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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00895R000200030002-4
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• Document Page Count: 16
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• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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1iii :gate of
Intelligence 25X1
Canada's New Democratic Party:
Heading for a Split?
EUR 83-16,281
December 1983
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 Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
Canada's New Democratic Party:
Heading for a Split?
Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Western Europe Division, EURA
Confidential
EUR 83-10281
December 1983
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Confidential
Canada's New Democratic Part :
Heading for a Split? 25X1
Key Judgments The small, socialist New Democratic Party (NDP) has played an important
Information available behind-the-scenes role in Canadian politics over the past two decades.
as oft October 1983 Although it has been in only one government, the NDP has strongly
was used in this report.
influenced the direction of federal policy since 1961 as Canada's "Third
Party," behind the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives. The NDP
has supported or sponsored much of the social welfare legislation adopted
by the Liberals, for example, and has been the leading exponent of
nationalist economic programs designed to free the Canadian economy
from what it sees as excessive US influence.
The New Democrats, however, are now beset with internal problems that
threaten the party's existence. The deep differences within the party reflect
the sharply divergent approaches of the NDP's eastern-based leadership
and the party's western wing, which elects most of the party's parliamenta-
ry delegation. The easterners advocate policies that would require an
increase in federal power; the western wing, on the other hand, advocates a
devolution of power to the provinces. Moreover, the NDP leadership's
willingness to cooperate with the Liberals has rankled many westerners
who consider Prime Minister Trudeau anathema. In addition, the Liberals'
predilection for co-opting New Democratic policies tends to widen the east-
west rift in the party by forcing the NDP's leadership to adopt more
stridently socialist policies in an effort to differentiate the NDP from the
Liberals.
Although we think the NDP will hold together through the next federal
election-likely to take place in fall 1984-the party's prospects after that
appear uncertain. If the NDP does badly, as most polls now predict, it may
fragment into an eastern-based radical socialist party and a western
populist organization that probably would affiliate with the Liberal Party
in the post-Trudeau era. Because the NDP now holds 25 of the 76 federal
parliamentary seats in western Canada, such a merger would greatly
enhance the Liberals' electoral prospects in the region where they now hold
only two seats. We believe that an alliance with the NDP's western wing
also would permit the Liberals to construct, for future elections, a
nationwide base of support that would be very difficult for the Progressive
Conservatives to challenge successfully. We would expect that such an
alliance would marginally increase the stridency of the nationalist empha-
sis of Liberal foreign, economic, and energy policies, but that these
alterations would be more a matter of tone than substance.
Confidential
EUR 83-10281
December 1983
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Table 1
Canadian Federal Elections: The New Democratic Party
New Democratic NDP Share of
Vote Total Popular Vote
Part
Members of Parliament
y
(percent)
Elected
Geographical Distribution
1962 1,036,853 13.5
19
British Columbia 10, Manitoba 2, Ontario 6, Nova
Scotia 1
1963 1,037,857 13.5
17
British Columbia 9, Manitoba 2, Ontario 6
1965 1,381,047 18.0
21
British Columbia 9, Manitoba 3, Ontario 9
1968 1,390,221 17.4
22
British Columbia 7, Manitoba 3, Ontario 6,
Saskatchewan 6
1972 1,700,000 18.1
British Columbia 11, Manitoba 3, Northwest Terri-
tories 1, Ontario 11, Saskatchewan 5
1974 1,476,350 15.1
British Columbia 2, Manitoba 2, Nova Scotia 1,
Ontario 8, Saskatchewan 2, Northwest Territories I
1979 2,064,937 18.0
British Columbia 8, Manitoba 5, Ontario 6, Nova
Scotia 1, Saskatchewan 4, Newfoundland 1, North-
west Territories 1
British Columbia 12, Manitoba 7, Ontario 5,
Saskatchewan 7, Northwest Territories 1
Confidential
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Confidential
Canada's New Democratic Party:
Heading for a Split?
