AFGHANISTAN: GOALS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE INSURGENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00556R000200080004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -1
Intelligence
Afghanistan:
Goals and Prospects
for the Insurgents
-stet,
NESA 83-10110
May 1983
308
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Secret
NESA 83-10110
May 1983
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Afghanistan:
Goals and Prospects
for the Insurgents
National Intelligence Council.
This paper was prepared b Office of
Near East-South Asia Analysis. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations and the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,-7 25X1
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Secret
Afghanistan:
Goals and Prospects
for the Insurgents
Key Judgments The Afghan resistance as a whole will continue to grow stronger over the
Information available next two or three years, although some organizations will suffer setbacks
as of 10 March 1983 and the resistance will be unable to resolve basic problems such as disunity.
was used in this report.
The most serious threats to the resistance-such as the loss of popular
support-probably will grow slowly and, despite the long-term danger, will
probably not affect the resistance significantly in the next few years:
? Many insurgent bands can still improve their capabilities by acquiring
more arms and adopting successful tactics, despite continuing disunity
within the resistance.
? The formation of regional organizations and ad hoc cooperation have
already ameliorated some insurgent problems-such as an uneven distri-
bution of both resources and the burden of fighting and a lack of
operational coordination. We expect the success of these organizations to
encourage their formation in additional areas of the country.
? The rise of organizations emphasizing common regional interests rather
than ideological differences may reduce infighting among insurgents.
? Civilian and insurgent morale remains high in most places, though the
cumulative costs of Soviet operations to both civilians and insurgents in
the longer term might lead to a significant reduction in insurgent
activity.
? The flight of a significant part of the population from fighting in the
countryside to Pakistan, Iran, and Kabul has so far not adversely affected
insurgent capabilities and appears unlikely to hurt the resistance in the
next few years. In the long run, however, the settlement of insurgents'
families outside the country could eliminate a major reason for resisting
the Soviets.
It is unlikely that resistance groups will overcome the differences that have
prevented the unification of the resistance above the local level. The
absence of an organization able to speak for the resistance as a whole
severely hinders their efforts to influence international opinion, to play a
significant role in negotiations about Afghanistan's future, and to ensure
that foreign diplomatic and material support for the resistance continues.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10110
May 1983
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A massive augmentation of Soviet forces in Afghanistan-though highly
unlikely-would cripple resistance operations. Continued resistance im-
pedes Soviet use of the country as a base for projecting both political and
military influence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. The
Soviet failure to overcome the insurgents also weakens the image of the
USSR as a power whose wishes must be accommodated. The continuing
Soviet effort, however, is a reminder of Moscow's persistence in trying to
assert its will. US policymakers could face difficult decisions in formulat-
ing a response if the Soviets at some point decide to reduce the intensity of
the insurgency with massive reinforcements.
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Afghanistan:
Goals and Prospects
for the Insurgents
The Prospects for the Afghan Insurgents '
If there is no significant change in Moscow's Afghan
policies, we believe that the most important factors
determining the course of the resistance in the next
few years will be:
? The degree to which the resistance can overcome
political, regional, and ethnic differences.
? The ability of the individual insurgent bands to
maintain or improve their military capabilities.
? Continued popular support for the resistance.
? Those bands, probably the overwhelming majority,
who seek considerable autonomy for their region or
ethnic group and favor a minimum of interference
in local affairs from Kabul.
Other groups, such as Maoists, social democrats, and
national socialists, fit into none of these categories,
but they have little power and are unlikely to have
much influence on the course of the resistance (see
table).
The Fragmented Resistance
The Afghan resistance is divided into hundreds of
different groups. Only a few of the resistance leaders
have revealed specific political programs, but their
statements to newsmen and diplomats and their ac-
tions and views as reported by individuals with good
access to resistance organizations give an indication of
the aims of the different groups.
There are wide differences in both specific goals and
strategy with significant disagreements even about
what it means to defend Islam and to free Afghani-
stan from the Soviets.' Most insurgents fall into one of
three categories:
? The Islamic fundamentalists, who want to make
Afghanistan into a theocratic state.
