THE POLISARIO FRONT: STATUS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000100150003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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e~,._?4
~?``~"~f Directorate of ~
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NESA 83-IOOdI
Alril I AB9
~ 289
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Directorate of
Intelligence
This paper was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations and the National Intelligence Council. 25X1
Secret
NESA 83-10081
April /983
The Polisario Front:
Status and Prospects
Office of Near East-South Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
This assessment was prepared by
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The Polisario Front:
Status and Prospects
Key Judgments Since late 1981 the Polisario Front has suffered major setbacks with its
/~t/ormation available tactics that were intended to force Morocco to negotiate a settlement of the
as of l0 March 1983 conflict in Western Sahara:
was used in this report.
? The attack on the Moroccan outpost at Guelta Zemmur in October 1981
substantially strengthened US support for the Moroccans, much to the
guerrillas' dismay.
? Admission to the OAU of the guerrillas' "state," a move initially
considered by the Polisario as a diplomatic victory, cost the Front heavily
in terms of international support because of the tactic's highly disruptive
effect on the organization.
Although the guerrillas have not abandoned hope of a negotiated settle-
ment to the war, they have decided that they must use arms to hasten prog-
ress toward a political conclusion. The Polisario probably will be unable to
force the Moroccans to make significant concessions:
? Because of its strengthened military position in the Sahara, Morocco is
less motivated to accommodate the guerrillas.
? The Polisario has lost the initiative on the battlefield and probably will
not be able to devise a successful campaign that would sap Morocco's will
to defend its claim to the Sahara.
The conflict appears likely to drag on, although at much reduced levels by
comparison with the activity of the late 1970s. The Moroccans cannot
completely contain the guerrilla threat, and the Polisario can continue to
harass Moroccan forces almost indefinitely.
The obstacles hampering a negotiated settlement and the significant
equities at stake for all parties suggest that flashpoints-probably involving
US interests-are unavoidable over the longer term. The guerrillas may
feel compelled to select options that could change the character of the
dispute: _
? Although the option now appears unlikely, the Polisario might conclude
that internationalizing the conflict is the only way to succeed.
? Algeria will play a key role in limiting the guerrillas' options.
iii Secret
NESA 83-1008/
April 1983
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POR7UGAl
Western Sahara
w - Moroccan defensive
barrier (berm)
* * +~ Proposed defensive
barrier
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base camps
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1 s
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The Polisario Front:
Status and Prospects
In October 1981 the Polisario Front achieved a major
victory against Moroccan military forces at Guelta
Zemmur in Western Sahara, inflicting on Morocco
the biggest loss of men and materiel in a single
engagement since the war began six years earlier.
Shortly thereafter, the guerrillas won an equally
important diplomatic victory by maneuvering to have
the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR}-
the Polisario's state apparatus-seated at a ministeri-
al meeting of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), thus gaining a highly valued international
credential.
Both achievements have turned into Pyrrhic victories,
however, as Morocco has used the full force of its
international ties and regional stature to blunt the
Polisario's momentum. Since the attack at Guelta
Zemmur, Morocco has gained increased military sup-
port from the United States, overcome weaknesses in
its defensive strategy against the guerrillas, and fash-
ioned abloc of OAU members unwilling to accept the
legitimacy of SDAR membership in the organization.
not the war. This impression obscures the important
fact that the Polisario shows no sign of weakening its
resolve in its struggle to control the Western Sahara
and can survive its current misfortunes so long as it
retains its backing from Algeria.
The Polisario Front: Down But Not Out
The Polisario's efforts since 1981 to use bold military
and political actions to force concessions and negotia-
tions from Morocco have by all measures failed. The
strategy was based on the somewhat ill-conceived
premise that the Front would be able to execute a
series of dramatic military and political victories over
Morocco that would shake Moroccan confidence
enough to produce significant concessions. The Front
has paid dearly for overestimating its abilities and
miscalculating both Morocco's determination to pre-
vail in Western Sahara and King Hassan's formidable
diplomatic talents. In the wake of their victory at
Guelta Zemmur, the guerrillas have watched King
Hassan turn defeat into a successful bid for greater
military support from the United States and greater
diplomatic support from Arab and African states.
The conflict between the Polisario and Morocco has
been essentially stalemated since Guelta Zemmur.
Morocco is incapable of vanquishing definitively the
Polisario, and King Hassan does not seem prepared to
risk pursuing seriously an OAU-sponsored peace plan
that could-if a proposed referendum were carried
out honestly-result in independence for the disputed
territory. The Polisario, on the other hand, is almost
hamstrung by its lack of good military options and by
the somewhat mercurial nature of the support from its
key patrons, Algeria and Libya, upon whom most of
the Front's successes have depended.
The deadlock generally serves Morocco's interests. It
has had the effect of significantly reducing the
amount of actual conflict and creating the impres-
sion-particularly among the Moroccan public-that
Rabat is in control and has won the key "battles," if
The results of the recent past have been disappointing
but not disheartening for the Polisario. The Front
seems to be preparing to persevere militarily and to do
so by employing a variety of tactics, from traditional
guerrilla operations to attacks with conventional
Debates before and during the
Polisario's Fifth Congress in Tindouf in October 1982
reportedly were heated, but the militant faction
headed by Front Secretary General Abdelaziz (who is
also President of the SDAR), prevailed.