Introduction
Canada's socialist New Democratic Party (NDP) has
been plagued since its inception in 1961 by a dichoto-
my: the party program is based on an eastern-
socialist-labor political philosophy that stands in sharp
contrast to the views of its western-agrarian electoral
base (see table 1). These internal tensions were sub-
merged until the severe economic recession of 1981-82
and the political battles surrounding the patriation of
the Canadian constitution in 1982.' Now, however,
intraparty differences are threatening the party's sur-
vival as a force in national politics.
The NDP and its predecessor, the Cooperative Com-
monwealth Federation (CCF), were formed by eastern
academic intellectuals who hoped to use the party to
attract an urban, working-class constituency with
which to create a socialist Canada. Ironically, howev-
er, the CCF-founded in the depression years of the
1930s-drew its most loyal supporters in the agricul-
tural provinces of western Canada. When the socialist
mantle passed to the NDP, it inherited the same
configuration-eastern ideological leadership and a
predominantly western rank and file.
The national NDP leadership favors a strong central
government with expanded federal powers. Drawn
until recently from Ontario's urban intelligentsia, the
national leadership has always regarded itself as the
party's most forward-looking element and frequently
has ignored regional concerns. For many years, west-
erners suffered this inattention in relative silence. At
the party's convention in 1983, however, these resent-
ments came to the fore and western delegates issued a
"Western Manifesto" calling for respect for regional
interests and a devolution of federal power to the
provinces. The westerners concluded that the only
basis for change in the Canadian federation is respect
' The process of patriation, which was completed in April 1982,
involved the Canadian Government's requesting the British Parlia-
ment to enact legislation relinquishing the United Kingdom's
control over the amendment of the British North America Act,
Canada's constitution, thereby leaving the course of future consti-
for its regional differences and the maintenance of
clearly defined and mutually accepted lines of demar-
cation between the prerogatives of the federal and
provincial levels of government. They also urged the
party to recognize Quebec's right to self-determina-
The manifesto was prepared under the direction of
Allan Blakeney and Grant Notley, respectively the
leaders of the provincial NDP parties in Saskatche-
wan and Alberta, and published without the knowl-
edge of federal party leader Ed Broadbent. Although 25X1
Broadbent handled the westerners' demands in a
manner that avoided a party split, he was forced to
allow the convention to adopt the west's revolutionary
and subversive-in terms of traditional NDP doc-
trine-demands for devolution and respect for region-
The Western Roots of Intraparty Strife
The NDP is stronger electorally in the western prov-
inces than anywhere else; 25 of the 31 members of the
party's current parliamentary contingent are from
Manitoba, British Columbia, and Sask:atchewan.1 25X1
Western delegates at the NDP's convention in 1983
made it clear that the region views party leader
Broadbent as "that guy from Oshawa" who is more
concerned about industrial strategies for automobiles
than about grain and who is willing to support the
interests of energy-consuming rather than energy-
producing provinces. The westerners, according to the
Alberta Report, interpret Broadbent's actions as be-
ing "for the industrial centre and against the west"-
a perception strengthening their belief that party
leadership is contemptuous of the west and formulates
policies to satisfy the NDP's eastern, unionized con-
stituency.
' Although the New Democrats won 32 seats in the election of
1980, one British Columbia NDP seat was lost to the Progressive
Conservatives in a byelection in August 1983. The party's federal
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Confidential
The Organizational Basis for Socialist Dominance of
the NDP
The organization of the federal NDP provides the
basis upon which the party's socialist constituency
has been able to dominate the formulation of party
policy. The party organization resembles a pyramid
whose base consists of 282 constituency associations,
one for each of Canada's federal parliamentary dis-
tricts. An equal number of delegates is sent from each
of the constituencies to the NDP's biennial convention
where a comprehensive party policy statement is
produced. Therefore, the delegates from the lightly
populated four western provinces (Manitoba, Sas-
katchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia) have less
influence on the formulation of party policy than
those from the other six provinces and two territories.
The populist policy interests of the westerners are, as
a result, frequently subordinated to the more social-
istic proclivities of industrial Canada.
In addition to formulating policy, the NDP's national
convention also selects a leader, president, associate
president, treasurer, and seven vice presidents. These
I1 individuals, together with 20 others selected by
the convention, become members of the party's Feder-
al Council. The Council implements the convention's
policy resolutions and guides the party in the period
between conventions. The entire contingent selected
by the convention for the Council generally reflects a
socialist rather than a populist orientation simply
because of the nonwestern advantage in the geograph-
ical distribution of delegates.
