J
Major rice growing area
5
Phosphate mine
Northern limit of peanut production
T
Airport
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
0 25 50 75 Miles
Casamarice
?Boutilimit
Mauritania
n Y~nrr~
re
u g
ga
Cape
Verde
Senegal
The Gambia
Guinea 1 Bissau Guinea
Sierra
Leone
ti Senegal Oriental
Guinea
Ivory
coast
Liberia
$0%sG
PEUL Major ethnic group
-?- Region boundary
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Secret
Senegal: Outlook
for the Diouf Government
Pro-Western Abdou Diouf, elected President of Sene-
gal in February 1983 after a two-year interim presi-
dency, faces popular pressure for improved living
conditions and a clean break with the inefficiency,
corruption, and cronyism that characterized his pre-
decessor's government. In addition, Senegal, which is
strategically and politically important for France and
the United States, is one of many moderate states in
West Africa in financial crisis and facing serious
adjustment problems. The US Embassy points out
that Diouf faces severe constraints in allocating in-
creasingly scarce resources among competing political
groups that he cannot afford to alienate.
This paper examines Dakar's efforts to stem economic
decline and analyzes the prospects for political stabil-
ity and change during President Diouf's rule. It
considers the potential for Libyan and Soviet exploita-
tion of Senegal's problems and the implications of
potential instability for Western, particularly US,
President Abdou Diottf: with
French President Francois
Mitterrand.
interests.
The Diouf Era:
Change Within Continuity'
of institutional stability and general respect for consti-
tutional procedures ensured an orderly transfer of
power to Diouf.
National elections in February 1983 gave 48-year-old
interim President Diouf a popular mandate to assume
the leadership in his own right and to continue his
campaign to increase the efficiency and responsive-
ness of Senegal's political and economic institutions.
He constitutionally succeeded to the office of presi-
dent in January 1981 upon the retirement of Leopold
Senghor, Senegal's "founding father" and first presi-
dent, who had dominated the country since inde-
pendence from France in 1960. Diouf was carefully
groomed by Senghor, who retired two years before the
end of his five-year term to allow his chosen successor
time to consolidate his own position. Senghor's legacy
Diouf, a brilliant graduate of Senegalese and French
universities, served eight years as prime minister and
won a reputation as a modernizing technocrat and
able administrator. During his interim presidency he
established a reputation as an honest, capable, and
independent leader. A Muslim of mixed Senegalese
ethnic origin, he proved adept at balancing the com-
peting interests of Senegal's six major tribes, labor,
students, and military factions, and he gained accept-
ance by the powerful Muslim religious brotherhoods,
to which 80 percent of the country's 5.5 million people
belong.
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Strategic Location and Access Rights
Senegal's location on the bulge of West Africa sets it
astride important mid-Atlantic sea and air lanes and
allows it to serve as a communications link between
North America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the South
Atlantic. Senegal accords important military air
transit privileges to Western countries during interna-
tional crises. Dakar allowed the United Kingdom to
carry out daily support flights during the Falklands
conflict and gives the United States ad hoc landing
rights for surveillance of Soviet naval task forces in
the Atlantic. Under a 10-year access agreement
signed in January 1983, Dakar's airport serves as an
emergency landing site for the NASA space shuttle.
Senegal permits France to maintain a permanent
military base at Dakar with 1,350 personnel orga-
nized into infantry and naval units, an air detach-
ment, and support forces.
Pro-Western Orientation and
Moderating Role in the Third World
Senegal's traditionally moderate and constructive
foreign policy is often supportive of US interests on
important international issues such as Afghanistan
Senegal was on the brink of financial collapse when
Diouf took office, and only the intervention of interna-
tional creditors saved it from bankruptcy. Diouf re-
sponded to the crisis by introducing a program of
economic recovery and reform that emphasizes diver-
sification of the economy toward and greater reliance
on the private sector. He also mounted a campaign
against corruption and inefficiency in government,
tried to bring new blood into the ruling party, and
allowed the formation of additional opposition parties
to "open up" the political system
Although Diouf's moves have shaken up the en-
trenched political establishment, dislocated many tra-
ditional patterns of economic activity, and financially
pinched the common man, he has avoided triggering
public unrest and alienating powerful local interests
that are essential to his political survival. With a full
five-year term ahead of him, Diouf's challenge is to
move his programs and reforms forward or risk
popular disillusionment.
and Poland. Dakar plays a moderating role in West
Africa and in Third World forums such as the
Nonaligned Movement and the United Nations. The
Diouf government supports Western efforts to secure
the departure of Cuban troops from Angola as part of
a Namibian settlement, and has occasionally served
as a channel of communication with the Luanda
government. The Senegalese participated in the boy-
cott by African moderates of the abortive OAU
summit in Tripoli last year that denied OAU chair-
manship to Libyan leader Qadhafi. The Senegalese
armed forces have participated in international
peacekeeping operations in Zaire, Chad, and Leba-
non.
