PORTUGAL: ARMED FORCES IN SEARCH OF A ROLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Portugal:
Armed Forces in
Search of a Role
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review
completed.
Secret
EUR 83-10107
April 1983
copy 3 15
5
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Directorate of
Intelligence
Portugal:
Armed Forces in
Search of a Role
Chief, European Issues Division, EURA, on
This paper was prepared by I pf the
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the National Intelligence Council. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be addressed to the
Secret
EUR 83-10107
April 1983
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Overview
Information available
as of 4 April 1983
was used in this report.
Portugal:
Armed Forces in
Search of a Role
67,000 with a topheavy grade structure and worsening morale
The Portuguese military is a force in transition. From a position of political
leadership following the revolution in 1974, it has passed through 'a period
of less direct but still important influence. It is now adjusting to a new con-
stitution and National Defense Law under which it must submit to civil au-
thority and play a very limited role in political life. From a force
numbering more than 260,000, designed primarily for counterinsurgency
operations in Portugal's African colonies, it has been cut to a force of about
political involvement to professionalism.
Portuguese military and civilian leaders have focused on NATO as a
means of rebuilding the armed forces and providing them with valid
missions, as well as modern equipment and training. They hope that
involvement with NATO will help smooth the transition from active
colonies, could not provide the bulk of the funding necessary.
The Allies-aware that Portugal during the revolutionary period was very
close to leaving or being forced out of NATO-have been sympathetic to
Lisbon's desire to modernize its armed forces. They recognize that the 25X1
Portuguese economy, wrecked by the revolution and the loss of the
Despite substantial assistance from the Allies-particularly the United
States and West Germany-Portuguese forces remain poorly armed and
unable to fulfill most of their NATO missions. Some force improvement
programs have been partially realized, while others have barely gotten off
the ground. For example:
? A 4,400-man brigade has been created for reinforcement of northern
Italy, although it remains short of critical equipment. Fulfillment of
plans to create additional brigades will depend wholly on outside
assistance.
? Air Force ground attack capabilites have been built up by the transfer
from West Germany of a large number of old G-91 attack aircraft and
the delivery, through US assistance, of one squadron of modernized A-7s.
Portugal and its allies have not been able, however, to come up with a
plan to provide modern air defense aircraft.
iii Secret
EUR 83-10107
April 1983
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
? A 1977 plan for Alliance-wide funding of several modern frigates, which
would assure the Navy a continuing capability to participate in Alliance
Atlantic defense programs, has foundered. The Allies have had difficulty
meeting the costs of an increasingly expensive program, and the Portu-
guese were unable to organize a complex undertaking, make decisions,
and stick with them.
Portuguese military leaders know that their country's most significant
contribution to NATO is its willingness to allow the Allies, especially the
United States, to use its facilities. Lajes Air Base in the Azores is
particularly important for antisubmarine warfare operations, maritime
reconnaissance, and facilitation of airlift to Europe and the Middle East.
Until recently, the Portuguese have allowed almost unrestricted use of
their facilities.
Despite the assistance they have received since 1976, the conclusion most
officers seem to have reached is that Portugal's contribution to NATO has
been largely unappreciated. They note that countries like Spain and
Morocco, which have not been "faithful allies," have been able to drive
hard bargains for limited use of their facilities.
Although we do not believe that a marked shift in the orientation of
Portugal's foreign policy is in the offing-Lisbon has no realistic alterna-
tives for assistance to modernize its armed forces-frustration could make
Portugal a more difficult and less reliable ally, both within NATO and in
the bilateral relationship with the United States. Lisbon's decision in April
1982 to deny for the first time a US request to transit Lajes may be a har-
binger of future Portuguese prickliness.
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Career Frustrations in a Shrinking Military 1
Adjustment to a Diminished Domestic Political Role 2
The Air Defense Warning and Control System
10
Portuguese Attitudes Toward NATO and the Allies
12
Implications for US and Allied Interests
13
B. Portuguese Defense Spending and Economic Constraints 19
2. Selected Items of Military Equipment Provided
by the Allies, 1977-82
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Portugal:
Armed Forces in
Search of a Role
A Military in Transition
Since 1974 the Portuguese military has had to adjust
to the loss of its leading role in the country's political
life. For some 19 months in 1974-75, a group of left-
leaning midlevel officers held power, bringing about
far-reaching changes both within the military and in
Portugal's economic, political, and social life. Follow-
ing a countercoup by more moderate officers in
November 1975 and the restoration of civilian rule in
1976, the armed forces accepted a diminished, al-
though still substantial, role. At the end of 1982,
however, they were legally barred from further in-
volvement in politics.
With the end of Portugal's colonial empire, there was
no further need for a huge military establishment;
moreover, the economic impact of the loss of the
colonies and the economic chaos resulting from the
revolution dictated contractions. As a result, an
armed forces of more than 260,000 men-most of
them engaged in fighting counterinsurgency wars in
Africa-has declined to about 67,000 men. (See ta-
ble 1.) At the same time, the military lost its principal
raison d'etre.
Career Frustrations in a Shrinking Military. Prob-
lems affecting military morale-low pay, old equip-
ment, the lack of a credible mission, and sliding
prestige within Portuguese society-have been wors-
ened by the dramatic cut in the personnel strength of
the armed forces since the revolution. In a profession
where promotion already was slow and dependent
almost totally on seniority and time in grade, the
contraction of opportunity brought about by the large
reduction in force provoked frustration and apprehen-
sion, there
have been repeated protests by regular military offi-
cers against the "milicianos"-those who entered the
military in large numbers during the colonial wars
with only brief military courses following graduation
from civilian universities. This problem should gradu-
ally fade because the miliciano corps was abolished in
February 1981 and only 100 of these officers remain
on Army rolls. Nevertheless, tension periodically
Table 1
Portuguese Armed Forces-
Then and Now
Defense spending 6.4 2.9 25X1
(as percentage of estimated GNP)
Personnel strength 264,500 66,700
Army 227,000 44,600
Navy 18,000 12,500
Air Force 19,500 9,600
erupts at promotion time-not only between regular
and miliciano officers, but also over any promotion
widely perceived as unfair or politically motivated.
