YUGOSLAVIA: TRENDS IN ETHNIC NATIONALISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00895R000100040008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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completed.
Directorate of Secret
1;~Intelligence
Ethnic Nationalism
Yugoslavia: Trends in
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
EUR 83-10223
September 1983
Copy 290
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ethnic Nationalism
Yugoslavia: Trends in
This paper was prepared by ~ Office of
European Analysis, with a contribution from
Office of Current Production and
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, East European Division, EURA,
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Secret
EUR 83-10223
September 1983
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Yugoslavia: Trends in
Ethnic Nationalism 25X1
Key Judgments Yugoslavia, created largely by victorious powers after World War I rather
Information available than through any internal consolidation, has never achieved the domestic
as of 30 August 1983 legitimacy enjoyed by most Western states because of unresolved rivalries
was used in this report.
among its diverse peoples and regions. The intensity of ethnic rivalry has
been increasing since the death of Josip Broz (Tito) in 1980 because the
cumbersome decentralized system Tito bequeathed is beset by economic
crisis-reflected in a widening gap between the prosperous north and the
poorer south-and a growing perception among Yugoslav peoples that
their collective leadership is inadequate. In addition, ethnic rivalries are
being exacerbated by polemics in the country's lively press, the increasing
tendency of religious leaders to link matters of faith with ethnic interests,
and the attraction of ethnic nationalism to Yugoslavia's dissatisfied youth.
The devolution of power to the republics and provinces in recent years has
strengthened the dominant nationality in each. In the process, minorities
have become restive and increasingly look to either their "home" republics
or their national churches for support rather than to the federal govern-
ment. We believe that the resulting ethnic strains may eventually focus on
fundamental issues such as how Yugoslavia is ruled.
In our judgment, the most serious of Yugoslavia's ethnic strains is the
Serbs' perceived drive for restored dominance and the more or less united
opposition to it by Yugoslavia's other nationalities. With federal leaders
faltering, prominent Serbs are calling for recentralization of the party and
the economy to reverse a decade and a half of decentralization in the
federal system and, in the process, to expand Serbian authority. The non-
Serbs see the proposals as a threat to their much-prized autonomy, insist on
maintaining the status quo, and conspire to undermine Serbian designs.
The Serbs' disadvantage is that, alone among the nationalities, they are
perceived as seeking hegemony over the system, rather than-like the
rest-autonomy within it.
We are monitoring four major fronts of ethnic strife:
? Serb-Croat animosity-the country's most critical traditional dispute-
is under control but increasing in intensity. Croats staunchly uphold
regional autonomy, and some nationalists even espouse outright inde-
pendence from the federation.
Secret
EUR 83-10223
September 1983
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? In Bosnia-Hercegovina, long an arena of Serbian-Croatian rivalry,
federal creation of a "Muslim" nationality, intended to dampen Serbian-
Croatian competition for control of the republic, has instead encouraged
a new "nation" to seek regional dominance.
? The situation in Kosovo is currently the most violence prone. Military
occupation has kept the lid on since Albanian riots in 1981, but local
Serbs bitterly resent pressures from Kosovo Albanians that they and
Montenegrins leave Kosovo. Moreover, agitation from Albanian dissi-
dents for an "ethnically pure" Albanian Kosovo-a model, perhaps, for
Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina-has stirred up Albanian nationalism in
neighboring Macedonia-where Albanians are 20 percent of the popula-
tion-and in a few regions in Montenegro.
? The Slovenes also are becoming increasingly nationalistic. Primarily
concerned with keeping their relatively privileged economic status, they
want to avoid a further drain of their resources to poorer Yugoslav
regions and to block Serbian efforts to recentralize power in Belgrade.
We do not see signs-such as concurrent anti-Serb demonstrations by
Muslims, Croats, and Albanians-that widespread ethnic violence is
imminent. The authorities probably can successfully rely on verbal attacks
against nationalism in general, on selective repression of the most radical
nationalists, and on the deterrent effect of the specter of intervention by the
military which, with its cohesive officer corps and well-disciplined ranks, is
less rent by ethnic tension than society as a whole.
Nevertheless, ethnic tensions and mutual distrust will grow, in our view, as
party and governmment authorities quarrel over regional prerogatives and
rival ethnic aspirations. In particular, the situations in Kosovo and western
Macedonia are likely to stay highly volatile because the Albanian populace
will probably exert greater pressure for a Kosovo republic as an ethnic
homeland. In the longer run, therefore, we foresee the further intensifica-
tion of ethnic strife and erosion of the central government's legitimacy
leading to more serious threats to Yugoslav stability.