? The moderates, who seek a secular government
similar to those before the Communists came to
power.
Insurgent efforts to influence international opinion
will continue to be hindered both by an inability to
decide on a common program and the adverse impact
of fragmentation and squabbling. The Peshawar
groups, who do the most fighting among themselves,
also have the greatest access to the world press. The
ability of the insurgents to play a serious part in
negotiations-either with the Soviets or with potential
allies-or to challenge the legitimacy of the Babrak
government in international forums, such as the
United Nations, is severely hampered by their inabil-
ity to form a delegation with any real authority to
speak for the resistance.
by the royal family
The Fundamentalists
The most important of the fundamentalist groups are
the two factions of the Hizbe Islami and the Jamiat-
i-Islami. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction of the Hizbe
Islami probably has a more detailed program than
any other resistance organization. A party charter,
issued before the Communists came to power, called
for a number of Islamic reforms including the com-
pulsory veiling of women and bans against coeduca-
tion and men and women working together. Gulbud-
din's followers deny, however, that a "dictatorship of
mullahs" is either desirable or possible in Afghani-
stan. The charter also called for an end to oppression
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Selected Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan
Soviet Union
Hera/t~ ~~
Bamian
Jalalabad
Vardak l Kabuo.
\. L- i Low9a .
PaMia
Orizgan '-
r
( >- Badakhshan
h
\B glk Ttkhar~?~
Fdryab
( lScan~ v f
%Jowzj n~, / E;^tt,to?~u stani
narbi
Zab
nandabar
Qandahar
Pashtun
Tajik
Uzbek
U Hazara
Q Turkmen
Baluch
Neither Younus Khalis-who heads the other faction
of the Hizbe Islami-nor Burhanuddin Rabbani,
leader of the Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan, has put
forth as detailed a program.
Younus-much more a military
leader than a politician-maintains that the only
constitution Afghanistan needs is the Koran. We
believe both men subscribe in general terms to Gul-
buddin's Islamic goals, but Khalis and Rabbani are
cooperate with moderate insurgent groups
ils n
about ideological purity than Gulbuddin's.
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Ghazni IPala(ka
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Group
Leader
Ethnic
Composition
Political/Religious
Orientation
Area of Strength
Hizbe Islami (Gulbuddin)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Pashtun
Islamic fundamentalist
Eastern Afghanistan
Hizbe Islami (Khalis)
Younus Khalis
Pashtun
Islamic fundamentalist
Nangarhar Province
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic
League)
Burhanuddin
Rabbani
Tajik
Islamic fundamentalist
Northeast Afghanistan
Panjsher Valley Organization
Ahmad Shah Masood
Tajik
Jamiat follower
Panjsher Valley
Harakat-i-Inqulab-Islami
(Revolutionary Islamic
Movement)
Mohammad Nabi
Mohammadi
Pashtun
Traditionalist
Eastern Afghanistan
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami
(National Islamic Front)
Syed Ahmad Gailani
Pashtun
Moderate Islamic
Eastern Afghanistan
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli
(National Liberation Front)
Sibqatullah
Mojededi
Pashtun
Moderate Islamic
Eastern Afghanistan
Kunar-Nuristan Union
Syed Shamsuddin
Majrooh
Pashtun
Nuristani
Tribal
Konarha Province
Vardak Union
Amin Vardak
Pashtun
Tribal
Vardak Province
Durrani Tribes
Azezullah Wasifi
Pashtun
Tribal/ Monarchist
Southern Afghanistan
Suzamane Azadelbarache
Mardo Me Afghanistan (SAMA)
(Organization for the Liberation
of Afghanistan)
Abdul Qayyum
Various
Secular/Leftist
Kabul City
Afghan Mellat (Afghan Nation)
Rahim Pushtunyar
Pashtun
National Socialist
None
Shola-i-Jawed (Eternal Flame)
Various
Maoist
None
Shora-i-Itifaq Islami (United
Council of Islamic Revolution
Syed Ali Beheshti
Hazara
Secular
Central Afghanistan
Sazman-i-Jihad-i-Akbar-i-
Islami (Organization for the
Great Islamic War)
Vahdet-i-Islami Afghanistan
(Islamic Union)
Hafizullah Siret
Turkic
speakers
Ethnic
Sazmani Nasir (Victory
Organization)
Mir Hussain
Sadeqi
Hazara
Pro-Iranian
Organization for Strength
and Unity for the Liberation of
Afghanistan
Mohammad Yusuf
