THE MAKING OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00552R000200130005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seciret
Intelligence
The Making of
Brazilian Foreign Policy
ALA 83-10086
June 1983
Copy 28 0
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Making of
Brazilian Foreign Policy
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations and
the National Intelligence Council.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 83-10086
June 1983
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The Making of
Brazilian Foreign Policy
Key Judgments Since the early 1970s Brazil's Foreign Ministry has gradually regained and
Information available consolidated the traditionally preeminent position in the foreign policy
as of 16 May 1983 establishment that it held before the military takeover in 1964. It has been
was used in this report.
the key institutional actor responsible for creating the operational frame-
work that guides foreign policy, and it has successfully forged a strong
national consensus in support of its diplomacy. The Ministry now is
generally unchallenged in formulating broad policy outlines and in dealing
with strictly political issues
Nonetheless, other institutions with varying degrees of latitude and
overlapping influence also affect policy. The armed forces, the so-called
Nine O'Clock Group of President Figueiredo's senior advisers, the Nation-
al Security Council, and key ministries, for example, all exercise a role in
foreign policy. On most issues these groups usually are in accord with the
Foreign Ministry, but in certain areas they sometimes openly vie with the
Ministry to set-and in some cases overrule-specific policies.
The Foreign Ministry's stewardship of foreign policy has been consistent
with the Brazilian elites' long-term goal of attaining world-power status
and their immediate goal of promoting rapid economic development. It has
adhered closely to several fundamental guidelines-primacy of economic
interests, a pragmatic approach to decisionmaking, diversification of
economic and political ties, association with the Third World, and 25X1
avoidance of leadership roles-which have transcended institutional inter-
ests and help account for the strong consensus on foreign policy.
We believe that most of the basic characteristics of foreign policy will
remain intact over the next few years for the following reasons: the Foreign
Ministry's continued domination of the policymaking process; the relative
success of Brazilian diplomacy; and the continuing need to increase exports
and expand markets.
We project, however, that some things probably will change:
? Brasilia could become more willing to assume a regional leadership role,
given its growing global status and unease over the lingering effects of
the Falklands war.
? Brazil may also lessen its association with the Third World, especially on
economic issues, as a result of its need for additional industrialized-world
support to overcome financial problems and its growing interest in
monetary stability
iii Secret
ALA 83-10086
June 1983
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In our judgment, the Foreign Ministry is likely to remain the key factor in
foreign policy making for at least the remainder of President Figueiredo's
term, even though other institutions-such as the military concerning
Suriname policy-have recently increased their voice. If a civilian govern-
ment is installed in 1985, the new administration and Foreign Minister
would remain heavily dependent on the Ministry's experience. The Foreign
Ministry's expertise in diverse areas, the broad public approval of its
stewardship of foreign policy, and the widespread respect for it among
Brazilians also weigh heavily in its favor.
The Foreign Ministry's central role in foreign policy making has some
important implications for the United States. We believe the Ministry is
likely to remain the institution most sensitive to perceived differences in
US-Brazilian relations and most ready to take issue with US actions that it
believes conflict with Brazil's interests. Its positions on international
commerce, technology transfer, nuclear energy, economic development,
and many international political issues are generally shared by other policy
actors and reflect a nationalist dimension of foreign policy that is not likely
to change soon. These positions will continue to create periodic frictions in
US-Brazilian relations.
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Key Judgments
The Foreign Policy Establishment
Dimensions of Foreign Policy 6
Constancy Versus Change 9
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The Making of
Brazilian Foreign Policy
Since the early 1970s, Brazil's Foreign Ministry has
gradually regained and consolidated its traditionally
preeminent position in foreign policy making. It has
successfully forged a strong national consensus in
support of its diplomacy and is now generally unchal-
lenged in initiating broad policy outlines and dealing
with clearly political issues. Its broad expertise, insti-
tutional aggressiveness, and the general liberalization
of the Brazilian political process are the primary
factors accounting for its reemergence.
