THE PHILIPPINES AFTER MARCOS: A PERSPECTIVE ON SUCCESSION POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00553R000200120004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
The Philippines Afterarcos:
A Perspective on
Succession Politics
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
DIA review
completed.
Secret
EA 83-10106
CR 83-12698
June 1983
Copy 2 / /~
`T
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Intelligence
The Philippines After Marcos:
A Perspective on
Succession Politics
Intelligence Council.
Office of East Asian Analysis, Office
of Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be.
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 83-10106
CR 83-12698
June 1983
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The Philippines After Marcos:
A Perspective on
Succession Politics
Key Judgments The concentration of political power in the person of President Ferdinand
Information available Marcos will make the transition to a new government precarious when he
as of 16 May 1983 departs the scene. Although Marcos has established institutions for
was used in this report.
overseeing presidential elections if he dies or is incapacitated in office, we
are uncertain that they will hold up.
In our judgment, no single individual among the ruling power elite now
commands sufficient resources to come to power on his or her own, but
Imelda Marcos seems to have the inside track. Defense Minister Enrile is
another contender, and there are two or three darkhorses, all from
Marcos's ruling circle. Succession jockeying is already under way among
presidential aspirants. The recent ruling party attack on Prime Minister
Virata's economic policies reflects Mrs. Marcos's longstanding desire to
wrest important policy areas from the technocrats' control. In the final
analysis, however, we believe the military will be the deciding factor in the
succession by its support of existing constitutional succession mechanisms.
The United States, because of its financial, military, and historical ties to
the Philippines, will inevitably be drawn into the succession process.
Political factions in the Philippines have constituencies among the 800,000
ethnic Filipinos living in the United States, and they will expect US
intervention on their behalf. At the least, Washington will be blamed if the
transition period is not smooth.
We believe our bilateral relationship will be altered in any case because an
immediate successor government, lacking the monopoly control over
politics Marcos currently enjoys, during the transition period will have
to appease domestic constituencies Marcos can ignore. The Philippine
Government might adopt a more nationalistic posture, which among other
things would focus on our use of military bases there.
iii Secret
EA 83-10106
CR 83-12698
June 1983
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Contents
Key Judgments
Formal Succession Arrangements
The Key Succession Players
The Moderate Political Opposition
Current Jockeying for Position
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A Chronology of Recent Constitutional Succession Mechanisms
1965 Marcos elected President for four-year term.
1969 Marcos reelected for second, and constitutionally mandated last, four-year term.
1972 Marcos declares martial law under provisions of the 1935 Constitution, citing danger of a violent
overthrow of the government by Communist rebels. Partisan political activity suspended.
1973 New British-style Constitution approved by hastily formed local assemblies. For an indefinite
transition period, Marcos is empowered both to exercise executive power as Prime Minister and
perform ceremonial functions as President; era of "constitutional authoritarianism" begins.
1978 Rubberstamp Batasang Pambansa-interim unicameral legislature-begins to function; Marcos
retains power to rule by decree if legislature is deadlocked; bill defeated that would have resurrected
office of vice president.
1981 Martial law lifted; Marcos retains power to have subversives arrested and held indefinitely, using
Presidential Commitment Orders. Plebiscite approves constitutional amendments that modify
parliamentary system along French lines. President given executive authority, including power to
nominate prime minister; president can now be elected to an indefinite number of six-year terms. Ex-
ecutive Committee is created. Marcos is reelected President in June and appoints Cesar Virata Prime
Minister; Marcos also names six other people to serve with Virata on the Executive Committee.
1982 Marcos gives General Ver secret memorandum of instructions on what to do if presidency became va-
cant. Opposition fears military takeover during an interregnum. Marcos names four more people to
Executive Committee, but one declines to serve. Legislature passes procedural rules for the Executive
Committee and defines presidential incapacity.
1983 Opposition leader in the legislature files a resolution calling for the restoration of the vice-presidency.
1984 Legislative elections to be held that will formally end the transition period to a new system of
government.
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The Philippines After Marcos:
A Perspective on
Succession Politics
The Succession Problem
After 17 years in office, Ferdinand Marcos is the glue
that holds the Philippine political system together.
Political institutions are largely his personal creations.