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Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR)
Council of Ministcrsa
Prime Minister- Mahjoub Laroussi
(Mahfoud ~11i I3cibol
Ministers
Defense - Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustaphn
Foreign Allhirs - Ibrahim Ilakim
Education-Mohamcdal-,1min Ould nhmed
Justice - Mohamed Ould 7.iou
Interior - Ahdelkader Tuleb Omar
Secretan~ of State
for Commerce - Kenti Ould Jouda
Secreuirc of State
for Ilydth - Nerna Ould Joum:mi
Saharan National Council
Politburo-25 members
Permanent Secretariat comprises:
Permanent Secretary
Walis (governors) of Dakhla, EI naiun,
and Scmara
I Ieads of women, labor, and student
organisations
Uaira (retligcc camel rcprescntaticcs-20
members
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Table 1
Polisario Front
Secretary General and President of SDAR
Ibrahim Ghali Ould Moustapha SDAR Minister of Defense
Bashir Mustapha Siyed Deputy Secretary General
Mohamed al-Amin Ould Ahmed a SDAR Minister of Education
Mahjoub Laroussi SDAR Prime Minister
(Mahfoud Ali Beiba)
Ayyub al-Habib
Mohamed al-Amin Bouhali
Revolutionary Command Council n Mohamed Abdelaziz
Mahjoub Laroussi
a The reassignment of al-Amin as Minister of Education may also
have affected his position on the RCC. The new Minister of Interior,
Abdelkader Taleb Omar, may be the fourth member in his stead.
n The constitution of the SDAR stipulates that the Executive
Committee shall fulfill the function of this council until the first
general popular congress after the "recovery of sovereignty."
Salem is chairman; other members are unknown.
A minority within the ruling hierarchy,
holds that the Polisario would do
better to modify its hardline position of demanding
direct negotiations with Morocco and look for a
mutually acceptable compromise. The majority, how-
ever, has come to believe that armed struggle is not
only the principal tool for bargaining with Morocco
but is the glue holding the Front together and keeping
it from obscurity. We do not believe that any faction
within the Front has considered terminating the
struggle or is likely to in the foreseeable future.
Conditions would have to be extremely dire-the loss
of Algeria as a sanctuary, the cutoff of all outside
economic and military aid, and severe attrition in the
ranks-before the Polisario would abandon its efforts.
The toughening of the Polisario's mentality and the
shift away from failed strategies have not inspired a
new vision for defeating Morocco. The current quies-
cence in the dispute is explained in part by the
Polisario's preoccupation with developing viable mili-
tary options. the
Polisario, at the insistence of Algeria and Libya,
refrained from significant military actions last year in
order to give OAU efforts to arrange acease-fire and
referendum a better chance of success.
Military Options
Despite grandiose rhetoric, the Polisario leadership
probably now has a fairly realistic appreciation of
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Morocco's superior strength and the limits and liabil-
ities the Front faces in virtually all of its choices for
challenging that superiority. The deepening realiza-
tion that the struggle is likely to be long and exacting
and that the Moroccans cannot be intimidated or
deterred easily but must be worn down, will probably
result in an eclectic approach, with the mainstay of a
renewed campaign being small-unit harassing attacks.
The Moroccan berm-the earthen defensive perime-
ter built since 1980 '-and other improvements in
Moroccan defenses will make small-unit attacks less
effective than they once were; however, such attacks
still can exact Moroccan casualties and rattle morale.
can airstrikes by Mirage F-1 s, and better detection
capabilities are the primary problems the guerrillas
are trying to work around.
an increase in nighttime
operations to take advantage of the Moroccan Air
Force's reluctance, and inadequate preparation, for
battlefield support missions in the dark.
The guerrillas now have the option to undertake
conventional warfare and will probably-in very
selected instances~ombine such operations with hit-
and-run missions. Over the past two years the Poli-
sario has accumulated an impressive modern inven-
tory of heavy armaments; its holding of medium
tanks, for example, equals about 70 percent of the
Moroccan Army's inventory.
The Polisario is probably not yet well prepared for
larger, conventional-style operations. Base camps out-
side Tindouf which appear to have a training func-
tion-Ghour Bouret, Aalfa, Oudiane Lemkhaf, and
Oued Tatrat-are providing instruction primarily in
small-unit infantry operations. Combined arms train-
ing-involving tank and armored infantry combat
vehicle platoons and field artillery-have been seen at
Table 2
Polisario Front: Inventory of Major Armaments a
Estimate of
Number n
Medium tanks (probably T-54/55) 70
BMP armored infantry combat vehicles 35
BTR-60 armored personnel carriers 25
Cascavel armored reconnaissance vehicles 18
BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles 12
BM-11/BM-21/RM-70 multiple rocket 11
launchers
D-30 122-mm howitzer Unknown
ZU-23 23-mm antiaircraft guns Unknown
SA-6 launchers 2
SA-7 missile launchers Unknown
SA-9 launchers 3
e Excludes items captured from the Moroccans and held near
Tindouf. For logistic reasons the guerrillas have made no appreciable
effort to integrate this equipment into their units.
b These figures represent a minimum estimate of the uerrillas'
holdings
Other risks associated with large conventional opera-
tions will limit their role in a renewed Polisario
campaign. These include:
? High casualties for a force that cannot afford
sacrificing many of its best trained men.
