THE BRITISH LABOR PARTY: CAUGHT BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND REALITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00555R000200060004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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OIi
Directorate of
Intellig nce
'~ r ^rY'!? a. F 2 ~' 1~ r.~R ;'r
ic~Y d? -s ~y~La k wL .
fI AK ON
and Reality
The British Labor Party:
Caught Between Ideology
An Intelligence Assessment
EUR 83-10144
May 1983
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Intelligence
The British Labor Party:
Caught Between Ideology
and Reality
This paper was prepared by lof the
Office of European Analysis. It was coordinated with
the National Intelligence Council. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Western Europe Division, EURI~
Confidential
EUR 83-10144
May 1983
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The British Labor Party:
Caught Between Ideology
and Reality
Key Judgments The British Labor Party entered the campaign for the election on 9 June in
Information available greater disarray than at any time in the past 60 years. Leftists and
as of 17 May 1983 moderates have muted their dispute in public, but intraparty differences
was used in this report.
over procedures and policy remain near the surface and could break into
view at any time.
Labor moderates have recovered some of their losses to the left in the
party's national level organizations. We believe the party's long-term swing
to the left has not been arrested, however, because the left continues to
make inroads into local party organizations and Labor's parliamentary
delegation. Indeed, these trends are such that any increase in Labor's
parliamentary representation after the election will almost certainly mean
a more leftwing parliamentary party.
The shift to the left is apparent in such radical policy prescriptions as
withdrawal from the European Community, cancellation of the Trident
submarine program, phasing out of the Polaris missile force, closure of US
bases in the United Kingdom, opposition to INF deployment, and trade
protectionism. Party moderates will try to tone down these policies which,
in calling for a more insular policy at home and abroad, could in our view
bring Britain more frequently into conflict with its allies.
We believe that the most likely prospect is for Labor to be returned to op-
position. It suffers from internal divisions and is running on an electoral
program that the polls show evokes little enthusiasm. In opposition, Labor
would indulge in intraparty strife, with moderates and leftwingers blaming
each other for defeat. Experience shows that the left-because it tends to
be more active at the grass-roots level-has a better chance of gaining
control of policies when Labor spends an extended period out of power.
Growing leftist influence in turn could cause many moderate Laborites to
defect to the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance. Even if Labor held
together, we believe the left would acquire a predominant voice, given. rules
changes that are pushing the parliamentary delegation in that direction. In
opposition, Labor could benefit from being the major focus for those
dissatisfied with the government's policies, and leftists would count on this
to bring them to power eventually.
iii Confidential
EUR 83-10144
May 1983
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In our judgment, the second most likely outcome for Labor-although
prospects appear weak-is to lead a minority government. Labor might be
able to emerge as the strongest single party in Parliament if the Social
Democratic-Liberal Alliance, now in a slump, regains momentum and
captures Tory seats. A Labor minority government would attempt to enact
the party's domestic program, but moderates would be in a strong position
to delay action on contentious foreign and defense policy planks, such as
ending the Polaris program or closing US bases.
Labor cooperation with the Alliance would be difficult but not impossible
to arrange. Labor moderates probably would see cooperation with the
Alliance as a way to fend off leftwing programs and perhaps to co-opt the
Social Democrats back into a Labor Party dominated by moderates. Trade
union insistence that Labor make a deal to keep the Conservatives out of
power could be a spur to a Labor-Alliance combination.
Such a government probably would steer a moderate course at home and
preserve most of Britain's international commitments. We believe it could
cancel Trident, however, and the fate of INF would be problematic, given
the strong opposition to it in Liberal ranks. A Labor-Alliance combination
would be uneasy, in any case, because Laborites would feud over how far to
accommodate Alliance policy views, and Labor leaders would look for a
way to achieve a majority at Alliance expense.
We believe that the least likely prospect for Labor is to win an absolute
majority, even though the vagaries of the British electoral system overrep-
resent Labor's strength and the continuing recession highlights problems
that the party has exploited with great success in the past. If the unlikely
event comes to pass, however, leftwingers would see it as an endorsement of
their domestic and foreign policies and would insist on rapid implementa-
tion of Labor's program. The moderates, for their part, would try to delay
policies such as unilateral nuclear disarmament by focusing party efforts
on domestic programs. Despite these efforts, however, a majority govern-
ment headed by Labor would pose the most serious threat to US interests.
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The British Labor Party:
Caught Between Ideology
and Reality
Labor's Continuing Intraparty Conflict
Throughout its 60-year history as the major alterna-
tive to the Conservatives, the Labor Party has been
plagued by divisions between social democrats, usual-
ly allied with the trade unions, and more ideological
socialists. The divisions grew sharper following La-
bor's election defeat in 1979 and continue to trouble
the party as it prepares for the general election on 9
June.
At party conferences in 1979 and 1980, leftists won
rules changes that greatly enhanced the power of local
parties and trade unions to choose the party leader.
The new rules also provided for the renomination of
Members of Parliament (MPs) and the selection of
candidates by local branches, which are often leftist
controlled.' Moderates-particularly those controlling
large unions-fought back at the 1981 and 1982
conferences. They were able to win a solid majority on
the National Executive Committee, the body that
plays a major role in formulating policy between
conferences. They have also attempted to expel
extreme leftists from the party and to reduce the
power of leftwing spokesman Tony Benn and his allies
in Labor's leadership councils.
