INDOCHINESE REFUGEES: THE CONTINUING EXODUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000400020002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Indochinese Refugees:
The Continuing Exodus
--geeFet
GI 83-10131
June 1983
463
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Indochinese Refugees:
The Continuing Exodus
Office of Global Issues. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the
Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Geography Division, OGI,
TM-
G183-10131
June 1983
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Summary
Information available
as of l April 1983
was used in this report.
Indochinese Refugees:
The Continuing Exodus
50,000.
The massive outflow of Indochinese refugees under way since 1975 has
diminished over the past year. The principal cause has been deterrence
policies instituted by asylum and resettlement nations, along with an
apparent growing shortage of small boats and engines. Arrivals have
slowed since mid-1982 to about 2,000 to 3,000 a month. We believe that
the slowing trend in refugee arrivals will continue through 1983, with the
number of arrivals possibly totaling little more than half the 1982 figure of
and resettlement programs with their promise of an improved life.
We estimate that 2.4 million people have fled from the countries of
Indochina since 1975. A massive and highly publicized outflow of refugees
during the 1978-79 period was triggered by Vietnam's persecution of its
Chinese minority, Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978, and severe
food shortages in Kampuchea the following year. Although the number of
refugee arrivals dropped dramatically after these peak years, arrivals
continued at high monthly rates (between 12,000 to 13,000) through mid-
1981. Other less dramatic factors continue to feed the refugee pool; these
include oppressive political conditions, a deteriorating social climate in
several countries of the region, and harsh economic policies that stifle
opportunities for gain. Refugee numbers have also been swollen by so-
called pull factors-that is, potential refugees' knowledge of asylum camps
As the refugee flow continued into 1981, first-asylum countries (notably 25X1
Thailand) instituted tough measures to discourage potential refugees.
Thailand nominally has closed its land border, established minimal
facilities or "austere" camps for new arrivals, and on occasion, turned
refugee boats back to sea. To lessen the attractiveness of the pull factor, re-
settlement criteria have been redefined by the United States and other
nations, leaving some refugees in limbo. Western nations are under
pressure to quicken the pace of resettlement to reassure asylum countries
that they will not be left with large numbers of refugees unwanted
elsewhere. 25X1
iii Secret
GI 83-1013/
June 1983
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Summary
Why They Leave
Warfare
3
Political Repression
3
Economic Pressures
3
Social and Health Factors
3
The "Pull Factor"
6
First-Asylum Countries
6
7
9
Indonesia-Philippines
9
Outlook
12
How Many More?
13
Policy Factors
13
Short-Term Refugee Projections
15
B.
A Profile of Boat Refugees
23
C.
Statistical Data on Indochinese Refugees, 1975-82
27
US Refugee Resettlement Categories and Priorities:
33
Immigration and Naturalization Service Classifications
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Figure 1
Indochina: Primary Refugee Emigration Areas
= Vietnamese, ethnic Chinese
- Khmer
Lao
Hmong
M Boat departure area
South China
Sea
Boundary representation is not
necessarily authoritative. Names
in Vietnam are shown without
diacritical marks.
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Indochinese Refugees:
The Continuing Exodus
More than 1.5 million refugees have left the Indo-
chinese countries since early 1975 for asylum or
refuge in nearby Southeast Asian nations. Another
780,000 or more Kampucheans seeking food and
safety have over the years migrated to the Thai
border, but have stayed inside Kampuchea.' We also
estimate that from 100,000 to perhaps as many as
140,000 Vietnamese "boat people" may have perished
at sea (table 1).2 The refugee flow has risen and fallen
in response to warfare, food shortages, and political-
economic policies. Although the number of refugees
has dropped significantly since mid-1982, the prob-
lems associated with receiving, caring for, and reset-
tling them will continue to exert political pressures on
the United States and other nations resettling refu-
gees.
Refugee. Used generically to mean people who leave
their native soil with little or no intention of returning
and with hopes of being resettled elsewhere
Displaced person. An individual, usually from
Kampuchea, who flees his home and goes to the Thai
border but remains on native soil. These people
generally go in search of food, usually intend to
return home, and seldom seek resettlement else-
where
Illegal immigrant. As used by some first-asylum
nations, refers to recent arrivals seeking refuge.
People so classified by the asylum nation are ineligi-
blefor immediate resettlement processing and may be
This paper examines the background of the Indo-
chinese refugee situation, the factors that cause
people to leave, the problems associated with process-
ing them in countries of first asylum for resettlement,
and the probable trends in refugee numbers. Appen-
dixes provide statistical data on the refugees since
1975 and more detailed accounts of the reasons for
flight, clandestine boat departures, and the hazards
involved.
Over the past seven years the flow of people seeking
refuge in Southeast Asia has surged and declined in
response to a series of major political events, national
policies, and socioeconomic conditions in the Indo-
china countries (appendix A).
' Most of the Kampucheans in time returned to their homes. Some
200,000 or more, however, remain in a number of border encamp-
ments, most of which are loosely controlled by anti-Vietnamese
resistance organizations.
' This estimate is based on accounts by refugees and fishermen as to
the percentage of boat losses, verified casualties on boats that
arrive, loss rates adjusted for weather conditions during months of
subject to repatriation.
First asylum. The temporary accommodation of new-
ly arriving refugees or displaced persons in a national
facility outside the country from which they have
fled.
elsewhere, primarily in the United States
Resettlement. The relocation of refugees from tempo-
rary first-asylum camps to permanent residences
? The Communist conquests of South Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos during 1975 provided the first
major impetus.
? Hanoi's virulent anti-Chinese policies that sent hun-
dreds of thousands of ethnic Chinese fleeing north-
ward on foot to China. Others, also mainly Chinese,
fled by boat, with more than 200,000 leaving in
1979 alone (appendix B).
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Table I
Statistical Synopsis of Indochinese Refugee and
Displaced Person Flow, April 1975-June 1982
396,800
1975
242,300
106,500 b
7,000 b
21,000 b
17,200
15,000 d
72,200 d
3,400 e
6,500 d
34,900 d
25,000 e
1977
91,800
17,300 f
3,000 d
30,500 d
10,000 e
25,000 a
1,000 g
5,000 h
1978
373,700
87,800 f
7,1004
71,8004
190,000 8
10,000 a
2,000 8
5,000 h
1979
346,600
1,000 d
10,000 d
54,600 d
205,200 f
15,000 h
2,000 g
57,000 g
(200,000) i
1,800
1980
207,300
1,000 d
35,200 d
74,300 d
74,100 f
10,000 h
1,000 B
7,000 g
(500,000) i
4,700,
1981
139,000
900 d
28,800 d
25,300 d
74,400 f
(50,000) i
1,000 g
8,600
1982
60,800
44,900 f
10,700,
a Does not include estimated 100,000 to 140,000 boat refugees lost at
sea.
b To the West.
To Southeast Asia.
d To Thailand.
To Vietnam.
Boat people.
g To China.
h To Laos.
Orderly Departure Program.
i Kampuchea-Thailand border (within Kampuchea).
k Illegal aliens and displaced persons.
? The invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 by
Vietnamese troops caused several hundred thousand
Khmer to flock to the Thai border over the next
several months to escape the fighting and to obtain
food.
Note: All figures are rounded estimates based on Department of
State data and may not reflect continuing adjustments of field data
supplied by refugee authorities Data prior to 1977 consist of
estimates from different sources. Also, post-1977 statistics lack
consistency because of unofficial entrants into Thailand, camp
births, change in definitions of refugee categories, and other factors
that lead to statistical errors and discrepancies.
Since the massive food shortages in Kampuchea in
1979 and, to a lesser extent, in 1980 ended, there have
been no events of comparable magnitude to spur
flight. Nevertheless, a sizable refugee outflow has
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continued because of unfavorable military, political,
economic, and social conditions-the "push fac-
tors"-in the Indochina countries.
Warfare
In the past few years, military operations have been
concentrated in western Kampuchea; they have be-
come seasonal, with sharpest fighting in the Novem-
ber-to-May dry season. The groups most affected by
warfare are the anti-Vietnamese resistance groups in
Kampuchea and the the Hmong tribespeople of north-
ern Laos. The Hmong have been attacked by both
Vietnamese and Laotian troops as part of a long,
small-scale, and bitter campaign of attrition. The
campaign has attempted to bring this traditionally
antigovernment minority under central government
control and to break the back of its guerrilla opera-
tions. Use of chemical warfare agents by attacking
Vietnamese forces has been reported by both Hmong
and Khmer refugees. An indirect military factor is
Vietnam's draft system, which is causing the flight of
eligible youth who do not want to serve under north-
ern Vietnamese cadres nor to fight in Kampuchea.F-
Political Repression
Political pressures continue to spur many to flee, with
the single most important factor cited being adverse
discrimination because of association with the now
defunct governments of the former Indochina nations.
Some Indochinese have served prison sentences. Those
once part of or in some way connected with the former
regimes in Indochina and who remain undetected fear
arrest; those who were once part of the former
government and who have been released from prisons
and "reeducation centers" fear rearrest.
The changed political situations in Vietnam and Laos
mean that key positions have changed hands, creating
resentment among the former elites and their clients.
In southern Vietnam, for example, refugees report
widespread resentment over the conqueror attitudes of
the carpetbagging northern cadre posted in the south.