Various
Moderate Secular
Exiles in Europe
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Hizbe Islami leader Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar_~~
Fundamentalist statements about the Soviet Union
undoubtedly contain much bravado but reflect an
attitude more uncompromising than that of the mod-
erates. The fundamentalists rule out negotiations with
the Afghan Communists and say the only subject they
will discuss with Moscow is troop withdrawal. At
times they say Afghanistan's future will be decided on
the battlefield, where the insurgents will destroy the
Soviet forces. There is distrust of the West in all of
the fundamentalist groups, most marked in the some-
times open hostility of Gulbuddin, but also evident in
statements by other leaders-reported by journalists
and others-that the United States is using the
resistance for its own purposes or is withholding help
because it distrusts Islam.
Gulbuddin's efforts to ensure a dominant position for
himself are probably the main source of tension
among the fundamentalists
3ulbuddin stayed out of the various exile
alliances until March 1982, when he, Rabbani, and
Khalis formed a loose alliance in which Gulbuddin
gained the dominant political positions-the presiden-
cy for an ally, Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf, and the'vice-
presidency for himself. By August
Secret
had become very concerned about Gulbuddin's al-
leged efforts to weaken their organizations and his
attempts to win support from Iran, for whose revolu-
tion Gulbuddin has expressed some admiration.
Gulbuddin favors a strong president for Afghani-
stan-chosen for his dedication to Islam-and some
of his statements to newsmen and diplomats have
implied that the Afghan Government would not be
selected through democratic processes. Some state-
ments by Khalis, however, clearly imply that the
selection of any government will be based on the views
of the Afghan people, although not necessarily
through direct elections.
In Afghanistan the rivalry has led to armed clashes
between Gulbuddin's faction and other insurgent
groups.
uring one Soviet effort to clear t e Pans er
a ey Hizbe Islami forces attacked the defenders
from the rear. lashes in
other parts of the country, apparently resulting from
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Gulbuddin's efforts to eliminate rival insurgent lead-
ers or co-opt their followers. In one area of Nangarhar
Province, fighting
resulted in a temporary alliance of all the other
resistance groups against the Hizbe Islami.
The Moderates
The moderates-including both exile leaders in Pe-
shawar and former government officials based largely
in Western Europe-seek a return to the days before
Communist rule. Although only a few minor leaders
openly advocate a restoration of the monarchy, most
see King Zahir Shah as the figure who can unite the
resistance. Nevertheless, they have some reservations.
exile leader Syed
Ahmad Gailani has expressed doubts that the King
can actually unite the resistance. Some moderate
spokesmen believe that, although the King can unite
Afghanistan, other family members are too unpopular
to be of use to the insurgency. Others see the King's
cousin, Prince Abdul Wali, as the logical resistance
field commander.
The moderates speak of a government more demo-
cratic and less restrictive than before the Communists
came to power. Sibqatullah Mojededi and Gailani
publicly advocate a democratically elected govern-
ment, and, at least when talking to Americans, Moje-
law-he would, for example, eliminate Western prac-
dedi speaks of a separation of powers in the govern-
ment. Although Mojededi makes clear that he wants
Afghanistan to be ruled in accordance with Islamic
tices in the judicial system-he also sees such things
as higher education and social equality for women as
compatible with Islam. Gailani-although a religious
leader-has been critical of Mojededi for being too
much a religious fundamentalist
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The former government officials exiled 25X1
references to Islam seem pro forma, and they appear
to regard Islam more as a means of encouraging
resistance than a goal in itself. Most of their state-
ments emphasize nationalist resistance to foreign
of Islam as a reason for fighting.