? The vulnerability of massed formations of armor to
Moroccan airpower, which probably cannot be to-
tally repulsed by the Polisario's limited air defenses.
? Greater chances of detection.
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The Polisario's acquisition of tanks and armored
personnel carriers was almost certainly intended for
major operations against the berm, which in itself can
be breached at a number of points without much
difficulty. But with Moroccan forces behind the berm
either stationed along the wall in defensive outposts or
heavily concentrated in a few positions-at Semara,
EI Aauin, and Bu Craa-the guerrillas have no easy
targets. A successful assault on one of the smaller
positions along the barrier would have only marginal
military and political impact. An attack on one of the
towns or major military encampments presents great
hazards with regard to a safe withdrawal of slow-
moving armor through narrow channels and may, in
any case, require more forces than the Polisario is
willing to risk on one venture.
There are few desirable targets outside the berm.
Within Western Sahara, Dakhla alone remains be-
yond the protection of the main defensive perimeter.
As for attacks on garrisons in southern Morocco, the
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Polisario would have to gain permission from Alge-
ria-which is unlikely to cooperate. In both instances,
the Polisario would be taking on significant, perhaps
even prohibitive, logistical challenges
The Polisario is unlikely at this time to put together a
battle plan that can do serious harm to the Moroccan
military
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borders from being used to short-circuit peace negoti-
ations. The Algerian leadership will, in our view,
maintain this strict posture with the Polisario as long
as there is hope of movement in negotiations, but it
might turn a blind eye to Polisario activity if Morocco
proves recalcitrant in negotiations or if relations with
Rabat cool for other reasons.
The Polisario almost certainly will launch a concerted
effort to block, delay, and increase the costs of
Moroccan plans to extend the berm from Semara
south to the Mauritanian border and from Zaag to
Mahbes. The proposed expansion of the berm would
hinder Polisario access to its rear bases at Tindouf,
substantially lengthen lines of communication, and
force the guerrillas to transit northern Mauritania.
The Moroccan project will be costly, however, and
will give the guerrillas broad opportunities for harass-
ment.
Terrorism
Understanding that a successful war effort against
Morocco depends in part on chipping away at the
morale of Moroccan troops, the guerrillas may be
more willing to use terrorist activities now that they
are less able to confront the Moroccans directly.
US intervention in the
Saharan war might cause the guerrillas to view
destabilization operations in Morocco as a legitimate
and viable military option. The reasons for the Poli-
sario not engaging in terrorism over the years have
not been entirely clear. In our view, the guerrillas
to strike targets well inside the berm. The possibility have the ability but have elected not to exercise it,
of the guerrillas developing an air capability is re- perhaps for fear of losing what little international
mote support they have.
The Polisario may seek to circumvent the berm by Terrorist attacks carried out behind Moroccan lines
traversing Algerian territory and entering the "useful inside the Sahara would presumably be less controver-
triangle"-the economic and political heartland of the sial than in Morocco itself, and the guerrillas might
deflate Moroccan charges of direct involvement in the
war and to prevent such violations of Moroccan
oroccan forces behind the berm have
become complacent about their physical security and
try these first to test reactions
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could be vulnerable to sabotage in major bivouac
areas or the key Moroccan-occupied towns. The Mo-
roccans have also been lax about protecting their
fighter aircraft based in the Sahara, and awell-
executed raid or mortar attack on E1 Aaiun could
cause devastating losses to the Moroccan Air Force.
Polisario commandos, who have attacked fishing
trawlers off the coast of Western Sahara, might
succeed in penetrating Moroccan defenses at E1
Aaiun or Dakhla despite Moroccan precautions.
Outside Help
Algeria's support is critical to the survival of the
Polisario, and changes in Algiers's attitude toward the
conflict have had a direct impact on the Polisario's
strategies and options. Algeria, in our opinion, is
committed to the Polisario as a matter of both
principle and self-interest. The right of self-determi-
nation-a principle in which the Polisario has totally
wrapped itself-remains the centerpiece of Algeria's
postrevolutionary ideology. Even though the country's
more pragmatic leaders under Bendjedid may not
hold the principle as dearly as their predecessors, they
cannot afford the appearance of any slackening of
commitment, particularly to a liberation movement
with historical and ethnic connections to Algeria. A
more compelling and perhaps more durable underpin-
ning to the Algerian commitment to the Polisario is
Algeria's deep-seated rivalry with Morocco for North
African predominance and thus its determination to
keep the Sahara from being incorporated by its
competitor. Indeed, the process of keeping that from
happening-supporting the Polisario in a costly and
debilitating conflict-seemed to be an end in itself
under the Boumediene regime.
Algiers seems more willing to pursue a diplomatic
solution to the Sahara dispute and has generally
counseled the Polisario in that direction. There is no
evidence, however, that the Algerians are willing to
compromise on anything other than tactical matters.
They want the implementation of the OAU plan for a
referendum in the Sahara, which they fully expect to
produce a vote for an independent state
The Algerians apparently are concerned about the
Polisario's current dilemma and are not enthusiastic
about the prospects for a renewed military campaign.
the
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Algerians believe that the guerrillas can no longer
hurt the Moroccan military because of the Moroc-
cans' successful static defense and because of deser-
tions and looser discipline within the guerrilla move-
ment.