US Aid and Investment
US bilateral aid is projected to total $49.3 million
during fiscal year 1983, including $33.8 million in
economic development and food assistance and
$15.5 million in military sales and training assist-
ance. US private investment in Senegal totals approx-
imately $25 million, largely in petroleum marketing
and phosphate mining.
The principal concern is that Dakar revitalize the
economy before irreversible decline and political de-
stabilization set in. The country faces serious econom-
ic problems that were brought about by dependence
on an essentially one-crop (peanuts) agricultural econ-
omy and excessive state involvement in economic life,
which led to a proliferation of inefficient state-run
enterprises. Recurrent drought and the global reces-
sion of the 1970s resulted in a convergence of several
bad crop years and depressed world demand and
prices for Senegal's peanut exports. For the 1970s,
this translated, according to the World Bank, into an
average annual increase in national output of only
about 2.5 percent and a secular decline in real
incomes of about 0.3 percent a year.
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From independence in 1960 until 1980, Senegal faced
a series of setbacks to its economic development,
including recurrent drought, depressed world prices
for its exports, and misguided government policies.
These problems, coupled with sharply rising oil and
food import bills during the last half of the 1970s
resulted in a slow but steady decline of the economy.
Senegal depends on peanut production and phosphate
mining for a large portion of its foreign exchange
earnings and government revenues. Agriculture em-
ploys 70 percent of the population on small farms
that produce peanuts for export and grains for do-
mestic consumption. Food imports absorb 20 percent
of total export earnings and account for almost half
of the country's basic food supply. Senegal's rapidly
growing population (a 2.7 percent annual growth rate)
has outpaced real economic growth in the last decade
and strained the government's ability to provide jobs
and services. Only large-scale aid from France and its
European Community partners, conservative Arab
states, and international financial institutions has
prevented an even sharper decline in economic activi-
At independence, Senegal-the administrative center
of French West Africa-inherited an oversized bu-
reaucracy, a university system producing graduates
in excess of local needs, and, in Dakar, one of the
most industrialized and urbane capital cities in
French-speaking Africa. President Senghor sought to
create a semi-industrialized urban state based on his
Development plans promoted import-substitution in-
dustries and sought to reduce French economic domi-
nance by emphasizing even greater public-sector in-
volvement in the economy. The result was a
proliferation of poorly managed, corrupt, and unprof-
itable state-run enterprises that provided political
patronage and employment for university graduates,
and a pampered urban elite that benefited from
government-subsidized prices for imported food and
consumer goods. The cost of industrial and urban
welfare was borne by the farmers through low prices
paid by the state peanut marketing monopoly.
The economy limped along through the mid-1970s,
despite the worst drought since independence and
sharply increased world oil prices. Ill-advised expan-
sionary policies resulting from a temporary boom in
world demand for phosphates and tropical commod-
ities and a sharp drop in peanut production pushed
the current account deficit to record levels. By the
end of the decade, the growing financial burden of
price subsidies, inefficient state enterprises, and the
economy's vulnerability to vagaries of weather
brought Senegal to the point of collapse and forced it
to seek emergency relief from creditors. By 1980,
Senegal's trade deficit had ballooned from $96 mil-
lion in 1976 to about $400 million. Its debt service
ratio rose from 6 to 30 percent of export earnings and
the government budget deficit exceeded $300 million.
philosophy of "African socialism."
The adverse impact of these factors on Senegal's
international transactions was amplified by burgeon-
ing costs of oil and food imports. A rapidly increasing
trade deficit and debt servicing ratio, spot shortages of
essential commodities, and inflated fuel and transpor-
tation costs signaled the need for prompt and forceful
policy responses.
The Five-Year Program
At the end of 1979, under pressure from France and
other major Western aid donors, Senegal launched an
ambitious five-year program of economic recovery
and reform in collaboration with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to stave off rapidly approach-
ing financial collapse. The economic plan was de-
signed to encourage stabilization in the short term by
reducing the serious foreign exchange gap and to
promote growth in the long term by emphasizing
reform of economic policies and institutions, particu-
larly in agriculture. It called for a sweeping transfer
of substantial control of the economy from the govern-
ment to private interests and a reduction of the
country's heavy dependence on peanuts for foreign
exchange revenue.
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The US Embassy reports that in support of these
goals the government streamlined the operations of
state-run enterprises, increased producer prices for
agricultural products, and reduced consumer subsi-
dies. Dakar also adopted an export bonus scheme to
encourage cash crops other than peanuts. To soften
the impact of these measures on the budget and
inflation, Senegal agreed to restrict government bor-
rowings, clamp down on hiring of civil servants, and
impose wage controls. It also agreed to open the
country more to non-French imports. On the basis
of this program, Dakar negotiated in 1980 a
$220 million three-year extended fund facility with
the IMF and obtained generous pledges of foreign
assistance from France, Saudi Arabia, and other
conservative Arab states, totaling almost $300 mil-
lion.