The remaining members of the Federal Council are
selected in the following manner, which also results
in the favoring of socialist over western populist
interests:
? The leader, president, treasurer, and secretary from
each of the 10 provincial and two territorial NDP
parties.
? Two additional members from each provincial and
territorial party chosen at their respective biennial
conventions.
? Two members chosen by the NDP s federal parlia-
mentary caucus.
? One member from each of the 12 labor unions with
the largest number of members officially affiliated
with the NDP.
Westerners also look with extreme disfavor on the
NDP leadership's willingness on occasion to support
Prime Minister Trudeau's Liberal government. The
NDP's support of a Trudeau minority government
between 1972 and 1974 raised the hackles of the
westerners because they generally believed that coop-
eration with the Liberals tended to blur the NDP's
distinctiveness. That dissatisfaction, however, was
largely mollified by the NDP's success in forcing the
Liberals to adopt several of its policies, including the
creation of a state-owned oil company. The real
problem came in 1981 and 1982 when Broadbent
endorsed Trudeau's unilateral decision to patriate the
Canadian constitution. Provincial NDP parties in the
west, headed by Allan Blakeney, then NDP premier
of Saskatchewan, opposed Trudeau's constitution be-
cause they believed it ignored regional interests and
unnecessarily strengthened the central government.
The intraparty rift over the constitution widened
when Trudeau backtracked and agreed to consult one
last time with the provinces, thereby leaving the
federal New Democratic leadership looking like Lib-
eral dupes.
The dissatisfaction over the constitution erupted at
the party's convention in 1983. The Toronto Globe
and Mail estimated that up to 40 percent of the
delegates would have been willing to dump Broad-
bent. Most of those delegates were from the west, and
many of the names suggested as successors were
westerners who had opposed Broadbent's constitution-
al position in the NDP's federal caucus.
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Confidential
The NDP's Unclear Image
Throughout its history the NDP has proposed many
controversial policies-such as old-age pensions,
medicare, and a state-owned oil company-only to
have them usurped by the Liberal Party and legislat-
ed into place with a Liberal imprimatur. This has
had a threefold effect on the NDP:
? The party often appears to be nothing more than a
stalking-horse that the Liberals manipulate from
time to time to test the national political environ-
ment. Most recently, for example, the NDP was the
first political party to suggest the upgrading of
Canada's relations with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). Shortly thereasfter, the Liberal
government announced its intention to raise its
diplomatic contact with the PLO to the ambassado-
rial level in the fall of 1983.
? Because NDP leaders and members want to main-
tain an image clearly distinct from the Liberals, the
NDP often adopts policies that are either more
radical or socialistic than would be the case if the
party did not have this concern. The NDP's recent
proposal to nationalize one of Canada's five major
chartered banks is an example of a policy that
probably lacks any significant appeal to the Cana-
dian electorate but clearly differentiates New Dem-
ocratic financial policy from that of the Liberals.
? Even when the NDP wins enough votes to influence
effectively the direction of federal policy, such as in
the minority Liberal government situation between
1972 and 1974, it remains in danger of having its
most important symbols usurped. In 1974, for
example, the NDP forced the Liberals to create the
state-owned oil company Petro-Canada. Afterward,
the Liberals, through extensive press and television
advertisement, made Petro-Canada an important
symbol of success for their own party. Such was
their effectiveness in this endeavor that Joe Clark's
minority Conservative government fell in 1979, in
part, because of its attempt to dismantle Petro-
Canada. And the Liberals were returned to power in
1980, in part, because they pledged to maintain
Petro-Canada as a federal enterprise.
In their manifesto, western NDP leaders expressed
their fear that the party may be annihilated in the
next general election by an expected Tory sweep-the
Tories led the Liberals by 27 percentage points in the
opinion polls in October. NDP leaders suspect, ac-
cording to US officials, that the public's hostility to
Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal Party is so intense
that the average voter will support the party most
likely to form a majority non-Liberal government.