Several constitutional revisions and nine years of
martial law (1972-81) effectively neutralized the legis-
lature and the judiciary, expanded the political role of
the military, and kept his major opponents in exile or
divided. By skillfully pitting his opponents against one
another and preventing competing power centers from
emerging, he has precluded any single individual,
political party, or institution from amassing the
strength to fill the power vacuum his death, incapaci-
tation, or retirement will leave. Thus, we cannot say
who will succeed him or how well existing succession
mechanisms will hold up.
Formal Succession Arrangements
The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution es-
tablish a legal mechanism for succession (see box).
Although the amendments make no provision for a
vice president, they create an Executive Committee to
exercise authority collectively if Marcos dies or is
incapacitated while in office. The Committee's au-
thority lasts up to 90 days, during which time a
presidential election is to be held. If the Committee
became deadlocked or otherwise unable to carry out
its functions, the speaker of the legislature 2 would
25X1 become acting president
' 25X1
Not only will the Executive Committee be in a unique
position to shape the successor government, but sever-
al of its current members are potential contenders to
' Marcos's six-year term in office expires in 1987, and his intentions
are unknown. It is possible that he will designate a successor after
1986, but this assessment considers the possibility that the succes-
sion may occur before then through death or incapacitation, say in
' We believe that Querube C. Makalintal, the present speaker of the
legislature, would be only a figurehead as acting president, trans-
mitting the orders of the majority KBL party and whoever con-
trolled it. US officials report that Marcos chose Makalintal for the
speakership of the National Assembly because of his loyalty and
the next three years.
succeed Marcos, in our view. Except for the political
opposition to Marcos, most major interest groups-
the military, the technocrats, and the business elite-
are represented on the Committee. Because most
members of the Executive Committee are also mem-
bers,of the ruling party, the KBL (New Society
Movement) will inherit immediate control of the
government.
The prime minister serves as the Committee's chair-
man and would head an interim government. Al-
though the President can appoint up to 14 members to
work with him, the Committee now is composed of the
prime minister and nine other persons (see appendix
A). Because the President can appoint and remove
officials from the Executive Committee, Marcos still
has considerable power to influence the succession
process.
Serious doubts remain among domestic and foreign
political observers as to whether the Executive Com-
mittee is powerful enough to uphold the prescribed
constitutional arrangements. President Marcos him-
self was apparently so concerned about this issue that,
just prior to his visit to Saudi Arabia in March 1982,
he gave Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian Ver
secret instructions to be carried out if anything unto-
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The Ver memorandum, which Marcos has never
denied exists and which may remain in effect, pro-
voked a storm of protest from opposition politicians.
Some of Marcos's followers in the legislature respond-
ed in mid-1982 by seeking to limit the powers of the
Executive Committee-particularly its power to de-
clare martial law during an interregnum and thus
delay presidential elections. The bill that finally
emerged from the legislature, however, clarified presi-
dential incapacitation and set up procedural rules for
the Executive Committee-such as the definition of a
quorum. More recently, concerned with the possibility
of a contentious power struggle after Marcos's death,
opposition legislators have tried to pressure Marcos
into designating a successor by calling for the revival
of the position of vice president
The Key Succession Players
In the immediate post-Marcos period, we believe
Marcos's successor will emerge from a select group of
people in the current political hierarchy. In our view,
the winner will be able to manipulate the existing
constitutional arrangements to his or her advantage.
Because of Marcos's policy of creating competing
power centers, however, we believe no single individ-
ual commands sufficient military, economic, and po-
litical resources to consolidate power quickly
More likely, in our view, alliances
between two or more of these individuals will produce
a new government whose durability would be tested
over time. On the basis of reporting from and discus-
sions with US Embassy officials in Manila,
we believe the key players will
be First Lady me a Marcos, Defense Minister Juan
Ponce Enrile, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen.
Fabian Ver, Deputy Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos, and
Prime Minister Cesar Virata
Imelda Marcos. In our judgment, if Mrs. Marcos can
garner the personal support of General Ver she will
have the best chance at succeeding her husband.
