CHINA: THE POLITICS OF HU YAOBANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000100090004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Lirecioraie of
Intelligence
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China: The Politics
of Hu Yaobang
An Intelligence Assessment
EA 83-10024
GI 83-10026
February 1983
Copy 271''
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
China: The Politics
of Hu Yaobang
This report was prepared by
Office of East Asian Analys
the Office of Global Issues with contributions from
of the Office of Central Reference.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, Domestic Policy Branch,
OEA,
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EA 83-10024
GI 83-10026
February 1983
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China: The Politics
of Hu Yaobano
Key Judgments General Secretary Hu Yaobang, 67, has taken great strides toward
Information available consolidating his power since becoming head of the Chinese Communist
as of 28 January 1983 Party in June 1981. His associates now hold key posts in most of the party's
was used in this report. F-25X1
sensitive organs and occupy important government positions as well.
Hu is far from secure, however. He did not earn the top party post as much
as he had it handed to him by his mentor, Deng Xiaoping, over the
objections of senior leaders. Many influential Chinese do not regard Hu as
a leader in his own right but merely as Deng's protege
Hu has Deng's complete confidence-although they do not agree on
everything-but we believe Hu's relations with other senior leaders are
strained. Politburo member Ye Jianying in particular appears to us to have
reservations about Hu. Hu has attempted to court the party elders, but we
believe none of them, regardless of their personal feelings about Hu, would
feel compelled to defer to him in Deng's absence
senior military officers distrust Hu.
They believe he is too critical of Mao and the army's role in the Cultural
Revolution, and they believe he lacks the stature and experience to lead the
nation. Military men also see threats to their prerogatives and political
power in the political and economic reforms that Hu champions.
At the top of Hu's political agenda is the party purge scheduled to begin
later this year and run through 1986. One key goal for Hu will be to re-
move as many opponents as possible, but Hu also sees the purge as a way to
revitalize the party and restore respect for it as an institution. Hu was
alarmed by events in Poland, and he believes the party must be cleansed of
the corrupt and incompetent to avoid a similar situation in China. Thus,
Hu advocates:
? A reduced role for the party in policy implementation.
? A larger role for intellectuals and technocrats.
? Less social regimentation and a somewhat freer artistic climate.
? More popular participation in local decisionmaking
In our judgment, Hu is not a key economic policymaker. He seems to have
a relatively unsophisticated understanding of economics and the complex-
ity of the problems facing China. Hu generally supports the economic
reform program and has been an active supporter of increased foreign
investment in China.
Secret
EA 83-10024
GI 83-10026
February 1983
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We believe Hu has had relatively little influence in foreign policy matters
until recently, but he is clearly expanding his role. Hu has very little first-
hand knowledge of the world beyond China's borders, and he appears to
have a very limited understanding of the Western democracies or apprecia-
Hu has adhered to the party line when discussing foreign nolicy issues
publicly.
he:
e tensions with Moscow, but still sees the Soviet
Union as the greatest threat to China's security.
? Tends to identify China's interests with those of the Third World.
Hu's test will come when Deng passes from the scene. Hu brings some con-
siderable strengths-including a headstart and Deng's support-to the
contest for influence that will follow. He is a very tough, clever, pragmatic
politician who has demonstrated that he can not only survive in the rough-
and-turnhle wnrld of ch;nese politics, but thrive.
Hu is a man used to exercising power in the
shadows and not someone to cross.
Hu's post-Deng prospects will improve if:
? Party elders like Ye die.
? Hu can increase his influence in the military by gaining a seat on the par-
ty body that sets military policy, advancing the careers of his supporters
in the military, and forcing retirements in the senior officer corps.
? Hu continues to place associates in the party and government bureaucra-
cies, especially the party's Organization Department, the internal securi-
ty apparatus, and the economic planning organs
Hu must also follow Deng's example and learn to court and placate his op-
ponents. Hu's hard-driving personality, a strength in many ways, also
makes him prone, in our judgment, to overreacting when the situation calls
for a deft touch, and he could easily alienate friends as well as critics
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Contents
Key Judgments
An Image Problem
Relations With Key Political Players
Deng and the Party Elders
4
Policy Views
Political Agenda
8
Economic Views
9
Foreign Policy
10
The Task Before Hu
11
A Succession Balance Sheet
11
Bureaucratic Musts
12
Appendixes
A.
Hu Yaobang: His Personality and Political Behavior
13
B.
An Analytical Chronology of Hu Yaobang's Career
19
C.
Key Associates of Hu Yaobang
23
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China: The Politics
of Hu Yaobang
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew, after
meeting General Secretary Hu Yaobang, summed
him up-accurately, we believe-as a man "used to
exercising power in the shadows" and not someone to
cross. Hu, 67, is a very tough, clever politician who
during the Cultural Revolution faced a Red Guard
mob with icy contempt. His enemies have purged him
twice in his 50-year party career, and each time Hu
has come back to settle scores. Like his mentor, Deng
Xiaoping, Hu is willing to sacrifice policy and allies to
achieve larger ends, and in China's rough-and-tumble
politics he has shown himself to be not only a survivor,
but someone who thrives.'
Hu's current standing in the party is something of a
conundrum. He holds the top party post, but he does
not wield the authority that goes with it; Deng is still
the most powerful man in China. Furthermore, be-
cause Hu did not earn the top position as much as he
had it handed to him by Deng over the objections of
other senior leaders, he is in a race to consolidate his
position before Deng passes from the scene.