Despite moderately successful initial implementation
of reforms, a disastrous peanut harvest in 1981
prompted the government to revise the goals of the
program as well as the time needed to achieve them.
The poor harvest resulted in a decline in national
output of 0.4 percent. In addition, the loss of export
earnings from peanuts, combined with a debt service
burden of $157.8 million, created a severe liquidity
crisis. To finance the nearly $360 million gap, Dakar
was forced to reschedule its public and private debt
and abandon the IMF extended fund facility for a
one-year standby agreement. France-Senegal's larg-
est aid donor-in turn tied its assistance to IMF
requirements for a freeze on government hiring and a
reduction in food subsidies that led to a dramatic
increase in prices of consumer goods.
We believe that the deterioration of the economy was
stemmed in 1982. Adequate rainfall boosted agricul-
tural output, which makes up more than 25 percent of
GDP. Peanut production alone jumped more than 80
percent. As a result, export earnings rose by 24
percent. This improvement in trade, combined with an
inflow of some $200 million in foreign aid, relieved
some of the pressure on foreign finances. Unfortu-
nately, record rates on international borrowing and
continued depreciation of the CFA franc against the
dollar continued to weaken the foreign financial posi-
tion somewhat.2 Moreover, the sharp fall in world
prices for peanut products increased the government's
cost of maintaining a relatively high producer price to
peanut farmers. The consequent drain on government
resources came when Diouf was preoccupied with
winning the 1983 elections and less inclined to scruti-
nize public spending
A primary result of the ups and downs of 1982 has
been a search for additional foreign grants to meet the
performance criteria for the current IMF agreement
and a difficult renegotiation of another IMF standby
agreement for 1983-84. The Fund has called on the
government to strengthen its tax collection system,
reduce public-sector hiring, and cut spending for
petroleum imports, while instituting additional re-
strictions on borrowing and other deficit financing.
Senegal, still trying to come to grips with these
prescriptions, has yet to sign an accord with the IMF
for new funds.
For the moment, such limited indicators as are avail-
able suggest that Senegal will neither lose nor gain
economic ground in 1983. Weather conditions appear
adequate to support agricultural production on a scale
similar to that of last year. On the other hand,
inflation, which was on the order of 23 percent
coming out of 1982, probably will not abate.
On balance, then, Senegal is on a better economic
footing than when Diouf took office but is still faced
with very serious challenges. Despite impressive re-
forms involving politically risky measures, recurrent
drought, falling commodity prices, high interest rates
and worldwide recession have prevented economic
recovery. The government has made definite strides to
correct its previous lack of fiscal discipline and to live
within Senegal's limited economic means; however,
even with massive foreign donor assistance, the effect
so far has only been to decrease the rate of economic
] Along with most other ex-French territories in central and West
Africa, Senegal participates in the French franc zone through the
multilateral Communite Francaise Africaine (CFA) franc, a cur-
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Figure 2
Senegal: Selected Economic Indicators
decline. Meanwhile, Diouf's economic measures and
his election to a full presidential term have, in our
view, increased popular expectations for improved
living conditions at a time when the country's indebt-
edness and desperate need for new liquidity will
restrict social service expenditures.
Muted Popular Reaction
In the view of the US Embassy, Diouf has successful-
ly implemented more politically painful austerity
measures than most African leaders could without
provoking major rioting. Although there was a series
of small-scale disturbances in Dakar at the height of
the economic crisis in 1981 over rising prices, spot
shortages of goods, and increasing unemployment,
public reaction over the last two years-especially
among the educated unemployed-has been muted.
Services-34.1
Manufacturing
and mining-
19.1
Other-20.2-
Other-51.6-
Peanuts-13.3
Phosphates-
16.3
Petroleum
Most Senegalese, according to the US Embassy, still
blame the country's economic woes on the former
Senghor regime and credit Diouf with common sense
and efforts to set things right. He is regarded as
willing to break with the past by bringing more
honesty and efficiency into government. The combi-
nation of Senghor's abdication, Diouf's interim moves
toward recovery and reform, and the 1983 elections
defused popular frustration and provided a substitute
for possibly explosive protests.
Peanut Productiona
Thousand Metric Tons
Eff
a Marketing years.
b Data for 1981 estimated.
C Projected.
Although economic conditions have not become bad
enough to generate popular challenges to his author-
ity, Diouf faces a variety of political problems that
could delay the implementation of his promised re-
forms and thus test public patience to the breaking
point. Indeed, Diouf's success will depend on his
continued ability to implement reform while balanc-
ing the often conflicting interests and competing
demands of key political interest groups.