Because of her relationship to the President, the
political skills she has developed over the years, and
the resources she commands, Mrs. Marcos is a major
force in the ruling KBL political machine. With a
personal fortune estimated at $1 billion, she has the
financial clout to keep traditional Philippine patron-
client politics operating to her advantage. Unless the
KBL collapses in the immediate post-Marcos period,
we believe her extensive network of supporters in the
bureaucracy, her many outstanding political markers,
and her sheer energy will be a near-unbeatable combi-
nation in a presidential election she would almost
certainly control. Nonetheless, her bid for power will
be strongly contested, in our view, and she will need to
make compromises with the technocrats and the
military-two groups in which she has limited sup-
port-in order to remain in power. We believe she is
more willing to curry favor among the officer corps
than among the technocrats, who US officials say she
regards as little more than uncreative accountants
lacking political vision. The extent of Mrs. Marcos's
influence in the armed forces is unknown, but, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports, she appears to be trying to
neutralize her opponents in the military while dispens-
ing privileges and largess to her favorites
Prime Minister Cesar Virata. Although speculation
was rampant that President Marcos was grooming
Virata as his successor when he appointed him Prime
Minister in 1981, we believe Virata's political position
has weakened considerably since Mrs. Marcos be-
came a member of the Executive Committee last year.
Despite his involvement in a broad range of policy
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issues as head of the Executive Committee and Fi-
nance Minister, we believe the KBL's recent attacks
on Virata's economic policies and his lack of a
political power base make his accession to the presi-
dency unlikely. Nonetheless, Virata and the techno-
crats he represents will be courted by presidential
aspirants, in our view, because their expertise is
crucial to maintaining the confidence of foreign inves-
tors and the international financial community. His
position as head of the interim government, moreover,
will be bolstered if the military supports the Executive
Committee, as the Constitution requires.
Gen. Fabian Ver. As head of the armed forces and the
intelligence network, Ver will be a critical actor in the
immediate post-Marcos period. Since he became
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in 1981, Ver has
consolidated his control over the armed forces by
placing loyalists in most key positions in the military
establishment
We estimate that about halt of the Philippine on-
stabulary's and one-third of the Philippine Army's
senior officers are loyal Ver men. Because we are
unable to measure the degree to which Ver's politici-
zation of the military promotion system may be
creating an undercurrent of resentment among profes-
sional soldiers, however, we cannot say for certain
that Ver holds the key to the armed forces.
Marcos and committed to protecting the First Family.
They are less certain that this loyalty will translate
into political support for Mrs. Marcos. In any event,
US Embassy officials in Manila do not believe that
Ver has presidential ambitions of his own and do not
think him intellectually ca able of handling the presi-
dency 25X1
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Although En-
rile has tremendous political and economic assets to
bring to bear on a bid for power and in our judgment
will go after the presidency ruthlessly, we do not
believe that his chances for success are good. He does
not command much support in the officer corps,
according to US officials, despite his position as
Defense Minister. Enrile's political support in his 25X1
home base of Northeastern Luzon, moreover, is weak
and does not extend nationally
We believe attempts by Enrile to culti-
vate a greater political following would be hampered
by his identification with the imposition of martial 25X1
law, last year's crackdown against the Catholic
Church, coconut marketing policies that are unpopu-
lar in rural areas, and by the personal enmity of
Mrs. Marcos. 25X1
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Enrile will still be a force to contend with, however,
because of his personal wealth and the financial assets
of his associate Eduardo Cojuangco, which Enrile
may be able to call on in a presidential bid. Because
25X1 money is a critical factor in this traditional patron-
client system, these resources may yet translate into a
broader power base for Enrile during the post-Marcos
Enrile also has supporters in the KBL and may
represent a palatable. choice for those members of the
elite who find themselves in the camp of "anyone but
Mrs. Marcos.'
Gen. Fidel Ramos. Although we do not believe Ramos
covets the presidency, he will make an attractive ally
in the succession period because of his untarnished
professional image and the military and police re-
sources he controls. US officials believe that he is the
only officer who has developed an independent power
base in the armed forces based on personal compe-
tence and professional respect. As a result, Ramos can
also claim some support among moderate opposition
politicians and may have indirect links to exiled
opposition leader Benigno Aquino through their mu-
tual friend, businessman Enrique Zobel. Most observ-
25X1 ers believe that Ramos will support constitutional
mechanisms for succession.