Increasing his personal power is Hu's primary con-
cern, but he is also committed to carrying out an
ambitious political and economic reform program
designed to cleanse the party and raise living stand-
ards. We believe Hu, who has concentrated on domes-
tic affairs throughout his career, has yet to put his
mark on foreign policy
Hu's Power Base
Recent appointments, dismissals,
behind-the-scenes maneuvering all indicate
to us that Hu is moving quickly to place men loyal to
him in key positions.' These events also suggest to us
that Hu is following a master plan and has a pool of
loyal supporters to draw on, essential preconditions
for success.
'Appendix A is a psychological assessment of Hu. Appendix B is an
analytical chronology of Hu's career.
2 Appendix C identifi Hu's ke supporters in the party, govern-
ment, and provinces
Chen
chun
Wang
waling
Deng
dung
Wei
way
Geng
gung
Wu
woo
Hu
hoo
Xiang
sheeahng
Hua
hwah
Xu
shoo
Li
lee
Yang
yahng
Nie
neeyeh
Ye
yeh
Peng
pung
Zhang
jahng
Qin
chin
Zhao
jaow
The core of Hu's personal power network is a group of
former officials of the Communist Youth League
(CYL) who served under Hu in the 1952-66 period.
We can identify 60 former CYL officials serving in
major government and party positions; most received
their assignments under circumstances that suggest to
us Hu was instrumental in placing them. Hu also has
taken a very active role in rehabilitating hundreds of
officials purged during the Cultural Revolution.
Many are deceased or too aged to play an active role,
but their former associates, whose careers stand to 25X1
benefit from the restoration of their mentor's' reputa-
tion, may feel beholden to Hu.
Hu's closest asso-
ciates are Hu Qili, Hu Keshi, Li Chang, Wang
Zhongfang, and Xiang Nan. Hu Qili, perhaps Hu's
principal ally, is a recent appointee to the party
Secretariat and head of the party's General Office, 25X1
which controls the party paper flow and is active in
preparing the purge that will begin this summer.
Xiang is now the Fujian provincial party boss,
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Figure 1. Hu meeting a Tibetan woman during a visit to Xizang
(Tibet) in May 1980. Hu has traveled extensively in China during
the last few years, campaigning for support from local officials and
Hu Keshi, Li, and Wang are key figures in the
Chinese Academies of Science and Social Science,
which often serve as think tanks for Hu and Deng.
We believe Hu is well on his way to establishing a
solid grip on the party bureaucracy. He has chaired
twp of the most sensitive departments himself, Orga-
nization (1977-78) and Propaganda (1979-80), and
associates now head nearly all the important ones.
Exceptions are the Organization Department, led by
Deng ally Song Renqiong, and the critical Military
Commission, which sets military policy and oversees
the political loyalty of the army. It is chaired by
Hu's influence in the government and provinces is
weaker than in the party, but he has a core of loyalists
in those areas too. Soviet China-watchers have told
diplomats in Beijing that approximately 20 officials at
the vice minister rank or above have ties to Hu,
generally through the CYL. In our opinion, Hu has
relatively few associates in the economic ministries or
on the planning commissions, fields dominated by
Politburo members Chen Yuri, Li Xiannian, and
Premier Zhao Ziyang. Appointments in the Foreign
Ministry last year, especially Wu Xueqian as Minis-
ter, indicate to us that expanding his influence in the
foreign policy bureaucracy is a high priority for Hu.
Hu had relatively little experience with foreign affairs
before heading the party, and he wants his people in
control of this vital policy arena
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Hu Yaobang in Person
Hu Yaobang's close relationship with Deng Xiaoping
over the years has earned him the sobriquet of
"Deng 's man. " Foreign diplomats have noted Hu's
similarity to Deng in style and mannerisms. This may
equally well reflect conscious or unconscious imita-
tion of Deng, habits acquired over their many years of
close association, or Deng 's choice of Hu as his
protege because of their similarity in personality.=
In meetings with Hu Yaobang, Western observers
have been impressed with his intelligence, dynamism,
self-confidence, and frankness.. Hu also projects an
image of himself as "a man of the people. " On one
occasion with a group of foreigners, he noted that he
was just a "country bumpkin. " He prefers to dress
informally and has been known to punctuate his
speech with earthy expressions in heavily Hunanese-
accented Chinese. His energy and direct manner have
led these same Western observers to compare him
favorably with the more reserved Premier Zhao
Ziyang or Hu's predecessor, Hua Guofeng.
Probably reflecting his long years in propaganda
work, Hu Yaobang has a proselytizing speaking style.
His speaking style is animated and uses gestures-
especially pointing his finger. Hu's extensive use of
rhetorical questions and practical examples in his
speeches also reflects his propaganda background.
We believe that the favorable opinion of Westerners
who have met Hu stands in sharp contrast to the
more mixed view of him expressed by Chinese.
Although some Chinese are drawn to his "man of the
people" style, the very qualities that ingratiate Hu to
foreign statesmen, his energy and frankness, are not
traits generally associated with leaders in China,
where reserve and aloofness are prized. Deng Xiao-
ping, also known for his energy and candor, is an
exception. Hu's animated style suggests a lack of
refinement to many Chinese. Hu's nationally tele-
vised address to the Sixth Plenum in July 1981, when
he rose from his seat repeatedly and pushed his voice
close to its limits
Hu's self-effacing remarks
at the Plenum, an effort to show respect to party
elders opposed to his promotion, apparently were seen
in some quarters as a sign of weakness
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An Image Problem. Hu is also attempting to improve
his image as a leader. We believe many Chinese have
a negative impression of Hu. They do not see him as a
national figure in his own right but merely as Deng's
"go for." For example, sophisticated residents of
Guangzhou who strongly support Deng are far less
enthusiastic about Hu in comments to US officials.