Similarly, refugees from Laos report that ethnic Lao
from the Mekong lowlands, who once staffed most
Vientiane government offices, resent both Soviet and
Vietnamese cadre now found at most levels of govern-
ment. Other political factors and irritations include
travel restrictions, surveillance and searches, and tight
controls on dissent
Economic Pressures
Ideologically inspired economic policies have in some
cases produced harsh conditions-for example, at-
tempted agricultural collectivization in southern Viet-
nam and the establishment of New Economic Zones
in remote, virgin land areas-causing people to seek
escape from the physical hardships imposed by these
programs. Others less directly affected by government
change have fled for opportunistic reasons, hoping to
improve their economic lot and to regain a position or
status enjoyed prior to 1975.
Food shortages have been the most important eco-
nomic reason for flight and have been reported in all
countries. By far the most severe shortages have been
in Kampuchea. Hanoi's December 1978 invasion of
Kampuchea interrupted the harvest of the country's
main rice crop, and by mid-1979 food supplies were
exhausted in many areas. From then through 1980,
more than 750,000 people trekked to the Thai border
in search of food, most of whom returned to their
homes after the fighting had diminished and food and
other aid had been obtained. Since then smaller
numbers have gone to the border as national food
production has slowly recovered, although production
still remains below national needs and has had to be
supplemented by international aid. Food shortages are
periodically reported in both Vietnam and Laos;
conditions in these countries, however, have not been
as nationally devastating as in Kampuchea.
Social and Health Factors
In Vietnam, deterioration of the country's social
fabric has contributed to the refugee flow. In a land
where education is traditionally held in high regard,
higher educational opportunities are now largely
denied to children of the politically tainted. An
increased crime rate is attributed in part to poor
economic conditions,
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Another irritant is
Hanoi's restrictions on overt religious practices.
Nationally, public health has suffered from shortages
of doctors and medical supplies. Inadequate nutrition,
because of chronic food shortages, affects much of the
population.
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Figure 2
Indochinese Refugees:
A Perilous Journey to Freedom
Refugees J7eeing fighting in Kampuchea in 1979-80fled in search of food. Because of
fighting, the normal agricultural cycle was disrupted and food shortages were
widespread. Some refugees died from starvation during their trek overland to
Thailand. Thousands of Vietnamese perished at sea. Overcrowded boats sometimes
sank in sight of the shore. The steelhulled Skyluck entered Hong Kong harbor in
February 1979 carrying some 2,700 refugees. After about five months at anchor, the
crew became impatient and ran the ship aground to ensure that the refugees would be
taken ashore.
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Some Kampucheans remain in camps near the Thai border but inside Kampuchea.
Feeding points on the border were established for the allocation of food provided
through and administered by international aid organizations. Refugee housing
ranges from makeshift camps, with nothing more than plastic sheets on a framework
of pole, to thatched roof shelters and more permanent and substantial houses.
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Many Kampuchean refugees also cite concerns about
health conditions. The health situation in Kampuchea
is poor, and a recent Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) survey states that the majority of children
below 12 years of age suffer from moderate to severe
malnutrition. The Kampuchean population as a whole
is highly susceptible to infection and disease because
of the cumulative effects of a substandard diet over
recent years. The FAO report also states that in all
villages visited, the food, nutrition, and health situa-
tion was much worse than in the most remote and
poorest areas of neighboring Thailand.
The "Pull Factor"
According to refugee camp workers and official as-
sessments made of the refugee situation, refugee
numbers have been influenced and augmented by the
so-called pull factor, which refers to the existence of a
means of assistance after flight, including probable
resettlement. Knowledge of an asylum and resettle-
ment system through letters from those who have fled
and from VOA or BBC broadcasts has induced some
to attempt flight, according to those who work with
the refugees. At times potential boat refugees have
been aided in their plans by humanitarian rescue ships
operating in the South China Sea that broadcast
weather data, sea conditions, and their positionsF_
The "pull factor" and its implications have presented
both asylum and resettlement nations with difficult
political and humanitarian decisions. Policy changes
instituted by Thailand and resettlement nations, pri-
marily the United States, over the past year or so have
been directed at reducing the attractiveness of the pull
and discouraging those potential refugees whose ob-
jective is to improve their economic lot as opposed to
individuals' fleeing because of the threat of or actual
political persecution. Both asylum and resettlement
nations continue to urge potential Vietnamese refu-
gees to leave through the legal but cumbersome
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) (see appendix A
for details).
Asian first-asylum nations, the principal destinations
of Indochinese refugees, are reluctant hosts. Because
the refugee flow continued at a high rate after the
Table 2
Refugees and Displaced Persons Assisted by
First-Asylum Nations, 1975-82
Number Attended
Number Remaining
in Camps
Total a
2,223,700
221,700 b
ASEAN and East Asia
1,856,700
221,700
Thailand
1,378,200
168,700 d
Malaysia
181,300
8,500
Hong Kong/
Macau
121,500
13,700
78,000
13,100
Singapore
28,100
500
Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan
38,200
2,100
Communist East Asia
367,000
NA
China
272,000
NA
Vietnam
60,000
Laos
50,000
a Excludes 89,000 resettled directly to Western nations in 1975 and
an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 boat refugees lost at sea.
b The difference in the two columns represents those refugees
resettled, repatriated, or returned to their homelands.
Includes 780,000 Khmer aided from Thailand but who stayed in
Kampuchea.
a Excludes estimated 225,000 Khmers in camps and areas near the
border but inside Kampuchea and who are aided by international
organizations.
traumatic events of 1978-79, strict measures have
been reinstituted by some nations to deter arrivals.
The cumulative refugee burden on first-asylum
nations since 1975, based on Department of State
statistics, is shown in table 2F-
First-asylum nations are increasingly concerned by
the continuation of the refugee flow, termed an
"unceasing and costly problem" by Thailand's Secre-
tary General of its National Security Council,
Prasong Soonsiri. These concerns are bolstered by the
decline in the numbers of refugees accepted for
resettlement because of tighter restrictions that are
being imposed on eligibility by the United States and
some of the other resettlement nations. Adding to the
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problem is Vietnam's continued uncompromising atti-
tude toward any type of repatriation program, assum-
ing that some Vietnamese kept in camps for several
years would opt to return.
The most closely watched statistics in first-asylum
countries are those indicating monthly departures,
arrivals, and rate of decline. Although the overall
camp population (based on Department of State sta-
tistics) in Southeast Asia declined by 35,000 during
1982 from about 258,000 to 223,000, and, with a
further drop to 213,000 by the end of March 1983,
many asylum countries in both public comments and
in discussions with US officials urge an acceleration
in the rate of departures. According to Embassy
reporting, there are greater worries in both Hong
Kong and Indonesia, particularly in the former, over
the failure of resettlement to match the arrival rate in
1982. All asylum countries fear the political conse-
quences of a large alien population, unwanted and
ineligible for resettlement
Thailand
Thailand has been the major recipient of the Indo-
chinese refugee outflow. Thai resources, heavily aug-
mented by internationally funded aid, currently house
71 percent of the Indochinese refugees and displaced
persons in camps throughout Southeast Asia and help
provide assistance to the more than 200,000 Khmer
located just inside the Kampuchean border. Thai and
international agencies also assist those Thai, reported
by Bangkok to number 80,000, living in areas affected
by the refugee inflow.
Thailand's cardinal goal, according to her top leader-
ship, is "not to allow even one displaced person left on
her soil." Bangkok officials both privately and public-
ly express fears of being left with thousands of
"leftovers"-refugees who lack qualifications for re-
settlement and are unwanted. These fears, reinforced
by recent reductions in the rates of resettlement and
changes in refugee acceptance criteria, led Bangkok
to introduce its humane deterrence policies in mid-
1981 to discourage potential refugees from heading
for Thai soil. Although other factors, including weath-
er, availability of boats and engines, and antidepar-
ture measures, are important in determining numbers
of refugees, boat arrivals did decline significantly in
1982, compared with 1981 figures. Overall in South-
east Asia, the drop was 42 percent; the decline in
Thailand, however, amounted to almost 70 percent,
which in actual numbers translated into some 12,000
fewer arrivals. Figures for early 1983 show this trend
continuing.
Thai policy is to grant temporary asylum to refugees
who cross their borders or land on their beaches. On
the other hand, Bangkok's "humane deterrence" poli-
cy discourages new arrivals by classifying them as
"illegal aliens" and placing them in "austere" camps.
The rationale is that through broadcasts and word of
mouth the tougher policies will serve to discourage
potential refugees from leaving. The Thai also unoffi-
cially reinforce "humane deterrence" by encouraging
local officials to "push off" refugee boats and to push
Interior order directed province-level officials to push
off newly arriving boats. Embassy reporting indicates
that the incidence and pattern of pushoffs is incon-
sistent, although behind-the-scenes pressure to divert
boat refugees elsewhere through persuasion or force
seems certain to continue.