Other Players
We believe the prospects of other groups in the
succession equation will depend to a large extent on
whether the KBL's political machine remains intact
(see box). We do not know if the ruling party will
survive the immediate post-Marcos period. Marcos
himself has commented that there are deep divisions
of opinion and interests within the KBL, and Deputy
Prime Minister Jose Rono recently told US officials
that he believes that upon Marcos's death the KBL
would dissolve immediately. In that event, we believe
the moderate political opposition will have a better-
than-even shot at their long-denied chance at power,
as politicians from both the KBL and the moderate
opposition form new coalitions in preparation for
elections." The radical left would also view the col-
lapse of the KBL as an unprecedented opportunity,
and we believe the extent to which they successfully
exploit the political uncertainty in the immediate
post-Marcos period will determine the military's will-
ingness to intercede.
In this environment, compromise candidates from the defunct
KBL would also have an opportunity to succeed Marcos, but, if
history is any judge, Filipinos will seek a distinct change in
government. In the almost 40 years since Philippine independence
from the United States, only Marcos has been elected to more than
one presidential term. Given this precedent, we believe moderate
opposition candidates would have an edge over those more closely
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launching a successful presidential campaign. Al-
though technically ineligible for the presidency be-
cause he no longer resides in the Philippines, the 50-
year-old Aquino still has wide popular appeal, the
existence of a well-organized opposition party-the
PDP-Laban-behind him, and the political opportun-
ism and savvy to unite rival interest groups. Since
1978, when he ran for a parliamentary seat from a jail
cell, his name has attracted a large following for his
party among the urban middle class.' Aquino's long 25X1
imprisonment by Marcos and his current exile have
We believe Aquino would be able to attract consider-
able financial support for a presidential bid. His wife's
family was once a major financial power in Tarlac
Province,
25X1
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Moreover, Philippine poli-
tics has traditionally involved a good deal of "party
switching" because party loyalty primarily depends on
personalities rather than ideology. Although Aquino
is distrusted by many opposition leaders, we believe he
would nonetheless have the best chance of projecting
The Moderate Political Opposition. Of the tradition-
al members of the ruling elite, we believe Benigno Marcos released Aquino from jail in 1980 to go to the United
Aquino-now living in the United States-has the States for heart surgery, which was successful 25X1
best chance of unifying Marcos's opponents and
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a winning image and pulling together a political
constituency that could attract financial support from
25X1 many quarters.
For his part, Aquino reportedly is anxious to return to
the Philippines and bolster his political position in the
post-Marcos period by running for office in National
Assembly elections next year. Aquino, however, faces
murder and subversion charges upon his return unless
he can cut a deal with the President. Mrs. Marcos
secretly met with Aquino during her visit to the
who boasted in some instances that their help would
guarantee election victories for cooperative parties in
legislative elections next year.
If examples from the Marcos years are any guide, we
believe it highly likely that election rules in the post-
Marcos period will be stacked against any opposition
candidate, and vote fraud will exist on both sides.
Even if there were fair elections and Aquino emerged
with a popular mandate, however, we doubt he would
last long as president. For one thing, we believe the
military as a group is extremely suspicious of Aquino
and probably would not tolerate him. The military's
distrust apparently stems from Aquino's revelations in
the late 1960s of Manila's involvement in a secret
plan to infiltrate Sabah, Malaysia, and his ongoing
contacts with US-based anti-Marcos terrorists and
Philippine Muslim rebel leaders in the Middle East.
The Radical Left. We believe the Maoist-style Com-
munist Party of the Philippines (CPP) would make a
concerted effort to exploit the succession process. The
Communists believe in a two-pronged revolutionary
strategy and are not likely to miss either military or
political opportunities. If elections are held, the CPP
would probably try to increase their political stature
by fielding candidates through legitimate political
parties they have infiltrated or by using their front
groups to gain influence in a new government. In
recent conversations with US Embassy officials, sev-
eral moderate opposition leaders independently said
that they had already been contacted by CPP leaders,
In the next two to three years, however, the CPP's
military arm-the New People's Army (NPA)-will
not be strong enough to launch an effective military
The Military. In the final analysis, we believe the
military will be the deciding factor in succession
dynamics. Military leaders will be confronted with a
variety of options:
? They could unite behind the Executive Committee's
collective leadership and ensure that presidential
elections are held.
? They could divide along factional lines in support of
political candidates of their choice.