1976 77 78 79 80 81 82c Party and Bureaucratic Responsiveness
Dioufs reform program is contingent on his ability to
mobilize the support of the ruling Socialist Party and
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Political Parties
Party
Socialist Party (PS)
Ruling centrist Socialist Party won 83
percent of the presidential vote and 111
of 120 National Assembly seats in the
February 1983 elections.
Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS)
Abdoulaye Wade
African socialist; holds eight
National Assembly seats
Democratic National Rally (RND)
Cheikh Anta Diop
African socialist; holds one
National Assembly seat
Popular Democratic Movement (MDP)
Mamadou Dia
African socialist
African Independence Party (PAI)
Majhmout Diop
Marxist-Leninist
Revolutionary Movement for New
Marxist (pro-Chinese)
Democracy (MRDN)
Independence and Work Party (PIT)
Amath Dansokoh
Communist (reportedly receiving
and Maguette Thiam
Soviet financial aid)
Senegalese Republican Movement (MRS)
Democratic League/Movement for a
Babacar Sane
Workers Party (LD/MPT)
Union for a People's Democracy (UDP)
Hamedine Racine
Marxist (pro-Albanian)
Guisse
Senegalese People's Party (PPS)
Oumar Wone
Marxist
Workers Communist League (LCT)
NA
Marxist
Socialist Organization of Workers (OST)
NA
Marxist
African Independence Party of the Masses
NA
Marxist
(PALM)
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the government bureaucracy. Although the 1983 elec-
tions gave the Socialists an overwhelming majority in
the National Assembly, we do not know how willing
the party's conservative old guard will be to cooperate
with the President on the recovery plan and to forgo
internecine battles
Upon assuming the presidency in 1981, Diouf faced
consolidating his hold on the Socialist Party structure,
which Senghor had dominated for 30 years. He tried
to do this by calling local party elections last Novem-
ber in hopes of replacing entrenched and aging politi-
cians-who derived their influence from the patron-
age system formed under Senghor-with loyal
supporters of his own policies. Although some youn-
ger, pro-Diouf activists won local party positions, the
party's old guard retains control of key local bureaus
and much of the party hierachy.
The US Embassy also reports that the public expects
Diouf to reduce graft and cronyism in the civil service
and to make the large and lethargic bureaucracy
more responsive to local needs. Diouf's appointment of
a majority of young, competent technocrats to his
Cabinet last March has reassured the Senegalese that
he intends to weed out incompetent senior officials
and to encourage promotions on merit. Diouf has also
set up special courts to try cases of corruption in
government and has put himself squarely at the front
of government operations by eliminating the post of
prime minister and assuming direct responsibility for
executing policies and programs.
In our view, veteran politicians resent Diouf's appoint-
ment of younger technocrats to many key posts and
may seek to reassert their influence by opposing some
of his progressive reforms. Yet, younger party activ-
ists may become disillusioned with Diouf if the pace
of change is too slow. In the short term, we believe
Diouf will continue, as he has in the past, to promote
gradual change through quiet consultation with all
party leaders to avoid additional ferment and to
ensure a firm base of support in the newly elected
National Assembly.
The Opposition
The US Embassy reports that fortunately for Diouf
none of Senegal's opposition parties-the proliferation
of which he has encouraged-constitutes a realistic
alternative to the ruling Socialist Party. These parties
have formed mainly around rival personalities and
ideologies drawn from the small Senegalese left, and
they lack coherent platforms and public appeal. Diouf
has undercut the weak and divided opposition by
adopting and implementing as his own virtually all of
the reforms they have advocated, such as abolishing
the corrupt government peanut purchasing monopoly.
Only two parties managed to elect representatives to
the National Assembly in the 1983 election. The
leading opposition party, the Senegalese Democratic
Party, won eight of the nine opposition seats in the
120-seat chamber. The US Embassy reports that,
although the party retains a rural organization and
maintains contacts with religious and business lead-
ers, it lacks significant grass-roots support
Islamic Brotherhoods and the Peasantry
The most influential leaders of Senegal's many inter-
est groups are the heads of the Islamic brotherhoods,
which command the religious loyalty of 80 percent of
the population and wield powerful social, economic,
and political influence. The brotherhoods' conserva-
tive leaders are thus in a position to demand homage
and favors from the Western-style central govern-
ment. In return they can deliver the vote of the
country's rural majority and ensure that the peasantry
complies with government programs.
The US Embassy reports that although Diouf is
Senegal's first Muslim President, his reputation as a
modernizing technocrat initially aroused suspicion
among the two principal brotherhoods-the Tijaniya
and the Muridiya-that he would upset traditional
patronage links between the government and the
brotherhoods. Since Diouf took office in 1981, he has
worked hard to bolster his Islamic credentials and to
win the confidence of brotherhood leaders; indeed,
they endorsed him for the presidency in the 1983
elections. Unlike former President Senghor-a Chris-
tian who deliberately encouraged rivalry among the
brotherhoods-Diouf has tried to promote coopera-
tion among the sects while balancing their competing
interests.