Since mid-1981 Thailand has nominally closed its
land borders to all except civilians forced across the
border because of fighting, for instance, when Viet-
namese military units attempt to clear out Kampu-
chean resistence forces in the border area. Overland
refugees from Laos, who averaged 5,000 per month
between 1977 and mid-1981, declined to a few hun-
dred arrivals a month after the border closure. In
some cases, the overland refugees, usually hill tribes-
men from Laos, have been forced back by local
officials, although most are given asylum and in-
terned. Resettlement of this group is handicapped by
a lack of ties and contacts in the resettlement coun-
tries; many have been in camps for a prolonged period
of time, and most prefer to remain in Thailand in
hopes of eventually returning to their homeland. Sonic
quiet planning is under way in Thailand to determine
through a pilot program with US assistance the
feasibility of relocating some hill tribe refugees in
Thailand
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Figure 3
Thailand: Indochinese Refugee Camps, March 1983
Songkhlaa
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Strait of
Malacca
Udon' N'tkhon
Thani ilh.,riorn
A Refugee camp
A Khmer agglomeration
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Although most Vietnamese refugees reach Thailand
by boat, some 2,000 have come overland. These
refugees have been housed for lengthy periods in
primitive camps near the border. According to Bang-
kok, their detention under squalid conditions was to
deter others from taking the hazardous land route to
reach Thailand. Under pressure from officials of the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNRHC) and
other nations, Bangkok has recently allowed repre-
sentatives of resettlement countries to begin process-
ing this group for eventual immigration.
Although Bangkok promotes repatriation of refugees,
only Laos, through the UNHCR, cooperates and
accepts returnees. The Thai unilaterally return
Khmer who wish to repatriate but take them only to
the border, where they may enter camps, just inside
the Kampuchean border, which are controlled by
Kampuchean resistance factions. No Vietnamese have
been repatriated, and the most recent approach by
Deputy High Commissioner Symser, UNHCR, to
Vietnam's Foreign Minister Thach in late 1982 pro-
vided the comment that the refugee "chose the easy
life, let them stay." Resettlement in Thailand is not
permitted, although some Laotian hill tribesmen have
unofficially settled in northern Thailand
Thailand, as the nation with the largest camp popula-
tion, has been the most vocal in publicizing the
refugee situation, particularly in pointing out the slow
rate of resettlement by some countries. Periodic warn-
ings and threats are made expressing Bangkok's lack
of confidence in the "promises and commitments
pledged by our friends" and of "drastic measures"
that may be taken, such as sending refugees back to
the border. The many thousand Khmer still in holding
center camps, presumably to return to Kampuchea
some day, and the numerous highlanders, mainly
Hmong from Laos, are particular concerns because of
their numbers (in excess of 100,000) and the probable
difficulty of getting them resettled. Thai fears are
founded on the reality of their previous experience
with the Vietnamese refugees from the French Indo-
china War who have remained and multiplied.'F-
' Vietnamese refugees from the first Indochina war (1946-54) still
reside as aliens in the northeast and have become largely self-
supporting. Children born to the original 45,000 refugees have
boosted the group's current population to an estimated 75,000.
Malaysia
The number of refugees arriving in Malaysia during
1982 totaled only 15,100, far less than the 60,000 or
so landing on Malaysian beaches in 1978-79, and a
decline of about a third over 1981 figures. Although
Malaysia received unfavorable publicity in 1978 when
it occasionally towed crowded and leaky refugee boats
out to sea, Kuala Lumpur has followed more lenient
policies since then. These liberal policies are likely to
continue as long as the rate of resettlement keeps pace
with new arrivals, even though Malaysia is currently
the destination of about one-third of all refugees
leaving Vietnam by boat
Malaysia grants first-asylum to refugees, but its
general policy is not to grant resettlement. There are
exceptions. One has been the resettling of some 4,700
Kampuchean Muslims in peninsular Malaysia. Kuala
Lumpur has also given asylum to about 80,000 (some
estimates run as high as 140,000) Filipino refugees in
East Malaysia. In contrast to Indochinese refugees
who are confined to camps and not permitted to work,
the Filipino refugees are a significant part of the
region's labor force and are under little pressure to
leave.
Indonesia-Philippines
Indonesia and the Philippines follow liberal asylum
policies, in part because refugee camps are restricted
to isolated island facilities out of the public eye and
have not become political liabilities in either country.
Indonesia's first-asylum camps are on the remote
Natuna and Anambas Islands; its internationally
funded regional refugee processing center is on
Galang Island, off Sumatra's northeast coast. The
Philippine's first-asylum camp is on Palawan Island,
and its internationally supported refugee processing
center is on the Bataan Peninsula. International orga-
nizations absorb most refugee program costs in each
nation, and the Marcos administration has improved
its image by following liberal asylum policies.
Indonesia does not allow refugees to resettle on its
territory, partly because of Jakarta's longstanding
distrust of ethnic Chinese in general, and partly
because of its own population and employment prob-
lems. The Philippines resettles only refugees with
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Figure 4
East and Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugee Camps
China
Andaman
Sea
,Sung #i; AAnambas '
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not necessarily authoritative.
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East
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' South TOKYO ~1(orea,
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Refugee camps are opened and closed in
response to changes in refugee numbers.
Philippine
Sea
Refugee processing
center
? First-asylum camp
Kilometers
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Figure 5
Indochinese Refugee Trends, 1981-83
I housand Persons
Arrival and Resettlement Rates
Resettlement
IFS
Other Countries
Refugee ('amp Population
(Includes First Asylum and Refugee Processing Center)
I Arrivals
32'
1
1982
1
1982
1
1983
1
1983
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Table 3
Other First-Asylum Country Policies
1977 have been resettled, including some 2,500
Khmer and 2,500 Laotians. Some dissatisfied with
life in China have gone to Hong Kong, posing as
new refugees. Most returned to China.
Grants asylum but has tightened policies because Resettlement not allowed, although 9,000 Viet-
of continued high-arrival rate. In mid-1982 estab- namese stranded in 1975 allowed to resettle
lished "closed" camps and denied new arrivals locally. Threatens repatriation if arrival rate
permission to work pending resettlement. Refu- greater than resettlement rate; camp population,
gees landing in Macau sent to Hong Kong. in contrast to other countries, increased slightly in
1982.
Koreans, essentially Vietnamese wives of Koreans
who served in Vietnam.
Restricts asylum to 90 days; limits camp popula- Resettlement not permitted.
tion to 3,000.
Has sheltered Khmer refugees. Many Khmer repatriated with UNHCR
assistance.
Allows resettlement of ethnic Chinese eligible for
family reunification; resettled 4,700 since 1976.
"strong" pre-1975 ties to Philippine nationals; by
June 1982 only 1,800 had been resettled. Although
both nations will probably continue their liberal poli-
cies for the near term, the Indonesian Government
has begun to voice concern with US officials over the
continuing high arrival rate, particularly in light of
fewer arrivals elsewhere and of the potential residue
of refugees ineligible for resettlement. Policies of
other first-asylum countries are summarized in table
Conditions that impel people to flee Indochina still
remain. Oppressive, heavyhanded political pressures,
burdensome economic systems, and deteriorated so-
cial climates act as catalysts, causing individuals and
families to risk the hazards of flight and the un-
knowns of resettlement. The massive number of refu-
gees generated since 1975 and the persistence of
flight, despite sizable yearly variations in numbers,
pose several questions as to probable future trends in
refugee numbers. More specifically:
? Given the persistence of push factors, in what
groups and in what number are there people still in
Indochina who are most likely to be affected by
these factors?
? Assuming continuing deterrence policies in Thai-
land and Hong Kong and more restrictive resettle-
ment standards, will the "pull factors" lose their
attractiveness and thus delay or postpone indefinite-
ly escape plans?
? Are internal policies and factors that deter flight as
well as slowly improving economic conditions in the
Indochina countries likely to become increasingly
important in slowing the refugee outflow?
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How Many More?
The push factors are particularly important to the
estimated 1.19 million ethnic Chinese still in Viet-
nam, mostly living in the central and southern parts of
the country. Although Hanoi continues to view the
Chinese with suspicion, there is no evidence of plans
to renew an anti-Chinese campaign that would spur
their departure. The Chinese made up most of the
more than 9,000 refugees who reached Hong Kong in
1982 and about 20 percent of the boat refugees who
arrived in Southeast Asian countries]
An estimated 100,000 persons remain in Vietnam who
once were associated in an official capacity with the
Saigon government or the US/Allied presence up to
1975. This number, based on the number employed
prior to 1975 less those estimated to have fled, when
combined with that for the close relatives makes a
pool of 500,000 to 700,000 potential refugees. This
group includes Saigon government military officers,
police and security officers, government officials, leg-
islators, and people working for the US and Allied
forces, most of whom have been-or are-imprisoned
for their associations (some of those released have
been rearrested). Another group of unknown number
consists of disaffected southern Vietnamese who were
willing to try working with the post-1975 government
that was run initially by southern revolutionaries
In Kampuchea, much of the rural population is a
potential pool of refugees or displaced persons, as the
1979-80 food crises demonstrated. Food shortages
persist, but international relief efforts at the Thai
border and an internal program have helped narrow
the gap between rice supplies and needs. Kampu-
chea's agricultural situation, however, remains peril-
ous and the size of the crop is highly dependent on the
vagaries of the monsoon. Harsher internal political
conditions-another forced resettlement program that
moves people into the countryside or increased num-
bers of Vietnamese settlers in Kampuchea-could
trigger a significant outflow of refugees
In Laos, the largest pool of potential refugees is
composed of lowland Lao who left in large numbers
until mid-1981. Since then the effect of Bangkok's
strict refugee policies and Vientiane's retreat from
unpopular programs designed to rapidly impose so-
cialism have caused a major decline in arrivals from
an average of 2,500 in 1981 to 425 per month in 1982.