The Tories were last able to form a majority govern-
ment in 1958, following 22 years of Liberal rule; in
that election the CCF, the NDP's predecessor, had its
parliamentary contingent reduced from 25 members
to eight.
The manifesto also delineated the western NDP lead-
ers' concern that socialism's appeal in their region is
being eroded by the social welfare policies of the
Liberal Party. US Embassy officers, for example,
expect the Liberals soon to displace the NDP as the
second-ranking party in the west behind the Tories.
Moreover, in the federal election of 1980, when the
Liberals won only two of 76 western seats, they still
captured between 22 percent and 28 percent of the
populatecross the region (see tables 2 and 3).
Western NDP leaders, according to the Montreal
Gazette, believe that their party's survival in western
Canada depends on the federal NDP's program be-
coming less socialist and more populist-more willing,
for example, to support private investment and free
enterprise and to demonstrate a greater respect for
individuality while not totally abandoning concern for
the collective welfare. We believe, however, that
western demands for a retreat from traditional NDP
ideology, beyond that secured by the adoption of the
Western Manifesto in June, would widen the regional
conflict in the partly and make a formal split inevita-
Eastern Canada: Problems and Opportunities
The NDP will have a difficult time making gains in
Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes. For the party to
achieve some success in Ontario and Quebec-which
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Table 2
Western Canada: Distribution of Major Party Popular
Vote in Federal Elections a
1979
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
Total
693,124
688,633
808,525
833,355
1,501,649
1,521,988
1,514,027
1,375,150
Manitoba
120,494
133,253
167,770
159,434
288,264
292,687
222,947
179,607
Saskatchewan
106,586
110,517
175,078
165,308
281,664
275,825
201,581
177,376
Alberta
188,228
176,601
84,282
81,755
272,510
258,356
559,516
516,079
British Columbia
277,816
268,262
381,395
426,858
659,211
695,120
529,983
502,088
Table 3
Western Canada: Distribution of Major Party Popular
Vote in Federal Elections a
1979
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
Total
22.9
23.7
26.8
28.7
49.7
52.4
50.2
47.4
Manitoba
23.5
28.2
30.5
33.7
54.0
61.9
44.0
38.0
Saskatchewan
22.0
24.3
36.2
36.4
58.2
60.8
42.6
39.1
Alberta
22.6
22.8
10.1
10.5
32.7
33.3
67.2
66.6
British Columbia
23.3
22.4
32.0
35.6
55.3
58.0
44.5
41.9
account for two-thirds of Canada's union members-
it would have to emphasize leftist policies that the
West would find unpalatable. In the case of the rural,
resource-based Maritimes, the NDP would have to
run on a populist platform not in keeping with the
socialist orientation of the present federal leadership.
Organized Labor. The NDP has traditionally main-
tained close ties with unionized Canadian labor-
which increased from 24 percent to 31 percent of the
Canadian work force between 1960 and 1980 and
largely is concentrated in Ontario and Quebec. La-
bor's recent demands, however, have tended to widen
the Western Manifesto.
the party's east-west rift, as the unions have leaned
further toward the political left in an attempt to
protect their eroding political power and deteriorating
economic base. Labor's calls for intensified federal
measures to protect domestic manufacturing and in-
creases in deficit spending to fund job creation pro-
grams, for example, drew fire from the proponents of
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Key NDP Policy Positions
Domestic Affairs
Economic Policy:
? Argues strongly for central government intervention
in and management of the economy.
? Urges adoption of a national industrial strategy to
develop Canada's natural resources and create a
domestic processing and manufacturing infrastruc-
ture to keep manufacturing jobs in Canada. Would
use Crown corporations, on the model of Petro-
Canada, to manage resource exploitation.
? Promotes federally mandated reduction in the level
offoreign control in Canada's resource and manu-
facturing industries. Would strengthen the Foreign
Investment Review Agency (FIRA) to restrict for-
eign takeovers and initiate periodic postlocation
reviews of foreign-owned industries to coerce good
corporate behavior.
? Would establish punitive tax rates for foreign com-
panies operating in Canada who fail to invest
domestically at a level set by the federal govern-
ment. Tax penalties also would be established for
companies failing to conduct a set amount of
research and development activity in Canada.
