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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: FORM

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STAT
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Japan's Liberal Democratic
Party Factions
Secret
EA 83-10068
April 1983
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ijIrMAVra LC VI
Intelligence
Japan's Liberal Democratic
Party Factions
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by ffice
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
This paper was coordinated with the National
Intelligence Council.
Secret
EA 83-10068
April 1983
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 4 March 1983
was used in this report.
Japan's Liberal Democratic M
Party Factions F_~ 25X1
Since 1972 six different prime ministers have led Japan, compared with
only three during the previous 15 years. The turnover in recent years has
been caused primarily by the factional infighting that has persisted since
Kakuei Tanaka defeated Takeo Fukuda-an older and more senior
contender-in the party's presidential election of 1972. The election of
Yasuhiro Nakasone last fall did nothing to resolve this conflict. Indeed,
Tanaka's support was instrumental in Nakasone's victory, which was
bitterly opposed by Fukuda.
This year promises even more intense factional maneuvering in the decade-
long conflict. The major event is likely to occur in October or November,
when a verdict is reached in the trial of former Prime Minister Tanaka for
involvement in the Lockheed scandal of 1976. If found guilty-as is widely
anticipated-Tanaka will be under intense pressure to retire from active
politics immediately, even though the judicial appeals process could last
years.
Fukuda, at 77, has virtually no hope of regaining party leadership. Former
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, whose faction Fukuda inherited, is
pressing Fukuda to step aside in favor of Kishi's son-in-law, Foreign
Minister Shintaro Abe. The death of the leader of a minor faction earlier
this year and uncertainty about a successor to former Prime Minister
Suzuki as head of the party's second-largest faction will further complicate
factional politics.
We, and virtually all other political observers, believe that factions will
continue to dominate the Liberal Democratic Party. How well the factions
work together and how they are aligned on key issues will influence
Japanese policy toward Washington because the LDP is playing a more
forceful and direct role in the US-Japan relationship. An expanded role for
the Nakasone faction in the mainstream alliance, for example, would move
Japan closer to the United States on defense issues.
Secret
EA 83-10068
April 1983
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Secret
Japan's Liberal Democratic
Party Factions
The Japanese media have long criticized factions of
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for their corrupt
"money" politics and their undemocratic methods of
selecting a party president. Nonetheless, the factions
are well rooted in Japanese political tradition and are
an important reason why the LDP has ruled continu-
ously since its inception in 1955
Indeed, the real contest for political power takes place
within the LDP, not between the LDP and other
parties. If the incumbent party leader or his policies
become a political liability, the leader of another
faction is selected; usually one or more are different
enough in style and approach from the incumbent to
be welcomed by the public as a fresh alternative.
(Faction leaders are often called daiymo-a reference
to the feudal lords during the Tokugawa period.)
During national elections, factions compete with each
other as well as with opposition parties. As long as
factional competition remains within the bounds of
electoral arithmetic, it adds an element of dynamism,
and thus electoral strength, to the party. F_
Another reason why factions are vital to the LDP is
the considerable expense required to run an election
campaign. The main supplier of political funds has
been the LDP, which through its organizations raised
$55 million for LDP candidates in 1980, according to
official records.
This is not, however, enough money to support all
LDP-endorsed candidates adequately, and few can
collect enough on their own to make up the difference
between what the party provides and what is required.
As a result, an aspiring candidate for a Diet seat
usually finds it necessary to approach one of the
faction leaders for supplementary campaign funds. In
return for campaign contributions, the candidate
pledges to work with the faction if elected. In fact, one
of the principal prerequisites for becoming a faction
leader is the ability to raise political funds.
The factions have also become almost the only road to
increasingly influential Cabinet and party offices.
When a prime minister is forming his Cabinet, each
faction lobbies for its candidates. The eventual com-
position of the Cabinet reflects to some extent the
relative strength of each faction, but many of the key
portfolios-foreign affairs, finance, trade, and the
cabinet secretary-are distributed to the factions
closely linked with the Prime Minister (see table 1).