25X1
In addition) the
sharp reduction in force has caused a top heavy grade
structure and career bottlenecks in the officer corps
and among noncommissioned officers. Many who 25X1
could retire will not do so because of the weak
economy and poor opportunities outside the military.
.At the same time, in the view of many Portuguese
military men and foreign observers, those who have
left the service since 1974 include some of the most
able officers and men. Some moderate officers were
pushed out during the revolution, and some leftwing
officers were separated or relegated to "do-nothing"
jobs after the moderates regained power.
'The armed forces leadership, however, regards the departure of
most leftist officers as no great loss in terms of the impact on
capabilities. A 1981 law forcing the military to accept several of
them back in service caused considerable dissension because of its
presumed impact on discipline and morale.
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
Given the resources Portugal is able to expend and the
limits to allied assistance programs, the armed forces
may have to be cut even more. We believe the Navy
and Air Force already are about as small as they can
be if they are to continue as traditional military
services. The Army, on the other hand, probably could
be further reduced to good effect-provided that its
units are consolidated and redirected to NATO mis-
sions. This would require the army to abandon its
territorial defense role and leave internal security
duties to the police. We believe that historical ties
remain strong between Army regiments and the towns
in which they are located and that most Portuguese-
particularly those in the armed forces-are unready
to abandon the military's historical role in Portuguese
life completely.
Adjustment to a Diminished Domestic Political Role.
From the countercoup in 1975 until late 1982, the
military had a legal role through the Council of the
Revolution,' although the Council's leftist political
character made it increasingly unrepresentative of the
military as a whole and often put it on a collision
course with the military leadership. The armed forces
have also continued to exert a residual influence
through President Eanes. The Army has remained his
chief political base, and he used his ability to name
service chiefs and his direction of the military chain of
command-without reference to elected government
officials-as political tools.
During 1982 two major laws were passed that effec-
tively ended the political involvement of the armed
forces, institutionalized civilian supremacy, and limit-
ed the power of the President. A major revision to the
1976 constitution promulgated in October 1982 abol-
ished the Revolutionary Council and replaced it with
a 16-member Council of State whose membership
includes only one military man. In October, a new
National Defense Law implemented in detail the
general concepts of the constitutional revision
z The Revolutionary Council, composed of armed forces officers,
many of them Armed Forces Movement leftists, grew in 1975 out
of earlier revolutionary organizations to play a guiding role in the
country's political development. Under the 1976 constitution, which
reestablished civilian rule, it advised President Eanes on a broad
range of questions and had supreme authority in military matters.
It also was the institutional defender of the revolution and had the
ultimate word on the constitutionality of legislation passed by the
Assembly-a role in which it repeatedly ran afoul of government
The National Defense Law brings the armed forces
firmly under the Defense Minister by giving him
authority:
? To coordinate and present to Parliament the overall
defense budget.
? To define and execute overall national defense
policy.
? To propose to the President the nomination and
dismissal of the Chief of the Armed Forces General 25X1
Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, and the service chiefs
of staff (selecting from among three names recom-
mended by the military Council of Chiefs of Staff).
The armed forces retain considerable autonomy in
internal service matters, particularly in promotions
below flag rank. The new legislation, however, has
broken the direct line that ran from the individual
service chiefs and the Chief of the General Staff to
the President and imposed a new degree of unified
direction. Moreover, although the US Defense Atta-
che observes that the legislation falls well within the
boundaries of normal civilian-military relationships in
democratic countries, the two laws mark a profound
change in the status of the armed forces and the
power of their leaders
Following passage in October 1982 of the law revising
the constitution, the military appeared to have accept-
ed the changes with relatively good grace. The gov-
ernment's original proposal for a National Defense
Law was discussed in September with the armed
forces leadership. A number of amendments spon-
sored by the Socialist Party were passed during
Assembly consideration, however, and military lead-
ers became convinced that the amended bill went
much too
they' weighed in energetically with Presiden
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Embassy, military units throughout Portugal wrote
memorandums attacking the law-a type of activity
not seen since 1976
Eanes outlined
his own dissents in a lengthy memorandum to the
Assembly that accompanied his veto.
The President vetoed the law in mid-November, but
the Assembly quickly voted to override his veto by
more than the required two-thirds majority. The
Assembly also decisively defeated a number of pro-
posals that would have made the legislation more
acceptable to the military
25X1
25X1
that it did not consider the five days allowed to have
run out and that it was leaving the matter for a future
government to decide. 25X1
In any case, the new legislation is likely to make the 25X1
military even more prickly than before about its 25X1
interests-particularly in the budgetary area. The
Chiefs of Staff, in our opinion, will expect the govern-
ment to protect the military budget in the face of
competing social needs and to press their demands
energetically in bilateral and multilateral negotia-
tions. (See pages 13-14.
We believe that the Portuguese military is firmly
"back in the barracks." Its current leaders-including
President Eanes-were among the moderate, "opera- 25X1
tional" officers who were anxious in 1975 for the
armed services to abandon politics. They probably are
also aware that there is little public sentiment for a
return to military rule 25X1
Military discipline, which all but collapsed during the
revolutionary period, appears to have been restored.
Accordingly, we expect the armed forces to continue
to acquiesce in the restoration of firm civilian control
A residue of bitterness over this battle ensures that
civil-military tensions will persist as the new arrange-
ments work themselves out. Distrust and disdain for
the machinations of party politicians have often been
evident in the views of Portuguese military officers;
rancor over the new law and anxiety about its effects
are likely to exacerbate this underlying tension.