They dismiss him as an unimportant figure who."is
incapable of leadership." Hu's personal style has also
contributed to his image problems. (See box "Hu
Yaobang in Person.")
We believe Deng has assumed a less public role in
part to vacate the stage for Hu. Since becoming head
of the party in 1981, Hu has maintained a busy public.
schedule that tends to contrast his relative youth and
vigor with the fraility of the party elders. Hu has
toured the provinces dispensing instructions and inves-
tigating grievances with great fanfare. Despite injunc-
tions on personality cults, the party press increasingly
contains references to the authority of his statements.
National television protrays Hu as a world leader who
receives the respect of foreign visitors. In our view,
however, such public relations efforts have made little
impression on cynical Chinese, who continue to see
Deng as the real leader of China
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Relations With Key Political Players
Deng and the Party Elders. The ups and downs of
Hu's career closely parallel Deng's. Hu clearly has
Deng's complete confidence.
Deng has entrusted Hu with numerous
sensitive political missions over the years
Despite their closeness, Hu and Deng apparently do
not agree
Den is more conservative
Hu is also more skeptical of the
United States and warmer toward the Third World
than Deng. Their differences, however, are clearly at
the margins of most issues and generally seem to be
matters of tone and emphasis rather than substance.
Hu is willing to buck
Hu has stated repeatedly and with apparent
sincerity that Deng is still "the helmsman" and that
Deng makes the hard decisions on major issues
We believe Hu's relations with some top leaders are
strained, and we doubt that any of the party's patri-
archs would feel compelled to defer to Hu in Deng's
absence. These men, who are in their seventies and in
declining health, see Hu as a talented junior partner
at best, and, while becoming less active, they still
exert great influence over policy and personnel deci-
Politburo member and party elder Ye Jianying in
particular has reservations about Hu. Ye differs with
Deng on aspects on the reform program, which Hu
supports, and Hu's harsh criticism of Mao does not
agree with Ye. Ye was also ex-party Chairman Hua
Guofeng's staunchest supporter on the Politburo
... To maintain the long-term stability and conti-
nuity of our party organizations, maintain and
carry forward our party sine traditions, and
continuously implement its lines, principles and
policies, it is necessary for the old comrades ... to
retire to the second line ...3
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Figure 3. Hu and three of the
most influential party elders,
Chen Yun (seated left), Deng
(seated right), and Li Xiannian
Publicly and in face-to-face situations, however, Hu
has been careful to praise the elders and to appear
deferential. His effusive praise for them and his self-
effacing statements after his promotion were intended
to win them over.
the Chinese image of the ideal leader,
The evidence is circumstantial but Hu appears to be
taking measures to ensure that Zhao's influence does
not grow to rival his own.
many informed Chinese expect-
ed Zhao to gain a seat on the powerful party Secretar-
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Zhao and Peers. We believe Hu regards Premier iat at the 12th Congress last September. He did not,
Zhao Ziyang as a talented subordinate and not as a and this key oversight body was packed with Hu's
rtner. associates. Associates of Zhao also did poorly in the
government reorganization last spring, although thu
government bureaucracy is Zhao's bailiwick; allies of
Hu did reasonably well. Hu's strong advocacy of
separating party and government functions has the
effect of reducing further the government's policy
formulating role, thus making the post of premier a
less powerful position
Hu may see Zhao as a potential rival." Zhao too
shares Deng's confidence, although he is not nearly as Other real or potential rivals of Hu have fared less
close to Deng as Hu is, and Zhao is the leader many well. Hua Guofeng was purged, and the 12th Party
Chinese associate with the most successful reform Congress also removed Peng Chong from the Politbu-
policies. Zhao's reserved style also more closely fits ro. Peng, who retains his government posts, is one of
the very few leaders who is young enough and suffi-
ciently well connected to become a rival on his own.
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Peng also was responsible for the internal security
apparatus, a crucial function assumed by one of Hu's
close associates. Deng largely engineered the removal
of both men, and he can be expected to move against
any others who show signs of coveting the top job. F_
senior mili-
tary officers are uneasy with Hu. We believe in 1981
they denied him a seat on the party's Military Com-
mission, the organ that sets military policy, although
Hu's position as party head entitled him to the
chairmanship. Some officers even prefer abolishing
the body to giving Hu a seat
Such sentiments seem to represent the extreme point
of view, however, and in our judgment Hu's differ-
ences with the military at this time are not so severe
that he faces an insurrection once Deng dies.
lacks the stature to head the party (some refer to him
as "the cricket" or "Mr. Nonsense," a pun on his
name), and others focus on his lack of military
experience. Hu is regarded as too liberal on cultural
and social issues by many, and Hu's outspoken and
frequent criticism of Mao, who is still revered in
military circles, has alienated military men. There
seems to be a belief in the People's Liberation Army
(PLA) that Hu does not understand or appreciate the
army's needs and that, once Ye and Deng pass from
the scene, the military will be without a sympathetic
ear at the most senior party levels. Many military men
are wary of the political and economic reform pro-
gram, which they see threatening their prerogatives
and political power
Mao Zedong made enormous contributions to the
Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist
Party. But he also committed errors, especially in
his later years. These errors brought misfortune to
the party and people. Chairman Mao and other
leaders bear the responsibility for the abnormal
conditions that developed during the Cultural
Revolution.'