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Senegal's Muslim community, the most highly orga-
nized in West Africa, is dominated by powerful
Islamic brotherhoods, principally the Muridiya and
the Tijaniya.
The Muridiya is the most powerful brotherhood
because of its economic influence and its rapidly
growing membership, which has tripled over the last
20 years to at least 1.5 million adherents. Although
the Muridiya is closely associated with the Wolof
ethnic community-Senegal's largest ethnic group,
which makes up 36 percent of the population-the
brotherhood is attracting significant numbers of other
ethnic groups. Young educated Senegalese increasing-
ly perceive Muridism, with its mass following,
wealth, and influence, as a ticket to upward mobility.
The brotherhood has become involved in student
politics and government employee associations, while
the migration of Muride peasants to the cities-
where they often fail to find work-has drawn the
Muridiya into providing assistance to the urban
unemployed. A majority of the Army, including the
Chief of Staff, belong to the brotherhood.
The brotherhood's economic strength stems from its
predominance among peasant producers of the peanut
crop, Senegal's major agricultural export. The Muri-
diya leadership has invested heavily in peanut proc-
essing and related transportation facilities, has taken
over the country's trading sector, and is diversifying
into many other aspects of the economy. Muride
businessmen, who have accumulated large invest-
ments in productive sectors of the economy, are
probably the largest source of private capital in the
country
The Tijaniya is the most orthodox brotherhood with
a membership estimated at 1.3 to 1.5 million. Many
top government officials, including President Diouf,
are Tijani, reflecting the brotherhood's attractiveness
to the Senegalese intellectual elite. Unlike the leader-
ship of the Muridiya, that of the Tijaniya exercises
only symbolic authority over its members and lacks
the intense drive of the Murides for economic and
political influence. The Tijaniya are opposed to con-
trol of the central government by any Islamic broth-
erhood and have traditionally exercised a moderating
influence in Senegal. They tend to look down upon
the Muridiya as vulgar, excessively ambitious, and
too concerned with worldly matters
As a nominal Tijaniya, Diouf has had to cultivate ties
with the economically important Murides to avoid
charges of favoritism. In exchange for their support,
according to the US Embassy, the Murides expect
Diouf to limit economic reform programs that would
depreciate their financial investments or put a heavy
strain on Muride peanut farmers. Among the Muri-
diya's demands are less restrictive credit policies,
better rural public services, cheaper fertilizer and seed
for farmers, and increased government subsidies for
mosques and Koranic schools.
In our view, President Diouf will find it increasingly
difficult to meet the brotherhoods' demands while
pursuing economic austerity. Although some agricul-
tural reforms-higher prices for farm products and a
five-year debt moratorium for farmers-have benefit-
ed the brotherhoods' rural membership and have
encouraged peasant support for Diouf, pressure from
Muride leaders forced Diouf to delay implementing
an IMF condition to eliminate government subsidies
on fertilizer.
we believe the brotherhoods have a large stake in the
recovery of the economy and will-despite consider-
able jockeying to protect their interests-probably
continue to back Diouf as long as his policies prove
reasonably effective.
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Urban Dwellers
The need to satisfy at least some of the demands of
urban dwellers poses yet another difficult challenge
for Diouf. The urban poor want lower food prices,
while businessmen seek looser credit, protected mar-
kets, and continued exemption from income taxes.
Workers want cost-of-living increases and more jobs.
Students and intellectuals are concerned with future
job prospects and want the French presence and
cultural influence reduced. The US Embassy notes,
that despite these demands and eroding living condi-
tions, students and workers- the most organized and
potentially the most threatening urban groups-have
remained unusually quiet.'
Left-leaning students and intellectuals, long a source
of opposition to the former Senghor regime, could
again become restless over bleak employment pros-
pects and delayed payment of student scholarships.
Although there have been no serious outbreaks of
student unrest since Diouf assumed power, short-lived
strikes have occurred periodically among students at
all levels of the educational systems. The Embassy
credits Diouf's conciliatory approach to their griev-
ances with averting student and teacher unrest so far.
The predominant labor organization, the National
Confederation of Senegalese Workers, traditionally
has followed a policy of "responsible participation"
with the government, making it an effective tool so far
for official control over workers and wages. As a rule,
the leaders of the 60,000-member union have not
called strikes to press the government for political or
economic aims. Instead, they generally work within
the ruling Socialist Party or the government to settle
disputes. Nevertheless, we believe that worker discon-
tent over the rising cost of living will sooner or later
force the union leadership to become a more active
defender of workers' welfare. The US Embassy re-
ports that the purchasing power of wage earners has
declined almost 20 percent since Diouf took office.