Increased direct contact between Moroccan and Alge-
rian officials, including a summit meeting between
King Hassan and President Bendjedid in late Febru-
ary, has generated greater hopes in Algiers that
negotiations might be stepped up. The nascent dia-
logue between the two sides, however, is probably only
steps away from revealing the incompatibility of their
positions on how to proceed with the OAU-sponsored
peace plan or with other negotiating gambits
Algerian constraints on the guerrillas will make it
difficult for the Polisario to launch an aggressive
military campaign. Nonetheless, the Algerians will
continue, in our opinion, to supply safehaven, arms,
and other equipment to the guerrilla movement, and
will not prevent renewed conflict so long as it is
deemed an advantageous form of pressure for negotia-
tions.
Libya, the Polisario's other key patron, has provided
most of the Polisario's major weapons systems-
armor, SA-6 missiles, and multiple rocket launch-
ers-and probably will be willing to continue under-
writing the guerrillas' challenge to Morocco on the
battlefield. In the past Libya has not been a very
reliable supporter of the Polisario. Qadhafi evidently
suspended assistance to the guerrillas for a time as
part of a rapprochement with Morocco intended to
restore diplomatic relations and secure the King's
support for Qadhafi's leadership of the OAU. The
agreement between the two countries did not last
long, and the Libyans resumed helping the Polisario.
The experience underscored Qadhafi's unreliability
and the importance of Algeria as the Polisario's
primary benefactor and the only one capable of
providing sustained safehaven and logistical support.
Closer Moroccan-US ties, particularly military coop-
eration agreements, and Rabat's support for anti-
Qadhafi oppositionists probably will ensure Libya's
continued and more regular assistance to the Poli-
sario. Algeria can control the Libyan-Polisario rela-
tionship, however, and would not permit collaboration
that would in any way hurt Algerian interests. This
includes ruling on transit rights for Libyan weapons
bound for the Polisario and requiring other forms of
Libyan assistance to the guerrillas and their depend-
ents to pass through Algerian checkpoints.
The Soviet Union has made overtures to the Polisario
offering direct assistance, including weapons. The
guerrillas have been reluctant to establish a direct link
with Moscow for fear it would jeopardize the all-
important relationship with the Algerians, who want
to avoid internationalizing the dispute. Algiers, in our
view, is motivated by a variety of factors, chief among
which are:
? A desire to reduce its own reliance on the Soviet
Union and to improve relations with the United
States.
? A concern that Soviet investment in the Polisario
would only elicit greater US aid to Morocco and
could push Morocco and Algeria into direct
confrontation.
? A belief that Algerian objectives can be achieved
without the risk and diminution of control that a
direct Polisario-Soviet link would entail.
The Polisario's reserve toward the Soviet Union stems
from the assumption that Algeria can and will main-
tain the liberation movement through to victory. This
assumption has recently been shaken by increased US
assistance to Morocco, which the guerrillas see as a
prime cause of their current misfortunes. The Poli-
sario has openly threatened to seek Soviet help, but
it is ambivalent about
following through. Although we believe it unlikely at
this point, the Polisario may eventually calculate that
internationalizing the dispute and accepting Soviet
assistance is the only way to succeed and that Alge-
ria-although it has great leverage over the Poli-
sario~annot for domestic political reasons afford to
exercise it fully
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The Cubans could serve, to some extent, as an
alternative to the Soviets. Although the Polisario has
rebuffed most offers of military aid from Cuba, it has
accepted some assistance.
_ I We have been unable
to confirm Moroccan charges that large numbers of
Cuban advisers have operated with the Polisario in
the Western Sahara. A significant escalation of Cu-
ban assistance to the Front would be viewed by
Algeria in much the same way as close Soviet-
Polisario ties and thus would present the guerrilla
leadership with similar risks. We do not believe the
Polisario will defy Algeria unless its propects fail to
improve.
Mauritania has not officially provided any assistance
to the Polisario, but it has been unable to prevent the
guerrillas from using its territory.
President Haidalla, while sympathetic
to the guerrillas' cause, wants to remain outside the
conflict, as do important elements of the largely black
armed forces, who see it as an intra-Arab squabble.
Beyond its
official position, however, the Mauritanians recognize
that they cannot prevent the guerrillas from using the
northern reaches of their country.
Outlook
The current stalemate may well continue for months
as the Polisario considers its options and consults with
Algeria as to the most appropriate next move. Despite
the renewed dialogue between Algerian and Moroc-
can leaders, there is little ground for optimism about a
negotiated settlement soon.
The OAU has been buffeted by the maneuvering of
Morocco and its supporters and the pro-Polisario
camp led by Algeria and Libya, with the majority of
members angered over how the Saharan issue has
divided the organization and reduced its ability to
function. (The Saharan dispute and the issue of Chad
twice contributed to the failure of the OAU to hold its
19th annual summit.) The OAU committee designat-
ed to implement the organization's settlement plan
has made no headway in over a year. Other than the
general concepts of a cease-fire and referendum, little
has been agreed upon:
? Because Morocco does not recognize the Polisario as
a party to the dispute, acease-fire between the two
sides is blocked.
? The definition of the voting population in the Saha-
ra is a subject of broad disagreement and has
stymied plans for the referendum.
? The composition of an interim administration and
peacekeeping force and their respective missions
have yet to be worked out.
Both Morocco and Algeria seem to see their present
interests best served by revitalizing the negotiating
process, but Morocco shows no sign of modifying its
position on the final disposition of the territory.
