THE SOVIET FISHING FLEET: AN EXPANDING GLOBAL PRESENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000200140003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY1
The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
An Expanding Global Presence
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
GI 83-10089C
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3ecrer
Ill
The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
An Expanding Global Presence
This paper was prepared byl
Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Geography Division, OGI,
Secret
GI 83-10089C
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The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
An Expanding Global Presence
Key Judgments During the 1970s the deterioration of fisheries in northern oceans and the
Information available assertion of 200-nautical mile (nm) fishing and economic zone claims by
as of 1 March 1983 coastal nations forced Soviet and other long-distance fishermen to seek new
was used in this report.
fish resources. The Soviet fishing fleet (approximately 4,500 vessels)
expanded its presence southward and, in so doing, enhanced its potential
for increased harvests, for more contacts with Third World countries
through mutually beneficial bilateral fishing agreements, and for conduct- 25X1
ing missions in support of military and intelligence objectives
We believe that over the next decade Soviet fishermen, using their ever im-
proving fishing technology as enticement, will continue to seek access to
Third World 200-nm coastal zones with offers of fishery training programs
and commercial joint fishing ventures. Such agreements afford the USSR
not only additional fish protein for the Soviet diet but also intimate
knowledge of foreign ports and coasts and legitimate access to foreign
citizens, institutions, and economies 25X1
While many developing countries are reluctant to enter into agreements
with the USSR, we believe that a large number will do so because they
want to establish indigenous fishing industries and have no similar offers
from the West. We also believe that once these nations feel competent to
run these operations themselves, the desire for greater profit-and also
feelings of national pride-will cause them to pull away from close Soviet
ties by letting the agreements lapse.
Soviet fishermen will, in our opinion, also increase their efforts in areas just
outside national 200-nm fishing and economic zones and also in midocean.
This repositioning of fishing activities, we believe, could lead to competi-
tion between US and Soviet long-distance tuna fishermen. It could also
result in a spate of claims to fishery jurisdiction beyond the 200-nm limit,
with attendant boundary and jurisdictional conflicts, by coastal nations
seeking to halt what they see as Soviet poaching of their fish resources
This repositioning will also enhance the fishing fleet's potential as a
valuable, in-place, and ostensibly innocent monitoring system
Secret
(:/R3-1mROC
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Key Judgments
New Fishing Grounds and Fish Species
Nonfishing Operations
Future Fishing Areas and Activities 3
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The Soviet Fishing Fleet:
An Expanding Global Presence
Two events during the 1970s forced Soviet fishermen World Ocean Fish Catch, 1965-81
to make fundamental changes in their traditional
fishing patterns and practices, changes that have
expanded Soviet presence in Third World areas and
have consequences for political and strategic planning Million metric tons
in the United States and other Western nations. First 80
came the near collapse of many of the popular fish
stocks in northern waters that Soviet and other fisher- 70
men had relied upon, the result in large measure of
uncontrolled fishing. Next, as a direct result of over- 60 I-1 n nn
I n F
tion of control by coastal nations over fish resources 50
within 200 miles ' of their shores. Both events forced
Soviet and other long-distance fishermen to seek new o
fish resources and, most importantly with regard to 30
the Soviet fishing fleet, new fishing grounds. F___1
New Fishing Grounds and Fish Species
Elements of the Soviet fleet began appearing in the
1970s in areas where none had been observed before,
and in greater numbers where only a few had
- Soviet
portion
25X1
25X1
The global distribution and makeup of the Soviet fish
catch reflects this shift in operating areas. The
USSR's North Pacific and Atlantic fishing grounds,
which regularly accounted for nearly 90 percent of
the Soviet total before widespread imposition of 200-
mile national coastal zones, produced 71 percent in
1981. The share of the grounds off New Zealand,
South America, southern Africa, and Antarctica, just
6 percent of the Soviet total in 1974, rose to 24
percent in 1981. Popular whitefish species like the
various cods, bakes, and flatfish from the northern
fishing grounds, which made up about a third of the
Soviet harvest in the early 1970s, accounted for just
5 percent in 1981. These have been largely replaced
by capelin and blue whiting from the Norwegian Sea,
which are processed mainly for fish meal; various
mackerel species from off Peru, Chile, and southern
25X1
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Africa; Japanese pilchard, a sardine species from the
northwest Pacific; and krill from Antarctica. Togeth-
er these species constituted 37 percent of the Soviet
catch in 1981.
The primary function of the Soviet fishing fleet is
fishing. Fish constitutes 15 percent of the 20 kilo-
grams per year of animal protein in the Soviet diet,
and Moscow included a 10 to 12 percent increase in
edible fish products in the 1981-85 Five-Year Plan.