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Reasons for Upsurge in Ethnic Nationalism
Serbian Orthodoxy
The Media and Cultural Expression
The Main Rivalries
The Serb-Croat Rivalry
9
10
12
12
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Figure 1
Yugoslavia: Regional and Ethnic Makeup
SLOVENIA
1.9 M
981 1971
90.5% 94.0% Solvenes
2.9% 2.5% Croats
2.2% 1.2% Serbs
CROATIA
4.6 M
1981 1971
75.1% 79.4% Croats
11.6% 14.2% Serbs
8.2% 1.9% "Yugoslavs"
aOSNIA AND
HERCEGOVINA
4.1 M
1981 1971
39.5% 39.8% Muslims
32.0% 37.2% Serbs
18.4% 20.6% Croats
7.9% 1.2% 'Yugoslavs'
2.1% 1.9% Montenegrins
8.2% 2.4% "Yugoslavs"
MONTENEGRO
0.6 M
1981 1971
68.5% 67.2% Montenegrins
13.4% 13.3% Muslims
6.5% 6.7% Albanians
Total Population
1981 22.4 M
Montenegrins 2.6%
Voivodin
2.0 M
18,9% 21.7% Hungarian
5.4% 7.1% Croats
3.4% 3.7% Slovaks
Total Population
1971 20.6 M
"Yugoslavs" 1.3%
Hungarians 2.3% i Other 3.3%
ti
1.4% 1.1% Montenegrins
1.3% 1.3% Albanians
4.8% 1.4% 'Yugoslavs'
Serbia proper
5.7 M
1981 1971
85.4% 89.5% Serbs
2.7% 2.4% Muslims
(SERBIA)
Kosovo
1.6 M
1981 1971
77.4% 73.7% Albanians
13.2% 18.4% Serbs
1981
87.0%
19.8%
1.9 M
1971
69.3% Macedonians
17.0% Albanians
4.5%
2.3%
2
. //"
2`..3%%'\
7%
%
8.6% Turks
2.8% Serbs
1.5% Gypsies
.1% Muslims
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Ethnic Nationalism
Yugoslavia: Trends in
Yugoslavia is a multinational state created largely by
victorious foreign powers from the ashes of the Turk-
ish and Austro-Hungarian empires after World War
1. Although the Serbs are the only Yugoslav people
with the number and drive to seek countrywide
hegemony, their dominance has never been accepted
by Croats, Albanians, and other minorities that con-
stitute present-day Yugoslavia (see figure 1). Yugo-
slav ethnonational rivalries are amplified by the coun-
try's fragmented, and often adversary, economic,
social, and cultural relationships. In its short history,
Yugoslavia's cohesiveness has been tenuous, owing
much in the post-World War II era to the personal
leadership of Josip Broz (Tito):
1944-48
1968
1971
1972
1983
Political turmoil between ethnic groups results
in assassination of Croat parliamentary
leaders.
King Alexander dissolves parliament and re-
vokes democratic rights.
Croatian nationalist assassinates Alexander in
Marseilles.
Prince Paul attempts to win over Croats by
giving them limited autonomy. Serbs riot.
Axis invasion splinters Yugoslavia. Independ-
ent Croation fascist state, Serbian nationalists,
and Communist forces begin civil war, which
claims 600,000 Yugoslav lives.
Consolidation of the Tito regime.
Riots by Albanian nationalists in Macedonia
and Kosovo.
Tito's purge of nationalist Croatian leadership.
Tito purges Serbian leadership of nationalists
and liberals.
Renewed rioting by Albanian nationalists in
Kosovo.
Trial of Muslim nationalists in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
The post-Tito leadership is facing a resurgence of
ethnic tensions signaled by major riots that broke out
in Kosovo in 1981. These riots involved at least nine
deaths, the arrest of hundreds of ethnic Albanians,
1
and provoked a military occupation of the province
that continues today. They resulted in a Serbian
nationalist backlash and subsequent nationalist ex-
pressions by Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes that
were caused, we believe, by non-Serbian fears of
resurgent Serbian chauvinism. As a result, many
Yugoslav politicians and intellectuals have recently
confided privately to US Embassy officials and have
even made pessimistic public statements that there
may be no cure for the country's internal divisions.
This paper assesses the factors leading to renewed
ethnic tensions in the post-Tito period, describes the
interplay of Yugoslavia's ethnic rivalries, and ana-
lyzes the likely impact of ethnic problems on the
A number of developments have heightened Yugosla-
via's traditionally tense ethnic rivalries since Tito's
death in 1980. These include:
? The perceived political weakness of Tito's
successors.
? An economic crisis that has worsened traditional
north-south income differentials to the further dis-
advantage of Kosovo; the southern republics of
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia- Hercegovina;
and southern Serbia.
? Burgeoning efforts by ethnic religious leaders to link
ethnic and religious interests.
? Greater freedom for the media and cultural leaders
to address controversial ethnic topics.
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In the 1981 census, 1.2 million citizens-a modest 5
percent of the total population, but 345 percent more
than in 1971-described themselves as "Yugoslavs
without nationality. " (Citizens could identify them-
selves as members of 25 ethnic minorities or as
"Yugoslavs without nationality" in the 1981 census.)
No adequate explanation of the phenomenon has been
offered, but we doubt that it signifies any major
decrease in the south Slavs' allegiance to their ethnic
groups. Some Yugoslavs, rather, may have acted to
protest the failure of the federal leadership to set
effective policies.
The phenomenon, in any case, caused a controversy
which various spokesman have tried to dampen by
explaining it away. Some official commentators of-
fered prosaic interpretations, postulating that chil-
dren of mixed marriages chose to be "Yugoslavs" or
that the complicated census form caused confusion
and statistical aberrations. One commentator in Bos-
nia hypothesized that Muslim Slavs uncomfortable
with the new Islamic religious fervor in Bosnia-
Hercegovina chose instead to be "Yugoslavs.
The controversy has involved some who hope that the
increase in "Yugoslavs" is leading to a more unified
populace. One Serb commentator recently expressed
Waning Central Government Control
Most important, in our view, is the perceived political
weakness of Tito's successors, which has created a
power vacuum. Tito developed one of the most decen-
tralized political-economic systems in Europe, in part
to deny any of Yugoslavia's nationalities cause to
leave the federation. Even the party, in effect, de-
volved into eight autonomous units at the republican
and provincial level. Although the nationality issue
was never solved, the system worked because Tito
periodically intervened to keep his proconsuls and
their national constituencies in line. Now, with Tito
dead and many of these proconsuls either dead or in
eclipse, the problems inherent in the Yugoslav system
are beginning to show. Polls taken by local publica-
tions and conversations between Yugoslav officials
and US Embassy officers indicate that Yugoslavs lack
the hope that "Yugoslav" patriotism could become a
'political unifier" of the country's ethnic mosaic, like
the "melting pot" effect often attributed to American-
ization of ethnic groups in the United States. Arguing
to the contrary, Dusan Bilandzic, a Croat professor in
Zagreb, condemned the new trend because some
"Yugoslavs "favor a unitarist (Serbian) state. Several
other self-appointed ethnic spokesmen hinted broadly
at chicanery in compiling census data; an exceptional
delay in publishing detailed census data fuels these
suspicions
Yugoslav research on the new trend produced some
results that suggest the new "Yugoslavs" are the
"outs" in society. Borba, a daily which often reflects
federal party policy, in March 1983 published a
study which asserted that "Yugoslavs" are propor-
tionately underrepresented in the party and that their
numbers decline sharply in higher party organs.
