SOUTH AFRICA: ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000100080005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
South Africa:
Armaments Industry
Top Secret
ALA 83-10160C
November
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
South Africa:
Armaments Industry
the Office of African and Latin American Anal sis,
with contributions from
This paper was prepared by
Chief, Africa Division, ALA,
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
It was coordinate
with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
ALA 83-10160C
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South Africa:
Armaments Industry
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Key Judgments Prompted by the perception of a growing military threat and international
Information available isolation, South Africa over the past 20 years has given ever higher priority
as of 15 September 1983 to meeting the equipment needs of its armed forces. It has developed the
was used in this report.
largest arms industry in Africa, and the government-controlled Arma-
ments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) has become one of the
country's largest industrial conglomerates, with assets estimated at $1.2
billion.
Although Pretoria's goal is to achieve self-sufficiency in arms production,
Armscor acquires some military equipment and considerable expertise
from abroad. Armscor's reliance on foreign acquisitions is most pro-
nounced in fields that involve high technology. To evade the UN arms
embargo, the South Africans make use of false end-user certificates and
employ middlemen or front companies to make military purchases abroad.
Armscor currently meets the bulk of the military's requirements for ground
force equipment out of domestic production. The domestic arms industry
produces such materiel as artillery and rockets, armored vehicles, tactical
communications equipment, mines, and small arms and ammunition.
The production of air and naval equipment remains a problem area for 25X1
Armscor, however. Although Armscor recently announced plans to begin
production of helicopters, Pretoria still faces problems in replacing its
aging fleet of fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. While South
Africa is producing missile-equipped patrol boats, it does not yet have the
capacity to achieve its stated goal of producing submarines and corvettes.
In addition, South Africa's production of some ground weapons systems
and higher technology items is inadequate to quickly replenish or build up
inventories. While South Africa has not encountered many problems in
supplying equipment for the counterinsurgency in Namibia, we believe that
it would be unable to fight a protracted conventional war with the current
level of arms production. This same weakness, in our view, would also
prevent Pretoria from becoming a reliable arms supplier.
Armscor's approach to arms production has essentially been one of
modifying available foreign technology to fit South Africa's needs. Only in
a few instances has Armscor developed entirely new systems. Moreover, at
each stage of development, Armscor has depended on foreign technicians
and engineers, equipment, or technology to achieve its goals.
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Barring a major change in the regional military equation or in South
Africa's internal security situation, we believe that Armscor will continue
to meet most of the needs of South Africa's armed forces through its two-
pronged strategy of foreign acquisitions and domestic production. Al-
though technology requirements will increase steadily, the flexibility the
industry has shown in developing and adapting weapons probably will
continue to work to South Africa's favor. We believe that, as in the past
when foreign technology, personnel, or materiel were needed, South Africa
will continue to acquire these assets despite its pariah status and interna-
tional embargoes. A major escalation of hostilities between South Africa
and its Communist-backed neighbors, the breakdown of internal security,
or a combination of external and internal security threats could, however,
result in armaments requirements significantly in excess of Armscor's
capabilities.
Thus far, South Africa's ability to produce arms has allowed it to pursue
aggressive military policies without being pinched by dependency on
foreign suppliers of weapons. Expected improvements in weapons produc-
tion will help to reinforce South Africa's sense of its ability to control the
southern African region. We expect this will make Pretoria more resistant
to US and Western pressures to modify both its domestic and regional
policies.
A serious dilemma for the United States could result from major hostilities
between South Africa and its Communist-backed neighbors any time over
the next few years, particularly in the event of increased Cuban and Soviet
involvement. In such circumstances, Pretoria would seek to increase its
covert purchases of Western military materiel and might also request
direct US and Western military aid.
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Organization
Requirements and R&D 4
Implications for the United States
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UN Arms Embargo Resolutions
Against South Africa
1963 Security Council urges all nations to stop the
sale of arms, ammunition, military vehicles,
and equipment to manufacture armaments to
South Africa.
1970 General Assembly and Security Council pass
resolutions strengthening the voluntary arms
embargo by expanding the definition of pro-
hibited items to include spare parts, licensing
agreements, and training of SADF personnel.
1977 Security Council adopts Resolution 418,
making the heretofore voluntary arms em-
bargo against South Africa mandatory.
UN resolutions calling for the embargo of arms sales
to South Africa have not had the intended effect of
totally stopping the arms flow to South Africa. It was
generally agreed at the time
that the 1977 resolution calling for a mandatory
embargo came too late to have an impact on South
Africa's ground forces and internal security units. It
was believed, however, that the embargo could nega-
tively affect South Africa's arms production capabili-
ties in high technology areas, such as aircraft, where
the country was highly dependent on foreign assist-
ance and supplies.
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South Africa:
Armaments Industry
In the 1960s, as a result of South Africa's growing
international isolation and the 1963 UN voluntary
arms embargo, South Africa made a commitment to
become self-sufficient in the production of arma-
ments. The stated goal of the country's budding
armaments industry then was the manufacture of
weapons needed for internal security. The urgency for
domestic arms production was renewed in the 1970s
after the United Nations imposed a mandatory arms
embargo, and developments in southern Africa
changed Pretoria's perception of the regional threat.
With the demise of the Portuguese empire and the
emergent crisis in Rhodesia, South Africa was con-
fronted with the replacement of friendly, white-con-
trolled governments in neighboring states by leftist
black regimes and a dramatic rise in Communist
presence in the region. During the decade of the
1970s, the task of the arms industry expanded to the
production of weapons needed for defense against
external threats. In recent years the sophistication of
the industry has increased, with emphasis on the
development of electronics and advanced weapons
systems.
