MOROCCO: ISLAM AND POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000100070002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Morocco:
Islam and Politics
NESA 83-10042
February 1983
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Intelligence
Morocco:
Islam and Politics
Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
This paper was prepared by I the
Office of Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Council
and the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
Secret
NESA 83-10042
February 1983
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Summary
Information available
as of 14 February 1983
was used in this report.
Morocco:
Islam and Politics
near term, King Hassan should be able to control Islamic extremism
Islamic consciousness has increased in Morocco since the Iranian revolu-
tion in 1979. But this revivalist sentiment has not seriously challenged the
dominant political-religious system-which is already conservative in
practice-nor have there been broad demands for radical reform. In the
fundamentalists who strongly oppose Western influence
A small number of militant fundamentalist groups have formed in the past
several years, primarily in the major cities where the stress of moderniza-
tion and recent economic hardships have been felt most acutely. Some
extremists seek to wipe the slate clean and establish a "true" Islamic state
through violence. Revivalist sentiment seems to have a certain attraction
for the country's many young people, and it is possible that they will
gravitate in greater numbers toward Islamic extremism should they
become significantly dissatisfied with the government's handling of key
domestic and foreign policies. Closer US-Moroccan ties, initially well
received in Morocco, may eventually become the focus of attack from
The traditions of Morocco and particularly the religious nature of the
monarchy will continue to be bulwarks against Islamic extremists. King
Hassan's dual role as religious and secular leader of the country gives
Islam and the King preeminence in Moroccan life, making it difficult to
challenge the King without seeming to attack Islam itself. Moreover, the
tradition of tolerance found in Moroccan Islam, which allows for a wide va-
riety of religious practice within the faith, makes it difficult for extremists
to find a rallying cry with widespread appeal.
Morocco's traditional religious establishment is closely associated with the
monarchy, gives strong support to King Hassan, and is not likely in the
foreseeable future to challenge the government. Moroccan religious leaders
(ulama) have strong ties to the palace and are often employed in govern-
ment institutions, which has enabled the King to co-opt and control them.
More importantly, Hassan consults the ulama frequently and visibly,
allowing religious leaders a voice in matters of policy. This has kept the re-
ligious establishment content and has enabled the King to present himself
to the public as an observant Muslim.
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Hassan has also used his considerable political skills to keep religious
critics off balance. The King, apparently trying to draw Muslim funda-
mentalists out rather than driving them into clandestine organizations, has
thus far elected to deal less harshly with them than with secular critics on
the left. To counter religious militancy, the government is encouraging a
revival of some of the traditional Muslim brotherhoods and has established
government-sponsored religious groups to provide controlled outlets for
increased religiosity. The government's ability to co-opt the fundamental-
ists greatly reduces the potential threat posed by radical Muslim elements.
It is questionable, however, whether King Hassan's designated successor,
19-year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed, has the political astuteness of his
father that would allow him to manage religious detractors or other
opponents with much deftness. Should heightened religious sentiments
persist in Morocco through a succession from Hassan to his son, a variety
of exploitable issues might develop which would play into the hands of
extremists. Moreover, the King, like the late President Sadat, could fall
victim to a religious fanatic. On balance, however, a serious challenge from
religious extremists does not appear likely in the foreseeable future.
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Morocco:
Islam and Politics
The discussion and judgments in this paper are based
in part on the experience and knowledge of the author
and others who have lived and worked in Morocco
and on a variety of recently published works on
Islam. Information on the current status of the
fundamentalist movement and on the Moroccan Gov-
ernment's response to the revivalist sentiment comes
from the US Embassy
Since the seventh century Morocco's history has been
intimately associated with the development of Islam.
To a large extent Islam has shaped the society's
political and economic institutions and determined its
social relationships and values.
As in other areas of North Africa, Islam in Morocco
often blended with preexisting local religions rather
than supplanting them completely. Thus, today there
is a fairly broad spectrum of religious practices and a
relatively tolerant attitude toward religious deviations
compared to eastern Arab countries.