"Yugoslavs" apparently are no more 'progressive"
than other citizens. A study in Danas also found that,
although more students claimed "Yugoslav" identity
than in 1971, "Yugoslav" students declined slightly
in percentage of the total student population during
that period. We believe these results suggest that the
new "Yugoslav" is too few in number and too far
from power to wield political clout any time soon. F
faith in the central government's efforts to solve the
country's serious economic and social problems.
Yugoslavs are looking increasingly to their ethnic
leaders to get things done.
Without Tito to orchestrate the regime, squabbles
among parochial regional representatives on federal
party and government organs are increasing. The
collective state presidency contains one member from
each republic and province, while its counterpart in
the party has two members from each republic, and
one each from Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Federal
Assembly, which is becoming more active in Yugosla-
via's legislative process, is dominated by regional
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Figure 2
Yugoslavia: Unemployment, 1981
delegations openly dependent on instructions from
local capitals. Only the Federal Executive Council-
the country's cabinet-is more representative of tech-
nical expertise than regional political balance. As a
result, perhaps, Prime Minister Milka Planinc may be
the one leader popularly credited (according to recent
public opinion polls and US Embassy reporting) with
serving overall Yugoslav interests.
Although regional and ethnic interests are not always
identical, the decentralization issue cuts across both.
According to contributers to the scholarly journal
Sociologija, decentralization has devolved power to
authoritarian regional bureaucracies at the expense of
grass-roots democracy. Viewed this way, the concen-
tration of power in the six republics and two provinces
has strengthened the dominant nationality in each
and created centers of power to which fellow nationals
in other regions can look. Minorities within a particu-
lar republic or province-Serbs in Croatia or Kosovo,
for example-increasingly seek support either from
their "home" republics or their national churches
rather than from the federal government.
Economic Problems
The weakened collective leadership is having difficul-
ties dealing with regional economic disparities, thus
intensifying debate within ethnic communities over
Yugoslavia *am
Kosovo
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Bosnia and
Hercegovia
Vojvodina
Croatia
Slovenia
the wisdom of consensus decisionmaking (see figures 2
and 3). For instance, in 1965, Belgrade vowed to 25X1
ameliorate the split between the relatively prosperous
north and the poorer south by launching a federal aid
program with contributions from the richer republics
and Vojvodina to the poorer republics and Kosovo (see
figure 4). However, since 1980, Slovenia has been
trying to limit its obligations to the fund, to eliminate
Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia as "underdevel-
oped" fund recipients, and to substitute enterprise-to-
enterprise aid for federal programs. In 1983, Slovenia,
Serbia, Croatia, and Vojvodina did not meet their
obligations to the fund and temporarily forced its
bankruptcy in March. We believe that failures to
fulfill commitments to the south in the future, which
seem likely given the general decline of the economy,
would increase the risk of nationalist outbreaks in 25X1
Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-
Hercegovina.
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Figure 3
Yugoslavia: Per Capita Income, 1982
Yugoslavia
Slovenia
Croatia
Vojvodina
Serbia
Montenegro
Bosnia and
Hercegovia
Macedonia
Kosovo
Although the federal government recently passed laws
designed to increase its economic authority, republics
and provinces continue to promote autarkic, ineffi-
cient investment strategies and regional protection-
ism. In 1978, the US Embassy in Belgrade reported
that only 3 percent of total investment moved between
Yugoslavia's constituent republics and provinces and
only 15 percent crossed municipal borders. Press
articles complain that interrepublic trade, which fell
from 28 percent of overall circulation of goods and
services in 1970 to 22 percent in 1980, is continuing to
decline. In addition, electric power, railroads, and
other basic transport and utility industries remain
controlled at the regional level. Bosnia-Hercegovina,
which has complained about Yugoslav airline service,
recently proposed creating its own carrier
The Churches
Yugoslavia's three major churches are making a
comeback after years of losing struggles with federal
or regional party barons (see figure 5). Events outside
Yugoslavia-such as the spread of Pan-Islamic ideas
and the election of John Paul II, the first Pope with
experience in combating ruling Communist parties-
undoubtedly contribute to this resurgence. But we
believe that the more telling factor is the clergies'
increasing inclination to link their churches with the
political goals of their ethnic constituencies. A recent
federal party conference on religion concluded that
there has been "an obvious trend to identify religious
affiliation with national feeling, which sometimes
leads to nationalism and even to irredentism."
Croat Catholicism. The Catholic Church, which
steadfastly holds to its claim to be the true protector
of Croat nationhood, and the Yugoslav regime are old
and bitter adversaries. The Church received a consid-
erable boost in December 1982 as a result of the
elevation of Zagreb Archbishop Kuharic, an avowed
Croatian nationalist, to the rank of cardinal. Kuharic
staunchly defended the Church from an anticlerical
campaign in 1981-82 led by Jakov Blazevic, a hard-
liner on the Croatian party central committee. US
officials, after conversations with him, have described
his views on history as containing "scarcely concealed
anti-Serb sentiments."
The Croatian government
has publicly admonished Kuharic to behave responsi-
bly in his new office.
Serbian Orthodoxy. The principal church of the Ser-
bian nation is also enjoying a modest reinvigoration.
Patriarch German, in conversations with US officials,
has mentioned frustrations with the political system
as the main cause, but Yugoslav officials say that
nationalist activism among the clergy is also responsi-
ble. Church leaders, for example, have been particu-
larly vocal in condemning Albanian excesses in
Kosovo, and they also stress their concern for Serbs
living in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. A measure
of the Serbian church's successes in capitalizing on
the linkage between religious belief and national
feeling is the steady increase in Serbian minisects,
which rededicate themselves to Orthodox fundamen-
tals and traditional Serbian culture.