Nevertheless, we believe that the armed forces will
adjust to their new status eventually. Much will
depend upon the sensitivity with which the cabinet
and the Assembly exercise their new powers. The
speeches by military and civilian officials marking the
promulgation of the National Defense Law on
21 December were conciliatory.
Because normal political life has been interrupted
since the fall of Prime Minister Francesco Pinto
Balsemao's government in early December, there is
little basis for judging how the new relationships are
working in practice. The caretaker government did
not use its authority under the defense law immedi-
ately to replace Melo Egidio or any of the service
chiefs-an action that press reports as well as US
Embassy reporting indicate had been widely expected
by Portuguese and foreign observers. Thus, a situation
with considerable potential for disruption was averted.
Nevertheless, in refusing to act, the cabinet stated
over the military. At the same time, the Portuguese
tradition of open discussion within the military re-
mains alive. Last summer, for example, a group of
leftist officers protested the abolition of the Revolu-
tionary Council. Afterward,
more an rmy officers called the 25X1
Army Chief of Staff's office to complain about this
public act of "indiscipline" and to advise the Chief of
ff on how he should res ond.
this activity represen e a
"cultural peculiarity" that was unlikely to threaten 25X1
Portuguese democracy
The notion that the Portuguese military is the ulti-
mate guardian of the system endures, however, partic-
ularly within the armed forces. In a public retort in 25X1
1979 to politicians who complained about Army
criticism of party politics, then Army Chief of Staff
Pedro Cardoso said, "The Army cannot do anything
against the people-the Army is the people." His
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
words probably reflected a generally felt military
sentiment. We believe, however, that only a period of
prolonged economic and political instability could
again impel the armed forces to act against the
civilian government
Focusing on NATO
Since 1976, Portugal's military leaders have focused
on the NATO connection to give the armed forces a
new sense of mission. As their bilateral and multilat-
eral discussions during that period made clear, these
officers were aware that the military was not ready to
fulfill NATO missions; all three services had been
organized and equipped to fight counterinsurgency
wars, their equipment was old or inappropriate to
European operations, and they had little training or
experience in the kind of interservice planning and
operations necessary to conduct modern warfare.
They also knew that the economy was in no condition
to provide the funding necessary to build a new,
modern military.
During and just following the revolutionary period,
Portugal and its armed forces assumed an internation-
al importance out of proportion to the country's small
size and limited resources. The prospect that a NATO
member might slide into the Communist camp riveted
attention on Lisbon. Following the countercoup, Por-
tugal's allies were deeply interested in buttressing the
new government, encouraging the transition to civil-
ian rule, and reinforcing the Alliance tie.
Portuguese leaders knew then and now that the most
significant contribution their country can make to
NATO is to provide access to Portuguese facilities,
and they have generally been forthcoming about
making them available. Lajes Air Base in the Azores
is particularly important: its location provides the
United States with irreplaceable facilities for con-
ducting naval reconnaissance and antisubmarine war-
fare operations against Soviet targets in the mid-
Atlantic. (See figure 1.) The airfield is a vital transit
point for aircraft on NATO-related missions and for
the US Rapid Deployment Force. Although Lisbon
has insisted on case-by-case approval for transits to
Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian countries, the
Portuguese have-with only one exception-allowed
use of the base for such flights. The Department of
Defense estimates that Lajes and a civilian airport on
another island would support almost 1,900 flights
during the first 30 days of a NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict, while an emergency in southwest Asia might
require 1,360 airlift sorties and 1,370 tanker sorties
during the first 30 days. Although expensive air-to-air
refueling technically could surmount loss of access to
the base for refueling stops for some locations, the
tanker aircraft that are available would be fully
committed elsewhere during a full-scale emergency.
Air Base in southern Portugal for year-round fighter
pilot training, and the United Kingdom trains small
ground force contingents at Santa Mar arida home
of the Portuguese "NATO Brigade."
Ovar Air Base in mainland Portugal has been set
aside for NATO use in an emergency, and NATO
port facilities are under development at Porto Santo in
the Madeira Islands. The headquarters for NATO's
Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) are located
near Lisbon. Finally, Portugal continues to welcome
visits by nuclear-powered warships at a time when a
growing percentage of the US Fleet is nuclear
powered and political pressures in many countries
make alternative ports of call fewer.
In addition to providing facilities, Portuguese military
leaders want to build up their military capabilities so
that they can at least play a role in defending
Portugal and its possessions-especially Lajes Air
Base. At the same time, civilian leaders are well
aware that the best way to keep the military out of
politics is to give it a real military mission. They see
bilateral and NATO assistance as the only way they
will accomplish these goals, and they see continued
use of Lajes and other Portuguese facilities as their
only leverage on the Allies
The Allies have responded to the Portuguese mili-
tary's desire for credible missions and the wherewithal
to fulfill them. They seized the opportunity in 1976 to
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Figure 1
Portugal and Its Possessions
4Lajes Airbase
AZORES
(Portugal)
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
help the Portuguese services put together programs
that would allow them to provide a series of modest
but useful contributions to Allied defenses, and most
gave assistance to support those programs. The Allies,
for the most part, have agreed with the Portuguese
view that their most serious problem is the absence of
modern equipment, and they recognize that the Portu-
guese are in a poor position to contribute substantially
to badly needed modernization programs.
(See appendix B.)
Alliance Aid Programs
Although there still are bilateral aid programs, the
Allies agreed in 1976 to coordinate their efforts
through an Ad Hoc Committee on assistance to
Portugal and Turkey. The committee worked with
those countries to define their needs and identify
equipment and weapons available for grant or sale.
The objectives of the three Portuguese services have
changed little since those early discussions, although
Allied views of what was realistic have sometimes
clashed with Portuguese aspirations on particulars.
Table 2
Selected Items of Military Equipment
Provided by the Allies, 1977-82
The Allies, in consultation with Portugal, quickly
identified the following goals, which would enable Italy
Portugal to meet its NATO commitments (see box):
? A brigade-sized, air transportable infantry unit for
NATO reinforcement.
? A squadron of medium-range transport aircraft
(C-130s) to lift and support the brigade.
? A new generation of combat aircraft to replace the
F-86s and G-91s then in service.