Labor's moderates have so far failed, however, to stem
growing leftwing control of local organizations. A
continuing decline in the number of party members
(now down to 276,692, according to a party report,
and the lowest figure since 1929) has permitted an
activist minority to take over moribund local
branches. Because party rules give the activist minor-
ity greater power than they had before, the left is in a
position eventually to take control of Labor's parlia-
mentary delegation. A number of local bodies have
successfully defied national orders to expel extreme
' According to the new rules the Labor Party leader and deputy
leader are elected by an electoral college in which 40 percent of the
votes are held by the trade unions that are affiliated with the party,
30 percent by the parliamentary party, and 30 percent by local
organizations. Thus far, moderates have been able to get support
only for a change that would give MPs 50 percent of the votes. In
the past the leader was elected solely by the MPs and was in large
measure insulated from activist pressure.
leftwingers (notably the Trotskyite "Militant Tenden-
cy") and have insisted on selecting parliamentary
candidates opposed by party leader Michael Foot.
In our view, moderates have given up trying to regain
control of local organizations and instead are trying to
circumvent them by rules changes that are of vital
significance for the party's future. Although many of
the changes proposed run afoul of important en-
trenched interests in the party, some probably will
appeal to grass-roots Labor supporters. For example,
in December, the moderate-dominated National
Executive Committee proposed changes that would
lessen the voice of local parties in the Committee
itself-a change the left was able to delay. Last year
some moderates proposed a radical break with prece-
dent by advocating that the mass of Labor voters be
allowed to determine policy, leadership, and eventual-
ly candidates for Parliament in primary-style elec-
tions. Action on this proposal was also put off until
after the general election.
In our view, moderates will find it difficult to '!bring
about the changes they want. Even moderate trade
union leaders, whose bloc votes give them unique
power to shape party policy and leadership, will be
reluctant to accept rules changes that would dramati-
cally lessen their power. In alliance with leftwing local
activists, they will be in a strong position to block any
changes they find unpalatable.
Even if moderates are able to find ways to circumvent
the power of local party branches, the party probably
will continue to drift to the left because the number of
leftwing parliamentary candidates replacing moder-
ates as they retire or fail of renomination is increas-
ing. The Sunday Times reported earlier this year, for
example, that self-identified leftwingers will probably
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Benn (57) is the most prominent spokesman for
Labor's "hard left, " the faction in the party that has
taken the lead in pushing through rules changes
favoring the left. Despite some health problems, Benn
continues to have ambitions to become Labor leader.
Many Laborites, however, have told US officials that
his high water mark was reached when he narrowly
lost the deputy leadership contest with Healey at the
1981 party conference and that some other figure is
likely to emerge as the left's standard bearer. Benn's
power on the National Executive Committee has
eroded since 1981, and he has not been elected to the
Shadow Cabinet by his fellow MPs. He remains a
charismatic speaker and retains a strong personal
following and power base in local Labor organiza-
tions. His presence arouses enthusiasm but also
frightens many voters, and his role has been played
down in recent byelections. Labor leftwingers are
divided over the extent to which their cause should be
tied to Benn's ambitions, but he remains confident
that trends in both the Labor Party and British
politics are workingfor him. Benn's influence has not
been strong in previous Labor governments because
he has not enjoyed great respect among his Cabinet
colleagues. He will press hard for implementation of
the party platform.
increase their strength in the parliamentary delega-
tion from 31 percent to over 44 percent, even if Labor
does no more than maintain its present parliamentary
strength of 237.2
Trade union bosses have told Labor Party leaders that
they want internal questions kept on the backburner,
and they have threatened to cut off financial support
that the party desperately needs if their demands are
not met. The struggle within the National Executive
Committee will continue, however, as moderates and
leftists "interpret" rules and vie for the upper hand.
Although disputes could break into the open at any
time, it is likely that a preelection truce-demanded
by the unions-will provide an appearance of
harmony.
The Primacy of the Trade Unions
The trade unions affiliated with the Labor Party have,
through the Trades Union Congress (TUC), been the
party's pillar of support for 80 years. Although the
unions are themselves in trouble today, their support
is more essential than ever for Labor because of
declining party membership and funds. Party rules
changes, meanwhile, have given unions greater power
to influence Labor's leadership and policy. As one
British newspaper stated, Labor is "now more in hock
to the unions than at any time in its history."
Union leaders, notably TUC General Secretary Len
Murray, have used their power to shape Labor's
domestic program. Pledges on economic policy in
Labor's election manifesto are largely the product of
union thinking. The union leadership has been less
successful in its attempts to enforce a truce between
party moderates and leftwingers; twice in recent
months the TUC has ordered party-union conferences
to patch together an agreement in order to present a
credible front to the electorate.
Ironically, at a time when union power to influence
Labor's policy is potentially greater than ever, the
TUC lacks the commanding personalities who in the
' "Self-identified leftwingers" was defined as all those who said
they supported the aims of the Tribune Group, a pressure group of
MPs who for decades have been associated with the left wing of the
Labor Party.