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Figure 4
Yugoslavia: Relative Population and Wealth by Republic
Percent
of total
population
Percent
of total
GNP
Population figures are from the 1981
census. GNP figures are based on 1981
estimates and represent each region's share
of the Yugoslav total.
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Figure 5
Yugoslavia: Historical Religious Communities
Roman Catholic majority
(Croats, Slovenes, and
Hungarians)
Orthodox majority
(Serbs, Macedonians, and
Montenegrins)
Islamic majority
(Muslim Slavs, Albanians, and
Turks)
Area with no community in the
majority
(each component less than
50% but more than 15%)
To some non-Serbs, the Serbian church's reviving role establishing an autonomous Macedonian church in
is seen as the dangerous manifestation of Serbian 1959 and a completely independent church in 1967.
chauvinism. Orthodoxy in Yugoslavia is, for example, Some Serbs rioted against the new church, and the
a major arena for rivalry between the Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox hierarchy refused to recognize it.
Macedonians-Macedonia was called Southern Ser-
bia between the world wars. The Macedonian Ortho-
dox clergy split with the Serbian Orthodox church,
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This split between the Serbian and the Macedonian
Orthodox has lent itself to regime manipulation to
keep the Serbian church in its place, but at the cost of
perpetuating tensions between Serbs and Macedo-
nians. Federal authorities quickly recognized first the
autonomous and then the independent Macedonian
church. In March 1983 the federal government
further irritated Serbs by appointing a Macedonian
priest to head the government-sponsored Federation
of Yugoslav Priests. Government officials have re-
cently repeated calls for Serbian recognition of Mac-
edonian Orthodox autocephalicity.
Islam. Islam in Yugoslavia has played an important
role in a broader Muslim reawakening. Benefiting
from the benign neglect of the authorities over the
past decade, Muslims have tried to establish an
identity between Islamic belief and political move-
ments that work against the interests of the Yugoslav
federation. The Islamic clergy is upgrading religious
instruction and has established many ties with Islamic
communities abroad. More than 150 Yugoslav Mus-
lims pursue Islamic studies in the Middle East each
year, and there are an unknown number of foreign
students in Yugoslav medresa.' Some of these foreign
students, according to recent accusations by a top
leader in Sarajevo, serve as links to radical "Muslim
brotherhoods" in the Middle East.
Yugoslav authorities have been slow to react to the
warning signals of growing Muslim assertiveness,
probably in part because of Yugoslavia's close ties
with the Third World Islamic states. However, a
recent flurry of official attacks on Muslim nationalists
may well presage the end of favored treatment for
Islam in Yugoslavia. Two Islamic clergymen were
among the Muslim nationalists arrested this spring
for advocating Muslim separatism, and public attacks
on foreign-based Islamic revolutionaries are on the
rise. We believe that the primary impact of any
crackdown would be felt in Bosnia-Hercegovina,
where rival Catholic and Serbian clergy will see
opportunities to use the issue of Muslim-Islamic
nationalism for their own advantage.
The Media and Cultural Expression
Since Tito's death in 1980, journalists, writers, and
dramatists have enjoyed new freedoms to broach
themes once held too controversial for public con-
sumption. Because editorial decisions are usually
made in regional capitals, the new themes often
counterpose local ethnic interests with those of rival
regions and nationalities. After the Kosovo riots, for
example, Serbia's press charged that the militia in
Kosovo aided Albanians while oppressing Serbs and
Montenegrins. Pristina papers denied the charges and
accused the Belgrade press of Serbian chauvinism.
Federal authorities seem powerless to stop such
polemics, despite their repeated warnings against
journalistic irresponsibility.
Writers and playwrights also are contributing to
heightened ethnic tensions. For example, the play
Golbunjaca (Pigeon Pit), dealing with wartime atroc-
ities committed against Serbs by Croats, created such
a controversy last fall and winter that the director of
the Serb National Theater in Novi Sad was fired
because he allowed it to be performed. Yet the play
has since been produced in several Serbian and
Slovenian cities. A best-selling novel, Knife, recently
published in Belgrade, graphically details Muslim
murders of Serbs (see inset). The book also postulates
that Muslim war criminals have infiltrated the pres- 25X1
ent power structure in Bosnia and are biding their
time until another round against the Serbs.
The federal party has closed several small publishing
houses, and there have been personnel changes at
Danas, Politika, and some smaller papers. But two
consecutive central committee plenums in February
and March failed to agree on a tougher information
and cultural policy, and the US Embassy does not
believe that a major media purge is in the offing. The
party's failure to stop the advertisement of ethnic 25X1
disputes in the media demonstrates its general inabil-
ity to reach difficult decisions on divisive issues
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In 1831 Sultan Mahmut ordered Namlik Pasha, the
Bosnian vezir, to lower taxes for Christians and allow
them to rebuild their destroyed churches. The vezir
summoned all Muslim leaders to Travnik and or-
dered them to observe the Sultan's wishes. Five begs
from Hercegovina accepted the new decrees. The rest,
from Bosnia, rebelled and recruited forces tofight the
Sultan. The Bosnian Muslims considered the new
decrees an attack on Islam and a concession to
infidels. They called up a large army to move against
the Hercegovinian begs who remained loyal to Istan-
bul.
The Hercegovinian forces were much weaker, for
each of them twenty rebels were in the field. Turhan-
beg led the Bosnians into battle waving his saber,
with the cry "Brother Turks, spill the blood of the
Serbs! All are infidels! Forward my falcons! Who dies
in battle with unbelievers enters heaven. Forward for
Mohamed's faith!"
Hasan-beg of Trebinje, leader of the Hercegovinian
forces, raised them by appealing to the Serbs. He
called them to battle with the cry "My people,
brothers, and falcons! Forward for the Holy Cross
and Saint John!" If he had not done so, the battle was
Youth
We believe that the declining employment pros-
pects-at present about 75 percent of the country's
900,000 unemployed are under 30 and looking for
their first job-are increasing the attraction of nation-
alism as a form of antiestablishment behavior among
Yugoslav youth, especially the university trained.