The repositioning of the fleet southward, however, not
so incidentally presents new opportunities for Third
World contacts and operations supporting intelligence
and military goals.
Third World Contacts
The USSR, like other long-range fishing nations, has
recognized the unilateral 200-mile claims. To gain
access to these new maritime zones, the USSR is
entering into a variety of bilateral fishery agreements.
With neighboring Japan and Norway, the agreements
are reciprocal in nature, allowing each party to fish
for specific quotas in the other's zone. Under the
agreements with Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States, Soviet vessels must secure licenses to
fish for assigned quotas, and they may also enter into
joint ventures with local companies.' The USSR
makes these same arrangements with Third World
countries and also concludes agreements that feature
development of local fishing industries. These agree-
ments are usually for five years with provisions for
review and modification during that time. Typically
under these arrangements:
? The USSR agrees to:
- Survey the local fish resources, using Soviet
vessels and equipment, and share the findings
with the host country.
- Train local fishery experts and fishermen, in
both the host country and the USSR.
- Establish local fishery training centers.
- Give or loan fishing vessels to the host country.
- Construct onshore fish-processing and ship-ser-
vicing facilities.
- Supply fish for joint ventures.
' The United States withdrew Soviet fishing quotas and New
Zealand halved Soviet quotas in the aftermath of the invasion of
Afghanistan. Soviet factory ships continue to operate in the US
? The USSR receives in return:
- A share of the local fish resource.
- Use of local port facilities for ship servicing and
crew changes.
- Landing privileges for Soviet aircraft to carry
out crew exchanges, which are major operations
because the crew complement of large trawlers
is commonly 100 and of trawler-canners, more
than 200.
- The right to establish a permanent Soviet fish-
ery representative.
- Housing for Soviet personnel.
The benefits for the host country from these agree-
ments vary. According to the press, Soviet fishermen
in a joint venture agreement with Yemen (Aden)
helped that country boost its catch from less than
20,000 tons in 1971, when the venture began, to more
than 75,000 tons in 1980, and the present five-year
plan calls for an increase to 195,000 tons by 1985.
With Soviet training and ships, Iraqi fishermen have
expanded their fishing grounds into the southeast
Atlantic and have queried such distant countries as
India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Malaysia about
setting up joint fishing ventures.
Some host countries have, however, expressed dissat-
isfaction with the agreements. Embassies report that
Senegal complained that Soviet fishing equipment
was hard to maintain. Guinea-Bissau and Mozam-
bique grumbled about the inferior quality and
quantity of fish they received from their Soviet part-
ners. Mauritius accused Soviet fishermen of overfish-
ing. Morocco said the Soviets tried to proselytize its
young fisheries trainees.
We believe that for the USSR these agreements have,
on balance, been worth the investment. In addition to
the fish harvest and port privileges, the USSR has
gained a knowledge of the physical character of
foreign coastal areas and ports, many of them adja-
cent to important straits and sea lanes, and legitimate
access to foreign citizens, institutions, and economies;
with crew exchange privileges, it has the opportunity
to move agents into and out of countries easily; and its
presence has been established in areas throughout the
world.
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Nonfishing Operations
With their sophisticated gear designed for sampling
and analyzing the ocean environment, finding fish,
and communicating, the fishing fleet's 4,500 vessels,
particularly those outfitted for fishery research, could
provide limited support for Soviet intelligence and
military activities.
While the fishing fleet as a whole may not have an
explicit intelligence collection mission, individual
ships undoubtedly report on targets of opportunity
British 200-mile exclusionary zone around the Falk-
lands until after the landing at San Carlos.
The fleet's factory ships, tankers, and supply ships are
capable of resupplying naval units, and trawlers could
be modified to lay mines. The British demonstrated
off the Falklands that trawlers can be used for
minesweeping operations as well. Research submersi-
bles carried on some fishery research vessels could be
used for undersea surveillance activities. These sub-
mersibles are not, however, known to have been used
in this manner.
Future Fishing Areas and Activities
Moscow's current five-year plan calls for an increased
harvest from the USSR's 200-mile zone and from
areas worldwide that lie beyond national coastal
zones. This means a greater assault on Alaska pollack,
already the largest component in the Soviet harvest
for more than a decade (a quarter of the 1981 total), 25X1
and Japanese pilchard from the Pacific Ocean and the
Bering Sea. The Barents and Baltic coastal areas have
no known comparable resource, but Soviet fishermen
will search for unexploited species off both coasts and 25X1
in the Pacific. 25X1
25X1
We believe that Soviet fishing operations beyond 200- 25X1
mile zones will focus on the midocean ridge system
worldwide and on isolated seamounts of volcanic
origin like those in the Emperor Seamount Chain, just
north of the US 200-mile zone around Midway
Island, and those immediately outside the US west
coast 200-mile zone. The fragility of seamount fish
stocks will necessitate a continuous global search for
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We also believe that Soviet fishermen will continue
their operations just outside the South American,
Canadian, Icelandic, and Mauritian 200-mile zones
where coastal species straddle the 200-mile boundary
and that they will search for other such areas. This
could bring about a spate of unilateral extensions of
fishing jurisdiction beyond present 200-mile bound-
aries by countries that view the Soviet activity as
poaching fish that should be theirs. Canada and
Argentina tried to insert such provisions into the new
UN Law of the Sea Treaty during the latter phases of
negotiation but were thwarted by the United States,
the USSR, and other nations that wanted to keep
national jurisdiction in the oceans to a minimum.