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Michael Foot, caught between
Healey on the right and Benn
on the left.
past could deliver bloc votes at party conferences and
impose moderate policies on a recalcitrant left. In
addition, the current lines between leftists and moder-
ates within the trade union movement are often hazy
and depend on specific people and issues. Over the
past year, the TUC has moved somewhat to the right
with the election of Frank Chapple of the electricians
union-he is an outspoken foe of Labor's left wing-
as TUC Conference chairman and with the adoption
of rules that lessen the power of small leftwing unions
on the TUC's General Council. Any decisive swing to
the right, however, is blocked by powerful leftwing
unions like Arthur Scargill's miners union and the
Transport and General Workers Union-Britain's
largest, and for over 20 years a spearhead of support
for unilateral nuclear disarmament. Moderate union
leaders have to contend also with extensive leftwing
activity among shop stewards and in local union
branches, much as moderate Labor MPs are pres-
sured by leftwing local organizations.
Since the left-right balance is close within many
unions, support for moderate positions is undepend-
able and union bloc votes can change with a shift of
position by only two or three people in union govern-
ing bodies. At the Labor Party conference in 1982, for
example, several contests that reinforced moderate
control of the National Executive Committee were
decided at the last minute and only when a railway
union president apparently reneged on a deal with the
miners. (Leftists forced the union president's resigna-
tion shortly after the conference.) Moderates have
been struggling to recover ground in organizational
struggles, but in recent party conferences the unions
have supported leftwing policy views more massively
than ever.
Even if moderates were to achieve the upper hand in
all of the major unions, they probably would be
preoccupied by the unions' internal problems. The
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unions are suffering from declining membership, high
unemployment, and reduced funds. Moreover, a gulf
has opened between the leadership and the rank and
file. As opinion polls and the results of strike ballots
demonstrate, many union members show less defer-
ence to leaders' wishes than they used to and most are
considerably less committed than they were to the
political baggage that goes with being a leftwing
union activist. According to recent polls, union mem-
bers also are finding traditional leftwing collectivism
irrelevant to their economic plight and, therefore, are
becoming indifferent to union and Labor Party poli-
tics. The decline in rank-and-file participation has
made it difficult for moderate trade unionists to fend
off challenges from activist minorities. This situation
in turn adds to what we see as the essentially undemo-
cratic nature of British trade unions, in which a small
group of executives elected by a minority can control
hundreds of thousands of bloc votes at TUC and
Labor Party conferences.
The disenchantment of union voters hurts the Labor
Party as a whole but offers promising prospects for
leftwing union activists who can join with leftists in
constituency party organizations to gain control of the
parliamentary delegation. Although unions normally
have sponsored between a fourth and a third of Labor
candidates for Parliament, their activity and influence
at local party levels have always been minimal.
However, the new rules increasing the influence of
local organizations makes them valuable prizes, and
this has revived trade union interest in the constituen-
cy level. The natural alliance between leftwing union
activists and party leftists prominent in many local
organizations will probably enhance prospects for
increased leftist influence in Labor's parliamentary
delegations. There have already been some bitter
contests between candidates sponsored by the moder-
ate electricians unions and those supported by the
leftwing miners unions.
The Leadership Question
Looming over the rules debates during the past few
weeks has been the question of Michael Foot's contin-
uation as leader of the Labor Party. Foot was elected
in November 1980 as the man best equipped to keep
the party together. Most Laborites believed his long-
standing leftist convictions reflected accurately the
new balance of power in the party, while wavering
Foot (69) is a leftwinger who in the past was often in
trouble with moderate Labor leaders for his policy
views, including his often bitter attacks on US foreign
policy. He defeated Denis Healey for the party
leadership in 1980, but has been unable to unite the
party. Since becoming leader, Foot has often battled
with leftists who were his strongest supporters in the
leadership contest. Moderates still have hope that
Foot's personal dislike of Tony Benn, and his fervent
desire to unite the party and become prime minister,
will lead him to join their effort to modify leftwing
policy views. Foot, however, supports most of the
left's policy prescriptions, particularly on unilateral
nuclear disarmament. A former deputy party leader
and Employment Secretary in the 1970s, Foot has
always been heavily influenced by the views of trade
union leaders and remains convinced that a Labor-
union partnership is the best way to govern Britain.
Foot has poor personal poll ratings when compared to
Thatcher, but his friends point out that Labor leader
Clement Attlee was far less popular than Winston
Churchill in 1945, yet Labor went on to win an
overwhelming election victory.
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moderates thought his desire for unity was the best
way to prevent the even more leftwing Tony Benn
from capturing the leadership. Poor poll ratings both
for the party and for Foot personally, Foot's inability
to maintain unity-29 moderate MPs defected to the
new Social Democratic Party-and a string of byelec-
tion defeats led to intense speculation in the press that
he would have to resign before the next general
election.
But Foot drew support from major trade union leaders
and from leftists, including Benn. The trade union
chiefs made it clear that they did not want a divisive
succession struggle so close to the election. And
leftwingers, so often a thorn in Foot's side despite his
longstanding support for their cause, were concerned
that moderate Deputy Party leader Denis Healey
would succeed Foot pending a party conference.
Rather than allow Healey to "usurp" the leadership,
they called for unity behind Foot. Any lingering
chance that Foot would be replaced as leader disap-
peared when Prime Minister Thatcher called the
early election.
Labor's Program- Domestic
Labor's domestic program is leftist in orientation,
although not markedly so by past standards. Even
moderates can endorse the platform as a broad objec-
tive for a Labor government, although various party
leaders have told US officials that they do not take all
parts of the program seriously.
The program was worked out by the Labor Shadow
Cabinet, the National Executive Committee, and a
special liaison committee of party and trade union
representatives. Party leader Foot and Shadow Chan-
cellor Shore have stated that the party's major elec-
tion theme will be fighting unemployment and restor-
ing social spending cut by the Thatcher government.