Moreover, King Hassan, in our view, has little leeway
with his domestic constituency even if he personally
were prepared to concede some of Morocco's claims.
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Saudi King Fahd, an acceptable negotiator to all
sides, apparently has tried to act as go-between during
his recent visits to Algeria and Morocco. Saudi
Arabia's substantial aid program to Morocco gives it
considerable leverage in that quarter; however, the
Saudis generally have avoided mediating roles that
require sustained effort and application of pressure.
Although the Algerian and Moroccan desire to create
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the appearance of progress in negotiations might
breathe life into one or more of these efforts, prospects
During the seeming dormancy of the conflict, a
number of developments are likely to occur that could
make the dispute more dangerous for the parties
involved. The Polisario is likely to be forced over time
to choose options that would signficantly change the
character of the dispute.
Morocco's ability to sustain the cost of the war could
deteriorate, perhaps seriously. The Moroccan econo-
my, which has been going downhill for the past two
years, probably will not improve in the foreseeable
future. Grumbling over bread-and-butter issues is
likely to intensify, particularly in large urban centers.
The average Moroccan does not associate his econom-
ic woes directly with the Saharan conflict; however,
his plight does shake his confidence in the government
and possibly the King. Moreover, should the illusion
that Morocco has already acquired the Western Saha-
ra be shattered by significant Polisario successes on
the battlefield or in a campaign of terrorism, econom-
ic unhappiness among Moroccans is likely to take on a
distinctly political coloration. Even without notable
Polisario actions, Morocco's claims of sovereignty
over the Sahara may become an exploitable issue by
either Islamic militants or leftists who could inflame
economic and social discontent with charges that the
regime has not fulfilled the country's historic and
nationalist aspirations.
Algeria is the only key player who may be motivated
both to contain the potential for renewed fighting and
to push negotiations forward, perhaps even into the
realm of serious interchange. Algerian leaders, in our
view, are currently reassessing key national interests
and the policy directions best suited to serve these
interests. Regional stability, internal social and eco-
nomic development, and more balanced relations with
the superpowers have clearly been elevated in the list
of national priorities. Whether they have eclipsed or
modified longstanding aspirations for regional domi-
nance and sympathy for the revolutionary ideals of
the independence movement is not clear.
Certainly Algerian leaders in the past year have
demonstrated real interest in improving relations with
Morocco, a willingness to restrain the Polisario with-
out offering alternative hope or help toward the
guerrillas' ultimate goal, and a forthright pursuit of
better relations with the United States, despite signifi-
cant increases in US assistance and commitment to
Morocco. What remains untested is how broadly these
efforts are supported and whether they are tactical
experiments or the products of more permanent
changes in Algeria's outlook.
Implications for the United States
Efforts by Morocco and Algeria-and to some extent
even the Polisario-to keep the Western Sahara
conflict from being "internationalized" have worked
to the benefit of the United States. Although the
special relationship between the United States and
Morocco and recent increases in US military assist-
ance to Rabat have occasionally elicited charges that
Washington is playing an interventionist role, the
dispute is still widely regarded as localized and is
unlikely to cloud broader US interests in the region.
Algeria's concerted effort over the past year to im-
prove ties with the United States demonstrates that
the conflict may constrain but not prevent better
relations.
Algeria's attitude-particularly toward the United
States-will be the key factor in limiting the possible
liabilities that the conflict could present to the United
States. So long as the Algerians keep a relatively tight
rein on the Polisario, there is little likelihood that the
guerrillas can challenge Morocco seriously in ways
that could destabilize the country in the near term.
Moreover, Algeria's current posture would seem to
guarantee that the conflict will not escalate into a
broader war between Morocco and Algeria or serious-
ly test the depth of the US commitment to Morocco.
If Algeria's policy were to change as a result of
domestic problems or a shift in leadership, or out of
concern over aggressive Moroccan tactics, the Poli-
sario could become a convenient instrument, both in
the military and diplomatic context, to use against
Morocco. A deepening alliance between the United
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States and Morocco that seemed to threaten Algeria's
status as a dominant North African power or to
ensure Morocco's prospects for totally absorbing the
Western Sahara might also instigate a significant
shift in Algerian attitude and policy. Although none
of these possibilities seems likely in the near term, the
lack of a clear-cut path to a negotiated settlement of
the Saharan dispute and the significant equities at
stake for all of the major participants in the conflict
suggest that dangerous flashpoints-probably involy-
ing US interests-are unavoidable over the longer
term.
The Saharan conflict could become a serious econom-
ic and political problem for the Moroccan monarchy
if the dispute is not settled on terms acceptable to the
Moroccan public or if at least the appearance of a
Moroccan military victory cannot be established.
During the course of such a protracted struggle, King
Hassan would probably seek assistance from the
United States in ways unacceptable to Algeria, and
the risk of direct Algerian-Moroccan clashes would
increase
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Appendix
Evolution of the Polisario Front, 1973-82
Early History
The Polisario Front was established in May 1973 by
members of the Sahara Liberation Front, who had
joined forces as students five years earlier in Rabat to
protest Madrid's control of Spanish Sahara. The
violent quashing by Spanish police of a political
demonstration in El Aaiun in June 1970 helped to
galvanize the group into a guerrilla organization that
formally adopted the name Frente Popular par la
Liberation de Saguia el Hamra y Rio de Oro at the
first congress in 1973.