The Current Lineup
The LDP is currently made up of six factions-
Tanaka, Suzuki, Nakasone, Fukuda, Komoto, and
Nakagawa-and a group of nonaligned members. All
are named after the faction leader. And, with the
exception of the Nakagawa faction, all have histories
of supplying prime ministers, cabinet ministers, and
party leaders (see chart). The current Suzuki faction,
for example, traces its history from the late Prime
Minister Ikeda (1960-64) through Ohira (1979-80) to
Suzuki (1980-82). Four of the current faction lead-
ers-Tanaka, Fukuda, Suzuki, and Nakasone-are or
have been prime ministers. Nakagawa and Komoto
were prime-ministerial candidates in 1982.
As in the past, the choice in 1982 for party presi-
dent-and thereby prime minister because of the
party's majority in the Diet-reflected the balance of
factional alliances. Prime Minister Nakasone had the
support of his own group and that of former Prime
Ministers Suzuki and Tanaka. Together, this alli-
ance-termed the mainstream-accounts for nearly
60 percent of LDP Diet members.'
' Alliances between factions are described as "mainstream" and
"antimainstream." The classic mainstream factions are those that
traditionally have been at or near the center of power-the Tanaka,
Suzuki, and Fukuda factions. In a more tactical sense, the main-
stream alliance is the governing coalition at any given moment. The
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Table 1
Japan: Distribution of Key Cabinet and LDP
Posts Among Factions in the Nakasone Government
Faction Size Number of Title
Posts
Affairs Research
Council
Finance Ministry
Health and Welfare
Ministry
Construction Ministry
Home Affairs Ministry
Environment Agency
LDP Secretary General
87 5 Agriculture Ministry
Administrative Manage-
ment Agency
Science and Technology
Agency
Chairman, LDP Policy
Ministry of International
Trade and Industry
Post and Telecommuni-
cations Ministry
The Political Issues
The LDP factions disagree little on important politi-
cal issues:
? All of the leaders support a strong US-Japan
relationship.
? All have links to big and small business and rural
voters; these blocs represent the party's source of
funds and votes, respectively.
What differences they do have on issues are mainly
small and usually reflect different priorities or choices
of policies, not goals:
? All the factions support Tokyo's efforts to spur
industrial development and high technology, al-
though Komoto and Fukuda favor somewhat higher
government spending.
? Nakasone and Fukuda are more hawkish on defense
issues; Komoto's faction is probably the most dovish.
Nonetheless, the factions are finding it more and
more difficult to agree on major policies or to pick an
LDP president. In 1980, for example, Fukuda took his
faction off the Diet floor before a vote of no confi-
dence by opposition parties. Without Fukuda's sup-
Foreign Ministry port, the LDP lost the vote, and Prime Minister Ohira
Education Ministry was forced to dissolve the government and call elec-
Hokkaido Development tions. In 1982 the LDP had to hold a arty
Agency p y primary
Chairman, LDP Execu- for party president because the antimainstream would
tive Council not support the mainstream candidate, Nakasone.
Komoto 42 2 Japan Defense Agency
Okinawa Development
Labor Ministry
Justice Ministry
The "antimainstream" is lead by former Prime Minis-
ter Fukuda and includes the Komoto and Nakagawa
factions. The antimainstream can count on about 30
percent of the votes in a party caucus, not enough at
this point to challenge seriously any mainstream
candidate.