To that end, the party, in close consultation with the
Trades Union Congress, has proposed steps to produce
jobs and to shore up manufacturing. As an integral
part of its economic program, Labor proposes to leave
the European Community within 18 months of com-
ing to power because only by "restoring full national
independence can a Labor government embark on a
Denis Healey, Deputy Leader of the Labor Party and
Shadow Foreign Secretary
Healey (65) is the most prominent member of Labor's
moderate wing and the labor leader Thatcher fears
most as an opponent. He has been deputy leader since
1980, and the party's foreign affairs spokesman since
1981. At one point following his defeat in the leader-
ship contest in 1980 and narrow retention of the
deputy leadership post in 1981, Healey appeared to
despair of leading the Labor Party. In recent weeks,
however, a US official reports that he has regained
his enthusiasm. His chances are hurt by the swing of
Labor's parliamentary delegation to the left and by
the bitter feelings leftists and many trade union
leaders continue to harbor because of his heavyhand-
ed dealings with them at party conferences. Healey is
a former Defense Secretary and Chancellor of the
Exchequer and has considerable defense expertise.
He supports conventional defense and says he wants
to play down reliance on nuclear weapons. His re-
vived leadership hopes have caused him to appease
the left at least in public statements. Although he
probably would try to ignore most leftwing views in
office, he now appears ready to compromise with the
left on arms issues if necessary. He has strongly
attacked both Thatcher and Reagan on arms control
matters and probably hopes demands for a "dual
key "for INF and for inclusion of British nuclear
forces in arms control negotiations will permit reten-
tion of nuclear weapons into the next decade.
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domestic socialist policy necessary to promote eco-
nomic growth." Labor's "Plan for Recovery" calls for:
? An immediate increase in spending of at least
$7 billion for public works jobs and for youth
employment, and a broad multiyear $43.5 billion
public investment program to reduce unemployment
to 1 million within five years.
? A devaluation of the pound by 30 percent over two
years to promote exports, a reintroduction of foreign
exchange controls, and imposition of import controls
to protect British industry from "unfair" competi-
tion and to hold up wage rates.
? Steps to reverse the Thatcher government's de-
nationalization of industry, especially of the British
National Oil Company, and to increase the role of
the state in managing the economy. Labor has
called for a National Economic Assessment and for
a centralized planning framework for production
and trade.
? A renewal of the social contract adopted by the
government and the unions in the mid-1970s. Be-
cause most unions reject any statutory incomes
policy, however, such a "contract" would be based
on cooperation and "common sense." As part of a
deal with the unions for wage restraint, Labor is
pledged to give them power to influence and partici-
pate in business decisions and to repeal all restric-
tions on trade union powers introduced by the
Conservatives.
Labor proposes to reduce the remaining powers of the
House of Lords as a step toward its eventual abolition
and calls for a phaseout of private education and
medical practice over several years. Labor also sup-
ports regional assemblies with financial and adminis-
trative powers for Scotland and Wales.
Moderates and leftists agree that the first priority of a
Labor government would be to stimulate the econo-
my, but they differ on the best approach. The two
factions have fought over how quickly to phase out
private education and medical practice, and Tony
Benn's proposal to renationalize without compensa-
tion businesses sold off by the Tories was bitterly
assailed by Foot. Most Laborites also decry union
opposition to any formal policy of wage restraint, and
we expect that union leaders will hint at acceptance of
such a policy as the election approaches.
We would expect a Labor government, under pressure
from the party's left wing, to implement its domestic
program, even though many party leaders doubt its
efficacy. Many Laborites, for example, have told US
officials that they think a full-blown reflationary and
protectionist program is incompatible with Britain's
international commitments. They also doubt that it
could be put into effect without touching off a wage
explosion and a collapse of the pound, renewed double
digit inflation, and retaliation from the United King-
dom's trading partners. Even if such a disaster should
come to pass, however, we believe that the leftists'
commitment to the domestic program is such that
they would oppose a pullback from most aspects of it
unless the moderates were prepared to offer conces-
sions on foreign policy, such as support for immediate
unilateral nuclear disarmament.'
Labor's Program-Foreign and Defense
Labor's current position on foreign and defense issues
dramatically reflects the change in the balance of
power between leftists and moderates. Foreign and
defense issues have polarized the party even more
than domestic policy. Since 1945, moderate party
leaders have usually been able to ignore leftwing
foreign policy demands, notably that Britain give up
its nuclear weapons. Since 1979, however, changes in
party rules have enabled leftists to enforce their policy
views on MPs. In addition, Michael Foot has backed
the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament for 20 years
and continues to voice his support for its principles.
The last three party conferences endorsed unilateral
nuclear disarmament, each time by a larger margin.
In 1982, unilateralism was supported by two-thirds of
' One of the most famous examples of this sort of intraparty
compromise came in 1967 when a sterling crisis forced drastic
budget cuts. In order to win leftwing acceptance of reductions in
social spending, the government was forced to accept equivalent
cuts in defense. Thus, then Defense Secretary Healey announced
the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf, leading an
irate US official to exclaim, "Do you mean to tell me you're selling
your imperial heritage to pay for false teeth and hearing aids"?
Similar compromises between Labor's factions led to defense cuts
in the mid-1970s.
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the voters, which theoretically ensures its inclusion in
Labor's program. The program consists of general
policy objectives of the Labor Party while the election
manifesto sets out the policy of the next Labor
government. According to the conference resolution,
Labor:
? Supports cancellation of the Trident program.