We believe the Foreign Ministry's reemergence has
important implications for the formulation and con-
tent of Brazilian foreign policy. This paper examines
the institutional dimension of Brazilian foreign policy,
the dynamics of foreign policy making, and the key
personalities that influence its formulation. It also
examines the tenets that have guided recent foreign
policy and have provided a constancy that transcends
institutional interests. Finally, the paper assesses the
pressures for change in Brazilian diplomacy and the
prospects for Brazilian foreign policy in view of the
Foreign Ministry's reemergence.
The Foreign Ministry's role was circumscribed in the
years following the 1964 military takeover by power
centers in the armed forces. Today, the Foreign
Ministry (known as Itamaraty') again plays the lead-
ing role in foreign policy making, although members
of other institutions also participate, and in some
cases-such as the Libyan plane incident in April-
overrule Itamaraty. According to the US Embassy,
the armed forces, the so-called Nine O'Clock Group
of President Figueiredo's senior advisers, the Civil
' Itamaraty is named after the residence in Rio de Janeiro of a
former Brazilian nobleman, which housed the Foreign Ministry
until the 1960s. when most ministries were required to move to
Household (essentially the President's secretariat),
and the National Security Council all become in-
volved in various issues. Other ministries-Finance
and Commerce and Industry-as well as business
groups attempt to intercede more frequently as Bra-
zil's economic stake has grown. On most issues these
various actors are usually in accord with the Foreign
Ministry, although they exercise some autonomy,
especially in areas of national security, nuclear ener-
gy, and international economic policy (see figure 2, at
back).
Itamaraty is a highly competent professional organi-
zation staffed by an elite corps of well-trained and
disciplined diplomats. It traditionally has commanded
respect in Brazilian society; the distinguished histori-
cal roles played by several foreign ministers have
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the excellent quality of political and eco-
nomic analysis produced by Brazilian diplomats
worldwide.
Itamaraty is divided into various geographic and
functional departments, but decisionmaking is highly
centralized.
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this system often produces internal
frictions. Brazilian diplomats, nonetheless, are dis-
creet,
According to the US Embassy, Itamaraty personnel
are reluctant to discuss with foreigners even innocu-
ous matters such as the decisionmaking structure.
Figueiredo's forceful UN speech on Third World
needs last fall-the first address to the Assembly by a
Brazilian president-were proposed primarily by the
Foreign Minister, who thus hoped to further enhance
Brazil's international status and help the country
become a voice for Latin American issues. Guerreiro,
moreover, has expanded the practice of placing a
number of Foreign Ministry career officers in other
key government ministries and councils, thereby en-
abling him to contribute to other areas of national
policy and to be privy to matters outside his official
purview
Itamaraty also has benefited from the essentially
closed nature of Brazil's foreign policy making envi-
ronment. The Brazilian Congress, for example, has
generally played a ceremonial role in foreign affairs,
and the media usually does not act as an adversary in
this area. Public opinion also is not an important
factor shaping foreign policy making; recent polls
indicate that the public does not consider Brasilia's
overseas policies an issue of concern. Finally, the
opposition political parties have rarely formulated
strong positions on foreign policy because they gener-
ally agree with Itamaraty's diplomacy; the largest and
strongest opposition group, the Brazilian Democratic
Mobilization Party, recently identified itself with
Itamaraty's broad policy line
Other Institutional Actors
Armed Forces. The military is the cornerstone and
guarantor of President Figueiredo's political power,
but its direct role in the foreign policy making process
has been diminishing as a result of the regime's policy
of gradual political liberalization. Although we know
fro reporting that segments of
the military periodically are uneasy with some of
Itamaraty's positions, military members of the Cabi-
net and senior military men do not frequently criticize
foreign policy in public or attempt to change it. The
military as a whole generally supports Itamaraty's
policy positions because it supports the Foreign Minis-
try's overall approach to advancing Brazil's interests.