Most Moroccans are Sunnis who adhere to the Maliki
school of Islamic jurisprudence.' Sunnis have tradi-
tionally been willing to accept a greater diversity of
opinion than the Shias, drawing the line only at those
actions that appear to deny either the oneness of God
or the finality of the revelations to Muhammad as
recorded in the Quran. Within this diversity, howover,
there is a broadly held perception that Islam is
supreme, that it guides the nation through its King,
and that the population is sufficiently devout and true
to Islamic dictates.
' Among Sunni Muslims four schools of Islamic law are considered
orthodox-the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. The Maliki
school places greater stress on using the traditions of the Prophet
(hadiths) for legal interpretations than on the Quran and is more
liberal than the Shafii and Hanbali schools, but more conservative
This somewhat unique development of Islam in Mo-
rocco has contributed to a relatively tolerant attitude
toward other religions. Morocco, for example, is one
of the few Islamic countries in which Jews have felt
safe; a Jewish community of about 19,000 is under the
official protection of the King, who quietly approves
of the community's ties with the World Jewish Con-
gress. About 40,000 Roman Catholics, most of them
foreigners, also reside in the country. This official
protection and tolerance of other religions and the
diversity within the Islamic community seems to
bespeak a national self-confidence that would tend to
inhibit the spread of religious extremism in Morocco.
The heightened religiosity in the Islamic world-
spurred by the religious revolutionaries in Iran-has
affected some Moroccans, particularly young people
who are groping for ways to bridge the gap between
the traditions of the past and the demands and
seeming spiritual emptiness of modernity. This reli-
gious sentiment does not have the virulent political
character of the fundamentalist movement in Iran nor
has it at this point developed the activism and follow-
ing found in some eastern Arab countries. This is due
in part to the nature of Moroccan society and its
history. It is probably also a result of Morocco's
geographic and political distance from the events and
issues that have stirred political and religious passions
elsewhere in the Arab world. In such matters King
Hassan has tried to steer a careful course, emphasiz-
ing both his historical role as preeminent protector of
Islam and his efforts to pursue the Arab tradition of
mediator as an honest broker on Arab-Israeli issues.
Islamic Fundamentalism
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, there has been
an increase in Islamic consciousness within the largely
devout Moroccan Muslim community. Mosque
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attendance has increased, and during the recent
month of fasting (Ramadan) the spirit of observance
was unusually devout, according to US Embassy
The heightened sense of religiosity has especially
affected Morocco's younger generation-over half of
Morocco's population is under 25 years old-whose
members often lack an adequate religious education.
Their attitudes toward Islam are influenced by for-
eign "reform" literature written by militant Muslims
whose observations have been formed in an often
politically tumultuous social environment different
from that of Morocco. This information has had a
significant impact upon Moroccan students who have
studied in Muslim countries with centers that foster
militant Islamic philosophies. In addition, according
to a knowledgeable Embassy source, radical Islamic
material is received clandestinely from Libya, Paki-
Socialist party leaders in Morocco have observed that
as a result of their inability to organize more mean-
ingful political opposition, Muslim fundamentalists
are making significant inroads among disadvantaged
elements of the population. especially among the
youth,
Mosques have sprung up in the slums of Casablanca,
where Muslim groups blame the government for
deteriorating economic conditions and the King for
allowing too much Western influence to penetrate
Morocco. One socialist leader has stated that the
party leaders believe that the Islamic fundamentalists
are capturing the support of young dissidents who in
most circumstances would have flocked to the left.
stan, Iran, and Egypt.
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a
consensus for an "authentic" Islamic society is strong-
ly evident in the religious fervor of his students,
despite their relative ignorance of Islam. Many stu-
dents criticize the government as non-Muslim and call
for its overthrow. Nevertheless, after four years of
university education, the majority of students aban-
don the violent approach to social reform as they
assume teaching and other jobs throughout the coun-
try.
Although estimates vary, perhaps 5 percent of Moroc-
co's students formally belong to fundamentalist
groups that subscribe to some form of militant theo-
logical doctrine. There are also small Islamic groups
in the military and other segments of society.
are 15 different fundamentalist groups in Rabat
Ithe growth of these organiza-
tions to the existence of a political vacuum and the
suppression by government authorities of other forms
of student political activity.
dedicated members of Islamic fundamentalist groups
belonging to 70 or 80 organizations operating in
Morocco. A few groups are formally recognized by
the government, but the majority have no official
status. Most of these groups are small, and,
they lack cohesion and coordination.