? Rejects INF deployment in the United Kingdom
and the rest of Western Europe.
? Favors a nuclear freeze and the closing of US
nuclear bases in the United Kingdom.
? Supports the inclusion of British forces in arms
control negotiations, ultimately leading to a phasing
out of the Polaris program. Britain would, during
the 4-to-5-year tenure of a Labor government, reject
nuclear weapons in favor of a "nonnuclear defense
strategy."
On other foreign policy matters, Labor continues to
advocate withdrawal from the EC and cuts in defense
spending while reaffirming support for NATO and for
a conventional defense strategy. The party roundly
criticizes US policy in the Third World, particularly
in Latin America and southern Africa, and calls for a
Labor government to improve relations with other
socialist regimes. Finally, in another break with the
past, Labor says it supports "eventual unity" between
Northern Ireland and the Republic, so long as it can
be brought about peacefully and by consent.
Nuclear Disarmament
Party leader Foot has said that he wants nuclear
weapons questions to be a major part of the election
campaign. With ground launched cruise missiles
scheduled for deployment in December 1983, disar-
mament demonstrations moving into high gear at the
Greenham Common INF site, and polls showing a
majority of Britons opposed to INF and skeptical of
US arms control policy, Labor leaders apparently
believe they can exploit the public's fears of nuclear
proliferation.' Leftists and moderates have shown
' Polls also show, however, that a 66-percent majority of the public,
including a 55-percent majority of Labor voters, opposes unilateral
nuclear disarmament.
unity in calling for arms negotiations, attacking the
expense of the Trident program at a time of cuts in
social spending, calling for the British to include their
own nuclear forces in arms talks (something we
believe is a ploy by moderates to retain the Polaris
force for as long as possible), and demanding rejection
of INF or at least a "dual key" system that would
place US nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom
under the joint control of London and Washington.
Additionally, Labor politicians of all stripes probably
will attack the current US administration during the
campaign, as Labor tries to take advantage of polls
showing rising skepticism about US policy and as
moderates attempt to protect themselves from the
party left.
In the weeks after the party conference of 1982,
Labor moderates told US officials that they hoped to
tone down some of the foreign policy planks in the
election manifesto, but thus far they have not had
much success. Support for unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment is strong among the Labor Party's rank-and-file
members, and even some so-called moderates on the
National Executive Committee are sympathetic to
unilateralist arguments-the US Embassy reports
that party officials say the manifesto will probably be
accepted by 95 percent of the party. On nuclear
weapons issues, therefore, movement away from the
leftist program is unlikely.
Most disheartening from the standpoint of US inter-
ests is the position of Shadow Foreign Secretary and
Deputy Party leader Denis Healey. Moderates have
assured US officials that Healey, who once said he
would not serve in a Labor government committed to
unilateralism, would play a major role in formulating
Labor's defense policy. Healey still has ambitions to
lead the party, however, and he apparently has decid-
ed to appease the left by attacking US arms control
policy, denouncing Trident, and denying he ever
supported the NATO INF program. Healey has said
also that he does not in principle oppose ending
Polaris or closing US bases, so long as it is done by ne-
gotiation with Washington and with the United King-
dom's allies.
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Healey's friends in the party argue that, despite this
public stance, he is hoping to "keep Britain's nuclear
options open"-specifically to retain Polaris as long as
possible and to keep US nuclear bases in the United
Kingdom. According to his supporters, Healey will
use the argument that unilateral nuclear disarmament
is a vote loser and exploit any leftist divisions about
how far to go in forcing the issue. To prevent or delay
implementation of leftist policies, he will also count on
pressure from the United Kingdom's allies and on the
transitory nature of the language in the manifesto,
which says that nuclear renunciation will take place
over the course of the four- to five-year life of a Labor
government.
Leftwingers are aware that Healey's strategy is to
have negotiations spun out over a period of years and
have recently criticized the draft election manifesto
because it does not call for immediate dismantling of
British nuclear forces and does not unequivocally
endorse closing US bases. Despite Healey's hopes,
however, the Labor left is closer to its objective of
unilateral nuclear disarmament than ever before.
Withdrawal From the EC
At party conferences sentiment for withdrawal from
the EC is even stronger than support for unilateral
nuclear disarmament. Moreover, public opinion on
the EC issue is closer to the Labor Party's position
than it is on the nuclear issue.'
Leftists have claimed for years that Labor must adopt
an insular and nationalist foreign policy if it hopes to
carry out a successful socialist policy at home. Ac-
cording to the leftists, a Labor government would
have to shed the "trammels" of Community member-
ship in order to revitalize the British economy. In
1975, pressure from the Labor left forced the Wilson
government to hold an unprecedented referendum on
EC membership, which pro-EC forces won. This time
the party platform commits the United Kingdom to
withdraw, which -means that the election itself will be
a referendum on the EC question.
Despite overwhelming endorsement of withdrawal at
Trades Union Congress and Labor Party conferences,
some union leaders have publicly admitted that with-
drawal from the Community would do nothing to help
the British economy. A Trades Union Congress report
early in 1982 stated that withdrawal would actually
harm union interests and recommended that the TUC
reverse its position-something the Congress refused
to do. Labor leader Foot also seemed to back away
from withdrawal in his public commentary, saying it
would only be done in consultation with other socialist
leaders in Western Europe.