Energy Policy:
? Stresses the need for Canadian control of the
country's energy industry and national energy self-
st(fficiency.
? Would `greatly expand"federal involvement in the
energy industry and establish predominant federal
ownership of the industry as its primary energy
policy goal.
? Fully supports National Energy Program (NEP),
including retroactive "back-in "provision, and urges
increasing the Canadian ownership goal from 50
percent to 75 percent. Urges that the goal be
attained in 1985 instead of 1990 as now scheduled.
? Would authorize Petro-Canada to purchase Imperi-
al Oil Ltd., Exxon's Canadian subsidiary, in order
to make the state-owned oil company the nation's
largest and most powerful oil company.
External Relations
? Most nationalistic Canadian political party and its
foreign policy contains a distinct anti-American
tenor.
? Party foreign policy traditionally focuses on disar-
mament and supports a nuclear freeze and the
creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Canada.
The NDP is the leading opponent of US cruise
missile testing in Canada and is the political leader
of the domestic peace movement.
? Member of the Socialist International (SI) and uses
the membership to gain media exposure with which
to alert Canadians to its foreign policy. Party
leader Broadbent is a vice president of the SI.
? Condemns US policy in Central America and the
Caribbean-equating it with Soviet behavior in
Afghanistan-and supports FSLN government in
Nicaragua and FDR guerrillas in El Salvador.
? Proponent of North-South dialogue and believes
the thrust of Canadian foreign policy should be
financial and technical assistance for the Third
World. Supports increased Canadian participation
in the United Nations, in particular UN-sponsored
peacekeeping activities.
? Would curtail the degree of Canada's military
cooperation with the United States through such
instrumentalities as NATO and NORAD and refo-
cus the national defense effort on the protection of
Canada's territorial integrity.
? In bilateral issues with the United States would
seek an improved auto pact, protection for domestic
manufacturing industries, and Washington's com-
mitment to resolving the acid rain problem.
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While we basically concur with the US Embassy's
judgment that the Canadian labor movement as a
whole remains fundamentally moderate, we also be-
lieve that it is showing signs of becoming increasingly
sympathetic to leftist leadership. The Toronto Globe
and Mail, for example, estimates that about one-
third of the delegates at the NDP convention in 1983
supported the policy paper presented by the Ontario
NDP's radical "Left Caucus. " Among other things,
the paper called for the across-the-board nationaliza-
tion of Canada's industrial and financial infrastruc-
ture. In addition, the UAW's Robert White, who was
born in the United Kingdom and trained in the British
trade union system, has not ruled out labor's break-
ing with the NDP and forming its own political entity
if its demands are not satisfied by the party.
In our opinion, the potential for an accelerated move
to the left by Canadian labor clearly lies in the
dramatic growth and increasing involvement of radi-
cal public-sector unions in the labor movement.
Union membership concentrations in Canada, accord-
ing to the Financial Post, shifted throughout the
1970s and early 1980s toward public-sector unions.
In early 1983, for example, public-sector unions
accounted for 41 percent of the CLC's total member-
ship. Underscoring the vitality of these unions is the
continual growth they experienced during the recent
recession; major public-sector unions, for example,
added 20,000 members in 1982 and another 35,000
members during the first six months of 1983. We
believe that the growing size and importance of the
public-sector unions in the labor movement is likely
to push laborfurther to the political left and simulta-
neously aggravate east-west tensions in the New
Democratic Party.
meant running the risk of an open break between the
party and its union supporters. By yielding to labor's
objections, the NDP was recognizing the vital impor-
tance to the party of union members and the financial
support they afford; the influential journal Saturday
Night estimated in July that union locals provide the
federal NDP with $200,000 annually in affiliation
fees-about 20 percent of the party's annual bud-
get-and contribute an additional $400,000 during
national election campaigns.