Thus, Foreign Minister Guerreiro has been able to
speak out in public about the high degree of military
support for Itamaraty's foreign policy. Unlike in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazil's foreign affairs
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Foreign Ministry Outlook
and Philosophy
Foreign Minister Guerreiro and a handful of diplo-
mats are the key individuals in Itamaraty that
formulate and influence foreign policy. Guerreiro; a
lawyer by training, reportedly has a reputation for
passivity because of his juridical approach to diplo-
macy, but virtually all observers acknowledge his
central role in foreign policy making. Guerreiro's
areas of expertise are international organizations,
where he spent a significant part of his career, and
multilateral negotiations. He coordinated Itamara-
ty's initiatives at the UN for several years and is
considered an authority on Law of the Sea issues.
Sardenberg, Chief of the Special Secretariat for
Economic and Political Bilateral Affairs, reportedly
dominates political policy formulation. He is Guer-
reiro's speechwriter and, 25X1
the second most influential person in 25X1
the Ministry. Abdenur, Coordinator for Economic
and Commercial Affairs, dominates economic policy
formulation. Both Sardenberg and Abdenur are in
daily contact with Guerreiro, and they coordinate the
most important position papers relating to the public
pronouncements of President Figueiredo and the For-
eign Minister.
the Third World school,
Joao Baena-Soares is Itamaraty s Secretary General
and formally the number-two man in the Foreign
Ministry. He is less committed than his colleagues to
his role under Guerreiro has been related
The majority of
Brazilian diplomats support Third World policies not
from anti-American motives, but because they believe
that this is the best way to advance Brazil's national
economic and political interests. This has meant that
foreign policy under Itamaraty has evolved steadily
but naturally away from a former close identification
with the United States and toward a greater divers iii-
more to administrative than policy matters. He none-
theless has contributed to expanding Brazil's pres-
ence in Africa and the Middle East and improving
relations with neighboring countries and the Soviet
Union. Orlando Carbonar, Chief of Cabinet of the
Foreign Minister, dominates all matters related to
postings and promotions. He is close to Guerreiro,
considered a pragmatist, and reportedly in a position
to achieve higher office.
cation of political and economic ties.
commentators no longer routinely refer to the coun-
try's "military" or "dual" diplomacy when describing
the influence of the armed forces on foreign policy.F-
Nonetheless, the Brazilian propensity to resolve prob-
lems by personal contact permits significant informal
contributions into policymaking. Both the Army Min-
ister and the Chief of the Military Household (the
President's keyman on military matters), as well as
many senior retired and active-duty officers, are close
friends of President Figueiredo and privately make
their views known to him. Within a small range of
issues-such as questions pertaining to Cuba-the
military probably still maintains a veto power over
foreign policy. The US Embassy reports, for example,
that the Chief of the National Intelligence Service
(SNI), an active-duty general close to the President,
was instrumental in blocking the opening of a PLO
office in Brazil. The US Embassy reported that
Itamaraty proposed this PLO presence.
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In April, the military played a central role on national
security issues related to Suriname and Libya. Danilo
Venturini, a retired general who heads the National
Security Council and is close to President Figueiredo,
visited Paramaribo in April and concluded a modest
economic and military assistance agreement with the
new leftist government. We believe the military, with
Itamaraty's concurrence, encouraged moderation in
Paramaribo by emphasizing to Surinamese President
Bouterse Brazil's strong concern over the possibility of
an increased Cuban presence in his country.