The Cultural Revolution was more than a revolu-
tion: a disaster."
To some degree the military's concerns are justified.
Certainly the reform program will reduce the PLA's
political clout, and Hu's views on social and cultural
issues are more liberal than the army's. In our opinion
6 Remark to Secretary General Carrillo of the Spanish Communist
Party in November 1980
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Figure 6. Hu and key military supporter, Chief of
Staff Yang Dezhi, sweeping a street as part of
adopted positions closer to the military on cultural
issues, and he criticized those seeking an investigation
of military abuses during the Cultural Revolution. Hu
has also toured in the provinces and met with the
regional military commands. In our view, however,
Hu's actions may have impressed younger officers but
probably have done little to alleviate senior military
Hu has fed the suspicions with his frequent harsh
statements about Mao and the Cultural Revolution
and his tendency to say different things to different
audiences.
Not all military officers are opposed to Hu.
influential men like Chief
of Staff Yang Dezhi and Beijing Military Region
Commander Qin Jiwei support him. Moreover, the
military is not a unified, single political actor; all the
points of view present in Chinese society are reflected
in the PLA, and no one man can "deliver" the army in
the succession. The opposition to Hu seems concen-
trated at the very top
We believe the influence of this
group has declined as a result of last year's govern-
ment reorganization and changes made in the military
command structure in the last several months.__~
Both Hu and Deng have expended considerable ener-
gy wooing the military in the last two years. Deng has
made fewer public appearances in part to build Hu's
image as a leader, and Hu in his frequent addresses to
military audiences has tried hard to assuage their
concerns about the impact of the reform program and
the party's criticism of Mao. Under pressure Hu has
concerns or doubts about his leadership.
Intellectuals. The intellectual and artistic communi-
ties are Hu's most ardent supporters. Hu has argued
in the leadership for relaxing controls on the arts and
for giving intellectuals a leading role in the modern-
ization program. He has also defended intellectuals
from more conservative elements, particularly the
military, who are angered by their criticism of Mao,
the PLA, and socialism. Although Hu has taken a
harder line on cultural issues lately, many intellectu-
als profess. to understand the political necessity and
claim not to harbor ill will toward Hu,
The intellectual community is not a political force in
China, but it has performed valuable services for Hu.
He has used their talents to criticize and discredit the
views of opponents, including Hua and the military.
The intellectuals are also a source of policy expertise
and advice in areas where Hu needs assistance, such
as economic and technical issues.
Policy Views
Our knowledge of Hu's policy views is clouded by his
tendency to tailor his remarks to his audience and the
fact that most public statements in China reflect a
general leadership view rather than personal opinion.
Our records suggest to us, too, that until recently Hu
has tended to be more of an executor of policy than a
formulator
Two facts, however, clearly emerge from Hu's speech-
es and statements over the years: his primary concern
is the health and well-being of the party, and he is
most influential in the area of party policy and
personnel. Hu speaks with the greatest passion when
discussing the need to restore popular confidence in
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the party and repair the damage done to the institu- Hu realizes he cannot sweep the party clean of all
tion by Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Hu justifies opponents, but he has positioned himself to exert the
much of his political program in terms of recapturing most influence over the purge. Hu's closest associate,
the spirit of commitment and self-sacrifice he believes Hu Qili, is in charge of planning the campaign,
characterized the pre-1949 period. according to a People's Daily editor, and Hu himself
is active in the party's Central Discipline Inspection
The basic tenets of Mao Zedong's thinking ... still Commission and the Special Investigation Group,
are of a guiding significance for Chinese cadres ... which is ferreting out Gang of Four followers. Other
(but) some of the tenets are no longer applied. Hu associates are involved in internal security and
party administration.
Despite a close personal identification with the party
and its ideals, Hu has a well-deserved reputation as a
pragmatist. We believe Hu, like Deng, judges the
value of a policy by its results and, if need be, will use
his considerable intellectual abilities and in-depth
knowledge of Marxism to find an appropriate ideolog-
ical justification. Hu's pragmatism has its bounds,
however. Like other top leaders, he will not abide
those who question the suitability of socialism for
China or challenge the role of the party.
In addition to the purge, Hu argues that if the party is
going to provide leadership it must become a leaner,
less autocratic organization and there must be a clear
separation of party and government functions.
u also favors relaxing the class-
background test for party membership, upgrading
Political Agenda. A thorough purge of the party, educational requirements, and allowing intellectuals a
which is scheduled to begin later this year and run larger role in party councils. Improved discipline,
through 1986, is at the top of Hu's agenda. He has led including the elimination of corruption, and greater
the fight to rehabilitate cadre purged in the Cultural emphasis on personal responsibility are major themes
Revolution and to punish those responsible for the in Hu's speeches and statements. Perhaps most impor-
excesses of the period. Hu has been among the most tant, Hu believes party institutions must be strength-
strident in calling for the removal from the party of ened so that no one can abuse authority as Mao did.
two other classes of individuals as well: those who
have failed to support wholeheartedly the reform
program and the incompetent! Not surprisingly, Hu
is one of Mao's harshest critics.
In most of his official statements, Hu has stressed that
"very few" people will lose their party membership,
but we believe Hu is actually targeting millions of
factors exist to some degree in China.