' Disgruntled students joined forces with workers in a crippling
strike in the late 1960s that nearly brought down the Senghor
The traditionally apolitical Senegalese military con-
siders itself to be the ultimate defender of political
order and that its self-restraint, discipline, and effec-
tiveness make it a key asset to Diouf as he wrestles
with the country's difficult economic problems. F_
The largely French-trained
military traditionally has remained on the political
sidelines and supported civilian rule.
Still, we concur with the US Embassy's view that the
military-which enjoys relatively comfortable living
standards compared to the average peasant-could be
provoked to intervene if economic austerity needs
dictated severe paycuts and a freeze in the acquisition
of equipment or if countrywide deteriorating living
conditions led to uncontrollable unrest. Articles ap-
pearing in the military's in-house publications from
French colonial days to the present are replete with
attacks on civilian administrations in those instances
when payrolls were not met on time, essential supplies
were not available, or Army units abroad on peace-
keeping missions were not adequately supported.
A military takeover to restore political order probably
would last no longer than necessary if led by senior
military officers who are members of the present elite.
We believe Armed Forces Chief of Staff Idressa Fall,
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the military's longtime pillar of strength, could
emerge to head such a military government. Accord-
ing to attache reporting, General Fall is a conservative
professional soldier without political ambitions.
Events in other African countries afflicted by similar
economic and political problems lead us to conclude
that it is possible that Senegalese junior officers or
enlisted men motivated by personal ambition or op-
portunism could exploit a period of popular unrest to
seize control. In our view, the coup leaders probably
would attempt to rally rank-and-file support with
promises to redress alleged neglect of the military's
needs and corruption among senior officers. We be-
lieve the ensuing regime would be beset by political
weaknesses and foreign policy uncertainties because
of their probable lack of experience, education, and
ism and discipline that pervades the Senegalese
Army, the lower ranks are less likely than their other
African counterparts to stage a populist revolt.
We believe that Diouf's political prospects depend
heavily on his ability to prepare the public for more
painful economic sacrifices at a time when his sup-
porters expect improvement in their living standards.
Diouf must distribute increasingly scarce resources
among his major constituencies, while trying to ad-
here to tough belt-tightening conditions imposed by
the IMF. Nevertheless, we note that he has estab-
lished himself in the public eye as a capable leader
committed to honest reform, which may buy him
another year or two before he is blamed for Senegal's
economic difficulties.
In our judgment, Diouf will probably manage to
muddle through the next several years and retain
grudging support of key political interests. To main-
tain the legitimacy of his regime, we believe Diouf
needs to meet the minimal demands of the Islamic
brotherhoods and the military, while dealing with
urban dissent on a case-by-case basis. The key to his
survival will be continued large infusions of foreign
assistance. US Embassy reporting indicates that al-
though Dakar has been able to slow the pace of
economic decline, the government will need sizable
increases in outside aid to arrest and reverse it. We
believe a significant decrease in assistance levels
would accelerate economic collapse and could lead to
serious political upheaval.
We believe that Senegal's economy is likely to remain
stagnant through mid-decade. Even if foreign aid
remains at present levels and rainfall is adequate to
ensure a good peanut crop, the harsh austerity meas-
ures that Diouf will have to implement to contain
budgetary deficits will constrain output. Inflation may
rise as subsidies for rice, vegetable oil, and petroleum
are reduced or eliminated, and the number of jobless
could increase as a result of stricter employment
policies. Living standards will continue to slide be-
cause of increasing consumer prices and the continued
decline in the international value of the franc, but in
our view little public outcry will ensue in the short
run. Over the next few years, however, we believe that
Diouf will be held increasingly responsible for failing
to stem the economic decline and that this could lead
to outbreaks of serious popular unrest and military
intervention. Growing unhappiness with the Diouf
government's performance could then inspire sympa-
thy for leftist opposition parties and maverick Islamic
religious leaders, thus offering opportunities for
Libyan and Soviet involvement.
So long as he retains office, we believe Diouf will
continue to pursue a moderate, pro-Western foreign
policy and that his efforts will be driven by two
primary concerns-finding massive aid to keep the
country economically afloat and securing the politi-
cal-military support to meet the perceived threat of
Libyan and Soviet destabilization in the region. These
concerns dictate that Dakar cultivate Saudi Arabia
and the conservative Persian Gulf states while main-
taining traditional ties with France and the West and
nourishing anew the regional ties in Africa that
Senghor allowed to wane in his later years.
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French-speaking Senegal and The Gambia-a former
British colony-officially merged on 1 February
1982 to form Senegambia. The confederation is a
loose political and economic union that for now
preserves separate national and governmental identi-
ties, but which could eventually evolve into a single,
federated state. It is designed to gradually integrate
the two countries' armed forces and police, foreign
policies, and communications and transportation net-
works. The union may eventually eliminate or at
least minimize the longstanding problem of cross-
border smuggling that worked to the advantage of
Banjul. The confederation also minimizes the danger
that a radical regime could be implanted in The
Gambia, which nearly separates most of Senegal
from its southern Casamance region, where separatist
sentiment has long smoldered.