Policy Factors
First-asylum nations, particularly Thailand and Hong
Kong, will probably maintain or tighten antirefugee
measures because they perceive that these measures
have been effective. We believe that restrictions on
new arrivals and treatment of them will be used-or
threatened-as a means to counter a slackened inter-
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The United States continues to lower the number of
refugees it will accept (from 168,000 in FY 1981 to
64,000 in FY 1983). New acceptance criteria effective
in April 1982 established six priorities that Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) officers use
case-by-case to determine refugee eligibility for reset-
tlement. Priority is given to those with close family
ties in the United States, former employees of the US
Government, and those in immediate danger of loss of
life, including political prisoners and dissidents (ap-
pendix D). The new guidelines lessen opportunities for
resettlement-the pull factor-for those having no
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the Indochinese regimes supported by the United
States before April 1975. Refugees who do not meet
priority I through 5 criteria are placed in priority 6
and have no immediate prospect of being considered
for resettlement. (Some might qualify for resettlement
under another nation's program.)
The intent of the revised criteria was to send word
through the efficient refugee grapevine and VOA
broadcasts to potential refugees that unhappiness with
the regime and a desire for economic betterment were
in themselves insufficient reasons to guarantee reset-
tlement in the United States. Guidance furnished to
US missions in Southeast Asia stressed the hope that
Hanoi would expedite the ODP and that "those
persons without ties to the US and with less than
compelling reasons to flee will tend to remain in the
Indochinese states."
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The effects of the revised INS criteria, the decision to
examine each refugee case-by-case, and the small
number of INS officers in the field have slowed the
pace of acceptance to the United States. From Janu-
ary through April 1982, under the old guidelines, the
monthly resettlement rate averaged about 7,000 per
month; in the October 1982-February 1983 period,
the number has averaged about 2,500 per month-a
rate that, if continued, would admit only half of this
year's 64,000 refugee quota.
Short-Term Refugee Projections
We believe that large-scale outflows comparable with
those in the 1978-79 period will probably not recur in
the near term. The circumstances triggering the 1978-
79 exodus of Chinese from Vietnam and the combina-
tion of events in Kampuchea-the harvesttime inva-
sion, an emotionally and physically devastated
population, and poor agricultural conditions-that
produced the massive flow of Khmer refugees in 1979
and 1980 are unlikely to be duplicated. In addition,
policy changes and other factors in the Indochina
countries, coupled with increased hazards experienced
in transit, are of increasing importance in deterring
refugee flight:
? For Vietnam, boat departures in 1983 continue to
decline, and we believe that the percentage drop
may be similar to the 42-percent decline recorded in
1982. This seems to result from more restrictive
aslyum and resettlement policies and from:
- Stricter enforcement of antideparture measures
by Vietnam as it seeks to improve its interna-
tional image.
- Greater difficulty in securing at greatly inflated
prices small boats and engines.
- A continuing high level of pirate attacks.
- Slow improvement in economic conditions, par-
ticularly in Vietnam, that may be reducing the
incentive to leave for those primarily motivated
by desires for improved living standards.
- The earlier departure of those most determined
to leave.
? For Kampuchea, food supplies are believed to be
minimally sufficient, with conditions poorest in the
southeastern part of the country. Given tightened
internal controls on movement and the distances
involved for those most in need, the number of
Khmer arriving at the Thai border seeking food has
declined during the latter months of 1982 and early
1983. We believe that this trend will continue
through the year. The heavy fighting in February-
March along the border may discourage for a time
treks to the border.
? For refugees from Laos, toughened Thai deterrent
policies have reduced the exodus to a trickle. Bar-
ring an unanticipated turn of events in Laos-
another anti-Hmong campaign, for example, or
government reversion to hardline Communist poli-
cies-the number of refugees leaving Laos is likely
to remain low in 1983.
? For the United States, the trends suggest a continu-
ation of the delicate balancing of objectives: tight-
ened restrictions on resettlement to the United
States to minimize the economic incentive for poten-
tial refugees; humanitarian efforts to protect the
integrity of the definition and status of the refugee;
and, to allay asylum-country fears, joint efforts to
increase resettlement rates and reduce overall camp
populations.
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Appendix A
Country Studies
Vietnam: A Political, Economic,
and Social Refugee Mill
From April 1975 through December 1982, well over
1 million residents of Vietnam fled the country and
sought asylum elsewhere (appendix C, table C-1).
Almost 600,000 were Sino-Vietnamese (ethnic Chi-
nese), most of whom were expelled from Vietnam
during 1977-78. Another 310,000 were ethnic Viet-
namese-primarily boat people-and about 4,000
were ethnic Khmer, who moved from southern Viet-
nam into Kampuchea in 1975. We estimate in excess
of 100,000 to as many as 140,000 were lost at sea.
The greatest exodus occurred in 1978 when 277,000
fled; the smallest outflow was in 1976 when about
12,500 fled
Why They Leave
Refugee reports indicate that there is rarely a single
reason why people flee Vietnam.4 Traditional ties to
home and family are no less strong than in most
societies, and most Vietnamese attempt to accommo-
date to the country's changing fortunes. Decisions to
leave home are made only after long consideration of
conditions inside Vietnam, as well as perceived oppor-
tunities elsewhere. Leaving the country requires many
sacrifices and-in the case of illegal flight-consider-
able risks. The reasons given by refugees for leaving
Vietnam fall into three broad categories: political,
economic, and social
Political Reasons. Discontent with Vietnam's politi-
cal system is cited by many refugees as a prime reason
for leaving the country. More specifically, refugees
' This section is based largely on refugee responses to interviews at
first-asylum refugee centers. Responses to the question "Why did
you leave?" should be weighed against the accuracy of translation
and faithfulness of interpretation of refugee's statements made
through a language barrier; the less-than-optimum conditions
under which the information is reported and recorded; and the
inferior/superior relationship between the refugees and their rescu-
ers and benefactors in which one is a supplicant and the other holds
the key to his future. Consequently, refugee responses to some
tell of political discrimination based on past associa-
tion with the former government of South Vietnam
and its allies. The discrimination translates into re-
duced employment opportunities and access to certain
jobs, lack of educational opportunities, poor health
care, and denial of the full rights of citizenship.
Others who fled include those who had served sen-
tences in reeducation camps or prisons and who feared
rearrest and reimprisonment; as a group they are
subject to postrelease surveillance and monitoring.
Extreme examples of dissatisfaction-the immola-
tions in 1980-81
former reeducation camp inmates were being re-
arrested and returned to the camps for "special
reconstruction assignments.'
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Many Vietnamese left Vietnam to avoid conscription
for military service, especially after Vietnam's inva-
sion of Kampuchea in December 1978 and China's
invasion in February 1979.5 Draft eligibility applies to
all males 17 to 45 and to females 18 to 25; all must
register. As of 1 October 1982 the callup to active
duty for males was widened to 17 to 30 (from 18 to 25)
to increase Army strength for service in Kampuchea,
according to recent refugee arrivals. Almost two-
thirds of the male refugees were in the draft-eligible
years and 41 percent in the prime-draft (or nearing
draft-eligible) years
' Draft-eligible males in southern Vietnam who are conscripted
train under northern military cadre, and historic and mutual north-
south antipathies-aggravated by the current victor-vanquished
relationship-are magnified in training camps. Desertion rates in
such camps have run as high as 50 percent. In addition, subsequent
service-often as replacements in PAVN combat units in Kampu-
chea-is usually under the command of northern cadre, who
reportedly discriminate against southerners in duty assignments.
morale
among southern replacements in Kampuchea is generally low,
partly because of a high casualty rate, and desertion rates there
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Economic Reasons. Field reports based on interviews
with refugees often include statements that some left
Vietnam "for economic reasons." Examples cited
include job discrimination, food shortages, tightened
controls and high taxes on small enterprises, and the
high cost of consumer goods. These economic prob-
lems stem from political decisions made in Hanoi and
have forced many who are not politically favored to
engage in black-market activities to make ends meet.
Inability to obtain employment in Vietnam is another
often cited reason for leaving. Refugees report that, in
a nation with high unemployment, job restrictions
imposed on those formerly associated with the South
Vietnamese Government and its allies limit them and
their extended family members to living in poorly
planned and ill-equipped rural New Economic Zones.
Although faced with the implicit threat of discovery
and arrest, some are forced to engage in black-market
or other illegal activities in urban areas to maintain
themselves.
Chronic shortages of rice and other foods have also
induced some Vietnamese, mostly southerners, to
leave the country. These shortages stem from both
natural factors (poor weather and insects) and man-
made ones (such as doctrinaire agricultural policies
and deteriorated logistics). Moreover, a politicized
distribution system aggravates the situation for some
people.
=families without relatives in PAVN receive fewer
rations, indicating that food is more readily available
for the politically favored. Associates with the former
Saigon regime tend to fare least well, although in
practice most of the civilian population must endure
short rations since military needs are met at their
expense
Social Reasons. Vietnam's political system has pro-
duced not only a sputtering economy but also a social
climate characterized by poor educational opportuni-
ties, declining public health, increasing crime, and
restrictions on religious practice
Educational opportunities are poor throughout the
educational system, and refugees regard teacher qual-
ity as "mediocre" and "poor" at the secondary level
and "sorely lacking" at the university level. In south-
ern Vietnam, university-level education is essentially
limited to the politically well-connected, although
even the politically qualified may encounter difficulty
gaining admission to universities. We estimate that
Vietnam is providing higher education to only about
one-fourth of its potential college students
The health situation in Vietnam is substandard and
contributes to the overall poor quality of life in
Vietnam. It is a factor in the continuing exodus.