Soviet Union, insufficient attention to living stand-
ards, too little democracy, and abuse of privilege by
party officials. Hu points out that the last three
The personnel and institutional changes advocated by
Hu serve his own political needs, but we believe they
also reflect a deep personal concern about declining
popular confidence in the party and its leadership. We
believe Hu is one of the leaders most alarmed by
events in Poland. In analyzing the roots of that crisis,
Hu points to four factors: overdependence on the
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if you do not act as you preach, nobody will listen
to you. You say you will serve the people whole-
heartedly, but, if you do not act as you say, the
consequences will be very bad. People will listen to
you if you act as you preach. This is the most
important requirement for doing a good job in
ideological and political work.9
Hu's remedy-besides cleansing the party-is to im-
plement the reform program. In speeches Hu has
stressed especially:
? Strengthening the legal system.
? Promoting intellectuals and experts regardless. of
class backgrounds to responsible positions, especial-
ly in the economy.
? Reducing social controls including those on the arts.
? Allowing more popular participation in local
decisionmakina.
willing to tolerate more ferment in the system than
other leaders. Hu's support for the "democracy wall
movement" in 1979 bolsters this impression.
Economic Views. Hu does not seem to be a key .
economic policymaker; Politburo members Chen Yun
and Premier Zhao share that responsibility and we
believe Hu defers to them. Moreover, we believe Hu
may have a relatively unsophisticated understanding
of economics and the complexity of the problems
facing China. In our view, he has a tendency to see
China's economic problems as essentially personnel
problems; this is an important aspect of the situation
but to emphasize it underestimates the primacy of
institutional obstacles to growth. Reflecting his long
years in propaganda and ideological work, he also
seems to overestimate the value of propaganda cam-
paigns and moral suasion as solutions to economic and
other policy problems.
Based on the relatively few statments we have, Hu's
views on economic development strategy seem closer
to Chen Yun's, a cautious supporter of the reform
program, than Zhao's, one of the program's most
enthusiastic advocates. Like other leaders Hu has
endorsed the principle of giving managers more con-
trol over their enterprises, but his speeches have a
more orthodox Marxist tone and stress central plan-
ning and limits on experimentation; Hu liberally
quotes Chen on these issues. We believe Hu may also
favor a somewhat faster rate of growth than other
leaders. In a 1980 speech in which he bitterly at-
tacked Hua, Hu stated Hua's advocacy of high
economic targets and heavy industry, which other
reformers were attacking, was not a major shortcom-,
ing.
Hu has strongly supported the Special Economic
Zones, four small areas on China's coast where
extensive foreign investment is encouraged. During a
recent inspection tour of the provinces, Hu attempted
to reassure nervous cadre that.the psuedocapitalistic
zones have the support of the leadership and that
cadre who enforce controversial economic policies
today will not suffer politically tomorrow. He also
stated that China's open door to the world will
continue-media warnings about a dangerous influx
of bourgeois influences notwithstanding-and encour-
aged local officials to expand their foreign trade
We should promote a new cooperative economy by
encouraging the peasants to pool their money
together to start their own undertakings, be share-
holders of their own businesses, manage their
businesses democratically, and determine the
amounts of their bonuses.1?
a public letter to a provincial
official last March indicate to us that Hu is more
willing to reduce central control of agriculture than of
industry. He favors giving greater authority over
income, field management, and marketing to the
peasant with the collective retaining only formal title
to the land and Beijing a say in the mix of crops sown.
Hu also endorses a system of private peddlers who
would travel from village to village buying and selling
excess production, a practice criticized as petty capi-
talism and speculation in the past.
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Foreign Policy. Based on our review of Hu's career,
we believe he has had little influence in foreign policy
matters in the past; until his elevation to General
Secretary he focused almost entirely on domestic
politics. Hu has downplayed his role in foreign affairs
during conversations with visitors-he has always
stuck close to the official line in such meetings-
makes ee major decisions, and he continues to have
Deng still
the sensitive, substantive conversations with visitors.
We believe Hu fully expects to assume Deng's role,
however, and he clearly is expanding his influence in
foreign affairs. He is seeing more foreigners and
placing associates in the foreign policy bureaucracy.
Hu is particularly well represented in the party's
United Front Work Department and International
Liaison Department, which suggests to us Hu is
particularly interested in such issues as the status of
Hong Kong and Taiwan and party-to-party relations.
Hu has almost no firsthand knowledge of the world
beyond China's borders. He visited Romania, Alba-
nia, and the Soviet Union briefly in the 1950s and the
early 1960s, Kampuchea in 1978, and North Korea in
1982. To our knowledge he has never traveled in a
non-Communist country, and until last year he met
very few foreigners who were not Marxists or Social-
ists. Given his concentration on internal politics
throughout his career, Hu's understanding of the
Western democracies would appear to be very limited.
As far as we know, Hu speaks no foreign language.F-
Elements of the traditional ethnocentric Chinese view
of the world are evident in Hu's speeches and com-
ments. A tone of moral superiority comes through
Hu's pronouncements, as when he told one party
gathering that China's international relations are
distinguished by a high degree of integrity. Like his
19th century forebearers, Hu is very interested in
acquiring Western know-how but is concerned about
the cultural attitudes and "bourgeois" values that
might accompany it. Hu reminded a group of writers
in 1980 that, although foreigners have skills China
needs, they are not comrades and must not be treated
as Chinese.
Hu strikes us as poorly informed about how advanced
much of the world is compared with China, which is
not surprising given his limited travel and contacts
with foreigners.