Morocco has not witnessed a large amount of violence
Another indication of how strongly some Moroccans
feel about enhancing the Islamic nature of their
society was revealed in the antigovernment demon-
stration on 22 January 1982 in Tangier. About 800
Muslim worshipers were stirred to a frenzy over the
government's dismissal of their prayer leader for
criticizing the King and replacing him with a govern-
ment man. Security forces put down the demonstra-
tion but not before a liquor store was destroyed by the
fundamentalists.
Islamic Youth Movement
Morocco's largest militant fundamentalist group, the
Islamic Youth Movement, was founded in 1972 and is
associated with the Egyptian-based Muslim Brother-
hood.' The government recognized the Movement at
its inception as a legitimate religious youth organiza-
tion to teach Islam. The Movement's covert aim, with
government approval, was to counter leftist influence.
Its opposition to Morocco's socialist party, the Union
of Socialist and Popular Forces, eventually led to the
assassination in 1975 of a prominent socialist leader
by the Movement's "shock brigade."
After the assassination the Moroccan Government
disowned the Movement, imprisoned some leaders,
and closed its headquarters in Casablanca. Some of
the Movement's leaders fled into exile; the group,
however, continues to function as a semiclandestine
organization, allegedly thoroughly penetrated by Mo-
roccan security personnel, according to a US Embassy
report
The Islamic Youth Movement, according to US Em-
bassy sources, has several thousand members and is
strongest in major Moroccan cities. The leadership is
composed of secular professionals-teachers, engi-
neers, lawyers, and student leaders-as well as poorly
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educated religious teachers and mosque preachers. 25X1
The Movement's militant doctrine appeals to youth,
particularly those disillusioned about their future.
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The Movement's leaders espouse violence as the sole
means of "purifying" Muslim society. The organiza-
tion does not adhere to the Maliki school of Islamic
law or the fundamentalist tenets of the Salafiya
movement, which greatly influenced Moroccan reli-
gious thought and nationalistic sentiments prior to
independence.4
the
Casablanca and Tangier militants describe themselves
as "Kharijites" (those who went out) in the tradition
of the first-century Hegira followers of Ali who broke
with Sunni tradition and whose movement evolved
into Shia Islam. Identification with Kharijite doctrine
best symbolizes the Movement's break with Moroccan
Islam as presently interpreted by the King and the
religious establishment
The Movement's members propagate a dogma based
on strict loyalty to fundamentalist tenets as they
define them. They reject as nonbelievers Moroccans
who oppose their interpretation of Islamic tenets.
Those scorned reportedly include government officials
and political party leaders who, according to the
militants, encourage divisive allegiances through
Western political institutions. In their desire to re-
move all foreign influence from Morocco, they also
reject the Moroccan constitution and legal code even
though it is rooted in Islamic law
' The Salafiya reform movement sought to eliminate heterodox
religious practices by encouraging a return to orthodox Islamic
principles. King Hassan's father identified with the reformers along
with Istiglal (Independence) Party leaders, giving importance to the
Mohammed Basri, exiled oppo-
sition leader, often uses reli-
gious themes
King.
in its early stages.
Mohammed Basri, in exile since the early 1960s, also
uses religious themes to criticize the Moroccan Gov-
ernment and the King. Although his connections in
Morocco are mainly with leftists, Basri enjoys some
support in militant Islamic circles and, like Moti, has
ties to Libya. Nevertheless, neither Basri nor Moti, in
our view, has sufficient power bases in Morocco to be
a serious threat to the regime. They could attempt,
however, to increase subversive activities, but Moroc-
can security officials are likely to detect such a move
The Religious Supremacy of the King-A Bulwark
Against Extremism
Since the arrival of Islam, a central figure in Moroc-
can society has been the warrior-saint. Idris II, the
ninth-century builder of Fez and the country's first
important King, was a descendant of the Prophet
Muhammad, a vigorous military leader, and a dedi-
cated religious purifier. When the centralized political
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order collapsed in the 15th century, it was followed by
the so-called Maraboutic Crisis when local holy men
(marabouts), descendants of the Prophet (shurfa) and
leaders of Sufi brotherhoods, made a bid for power in
different regions of the country. In the 17th century a
reform-minded descendant of Muhammad emerged to
establish the current ruling Alaouite dynasty. The
deeply held belief among the majority of Moroccans
that their King is both a religious and political leader
with the former mandate linked historically to the
Prophet Muhammad is perhaps King Hassan's great-
est asset in limiting fundamentalist challenges.