Leftists reacted strongly to hints that there would be a
retreat from the conference position, and Foot quickly
repeated his promise to take Britain out of the EC.
Earlier this year, the party's spokesman for European
Community matters, Eric Heffer, produced an
18-month timetable for withdrawal. Given hostility to
the Community from Labor's activists, trade union-
ists, and a large segment of the public, withdrawal
from the Community remains a strong possibility and
will probably be prominent in the election cam-
paign-especially as long as the controversy over
Britain's EC budget contribution remains unresolved.
Economic and political realities, however, could delay
the 18-month timetable, particularly if union leaders
and other European socialist politicians press Labor to
reconsider and if the Community appears willing to
accommodate British complaints on the budget and
CAP reform. We believe leftist notions of substituting
vague forms of "international socialist solidarity" or
reviving stronger ties with the Commonwealth would
quickly be seen as poor substitutes for the connection
with Europe, as even a number of Laborites have
admitted to US officials.
Can Labor Win?
We believe that Labor will face formidable obstacles
to winning a majority in the House of Commons.
Disputes between moderates and leftists, which have
been muted, are likely to reemerge when prominent
politicians are pressed during the campaign about the
future policies of a Labor government. Other parties
will in any event make a major issue of Labor's
internal squabbling and will emphasize the threat of a
leftist-dominated party in power. And because
Michael Foot leads the party, the issue of weak and
indecisive leadership will hurt Labor's chances.
5 Polls over the past three years have consistently shown three out of
five Britons in favor of withdrawal from the EC.
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Labor's prospects are also damaged by a long-term
decline in its support, from almost 49 percent of the
electorate in 1951 to less than 37 percent in 1979.
Recent polls show Labor hovering at around 30 to 35
percent of the vote and the Tories between 45 and 50
percent-the highest level of support for the Conserv-
atives since the 1979 election. In addition, parliamen-
tary reapportionment will cost Labor some 20 seats.'
One political writer described Labor's immediate
dilemma-as opposed to the party's long-term prob-
lems-in trying to win the next election: because the
election will be for an enlarged 650-seat House of
Commons, the party would have to gain 100 new seats
beyond the 237 currently held. A swing to Labor of
this scale has occurred only once-in 1945-and
there is little prospect for such a result in June.
Recent byelections have shown a swing to Labor of
only 1.5 percent, not nearly enough to win a national
election.
Nevertheless, we do not believe that Labor can simply
be written off. There is still a chance it will win a
plurality of seats giving it a strong claim to form the
next government. If this election parallels most previ-
ous contests, the 15- to 20-percent lead that the Tories
currently enjoy will be reduced as voters boost the
underdog party-partly to deprive the front-runner of
too strong a majority, according to the Embassy. The
Embassy also points to the advantage Labor should
get from the addition of younger voters to the newly
updated electoral register of Britain's 41 million
voters. In addition, and probably most crucial to
Labor's chances, any increase in support for the
Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance probably will
come at the expense of the Tories.
Despite a long term decline in Labor's vote, the party
continues to benefit from Britain's system of single
member "winner take all" constituencies. It also has a
solid core of support-roughly 30 percent of the
electorate-concentrated in the older urban, industri-
al areas in Scotland, Wales, and the northeast of
England which give it a base of close to 200 seats.
Oxford political scientist Daniel Butler told US Em-
bassy officers in early May that with Labor starting
6 According to most studies, the decline in Labor's vote has been
caused by a drop in the number of working-class voters and a
general 20-year decay in loyalties to the two major parties. Labor is
also suffering from a steady drop in the number of people who
support Labor's traditional policies of nationalization and redistri-
bution of income.
from this base he could make a good case for the
prospect of a hung Parliament-no party wins a
majority. Butler pointed to the uneven demography of
the electorate, which, according to his calculations,
means that the Tories would shed seats rather quickly
if they drop toward 40 percent of the vote. He thinks
the Tories would lose seats twice as fast as Labor
would under similar circumstances. Butler's case for
such a Tory decline, however, rests heavily on a surge
in Alliance support to about 30 percent, a prospect we
now believe unlikely. The Alliance began the election
campaign by shrinking to below 20-percent support in
the polls.
We believe that the most likely outcome on 9 June
will be for Labor to return to opposition. Thatcher's
current lead in the polls is bolstered by her image of
decisive leadership and a perception by the electorate
that the economic situation is getting better. If Labor
manages to effectively exploit issues such as unem-
ployment and if the Alliance regains sufficient mo-
mentum to capture a significant share of the vote,
Labor might gain a plurality of seats in Parliament.
Only a major change in voter preference-for reasons
not now apparent-could produce a Labor majority.
What Labor Would Do
Labor Again in Opposition. Labor once again in
opposition would be plunged into disputes between
leftists and moderates, with each side blaming the
other for election defeat. Foot probably would be
replaced by someone union leaders believed could
hold the party together and conduct a vigorous
opposition.
Labor probably would try to balance a moderate with
a leftwinger in the leadership and deputy leadership
positions, according to US Embassy reporting. The
most widely bruited combination is Denis Healey as
leader and leftist Neil Kinnock (a rising star in the
party) as deputy. Should Healey's enemies on the left
prove adamant, we believe either Shadow Chancellor
of the Exchequer Peter Shore or, less likely, Shadow
Defense Secretary John Silken (both more acceptable
to the left) might become leader. In this case, moder-
ate Roy Hattersley, who like Kinnock is ambitious to
lead Labor in the future, would be a strong candidate
for deputy leader.