Overall, the nation's general level of nutrition is below
standard.
stated that malnutrition in the
province was "high" and estimated that 50 percent of
the population was affected by medical problems
caused by poor diet. Instances of "shocking" child
malnutrition in southern Vietnam have been reported
by both diplomatic and nongovernmental travelers. In
mid-1981 Saigon Giai Phong published rations that
for some young children provided only about two-
thirds of recommended Southeast Asian dietary al-
lowances.
A high incidence of tuberculosis, a disease aggravated
b d malnutrition,
in Hanoi as "alarmingly high." In early
1982 a medical delegation reportedly stated that "a
full 2 percent" of Vietnam's population has active
tuberculosis. Nearly half the refugees arriving in
Hong Kong have shown signs of the disease. Vietnam
also suffers a general shortage of medicines, medical
equipment, and hospital supplies. Supplies are so
short,
monly" repaired for further use.
An increase in crime and social vices (for example,
robberies, begging, and prostitution) that tend to rise
under poor economic conditions has been reported in
Vietnam.
the standard of living there as "lower than in the
bleakest days of the war." Corruption among officials,
often described as "rampant," is increasing and has
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been given wide coverage in the Hanoi-controlled
media, with attention focused on apprehension and
conviction of guilty individuals.
Although few refugees cite restrictions on practice of
religion as a reason for leaving, Hanoi is clearly
harassing overt religious practice, particularly
Buddhism. Catholics have also suffered; in April 1982
a Saigon Army officer refugee stated that priests were
being restricted and a bishop had been jailed.
Family reunification, often cited as a reason for
leaving, is a direct outgrowth of the close-knit, extend-
ed Vietnamese family. The phenomenon is self-
perpetuating: as more Vietnamese become resettled
outside the country, they become the nuclei and act as
magnets drawing the rest of the family out of Viet-
nam. Until the spring of 1982, some families would
pool assets to finance clandestine flight by one mem-
ber, often a draft-eligible male able to handle the risks
of flight and with a good chance of landing a job once
resettled. This person would become an "anchor,"
sending part of his wages back home to finance escape
by other family members whom he would then spon-
sor for resettlement. Changes in US resettlement
priorities in April 1982 have essentially ended this
practice inasmuch as an anchor would need to qualify
for resettlement under one of the other priority cate-
gories.
Ethnic discrimination. Hanoi's policies discriminate
against ethnic Chinese and include heavy taxation of
commercial and trading activities as well as travel
restrictions and prohibitions against Chinese language
study. The proportion of Sino-Vietnamese in the
outflow has changed from year to year (see note,
appendix C, table C-1); currently, only about 15
percent of new arrivals are Sino-Vietnamese. Reasons
vary. According to the refugees, most wealthy
Chinese-those most able to buy passage out of
Vietnam-have already left. Those remaining are
relatively less willing or able to pay the costs of flight,
currently about US $3,000 per adult. In addition,
recent refugees claim the Chinese are less ready to
accept the hazards of small boat flight, tending to
favor departure via the government-sanctioned ODP.
Hanoi's antiethnic Chinese policies have been effec-
tive: the Chinese population in Vietnam has declined
from a 1977 peak of some 1.63 million to a currently
Hanoi's Refugee Policies
Official government policies toward those wishing to
leave Vietnam have ranged from one of active promo-
tion of exodus, through apparent indifference, to
actively discouraging flight. Apparent indifference
reigned from the fall of Saigon through the beginning
of the Chinese expulsion (May 1975 through March
1978), then changed over the next 18 months as Hanoi
promoted expulsion of its ethnic Chinese population.
Since September 1979 Hanoi has stopped promoting
departures and has banned illegal emigration. The
effect of these changing policies is roughly reflected in
yearly arrival figures (appendix C, table C-2).
Orderly Departure Program (ODP). The ODP permits
limited numbers of Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese to
leave the country legally. Originally proposed by the
UNHCR, Hanoi agreed to the proposal in May 1979
in response to international outcries against the mas-
sive exodus of boat people. The ODP is aimed primar-
ily at family reunification and "humanitarian" cases;
Hanoi has never pushed it enthusiastically. An esti-
mated 40,000 to 50,000 persons are believed to have
signed up for legal emigration when the program was
launched, but by December 1982 only 25,870 had
been allowed to leave-about 7 percent of the 385,000
refugees estimated to have left Vietnam from July
1979 through December 1982. ODP participants in
1982 were predominantly ethnic Chinese from urban
areas in Vietnam, especially Ho Chi Minh City.
estimated 1.19 million
Departures in 1982 under the ODP were slightly
below Hanoi's stated goal announced by Foreign
Minister Nguyen Co Thach of about "1,000 Vietnam-
ese every month," averaging about 890. These
departures are also sharply below clandestine boat
departure rates, which averaged about 3,780 per
month for 1982.
Hanoi will find it difficult to achieve its goal of having
ODP departures exceed clandestine departures. One
reason is Hanoi's policy of declaring some people-for
example, persons with essential skills, government
officals, and draft-age males-ineligible for the ODP.
Another reason is an apparent change in ODP-
associated regulations. ODP applicants are required
to have relatives in the country to which they wish to
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immigrate-but with the proviso
Vietnam illegally are ineligible to sponsor Vietnam-
ese. Although these "Catch-22" regulations apparent-
ly have not yet been enforced, their existence probably
will deter potential ODP applicants
Other factors tend to make the ODP unattractive:
costs (including bribes) are about the same as for
clandestine departure, repeated contact with govern-
ment authorities is essential, and the process is time
consuming, taking as much as one year from start to
finish. In addition, all personal property is confiscated
during the ODP process, leaving the emigre with little
more than his clothing at departure time. Clandestine
departure, in contrast, involves little or no contact
with authorities, can be arranged and completed in a
matter of weeks, and allows retention of some proper-
Despite the low ratio of ODP departures to clandes-
tine means, the United States and other resettlement
nations urge departure through the legal mechanism,
citing advantages of safety and the increasing uncer-
tainties of resettlement once in an asylum country. F
Repatriation. Hanoi's record on repatriation of Viet-
namese who left as refugees has been negative. Early
policy was clearly negative, as evidenced by the
treatment accorded some 1,500 Vietnamese who had
voluntarily returned in mid-1975, only to be manacled
and interned on arrival. Some were reportedly in jail
as late as 1979.
Deterrents to Flight
Hanoi did little to stem its refugee exodus until mid-
1979, when antideparture measures began to be en-
forced (appendix B). Refugee sources estimated as
early as 1976-77 that only 20 percent of attempted
clandestine departures succeeded. During 1980-81
heavy press and radio coverage of the trials and
sentences of captured escape organizers and boat
crews made the Vietnamese public well aware of the
government's antideparture campaign and penalties
for getting caught. Penalties ranged from a year or
less in jail for some women to death for some
organizers and crews. Refugee sources who left Viet-
nam by boat between October 1981 and March 1982
reported that the success rate for clandestine depar-
tures was still only 20 percent, including both those
detected in the planning or land phase and those
stopped at sea. A recent refugee estimate is that 60
percent of all boats departing Vietnam are seized by
the authorities.
Depending on destination, boat arrivals usually show
a seasonal pattern related to sea and wind conditions.
The onset of the southwest monsoon with stronger
winds and rougher sea in May-June through Septem-
ber normally deters boat traffic headed south; in
contrast, the April-September period with its follow-
ing winds and currents favors boats headed north to
Hong Kong. Conditions usually are improved in the
South China Sea after the abatement of the southwest
monsoon during September-October and continue
generally fair to good during most of the dry season
when the weaker northeast monsoon predominates.
The Brain Drain
The cost to Vietnam of the refugee exodus has been
high in terms of skilled workers and professionals.
Analysis of data covering arrivals in 1981 suggests
that since 1975 Vietnam may have lost about 50,000
professionals and nearly 200,000 skilled workers and
technicians. The official newspaper Nhan Dan com-
plained in November 1981 that the United States and
China have "maliciously used all sorts of bait to bribe
and incite skilled workers and competent technical
cadres to quit their jobs and flee abroad." Some of the
more serious losses included ethnic Chinese miners
who worked northern Vietnam's anthracite mines,
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Chinese dockworkers (Moscow sent Soviet stevedores
in 1979 to unload Soviet ships in Haiphong), and
doctors, computer technicians, and Western-trained
Ph. D.'s from southern Vietnam.
The exodus of skilled workers is only partially offset
by students graduating from secondary, technical, and
higher education institutions.
the Vietnamese university system (including
students at overseas institutions) was graduating only
5,000 students annually as of 1981. This figure is well
below Hanoi's official figures and is sharply below
quality of current graduates is low because college-
level education in Vietnam is beset by poor organiza-
tion, unstandardized curriculums, and poorly
balanced study programs.
Hanoi's complaint about losses of skilled people is
muted, however, perhaps because the government
itself aggravates the situation by internally diverting
personal skills. Vietnam's armed forces is currently
the fifth largest in the world and includes many
skilled people conscripted from productive civilian
work and diverted to nonproductive military support.
From April 1975 through December 1982, more than
990,000 Khmer left their homes in the wake of
political oppression, warfare, and acute food short-
ages. In contrast to refugees from Vietnam and Laos
who fled their national territories, only a fifth of the
Khmer have actually left Kampuchea and officially
entered refugee camps or holding centers. About
107,000 of Kampuchea's refugees fled during the
oppressive Democratic Kampuchean (DK) regime of
Pol Pot (1975-78); the rest left during the fighting that
followed the December 1978 Vietnamese invasion.