The moderates seek a negotiated settlement with
Moscow. Gailani has said on several occasions that
any Afghan government will have to be on good terms
with the Soviets. There have been recurrent rumors of
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attempts by moderate leaders to open contacts with
the Soviets or the Afghan Communists. Former Prime
Minister Yusuf has told journalists that the "Finland-
ization" of Afghanistan is the only realistic solution
and implies that he is willing to accept even greater
Soviet influence than in pre-Communist days. Far
from rejecting Western support, the moderates have
asked the United States on a number of occasions to
force unity on the resistance.
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, chief of the Harakat-
i-Inqulab-Islami, is currently allied to Mojededi and
Gailani. Even vaguer than others about his goals, he
seems ideologically closer to the fundamentalists than
to his current colleagues. According to US diplomats,
he is seen by many Afghans as a truly Islamic leader
opposed to both the Islamic reformers and the influ-
ences of the West.
The Bands in Afghanistan
The exiles are the ideological and national political
leaders of the resistance and also serve as propagan-
dists and intermediaries with the outside world for the
insurgent bands fighting in Afghanistan. Exile influ-
ence on the activities of the insurgents, however, is
usually limited and indirect.
Former Prime Minister Mo-
hammad Yus
Some of the hundreds of bands fighting in Afghani-
stan are associated with exile groups, others with
regional organizations, and many operate independ-
ently. In 1980 an insurgent leader from Konarha
Province estimated that only 5 percent of the insur-
gents there supported the Peshawar groups, and a
prominent exile official told a US diplomat that the
exiles controlled only 1 percent of the fighting in
Afghanistan
the number of insurgent bands having a nominal
connection to an exile organization has increased in
the past three years, but the exiles do not appear to
have any greater control over the fighting.
Most exile leaders have only limited control of even
the bands that acknowledge their authority. Younus
Khalis, who is sometimes directly involved in the
planning and execution of military operations, may
have the greatest control, but in only a limited area.
At one time Gulbuddin appeared to most observers to
have strong control over his followers in Afghanistan.
a number
of recent defections to the government or other resist-
ance groups by bands no longer willing to follow his
policies.
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Some Jamiat field commanders acknowledge the au-
thority of Rabbani, although he appears to exert little
actual control over their actions. There are, however,
many bands with onlya nominal relationship. Nabi
claims to command some 200,000 men in Afghani-
stan; the figure may reflect the number who respect
Nabi and prefer the Harakat to other exile groups,
but Nabi has firm control of few if any bands in
Afghanistan. Only a few hundred men are probably
directly controlled by Mojededi or Gailani, most
based in Pakistan. Westerners who have talked with
their ostensible followers fighting in Afghanistan re-
port the bands usually receive neither guidance nor
support from Peshawar, and sometimes they know
little of either man except that he belongs to a
prominent religious family
Leaders of other bands have told diplomats and
newsmen that their only ties to exile groups are an
intermittent and sometimes unsatisfactory supply re-
lationship. insurgents
sometimes claim to follow an exile leader only in the
hope of obtaining arms through him. Some insurgents
openly admit they joined an exile group solely because
they needed an identification paper to travel unhin-
In many talks with newsmen I lin 25X1
Afghanistan, insurgents in the field have usually said
they are fighting to defend Islam, but their definition
of Islam appears to include all traditional ways
including the Pashtun code of revenge and other
customs that are not Islamic. They also claim to be
fighting to free their country from the Soviets, but
most seem concerned primarily with keeping Commu-
nist troops out of their own village or valley. They
rarely appear to have a broad sense of Afghan
nationalism
dered in Afghanistan.