? Equipment to upgrade Portugal's obsolete air de- Canada
fense early warning and control system. Belgium
? Reconnaissance/ antisubmarine warfare aircraft to Netherlands
replace old P-2s that were essentially inoperable
after about 1975.
? Three modern frigates, which would provide a con-
tinuing blue water naval capability.
Number Type of Equipment
of Items
86 M-113 A-1 armored personnel
carriers
6 M-109 self-propelled howitzers
21 TOW launchers
TOW missiles
LAW antitank weapon systems
100 90-mm recoilless rifles
18 M-48 A-2 medium tanks (up-
graded by the US to M-48 A-5)
18 105-mm towed howitzers
500+ Vehicles, including more than
240 trucks, 120 trailers, 19 am-
bulances, one crane, four heavy
equipment transporters
18 M-1 machineguns
14 Twin 20-mm towed air defense
guns
74 G-91 ground attack and trainer
aircraft
36 Towed M101 105-mm
howitzers
36,000 Rounds of 105-mm ammunition
32 Ferret armored scout cars
24 105-mm pack howitzers
1 Floating bridge
1 Blowpipe surface-to-air missile
launcher (the first of 12 due by
the end of 1982)
35 SS-11 launchers, 1,900 missiles
200 1 /4 ton trailers
32 106-mm recoilless rifles
1 Steam shovel
44 Fire engines
The United States and the Federal Republic of more than nominal resources to military moderniza-
Germany-both of which regularly use Portuguese tion. Therefore, the Portuguese have increasingly
facilities-have provided the most assistance, al- focused on the bilateral security relationship with the
though almost all of the Allies have given some- United States-and to a lesser extent, with West
thing-usually old equipment about to be retired- Germany-to meet their needs.
and several have provided training programs to the
Portuguese forces. (See table 2.) A steadily weakening
economy has made it difficult for Lisbon to devote
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Portugal's Commitment to NATO
Territorial defense of the Iberian peninsula falls
under the Atlantic, rather than European, Command.
Service commitments are as follows:
Army
To Allied Command Europe:
- First Composite Brigade earmarked to Allied
Forces Southern Command for reinforcement of
northern Italy.
To Allied Command Atlantic:
- Azores Military Zone Headquarters is NATO's
HQfor the Azores under the Western Atlantic
Command.
- Madeira Military Zone Headquarters is NATO's
HQfor Madeira under the Iberian Atlantic
Command.
The Army is considering contributing a small unit to
the ACE Mobile Force, a multilateral force intended
for deployment in times of crisis to the Northern and
Southern Flanks of the Alliance.
Navy
Ships assigned to the Atlantic Command are five
frigates (three on high readiness status), six corvettes
(three on high readiness status), all three subma-
rines-one readily available-and an underway re-
plenishment ship.
One frigate is detailed to Standing Naval Force
Atlantic on a rotational basis.
Air Force
- 20 G-91 R fighter-bombers and five C-130H trans-
ports are assigned to the European Command to
support the First Composite Brigade.
- 20 A-7P attack aircraft are earmarked for the
Atlantic Command, for use in the Azores. They
will be upgraded to "assigned" after the second
squadron is available.
Most Air Force units are listed under "other forces
for NATO" and would be provided to the Alliance in
wartime.
The NATO Brigade. Until 1975, Portugal had com-
mitted to NATO an 18,000-man infantry division for
reinforcement of the Central Front. Because the
components of the division were scattered throughout
Africa, however, the US Department of Defense
estimated that it could not have been assembled for
duty in Europe in less than six months. As the Army
began in 1976 to pull itself together and look to the
future, Portugal, in consultation with the Allies,
decided to create a new brigade-sized unit, committed
to NATO, around which the new Army would be
built. The Allies quickly agreed that support for the
brigade would be their first priority, and nearly all
supplied at least token assistance 25X1
The brigade was organized during 1976-77 and sta-
tioned at Santa Margarida, some 140 km from Lisbon
in central Portugal. It has armored, mechanized, and
motorized battalions, numbers 4,420 men in peace-
time, and has a wartime authorized strength of 4,740.
25X1
The brigade is "earmarked"' for NATO, and its
mission is the reinforcement of Northern Italy. Mili-
tary officials from NATO headquarters have stated
that the brigade is now comparable with other South-
ern Region units and could be upgraded to "assigned"
status, but the Portuguese have argued that continued
deficiencies in ammunition stocks and air defense,
antitank, electronic warfare, and nuclear, bacteriolog-
ical, and chemical (NBC) defense capabilities need to
be met before the unit can be assigned. They have
expressed doubt to NATO officials that this can be
accomplished by the target date in mid-1983, but we
suspect their unwillingness to assign the unit is a ploy
to keep pressure on the Allies to come up with
additional equipment. Because only 23 M-48 A-5
tanks have been provided, the brigade has only one
tank company instead of the planned battalion. West
' Under NATO definitions, "assigned" forces are those that mem-
bers have agreed to place under the operational command or control
of a NATO commander at a specific alert stage. "Earmarked"
forces are those that the members agree to place under NATO
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Troops from the Portuguese
NATO Brigade exercise with
Germany, however, recently made available 43 more
M-48 A-2s, which will be converted during 1984-85
to the A-5 model.4
The unit has participated in a number of exercises
with the Air Force, and portions of it have twice
deployed to Northern Italy during NATO's Display
Determination reinforcement exercises. The Com-
mander of NATO's Southern Region gave the Portu-
guese high marks following the 1980 exercise and
proposed a gradual upgrading of the brigade's partici-
pation in succeeding exercises. The Italian representa-
tive to the Defense Review Committee recently ex-
pressed his government's admiration for the
Portuguese contingent that participated in Display
Determination 1982. No heavy equipment was airlift-
ed with the brigade, however, and the Portuguese had
to use Italian equipment, including tanks and commu-
nications gear, much of which was not compatible
with their own.