These two recent events clearly indicate the party is
being subjected to 'far more than the usual factional
contest for power. Party infighting, of course, is not
new; the late Prime Minister Ohira once described the
LDP as oil and water that would not mix. We believe
a major factor since the early 1970s has been the
enduring enmity between former Prime Ministers
Fukuda and Tanaka, which has added an element of
continuing tension to normal faction politics. Fukuda
is on record as saying his goal is to break Tanaka's
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secret
Liberal Party
Yoshida
1946-47 1948-54
Liberal
Democratic Party
1955-Present
Sato* Ikeda* Kono* Kishi Miki Ono*
Nov 64-Jul 72 Jul 60-Nov 64 Feb 57-Jul.60 Dec 74-Dec 76
Ohira*
Dec 78-Jun 80
* -Deceased
Dates -Term served as Prime Minister
1777 7
Mori* I L' Kawashima*~, Funada* Murakami*
Democratic Party
Hatoyama
Mizuta*
I I
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grip on the party. Tanaka and some other party
leaders blame Fukuda for the fall of the Ohira
government in 1980. The feud has also distorted the
factional system because both men have refused to
relinquish control of their factions, even though it is
traditional to do so after stepping down as prime
minister.
Tanaka Faction
With 110 members, the Tanaka faction is the largest
in the LDP, accounting for about a fourth of the
party's strength in the Diet. Its influence is even
greater. It is unlikely that a prime minister could
remain in office without Tanaka's support or that
major decisions could be made without his faction's
participation. The future of the faction is uncertain,
however, because of Tanaka's involvement in the
Lockheed scandal.
Influence and Power. Kakuei Tanaka has headed his
faction since 1972 when he took over former Prime
Minister Sato's group. A charismatic politician who
was widely regarded as a "people's prime minister"
when he headed the government during 1972-74,
Tanaka continues to have popular appeal and to
attract considerable media attention. He is the subject
of about 20 books and over half of the items on
politicians published in the Japanese press. This cov-
erage both demonstrates his continued influence and
helps to perpetuate it.
But Tanaka's dynamism only partly explains his
faction's influence in the LDP:
? Tanaka's principal lieutenants (Takeshita, Nikaido,
Gotoda, Esaki, and Ozawa) are skilled politicians
who have strong ties within the LDP and to the
bureaucracy and some opposition parties.
? One-third of the faction members have held cabinet
rank, and political observers consider five of them to
be potential prime ministers.
? Tanaka's most trusted lieutenant, Nikaido, holds
the second most powerful post in the party-secre-
tary general, who plays a key role in distributing
election campaign funds and determining which
politicians receive LDP endorsement.
? Gotoda, Tanaka's longtime confidant and a superb
conciliator within the party, holds the sensitive post
of chief Cabinet secretary.'
? Another Tanaka faction member, Takeshita, heads
the powerful Finance Ministry.
The influence of the Tanaka faction extends into
Japanese foreign policy. According to the press, the
Tanaka faction was instrumental in ensuring the
success of Nakasone's bold initiative to improve rela-
tions with South Korea and settle the bilateral aid
dispute. Prime Minister Nakasone recently sent
Nikaido to China as his envoy. In addition, Esaki has
chaired the special LDP Committee on Trade Rela-
tions under both Suzuki and Nakasone. Various
Tanaka lieutenants are playing important roles as
chairmen of other government and party consultative
meetings on the US-Japan trade issue.
Information and Money. Tanaka controls the most
effective network of local and national politicians,
businessmen, and bureaucrats in the LDP. This gives
' The chief Cabinet secretary is the Prime Minister's chief of staff,
his confidential emissary to government ministries and opposition
orlyl
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L70G. Ct
Table 2
Japan: Leaders and Key Members of the LDP Factions
Kakuei Tanaka 64 Masaharu Gotoda
Tatsuo Ozawa
Susumu Nikaido
Noboru Takeshita
Ganri Tamashita
Masumi Esaki
Zenko Suzuki 71 Rokusuke Tanaka
Kiichi Miyazawa 63 Kunikichi Saito
(Acting Chairman) Heiji Ogawa
Ito Masahari
Yasuhiro Nakasone 64 Takao Fujinami
Yoshio Sakurauchi 70 Sosuke Uno
(Acting Chairman) Sadanori Yamanaka
Tadashi Kuranari
Takeo Fukuda 77 Shintaro Abe
Kichizo Hosoda
Mitsuo Setoyama
Tadao Kuraishi
Mutsuki Kato
Komoto Faction
Toshio Komoto 71 Takeo Miki
(honorary chairman)
Kinji Moriyama
Hyosuke Niwa
Naozo Shibuya
Munenori Akagi
Takashi Hasegawa
Shiro Hasegawa
a Ichiro Nakagawa, the leader of this faction, committed suicide in
January 1983 at the age of 56. His faction retains his name but is
now led by Ishihara.