Perhaps as basic as any other motivation is the
preservation of the Afghan way of life against outside
interference. Each small group is fighting to preserve
its own traditions and its autonomy. Outsiders-
whether Soviets, Afghan Communists, or other insur- 25X1
gent bands-are a threat. Under Soviet military
pressure, insur-
gent bands have begun cooperating to obtain better
intelligence, acquire and move weapons and other
supplies more easily, stage operations requiring forces
larger than a single band, and coordinate operations
so that one band does not interfere with another
The trend has been encouraged by a belief that
support from exile groups.in Pakistan is inadequate. A
common insurgent complaint is that the exiles are
withholding arms, and many claim that only by
uniting can they obtain weapons from the Peshawar
groups or from foreigners themselves.
Insurgent "Governments"
In some areas small local governments began to
coalesce when it became apparent that greater co-
operation among the civilian governments was needed
to support the military organizations. The most fully
developed of these organizations is the United Council
of the Islamic Revolution, headed by Syed Ali Be-
heshti, in the Hazara area of central Afghanistan. It
collects taxes, administers justice, maintains the Ha-
zara military force, and attempts to conduct foreign
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affairs through two offices in Iran and one in Paki-
stan. Although the organization's stated goals are
defending Islam and driving out the Soviets, we
believe the movement eventually may advocate inde-
pendence. The Hazaras-Mongol Shias in a predomi-
nantly Caucasian Sunni country-have long resented
their second-class status in Afghanistan.
The Tajiks of the Panjsher Valley under Ahmad Shah
Masood have been nearly as successful in creating a
functioning local government, despite continued Sovi-
et military pressure. Although the Panjsher organiza-
tion is still intact, the establishment of Soviet garri-
sons in the valley in 1982 probably will inhibit its
ability to administer civilian affairs there.
Elsewhere in Afghanistan, similar developments have
not generally led to as fully formed governments.
in northeastern Afghanistan, the
insurgents are collecting traditional Islamic taxes,
using the funds to carry out governmental functions
and support the activities of village governments.
Pashtun tribesmen in Vardak Province cooperate
through the decisions reached by the consensus of
military leaders elected by each village. Groups in the
Kabul area-including the Panjsheris-have formed
an organization to coordinate their military activities.
There are reports of unification among Tajiks,
Uzbeks, and Turkmen in northern Afghanistan.F_
The weaker regional organizations only partly control
the areas in which they operate, and even the two
most successful regional groups-the Jamiat organi-
zation in the Panjsher Valley and the Hazara Coun-
cil-face opposition in their home territory. Masood's
followers have had frequent clashes with Panjsheris
loyal to Gulbuddin a
militant pro-Iranian organization is becoming a seri-
ous rival to the Council in the Hazarajat
All of the organizations share a number of traits.
They are generally confined to a single ethnic group.
There is, for example, little interest by either side in
cooperation between the Hazaras and the various
Pashtun organizations along the borders of the Ha-
zarajat.
Exceptions are the primarily military um-
re a for the Kabul area and the Kunar-Nuristan
Union-composed of both Pashtuns and Nuristanis-
in Konarha Province. We believe their longstanding
rivalry is an important reason the union has not
flourished.
The regional groups tend to ignore the moderate-
fundamentalist divisions of the exiles. The Vardak
Union contains groups ostensibly loyal to several
different exile groups; one reason for its formation
was the disillusionment of all with their nominal
leaders in Peshawar. The Hazaras never expected or
got much help from the exiles-they had little alter-
native but to try to open their own lines to the outside.
The Kabul organization includes groups with widely
differing ideologies. Masood, in the Panjsher Valley,
claims complete loyalty to the Jamiat-but this has
not prevented him from dealing with Jamiat rivals, or
from establishing
an independent office in Peshawar. There have even
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been a few instances in which
::::I-Gulbuddin's followers have cooperated with
groups with which he was at odds, and disillusioned
with his divisive policies, some of his followers have
transferred their allegiance to other fundamentalist
organizations.
during the Panjsher
Valley offensive in May 1982, insurgents, including
some Hazaras and Nuristanis, traveled to the valley
to help the local Tajik guerrillas, while other bands
conducted diversionary attacks on the Soviet POL
pipeline. The help, however, may be more a reflection
of the prestige of Masood than a trend toward
interregional and intergroup cooperation.
where bands
are cooperating, inadvertent interference with each
other's operations is rare, and intelligence is passed
quickly from group to group. When a target is too
strong for a single band, several may join to attack it.