The M-48 A-5 has a diesel engine and a 105-mm gun and is
comparable to the more modern M-60 main battle tank. Conversion
of the 43 new tanks may take place in the United States, but
In sessions of the Defense Planning Committee, the
Allies have encouraged the Portuguese to develop one
or two additional light infantry brigades to be ear-
marked for reinforcement duties. These would have
no heavy or sophisticated equipment. Portugal's trans-
port fleet could independently move such units to their
destinations. The Portuguese have accepted the goal
in principle-they refer to the NATO brigade as "the
first brigade" in Defense Review Committee discus-
sions-but they clearly see the creation of these units
as a very long-term objective, to be accomplished
after completion of the first brigade and wholly
dependent upon outside assistance.
Transport for the Brigade. Using US grant aid and
the proceeds from the sale of two Boeing 707s, the
Portuguese acquired five C-130H Hercules transport
aircraft during 1977-78 to lift and support the NATO
brigade. These aircraft have a range, with maximum
payload, of some 4,000 km (2,160 nm}-more than
enough to reach their likely destinations of Northern
Italy or the Azores. They can carry only 92 troops,
however, and their maximum cargo capability is
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
about 19 metric tons. Although they can carry some
heavy equipment, the C-130s cannot accommodate
the brigade's. M-48 medium tanks.
Thus, the Air Force will require substantial assistance
to lift the brigade to its wartime destination. Com-
mercial aircraft belonging to TAP, Portugal's nation-
al airline, could be used to transport troops and
supplies in an emergency, but these aircraft are not
fitted to carry heavy equipment.' The Portuguese
hope for allied assistance to transport the brigade even
though they are well aware that US and other allied
transport assets will be heavily engaged elsewhere if
war is threatened.
the Portuguese have unofficially
roac a wit NATO officials the possibility of task-
ing Alliance transport aircraft for assistance and have
been unofficially discouraged.
Portuguese force goals for 1983-85 include the pro-
curement-with outside assistance-of four addition-
al C-130s, to bring Air Force holdings to a total of
nine. Nevertheless, we believe that the knowledge that
Portugal is unable, both now and later, to fulfill the
relatively modest mission it has undertaken under-
mines the morale of Army and Air Force officers.
Combat Aircraft. The Portuguese Air Force in 1976
also found itself in bleak straits. Air defense resources
consisted of some 20 old F-86 dayfighters due for
retirement in 1978. Approximately 40 old G-91 jet
aircraft were available for ground attack missions,
along with a variety of light aircraft capable of
ground support in cases of civil unrest. A substantial
number of planes had been abandoned in Africa when
the Portuguese pulled out, but the more serious
problem was the lack of modern aircraft.
Planning for Air Force modernization in Lisbon and
in Brussels at the Ad Hoc Committee quickly took
two directions-one that was "doable," and one that
has proved more difficult. First, West Germany
.agreed to transfer to the Portuguese a number of
G-91 trainers and ground attack models that were
' Approximately 36 civil transport aircraft with a takeoff weight of
9,000 kg or more are registered, owned, or operated in Portugal.
being retired from the Luftwaffe. The first 20 were
delivered in 1976. A total of 74 have been transferred
to date, with another six still planned for delivery. The
Portuguese cannibalized most of these aircraft to
produce the approximately 45 G-91 s that are opera-
tional today 25X1
Portugal has been less successful in attempts to
replace its F-86 fighters, which had to be phased out
in mid-1979 because of their age. Air Force chiefs
have tried since 1976 to work out the combination of
military assistance and national financing that would
allow them to acquire a modern air defense aircraft.
Over the years, they have focused on a variety of
models, including the US-built F-4 and F-5E, the
French-designed Mirage III, and even the Israeli Kfir
fighter, but financing problems eliminated all of these
options. Unwilling to settle for what they regarded as
outmoded hand-me-downs, the Portuguese refused 25X1
offers of Italian F-104s and Canadian, Norwegian,
and US F-5 A's and F-5 B's. In 1977, as a stopgap 25X1
measure, the US loaned the Portuguese six T-38
Peace Talon trainers to help maintain the competence
and the morale of Air Force pilots
Finally, in 1980, the Air Force decided to purchase
from the United States 50 A-7P light attack air- 25X1
craft 6-two operational squadrons plus six trainers.
Although the A-7 does not fill the air defense gap, the
United States encouraged the Portuguese to acquire
the plane because it supplies a reasonably modern
aircraft that offers considerably improved capabilities
for close air support and interdiction over those of the
old G-91. The first 20 were delivered in 1981-82, at a
cost of about $144 million, most of it in US assistance.
Air Force Chief of Staff Lemos Ferreira has been
pressing hard for funding of the second squadron, and
agreement was reached in January for the purchase of
30 additional aircraft with US assistance. US military
officials are concerned because the Portuguese bought
the planes without providing for spare parts and 25X1
maintenance, but Lemos Ferreira evidently hopes that
maintenance funds will somehow be obtained
6 A-7Ps are modernized A-7A carrier-based light attack aircraft,
introduced in 1965. They are being refitted with more modern
engines and avionics that make them comparable to late 1960s
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Portugal has promised to commit one A-7 squadron to
SACEUR for support of the NATO Brigade and the
other to SACLANT to defend the Azores and Lajes
Air Base. As with the brigade, however, the first unit
will not be assigned until both are available-a
decision calculated to enhance Portugal's bargaining
position with its Allies. Both units are planned to have
ground support and maritime surveillance missions.
In early 1983, as a way of providing some air defense
capability, the Air Force decided to modify, with US
assistance, the 12 T-38 trainers it now holds so they
can carry the Sidewinder missile. Two squadrons of
air defense aircraft remain on the books as goals for
the period 1984-85, but Air Force officials recognize
that they are "pie in the sky" given competing
priorities. Once the second A-7 squadron has been
acquired, however, we can expect Portuguese officials
to renew pressure for air defense aircraft.