The media, among others, have been tempted to
exaggerate incidents such as the Venturini mission
and to interpret them as reflecting serious differences
between Itamaraty and the military that foreshadow a
reassertion of military control over foreign policy. On
many issues, however, the record reflects a conver-
gence of view between the two institutions on policy
and tactics. It was Foreign Minister Guerreiro who in
late 1982 emphatically noted that Brazil would never
permit a grave security threat-such as Cuban influ-
ence in Suriname-to develop on its border. His
public handling of the naming of a military emissary
to discuss security and training agreements with the
Surinamese President also suggests more consensus
than divergence on the overriding policy questions
Nine O'Clock Group. According to the US Embassy,
the Nine O'Clock Group, a coterie of senior advisers,
meets most weekday mornings with the President and
serves as an informal executive secretariat and clear-
inghouse for ideas and proposals. Such groups have
been common in Brazil, their role varying with the
President's personality and the standing of individual
members. At present, the Nine O'Clock Group is
comprised of the following individuals: Octavio
Aguiar de Medeiros, Chief of SNI; Joao Leitao de
Abreu, Chief of the Civil Household; Antonio Delfim
Netto, Planning Minister; Danilo Venturini, Special
Minister for Land Affairs and Secretary General of
the National Security Council; and Rubem Ludwig,
Chief of the Military Household.
The group discusses issues of national importance in
an informal setting, but, according to the US Embas-
sy, foreign policy is only infrequently on its agenda.
The Embassy believes, nonetheless, that Itamaraty is
occasionally overruled by the group. We believe,
however, that members of the present group generally
do not influence policy outside their areas of compe-
tence.
National Security Council. The Brazilian NSC,
chaired by the President and comprised of all Cabinet
ministers, meets infrequently and deals primarily with
domestic issues. Its staff is made up mostly of military
officers, but includes lawyers and economists from
other ministries and three Itamaraty officials. The
NSC exerts considerable influence in three areas
related to foreign policy: general national security
issues, military sales, and energy.
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The NSC and Itamaraty, however, have had differ-
ences with respect to the Iran-Iraq conflict.
NSC initially supported
a continued close relationship with Iraq, while
Itamaraty favored redressing the balance by broaden-
ing ties with Iran. A likely contributing factor to the
NSC view was the extensive arms relationship it had
developed with Iraq. In early 1982, however, the NSC
reportedly changed its position)
Since then, Brazilian policy
Civil Household. This office, headed by Joao Leitao
de Abreu, acts as a clearinghouse for the day-to-day
transmission of correspondence from Itamaraty and
other civilian ministries to the President. According to
the US Embassy, Leitao de Abreu is in an ideal
position to influence foreign policy, but, unlike his
predecessor, he appears to focus almost exclusively on
domestic politics. His lack of involvement in foreign
affairs may be due to his confidence in Itamaraty's
abilities and his agreement with its policies. Such a
coincidence of views is suggested by the fact that
Leitao de Abreu's chief of staff and two of his other
five senior aides are career diplomats
Key Ministries. In the area of international economic
policy, the Planning Ministry and to a lesser extent
the Finance Ministry are the effective moving forces.
Planning Minister Delfim Netto, for example, has
played the central role in negotiating large diversified
commercial packages with Iraq and the Soviet Union.
Finance Minister Ernane Galveas has been directly
involved, along with Itamaraty diplomats, in the
numerous and increasingly contentious bilateral trade
disputes with the United States.
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Business. The private visit last year to Cuba by the
President of the Brazilian Confederation of Commer-
cial Associations illustrates the business pressures 25X1
sometimes levied-in this case unsuccessfully-on 25X1
foreign policy. The businessman undertook the trip to 25X1
explore trade opportunities between private Brazilian
firms and the Cuban Government. Upon returning, he
publicly lobbied for the initiation of commercial rela-
tions with Havana but failed to elicit a positive
added its voice in strong opposition to any change in
policy toward Cuba. Virtually nothing has been heard
since then about reestablishing commercial or diplo-
matic relations with Havana
1974.