The regional organizations have been able to distrib-
ute the burden of the war more evenly-at one time
villages on the periphery of an insurgent-controlled
area had to do most of the fighting; now men from
villages in the interior are sent to help.
the ease with which supply convoys and
n s returning from Pakistan move within Afghani-
bands-
stan, despite ethnic and ideological differences. Ethnic
rivalries, political disagreements, and depredations by
insurgents have occasionally resulted in clashes with
villagers, insurgents
traveling through an area are welcomed by both the
population and local insurgent bands
civilian support for
insurgents remains high in most of Afghanistan.
villages continue to supply
Some diplomats and journalists believe, however, that
tactics such as mass arrests, frequent sweep opera-
tions, and what the insurgents believe to be retaliatory
bombings are beginning to reduce insurgent activity.
civilian morale is declining in
areas-such as the Panjsher Valley-where there has
been great Soviet pressure. Although assassinations
and sabotage continue in the capital, most Kabulis
seem to have accepted the Soviet occupation. Accord-
ing to the Indian Ambassador, a large Soviet presence
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has cowed Jalalabad. The resistance in Herat and 25X1
Qandahar did not recover until the spring of 1983
from large-scale Soviet operations in both cities in 25X1
January 1982. The departure of most of the civilian
population for Pakistan long ago brought peace to the
Vakhan (Wakhan Corridor) in the far northeast
The evidence is inconclusive whether the Soviets have-
actually
actually embarked on a strategy of retaliation and
pressure on civilians. The Soviets have shelled and 25X1
bombed villages, but it is difficult to tell whether the
intent was to intimidate villagers or simply to attack 25X1
insurgents believed to be in a village. Even if civilians
were the intended target, the attack could have been
made by the local Afghan or Soviet commander on his
own initiative. Moreover, much of Afghanistan has so
far escaped the attacks on villages, mass arrests, and
destruction of crops.
In much of Afghanistan, the relationship between the
resistance and civilians is so close that any distinction 25X1
is somewhat artificial a ?.5X1
typical insurgent spends part of his time at his civilian 25X1
occupation as men rotate into and out of the local 25X1
resistance band. In some villages most of the popula-
tion probably consists of part-time resistance fighters
and their families. Only the few bands operating
outside their home areas are clearly distinct from the
local population.
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o instance in which a village has 25X1
refused to support its local insurgent band. There have 2FX1
been insurgents deciding 25X1
not to fight because of fear of retaliation against
civilians. Even before the alleged Soviet intimidation 25X1
campaign began, resistance bands often planned their 25X1
operations to limit the likelihood of reprisals. They 25X1
attacked convoys where it would be difficult for the
Soviets to assign the responsibility to a specific vil-
lage. For the same reason, some bands set up bases
away from their villages.
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A few bands, either because of military pressure on
their villages or disputes with other bands, have
defected to the government.
these groups are often made into village defense
units, retaining their weapons and remaining in a
position to rejoin the resistance should circumstances
change. We know of less than 40 defections so far
from the hundreds of insurgent bands, and some of
these "defections" were designed only to obtain weap-
ons or set up ambushes of government forces.
There have been scattered reports of villages-usually
supported by the local insurgents-refusing to feed
and shelter bands operating outside their home areas
and on occasion actively resisting them
most of the clashes be-
tween villagers and insurgents to excessive demands
by outside insurgents for supplies and money or
attempts to impose their authority or ideology on
villagers and local insurgent bands, rather than fear of
Soviet reprisals.
Our assesment is that the migration of perhaps
20 percent of the total population of the country into
Pakistan, Iran, and Kabul has had mixed effects.