The Air Defense Warning and Control System. Portu-
gal's antiquated air defense warning system consists
of a 25-year-old network of search and height-finding
radars. With only four sites, it cannot cover all of
continental Portugal, and communications links are
manual rather than computerized.
In 1981 NATO approved a $100 million,program to
upgrade the early warning and control system. Bids
will be accepted this year, and plans are for construc-
tion to be completed in 1985. Modern radars are to be
installed at three sites, including one in southern
Portugal that will be oriented toward the Gulf of
Cadiz-an area that has not been covered before.
Automated digital communications will link the Por-
tuguese system to those of other NATO countries
including Spain, SHAPE headquarters in Belgium,
IBERLANT at Lisbon, and the Portuguese civil air
traffic control headquarters. According to the US Air
Attache, the new system will give the Air Force a
much improved capability to monitor its airspace and
national waters .and to support NATO air operations.
Maritime Patrol Aircraft. When Portugal's old P-2E
Neptune maritime patrol/ASW aircraft were phased
out in 1977, the Air Force could no longer fulfill its
NATO maritime reconnaissance mission. Acquisition
of six P-3A or B aircraft has been a NATO-approved
goal since that time. The Portuguese view the pro-
gram as important. Some Air For officers 25X1
see maritime
reconnaissance as their services most viable mission
because a substantial capability could be achieved
with a relatively small number of aircraft, and it is the
mission most likely to give them a useful role in
NATO. Nevertheless, the program has a funding
priority behind the Army's brigade, other competing
Air Force needs, and the Navy's frigate program. We
think it unlikely, therefore, that it will be accom-
plished before the end of the decade.
The Frigate Program. Although Navy needs initially
took third place to the development of the Army
brigade and the search for modern aircraft for the Air
Force, naval leaders were determined-as they have
repeatedly told US representatives in Lisbon-that
their time would come. Without a new class of major
surface combatant ships, the Navy's capability for
blue water operations, and its ability to contribute to
NATO's Atlantic ASW operations, will disappear
within the next few years. Portuguese officers believe
that the Navy provides Portugal's most natural link
with NATO and has the most realistic potential for
providing valued services to the Alliance-a judgment
with which we basically agree, although the naval
assets required are inherently expensive and sufficient
resources may not be available from national funds or
allied assistance.
The Navy took some relatively inexpensive steps to
upgrade and extend the life of ships committed to the
Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) and partici-
pating in NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic
(STANAVFORLANT).' By 1977, however, the Navy
had focused on obtaining Alliance aid to construct six
'Three old da Silva-class frigates (ex-US Dealey-class destroyer
escorts), for example, were altered to burn standard NATO diesel
fuel rather than heavy black oil. The three ships will become
administrative escorts for economic zone patrol next year, however.
Their NATO mission will be filled by four 2,250-ton Joao Belo-
class frigates, currently being updated with new electronic equip-
ment. None of these ships is large or modern enough to operate for
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Allies have too often wanted to provide in-kind aid-
mostly domestically produced equipment such as en-
gines or electronics-that often was not appropriate to
Portuguese needs. Lisbon also has offended some of
the Allies, particularly the Germans, by implying in
NATO meetings that their assistance was insufficient
or might not be reliable over the life of the program.
25X1
modern frigates, which would provide by. the mid-
1980s a small but capable force for NATO duties. In
1978 NATO's Ad Hoc Group adopted the frigate
construction plan as an Alliance program. A variety
of frigates were considered, but the Portuguese settled
by 1980 on an initial purchase of three modified
Dutch Kortenaer-class frigates. Lisbon was to sell
four relatively modern corvettes for seed money, and
the Allies committed themselves in principle to assist
the funding of the program.
In spite of this agreement, the program has gone
nowhere and currently is in danger of cancellation.
The Portuguese apparently blame the Allies for the
lengthy delay. Portuguese officials have complained in
NATO meetings and hallway conversations that the
We believe, however, that most of the responsibility
for the delay lies with the Portuguese. From the outset
they have been reluctant to decide upon a program
and adhere to it. In early 1982, for example, they
suddenly raised with the Germans the possibility of
building frigates in German yards, in an apparent
effort to obtain more assistance from the FRG-a
development that alarmed the Dutch, who had based
their substantial offer of assistance on the Portuguese
commitment to build the ships in the Netherlands.
Lisbon's handling of this program has made clear its
lack of experience and technical ability in managing a
complex program, meeting planning deadlines, and
working with the Allies on their contributions. Final-
ly, Lisbon is reluctant to commit itself to an expen-
sive, multiyear program without absolute assurance
that Allied funding would be available in the out
years. Portuguese negotiators thus far have rejected
the assurances of allies like West Germany and the
United States, which cannot legally make multiyear
commitments, that they will continue to support the 25X1
program. This problem has become more severe over
time as inflation has driven up the cost of the frigate
program (from approximately $400 million in 1977 to
an estimated $650 million in late 1982).
We suspect the Portuguese position on the frigate 25X1
program may reflect a disjunction between the Navy,
which is anxious to get construction under way, and
the government. Although civilian officials mouth
support for the frigates, they may be reluctant to
spend the relatively large amounts necessary to fund
Portugal's part of the program in spite of substantial
allied assistance-especially for the Navy, a less
politically potent force in the Portuguese equation. To
the extent that this kind of problem is reflected in
conflicts over priorities and mixed signals to the
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
Allies, the recent reforms intended to unify the serv-
ices under a defense minister with new authority
could help
Portuguese Attitudes Toward NATO and the Allies
Portuguese military officers suspect that the prospects
for achieving most of their modernization goals are
bleak. In spite of substantial Allied assistance, espe-
cially for the NATO Brigade, the message most
officers seem to have taken from modernization ef-
forts since 1976 is that Portugal's contribution to
NATO is largely unappreciated. In private conversa-
tions and in public statements since the mid-1970s,
the leaders of all three services have made it clear that
they believe Portugal's loyalty to NATO and the
United States deserves more support. They view the
programs to improve their forces as modest, reason-
able, and justified
The Portuguese almost certainly overstate their anxi-
eties and resentments at times to impress on the Allies
the importance of generous assistance programs. Nev-
ertheless, although Allied observers sometimes find
the Portuguese importuning irritating or resent the
kind of bungling and crossed signals evident in the
delays in the frigate program, most of them agree
with the basic elements of the Portuguese assessment:
that the Portuguese forces need modernization if they
are to fulfill NATO commitments, that domestic
economic resources are too limited to fund needed
programs, that Lisbon has been since 1976 a faithful
ally, and that Portuguese facilities are important to
NATO defense plans and US efforts to stabilize the
Middle East and Southwest Asia.