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Important business interests, particularly in the ex-
port sector, nonetheless identify closely with
Itamaraty's foreign policy because, on the whole, it
has created extensive commercial opportunities. In-
deed, Itamaraty occasionally has viewed segments of
the business community as a valuable constituency in
supporting its foreign policy designs. Brazil's opening
to the People's Republic of China, which was viewed
with dismay in some military circles, began in earnest
after a delegation of Brazilian businessmen-encour-
aged by Itamaraty-visited Peking to stimulate trade. 25X1
Diplomatic relations were consequently established in
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Dimensions of Foreign Policy
Brazil's governing elites have long considered the
attainment of grandeza, or world-power status, the
central-if somewhat distant-goal of national poli-
cy.' Successive governments, both civilian and mili-
tary, have consequently given top priority to promot-
ing rapid economic development-the indispensable
condition to achieve grandeza. Sustained economic
development, in Brasilia's view, is the best means to
reduce external dependence, alleviate domestic socio-
economic pressures, and preserve national security,
The long-term quest for grandeza and short-term
strategy of promoting development have shaped
Itamaraty's stewardship of Brazilian diplomacy. For-
eign policy has basically been employed as a tool to
promote rapid economic development. Consequently,
it has been intimately tied to development objec-
tives-especially increasing exports, diversifying mar-
kets, and assuring energy supplies-and its execution
has adhered closely to several fundamental guidelines.
Operational Guidelines
We believe the precepts discussed in the sections that
follow have generally guided foreign policy decisions
and provided a constancy that has transcended insti-
tutional interests. Collectively, they are the underpin-
ning for the strategies that Itamaraty variously labels
"responsible pragmatism," "universalism," and "ecu-
menicalism."
Primacy of Economic Interests. Itamaraty and other
ministries have always been mindful of the economic
and commercial dimension of diplomacy. Economic
relations with specific countries are often encouraged
and established without regard to the status of politi-
cal relations. Brazil's recognition of the People's
Republic of China in 1974, for example, was preceded
by a period of expanded commercial relations. The
development of extensive relations with Iraq since
1976 stemmed from the economic impetus provided
7 The Medici government (1969-74) in 1970 officially established
the following objective: "achievement by Brazil of developed coun-
try status by the end of the century, thereby acquiring the
economic, social, and political conditions of a great power."
by the search for new export markets, arms purchas-
ers, and oil suppliers. The Foreign Ministry's empha-
sis on foreign trade is underscored by its trade
promotion department, which, in collaboration with
private exporters and government trading companies,
has played a significant role in expanding exports
Pragmatic Approach. Only in a small number of cases
does ideology affect foreign policy decisions. Despite a
philosophical incompatibility, Brazil was one of the
first countries to recognize the Marxist government in
Angola in 1975. The potential commercial benefits-
increased trade and oil supplies-and the diplomatic
advantages to be gained in Africa by recognizing
Luanda took precedence over any ideological differ-
ences with the Angolan regime. Brazil's increased
trade relationship with the Soviet Union is another
example of pragmatism. Brazil does refuse, however,
to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba because
of Havana's global meddling. It also has expressed no
interest in formal membership in the Nonaligned
Movement-in which it has held observer status for
years-because it sees little to gain from it.
Diversification of Economic and Political Ties. Bra-
zil's worldwide effort to establish and strengthen ties
with a variety of countries is aimed at developing new
commercial opportunities and preventing overly de-
pendent relationships. Brazil's emphasis on diversifi-
cation recently has been directed not only toward the
Middle East, but also Africa, the Communist Bloc,
and, to a lesser degree, Asia. The importance Brazil
attaches to diversified relations was underscored by
Brasilia's refusal of Baghdad's request to take Iraq's
side in the Iraq-Iran conflict, even though Baghdad
remains one of Brasilia's important oil suppliers and
arms markets.