Moreover, the government now projects that econom-
ic austerity will continue through 1989, probably
ensuring that youth unemployment will be virtually
unsolvable until then. Young persons' identification
with the system through entree into and mobility up
through the political bureaucracy also offers little
hope because those in place are loath to give way.
Branko Mikulic, the Bosnian leader, has expressed
what we believe is a growing fear among Yugoslav
leaders: the younger generation is more loyal to
lost. As it turned out, confusion spread in the ranks
of Bosnian rebels and both flanks retreated in the
belief the other had left the field. A general rout
followed, with total victory for the Hercegovinians.
One of the victorious begs, Ali-Aga from Stolac, who
kissed the cross and rushed into battle with it in his
hand, was later rewarded by promotion to vezir. All
of the Christians in Hercegovina assembled in Mos-
tar to honor his appointment and to recognize him as
their benefactor and savior.
On the same day of this ceremony, Ali-Aga ordered
four Serbs executed. They were impaled alive and
hung in agony for three days cursing the faith of
Mohamed. From then on Ali-Aga loosed a rein of
terror against the Serbs. He ordered that the walls of
his palace in Mostar be decorated with Serbian heads
so that from any position, even reclining, he could see
them. He took special pleasure in witnessing execu-
tions during meals. During his twenty-year rule, a
day never passed without at least a hundred and fifty
Serb heads hanging on his palace walls, with their
eyes turned toward his quarters.
ethnic, material, and religious values rather than to
Yugoslav and socialist ones. Albanian young people-
52 percent of Kosovo's population is under age 19-
were the principal participants in the 1981 riots and
subsequent agitations. Since then, Croatian students,
some overtly sympathetic to the Kosovars, increasing-
ly have sparked nationalist disturbances at basketball
games and in medical faculties and dormitories at
Croat universities; Jure Bilic, then president of the
Croatian party presidium, complained in December
1982 of a "nationalist mosaic" among Croatian youth.
Kosovar and Croatian nationalism, in turn, have
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helped to energize Serbian youth. Outraged officials
protest crude posters in Serbian schools that encour-
age students to "make a check if you hate Albanians"
and the fashion among Serbian youths to wear caps in
the style of chetniks (World War II Serbian anti-
Communists).
Yugoslav officials have reacted to the youth problem
by increasing pressures on educators. Hamdija Poz-
derac, Bosnia's party president, recently claimed that
some local schools add to the problem by segregating
students according to national origin. The Bosnia-
Hercegovina party central committee, meanwhile, has
complained that curriculums foster "the nationalist
point of view." In Kosovo, 200 out of 480 people fired
from their jobs in the first three months after the riots
were teachers. The Communist organization of the
University of Pristina in Kosovo in January 1983
called for even greater purges.
Declining federal authority, troublesome economic
disparity, and a more vocal press are, in our view,
renewing the scramble for power among ethnic groups
harboring deep-seated suspicions of out-group goals
and motivations. We believe that competition between
Serbs and non-Serbs is the key factor in this new wave
of ethnic nationalism. Serbs claim they are on the
defensive, attempting only to protect the Yugoslav
federation and their constitutional authority in their
autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Ac-
cording to Yugoslav press commentators, however,
many non-Serbs believe that the Serbs want to restore
their position of preeminence throughout the country.
Non-Serbs, through press commentary and in Federal
Assembly debates, express their determination to
protect their constitutional autonomy.
The Serbs' Special Position
Alone among the nationalities, the Serbs are per-
ceived to seek hegemony over the system rather than
the less difficult goal of autonomy within it. Even at
its height before World War II, Serb dominance was
contested fiercely. Serbian vulnerability as Yugosla-
via's dominant ethic group stems from its taking
charge as a result of decisions in 1919 by Allied
Dragoslav Markovic, president of League of
Communists of Yugoslavia
victors who were grateful for the Serbs' role in World
War I rather than as a consequence of internal
political or military victories.
The historical distrust between Serbs and non-Serbs
has divisive repercussions in the party leadership.
According to press reports, in June 1982 non-Serbs
unsuccessfully tried to block the elevation of Dragos-
lav Markovic, a Serb leader known for his nationalist
sentiments, as Serbia's representative on the party
presidium. In June 1983 Markovic became president
of the party after Serbia nominated him to serve the
Markovic, in fact, has been consistently pressing for
proposals that would, in effect, restore some of Ser-
bia's lost preeminence. During the mid-1970s, for
example, he tried to recentralize control over the
Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces and was blocked only
by Tito. And prior to last year's party congress,
Serbia's leaders, including Markovic, made sweeping
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proposals for strengthening controls over the regional
parties by the federal party, in which the Serbs are
the largest bloc. Serbs were blocked by other delega-
tions but, despite the rebuff, a parliamentary commis-
sion has been studying recentralizing reforms at
Serbia's insistence. Judging from his speeches at
recent Central Committee plenums, Markovic is a
leading backer of efforts to restore economic decision
making to the federal government, a move opponents
criticize as presaging political recentralization, a pre-
requisite to renewed Serb hegemony.
In our judgment, the Serbian leadership's drive for
more power is not likely to wane because the political
strength of nationalism in Serbia is so strong that
most top Serbian leaders have to accommodate to it.
Judging from their speeches and from US Embassy
reporting, Markovic and his chief rival, Nikola Ljubi-
cic, a former Defense Minister who is now president
of Serbia, compete with each other for legitimacy as
defenders of Serbian rights. And, as in other repub-
lics, Serbian officials with reputations for a broader
"Yugoslav," rather than local political orientations-
like former Foreign Minister Milos Minic-have been
pushed by their home constituencies to the political
sidelines.