King Hassan II dominates Morocco's political system,
manipulating both religious and dynastic symbols to
enhance his position and legitimize his rule. The King
is, at the same time, the chief executive of the
government and the supreme commander of the
armed forces. Further strengthening the King's posi-
tion is the belief that he possesses baraka, an aura of
holiness that is considered the manifestation of divine
grace transmitted through the Prophet's descendants,
enhancing the mystical regard that thousands of
poorly educated Moroccans have for the monarchy.
As head of the Muslim community, the King is
responsible for ensuring respect for Islam, defending
it against external threats, and protecting public
morality. Although these duties are performed both in
domestic and international affairs through the exer-
cise of temporal power, the authority for their accom-
plishment rests basically in the King's religious man-
date.
The King relies on traditionalism and fealty to offset
popular dissatisfaction with Morocco's political elite.
Hassan has concluded that it is safer to enlarge his
political base by allying with the rural elite-primari-
ly Berbers-to resist demands of the urban middle
class and political pressure groups. Thus far his bet
has paid off. This de facto alliance affects the mon-
arch's use of Islamic symbols since his most faithful
clients are religious conservatives. A widely held
belief in the religious authority of the King as Com-
mander of the Faithful has tended to keep some
Moroccans away from political battles for power
King Hassan II, Commander of
the Faithful, rides to Friday
Hassan systematically seeks to mobilize mass support
through the manipulation of religious values and by
reaffirming direct ties between himself and his people.
This may be in symbolic terms as leader of important
religious ceremonies or reading the Quran on national
television from the palace. For the "Green March" in
1975, Hassan-exploiting strong popular feeling that
the Western Sahara is historically part of Morocco-
mobilized an army of several hundred thousand civil-
ians armed only with copies of the Quran and tradi-
tional Islamic banners to consolidate his claim to the
territory
As a corollary to his domestic Islamic credentials,
Hassan espouses a strong identification with Arab
causes, especially the struggle to recover Palestine-
an issue that has important religious overtones. Has-
san, for example, was host to an Arab summit in 1974
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"Green March " participants, armed with the Quran and banners,
march into Western Sahara on King Hassan.s order.
that laid the groundwork for Islamic bloc votes in the
United Nations in favor of the Palestine Liberation
Organization, and he contributed troops to the Arab-
Israeli war in 1973. The King is currently chairman of
the Arab League and heads its Fez Middle East peace
committee. Hassan also chairs the Islamic Conference
Organization's Jerusalem committee. Hassan, howev-
er, is careful not to overtax his credentials as an Arab
leader or to get too far in front of his Moroccan
constituents.
Other Key Institutions
Ulama. Supporting the King's conservative point of
view on religion is the League of Moroccan Ulama,
founded in 1961 and consisting of several hundred
Islamic scholars organized into national and regional
councils. The League's avowed purpose is to strength-
en Muslim religious life, combat moral and social
Hassan, aware of growing
Islamic fundamentalism in Morocco, met with the
Ulama in mid-1982 to ask their assistance in curbing
trends toward extremism and in urging religious
leaders to stay away from political issues.
We believe the Moroccan Ulama is co-opted by the
King and follows his lead on most matters. The
League has made pronouncements against the ex-
cesses of Iranian Shiites and Libyan leader Qadhafi's
interpretation of Islam. The Ulama is represented by
two members on the 13-man Regency Council ap-
pointed by the King. The League, technically a
nongovernmental body, occasionally has taken stands
at variance with official policy-for example, with
regard to family planning and Arabization
decay, and sponsor religious instruction.