The presence of fewer labor delegates at the NDP's
convention in 1983 probably is an indication that
labor is reassessing the direction of its political activi-
ty, including its association with the NDP. Dennis
McDermott, president of the 1.9-million-member Ca-
nadian Labor Congress (CLC), pointedly stayed away
from the convention this year and, according to the
Financial Post, says that he is considering a more
independent political position for the CLC to combat
the public's perception of labor as a mere adjunct of
the NDP. Robert White, head of the United Auto
Workers (UAW) in Canada, also has expressed his
intention to involve the labor movement more fully in
the Canadian political system-a departure from
labor's historic practice of largely remaining on the
political sidelines between federal elections-and to
seek greater labor representation in the front ranks of
the NDP's leadership, particularly the Federal Coun-
cil.
In our judgment, increased political involvement by
labor probably will result in the growth of provincial
NDP parties in the industrialized areas of central
Canada. On the other hand, however, we believe that
the economic and political goals of labor are basically
incompatible with those of the party's western wing
and that the strengthening of the NDP parties in
Ontario and Quebec, and the probable correspondent
growth in their influence in the federal NDP's coun-
cils, will deepen the east-west split in the party.
Labor's major success at the convention in 1983 also
alienated many of the western delegates. At labor's Ontario. The federal NDP leadership-probably ac-
behest, party leaders agreed to delete from the con- curately in our view-sees Ontario, Canada's most
vention's policy statement that section of the Western industrialized province, as the best foundation for a
Manifesto calling for an "incomes policy," another
name for wage and price controls. Controls of this
type are anathema to labor, and the NDP's leadership
was unwilling to accept the westerners' demand if it
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party fully committed to socialism. Most card-
carrying NDP members historically have come from
Ontario's unionized work force, which now totals
nearly 1.2 million members. Ironically, however,
NDP leaders have been unable to persuade their
supporters in Ontario to cross the line that separates
ideological sympathies from a "dollars and cents"
pragmatism and vote for the NDP in federal elections.
The majority of union members in Ontario has unfail-
ingly supported the federal Liberal Party, which has
proved itself generally sympathetic to NDP policies
and consistently able to form majority governments
willing to implement comprehensive social welfare
programs. The most members of Parliament (MPs)
that the New Democrats have ever returned from
Ontario's 95 electoral ridings, for example, was 11 in
1972; the party elected only five MPs in Ontario in
Despite these problems, however, we believe industrial
Ontario holds some promise for the NDP. Ontario's
unionized labor force, in both the public and private
sectors, is the largest of any Canadian province and,
with economic recovery now under way, holds the
promise of further expansion. US Embassy officials
also expect the provincial NDP party shortly to
displace the Ontario Liberal Party as the official
opposition in the Ontario legislature, a factor that
probably would enhance the party's public image and
therefore improve its ability to gather votes in the
province for federal NDP candidates in the next
general election. In addition, Canada's federal elec-
toral map will be redistricted after the next general
election, creating 10 new, labor-oriented, and possibly
NDP-oriented, constituencies in Ontario's heavily in-
dustrialized Oshawa-Kitchener corridor.
Quebec. Quebecers have long considered the NDP a
prairie-populist movement abetted by eastern anglo-
phone socialist intellectuals-all elements alien to
traditional Quebecois society-and have never elected
a federal NDP MP. Still, the NDP hopes to exploit
the threat posed by the Progressive Conservatives to
the Liberal Party's traditional hegemony in Quebec-
the Liberals now hold 74 of the province's 75 federal
seats. Recent polls indicate, for example, that the
Tories could take between 12 and 15 federal seats in
Quebec in the next general election. In its policy
statement following this year's convention, the NDP
announced plans to compound Liberal difficulties in
Quebec by mounting an extensive campaign of its own
in the province. We believe that the NDP has some
basis for optimism in Quebec simply because there are
nearly 1 million unionized workers living in the
province. In addition, we believe that the social-
democratic policies of the PQ government-which has
held power in the province since 1976 and has ob-
tained observer status in the Socialist International-
probably have begun to create a constituency in
Quebec sympathetic to socialist-oriented programs.