An issue that Serbian leaders have tried to capitalize
on to justify their drive for more power is the current
dispute with Albanian leaders over the emigration of
Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. Most Serbs
revere Kosovo, the heart of the ancient Serbian
empire and site of its religious monuments, as their
national birthplace. Yugoslav officials have told US
diplomats that between 15,000 and 20,000-about 10
percent-of the province's Serbs and Montenegrins
left under duress between 1981 and October 1982. In
June, Politika reported that, on average, 400 Serbs
and Montenegrins leave each month. In July, the
party daily Borba reported a Serbian complaint that
emigration has spread to areas of southern Serbia
bordering Kosovo. Serbian leaders, as well as Monte-
negrin and Macedonian officials, blame the exodus on
pressure by Albanian nationalists who want to create
an ethnically pure Kosovo as a step toward secession
and reunion with Albania.
Milutin Baltic, president of
Croatian state presidency
The Serb-Croat Rivalry
While Serbian assertiveness remains the focus for
current ethnic tensions, and while Kosovo remains the
most volatile area, we believe that Croatian opposition
to Serbian hegemony remains the most potentially
dangerous of the country's ethnic rivalries. While
leading Serbs seek to gain preeminence over the
Yugoslav state, the Croats, who are the Serbs'
staunchest opponents, have always had some leaders
who espoused secession from the federation.
There is a long legacy of Serbian mistrust of the
Croats, who during World War II established an
independent state under German protection. This
legacy was reinforced by years of nationalistic policies
pursued by Croatian republican leaders who were
ousted in a major purge in 1971. Arrests associated
with this so-called Croatian mass movement contin-
ued for a decade, and the Croatian nationalist cause,
despite harsh suppression by the federal leadership, is
very much alive. In 1980, many leading Croats signed
petitions for the release of their political prisoners.
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Dusan Dragosavac, member of
the presidium of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia
Adm. Branko Mamula, De-
fense Minister
The next spring, the US Consulate in Zagreb reported
receiving a manifesto calling for Croatian independ-
ence from an underground "Croatian Communist
party."
The Croatian leadership, which has rigorously sup-
pressed Croatian nationalism, is now alarmed that
Serbian agitation will strengthen anti-Serb sentiments
and undermine its position. Croatian officials have
expressed concern at the increasing incidence of na-
tionalist expression at Croatian universities, some-
times in open support of Albanian opposition to
Serbian policies in Kosovo. Stipe Suvar, an influential
Croat theoretician, recently noted that all other Yu-
goslav nationalists "hate the Serbs," and he warned
that the problem could increase because Serbs are
nostalgic for their pre-1941 position. Milutin Baltic,
the new president of the Croatian state presidency,
warned in May that Serbia's strong response to
problems in Kosovo could incite other nationalisms in
response.
Croatian animosity toward Serbs also has a local
focus in a perception that the Serb minority in
Croatia-living primarily in southwestern and eastern
Croatia-is favored politically. The authorities in
Zagreb have often admitted that Croatian resentment
of the disproportionate numbers of Serbs in the
republican leadership-a residual impact of their
greater role as Communist partisans during the war-
is a special sore point among Croats. Serbs are heavily
represented in the current leadership; Baltic, Dusan
Dragosavac, one of the republic's two representatives
on the federal party presidium, and Adm. Branko
Mamula, Defense Minister, are all Croatian Serbs
There is also a strong emigre activity which keeps
Croatian nationalism simmering. Nationalist Cro-
atian emigres in Western Europe and the United
States are the most active among anti-Yugoslav
groups abroad, with most dedicated to restoring an
independent Croatian state encompassing boundaries
greater than even the 1941-45 wartime puppet state of
Croatia. Croatian nationalists, both in Yugoslavia and
outside, still claim that Bosnia-Hercegovina is an
integral part of the Croatian homeland. Small radical
groups have taken the terrorist road. More disturbing
to the Yugoslav leadership is the current trend of 25X1
Croatian emigres to join forces with Albanian coun-
terparts in Western Europe to protest Yugoslav hu-
man rights violations and policies in Kosovo.
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Muslim Nationalism
Serb-Croat rivalry helped produce the growing strain
of Muslim nationalism in current Yugoslav ethnic
tensions. For hundreds of years, Serbs and Croats
both have claimed the "hearts and minds" of the
majority of Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the de-
scendants of ethnic Serbs and Croats who converted
to Islam during the 500 years of Turkish rule. Ancient
hatreds were reinforced during World War II when
many Bosnian Muslims sided with the Croats and
participated in exterminating Serbs. Yugoslav offi-
cials and press observers have noted that to this day
Croats and Muslims generally maintain better rela-
tions with each other than do Serbs with either group.
Federal officials tried to defuse this rivalry before the
1971 census by setting the "Muslims" legally apart as
a separate nationality. The move only complicated
Yugoslavia's national problems, however, by creating
yet another claimant to national self-determination.
Raif Dizdarevic, former president of the Federal
Assembly
The Muslims are pressing to expand their influence as
the plurality in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Their current
aggressiveness probably is based on resentment of
past overrepresentation of Serbs in the institutions of
power, somewhat similar to the situation in Croatia.
According to 1971 figures, Serbs, who then consti-
tuted 37 percent of the population, made up 47
percent of party membership. The US Embassy in
Belgrade reports that an unwritten rule requires that
the party presidency still be made up of three Serbs,
three Muslims, and two Croats despite declines in the
Serb population in the republic.
As evidence of their nationalism, the Yugoslav press
reports that Muslim officials from Bosnia-Hercego-
vina increasingly court Muslim communities in Mac-
edonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo (see figure
1). In October 1982, for example, Raif Dizdarevic,
then president of the Federal Assembly and a leading
Bosnian Muslim, visited Kosovo-where the majority
Albanians are of Islamic religious extraction-and
returned with a report defending Kosovar treatment
of Serbs and Montenegrins in the province. He was
attacked by Serbian officials, and his report was
ignored in a subsequent Assembly resolution, which
generally blamed Kosovar pressure for Serb and
Montenegrin emigration.