Most Kampucheans went to the Thai border in 1979-
80 as displaced persons seeking food and have since
returned to their home villages, although about
225,000 remain encamped along the Thai border
inside Kampuchea and most of the other 77,000 are
classified as "illegal aliens."
antipathy for the Vietnamese.
Why They Leave
Most of the Kampucheans arriving at the Thai border
since early 1979 have been driven there by hunger.
Others cite reasons rooted in a centuries-old national
The political reasons most often cited for leaving
include "hatred" and "fear" of the Vietnamese, stem-
ming from longstanding Khmer-Vietnamese ethnic
animosity and more recently, from the murder, rob-
bery, and rape of Kampuchean citizens by People's
Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops. Dislike of the
nominally Kampuchean Heng Samrin (People's Re-
public of Kampuchea or PRK) regime is also cited.
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Draft evasion also ranks high as a reason for leaving. 25X1
Both PAVN and PRK soldiers periodically round up
Kampuchean military-age males and females, garner-
ing some as young as 10 and others as old as 50 for
national service. Service may either be military, with
training reportedly in Vietnam as well as in Kampu-
chea, followed by frontline duty, or nonmilitary, such
as road construction.
Other political reasons cited by refugees include
restrictions on internal movement, "surveillance," and
"hatred of enforced socialism," exemplified by at- 25X1
tempts to push peasants into cooperatives. Many
people at the border also express dislike for the DK
forces. Despite DK efforts to project a positive new
image, the excesses of 1975-78 scarred almost all
Khmer, and few willingly affiliate with the DK.
Refugees have expressed fear that Pol Pot might
return to power and note with some apprehension
similar PRK-directed movements of people from
towns into the countryside.
Poor rural security, particularly from resistance activ-
ities along Route 6 north of the Tonle Sap, makes
field work risky and may cause some people to leave.
In areas near the Thai border, PAVN and PRK
troops have moved people out of border areas ahead of
antiresistance operations. Military activity near the
border, however, has deterred some people from leav-
ing home. Refugees report that antipersonnel mines in
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border sectors have caused significant military and
civilian casualties, and PAVN troops themselves have
commented on the dangers of such mines
Phnom Penh's Refugee Policies
Since formation of the anti-PRK coalition in June
1982, PAVN and PRK forces have clamped down on
movement to and from the Thai-Kampuchean border.
Until the coalition was formed, Phnom Penh followed
a generally pragmatic, relaxed policy toward
Kampucheans wishing to travel to the border. Most
travelers were in search of food supplies; some were
smugglers and black-market operators who brought
consumer items in demand and otherwise unobtain-
able in Kampuchea. Bangkok permitted no one to
cross into Thailand as refugees. After the coalition
was formed, however, travel was sharply curtailed, as
Phnom Penh and Hanoi sought to avoid strengthening
the anti-PRK resistance within Kampuchea
Repatriation
Phnom Penh has accepted "in principle" but has not
yet officially sanctioned the voluntary repatriation of
the 77,000 Khmer classified as "illegal aliens" in
Thailand. Bangkok has been pushing this concept as a
means of reducing its refugee load and has unilateral-
ly moved thousands of Khmer, especially since about
24,000 have indicated interest in voluntary repatria-
tion. Phnom Penh, however, apparently fears that too
many resistance members would slip into the country
legally during a formal repatriation program and
continues to drag its feet.
Laotian Refugees: Resentment and Reprisals
From April 1975 through June 1982, more than
400,000 Laotians sought asylum in Thailand; a few
fled to other countries. Almost two-thirds were ethnic
Lao; most of the rest were Hmong montagnards. The
flow of refugees from Laos into Thailand has dropped
markedly in the wake of Thailand's deterrence poli-
cies, declining to an average of 200 to 300 a month
since late 1982.
Why They Leave
Reasons cited by refugees for leaving the Lao People's
Democratic Republic (LPDR) differ according to
their ethnic backgrounds. Ethnic Lao generally leave
because of political and economic conditions, whereas
Hmong montagnards usually flee government mili-
tary action designed to break up guerrilla warfare
activities prevalent in Hmong-inhabited areas.
Lao refugees who cite government policies as a reason
for leaving are mostly from the towns and lowlands
along the Mekong River, where they are in contact
with Vietnamese and Soviet cadres. Both cadres
actively participate in running the LPDR Govern-
ment, and many Laotians cite resentment of Viet-
namese and Soviet "domination" as a prime reason
for leaving the country. Refugees also cite resentment
over the privileged status enjoyed by Vietnamese
cadres. Less frequently stated reasons include flight to
avoid Vietnamese harassment and the threat of arrest
or rearrest.
To avoid military service is another reason cited for
leaving. Escape from Laos to Thailand, however,
often results in pressure by anti-LPDR resistance
groups active in Thai refugee camps to join guerrilla
units operating in Laos.
Most Hmong departures are because of military
operations by the Vietnamese and LPDR Government
forces to eradicate antigovernment guerrilla bases.
The war of attrition against the Hmong has been
under way since 1975 and has included use of the
well-publicized "yellow rain" CBW agents. Hmong
refugees often state that they fled because of Viet-
namese military operations that use CBW weapons.
In addition, some Hmong leave to join family mem-
bers who have already left Laos.
Vientiane Government Policies
Official government policy prohibits flight. Neverthe-
less, the loss of about 11 percent of a population of
3.5 million persons indicates the degree of the discon-
tent in Laos and until recently the relative ease in
fleeing the country. Vientiane is aware that some
military-age refugees have returned to Laos as mem-
bers of anti-LPDR resistance forces.
The regime is taking forceful steps to halt the outflow.
Recent refugees report that villagers caught while
attempting to flee are subject to arrest and that the
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LPDR military units have mined points along the
banks of the Mekong River. Persons fleeing Laos by
swimming the Mekong have been fired on by border
guards and troops. As a further deterrent, the govern-
ment confiscates the property of those who have left.
The refugee exodus has been costly in lost manpower
and skills, and Vientiane lacks trained personnel to
run the country. The exodus of skilled people and
professionals has adversely affected both the nation's
economy and the administration of its government.
Vientiane has attempted to replace lost skills by
sending able young Lao abroad for study-mainly to
Vietnam and Europe-but many who return soon flee
to Thailand.'
Repatriation
Vientiane officially encourages repatriation of both
ethnic Lao and Hmong refugees. The UNHCR assists
in repatriations and attempts to assure that force is
not used. Only 1,800 Lao and Hmong have officially
repatriated to Laos, of which half were sent back
between April 1975 and April 1980 and the rest after
the UNHCR began assisting. Repatriates have been
about 80 percent ethnic Lao. Most Hmong elect not to
return, although in practice some return clandestinely
as members of armed resistance forces.
Officially, the Vientiane government is friendly and
publicly welcomes returning refugees.
Despite the public expression of welcome, however,
the reception given repatriates is cool and laced with
suspicion. Returnees are classified into four categories
and processed according to their apparent antiregime
activities and attitudes. All apparently are sent to
reception centers or "rest camps" for a minimal
period of political indoctrination. Those further sus-
pected of significant antiregime activities are sent to
detention centers for interrogation, and others
thought to be actively working with the anti-LPDR
resistance are sent to camps for three to six months of
political "reeducation." Persons with "prior records"
with the LPDR are sent off for "detention and hard
labor."
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Appendix B
A Profile of Boat Refugees
About half of the 1 million refugees who have fled
Vietnam since 1975 faced the hazards of illegal boat
travel. The typical boat refugee was young (72 percent
are age 25 or less), male, and described as a student
(tables B-I and B-2). We estimate that perhaps
100,000 to 140,000 failed to survive; losses were
greatest in 1978-79 when large numbers of people left
in severely overloaded boats and in unfavorable
weather.
Thank God corruption is so widespread. Without it
we would never have been able to leave.
Former ARVN lieutenant colonel who
arrived in the Philippines as a refugee
Table B-I
Indochinese Refugee Occupations
(Based on 1,794 Interviews, 1981)
1,794
100
Student, age 6 to 25 787
44
Clerical, trade skilled 347
19
Infant, age 0 to 5 182
10
Farmer and fisherman 156
9
Unemployed
5
Professional
5
4
3
1
in early 1982.
At the central government level, Vietnam condemns
illegal departure and attempts to suppress it. Penalties
for flight and sentences given apprehended refugees
and escape organizers are severe and well publicized.
At lower operating levels, however, official policy
gives way to practical venality.' Illegal boat flight is
generally expensive and usually fueled on gold; an
estimated 20 to 30 percent of all illegal departures
have involved some degree of complicity by local
security forces with bribes usually paid in gold.
An example of official corruption is a November 1981
departure organized by a North Vietnamese major, on
duty in the Mekong Delta, who apparently bribed
some well-placed National Police Directorate offi-
cials. In return for an unspecified payoff, these offi-
cials:
? Prepared and issued the refugees the documents
necessary for travel in the Mekong Delta.
In contrast, during 1978-79 a government-sanctioned semiofficial
departure industry flourished. Government control of boat depar-
tures was well documented in reports by many of the 253,600
refugees who exited during the peak September 1978-79 period.