Those remaining in villages apparently grow enough
to feed the freedom fighters; some men return from
Pakistan or the cities both to fight and farm. Fewer
civilians are available in the countryside to inform
insurgents about local conditions, but more people
with contacts with the insurgents are in Soviet-
controlled areas and able to report. The same contacts
have probably increased the government's ability to
learn about insurgent activities in outlying areas. We
also believe the departure of civilians makes it easier
for the Soviets to identify those who remain as
insurgents
Prospects for the Future
We believe the resistance probably will grow stronger
in the next two or three years. Still, our assessment is
that basic weaknesses preclude its moving beyond
small unit guerrilla operations and raise questions
about its long-term survival.
Better tactics and more and better weapons have been
important factors in the marked improvement in
insurgent military capabilities since the Soviet inva-
sion. The insurgents have become effective guerrilla
fighters but are still unable to defeat main Soviet
units.
Tactics
Most offensive operations are small unit attacks on
road convoys and small military posts. The insur-
gents try to avoid combat with main Soviet units.
Some bands plan and execute operations well, but
others show serious deficiencies.
Weapons
Bands are armed with rifles, heavy machineguns,
antitank rockets, and mines. There are wide differ-
ences from band to band. Some can attack well-
armed convoys; others are able to stage only occa-
sional attacks on poorly defended posts.
Intelligence
The insurgents obtain good information on Soviet
and government plans and activities
Training
Most insurgents are familiar with rifles, but only a
few have received training on other weapons, a princi-
pal reason for their ineffective use of SA-7s and the
inefficient use of crew-served weapons in many bands.
Supply
Arms are obtained in Afghanistan through capture,
purchase from government troops, and from desert-
ers. Most machineguns, antitank rockets, and modern
mines come from foreign sources. Food and other
supplies are obtained locally. Supplies are generally
transported by animal caravans.
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In our view, most of the potential for progress lies
within individual insurgent bands rather than with the
resistance movement as a whole. As small unit com-
manders and their men become more experienced,
and if more weapons become available, more bands
will reach the standards so far attained by only a few.
We do not expect significant improvements in the
most effective insurgent organizations. They have
already developed effective tactics for guerrilla opera-
tions, and any tactical modifications in the future
probably will be designed to offset new Soviet coun-
termeasures.
Because of both the low number of defections so far
and the widespread hostility toward the Soviets, we
doubt that enough bands will stop fighting in the next
few years to affect the level of fighting. Only a
handful of the hundreds of insurgent bands have
defected to the government.
Soviet sweep operations-through both dam-
age tote bands themselves and pressure on civil-
ians-generally have brought only temporary and
local reductions in the level of resistance over the past
three years. Bribery and other inducements to tribes-
men have also brought the Soviets no lasting bene-
fits-the tribesmen probably will take the bribes and
continue fighting the Communists.
the Soviets have
recently begun negotiating cease- ires with insurgent
leaders that will enable the Soviets to withdraw forces
from some areas to increase pressure on resistance in
other places. We believe the Soviets also see the
negotiations as an opportunity to further divide the
resistance and convince some insurgent leaders to
change sides. Past developments wherein tribal lead-
The way in which the Soviets are conducting the war
leads us to believe that they assume that eventually
the insurgents and the Afghan people will become
unwilling to bear the cost of continued resistance.
Even if the Soviets are right, we believe that-barring
a massive augmentation of Soviet forces-most insur-
gents will still be resisting two or three years from 25X1
now. In much of Afghanistan, from the local point of
view, the benefits of continued resistance will still
outweigh the costs. The resistance will probably be
judged a success if it prevents the Communists from
gaining local control, especially if Soviet and govern-
ment attacks have been so infrequent that casualties
remain low.
ers who have reached accommodations with the Sovi-
ets have often lost influence-or their lives-suggest
that the Soviets will be unable to negotiate cease-fires
with a significant number of bands unless resistance
morale begins to collapse. Moreover, we doubt that
the Afghan Communists could exploit a cease-fire to
increase their influence in the countryside because
their programs remain as unpopular as ever.