The Muslims' growing assertiveness has alarmed
some federal leaders, particularly as evidence has
grown that some Muslims sympathize with the Irani-
an revolution. As early as 1979, a Sarajevo official
claimed that Ayatollah Khomeini had significant
influence in the republic. On 22 March 1983 Branko
Mikulic, then president of the republic presidency,
attacked "pan-Islamism;" the US Embassy in Bel-
grade reported that this was the first statement on the
problem by a Bosnian leader in recent memory. In
April, Interior Minister Dolanc told US officials that
Muslim nationalists who were arrested on 8 April
after a trip to Teheran were supportive of Khomeini's
goal of establishing a Muslim state in Bosnia-Herce-
govina as an Islamic toehold in Europe.
The Albanians
The Albanians are Yugoslavia's most volatile ethnic
community, their most violent outbreak being the
1981 riots in Kosovo, where they are the dominant
majority. In addition, they make up 20 percent of the
population of Macedonia-concentrated in western
Macedonia-and a growing minority in Montenegro.
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We believe that the Albanians are deeply influenced
by a sense of wrongful separation from their conation-
als beyond the Yugoslav border. While under Italian
occupation during World War II, Albania annexed
Kosovo, a development previously supported by Yugo-
slav Communist Party declarations in 1928 and 1940.
But Kosovar hopes for permanent union with Albania
were dashed when Tito broke with Stalin in 1948-
Albania remained a loyal Soviet ally, and Tito was
forced to abandon his designs for a Yugoslav-domi-
nated Balkan federation that allowed for a "Greater
Albania" component state. Over time, agitation for
union with Albania has declined in favor of demands
for a separate Yugoslav Kosovo republic, judging
from dissident slogans and comments by Yugoslav
The riots in 1981 and subsequent nationalist slogan-
eering were only the most recent demonstrations of
Albanian discontent. The Albanians in Kosovo have
resisted Belgrade's attempts to coerce them or to
court them with economic subsidies throughout the
postwar period. Rebelling during the Communist
takeover, they were suppressed by the army until the
late 1940s and subsequently kept on a tight leash by
Alexander Rankovic, Tito's vice-president and Yugo-
slavia's principal standard-bearer of Serbian interests.
After Rankovic's ouster in 1966, economic aid to the
region increased, but it failed to avert serious rioting
two years later. In 1974, in part to diffuse this
discontent, Kosovo's status was upgraded in the con-
stitution from autonomous region to province. None-
theless, between 1974 and 1981, 600 ethnic Albanians
were arrested for nationalist and irredentist activity.
Tensions have remained high since 1981, although the
military occupation has prevented renewed wide-
spread violence. Belgrade tried blaming the provincial
party, firing its leader, Mahmut Bakali, and purging
local party organizations, particularly the faculty at
the University of Pristina. But nothing Belgrade has
done has halted clandestine circulation of slogans,
such as "Kosovo-Republic" and "Death to Serbian
Bloodsuckers," cemetery desecrations, and nationalist
excesses, including rapes of Serbian women by Alba-
nians
The Slovenes
The Slovenes bear no legacy of bitter struggles for
independence from Yugoslavia's other ethnic groups,
and Slovene leaders support a federation that ensures
their access to markets and raw materials in the
south. Nevertheless, their relative prosperity is now
the cause of a widening rift with other regions and
ethnic groups. Slovene leaders, seeking to protect their
prosperity, are among the most outspoken opponents
to increasing Belgrade's economic authority.
Statements by the republic's leaders illustrate that
they are not in sympathy with other Yugoslavs'
problems. Andrej Marine, president of the party
presidium, recently extolled Slovene economic superi-
ority, crediting it to superior cadre and farsighted 25X1
economic strategies. Other Slovenes have proudly
pointed out the contrast between Slovenia's energy
surplus and the difficulties faced in Macedonia and
elsewhere. Top Slovene party officials have argued
that other Yugoslav regions should correct their mis-
management practices before seeking relief in federal
subsidies, a position that has led to sharp rebuttal
from leaders in less developed republics. Kosovars
complain that Slovenia acts like an "imperial power"
by exploiting Kosovo's resources, paying less than
world market prices for raw materials, and charging
high prices for its industrial products.
The Slovenes also are becoming less tolerant of
"guestworkers" whose growing presence is diluting
the once homogenous ethnic environment. Migration
of outsiders seeking work in Slovenia is creating
interethnic tensions similar to those in West European
countries. Guestworkers complain of discrimination, 25X1
while Slovenes begrudge the increased costs of social
poses changes that would decrease the republic's need
for non-Slovene labor by stressing high technology, a
policy that deliberately works against the federation's
ability to increase employment in its less developed
regions.
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Although Yugoslavia's ethnic disputes show every
prospect of increasing in intensity, we do not expect
immediate, widespread ethnic violence. Because re-
gional officials-who largely support autonomy, not
independence, and fear that extremism could lead to
another civil war-increasingly speak out for ethnic
aspirations, radicals lack the issues with which they
might seize the initiative and provoke confrontations.
Moreover, in our view, the ultimate prospect of harsh
suppression-perhaps by the military-will deter the
public from responding to the most radical national-
ists, except perhaps in Kosovo. We believe that the
Yugoslav military, despite a predominance of Serbian
officers, is less affected by ethnic tension than society
as a whole. According to the US Defense Attache in
Belgrade, 95 percent of the country's military officers
are members of the party. Although there has been at
least one trial of ethnic Albanian recruits who were
involved in nationalist activity, there is no evidence of
major ethnic problems in the military as a whole or
among the occupation forces in Kosovo. We would
expect the military's discipline-a characteristic not
evident in the party and other Yugoslav institutions-
to enable it to overcome any internal ethnic problems
in the event it was called on again to intervene to
preserve order.
In addition, many Yugoslavs have expressed the fear
that a breakdown of order could make the country
vulnerable to Soviet political intervention or political
manipulation. There is no evidence of Soviet interfer-
ence in Yugoslavia's ethnic disputes. Nevertheless, in
our view, the memory of the break with Stalin and
general acceptance of the notion that the Soviet
Union is Yugoslavia's primary potential military
threat currently helps restrain the centrifugal senti-
ments of many who might otherwise have little stake
in the federation.