Moreover, the NDP's statement this July supporting
self-determination for Quebec-one of the demands
contained in the Western Manifesto-probably will
aid the party's effort to build an effective organization
in the province. In the 1980 federal election, the NDP
received 268,000 votes in the province-10 percent of
the total-and finished second to the Liberals and
ahead of the Progressive Conservatives in 39 constitu-
encies. By June 1983, however, polls showed that the
party had squandered this support, probably by ignor-
ing the need to build an effective grass-roots organiza-
tion in Quebec, and had only a 3-percent approval
rating. Recognition of this failure, together with the
westerners' insistence that the self-determination
clause become NDP policy, sparked the party's deci-
sion to make a major effort in Quebec. Although the
NDP has a long way to go in Quebec--there are now
only 12 functioning NDP constituency associations in
the province and the provincial NDP has been leader-
less since 1981-we believe that its projected cam-
paign in the next election could begin ive it a
foothold in the province.'
' In September, NDP hopes of making inroads in Quebec were dealt
a setback when the Parti Quebecois announced that it will support,
for the first time, a Quebec nationalist party, the Parti Nationaliste,
that is going to contest the next general election. The new party and
the NDP both profess a similar social-democratic approach to
governing. The NDP, however, is tainted for many Quebecers by its
traditional support for a strong central government, and the new
party probably will gain considerable support from advocates of a
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The Maritimes. Canada's Maritime provinces-New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and
New Brunswick-constitute another problem region
for the NDP. In July the party did not hold a federal
seat in the Maritimes and held only two of 204 seats
in the four provincial legislatures. The NDP is start-
ing from an even smaller popular base in the Mari-
times than in Quebec, having polled only 181,000
votes in the region in the federal election of 1980.
If the NDP is to grow in the predominantly agricul-
tural and resource-based economic environment of the
Maritimes, we believe it would probably have to
promote populist policies much the same as those
supported by the party's western wing-such as a
major reduction in the federal government's power to
intervene in the exploitation of the provinces' energy
resouces. Such a policy stance probably would place
the Maritime NDP parties at odds with the socialist-
labor orientation of the federal leadership and thereby
contribute to exacerbating intraparty tensions. In our
view, only Nova Scotia's militant coal miners' unions
and the rapidly growing Seafarers International
Union in Newfoundland would find the party's more
radical socialist philosophy attractive.
Precarious Prospects
In our opinion, the east-west compromise negotiated
at the NDP's convention in 1983 will allow the party
to hold together through the next general election,
now expected in late 1984. Intraparty strife is likely to
continue, however, and we believe that it ultimately
will culminate in a formal split in the party along
east-west lines. According to US officials, the Liber-
als' private polling organization believes that the
NDP will disintegrate within 10 years-an estimate
we find conservative given current circumstances.
Timing. In the unlikely event that the NDP should
acquire some access to power after the next election
by supporting a minority Liberal government, we
believe that there would be some worsening of US-
Canadian relations. In addition to pushing hard for
strengthened economic nationalism and striving to
differentiate, if not divorce, Canadian foreign policy
goals from those of the United States, the NDP would
probably act to limit the Liberals' ability to modern-
ize Canada's defense forces or upgrade its contribu-
tion to NATO. Moreover, we believe that the NDP
would attempt to exact from the Liberals, as the price
of its support, a revocation of Ottawa's permission for
the testing of US air-launched cruise missiles in
Canada.
Although differences between NDP factions would be
papered over temporarily in a minority government
situation, even if Trudeau remains Liberal leader,
such a compromise probably would not last long.
NDP leaders would have to steer a middle course
between their eastern and western wings to find policy
positions that would enable the party to work with the
Liberals. We believe that such an arrangement would
satisfy neither wing of the party and would result in
intensified intraparty conflict after the minority gov-
ernment fell.