From the outset, the Polisario's primary objectives
were to terminate foreign domination of Saharan
territory and to create an independent socialist Arab
republic.2 The coup in Portugal in April 1974 unex-
pectedly brightened prospects for achieving that goal
when the new government in Lisbon announced its
intention to divest itself of its African territories.
Spain, Portugal's fellow colonial power, was uryVvilling
to remain isolated on the continent and soon an-
nounced plans for a referendum on self-determination
for its largest African territory, Spanish Sahara.
(Spain also held the Canary Islands and two exclaves
in Morocco-Ceuta and Melilla.)
Spain's plan aroused the territorial ambitions of
Morocco and Mauritania. King Hassan of Morocco
began a determined campaign to "regain" the territo-
ry, over which Moroccan rulers had varying degrees
of control as far back as the 10th century. The
Moroccans maintained that at independence in 1956
they had not recovered from the colonial powers all of
their rightful land holdings, including the Spanish
Sahara. Mauritania likewise drew on historical associ-
ations-tribal affiliations and shared language-to
lay claim to the territory. The initial rivalry between
Rabat and Nouakchott for Spanish Sahara evolved
into a cautious partnership by early 1974, when the
two countries agreed in principle to partition the
territory. In mid-1974 Morocco initiated a major
military buildup on its southern frontier, signaling its
willingness to use force to reinforce its "rights" of
sovereignty.
Algeria, although without pretensions to Spain's
North African possession, was not eager to see
Morocco absorb Spanish Sahara, given Morocco's
continuing Irredentist claims to Algerian territory and
a longstanding regional rivalry. Algeria favored self-
determination for the Spanish possession and strongly
denounced the Madrid Agreements signed by Spain,
Morocco, and Mauritania in November 1975. The
agreement designated Morocco and Mauritania as
inheritors of the territory once Spain pulled out in late
February 1976. That accord prompted a sharp in-
crease in support for the Polisario Front by Algiers,
which was already giving limited material and politi-
cal assistance.
Polisario guerrillas, who had conducted small-scale
raids on Spanish troops in remote outposts during
1974 and 1975, switched their attention to the threat
from Morocco and Mauritania. Heavily outnum-
bered,they could not prevent the takeover of the
territory, but the Polisario was able to carry out
successful harassment and sabotage against the new
occupiers. Moroccan troops were unprepared for such
strong resistance and soon had their hands full trying
to cope with the guerrilla war in southern Morocco
and Western Sahara. Mauritania, clearly the junior
partner, came under pressure from the insurgents,
who sought to make the burden of the war unbearable
for Nouakchott. By mid-1978 Morocco was left to
fight the war with the guerrillas by itself after a
military coup in Mauritania brought to power leaders
who wanted no further involvement in the Saharan
dispute.
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Algerian military units apparently were directly in-
volved in only one clash in Western Sahara in early
1976. The battle at Amgala in early 1976 raised the
specter of the insurgency escalating into a broader
confrontation between Moroccan and Algerian mili-
tary forces, something that both then Algerian Presi-
dent Boumediene and King Hassan wished to avoid.
Algeria thereafter participated in the war solely by
proxy, while further strengthening its forces along its
western frontier so that Morocco would be deterred
from hot pursuit or preemptive raids into Algerian
territory
The Polisario Front has never expected to vanquish
the Moroccans on the battlefield, and its military and
political campaigns have always been aimed at per-
suading King Hassan to recognize the legitimacy of
the guerrillas' claims and negotiate a settlement. As it
worked to bolster its diplomatic credentials, the Poli-
sario simultaneously sought to make the armed strug-
gle in the Sahara a serious liability for Hassan, on the
assumption that the King would never make conces-
sions if Morocco had the upper hand
For much of the fighting in the late 1970s, the
guerrillas' activities kept the Moroccan military on
the defensive, despite the Moroccans' clear-cut advan-
tages in manpower and weaponry. Wily Polisario
fighters proved particularly adept at modifying their
tactics to counter changes in Moroccan strategy.
When the Moroccans organized massive sweeps of the
desert to hunt down guerrillas and destroy supply
caches and bases, the Polisario temporarily evacuated
the areas, to return when the task forces had moved
on. Then, when the Moroccan military clustered its
forces in a few towns and gave up trying to patrol the
vast expanses of Western Sahara, the guerrillas ex-
panded their strike forces so that they could overrun
garrisons. By 1979 the Polisario had the Moroccan
forces on the run, and Moroccan military morale had
sunk to dangerously low levels.
Changing Political and Military Strategies
Before Morocco's poor showing against the insurgents
could crystallize into a major problem for the
throne-as a direct threat from war-weary armed
forces or by forcing the Moroccans into a "humiliat-
ing" treaty-Hassan authorized changes in military
operations that by mid-1980 substantially improved
Morocco's military fortunes. Unable to regain quickly
the initiative that had been lost to the Polisario, the
Moroccan military managed at least to deny the
guerrillas some of the victories possible the preceding
The Moroccans also made a strategic decision that
had profound implications for the conduct of the war.
Rabat ordered the construction of a berm around the
economic and political heart of the disputed terri-
tory-the so-called useful triangle. No independent
Saharan state could hope to be economically viable
without this core area, with its extensive phosphate
deposits and mines. Behind the earthen wall, the
Moroccans decided to consolidate their forces so that
the Polisario would no longer have its pick of isolated
outposts and garrisons to harass.