Spain's accession to NATO has heightened Portu-
guese anxieties. Although Lisbon publicly supported
Spanish membership, the Portuguese made it clear to
the Allies publicly and privately that they would insist
on Portugal's pride of place as a founding member
and, in addition, that they would never allow Portu-
guese forces to be commanded by a Spaniard. In both
bilateral and NATO forums, they pressed the United
States to support giving NATO's Iberian command to
Lisbon, and the first Portuguese admiral was installed
as CINCIBERLANT in September 1982. They have
pressed US officials to support transferring the sub-
command for the Azores from WESTLANT to
IBERLANT to consolidate their position. They
sought and received NATO funding for an automated
air defense warning and control system because they
hope to obtain an Iberian air defense command before
the far more modern and effective Spanish system can 25X1
be integrated. Most of all, they want to nail down
funding for important military programs, such as the
frigates, that would buttress their NATO role.
The Portuguese must therefore view the new Spanish
Government's freeze on military integration into
NATO with a certain amount of satisfaction. A delay
of a year or two in bringing Spain aboard would allow
time for realization of some Portuguese goals. If
Spain should ultimately decide to withdraw, the Por-
tuguese probably would believe themselves better off
than before Spanish entry.
Both military and civilian leaders monitor US securi-
ty assistance to other countries closely and use these
levels to press for additional aid. They are intensely
interested in levels of assistance and somewhat anx-
ious that new facilities in countries like Morocco
could reduce the value of Portuguese facilities to the
United States. Further, their questions to US officials
make it plain that they are offended that some states
not formally allied with the United States are able to
drive hard bargains for limited use of their facilities,
when the Portuguese have been willing to allow
almost unrestricted access to Lajes for so many years.
Lisbon so far seems to have accepted the fact that
Spain receives substantially greater total assistance,
especially because it is currently provided in loans and
Lisbon is interested primarily in grants. The Portu-
guese are watching Moroccan aid programs with 25X1
great interest, however, and are likely to regard the
level of that assistance as a floor for.their new
agreement with the United States.
Civilian leaders have reflected the military's anxieties
in part because of the important role the armed forces
still play in Portuguese politics. They are keenly
aware of the military's desire for a valid mission both
internally and- externally and for the means to fulfill
it. Although civilian politicians undoubtedly take
satisfaction in the completion of constitutional reform
efforts and restoration of civilian authority over the
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
25X1
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
Secret
military, they believe the country's economic and
political health remains fragile. They-like the mili-
tary-are not convinced that Portugal's allies appreci-
ate that vulnerability.
Implications for US and Allied Interests
Despite their frustration with bilateral and Alliance
support, the Portuguese do not, in our view, have any
realistic alternatives. Since the days following the
revolution, no one except the Communists has pro-
posed closer ties with the Soviet Union. Although
there is an active strain in Portuguese thought that
sees Portugal as a kind of "bridge" to the Third
World, particularly to the former colonies in Luso-
phone Africa, these ties are not viewed as an alterna-
tive to Portugal's reliance on its NATO allies for
military and economic aid
We do not believe, therefore, that even continued
disillusionment with the Allies is likely to lead to any
marked shift in the overall orientation of Portuguese
foreign policy toward NATO and the West. The
modernization of the Portuguese armed forces and
their overall health will remain dependent on the
bilateral relationship with the United States and, to a
lesser extent, on the association with NATO. These
relationships also have a broader importance, given
Portugal's fragile economy and the economic and
developmental aid provided by its allies. So long as
these relationships hold out any hope for continued
economic and military assistance, the Portuguese will
probably compromise on their most extreme demands
and bow to Allied pressures for facilities or other
Moreover, in addition to these pragmatic consider-
ations, most Portuguese military and civilian leaders
want to maintain what they regard as a special
relationship *ith the United States and to play a
valued role in NATO. The Foreign and Defense
Ministers, for example, expressed these sentiments
and a willingness to support US initiatives in conver-
sations with several top US leaders during 1982, and
US Embassy sources make it clear that these views
are evident throughout the military leadership. Portu-
guese political and military leaders seem to take pride
in the support they provide almost across the board on
issues like Poland and Afghanistan. Unlike many of
the countries with which the United States has bilat-
eral security relationships, there is widespread public
support in Portugal for the tie to the United States.
Although they express concern in bilateral negotia-
tions that US financial support must be high enough
to elicit military and parliamentary approval, Portu-
guese Government officials do not seem to worry
about public opposition; a 1982 poll showed 66
percent of the people viewed the United States and
NATO favorably. US use of Lajes Air Base is 25X1
generally popular in the Azores, where the base
supplies needed jobs and economic assistance, and
nearly everyone has relatives in America.
Nevertheless, we believe there is a real possibility 25X1
that, if the armed forces continue to feel unrequited,
Portugal will become a more difficult and less reliable
ally. This trend is already evident in the ongoing 25X1
negotiations for a new bilateral security agreement.
In a 1982 statement to NATO's Defense Review
Committee, Portuguese representative Admiral
Tavares said that, if Portugal finds itself unable to 25X1
defend its territory and interests adequately, it will
find it difficult to supply bases or assistance to others.
Although such threats are no doubt calculated to 25X1
increase the pressure on the Allies, we believe the
Portuguese are increasingly ready to act on them.