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Peter Shore, Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer
A pragmatic, articulate, and intelligent party leader,
Shore (58) is popular with his colleagues. He is
considered by many as a probable successor to Foot.
He often meets with US officials and acknowledges
the importance of the special relationship. He sup-
ports NATO, opposes unilateral nuclear disarma-
ment, and is described by colleagues as a staunch
English patriot. Pressure to cut defense spending,
however, and his ambition will probably convince him
to go along with a Labor consensus on defense. He
has limited foreign policy experience as Labor's
Shadow Foreign Secretary in 1979-80. Sharply criti-
cal of continued British membership in the EC, Shore
has called the decision to join the Community "the
biggest single error of national policy in the postwar
period. " Some observers believe his opposition to EC
membership and subsequent "little England" image
have given him more of a leftwing reputation than he
deserves. He is a vocal critic of Prime Minister
Thatcher's economic policies and advocates an eco-
nomic strategy that cuts interest rates and increases
government spending. He has also supported selective
import controls. Failure of the unions to accept his
proposals for an incomes policy and perceptions that
his economic plan lacks credibility have hurt him.
John Silken, Shadow Defense Secretary
Silken (60), Labor's defense spokesman, is another
man anxious to lead the party. He entered the deputy
leadership contest in 1981 in the hope of emerging as
a compromise choice between Healey and Benn or, at
least, of preventing Benn from winning by drawing
leftwing votes away from him. Silken probably sees
himself as a man who can obtain leftist support once
Benn is no longer a candidate, while remaining
acceptable to trade union leaders and moderates. He
is in the process of trying to obtain control of
Tribune, the Labor left's newspaper. Silken was not
enthusiastic about becoming defense spokesman and
relies heavily on aides for expert advice. He is critical
of US arms control policy, supports unilateral nu-
clear disarmament, and claims ending nuclear pro-
grams will free funds for conventional forces. Silken
also supports withdrawal from the EC and alienated
many of his European colleagues when he was Agri-
culture Secretary in the late 1970s. Silken is widely
regarded by both moderates and leftwingers as a
political opportunist, mainly concerned with advanc-
ing his own career.
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A Labor MPfrom Wales, Kinnock (41) has been the
party's education and science spokesman since June
1979. British newspapers have called him a fast-
rising star in the party and a potential future leader.
Kinnock, who was Parliamentary Private Secretary
to Labor leader Foot when Foot was Employment
Secretary in 1974-75, was elected to the party's
National Executive Committee in 1978 and has been
reelected each year at the party conference by a larger
margin. He is a member of the Tribune Group, a
formal caucus of leftwing MPs, but is often described
as a leader of the "soft left, " that group willing to
compromise on some issues in the interests of party
unity and electoral credibility. He was among the
handful of MPs on the NEC whose votes cost Tony
Benn the deputy leadership in 1981, an action that
has earned Kinnock many enemies on the "hard left"
but solidified his position with moderates. Any suc-
cess in the effort to forestall or delay implementation
of leftist policies on nuclear weapons or withdrawal
from the EC would have to depend on moderates
reaching an agreement with Kinnock and his
supporters.
Hattersley (50) is generally regarded as the most
prominent Labor moderate after Denis Healey and as
the moderates'future hope to lead the Labor.Party
and return it to a center-left course. Hattersley
opposes unilateral nuclear disarmament and with-
drawal from the EC; he has also supported close
relations with the United States in foreign and de-
fense matters. Hattersley enhanced his standing with-
in the party and the trade union by loyally defending
Labor policies even when he disagreed with them and
by refusing to defect to the Social Democrats ,despite
his past association with SDP leader Roy Jenkins.
Hattersley's position as Home Secretary may hurt
his prospects with voters because he could be tied to
unpopular perceptions of Labor as "soft" on law and
order and on nonwhite immigration. Hattersley will
be a key figure in any efforts to short-circuit leftwing
foreign and defense policies should Labor return to
power.
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Whoever the leader might be, we believe the left wing
would be better placed than the moderates to pick up
the pieces. The influence of activists usually increases
when Labor is not responsible for government and can
more conveniently indulge in ideological fancy. In
addition, the rules changes won by the left over the
past several years will contribute to a continuing
leftward pull.
Should Labor win a plurality and still be kept in
opposition, leftists are likely to complain of unfair
treatment and even charge a "ruling class conspiracy"
to keep Labor from power. Some leftwingers may
even become more willing to support mass protest
actions. A more tangible danger is the prospect that
Labor will remain predominant in Scotland and
Wales no matter what the result in the United
Kingdom as a whole. In this event, the regional Labor
parties would be inclined to demand "home rule" in
an effort to fend off defections to local nationalist
parties and to find an identity for Labor apart from a
futile opposition at Westminster.
Because all those dissatisfied with government policies
would tend to gravitate to Labor's camp, the party
probably would benefit, at least initially, from being
the main opposition force. This would be especially
likely if the Social Democrats and Liberals cooperat-
ed with the Conservatives. On the other hand, left-
right disputes would strain party unity, and if the
Alliance made a respectable election showing and
could plausibly claim to represent the alternative to
the Tories, more Labor moderates might defect. In
these circumstances, Labor might become a small
leftwing party, displaced by the SPD-Liberal Alli-
ance as the main opposition to the Conservative Party.