We see little prospect for the development of a unified
national resistance in Afghanistan. The conflicting
political views in the resistance are irreconcilable, and
many-probably a majority-of the insurgents are
opposed to any strong central government. Limited
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nic and regional differences make it unlikely that they
will coalesce into a national organization. Even the
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We believe the lack of unity will also be one of many
factors precluding the expansion of the resistance 25X1
beyond a guerrilla war. Even if foreign supporters
were willing to supply the equipment and training 25X1
necessary for the formation of "main force" units
capable of fighting Soviet units on equal terms, the
fragmented resistance would be unable to develop the
logistic system larger units would require or the
command structure to use the forces effectively.
The squabbling of the exiles in Peshawar has tar-
nished the image of the resistance internationally, and
the lack of any organization able to speak for the
resistance as a whole has allowed the Communists, by
default, to represent Afghanistan in the United Na-
tions and other international organizations. The re-
sistance has played only a minor role in orchestrating
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international condemnations of the USSR, obtaining
aid for Afghan refugees, gaining outside support for
the insurgents, or in negotiations on Afghanistan's
future.
As long as others are willing to undertake these tasks,
the inability of the fragmented resistance to achieve a
united political front will not seriously harm the
insurgency. If international interest in supporting the
insurgents or the refugees began to lag, their past
ineffectiveness in influencing international opinion or
government leaders suggests they could do little to
press foreign leaders to continue support.
Implications for the United States and the USSR
The most important result of continued resistance, in
our view, for both Washington and Moscow will be to
deny the Soviets the opportunities in the region that
would follow the consolidation of their hold on Af-
ghanistan. Both the need to devote their efforts to
fighting insurgents and the lack of secure supply lines
almost preclude the use of Afghanistan as a base for
projecting military power in the Indian subcontinent
or the Persian Gulf. Some of the hostility and suspi-
cion engendered-especially in Islamic countries-by
Soviet actions in Afghanistan will remain whatever
the military outcome, but continued fighting helps
keep the hostility at a higher level. Successful resist-
ance also weakens the image of the USSR as a
country whose wishes must be accommodated because
it has the will and ability to use as much force as
necessary to achieve its goals. As long as the Soviets
continue fighting, however, Afghanistan will also be a
reminder of Moscow's persistence in pursuing its
objectives.
US policymakers could face difficult decisions on a
response if continuing resistance leads to massive
Soviet reinforcements. Many resistance leaders have
said that if the fighting continues long enough, Mos-
cow will decide conquering Afghanistan is not worth
the cost and will withdraw its forces. The war in
Afghanistan will be a drain on Soviet resources, but
the Soviets have so far been willing to bear this
burden. Afghanistan complicates Moscow's relations
with most other governments, hindering negotiations
on a wide variety of issues. The Afghan issue, howev-
er, has much less impact on Soviet relations with
many countries than it did three years ago. Despite
the hopes of the insurgents, in our view, Moscow does
not believe these costs outweigh the damage with-
drawal would do to the USSR's interests and image.
At some point Moscow might decide a massive re-
inforcement designed to reduce significantly the level
of insurgency was a more attractive option than either
a continuing deadlock or a peace settlement that left
the resistance in control.
Other problems for the United States could arise
because of Washington's interest in stability in Paki-
stan. Fighting in Afghanistan will probably force
more refugees into Pakistan, adding to economic and
social pressures that contribute to political instability
there. Soviet control of Afghanistan, however, might
have the same effect, and we believe that many of the
more than 2 million Afghans who have fled to Paki-
stan will not return to a Communist Afghanistan.
Because of Afghanistan, Soviet pressure on Paki-
stan-and to a lesser extent Iran-will continue, and
the Soviets could easily escalate this pressure through
small-scale cross-border raids. We believe, however,
that Afghanistan's neighbors will be much less sus-
ceptible to Soviet pressure than they would if Moscow
gained effective control of Afghanistan.
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