Both countries had long talked about closer ties, but
The Gambia-afraid of being swallowed by its larger
neighbor-resisted until July 1981, when Gambian
President Jawara finally agreed to the merger as the
price of Senegals intervention to put down a Marxist-
led military coup and restoring him to power. The
Gambia's continued dependence on the presence of a
Senegalese Army battalion to keep order has con-
vinced the still-reluctant Gambians of the inevitabil-
ity of the union despite occasional delaying tactics on
their part.
France
Although Diouf is more African oriented and less
automatically responsive to French policy concerns
than was Senghor, he has stressed Senegal's basic
fidelity to France-the cornerstone of Senegal's for-
eign policy. In return, the Mitterrand government has
assured Diouf that Senegal remains one of the most
important countries in francophone Africa and that it
will not be neglected as France tries to broaden its
relations with key non-French-speaking states south
of the Sahara.
There is little doubt in Senegal that France remains
the most reliable guarantor of its security. French
spokesmen have told US officials that they view
Senegal as an "island of moderation" in a volatile
region. Paris maintains an important naval base and
airbase at Dakar manned by some 1,350 French
troops and is obligated under a mutual defense agree-
ment to intervene at Senegal's request if the country's
security is threatened." According to the US Embassy,
after Senegal sent troops into The Gambia in 1981 to
crush a Marxist-led coup, Diouf received President
Mitterrand's assurance that France would honor the
defense treaty if Senegal invoked it
France continues to be Senegal's largest single inves-
tor, financial donor, and source of technical and
administrative assistance. In 1980, the last year for
which data is available on regularly scheduled French
aid, Paris provided some $111.4 million. Despite
Dakar's fears that its share of French economic aid
would diminish as the worldwide recession squeezed
Paris's financial resources, in both fiscal years 1981
and 1982 Diouf requested and received extraordinary
budget support from the French totaling almost $100
million. French private investment totals $65 million,
and some 18,000 French live in Senegal. The latter
include some 1,400 French advisers (teachers, techni-
cians, and doctors) stationed in Senegal, according to
the US Embassy in Paris.
Despite Diouf's close ties with France, US Embassy
reporting suggests that there have been some mo-
ments of stress and that there could be similar
episodes in the future. Diouf, for example, is under
domestic pressure to reduce France's "neocolonial"
presence and influence, and he has begun to "Sene-
galize" education by ordering instruction in native
Senegalese languages. His emphasis on diversifying
Senegal's foreign relations, stressing even closer ties
with the Persian Gulf states and the United States,
has engendered some concern in Paris of US en-
croachment on a French preserve. The Senegalese
would like the French to increase their financial
support and to place greater emphasis on development
and joint investment projects.
' French forces include a 450-man naval force at Dakar harbor with
one sea-reconnaissance aircraft; a 400-man Air Force unit with
four transport aircraft, two helicopters, and four Jaguar fighter
aircraft at Dakar airport; and a 500-man ground force that is 50
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Persian Gulf States
Diouf realizes that Senegal is increasingly dependent
on continued large-scale assistance from Persian Gulf
oil-producing states and would be hard pressed to
cope with reductions in present aid levels. Riyadh has
become Senegal's second-ranking bilateral aid donor.
Saudi Arabia
has provided Senegal with $400 million in balance-of-
payments assistance over the last four years. Last
year, Kuwait extended a $110 million low-interest
loan and Iraq provided a $10 million loan to help
balance the Senegalese budget, according to the US
Embassy. Conservative Arab states also are financing
80 percent of a' $1 billion development project in the
Senegal River Basin and have funneled capital into
joint ventures and state enterprises.
In exchange for Arab aid, Diouf keeps Senegal's
stance on Middle Eastern issues closely aligned with
the moderate Arab mainstream. Diouf has marshaled
moderate Arab support by arguing that if left un-
solved his country's serious economic problems would
lead to greater opportunities for Libyan and Soviet
subversion.
We believe that, despite Ri-
yadh's reluctance to increase foreign aid to the Third
World because of its reduced revenues due to soft
world oil prices, the Saudis will continue to provide
Dakar with crucial infusions of aid when necessary to
protect their interests
Any serious domestic unrest in Senegal could provide
the Soviets and Libyans with opportunities for med-
dling. In our view, precisely because of Senegal's
politically moderate orientation, strong ties to France,
and large Muslim population, any signs of exploitable
instability would make Senegal an inviting target for
Libyan and Soviet efforts to undermine Western
influence in the region, and a major prize if it
succumbed. Moreover, the chronic economic problems
of all of Senegal's neighbors-Mauritania, Mali,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde-may offer
unforeseen opportunities for further Libyan or Soviet
meddling in the region. We believe that Dakar's
vulnerability will increase if economic conditions dete-
riorate to the point of stirrin ublic unrest and
demands for radical change
Libya
Reports of Libyan military training of Senegalese
dissidents led Senghor to break diplomatic relations
with Tripoli in June 1980, and Diouf has continued
Senghor's vigilance against Libyan encroachment in
the region. US Embassy reporting indicates that
Senegal keeps an especially wary eye on Mauritania
because it is so politically weak and prone to coups.