Minority Government. We believe the second most
likely outcome for Labor-although the prospects at
this time for any sort of Labor victory appear weak-
is to lead a minority government. Labor's chances
depend less on its own popularity than on the ability
of the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance to take
seats from the Tories. If Labor does form a minority
government, we expect it would embark on its domes-
tic program as if it had a majority. Labor followed
this course from February to October 1974, when it
was without a parliamentary majority. A Labor prime
minister in such circumstances would probably con-
clude that efforts to reduce unemployment and in-
crease social spending would bolster Labor's electoral
appeal, and count on the reluctance of third parties,
notably the Social Democrats and Liberals, to risk
another election by bringing down the government.
A minority government would be less likely to imple-
ment the left's foreign and defense policy program.
Some parts of it-withdrawal from the EC, opposition
to INF, and ending Britain's own nuclear program-
are strongly opposed by Conservatives and the Alli-
ance. Labor moderates, following the precedent when
Labor had only a small or no majority, would use this
tenuous parliamentary situation as a reason to delay
embarking on any ambitious and controversial pro-
gram and would instead emphasize domestic con-
cerns, where bargaining for support from third parties
might be possible. Given the left's strong views on
nuclear weapons and its stronger bargaining position
within the party, however, such an approach would be
divisive and could lead to the government's fall.
Cooperation With the Social Democrats and
Liberals. Labor will enter the election pledged not to
join in a coalition with the Social Democratic-Liberal
Alliance and there are severe obstacles to such coop-
eration. According to US Embassy reporting, many
Labor and union moderates remain bitter at being
"deserted" by their former colleagues who set up the
Social Democratic Party in 1981. For their part,
leftwing Laborites would see any such cooperation as
part of a moderate plot to keep their plans from
fruition. Finally, Alliance spokesmen have said that
adoption of proportional representation will be a
condition for their support of one of the major parties.
Because Labor's national vote has been declining for
the past 30 years, however, the party has more to lose
from changing the British electoral rules than the
Tories, and this has led most Laborites and union
leaders to reject Alliance plans for electoral reform.
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Nevertheless, trade union leaders, who are eager to
remove the Tories from office, could insist that Labor
attempt cooperation with the Alliance. Rather than
form a Labor-Alliance coalition, however, Labor
would probably try to negotiate Alliance support in
exchange for some policy concessions. Policy differ-
ences between moderate Laborites and the Alliance
on most domestic issues are more of degree than of
kind, although Alliance demands for proportional
representation and Liberal insistence on limiting trade
union powers would be difficult to overcome. In the
background of any agreement probably would be the
moderate Laborites' hope of enticing the Social Dem-
ocrats back into the Labor fold, while the Alliance
would be likely to hope for just the opposite-by
supporting the moderates in the Labor Party against
the leftwingers, the Alliance would hope to split
Labor ranks and welcome the moderates into its own
camp.
Although the prospects for a Labor-Alliance govern-
ment are slim, we believe such a combination, howev-
er uneasy, would be the Labor government scenario
most favorable to US interests. Labor moderates and
Alliance spokesmen would adopt an economic policy
akin to that followed by past Labor administrations.
The Social Democrats and Liberals also would oppose
any extensive move toward protectionism and a
Labor-Alliance combination would keep Britain in the
EC or insist on a referendum on the issue. Relations
with the United States would be better than undeea
government of Labor alone, but there could be prob-
lems over nuclear weapons and Third World issues.
Given the strong unilateralist sentiment in the Liberal
Party, Labor leftists could find uncharacteristic allies.
In our judgment, Trident would almost certainly be
canceled and Polaris might be phased out, though
probably only over a period of years. US bases in the
United Kingdom would remain, and we believe there
is a chance that INF could proceed-although condi-
tioned on a formal "dual key" arrangement and a
major emphasis on arms control negotiations.
reasons. First, given the new party rules pushing the
parliamentary delegation to the left, the number of
leftwingers will be larger the better Labor does in a
general election. Second, long-honored traditions-
the "doctrine of the mandate" and the "sovereignty of
Parliament"-provide that a party winning a majority
has a mandate from the voters to carry out its
program in full, even if its popular vote (as is almost
always the case in British elections) falls well short of
a majority. Thatcher, for example, carried out her
programs even though the Tories received less than 44
percent of the popular vote in 1979.
In implementing its domestic program, a majority
Labor government, in our view, would give priority to
reducing unemployment. In foreign and defense
policy, moderates (who would still make up a majority
of MPs and the Cabinet) probably would attempt to
delay ending British nuclear programs, relying pri-
marily on the platform wording about phasing out
such programs over four to five years. Given activist
pressure and apparent voter endorsement, however, a
Labor government would almost certainly embark on
a "nonnuclear defense" program, including cancella-
tion of Trident and rejection of INF. We would also
expect a majority Labor government to set at least a
timetable for withdrawal from the EC.
The special relationship with the United States would
also be strained. Differences on foreign and domestic
policy are numerous, and the Labor left has for
decades expressed suspicions about US policy and the
US presence in Britain. Even moderates like Healey
relationship would be under much closer scrutiny by
leftwing politicians, and the tone of relations would be
harsh at times as differences emerged on various
issues.
Majority Government. We believe that the least likely
prospect for Labor is to win an absolute majority
because such an outcome would hinge on a swing of
voter support unprecedented since the end of World
War II. A Labor majority government would repre-
sent the greatest threat to US interests for two
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