him an advantage over other factions and the opposi-
tion parties when it comes to raising political funds,
funneling public works spending into local projects,
and spotting new talent-particularly during election
campaigns. He also has a highly effective fundraising
system; Takeshita and Nikaido are two of the LDP's
large.
best fundraisers. In 1981 the faction's reported in-
come was roughly $3.5 million; several reliable ob-
servers, however, claim it may be four times that
Tanaka's personal political base is in his home prefec-
ture of Niigata, where he controls a 90,000-member
political club-the Etsuzankai. Some press reports
suggest Tanaka's backing is declining in this powerful
group, but financial contributions to the faction have
not tapered off. A well-placed observer noted recently
that Tanaka's war chest is much larger than that of
his longtime rival, Fukuda.
Direct campaign aid is only 'a part of Tanaka's
financial clout. He makes a point of recruiting former
bureaucrats into his faction and using their expertise
and ministerial connections to influence where gov-
ernment public works funds are spent and how gov-
ernment subsidies are allocated. Tanaka faction mem-
bers usually hold the construction or transportation
portfolios in the Cabinet. According to a close asso-
ciate of Esaki, key bureaucrats in several other minis-
tries, including International Trade and Agriculture,
take guidance from Tanaka.
Clouds on the Horizon. Tanaka has been on trial
since 1977 for taking bribes from the Lockheed
Corporation while Prime Minister. In late January
the prosecutor delivered his summation, requesting a
sentence of five years in prison and a fine of
$2 million. Most observers expect the court to deliver
a guilty verdict this fall. Although Tanaka is certain
to initiate a series of appeals, the public outcry and
likely political pressure for Tanaka to retire from
politics could cause the, faction considerable trouble.
There have already been signs that Tanaka's influ-
ence in his home constituency is eroding; an official
supported by Tanaka lost a local election in late 1982.
Tanaka and his faction, however, have been remark-
ably resilient, and in fact the faction has expanded
during the six years the Lockheed trial has been in
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progress. Tanaka himself apparently is not overly
concerned about the possible repercussions of the
trial. According to the press he is in good spirits and
hopes to be "politically active for another 10 years."
Some political observers in Tokyo predict that Tanaka
will try to minimize the impact of a guilty verdict by
resigning gracefully and establishing "a government-
in-exile" until he can be reelected, just as he did in
1975. We believe most 'of his faction members and his
supporters in his home district will remain unified
behind him in the face of outside criticism-at least
until the verdict is handed down.
Future Leaders. Under a guilty verdict, however, the
faction could begin to disintegrate. Younger members
are becoming increasingly concerned about their asso-
ciation with Tanaka. They recognize his influence and
want his backing, but they are afraid public associa-
tion with a faction bearing his name could hurt them
at the polls and hope for a change in leadership.
Takeshita may be unwilling to wait. According to
press reports, Takeshita has directed the faction to set
up individual accounts for each political fundraiser.
We believe he wants to draw a clear line between his
war chest and that of other members in case the
faction does split. Even if the faction dissolves, we
believe Tanaka will remain influential for some time
to come, wielding power from behind the scenes. His
supporters also probably will continue to be an impor-
tant factor in the mainstream.
Suzuki Faction
The 87-member Suzuki faction is the second largest
in the LDP. It was established by the late Prime
Minister Ikeda and has continued under the leader-
ship of Ohira and Suzuki. Although Suzuki retains
nominal control, he appointed Kiichi Miyazawa act-
ing chairman in December 1982.