Much of the gold and other valuables used by the refugees to buy
passage went into the government till; the total probably ran into
')r.Y I
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? "Escorted" the group past police checkpoints to the
departure assembly point.
? Assembled the refugees into departure groups.
? Loaded them into small boats and towed them to
larger seagoing departure boats.
? Paid off security patrols at least once along the
route downstream to the sea.
? Obtained the release of some would-be refugees 25X1
arrested by security forces who were apparently not
in on the plan.
The proportion of departures involving official com-
plicity has been dropping. Data compiled on boat
arrivals indicate that in 1980 about 30 percent of all
boat departures from Vietnam involved some degree
of official complicity; in 1981 the proportion was
about 20 percent. The decline reflects the likelihood
that most of those who could afford the payoffs have
left; those remaining tend to have fewer resources and
must accept the greater risks inherent in totally
clandestine departure.
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Table B-2
Indochinese Refugees, by Age and Sex
(Based on 817 Interviews, 1981)
0-4 73
5-14 213
15-24 303
25-44 196
45-59 20
60 and 12
Number
Percent
Percent
of Total
33
6
4.0
132
25
16.2
214
41
26.2
126
24
15.4
13
3
1.6
6
1
0.7
Most clandestine departures from Vietnam are ar-
ranged by professional escape organizers, some of
whom were active as early as 1978. These black
market travel agents arrange for payoffs, boats, sup-
plies, and crews. While the risks are substantial-
arrest and conviction could result in a death penalty-
so are the profits. From late 1981 to early 1982 the
average boat carried 47 passengers and typically
yielded the organizer 150 to 160 taels' of gold (184 to
197 troy ounces). Refugees have reported that some
organizers offer "flee now-pay later" credit terms:
one tael of gold buys passage on a boat with the
balance held and payable by a third party in Vietnam
once the refugee reports safe arrival. After expenses,
the organizer realizes a profit of perhaps 50 percent.
The need for tight security keeps departure organiza-
tions small and efficient. The largest reported escape
organization had 10 members, and the average escape
attempt took about one month to plan and negotiate.
Prospective refugees are usually kept in small groups
' The tael is a nonstandard unit of weight used throughout East
Asia. Although at least five different varieties and weights have
been described, the most common tael in current use weighs 37.8
metric grams, or 1.215 troy ounces. In Saigon, however, a tael has
been used that weighs 38.3 grams, or 1.231 troy ounces. Standard
metric-to-apothecary conversions: one gram = 0.0322 troy ounces;
Number
Percent
Percent
of Total
293
14
4.9
28
9.9
30
10.9
24
10.9
2
0.7
2
0.7
until shortly before departure, then moved to an
assembly point near the boat. Assembly points are
usually houses, but may be unsheltered sites con-
cealed in vegetation. Boats are usually boarded late in
the day and move out to sea after dark.
Based on data from 256 boats leaving Vietnam in
1981, about 40 percent departed from the western
Mekong Delta area in southern Vietnam, some
37 percent from the Ho Chi Minh City area, about
14 percent from the eastern Mekong Delta area, and
8 percent from northeast of Ho Chi Minh City to as
far north as Da Nang Province. From northern
Vietnam the primary departure point is the Haiphong
city area. Minor departure areas include Hong Gai
and Cam Pha ports, and smaller ports scattered along
the irregular coastline northeast of Haiphong. More
recently departure points have been altered in re-
sponse to government-control efforts. Minh Hai Prov-
ince, Vietnam's southernmost province, is a current
favorite.
Refugees leave Vietnam in boats of varying size and
condition. In 1978-79, when Hanoi actively promoted
boat departures, several large steel-hulled boats each
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heavily overloaded with 2,000 to 3,000 or more
refugees were used, as were many smaller, wooden
boats that carried 500 to 1,000 passengers each. After
antideparture measures were tightened in late 1979,
clandestine departures again became the rule and
small, difficult-to-detect boats became essential. The
length of the boats have decreased from an average 13
to 14 meters in 1979 to the current 11 to 12 meters,
and passenger loads have declined from an average 96
to 54 per boat
Despite the boat refugee exodus, small craft probably
remain generally available in Vietnam. The country's
annual average inventory of small boats was about
98,000 in 1966-71 (the last years for which reliable
data are available), and since early 1975 we estimate
that only about 10,500 such boats have been diverted
to refugee transportation. Losses to refugee use have
thus averaged about 1,400 boats annually, well within
the replacement capabilities of the hundreds of boat-
yards along Vietnam's 3,400-kilometer coastline. Re-
cent refugee reports indicate that boat costs rose
dramatically during 1982, however, suggesting a
growing scarcity.
Small difficult-to-obtain engines power most boats,
and in June 1982 a refugee reported that they are a
"major constraint" to flight by boat. According to the
refugee, a "well-worn" one-cylinder diesel engine may
cost 7 taels of gold. Other reports state that nonma-
rine engines-from agricultural implements and mo-
torcycles, for example-have been fitted into refugee
boats, although most fail after two to three days of
marine use. In addition, most boats were designed for
coastal fishing or use on inland waterways. As such,
most have a low freeboard and are ill-suited to use on
the open ocean
The typical refugee pays 4 to 5 taels of gold (4.9 to 6.2
troy ounces) for his passage; children are usually
charged half-fare. Some boat passengers pay nothing;
freeloaders seek out a departing boat, muscle their
way aboard, then threaten to report the illegally
departing group to police if forced off.
Assuming that the refugee escapes the decoy organi-
zations that Hanoi operates to trap the unwary and
safely avoids checkpoints manned by Public Security
Office (PSO) personnel on routes to departure points,
he must still pass through Vietnam's internal waters,
territorial sea, and contiguous zone-in each of which
Hanoi claims control over both refugees and interna-
tional shipping. On 12 November 1982 Vietnam's 25X1
internal waters were extended as much as 72 nautical
miles off southern Vietnam and 100 nautical miles off
northern Vietnam, with the territorial sea and contig-
uous zone extending another 12 nautical miles each
beyond.
PSO and Border Guards Command (BGC) units are
charged with stopping illegal refugee flight. Both
operate ashore, on rivers and canals, and in coastal
waters. Coastal security units have received direct
orders to stop illegal flight. The effectiveness of
marine patrols is nonetheless blunted by poor equip-
ment, and fuel shortages limit patrol activity. During
1981, for example, only one refugee boat in five 25X1
reported significant contact with security forces. In
late 1982, however, refugees claim a much higher
ratio of contact. Despite replacement or rotation of
some PSO cadres, corruption among security forces is
common and refugees report routine bribing of offi-
cials. Patrolling is also down during poor weather and
many refugees flee through this security loophole.
Drowning claims most refugees lost at sea. Boats are
small, overcrowded (often from freeloaders), margin-
ally seaworthy, and in heavy seas are highly suscepti-
ble to foundering. Accidental loss of passengers is 25X1
greatest among small boats sailing the South China
Sea and Gulf of Tonkin during rough weather. Dehy-
dration may occur after fresh water supplies run out;
reserve supplies are unavailable because of limited
storage space. 25X1
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Piracy is traditional around the South China Sea. Not
only are small craft attacked; large ocean-going ships
moving slowly through crowded Straits of Malacca
traffic channels have also been attacked and boarded.
Refugee boats-slow-moving and essentially defense-
less-are highly vulnerable to attack by both profes-
sional pirates and opportunistic fishermen. Victims
are almost always Vietnamese boat people; the at-
tackers most often Thai, sometimes Malaysian, and
occasionally even Vietnamese. In 1980-81, some 80 to
90 percent of refugee boats arriving in southern
Thailand and Malaysia reported attacks, usually by
two or more pirate boats. Most occurred in Thai
waters, where boats were attacked on average three to
four times each; one refugee reported 13 attacks. In
Malaysian waters refugee boats averaged one to two
attacks each; incidents elsewhere are less frequent.
Some refugees report being stopped in Vietnamese
waters by Vietnamese patrols and relieved of valu-
ables.
Robbery is a prime reason for piracy, as occupants of
one refugee boat may yield valuables worth more than
a pirate trawler's fish catch. Attacks often involve
physical violence, including mayhem, rape, and mur-
der.
In mid-1982 a UNHCR-funded, antipiracy program
was launched using Royal Thai Navy equipment. The
effectiveness of the program has not yet been deter-
mined. Press reporting and accounts by new arrivals,
however, indicate that pirates were still operating
"with impunity in early 1983.'
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Appendix C
Statistical Data on Indochinese Refugees, 1975-82
Table C-I
Approximate Ethnic Composition of
Indochinese Refugees, 1975-82
Total
1,541,400
933,600
211,000
396,800
Chinese
662,500
601,200
26,300
35,000
Vietnamese
339,300
328,700
9,600
1,000
Khmer
181,300
3,700
174,600
3,000
Lao
225,800
0
500
225,300
Highlanders
132,500
0
0
132,500
11 Does not include an estimated 100,000 to 140,000, boat refugees
lost at sea.
n Does not include approximately 77,000 Khmer "illegal aliens" in
Thai holding centers.
Primarily Hmong (Meo) and Yao from Laos; also Thai Dam from
the Vietnam-Laos border area.
Note: The ethnic composition of Vietnam's boat refugees has varied
with Hanoi's policy shifts. In 1977 it was about half Chinese and half
Vietnamese as Hanoi pushed its New Economic Zone Program to
move members of both groups out of cities and into the countryside.