Brazil's rapid growth and expanded presence overseas
also have increasingly entangled Brazilian interests
with those of developed countries in Western Europe
and Japan. Increased access to Japanese and West
European technology, capital, and markets has con-
tributed significantly to recent Brazilian economic
successes. The European Community, for example,
has since 1960 been a larger market for Brazilian
exports than the United States-historically Brazil's
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Brazil's Growing Economic
and Political Status
Brazil is an atypical, rapidly developing country
whose status within the international community
defies easy categorization. Its interests are increas-
ingly diverse and complex, reach out to all corners of
the globe, resist ideological characterization, and cut
across international groupings such as North-South,
East-West, and Third World. It possesses all the
attributes and potential-large population, land area
of continental proportions, vast resources-to attain
power status on a par with France or England. F_
In the past three decades, Brazil has undergone
dramatic growth and is now the non-Communist
world's eighth-largest economy. Its 1981 GDP ex-
ceeded the combined GDP of Mexico, Argentina, and
Venezuela for that year; according to a recent survey
by Euromoney magazine, Brazil probably will be the
world's fifth-largest economy by the turn of the
century.
Brazil also has successfully diversified its economy.
Industrial goods now account for well over half of
total exports, and Brazil is second only to the United
States as an agricultural exporter, with leading posi-
tions in coffee, sugar, cocoa, orange juice, and soy-
bean markets.
Brazilian economic growth has been based on an
export-led development model and, since the first oil
shock in 1973, massive foreign borrowing. Between
1964 and 1981, exports increased dramatically from
$1.4 billion to $23.3 billion, while the flow of trade
in the six years through 1981 increased to $45
billion. The foreign debt, meanwhile, mushroomed
from less than $10 billion in 1972 to about $85
billion in 1982-the largest among developing coun-
leading market-and EC exports to Brazil now rival
those of the United States. In addition, the amount of
Japanese direct investment in Brazil has increased
significantly since 1969. Japan also is playing an
important role in the development of Brazilian capital
industries; among the more than 400 joint Japanese-
Brazilian enterprises in Brazil are a large steelworks
On the political side, Brazil's regional and interna-
tional prestige and respect have risen dramatically in
the past decade. As a result of its cautious, low-
profile diplomacy, Brasilia's Spanish-speaking neigh-
bors, notably Chile and Colombia, have been increas-
ingly willing to accept-indeed, encourage-an
expanded Brazilian role in regional affairs without
fear that Brazil will strive for hegemony. Brasilia's
careful, reasoned stance during the Falklands con-
flict, for example, permitted Brazil to remain on good
terms with both belligerents and to serve as a force
for regional moderation-in contrast with the emo-
tional and confrontational positions of most other
Latin nations. The major powers, moreover, increas-
ingly have acknowledged Brazil's upwardly mobile
status and consider Brazil a serious aspirant for
world power status, as attested by reciprocal state
visits in recent years between Brazil and Great Brit-
ain, France, West Germany, Japan, Canada, the
United States, and an invitation from the Soviet
Union.
Internal political developments also have contributed
to a positive image of Brazil, regionally and interna-
tionally. Since 1974 Brazil has undergone a signifi-
cant trend toward a more open and representative
political system. President Joao Figueiredo, inaugu-
rated in March 1979, has strengthened this evolution
and improved the prospects for the election of a
civilian president in January 1985. Specific policies
undertaken by the Figueiredo administration to fur-
ther Brazil's political evolution include: a broad
amnesty for political exiles and prisoners; relaxation
of controls on student and labor activities; a new
political party law permitting the formation of more
diverse groupings; and the first popular gubernatorial
elections-held last November-since 1965.
complex, a major shipyard, and an 800,000-ton alumi-
na plant. The fact that Brazil's Japanese community
is the largest outside Japan-400,000 Japanese in Sao
Paulo alone-serves to reinforce Brazilian-Japanese
ties.