The Miyazawa Factor. When Suzuki assumed control
of the faction-and the prime-ministership as well-
in mid-1980, after the sudden death of Ohira, he was
well known in the party as an organizer and mediator.
But he had held none of the government and party
posts that traditionally pave the way to the top and
had had little international exposure. His perform-
ance as prime minister'was lackluster, and last fall
mounting economic problems and criticism from the
antimainstream factions contributed to his decision
not to run for reelection.
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Suzuki has withdrawn from direct management of the
faction and has been grooming Miyazawa as his
successor and as prime minister. According to the
Japanese press, Miyazawa has the support of the
faction's senior members responsible for policy,
known as the group of seven, and his main rival in the
faction, Rokusuke Tanaka, is in poor health. In
addition, Miyazawa and Suzuki have close ties by
marriage, and Suzuki values Miyazawa's understand-
ing of policy issues and his experience in international
affairs.
Miyazawa's appointment as acting chairman has
strengthened his legitimacy as a candidate for prime
minister. Even though he was senior Cabinet secre-
tary in the Suzuki government, he has never held a
senior party post and is inexperienced in intraparty
maneuvering. The Japanese press describes him as a
bureaucratic elitist who lacks the interpersonal skills
to hold a faction together. Now he will have a chance
to work to increase the faction's role in formulating
LDP policy. To prove himself an effective leader he
must develop these skills and also show he can provide
financial support to his followers.'
The Tanaka Connection. The faction's longstanding
ties to Tanaka are beginning to cause some strains as
it becomes apparent that Tanaka will probably be
found guilty in the Lockheed trial.
Nakasone Faction
The 50-member Nakasone faction is the smallest in
the LDP mainstream. It projects an image of youth
' In 1981 Miyazawa personally collected nearly $1 million in
political funds, but Rokuzuke Tanaka outpaced him with more than
and vitality, even though many members are in their
sixties and seventies. Moreover, it is very well fi-
nanced and will be trying to increase its size in
upcoming national elections.
The President's Faction. Because Nakasone must
focus on government activity, he turned over the day-
to-day leadership of the faction to Yoshio Sakurauchi,
a widely respected senior faction leader and a former
Foreign Minister. Sakurauchi is faced with the task of
raising the faction's morale, which is low because
Nakasone appears to have ignored his own faction
when he formed his Cabinet in November 1982. The
Tanaka faction was given five portfolios, plus the key
position of chief Cabinet secretary. The Nakasone
faction holds only two.
Nonetheless, Nakasone has appointed his men as
deputies to key Cabinet ministers and top LDP
officials, helping to establish an effective Tanaka-
Nakasone team. In addition, many ranking Nakasone
faction members are influential and active in formu-
lating various LDP policies, particularly in defense
and agriculture.
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presidential campaign, defense industry stocks sky-
rocketed. In addition, the presidents of Kansai Feder-
ation of Economic Organizations (Kankeiren), the
Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Kei-
danren), and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and
Industry are Nakasone supporters.
The stock market is yet another source of political
funds. According to the press, in 1977 Nakasone
purchased stock at a special low price from a good
friend and shortly thereafter sold it at market prices
for a $2 million profit. In Japan deals such as this are
not uncommon. Media and other sources report that
many LDP members make big profits by purchasing
stocks-under special arrangement with the seller-
before the equities are offered to the public. One
influential LDP member has commented that money
contributed by business and industry is minuscule
compared with cash made through stock market
manipulation
These appointments, along with Nakasone's explana-
tion that he had to cooperate with Tanaka, have
somewhat appeased his supporters. Even so, some in
the faction are trying to decrease their dependence on
Tanaka's support, according to Japanese media
sources. The young leaders in particular are now
calling for the faction to increase by LO members in
the next lower house elections. We believe they have a
chance of succeeding but Nakasone will have to move
cautiously. As party president he risks losing support
in the LDP if he gains too much strength at the
Political Funds. The faction has the money to ex-
pand. According to public records, in 1981 the Naka-
sone faction collected more money than any other
faction-almost $6 million. A list of Nakasone's
business backers reads like an industrial "Who's
Who." It includes Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo,
Nippon Electric Corporation, and Kajima Construc-
tion. Nakasone has had close ties to Mitsui-related
businesses for almost 25 years.