Lisbon's decision in April 1982 to deny for the first
time a US request for a transit through Lajes almost
certainly was a shot across the bow. The Portuguese
Government also refused to consider, in advance of
the negotiations for a new agreement, US requests to
expand fuel storage facilities at Lajes to support
greatly increased traffic during crisis operations or for
contingency access to additional facilities in mainland
Portugal. Portuguese negotiators argue that such con-
cessions will increase the threat to Portugal and the
Azores and require new defensive efforts by Portu-
guese forces. In 1982 Lisbon also dragged its heels on
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84S00555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
approval for improved housing for dependents at
Lajes, and the Portuguese Air Force base commander
has been difficult about allowing even routine upkeep
In early February, the parliament empowered the
caretaker government to continue negotiations with
the United States for a new security agreement that
would simply allow continued use of Lajes, including
expansion of the fuel storage facilities there. Given
their willingness to press ahead on the basic agree-
ment,.civilian leaders, at least, are evidently satis-
fied-at least for now-with the levels of assistance
proposed for 1983 and 1984. It now appears that the
basic agreement could be achieved within the next
several months. Following the formation of a new
government, which may not be completed before
summer, a new government is to resume discussions
on other elements of tpe US request-a space track-
ing site in mainland Pbrtugal and contingency access
to several mainland airbases. Although they have
been told repeatedly that there are no additional
sources for assistance above what has' already been
proposed to Congress, the Portuguese evidently hope
to negotiate these requests item by item, extracting
additional assistance for each.
If the Portuguese are not satisfied with the US offer
of a "rising trend" in military and economic assist-
ance for future years, however, we believe they are
likely to exercise more active control over the use of
Lajes in the future. They may even resort again to
refusal of transit requests to make clear how costly
their failure to cooperate could be. Portuguese offi-
cials already have made it clear to US representatives
that they expect more active consultation in the
future.
Given the extent of Portugal's equipment needs and
economic problems, and the Allies' own economic
constraints, there may inevitably continue to be a
tension between Portuguese aspirations and the ability
of the United States and its allies to satisfy those
aspirations. The Navy, for example, is likely to contin-
ue to be frustrated about the lack of progress on the
frigate program, while some US military representa-
tives predict friction with Air Force officials over
spare parts and maintenance for the A-7s.
Such frustrations may turn out to be no more than
temporary irritants, but US Embassy officials are
concerned that, over the long term, they could dam-
age the basic trust and sense of common interest that
underlie bilateral and multilateral cooperation with
Portugal. There even is a distant possibility that a
disaffected military, impotent to carry out its profes-
sional duties and fulfill its security missions, could
again look to meddling in domestic politics. In that
event, frustration and bitterness over security issues
could combine with severe economic and political
problems to present the Alliance once more with
serious instability in Portugal.
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Secret
Appendix A
The Portuguese Armed Forces
in 1983
Army
The Army has about 44,600 men when it is at full
peacetime strength. Because of the drastic manpower
reduction since 1974, about 35 percent of this number
are regulars-an unusually large proportion in a
conscript-based Army. Conscripts serve for a period
of 16 months. The Army has a large pool of recently
trained reservists and could be brought to about
90,000 men within 15 days of mobilization. Some
240,000 reservists are available for callup, but the
Army lacks the equipment or organization to use all
of them.
The Army's combat forces are organized into one
partially air-transportable infantry brigade (the
"NATO Brigade") numbering about 4,400 men in
peacetime, and 18 battalion-sized regiments-one
commando, one armored cavalry, two cavalry, and 14
infantry. These vary from about 600 to 1,200 men.
The brigade and the commando regiment make up an
elite Maneuver Corps, which is to fill the NATO
commitment and provide a rapid intervention capabil-
ity. These units are under the direct control of the
Army Chief of Staff. The rest of the units are
essentially a territorial defense force.
Portugal is divided into four military regions (see
figure 2), with additional military zone commands for
the Azores and Madeira.
The Army's greatest strength is that much of its
officer corps has had combat experience as recently as
1974-75. The Army has embarked upon a major
reorganization and development of the NATO Bri-
gade with great enthusiasm, and the desire among
Army officers for improved training and greater
professional opportunity is evident. The Army's basic
weakness is its lack of equipment, particularly modern
weapons and stocks of ammunition (see table 3). There
are plans to develop a workable mobilization system
and to streamline and modernize antiquated logistic
practices.
Table 3
Portuguese Army:
Major Items of Equipment
M-48 A-5 tank 23
M-47 tank 68
M-5 light tank 15
M-24 light tank 17
M-113 Al armored personnel carrier 86
Chaimite wheeled APC 87
Artillery
105-mm howitzer
130+
M-109 55-mm self-propelled howitzer
6
4.5- and 5.5-inch towed guns
50
Large caliber coastal defense guns
38
Antitank weapons
TOW missile launchers
21 a
SS-11 missile launchers
35
M-72 LAW rocket launchers
7,515
Recoilless rifle (75-mm and above)
140
Antiaircraft guns
212+
a The Army is to receive 42 TOW launchers by the end of 1983.
25X1
The Army also has on the books a plan for a further
reorganization, involving the development of three 25X1
additional brigades-one for each military region-
and a light infantry brigade in each island grouping.
Headquarters and staffs are to be created at each
military region command, but the brigades themselves
will consist of existing regiments. The US Defense
Attache has noted the unusual autonomy of Portu-
guese regiments. Their long historical connections
with the cities in which they are located would make
Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
 Approved For Release 2009/05/11: CIA-RDP84SO0555R000100200004-7
Figure 2
Portugal: Major Military Installations
30 2
6
A RES
*Lajas
L
38
c~-~
`j'Ponta
Delgada
lometers
5 Miles
MADEIRA
ISLANDS
NORTHERN
MILITARY REGION
MILITARY REGION
Monte
Real
J Tancos
Santa*
~NlargarLda?
T
Alverca
nten
" facilitance
y)
Si ; ra* t'
LLisbon$)