Soviet fishermen could also begin an exploratory
fishery for the little-studied mesopelagic species-
small, elusive fish that live at great depths independ-
ent of seamounts and continental shelves. Thought to
have an annual yield potential of about 450 million
tons, they are envisioned as an important source of
fish meal and oil. Finding them is, at this point, a
greater problem than processing them.
An order reported in the press for 20 modern tuna
vessels from Polish shipyards indicates that Soviet
fishermen will also begin to hunt tuna, the most
important commercial species of the open ocean.
These species, many of which accomplish transocean-
ic migrations, at present constitute only 0.1 percent of
the Soviet catch. This fishery will be precarious,
however, because the least exploited stocks, those
around tropical Pacific and Indian Ocean islands, are
encompassed by national 200-mile zones. Since the
USSR has had little experience with modern tuna
fishing, we believe the fishery will develop slowly.
Moreover, Soviet fishermen will come into direct
competition with US long-distance tuna fishermen,
who now operate as far away as New Zealand and the
Indian Ocean.
We believe the southern ocean, the waters surround-
ing Antarctica, will also receive a greater Soviet
fishing effort, with the focus on krill. This resource,
which scientists now estimate as capable of producing
as much as three times the world's current annual
ocean harvest of 65 million tons, is unprotected by
quota regulations. Growth will continue until the krill
is depleted or until the nations' that have ratified the
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources develop effective conservation mea-
sures and an effective enforcement mechanism.
Soviet fishing within foreign 200-mile zones will, in
our judgment, increasingly take place under joint-
venture arrangements. Many nations, particularly
those from the Third World, want greater profits
from their coastal fish stocks than just license and
catch fees from foreign fishermen. Most now demand
not only the establishment of joint ventures but also a
controlling interest in them. In addition to the profits
derived from selling the fish products domestically
and abroad, joint ventures give these nations greater
control over Soviet fishing off their coasts, as well as
training to run their own fishing industries. We
believe that once these nations feel competent to run
fishing operations themselves, the desire for greater
profit-and also feelings of national pride-will cause
them to pull away from close Soviet ties by letting the
agreements lapse.
The Indian Ocean, which has been the backwater of
Soviet fishing, is a likely area for new Soviet joint
ventures. UN estimates indicate that the Indian
Ocean is capable of producing about three times its
current annual fish harvest of 3.5 million tons. These
estimates further indicate that the approximately 40
countries of the Indian Ocean area, most of which are
protein deficient, will require all of this expanded
catch by the turn of the century. Many are desperate-
ly trying to upgrade their fishing industries to exploit
this potential source of protein.
In sum, we believe that the Soviet presence in the
form of its fishing fleet will pervade the oceans,
generally seaward of the 200-mile limit, but also
' Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, East Germany, West
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, the USSR, the
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within many of the national fishing and economic
zones. All ships of all nations, according to the new
UN Law of the Sea Treaty, are allowed full naviga-
tional freedom in foreign 200-mile zones as long as
they do nothing related to the natural resources
therein. Furthermore, the new treaty also stipulates
that all ships have the right of innocent passage in
foreign territorial seas, the maritime zone that ex-
tends as far as 12 miles from shore. The location of
the Soviet vessels will shift as new fish resources are
discovered and others are depleted, but the fleet will
continue to give the USSR a valuable in-place and
ostensibly innocent asset that could be used for moni-
toring foreign activities and for other nonfishing tasks.
The Soviet news agency Novosti recently announced
plans by the Ministry of Fisheries for a grand updat-
ing of the fleet. The Soviet goal is increased fishing
efficiency, and the plans presumably include installa-
tion of state-of-the-art fish-finding and communica-
tions gear. The modernization will enhance the fleet's
capability both to perform its fishing tasks and to
persuade developing nations that the USSR has the
most advanced fishing technology. Given the opportu-
nities provided by fleet improvement and expansion,
the USSR will undoubtedly continue to use its fishing
Impact on US Interests
The expanding presence of the USSR's fishing fleet
creates pressures on US foreign, strategic, and domes-
tic policy that will require appropriate responses.