If the NDP does poorly and fails to gain a share of
power in the next election, as polls now predict-the
party had an approval rating of only 16 percent in
November, down from an alltime high of 25 percent
in February 1981-we believe that a formal split in
the party may come as early as its next biennial
convention in the summer of 1985. Recriminations
between east and west would abound in the postelec-
tion period and, in our view, the westerners would
hold the NDP's socialist-labor orientation responsible
for the party's setback. At the very least, western
NDP leaders like Blakeney and Notley probably
would demand the subordination of socialist policies
to the more populist policies they advocate, particular-
ly full party support for the further devolution of
federal power to the provinces. We believe, however,
that the eastern leadership, ever mindful of the impor-
tance of organized labor to the party, would balk at
western demands and would thereby provoke the
westerners into an open, and probably permanent,
break with the party
Implications. A split would leave the party's socialist-
labor group concentrated in Ontario and the populist
western wing scattered across the four western prov-
inces. In our judgment, the Ontario group would
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Table 4
Western Canada: Distribution of Major Party MPs
in Federal Elections a
Liberal Party New Democratic
Party
1979
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
1979
1980
3
2
17
26
20
28
38
47
56
48
38
29
2
2
5
7
7
9
9
12
6
5
4
2
Saskatchewan
0
0
4
7
4
7
11
13
10
7
3
1
Alberta
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
21
20
21
19
British Columbia
1
0
8
12
9
12
18
21
19
16
10
7
8 Data do not include the Yukon and Northwest Territories.
b The totals in this column represent the number of seats that
potentially could have accrued to an NDP/Liberal coalition.
c The totals in this column represent the number of Tory seats
remaining after subtracting the vote totals of a potential NDP/
Liberal coalition from the actual Tory vote without the coalition.
assume a more radical socialist demeanor and seek to
have a national political impact through its union
affiliates. We speculate that the socialist faction
would advocate many of the policies now espoused by
the NDP but would eliminate the party's present
policy of promoting the devolution of some power
from Ottawa to the provinces. We believe that the
Ontario-centered and union-based federal NDP
would be highly visible because of its strident socialist
rhetoric, its location near the media center of Toronto,
and possibilities for at least limited growth in the
industrialized areas of central Canada. The likely
status of the Ontario NDP party as the province's
official opposition also will aid the federal party's
electoral prospects in Ontario. In our judgment, how-
ever, the federal NDP's attractiveness to the over-
whelmingly centrist Canadian electorate probably
would be minimal and its influence on the direction
and content of national policy would be scant.
We believe, on the other hand, that after a split the
NDP's western wing would be able to secure in-
creased importance on the national political scene
through some form of association or, perhaps, amal-
gamation with the federal Liberal Party. The two
groups currently are fairly close in their domestic
policy orientations-especially regarding medicare
and national energy policy-and the conflict between
them results primarily from the animosity felt by
many western New Democrats for what they perceive
as Prime Minister Trudeau's insensitivity and antago-
nism toward the region's interests. In our opinion, the
westerners, who have long been denied any significant
opportunity to influence NDP policymaking, probably
would seek to join the Liberals in some fashion after
Trudeau's retirement.
We also believe that the Liberal Party's hierarchy
would be eager to arrange an alliance with the
western wing of the NDP. Such a coalition would
benefit the Liberals by giving them a considerable
foothold in western Canada where the NDP now
holds 25 federal seats. In addition, an alliance would
lend the Liberals a certain radical chic that might
help refurbish the party's tattered image. We would
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expect that the addition of the western New Demo-
crats to the Liberal Party would marginally increase
the stridency of the nationalist emphasis of Liberal
foreign, economic, and energy policies, but that these
alterations would be more a matter of tone than
substance.
A review of the returns from the four western prov-
inces for the general elections of 1979 and 1980 amply
demonstrates why such an alliance would be attrac-
tive to the Liberals. In the federal election in 1979, for
example, a western NDP-Liberal alliance would have
outpolled the Progressive Conservative candidates in
18 of the 56 western constituencies they won. In the
federal election in 1980 the total would have been 19
of 48 Conservative constituencies. Such a coalition
would have divided the West's seats equally with the
Tories in 1979 (38 each) and would have won a
majority in the region (47 to 29) in 1980. Only in
Alberta would the Tories have won a majority of seats
in both elections (see tables 2, 3, and 4).
We believe that these returns indicate a path along
which the Liberals could seek to regain a truly
national constituency and one that would permit the
western wing of the NDP to find support for some of
its policies. In addition, we think that this alliance
would give the Liberal Party a long-term advantage in
national politics that the Progressive Conservative
Party, the only other national party that would re-
main after the breakup of the NDP, would find
extremely difficult to overcome. In our opinion, a
western NDP-Liberal alliance could be the boost the
Liberals need to begin a new string of election
victories similar to the run of successes that has kept
them in power for 31 of the 38 years since 1945.
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