At the Ambas-
sador's conference last summer, Hu stated that mo-
rale in embassies would improve if officials traveled
more in their host country; they would then appreciate
the quality of life in China. As is the case in other
policy areas, better ideological education is Hu's
standard prescription for combating the appeal of
Western lifestyles.
Analysis of Hu's conversations and speeches on for-
eign relations suggest to us that he favors identifying
China more closely with Third World interestsF-
u differs with Deng on this issue, and
Hu would also prefer a more passive foreign policy
that would allow China to concentrate on domestic
issues.
Hu's views on relations with the United States are
very much in keeping with his view of the world and
limited exposure to the West.
Hu is more skeptical of the
relationship with the United States than Deng, and a
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Hu is one of
those taking a particularly hard line on US dealings
with Taiwan. Caution is required, but the few private
remarks Hu has made on the political relationship
seem to support their assessments. In a speech to the
Secretariat in 1981, Hu reportedly accused Washing-
ton of paying attention to Beijing only when forced to,
and, Hu
made a point of noting that friendly Sino-US relations
are a fairly recent development and the exception to
the rule. The 1981 speech did acknowledge the strate-
gic importance of the United States in dealing with
the Soviet threat, however, and when discussing the
economic relationship with US officials, Hu has ex-
pressed interest in expanding trade and exchanges.
Hu has kept to the party line when discussing Sino-
and we believe he supports efforts to reduce tensions
with the Soviet Union. The history of Sino-Soviet
relations and his analysis of Poland's problems sug-
gest to us that he is wary of moving too close or too
quickly. We believe recent statements to the press by
Hu that convey an impression of flexibility, including
a willingness to restore party-to-party relations under
the right circumstances, reflect a leadership position
rather than Hu's personal view. The 1981 speech to
the Secretariat, and other speeches since then, indi-
cate to us that Hu has not changed his perception of
the Soviet threat to China.
The Task Before Hu
A Succession Balance Sheet. Hu enters the succession
sweepstakes with some significant advantages that
seem to be increasing. He already has the top title,
General Secretary of the party, and he enjoys the
trust of the most influential man in China, Deng.
Deng, moreover, has repeatedly demonstrated a will-
ingness to expend his political capital to advance Hu's
cause. Hu has begun building an impressive power
base in the party, and he is in an excellent position to
expand it during the upcoming purge.
Many of the most frequently voiced objections to
Hu-his relative youth, inexperience in military af-
fairs, lack of national stature-apply with equal or
greater force to most would-be rivals. Hu's headstart
coupled with Deng's comparatively good health make
it very difficult for a peer to challenge Hu
These pluses are enhanced by Hu's considerable
personal abilities. Chinese press reports, credible in
light of the descriptions of those who have met Hu,
present a picture of a man capable of working long
hours to see that his ideas become reality. In an aging
and infirm leadership, Hu may simply be able to
outwork his opponents-particularly those among the
party elders. A self-confident man steeled in the
rough-and-tumble politics of the Cultural Revolution,
Hu is a political competitor who will not passively
accept defeat.
Hu's weaknesses are more difficult to assess because
they are more subjective. Some of his personal traits,
for instance, could easily become liabilities. Hu's
considerable drive produces behavior that may be
viewed by others as impulsive and exceeding his
authority. He injects himself into minor matters over
which he does not have major responsibility, a pattern
which may in the long run generate considerable
resentment even among his political allies. He also has
a tendency to speak rashly and to make snap judg-
ments, which he later has to qualify or reverse.
The seriousness of Hu's image problem is also hard to
gauge. The temptation is to minimize it, but Hu is still
a man who reached the top on Deng's coattails, not 25X1
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ability. In our judgment, 18 months after reaching the
top, Hu is not yet viewed as an independent leader.F_-]
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Hu needs a policy success, too, which would help his 25X1
image problem. Unfortunately for him, policies he is
closely identified with-the new minorities policy,"
the easing of restrictions on the arts and dissent-are
floundering or have been partially reversed or have
generally. failed to yield the expected results. Increas-
ingly, Hu has attempted to link his name with the
successful agricultural reforms by appearing at fo-
rums that tout their success. The agricultural reforms,
however, are more closely identified with Zhao, who
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pioneered them in Sichuan Province, and it is unlikely
that Hu will garner little more than reflected gloryF-
In our judgment the largest question facing Hu is
whether he can hold the reform coalition together-
elders and peers. Like Hu, Deng has a reputation for
abrasiveness and bullheadedness, but, after his return
to power in 1978, Deng found the ability to compro-
mise and to placate while patiently advancing his
program. The immediate post-Deng period will be
tense as elders and peers jockey for influence. Hu will
have to court and placate and cajole other players-if
he is to consolidate his power. Hu's impulsive, hard-
charging style makes him prone, in our judgment, to
overreact in a situation requiring a deft touch, and he
could easily alienate friends as well as critics. Hu's
chances for success will improve materially if he can
learn from Deng.
Bureaucractic Musts. Because of the progress he has
made, Hu's survival is becoming less a question of
how long Deng lives and more a question of Hu's
ability to put a few more important pieces in place.
Three broad areas stand out-the party elders, mili-
tary, and party/government bureaucracy.
Hu's progress in these three areas can be gauged in
the months ahead by his success in accomplishing
some specific tasks. To the degree that the following
occurs, Hu increases his chances of surviving and
prospering after Deng dies:
? Party elders die, but most especially Politburo mem-
bers Ye, Chen, Li Xiannian, Li Desheng, Zhang
Tingfa, Wei Guoqing, and Peng Zhen.