Defense-related industries have always been a major
source of Nakasone's funds as a result of his strong
support for a military buildup. When opinion polls
showed him as the likely winner during the 1982 LDP
Fukuda Faction
The faction led by former Prime Minister Fukuda is
the third largest in the LDP, with 78 members. It is
the major force within the antimainstream camp.
Fukuda's most recent attempt to unseat the main-
stream during the 1982 presidential election ended in
failure, however. As a result,
have questioned his leadership
Influence. Fukuda inherited his faction in 1960 from
former Prime Minister Kishi, Japan's foremost right-
ist ideologue. As a former Finance Ministry bureau-
crat, Fukuda has had considerable influence over
LDP economic policy. In addition, the faction tradi-
tionally has had a strong voice in educational matters.
Since the mid-1970s the chairmen of the LDP Text-
book Committee and the Education Committee have
been in the Fukuda camp.
Like Nakasone, Fukuda and many in his faction
believe that Japan must improve its defense capabili-
ties and that the "peace" constitution should be
revised. Fukuda is discreet about expressing these
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views publicly, however. In the diplomatic arena, the
Fukuda faction has traditionally dominated the con-
duct of relations with Taiwan and South Korea.
Nakasone bypassed the faction, however, when he
moved quickly to solve the aid dispute with Korea
early in his administration.
Political Funds. Fukuda and his heir apparent,
Shintaro Abe, are effective political fundraisers. Their
main source of financial support is the business
community, particularly the financial sector. They
also receive backing from religious groups, and Abe
has ties to commodity exchange industries. According
to press reports, he was the central figure in promot-
ing the opening of Japan's first official gold exchange
market and was involv.,d in shady gold transactions.
Despite the skill of these two fundraisers, the reported
contributions to the faction dropped in 1981, perhaps
reflecting the faction's position in the antimainstream.
The group's bank account probably was also hurt last
year by Abe's unsuccessful campaign for the party
presidency
The Fukuda Faction Versus the Mainstream.
Fukuda's conduct during the 1982 LDP presidential
primary and his failure to elect an antimainstream
candidate has eroded his influence as a party leader:
? Fukuda's determination to wrest power from the
mainstream-and from Tanaka in particular-
forced a party primary. Fukuda's tenacious pursuit
of his goal, at the risk of splitting the party, has
tarnished his image as a responsible leader of the
antimainstream.
? Fukuda had promised Komoto that the antimain-
stream would support his candidacy for president of
the LDP. Fukuda subsequently nominated Abe.
? Ten members of the Fukuda faction hold dual
membership in the Nakagawa faction. Early last
fall Fukuda implied he would allow these 10 to
transfer to the small Nakagawa faction. The in-
creased numbers would have helped the faction
support Nakagawa's campaign for president of the
LDP. Fukuda changed his mind, alienating another
antimainstream faction.
Fukuda's Successor. Fukuda is also facing a struggle
in his own faction over future leadership. Fukuda's
last-minute support of Abe during the LDP primary
angered younger faction members and even some
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older ones. According to the press, the faction is now
divided into pro-Fukuda and pro-Abe groups. The
pro-Abe group is demanding that Fukuda hand over
control of the faction to Abe or at least that the group
be called the Fukuda-Abe faction. The pro-Fukuda
group insists that it could not work under Abe
Abe's defeat in the primary-though expected-
allowed Fukuda and other senior leaders to point out
that the Foreign Minister needs several more years of
grooming. Political observers recently rated Abe as
the weakest among the next generation of leaders,
despite his ability as a fundraiser. Nonetheless we
believe Abe will eventually assume leadership of the
Fukuda faction, if only because there is no other clear
challenger.