As academic observers have pointed out, however,
Yugoslavia's post-Tito system is prone to indecision.
We expect the country's leaders will attempt to
"muddle through" their ethnic difficulties, making
only those ad hoc decisions absolutely necessary to
preserve the country's immediate stability. In the
short run, the party will probably continue its reliance
on verbal attacks on nationalism and on selective
repression of the most radical nationalists. The Social-
ist Alliance-the party's mass front organization-is
likely to intensify its campaign to propagate popular
opposition to nationalist excesses.
This strategy, in our view, may work for a while
because most dissidents-many Albanians and some
Croats providing notable exceptions-accept the need
for confederation. For now, ethnic leaders are likely to
restrain their demands within the existing political
system, hoping to take advantage of the post-Tito
leadership's weaknesses to increase personal follow-
ings.
Nevertheless, ethnic tensions and mutual distrust will
grow as party and government authorities quarrel
over regional prerogatives and rival ethnic aspirations.
The party, fractured along ethnic lines, is especially
unlikely to serve a unifying role when important issues
divide Yugoslav ethnic groups. In particular, we
believe that the central rivalry between Serb and non-
Serb will continue to weaken Yugoslav stability for
the foreseeable future. A major indicator of the
seriousness of this trend will be the extent to which
measures to strengthen federal prerogatives are actu-
ally implemented in the face of near-certain opposi-
tion of Croats, Slovenes, Kosovars, and Bosnian Mus-
lims.
The situation in Kosovo and western Macedonia is
likely to stay highly volatile because postriot suppres-
sion has driven an even deeper wedge between the
Albanian populace and the local political elite. The
Kosovo party's ability to control or co-opt Albanian
nationalism is diminished because it is now particular-
ly seen as representing outside-chiefly Serbian
interests.
We believe that pressure for republican status in
Kosovo will continue to grow; the Albanian birth-
rate-the highest in Europe-coupled with continuing
Serbian and Montenegrin emigration, is rapidly creat-
ing an overwhelmingly Albanian province. In addi-
tion, we believe that this could increase common anti-
Serb interest between Kosovar and Muslim. Any
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indication of common organization among these
groups would be perceived by federal authorities-
and especially by Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedo-
nians-as a major threat to Yugoslav stability and
probably would be dealt with harshly.
Although we believe that ethnic discontent can be
contained for now, the Yugoslav situation is and will
remain unstable. Certain developments would indi-
cate more acute ethnic discontent than we currently
foresee in the short run. In descending order of
likelihood, these would be:
? Renewed demonstrations in Kosovo.
? Drastic economic deterioration in the south, creat-
ing severe shortages that give radical nationalists
more influence in Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, or southern Serbia.
? Collapse of the economic stabilization program
leading to dramatic loss of confidence in the federal
government.
? Evidence, such as ad hoc demonstrations or wildcat
strikes, that grass-roots agitation, led by disaffected
youth, is slipping from the control of present ethnic
leaders.
? Joint anti-Serb demonstrations by combinations of
Croats, Muslims, and Albanians inside Yugoslavia.
? A stronger Serbian backlash against anti-Serb agi-
tation, perhaps including calls for military interven-
tion to maintain order.
In the longer run, we believe that the stresses of ethnic
tensions, combined with north-south economic differ-
ences, ethnic argument in the media, and dissaffected
youth could present the regime with overwhelming
challenges to the existing system. In particular, we
believe that youth-with encouragement from the
Churches-probably will continue to turn away from
socialism and toward nationalism. The resulting de-
cline in the regime's legitimacy, especially if com-
bined with inability to restructure adequately the
country's inefficient political and economic institu-
tions, could eventually deliver shocks to the system
greater even than the 1981 Kosovo riots. In sum,
although the leadership may "muddle through" its
immediate ethnic challenges, ethnic problems will
continue to grow. Yugoslavia's long-term stability is
likely to depend on the relationship between its en-
demic ethnic disputes, fragile economic prospects, and
cumbersome, decentralized political structures.
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indication of common organization among these
groups would be perceived by federal authorities-
and especially by Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedo-
nians-as a major threat to Yugoslav stability and
probably would be dealt with harshly.
Although we believe that ethnic discontent can be
contained for now, the Yugoslav situation is and will
remain unstable. Certain developments would indi-
cate more acute ethnic discontent than we currently
foresee in the short run. In descending order of
likelihood, these would be:
? Renewed demonstrations in Kosovo.
? Drastic economic deterioration in the south, creat-
ing severe shortages that give radical nationalists
more influence in Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, or southern Serbia.
? Collapse of the economic stabilization program
leading to dramatic loss of confidence in the federal
government.
? Evidence, such as ad hoc demonstrations or wildcat
strikes, that grass-roots agitation, led by disaffected
youth, is slipping from the control of present ethnic
leaders.
? Joint anti-Serb demonstrations by combinations of
Croats, Muslims, and Albanians inside Yugoslavia.
? A stronger Serbian backlash against anti-Serb agi-
tation, perhaps including calls for military interven-
tion to maintain order.
In the longer run, we believe that the stresses of ethnic
tensions, combined with north-south economic differ-
ences, ethnic argument in the media, and dissaffected
youth could present the regime with overwhelming
challenges to the existing system. In particular, we
believe that youth-with encouragement from the
Churches-probably will continue to turn away from
socialism and toward nationalism. The resulting de-
cline in the regime's legitimacy, especially if com-
bined with inability to restructure adequately the
country's inefficient political and economic institu-
tions, could eventually deliver shocks to the system
greater even than the 1981 Kosovo riots. In sum,
although the leadership may "muddle through" its
immediate ethnic challenges, ethnic problems will
continue to grow. Yugoslavia's long-term stability is
likely to depend on the relationship between its en-
demic ethnic disputes, fragile economic prospects, and
cumbersome, decentralized political structures.
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