US Embassy reporting indicates that Libya has pro-
vided an unknown amount of money to Senegalese
religious and political groups in an effort to spread
Qadhafi's brand of radical Islamic nationalism. Trip-
oli gave support and asylum to a religious figure,
Ahmed Niasse, who advocated an Iranian-style Is-
lamic revolution in Senegal until his arrest in April
1981 and expulsion from the country. Although Da-
kar viewed Niasse as a religious renegade with little
popular support, his emphasis on Islamic unity and
the shortcomings of Senegal's secular state appealed
to a small group of young intellectuals and radical
leading opposition group,
Wade spent lavishly during the campaign. He re-
turned to Senegal last year from self-imposed exile in
France following revelations in early 1981 that mem-
bers of his party allegedly were receiving guerrilla
training in Libya.
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Soviet Union
Diouf is suspicious of Soviet intentions in West Africa
and has continued to limit official ties with the Soviets
to cultural and educational activities. A cultural
exchange agreement provides for student scholarships
to the USSR, Soviet funding of teachers' salaries at
the National Arts Conservatory of Dakar, and the
exchange of radio and TV programs. Dakar receives
no military or economic assistance from Moscow and
there are no Communist military or technical advisers
in the country. We believe the size of the Soviet
Embassy in Dakar-the 110-man mission serves as
Moscow's regional West African headquarters-
keeps the Senegalese Government particularly alert to
Soviet activities
The Soviet Union provides limited funds to some of
Senegal's small, legal Marxist-Leninist opposition
parties, continuing a practice that began years ago
when these groups were underground or exile move-
In our view, the Diouf government will continue its
efforts to monitor and thwart Soviet and Libyan
machinations, but opportunities for Moscow and Trip-
oli to expand contacts with religious and political
dissidents will be enhanced if the economy continues
to decline over the long run. Conservative Muslim
brotherhoods traditionally have used their powerful
social and political influence to ensure domestic sta-
bility, but young religious dissidents seeking a larger
share of power could become susceptible to Qadhafi's
proselytizing. Leftist opposition parties remain weak
and divided, in our view, although increased funding
could make them a more united and potent force.
Unemployed students and disgruntled intellectuals
also may provide fertile ground for Soviet and Libyan
recruitment efforts.
We regard Diouf's election to a full presidential term
as an important plus for US and Western interests in
West Africa, where there are few friendly govern-
ments willing to use what resources and influence
they have to help oppose Soviet and Libyan activities.
Without a Western-oriented government in Senegal,
we believe the United States would be very likely to
lose its present military access to Dakar's port and
airfield as well as a useful and moderate voice in
African and international forums on Third World
issues.
Senegal, faced with severe economic problems that
could spur instability, almost certainly will seek even
closer ties with Washington to help guarantee the
country's economic survival and security against per-
ceived Soviet and Libyan threats. Diouf sees the
United States as the power most capable of holding
the Soviets and Libyans at bay. According to the
Embassy, he also believes Washington has decisive
influence with the IMF and World Bank, which play
the major role in setting the standards for his govern-
ment's economic performance. We believe Diouf is
likely to intensify requests for aid and US intercession
with international financial institutions to soften their
demands for even tougher austerity measures. More-
over, we believe Senegal's reliance on Washington
would sharply increase if France and conservative
Persian Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, cur-
tailed their assistance.
We believe Diouf calculates that the promotion of
better relations with the United States will help keep
the French as generous as possible to protect their
very substantial interests in the country. The US
Embassy reports that Diouf will continue to look to
France as Dakar's major source of economic and
military aid. In our judgment, the French, who have
always viewed Senegal with favor as their first colony
in black Africa, are likely to work closely with
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conservative Arab states and the United States to
prevent financial bankruptcy and instability in Sene-
gal.
In our view, the maintenance of a strong Senegalese
relationship with France and the United States will
probably deter major opportunities for Soviet and
Libyan inroads. Nevertheless, an expansion of Libyan
and Soviet influence-or heightened fears of such
influence-in response to domestic instability has the
potential to raise doubts in the region about the
wisdom of depending too heavily on France and the
United States. The danger will remain that other, less
.stable governments in West Africa will seek security
through greater accommodation with Tripoli and
Moscow if the Senegalese example of relying on the
West fails.
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