Komoto Faction
The Komoto faction was under the control of former
Prime Minister Miki until 1977. Miki had been
known for his liberal and dovish views; Komoto, a
former president of Sanko Steamship Company, tends
to reflect the views of big business. A financial expert,
he believes, according to the media, the Japanese
economy still has growth potential and strongly advo-
cates domestic stimulative measures. Komoto also
believes Japan should fulfill its global responsibilities
through increased foreign aid rather than increased
defense expenditures.
Financial Strength. When Miki was faction leader,
he had limited sources of financial support in the
business community. Komoto has more than made up
for that shortfall. In 1981 Komoto collected about
$4 million, which was far more than the totals Suzuki
and Tanaka reported. His financial supporters include
the shipping industry, prominent Osaka-Kobe indus-
trialists, and fellow Nippon University graduates who
-are in big business.
According to the press, leaders of the mainstream
factions view Komoto's fundraising ability as a threat.
He is the faction's only fundraiser, however, and this
casts doubt on the future of the group. Komoto's
principal lieutenants, Niwa and Shibuya, are seasoned
LDP Dietmen, well versed in interfactional battles
The 1982 Election Defeat. Before the LDP presiden-
tial primary last fall, it was widely believed that
Komoto had the largest number of rank-and-file
Nakasone defeated him by a wide margin, however,
mainly because of the support Nakasone received
from the powerful Tanaka and Suzuki factions, but
also because Komoto's faction failed to develop its
grass-roots support. Despite earlier promises of sup-
port from Fukuda, Komoto ultimately had to rely on
only his own faction.
His poor showing has caused many in his faction to
question his leadership. Although his business ties and
fundraising ability will make his followers think twice
before leaving the faction, most observers of the
Japanese political scene believe his influence within
the antimainstream has declined.
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Nakagawa Faction
With only 13 members, the Nakagawa faction is the
smallest in the LDP, but it had been one of the most
vocal and nationalistic. From the moment the faction
was formed in 1979, it played an active role in
bringing discussion of constitutional reform into the
open in LDP forums and has also called for improving
the Self Defense Forces. Nakagawa was the first
faction leader to challenge Prime Minister Suzuki last
fall, and he was potentially the most outspoken critic
of the Nakasone government. His suicide in January
crippled the faction, however, and its survival is
questionable.
Political Funds. Shintaro Ishihara, a popular author,
has assumed control of the Nakagawa faction, and,
with the help of veteran politicians Shiro Hasegawa
and Takashi Hasegawa, will try to keep it afloat. His
success will depend largely on his skill as a fundraiser.
According to the press, Nakagawa spent nearly $1.5
million in the 1982 presidential primary, draining the
faction's bank account. And with local and upper
house elections coming up, the faction will need
additional funds. Nakagawa's main sources were the
fishing industries-particularly Mitsubishi-and
small and medium-size enterprises. He received their
support because of personal ties built up over many
years. Ishihara and his lieutenants must try to main-
tain the existing Nakagawa pipeline and also develop
new sources of funds.
Uncertain Factional Ties. Although the Nakagawa
faction is still considered part of the antimainstream,
its position is not firm. Toward the end of the 1982
LDP primary election, Nakagawa began to pull away
from the alliance. He avoided meeting with the other
two antimainstream candidates and announced he
would cast his ballot for Nakasone in the final vote at
the LDP convention if the antimainstream candidates
were defeated in the primary.
Nakagawa's supporters could turn to the mainstream.