? Hu gains at least a seat on the Military Commis-
sion, preferably its chairmanship.
? Yang Dezhi and Qin Jiwei increase their influence
in the military.
? Xiang Nan, Hu's candidate, replaces Song Ren-
qiong as head of the Organization Department.
? Hu's associates gain leadership positions in the
Ministry of Public Security and the economic plan-
ning bureaucracy, where Chen and Zhao are
strongest.
? The party purge begins on time and succeeds in
removing critics of the Deng-Hu program down to
senior provincial levels.
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Appendix B
An Analytical Chronology
of Hu Yaobang's Career
Liaison
Figure 9. Hua Guofeng, Mao's Figure 10. Hu in the 1950s
handpicked successor and the when he was head of the Com-
1915 Born in Hunan Province.
1921 Chinese Communist Party founded at Shanghai in July.
Participated at age 12 in the Autumn Harvest Uprising in Hunan, one of a series
of bloody clashes instigated throughout China that year by the party. It was
crushed and the survivors, including Mao, fled to mountainous areas and began re-
building the party.
Japanese began military expansion in China and the Chinese Communist Party
declared war on Japan.
1933 Active in Communist Youth League in the "liberated area" of central China.
1934 Nationalist forces surrounded and crushed the liberated area, and party leaders,
including Hu, began the Long March to Yanan, a sanctuary in north China.
1936 Studied at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political Academy in Yanan and was
elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League.
1937 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July marked the beginning of the full-scale
Japanese offensive in China.
1941 Active in the Organization Department of the General Political Department of the
18th Army Corps.
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World War II ended and Chinese civil war began. Hu was active in political work
in the 2nd Field Army, in which Deng was the Political Commissar.
Active in North Sichuan Military Government after Communist victory.
Became a secretary of the New Democratic Youth League, the postliberation
name for the Communist Youth League, and transferred to Beijing. ,
Headed Chinese delegation to the World Federation of Democratic Youth in
Bucharest, Romania, and was elected Vice Chairman of the World Federation.
Elected to the Eighth Central Committee and gave the report on youth work to the
Congress.
Mao's call to "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" led to sharp criticism from
intellectuals about the party and Communism. The regime cracked down on
intellectuals. Hu was now head of the Communist Youth League (renamed again)
and attended the World Youth Festival in Moscow.
Great Leap Forward began and resulted in massive setbacks for the economy. Hu
very active in youth work during the period.
Led a Sino-Albanian Friendship delegation to Albania for 1 October, Chinese
National Day. While there, Hu made a very tough anti-Soviet speech in which he
reaffirmed standard Chinese positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Made very few appearances between 1962 and 1964, but reelected First Secretary
of the Communist Youth League in July.
Named Third Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the party Central Committee
and First Secretary of Shaanxi Province. Hu's exact status in the leadership was
confused by contradictory identifications in the Chinese media and his continuing
appearances in Beijing.
Purged during the Cultural Revolution as a member of the Liu Shaoqi-Deng
Xiaoping Antiparty Clique.
Reappeared in April 1972 but was not identified as holding a political post.
Hu's mentor Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated and appointed Vice Premier.
As Deng's influence grew, Hu became more active. At work in the Chinese
Academy of Sciences, which became a source of expertise and policy ideas for
Deng.
In January Premier Zhou Enlai died and Deng and Hu were purged again. Mao
died in September and the Gang of Four were toppled from power a month later.
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Hu returned to public life in March and Deng returned in July. The two men com-
menced a long struggle to unseat party Chairman Hua Guofeng. Hu was elected to
the 11th Central Committee and became head of the party's Organization
Department. He was also Vice President of the Party School. These posts put him
in a position to influence the removal of Gang of Four supporters from the party.
Elevated to the Politburo at the Third Plenum of the 11th Congress in December.
The Congress laid the ideological foundation for the reform program. Hu also
became Third Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission. In November he
led a Chinese delegation to Kampuchea.
Hu became head of the party Propaganda Department in January and relin-
quished control of the Organization Department. He also served as Secretary
General of the Central Committee.
At the Fifth Plenum of the 11th Congress in February, Hu was elevated to the Po-
litburo Standing Committee. The Congress also reestablished the Secretariat,
which Hu headed as General Secretary. The Secretariat began to evolve into the
key organ responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the party. As Hu's political
fortunes improved, Hua Guofeng's declined; four key supporters of Hua were
dropped from the Politburo at the Plenum. Zhao Ziyang replaced Hua as Premier
in September.
Final blow for Hua came at Sixth Plenum in June when he was forced to resign as
Chairman after 15 months of political maneuvering. Hu was named to replace
him.
The 12th Party Congress abolished the position of chairman and vice chairman of
the party, leaving Hu atop the party structure as General Secretary. Hu began, to
meet more foreign visitors and traveled to North Korea with Deng.
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Appendix C
Key Associates of Hu Yaobang
National officials are listed under more than one
category if they hold more than one major position.
Provincial officials are listed only in the provincial
section, even though some also hold national titles.
Party organs
Bai Zhimin Deputy Director, Organization De-
partment; member, Central Disci-
pline Inspection Commission; mem-
ber, 12th Central Committee.
Chen Pixian Member, Secretariat; member, 12th
Central Committee.
Feng Wenbin Deputy Director, Party History Re-
search Center; Vice President, Party
School.
Gao Zhanxiang Secretary, Communist Youth
League; Vice Chairman, All-China
Youth Federation; alternate mem-
ber, 12th Central Committee.