? They could throw their weight behind a civilian
figurehead, while retaining power for themselves, or
actively support a candidate who they believe would
protect their interests.
? They could seize power themselves and rule by
military junta
On balance, we believe the military would probably
act as a group to support existing constitutional
succession mechanisms, as has been its tradition. We
believe the armed forces will play a stabilizing role in
a succession by supporting a compromise civilian
candidate of their choice or the winner of an intraelite
election contest. A military coup, although least likely
in our view, would become more likely over time if a
new government were unable to consolidate power
and internal security deteriorated. An upsurge in
nationwide NPA or Muslim insurgent violence, for
example, or a return to pre-martial-law conditions
when large private armies existed, might precipitate
military intervention.
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25X1
Current Jockeying for Position
Succession jockeying for the post-Marcos period has
already begun. Several presidential aspirants have
been building their power bases, quietly probing the
limits of their authority, and trying to undermine
other potential contenders. Mrs. Marcos is doing most
of the maneuvering and jockeying.
Business Development Council by Kokoy Romual-
dez-Mrs. Marcos's brother-and his unsuccessful
bid to handle Manila's contacts with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are
further evidence of Mrs. Marcos's longstanding desire
to wrest important policy areas from the technocrats'
25X1 control.
25X1
The most recent round of infighting was the KBL's
attack against Prime Minister Virata at the ruling
party caucus in mid-April. Spearheaded by Imelda
Marcos, the campaign calling for Virata's ouster
attracted widespread support among leading KBL
politicians, many of whom face legislative elections
next year. They joined Mrs. Marcos in accusing
Virata of selling out Philippine national interests to
the IMF and the World Bank, and complained about
the financial austerity program imposed on the Philip-
pines in return for continued balance-of-payments
assistance.
For his part, Virata reportedly defended his actions
articulately at the caucus and later fought back by
forcing the President to acknowledge his support
publicly. In television interviews, Virata claimed that
Philippines' credit rating abroad.
he had tendered his resignation to Marcos but it had
been refused. Although Virata temporarily came out
on top, the episode showed his lack of support among
ruling party politicians and his inability to muster a
political defense independent of the President. None-
theless, letting Virata go has its risks for Marcos, who
recognizes such a step would adversely affect the
Implications for the United States
The United States will unavoidably be drawn into the
succession process when it occurs if for no other
reason than our concern over continued use of Subic
Bay Naval Base and Clark Airbase. In addition, the
United States has strong financial links to the Philip-
pines. US banks have acquired a $6 billion loan stake
there and, with net investments by US firms totaling
$1.2 billion, we remain the Philippines' largest foreign
investor. 25X1
Both the moderate opposition and the ruling elite,
moreover, have political constituencies in the United
States which we believe will try to influence US policy
during and after the succession. About 800,000 ethnic
Filipinos live in the United States, and there is
constant two-way travel that reinforces the notion-
prevalent in the Philippines-that the United States
has a special moral obligation to the Philippines
because of the colonial relationship. At the very least,
we believe that moderate opposition politicians in
exile here will encourage the United States to uphold
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constitutional succession mechanisms, and in all like-
lihood they will expect the United States to intervene
behind the scenes to determine the succession out-
come. In the worst of circumstances, Philippine oppo-
sition leaders here will blame the United States if the
transition to new leadership is not smooth or for any
unrest that occurs. Working in our favor, however, is
a strong reservoir of good will that may offset Philip-
pine inclinations to hold the United States account-
able
No matter who leads it, a new government, in our
judgment, will want continued close relations with the
United States. Even so, a successor government will
have to be more responsive to its domestic constituen-
cies because it is unlikely in the short run that any
post-Marcos politician can muster the monopoly on
power that Marcos enjoys. We also believe a new
government will face nationalistic pressures from
these constituencies, including the bureaucracy, ele-
ments in the military, and the moderate political,
opposition. A more nationalistic stance by the govern-
ment might take the form of adopting stricter posi-
tions on foreign investment, or tougher negotiations
with the IMF. In terms of US bilateral issues, it
would almost certainly focus on the US military
bases. During the recently concluded review of the
Military Bases Agreement, for example, President
Marcos remained the arbiter of last resort, keeping
nationalistic pressures for a bigger compensation
package and greater control over operation of the
bases in check.
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