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Figure 1
Brazil: Economic Dimensions
Billion US $
0 25 50 75 100
Real GDP
Foreign Debt
Exports
Imports
1964
1981
Association With the Third World. At the UN and
other international forums, Brazil consistently identi-
fies itself as a developing country. It usually adopts
positions consistent with the Group of 77, the develop-
ing countries' UN caucus, and has vigorously opposed
what it believes are attempts by the superpowers to
freeze political-economic relationships. It therefore
has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
based on the publicly stated belief that the treaty
formally establishes the technological advantages of a
few select developed countries while perpetuating
dependency relationships for developing nations.
Brasilia's stances on Law of the Sea issues and North-
South negotiations also underscore its Third World
affinities.
Brazil is less committed to the Third World, however,
than its rhetoric would indicate. Brazil's ties with
Africa, for example, reflect some of Brasilia's con-
tinuing ambivalence toward the Third World. Al-
though Brazil expresses a special affinity for former
Portuguese colonies, it nevertheless refuses to sever
relations with South Africa and maintains extensive
commercial ties with Pretoria
Brazil's rapid industrialization has caused it to disas-
sociate itself from Third World positions that run
counter to its economic interests. Notwithstanding its
public support, Brasilia is not pressing for the forma-
tion of a common fund and has privately agreed with
the industrial countries on this issue. Brazil has
opposed all debt-relief proposals joint renegotiation,
collective moratoriums-that would impede its access
to private international capital markets. Brazil has
shown little willingness to prod industrial nations to
increase aid to the LDCs and is opposed to an
international code that would restrict foreign private
investment. Although the government supports the
international coffee agreement, it has shown little
interest in pushing for agreements on other commod-
ities, many of which it imports.
Avoidance of a Leadership Role. Although Brazil
seeks world-power status, until recently its diplomatic
involvement in international affairs has-by design-
lagged behind its current and potential economic,
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demographic, and territorial stature. Brasilia's policy
of shunning a leadership position in Latin America to
allay concerns of "hegemonism" among its neighbors
is the best example. Brasilia long believed that the
costs of a regional leadership role have outweighed the
potential advantages. Recently, however, Brazil's re-
luctance to assume a higher profile has begun to ebb
in recognition of its growing global status. Thus,
Brazil has begun to speak out more strongly on
regional issues. It may be considering seeking the
OAS presidency next year, according to the US
Embassy, and is willing in general to accept more of a
leadership role among developing nations.
Constancy Versus Change
We believe that most of the fundamental guidelines
that have characterized Brazilian foreign policy will
remain intact-especially the primacy of economic
interests, a pragmatic nonideological approach, and
the diversification of political and economic ties. The
relative success of Brazil's diplomacy, the continued
need to increase exports, and the reluctance of various
groups in the foreign policy establishment to depart
markedly from past policies all indicate constancy.
Nonetheless, Brazil's recent economic setbacks and its
unease over the hemispheric fallout of the Falklands
conflict could lead it to reexamine and reshape some
aspects of its foreign policy, particularly its reluctance
to assume a leadership role and its association with
the Third World
Itamaraty late last year
initiated a reexamination of Brazil's low-profile diplo-
macy. The most tangible indication of potential
change stemming from that review was President
Figueiredo's opening speech to the United Nations
last September. Figueiredo emphasized the serious
economic problems confronting developing nations
and worldwide political tensions and forcefully called
for a restructuring of the international economic
system.
In our opinion, Brazil's assumption of a higher inter-
national profile would-over the long term-have the
greatest impact on its relations with other Latin
American countries. Brasilia has assiduously avoided
leadership roles in Latin America to allay traditional
Latin suspicions about Brazilian "subimperialism."
Some Latin countries, however, such as Chile and
Colombia, now appear less concerned about Brazilian
intentions and more willing to accept an expanded
Brazilian role in regional affairs. During a state visit
to Bogota in 1981, for example, then Colombian
President Turbay characterized Brazil as "a natural
leader" and "guarantee for Latin America."