These pressures include:
? Increased Soviet penetration of Third World coun-
tries through cooperative fishing agreements.
? Increased opportunity to collect intelligence on US
and other Western defenses and naval operations,
which will to some degree affect the planning and
conduct of Western naval operations.
? Increased likelihood of expanded national maritime
claims because of uncontrolled Soviet fishing just
outside coastal fishing and economic zones, with
attendant boundary and jurisdictional conflicts.
? Possible future competition for US tuna fisheries,
not only for the tuna but for commercial and
political ties with developing nations as well.
? Possible depletion of fish stocks that are unprotected
by national or international regulations.
expertise as a tool for penetrating the Third World.
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within many of the national fishing and economic
zones. All ships of all nations, according to the new
UN Law of the Sea Treaty, are allowed full naviga-
tional freedom in foreign 200-mile zones as long as
they do nothing related to the natural resources
therein. Furthermore, the new treaty also stipulates
that all ships have the right of innocent passage in
foreign territorial seas, the maritime zone that ex-
tends as far as 12 miles from shore. The location of
the Soviet vessels will shift as new fish resources are
discovered and others are depleted, but the fleet will
continue to give the USSR a valuable in-place and
ostensibly innocent asset that could be used for moni-
toring foreign activities and for other nonfishing tasks.
The Soviet news agency Novosti recently announced
plans by the Ministry of Fisheries for a grand updat-
ing of the fleet. The Soviet goal is increased fishing
efficiency, and the plans presumably include installa-
tion of state-of-the-art fish-finding and communica-
tions gear. The modernization will enhance the fleet's
capability both to perform its fishing tasks and to
persuade developing nations that the USSR has the
most advanced fishing technology. Given the opportu-
nities provided by fleet improvement and expansion,
the USSR will undoubtedly continue to use its fishing
Impact on US Interests
The expanding presence of the USSR's fishing fleet
creates pressures on US foreign, strategic, and domes-
tic policy that will require appropriate responses.
These pressures include:
? Increased Soviet penetration of Third World coun-
tries through cooperative fishing agreements.
? Increased opportunity to collect intelligence on US
and other Western defenses and naval operations,
which will to some degree affect the planning and
conduct of Western naval operations.
? Increased likelihood of expanded national maritime
claims because of uncontrolled Soviet fishing just
outside coastal fishing and economic zones, with
attendant boundary and jurisdictional conflicts.
? Possible future competition for US tuna fisheries,
not only for the tuna but for commercial and
political ties with developing nations as well.
? Possible depletion of fish stocks that are unprotected
by national or international regulations.
expertise as a tool for penetrating the Third World.
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within many of the national fishing and economic
zones. All ships of all nations, according to the new
UN Law of the Sea Treaty, are allowed full naviga-
tional freedom in foreign 200-mile zones as long as
they do nothing related to the natural resources
therein. Furthermore, the new treaty also stipulates
that all ships have the right of innocent passage in
foreign territorial seas, the maritime zone that ex-
tends as far as 12 miles from shore. The location of
the Soviet vessels will shift as new fish resources are
discovered and others are depleted, but the fleet will
continue to give the USSR a valuable in-place and
ostensibly innocent asset that could be used for moni-
toring foreign activities and for other nonfishing tasks.
The Soviet news agency Novosti recently announced
plans by the Ministry of Fisheries for a grand updat-
ing of the fleet. The Soviet goal is increased fishing
efficiency, and the plans presumably include installa-
tion of state-of-the-art fish-finding and communica-
tions gear. The modernization will enhance the fleet's
capability both to perform its fishing tasks and to
persuade developing nations that the USSR has the
most advanced fishing technology. Given the opportu-
nities provided by fleet improvement and expansion,
the USSR will undoubtedly continue to use its fishing
Impact on US Interests
The expanding presence of the USSR's fishing fleet
creates pressures on US foreign, strategic, and domes-
tic policy that will require appropriate responses.
These pressures include:
? Increased Soviet penetration of Third World coun-
tries through cooperative fishing agreements.
? Increased opportunity to collect intelligence on US
and other Western defenses and naval operations,
which will to some degree affect the planning and
conduct of Western naval operations.
? Increased likelihood of expanded national maritime
claims because of uncontrolled Soviet fishing just
outside coastal fishing and economic zones, with
attendant boundary and jurisdictional conflicts.
? Possible future competition for US tuna fisheries,
not only for the tuna but for commercial and
political ties with developing nations as well.
? Possible depletion of fish stocks that are unprotected
by national or international regulations.
expertise as a tool for penetrating the Third World.
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