In 1978-79, as Hanoi actively expelled its ethnic Chinese, the ratio
changed to about 80 percent Chinese and 20 percent Vietnamese,
although refugees fleeing to China and Hong Kong were nearly all
ethnic Chinese. By late 1979 the Chinese expulsion policy stopped,
and since 1980 the ethnic composition of the boat people from
southern Vietnam has been 80 to 85 percent Vietnamese and 20
percent or less Chinese. Boat refugees arriving in Hong Kong and
Macau since 1980 have remained predominantly Chinese: according
to the US Consulate in Hong Kong, ethnic Chinese form about 92
percent of arrivals. Recently, there has been an upsurge in the
number of Vietnamese arrivals.
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Table C-2
Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugees
All Arrivals in UNHCR Camps, 1977-82 a
Total
94,000
358,650
545,660
682,250
January
3,400
6,650
17,700
7,230
2,160
2,030
11,690
15,940
3,110
3,330
22,860
14,820
April
2,220
7,090
37,960
9,350
May
4,550
9,690
--- -
51,300
17,990
June
3,600
July
6,140
9,200
30,070
17,030
August
5,030
7,380
11,980
7,820
September
6,810
11,150
13,560
7,410
October
6,480
21,430
6,930
19,280
November
5,760
36,860
4,280
11,080
December
Other land b
41,000
207,000
274,000
519,000
ODP
0
0
1,850
4,700
a Monthly data for 1975-76 unavailable.
b See note, table C-5.
Source: Based on data supplied by Department of State, Bureau for
Refugee Programs.
200,430 119,280
10,120 5,020
9,000 3,490
8,950 5,480
14,250 5,140
15,840 6,510
4,400 3,580
4,460 2,100
6,270 5,020
6,760 2,480
88,830 58,500
8,550 10,660
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Table C-3
Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugees
Boat Arrivals, 1977-82 a
Total
17,270
87,790
205,200
74,090
74,900
44,870
January
150
1,740
10,500
2,710
5,620
4,140
February
620
1,410
8,360
4,970
4,030
2,890
March
670
2,050
17,190
5,480
5,150
4,500
April
660
4,920
32,320
6,430
10,790
4,600
May
1,840
5,360
46,320
10,350
14,800
6,030
June
2,040
5,000
43,450
10,170
10,130
5,220
July
1,200
5,760
20,500
6,230
4,740
3,590
August
1,160
4,340
8,790
6,090
3,140
3,120
September
2,740
8,060
8,990
2,700
3,570
1,850
October
2,720
12,080
3,450
8,290
5,430
4,770
November
1,710
19,730
2,560
6,410
4,170
2,280
December
1,760
17,340
2,770
4,260
3,330
1,880
, Monthly data for 1975-76 not available.
Note: Figures do not include 100,000 to 140,000 refugees lost at sea.
Source: Based on data supplied by Department of State, Bureau of
Refugee Programs.
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Table C-4
Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugees
Land Arrivals in UNHCR Camps, 1977-82 a
Total
76,750
270,860
338,610
603,460
To Thailand
35,750
63,860
64,610
84,460
March
2,440
1,280
5,670
9,340
April
1,560
2,170
5,640
2,920
May
2,710
4,330
4,980
7,640
June
1,560
11,520
14,940
10,920
July
4,940
3,440
9,570
10,800
August
3,870
3,040
3,190
1,730
September
4,070
3,090
4,570
4,710
October
3,760
9,350
3,480
10,990
November
4,050
17,130
1,720
4,670
December
2,000
2,980
320
5,250
To other Southeast Asian
countries b
41,000
207,000
274,000
519,000
a Monthly data for 1975-76 not available.
b See note, table C-5.
Source: Based on data supplied by Department of State, Bureau of
Refugee Programs.
117,470 63,750
28,640 5,250
3,800 980
3,460 540
1,540 480
1,890 230
1,800 220
1,260 460
890 250
840 250
2,590 200
1,100 160
88,830 58,500
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Table C-5
Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugees
Non-UNHCR Arrivals, 1976-82
Sino-Vietnamese from northern
265,000
0
Vietnam to China
7,000
0
1,000
2,000
2,000
1,000
1,000
0
Khmer to Vietnam
Khmer to Laos
35,000
0
5,000
5,000
15,000
10,000
0
0
Khmer displaced from interior
780,000
0
0
0
200,000
500,000
50,000
30,000
Kampuchea to Thai border but
remaining in Kampuchea
Khmer transferred from Thai holding
66,330
0
0
0
0
0
37,830
28,500
centers to UNHCR refugee status
Note: Monthly land refugee data in table C-4 cover only arrivals of
new Indochinese refugees in UNHCR camps in Thailand. In
addition to these, Indochinese refugees also arrived in other
Southeast Asian nations; these estimates are available only by year
and are provided above. Small numbers of refugees migrated
elsewhere---for example, from Laos into Burma. Other minor
migrations undoubtedly occurred, for example, small numbers of
people from Vietnam into Kampuchea; these are estimated to total
perhaps 10,000 since 1975.
Source: Based on data supplied by Department of State, Bureau of
Refugee Programs.
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Table C-6 Table C-7
Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugees Southeast Asia: Indochinese Refugees
Orderly Departure Program Arrivals, 1979-82 a Refugee Camp Population, December 1982
1,850 4,700 8,550 10,660
Total
221,700
January NA NA 400 900
Thailand
168,700
February NA NA 180 560
90,100 I
n land camps; Khmer, Lao, Hmong,
March NA 2,540 0 750
V
ietnamese.
April NA NA 0 980
78,300 I
n holding centers; Khmer, Lao,
M
630 980
V
ietnamese.
ay NA NA
June NA 0 400 1
090
300 I
n boat camps; Vietnamese.
,
,
A
t
1
170 580 720
4,800 I
n boat camps.
ugus
NA
,
S
t
b
180 1
070 950
3,700 I
n transit center.
ep
em
er NA
,
O
t
b
40
1
720 870
Indonesia
13,100
c
o
er NA
__
,
November NA 0 850 780
7,300 I
n boat camps.
5,800 I
n Galang RPC (for resettlement
December NA 770 1,950 1,040
p
rocessing).
Source: Based on data supplied by Department of State, Bureau of
Refugee Programs.
11,200 I
p
n Bataan RPC (for resettlement
rocessing)
Hong Kong
12,700
.
8,900 I
n open camps.
3,800 I
n closed camps.
Taiwan, South
Korea, Japan
2,100 I
n boat camps.
Source: Based on data supplied by Department of State, Bureau of
Refugee Programs.
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Appendix D
US Refugee Resettlement Categories and Priorities:
Immigration and Naturalization Service Classifications
I-A: Spouses, sons, daughters, parents, grandparents,
unmarried siblings, unmarried grandchildren of per-
sons in the United States.
I-B: Unaccompanied minors whose parents are still
in an Indochina country or deceased.
II: Former US Government employees; those "so
integrated into US Government offices as to have
seemed to be US employees"; for at least one year
after 1 January 1962.
III-A: Employees of US organizations or of US
citizens for at least one year.
III-B: Employees of former Indochinese governments
once "closely associated" with US policy and
programs.
III-C: Persons educated or trained under US
auspices.
III-D: Persons who received individual US combat
decorations.
III-E: Persons who 'played a meaningful role in the
life of the former societies of Indochina. "
IV-A: Married siblings, unmarried grandchildren of
persons in the United States.
IV-B: Minors under 21 with relatives in the United
States and no closer relatives elsewhere outside
Indochina; may be accepted by United States regard-
less of other resettlement offers.
IV-C: Persons with education or work experience
that would help resettlement; those "showing initia-
tive" in refugee camps; those who had `particularly
difficult" experiences at home or during escape; those
having "obviously compelling" reasons for being
granted parole.
IV-D: Other relatives of persons in the United States.
IV-E: Remaining refugees, by date of registration
with the UNHCR.
A prime difference between the two systems involves
the first category/priority. Under the old system,
thousands of refugees qualified for Category I reset-
tlement because they had relatives in the United
States. Under the new system, Priority 1 will cover
about 100 persons annually, according to INS
estimates.
I. Refugees in "immediate danger" of death and with
no alternative to resettlement in the United States
and those of "compelling concern" to the United
States (for example, political prisoners,
dissidents).
2. Former US Government employees and persons
"so integrated into US Government offices as to
have seemed to be US employees" , for one year
prior to claim for refugee status.
3. Spouses, sons, daughters, parents, grandparents,
unmarried siblings, unmarried minor grandchil-
dren of persons living in the United States. Anchor
relative must be US citizen, permanent resident
alien, refugee, or asylee.
4. Employees of US organizations for at least one
year prior to claim for refugee status; persons
trained under US auspices; employees offormer
Indochinese governments who were associated
with US policy and programs; persons "who
played a meaningful role in the life of the former
societies of Indochina. "
5. Married siblings, "unmarried grandchildren who
have reached their majority, " married grandchil-
dren of persons living in the United States, distant-
ly related family members dependent on family
support; minors under 18 with relatives in the
United States and no closer relative elsewhere
outside Indochina.
6. Others whose admission to the United States "is
in the national interest, " and minors under 18
unaccompanied by relative or guardian in camp
whose parents are still in Indochina or deceased
and without relatives in a resettlement country.
The new system shifts most refugees into lower
priorities. Coupled with strict interpretations of crite-
ria by INS staffers interviewing refugees, the new
system has resulted in significantly fewer refugees
being approved for US resettlement.
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