On issues that enjoy broad consensus in Latin Ameri-
ca-for example, trade with developed countries-
Brazil could be more willing to become the area's
spokesman. On issues where there is dissension, such
as border disputes, Brazil could expand its current
moderating role to reduce the possibility of potentially 25X1
destabilizing conflicts-as its balanced statements on
the Venezuela-Guyana dispute suggest. Overall, Bra-
zil has been less reticent about actions and statements
that touch on the controversy and has consistently
called for negotiations. In Suriname, moreover, Brazil
is following a moderate policy that seeks to counter
potential Cuban influence by offering aid to Paramar-
ibo to prevent its isolation.
Brazil's association with the Third World may also.
decline over the longer term. Brazil's practice of
attempting within Third World councils to take ad-
vantage of its developing-country status eventually
will be more difficult. Brazil's policy of insisting on
preferential trade treatment, for example, will be
increasingly hard to sustain as it becomes a more
effective competitor in developed-country markets.
Brazil will become more susceptible to demands-
generated by other developing countries as well as
developed ones-for reciprocity in the world trading
order.
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As Brazil becomes a richer nation and its trade
continues to grow and diversify, the areas of mutual
agreement with its industrialized trade partners will
expand. Some changes are already evident. Despite
initial opposition to the US proposals, the Brazilian
delegation did support US efforts to prevent tariff 25X1
escalation at the GATT Ministerials in November
1982. Brasilia's positions over the longer term also are
likely to reflect greater Brazilian common interests
with the industrialized world in promoting freer trade
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and monetary and political stability. It will for some
time, however, continue to articulate the Third
World's resentment of the present international eco-
nomic structure.
We believe that Itamaraty is likely to remain the key
factor in Brazilian foreign policy making, even though
the military and the economic ministries recently have
increased their influence in specialized areas. The
Foreign Ministry's expertise in diverse areas, its gen-
erally successful stewardship of foreign policy, and
the widespread respect for Itamaraty among Brazil-
ians are factors in its favor. The continuing consolida-
tion of its role, moreover, probably will ensure that the
strong national consensus in support of its diplomacy
will continue and that the future conduct of Brazilian
foreign policy will be as cohesive, pragmatic, and
capable as in the recent past
If political liberalization proceeds and a civilian presi-
dent is installed in 1985, the chances will increase that
a political appointee rather than a career diplomat
may head the Foreign Ministry. Although successive
military governments for almost 15 years have chosen
career diplomats to run Itamaraty, civilian politicians
usually held the post prior to 1969. Although the
formulation of foreign policy inevitably would be
more susceptible to the political considerations of the
new civilian government, the administration nonethe-
less would still be heavily dependent on the expertise
and experience of Itamaraty. Considering the relative
success of past foreign policy, moreover, a new gov-
ernment and foreign minister would take political
risks if they instituted new policies without good
reason or failed to produce demonstrable results.
Itamaraty's role as the preeminent participant in
Brazilian foreign policy making has several important
implications for the United States. For example, we
believe Itamaraty is likely to remain the institutional
group most sensitive to perceived differences in US-
Brazilian relations and most ready to take issue with
US actions that it believes conflict with Brazil's
interests. Itamaraty's positions on international com-
merce, technology transfer, nuclear energy, economic
development, and many international political ques-
tions are generally shared by other policymakers and
reflect a nationalist dimension of foreign policy that is
not likely to diminish soon-it may well increase-
and will create periodic frictions in US-Brazilian
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Figure 2
Brazil's Foreign Policy Establishment
Special Secretariat
for Bilateral Economic
and Political Affairs
Coordinator for
Economic and
Commercial Affairs
Americas Europe
Department Department
Cultural Cooperation Scientific and
and Dissemination Technological Cooperation
Department Department
International Consular and
Organizations Judicial
Department Department
Subordination
Influence
Near East Asia and Oceania
Department Department
Regional Economic
Organizations Department
Department
Communication and Commercial
Documentation Promotion
Department Department
Nine O'Clock
Group
National Security
Council
Economic
Ministries
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