While the guerrillas contemplated the implications of
a defensive perimeter, there were other developments
that caused the Polisario to reevaluate its situation.
Perhaps the most significant was the Polisario's per-
ception of a shift in Algerian attitudes, which seemed
to be showing increasing impatience with the pro-
longed hostilities and a greater eagerness to have the
dispute settled. By mid-1981 the Polisario evidently
had become deeply concerned about the state of its
relations with Algeria. One high-ranking Polisario
official averred that Algeria no longer supported the
war with any enthusiasm, that it was looking for ways
to extricate itself from its relationship with the guer-
rillas, and that it was prepared to seek a political
solution at any price. This change of heart, the
Polisario feared, could express itself in a cutoff of
military aid and in greater restraints on guerrilla
operations.
Concurrently, the guerrillas learned that their other
benefactor, Libyan leader Qadhafi, had promised
King Hassan that he would curb arms assistance to
the Polisario in exchange for normalized relations
with Rabat and Hassan's assurance that Morocco
would assent to Qadhafi's nomination as chairman of
the Organization of African Unity in 1982. The
Libyans apparently hastened delivery of a large ship-
ment of armor and multiple rocket launchers to the
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Polisario before the agreement went into effect, but
the guerrillas were upset by Qadhafi's willingness to
jettison his relationship with the Front for Libyan
self-interest. Although the Libyans resumed arms
shipments by March 1982, and perhaps even earlier,
the experience left a bad taste with the guerrillas and
provided a harsh reminder of the undependable na-
ture of this major ally
Finally, King Hassan achieved diplomatic triumphs in
the summer of 1981 that were major disappointments
for the Polisario. Making an appearance at an OAU
conclave for the first time in six years, Hassan
pledged at the summit meeting in Nairobi in June
1981 to abide by a cease-fire and to hold a referen-
dum in Western Sahara as called for the year before
by the "Wise Men's Committee," an OAU group
designated to mediate the dispute. This permitted
Rabat to appear committed to a peaceful solution to
the conflict, yet run little risk of jeopardizing Moroc-
can equities. Another bonus from the Moroccan point
of view was that it preempted attempts by the Poli-
sario to have the SDAR, which by then had been
recognized by a simple majority of the OAU's mem-
bers, admitted to the organization.
In the follow-on meeting in Nairobi in August, the
resolution set forth by the committee organized in
June to implement the cease-fire and referendum was
viewed by the Polisario as likely to help Morocco
prevail. According to the US Embassy in Rabat,
Hassan managed "both to retain the initiative and to
build further momentum toward a denouement favor-
able to his interests." Morocco "seized the high
ground" by telling the committee it was willing to
proceed at any time, which put the onus on the
Polisario and its supporters for delays caused by
discussions of the terms of conducting a vote.
The guerrillas believed that Hassan's diplomatic
strategy in mid-1981 was designed to throw the
Polisario Front off balance, win more international
support for Rabat's position, and capitalize on Alge-
ria's desire to end the war. Because this ploy seemed
to be working and the war had become much less a
problem for Rabat, the Polisario concluded it had to
do something to recapture the momentum. At the
suggestion of a ranking Front ideologue, the Polisario
decided first to try to garner more international
backing for its cause and to establish links to Moroc-
can opposition parties, specifically the socialists and
Communists.
Guelta Zemmur-A Turning Point
Zemmur outpost, which they had struck earlier in
1981, as their target because of its remote and
vulnerable position outside the berm. Although the
Moroccans detected signs of an impending attack in
early October 1981, elements of the 4th Motorized
Regiment-comprising three infantry battalions with
supporting artillery-took no special precautions.
Consequently, the Polisario displaced the Moroccans
and inflicted heavy losses on the garrison in the battle
that began on 13 October. The US defense attache
estimated that the fighting in the initial assault over
the next week cost the Moroccans at least a full
batallion's worth of equipment and roughly 300 casu-
alties
The key aspect of the battle at Guelta Zemmur was
the Polisario's use of the SA-6 missile system, which
was responsible for downing five Moroccan aircraft.
Because Hassan adroitly portrayed the introduction of
SA-6s into the war as a grave new threat to Morocco,
a Polisario official later characterized the outcome at
Guelta Zemmur as an incontestable military victory,
but a political and strategic failure. He noted that the
Moroccan monarch had masterfully created the im-
pression that the Polisario used equipment of a sophis-
tication that would have required foreign military
advisers and the active involvement of Algeria and
Mauritania, thereby enhancing Hassan's case for an
increase in US military assistance to Morocco.
Prospects for a peaceful solution to the conflict
dimmed perceptibly in the aftermath. Morocco could
cite the attack on Gueita Zemmur as proof that the
Polisario, having blatantly violated the cease-fire stip-
ulated at Nairobi in June, was insincere about con-
tinuing the peace process. When a meeting of the
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OAU implementation committee was called in Febru-
ary 1982, Hassan refused to attend. Neither the
Moroccans nor the guerrillas were happy with the
recommendations of the committee. Because the con-
tentious issue of defining parties to the dispute was
again avoided, the Polisario reiterated that it must
negotiate directly with Morocco, a position that the
Moroccans flatly rejected. Rabat also dismissed the
committee's more detailed proposals on the interim
administration and referendum because they would
weaken Morocco's ability to retain control of the
territory.