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Sheikh Nekki Naciri, head of the Rabat-Sale
Council of Ulama, is a member of the Regency
Council along with the Secretary General of the
League of Moroccan Ulama, Abdullah Guen-
Mosque construction is funded
by the Ministry of Religious
Endowments and Islamic Af-
Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic
Affairs. This Ministry is the focal point for official
Islamic trusts in Morocco. Through it religious educa-
tion is controlled, Quranic schools are staffed, and it
helps ensure that Friday sermons preached in Moroc-
co's 20,000 mosques accord with the decrees of higher
authority. The Ministry manages extensive urban and
agricultural properties for the benefit of Islamic edu-
cation, mosque construction, and publishing.
schools-generally associated with them are religious
endowments established by believers' bequests to sup-
port their activities-and the religious courts. In
recent years the Islamic courts have been restricted to
adjudicating questions of personal status divorce,
guardianship, inheritance, and certain land transac-
tions. This institutional complex is shared by the
entire Muslim community, while many Moroccans
consider religious brotherhoods and the clientele asso-
ciated with marabouts (saints) as distinct from the
formal institutions because their support cones from
The formal structure of the Islamic establishment
facilitates political communications. Friday sermons,
which deal with social as well as religious themes, are
often prepared by the Ministry and are always given
in the name of the King. They provide a dialogue
between the prayer leader and the congregation and
establish links between national authority and the
people. The people's views are passed up to the
Ministry, while criticisms of the King are identified to
security forces. Questions of religious doctrine are
passed to the regional council of the Ulama. F--]
a designated membership.
Marabouts and Sufi Brotherhoods-A Revival
While orthodox Islam emphasizes formal belief, ritu-
al, and a knowledge of the Quran, folk Islam, whose
beliefs and practices often reflect the pre-Islamic
heritage, serves a mainly illiterate rural and poor
urban population among whom animistic beliefs are
still prominent and Islamic ritual is often only casual-
ly observed. Its practitioners, nevertheless, consider
At the local level, the formal complex of Islamic
institutions centers around mosques and Quranic
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themselves pious Muslims and see no contradiction
between their indigenous beliefs and those of orthodox
Islam. Folk Islamists see the physical world as popu-
lated by spirits, both good and evil, and rely on the
power of magical personalities or objects to ward off
movement also lost much of its force, but its ideals
still infuse the pronouncements of Istiqlal Party lead-
ers and others concerned with the preservation of
national and religious values.
evil ones.
In Morocco there are men, and sometimes women,
who have gained a reputation for possessing supernat-
ural powers and have come to be venerated as saints,
and most towns and regions have patron saints who
are believed able to intercede and perform miracles.
Marabout or saint cults can be centered around a
living or dead person or some place or object associat-
ed with him, and followers of some saints have created
centers of devotion that include religious lodges and
regular pilgrimages to the marabout's tomb. The
government does not discourage saint cults, and they
have been incorporated into popular Moroccan belief.
Historically, Sufi or mystic brotherhoods, whose ori-
gins in some cases date back to the 12th century, have
played an important religious and at times political
role in Morocco. They helped spread a popular version
of Islam and provided a sense of unity through a
network of religious lodges. Some brotherhoods or
orders provided a nucleus for resistance to early
French and Spanish encroachments. Later, some or-
ders collaborated with the Protectorate regime that
encouraged their antinationalist tendencies. The
French, however, unwittingly reduced the importance
of the brotherhoods by centralizing the government,
reducing their regional roles.
The brotherhoods were further weakened by the
Salafiya reform movement, which sought a return to
orthodox Islamic principles. Mohammed V, the cur-
rent King's father, identified himself with the reform-
ers and in 1946 forbade the establishment of new
brotherhoods or the formation of religious lodges
without royal permission.