Ishihara is personally close to Nakasone. The Prime
Minister hopes to increase the strength of the main-
stream and as a result has been courting the
Nakagawa faction. He awarded a Cabinet post to one
of Nakagawa's followers, indicating that he recog-
nized the small group as a legitimate faction that
should be represented in the Cabinet. Previously,
Nakagawa had been the only member of his faction to
hold a Cabinet portfolio. a 25X1
The Independents
The nonaligned LDP Dietmen have held an important
place in party politics, frequently playing an instru-
mental role in settling factional disputes and broader
political differences. Their position is less prominent
now than it was 10 years ago, however, and the 25X1
Japanese press claims that morale is low.l 25X1
The Good Years. The neutralists enjoyed considerable
influence during the 1970s. In 1971 one-third of all
Dietmen were unaffiliated members of the LDP,
loosely organized into study groups. The members of
one group, run by Asao Mihara and Seisuke Okuno,
often invited incumbent prime ministers to meetings
where the independents presented their opinions and
recommended policy. Because the independents could 25X1
serve as a swing vote, a prime minister could not
afford to ignore their views. One who did-Takeo
Miki-lost his post in 1976 when neutralists cast the
deciding votes that toppled his government.
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Sources of Funding. In addition to the funds the party
provides every member, senior independent Dietmen
raised an average of $6,000 in political contributions.
Many use fundraising parties, but some can also
count on backing from businessmen in the Osaka-
Despite these sources of funds, the neutralists tradi-
tionally have had difficulty getting financial backing.
This has been a major reason why they have lost
influence in recent years. Most factions have been
able to improve political fund collection, sometimes
cutting into the neutralists' source of support. As a
result, many nonaffiliated members have been forced
to turn to one of the six factions for backing and have
been absorbed into the groups. Independents now
represent only 9 percent of LDP Diet members.
Tanaka's financial support of many independents has
also limited their political latitude. The media report-
ed last year, for example, that at Tanaka's instruction
many neutralists held down their criticism of the
Suzuki government. Since the late 1970s, successive
prime ministers have appointed a neutralist as Justice
Minister-ostensibly to keep politics out of the Minis-
try. Each has been pro-Tanaka, and it is widely
speculated in Japan they were appointed to keep the
Lockheed scandal, investigation from getting out of
hand.
The factional maneuvering that accompanied the
LDP presidential election last year also affected the
fortunes of the neutralists. The rivalry between the
mainstream and antimainstream factions was intense;
both groups put pressure on the neutralists to choose
sides. A majority of the most influential independents,
including Asao Mihara, Hirokichi Nadao, Zentaro
Kosaka, and I-Ichiro Hatoyama backed the antimain-
stream candidates, mainly to protest what they be-
lieved were Tanaka's attempts to dictate the choice of
the next prime minister.
Another unaffiliated LDP Dietman, lower house Pres-
ident Hajime Fukuda, sided with the mainstream.
According to press reports, he and pix of his followers
are likely to join the Tanaka faction after upper house
elections in June. Tanaka probably promised them
generous political funds. Most of them have held
Cabinet and LDP posts and may believe their chances
of holding even more prestigious Cabinet or party
posts would be greater as members of the Tanaka
faction. As a result, it seems likely that the influence
of the neutralist camp will decline even further. Even
former Foreign Minister Hatoyama, who sided with
the antimainstream last year, decided recently to join
a pro-Nakasone study group-Kinyo-kai-led by for-
mer Foreign Minister Sakurauchi.
Outlook
We, and virtually all other political observers, believe
factions will continue to dominate the LDP. For one
reason, campaigns are getting more expensive and
politicians with proven fundraising ability will find it
easier to attract supporters.
How well these factions work together will influence
Japanese policy toward Washington, because the LDP
is playing a more forceful and direct role in the US-
Japan relationship. The LDP committee on trade,
chaired by Esaki from the Tanaka faction, for exam-
ple, has been instrumental in pushing the Japanese
bureaucracy to do more to lower some Japanese
import barriers. On the other hand, LDP leaders such
as Kato (Suzuki faction) and Yamanaka (Nakasone
faction) have led the battle against liberalizing agri-
cultural import quotas, reflecting the farm lobby's
strong voice in the party
We expect the LDP will continue to expand its role.
From the US point of view, whether that role is
positive or negative will depend in part on how the
factions align themselves on key issues. An expanded
role for the Nakasone faction in the mainstream
alliance, for example, suggests that Japan-would edge
closer to the United States on defense issues.
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Secret
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