The surprise seating of a delegation of the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic at an OAU ministerial
meeting in late February 1982 dealt the already
stalemated peace process another blow. Protesting the
admission of the Polisario "state" as the OAU's
newest member, Morocco and 18 other African gov-
ernments organized a boycott that blocked movement
toward an OAU-sponsored solution to the Saharan
problem and disrupted the organization's meetings
over the next several months. This cleavage in the
OAU's ranks also stymied the 19th summit meeting
scheduled in Tripoli last August, although disgruntle-
ment over the selection of Qadhafi as chairman also
helped to keep some of the "Group of 19" away.
With the collapse of the Tripoli summit, more of the
OAU's members believed that the organization
should no longer be held hostage by a single issue,
particularly an Arab dispute. Asix-member contact
group, established at the meeting in Tripoli to seek
ways to reconvene the summit, met with various OAU
members and concluded in late September that the
SDAR issue endangered the OAU's continued exist-
ence. The group agreed that it was important for the
summit to be reconvened by the end of 1982 and that
to be able to do so, the Polisario must not participate
in either the preceding Council of Ministers meeting
or the summit itself.
Anticipating that they would be asked to absent
themselves from a rescheduled OAU summit, the
Polisario Front agreed in mid-September that they
would forgo participation, provided certain conditions
The Polisario, however, did not get all it wanted.
Following consultations with its supporters, the Front
concluded it had little choice but to announce its
temporary abstention from all meetings of a recon-
vened summit. The contact committee also recom-
mended placement on the summit's agenda of the
report of the implementation committee on Western
Sahara in order to revive the languishing peace
process.
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Table 3
OAU Treatment of the Western~Sahara Dispute, June 1981-February 1982
("Nairobi I") 18th Assembly of Recognizes King Hassan's promise to organize
OAU heads of state and govern- referendum in Western Sahara.
ment 24-28 June 1981
Establishes committee of representatives from
Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
Sudan, and Tanzania to implement recommenda-
tions of former ad hoc committee on Western
Sahara.
Requests meeting of implementation committee
before end of August to plan for cease-fire and
referendum.
Gives implementation committee, with participa-
tion of UN, authorization to take "all necessary
measures" to guarantee general and fair referen-
dum for self-determination.
("Nairobi II") Chiefs of State Referendum options will be independence or
Implementation Committee on integration with Morocco.
Western Sahara 24-26 August
1981 All South Saharouis in the Spanish census who are
now 18 years of age will be eligible to vote.
In determining the voting population the UNHCR
will also be consulted, and internationally recog-
nized rates of growth will be factored in.
Interim administration will work with existing
Moroccan administration and be assisted by OAU
and/or UN peacekeeping forces.
Opposing forces will be confined to base during
cease-fire and referendum.
("Nairobi III")Chiefs of State Comprehensive cease-fire to be fixed by commit-
Implementation Committee on tee on advice of chairman after consultations with
Western Sahara 8-9 February all concerned parties.
1982
Peacekeeping force and/or military observer
group to supervise cease-fire.
Interim administration to have legislative and
administrative power.
Final result of referendum must be ratified by
implementation by OAU assembly and UNGA.
Morocco:
Implies self-determination a ballot option.
Ready for confirmatory referendum within three
months.
Needs assistance of UN and OAU to supervise
referendum for which voter eligibility is deter-
mined by 1974 Spanish census.
Says Moroccan troops will not be withdrawn prior
to referendum.
Polisario:
Direct talks with Morocco must precede cease-
fire.
Moroccan troops have to leave Sahara before
referendum and withdraw to distance of 150
kilometers from border.
Algeria:
Moroccan troops and administration must be
withdrawn.
Fixed dates for cease-fire and referendum needed;
Morocco and Polisario must agree.
Recalls June 1979 OAU meeting recommended
five-state committee to define modalities and
supervise organization of referendum.
Morocco:
The Moroccans will organize the referendum.
Will not negotiate cease-fire directly with
Polisario.
Polisario:
Moroccan forces must leave Western Sahara and
remain 150 kilometers from the border.
Polisario Front must be part of peacekeeping
force.
Algeria:
Moroccan forces should be withdrawn. If any are
allowed to stay, should be only a small force.
The international peacekeeping force must main-
tain order.
A neutral interim administration must be
established.
A new census to identify voters is needed. Com-
mission of interim administrators, UNHCR, Al-
geria, and Mauritania can oversee project.
Morocco:
Polisario is not a party to the conflict.
Moroccan military and administration must re-
main through referendum.
Polisario:
Emphasizes need for direct negotiations with
Morocco.
Criticizes "failure" of OAU implementation to
force Morocco to negotiate.
Challenges good faith of implementation
committee.
Algeria:
Any agreements must be between Polisario and
Morocco, not Algeria and Morocco.
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Polisario Base Camps
North Atlantic
Ocean
bra rna
~~ed
Abaitih
MOROCCO
Anech~,,
` ? Jdiriya'-
(Echediria)
~^~ Hamra
"~ ...
WE~TER`N SAHARA
Amgala~
?
a ~ ? ?
?
MAURITANIA
ALGERIA
Tindouf
? -
? Polisario base camp
Road
Track or trail
Salt pan
N07E: Camp saes are not continuously occupied
All drainage is intermittent
Scale 1 7,500.000
25 W Kilometers
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