The orders resisted and were used by the Protectorate
in its efforts to replace Mohammed V with a more
pliable ruler. The French defeat in this ill-considered
move drew disgrace upon the brotherhoods. With the
orders in decline by the late 1950s, the Salafiya
the Moroccan regime is attempting to
revive the Sufi brotherhoods to counter the radical
fundamentalist trend, and press reports indicate that
some brotherhoods have regained popularity in recent
years. The brotherhoods and marabout cults serve
primarily as social and religious outlets, but as in the
past they could come to play a political role. Some
politicians see the
revival of Sufi brotherhoods as a potential threat and
are making plans to counter the increased importance
of these religious orders
Government Response to Increased Fundamentalism
Although the threat to the established order from
fundamentalist groups is still small and has been
controlled, the history of Morocco suggests that dy-
nasties are changed through events born of such
groups. Moroccan officials appear to be very aware of
the current Islamic revival, according to US Embassy
reports. Local media frequently identify the King with
Islam and its causes, such as Hassan's recent remind-
er to Moroccan magistrates that their judgments be
guided by Islamic tenets. The government's emphasis
on the need for its officials to understand Islam
thoroughly was the message the Interior Minister
delivered to police cadets last year, and he ordered the
police academy to teach future police officers ortho-
dox Islam.
The religious establishment and some lay leaders seek
to curb trends toward radical Islam through standard-
ized religious education in secular schools. This
"gradualist" approach to reform through education is
also evident in the semiofficial Islamic newspaper,
N'nook. Its conservative articles constitute one of the
few Moroccan attempts to challenge fundamentalist
literature coming in from abroad.
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Ministry of Education officials and other members of
the Westernized elite differ with the religious estab-
lishment's approach and desire to retain Western,
mainly European, influences and institutions. The
ulama and lay scholars instead desire to remove
Western influences gradually from Moroccan society.
These competing views could nullify each other and
make it easier for radical and militant Islamic doc-
trines to spread.
In a more direct response to the growing challenge of
radical fundamentalism, the government sanctioned
last year the creation of the Popular Islamic Renais-
sance Movement. This group, supported by the King,
hopes to divert the appeal of more radical fundamen-
talist organizations and provide a legitimate political
channel for popular religious sentiments.
Outlook
Although radical Islamic fundamentalism has
emerged in major Moroccan cities in the past few
years, we believe the movement is not a serious threat
to the monarchy at this time because it is small and
split among isolated and competing factions. The
fundamentalists, however, almost certainly will con-
tinue to seek a larger role in the political process.
The current economic malaise, nearly 30 percent
unemployment in the cities, and rising expectations
among a burgeoning and youthful population are key
sources of discontent, and militant fundamentalists
are likely to use these secular issues to further their
Islamic causes. Closer US-Moroccan ties, initially
well received in Morocco, may eventually become the
focus of attack from fundamentalists who strongly
oppose Western influence. They are also likely to
condemn the United States for supporting what they
perceive as a corrupt monarchy
The government has dealt with opposition from Mus-
lim fundamentalists less harshly than with secular
critics, although some activists have been arrested.
Avoiding repressive measures and attempting to co-
opt the fundamentalists in government-sponsored or- 25X1
ganizations or through Sufi brotherhoods, the govern-
ment is likely to meet with some success in defusing a
potentially dangerous threat by providing an outlet for
pent-up pressures from Islamic groups
old Crown Prince is ready to take full control.
In addition, Morocco has a fairly effective internal
security establishment, under the direction of the
tough and efficient Interior Minister Driss Basri,
monitoring and controlling the more militant Muslim
elements. The accidental death early this year of Gen.
Ahmed Dlimi, the most trusted intelligence and mili-
tary adviser to the King and only military member of
the Regency Council, is unlikely to affect internal
security in the near term. Hassan, however, had
counted on Dlimi as a key guarantor of the survival of
the monarchy should the King die before the 19-year-
It is questionable whether King Hassan's designated
successor, Prince Sidi Mohammed, has the political
astuteness of his father that would allow him to
manage religious detractors or other opponents with
much deftness. The Crown Prince has been groomed
since childhood to ascend the throne and, like his
father, is often identified with religious functions in
public. Should heightened religious sentiment persist
in Morocco through a succession from Hassan to his
son, a variety of exploitable issues might develop
which would play into the hands of extremists, who
would be emboldened by Sidi Mohammed's weakness.
Moreover, King Hassan, like the late President Sadat
and a host of Arab leaders before him, could fall
victim to a religious fanatic. On balance, however, a
serious challenge from religious extremists does not
appear likely in the foreseeable future.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000100070002-7
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000100070002-7
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP84SO0556R000100070002-7