Guo Chunyun Member, Central Discipline Inspec-
tion Commission.
Han Tianshi Secretary, Central Discipline Inspec-
tion Commission.
He Jingzhi Deputy Director, Propaganda De-
partment; member, 12th Central
Committee.
Hu Qiaomu Member, Politburo; member, 12th
Central Committee.
Hu Qili Member, Secretariat; Director, Gen-
eral Office; member, 12th Central
Committee.
Hu Sheng Director, Party History Research
Center; member, 12th Central
Committee.
Jiang Member, 12th Central Committee.
Nanxiang
Li Chang
Identifications are based on similar career patterns,
promotion under circumstances suggesting Hu's ac-
quiescence if not. initiative, and simultaneous purges.
Party organs (continued)
Li Shuzheng
Liao Chengzhi
Ou Tangliang
Qian Liren
Wang Zhaohua
Wu Xueqian
Yang Jingren
Deputy Director, International Liai-
son Department; alternate member,
12th Central Committee.
Member, 12th Central Committee.
Adviser, International Liaison
Department.
Deputy Director, International Liai-
son Department.
Deputy Director, Organization De-
partment; member, 12th Central
Committee.
Member, 12th Central Committee.
Director, United Front Work De-
partment; member, 12th Central
Committee.
Zhang Jingfu Member, 12th Central Committee.
Zhou Secretary, Communist Youth
Pengcheng League.
Government posts
Ding Hao Ambassador to Ecuador.
Gao Yangwen Minister of Coal.
Hao Jianxiu Minister of Textiles.
Li Menghua Minister in Charge, State Physical
Culture and Sports Commission;
Vice Chairman, All-China Sports
Federation.
Liao Chengzhi Vice Chairman, National People's
Congress; Director, Office of Over-
seas Chinese Affairs.
Secretary, Central Discipline Inspec- Lu Jindong Vice Minister, State Physical Cul-
Li Ding Deputy Director,, United Front
Work Department.
ture and Sports Commission; Vice
Chairman, All-China Sports
Federation.
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Government posts (continued)
Ma Yi Vice Minister, State Economic
Commission.
Meng Yue Ambassador to Tunisia.
Song Yiping Deputy Secretary General, State
Council.
Wang Wei Vice Minister, Public Health.
Wu Xueqian Minister, Foreign Affairs.
Xu Cai ' Vice Minister, State Physical Cul-
ture and Sports Commission:
Xu Yinsheng Vice Minister, State Physical Cul-
ture and Sports Commission; Vice
Chairman, All-China Youth
Federation.
Yang Jingren Minister in Charge, State National-
ities Affairs Commission.
Zhang Jingfu Minister in Charge, State Economic
Commission; State Councillor.
Intellectual community
Feng Wenbin Chairman, Commission for Collect-
ing Party Historical Data; President,
Research Society for Chinese Com-
munist Party Historical Figures.
He Jingzhi Vice President, China's Writer's
Association.
Hu Keshi Vice President, Chinese Academy of
Sciences.
Jiang Vice Chairman, National Academic
Nanxiang Degrees Committee.
Li Chang Executive Chairman, Presidium of
Chinese Academy of Sciences.
Qian Junrui Director, Institute of World Eco-
nomics, Chinese Academy of
Sciences.
Song. Yiping
Bai Jinian Vice Governor, Shaanxi.
Dong Xin Vice Governor, Jilin.
Ke Ligeng Vice Chairman, Nei Monggol Au-
tonomous Region People's Congress.
Li Ligong Executive Secretary, Shaanxi Pro-
vincial Party Committee; member,
Central Discipline Inspection
Commission.
Li Qiming Second Secretary, Yunnan Provin-
cial Party Committee; First Secre-
tary, Yunnan Provincial Discipline
Inspection Commission; member,
12th Central Committee.
Li Ruihuan Mayor, Tianjin; Secretary, Commu-
nist Youth League; Vice Chairman,
All-China Youth Federation; mem-
ber, 12th Central Committee.
Liang Buting Governor, Shandong; member, 12th
Central Committee.
Liu Bing Vice Governor, Gansu.
Liu Daosheng Secretary, Beijing Municipal Party
Committee.
Liu Xiyuan Deputy Political Commissar, Nan-
jing Military Region.
Meng Xiande Secretary, Guangdong Provincial
Party Committee; Vice Governor,
Guangdong.
Shen Xiaozeng Secretary, Ningxia Provincial Party
Committee.
Wang. Secretary, Guizhou Provincial Party
Chaowen Committee.
Xiang Nan First Secretary, Fujian Provincial
Party Committee; member, 12th
Central Committee.
First Political Commissar, Lanzhou
Military Region; Secretary, Gansu
Provincial Party Committee; mem-
ber, Military Commission of the
party.
Vice President, Chinese Academy of Xiao Hua
Social 'Sciences.
Wang Deputy Secretary General, Chinese
Zhongfang Academy of Social Sciences; Direc-
tor, Law Institute, Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences.
Xu Liqun Director, Institute of Philosophy,
Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences.
Xu Jianchu Vice Chairman, Shandong Provin-
cial People's Congress; Secretary,
Shandong Communist Youth
League.
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Provinces (continued)
Yan Jimin Vice Governor, Henan
Zhang Secretary, Tianjin Municipal Party
Huaisan Committee.
Zhang Ze Executive Secretary, Shaanxi Pro-
vincial Party Committee; member,
12th Central Committee.
Zhao Zengyi Acting Governor, Jiangxi; Secretary,
Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee.
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