This paper reviews the development and production
capabilities of the South African armaments industry
and assesses Pretoria's claim that the goal of self-
sufficiency has largely been met.
Structure and Functions of the Armaments Industry
Armscor's senior managers.
Organization
Aside from a brief effort during World War II, South
Africa did not establish an arms production industry
until after the Afrikaner National Party came into
power in 1948. In 1951 the government organized the
Defense Production Office, which a year later opened
a small arms and ammunition plant. By the early
1960s the name of the organization was changed to
the Armaments Board and its responsibilities expand-
ed to include the acquisition of foreign equipment and
licenses to produce rifles and armored vehicles. It also
set up plants for the production of military high
explosives and propellants.
In 1968 the armaments industry was reorganized.
Legislation of that year created the Armaments
Development and Production Corporation of South
Africa, Ltd. (Armscor). The government provided
Armscor with initial capital of R100 million ($140
million) and gave it control over existing armaments
plants.' The Armaments Board retained responsibility
for purchasing-either abroad or from private South
African firms-equipment that could not be produced
by Armscor.
The present organization of the armaments industry
dates to 1977, when the Armaments Board and
Armscor were merged to become the Armaments
Corporation of South Africa, Ltd., known-like its
predecessor-as Armscor The new 25X1
Armscor was given responsibility for research, devel-
opment, production, and testing of armaments re-
quired by the South African Defense Force (SADF) 25X1
and the police. It was also tasked with purchasing
abroad or manufacturing by itself equipment which,
because of economic, technical, or security consider-
ations, could not be produced by the private sector in
policies are set and executed by a Board of Directors 25X1
whose members are drawn from the military (the
Chief of the SADF), the government (the Director
General of Finance), private industry, academia, and
South Africa. In line with this charter, Armscor's
' All currency conversions in this paper are at the then prevailing
exchange rates between the South African rand and the US dollar
unless otherwise indicated. (The current rate is R1.00 = $.90.) F_
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Figure 1
South African Spending for Defense and Arms Procurement
Defense Spending
Percent of national budget
ARMSCOR/SDA Allocations
Percent of defense budget
Total
SDA
Funding
From its modest beginnings, Armscor has become one
of the largest industrial conglomerates in South Afri-
ca, with assets estimated at R1.3 billion ($1.2 billion),
according to the 1982 defense white paper.
Armscor is funded directly through the defense bud-
get, which has accounted for 10 to 20 percent of total
national expenditures since 1975, when measured in
constant 1975 US dollars (see table 2). Within the
defense budget, allocations for the production and
procurement of armaments are carried under "Arms-
cor" and a "Special Defense Account (SDA)." Using
South African budget documents, we estimate that all
the funds for procurement come from the SDA and
those for operations and maintenance from the Arms-
cor account. Together, SDA and Armscor allocations
have made up between 60 and 70 percent of the
defense budget since 1975 (see figure 1). In recent
years Armscor also has borrowed small amounts of
funds in the domestic capital market.
We estimate that since 1975 allocations for Armscor
and the SDA have grown at an average real rate of
about 2 percent annually, although growth rates have
fluctuated widely from year to year. These fluctua-
tions have been due in part to cancellations of foreign
contracts because of the 1977 mandatory UN embar-
go, a slowdown in the establishment of new subsidiar-
ies, and changes in domestic production schedules.
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Table 2
Armscor Budget 1975-82 a
Current expenditure b
41
56
53
28
33
32
35
44
Transfer payments b
32
32
79
122
85
29
50
51
Capital expenditure b
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Subtotal
73
88
132
150
118
61
86
95
SDA C
817
1,089
1,097
776
909
851
1,099
896
Total, Armscor/SDA
890
1,177
1,229
926
1,027
912
1,185
991
Total defense budget
1,329
1,639
1,813
1,510
1,590
1,520
1,878
1,567
Total budget
9,543
9,913
9,923
10,008
9,982
10,234
10,978
NA
a The source of the budget figures is the yearly "Estimate of the
Expenditure To Be Defrayed From the Revenue Account" as
presented to Parliament. The revenue account is financed by taxes
and includes all the main current expenditures for government
operations.
b As defined in official South African budget documents, current
expenditure is the recurrent expenditure of departments on goods
and services not intended for the establishment or acquisition of
capital assets-that is, operating costs, including research. Trans er
payments refers to amounts which will not be spent on goods and
services by the department on whose budget they appear, but will
be paid to other bodies or persons-that is, grants, financial
assistance, loans, and pensions. Capital expenditure includes ex-
penditures on goods and services that lead to capital formation or
the establishment or acquisition of fixed capital assets such as land,
buildings, and machinery.
Personnel
According to the South African press, in 1982 nearly
105,000 people were employed in weapons production,
of whom 80,000 worked for some 700 private firms as
Armscor's contractors. Armscor itself has boasted of
doubling its own personnel from 12,000 to 24,000 in
the last 10 years. The total number of workers in arms
production constitutes 7 percent of the labor force
1.5 million employed in the manufacturing sector.
The composition of the work force has also changed
over time. Initially, lacking qualified personnel,
Armscor had to rely on foreign technicians and
c According to official documents, in 1975 all the funds for
procurement were transferred from the Armscor account to the
Special Defense Account (SDA). SDA is described as a holding
account where unspent funds-due to discrepancies between lead-
times and yearly appropriations-are retained and carried over to
the following fiscal year. According to open sources, however, SDA
allocations finance "special operations" as determined by the
Minister of Defense. The funds have to be approved by the Minister
of Finance, but the Minister of Defense determines how to allocate
them without being accountable to anyone outside the Ministry.
engineers.
Armscor
continues to make efforts to reduce this dependence;
in 1981 it had about 6,000 trainees and apprentices,
according to South African press reports.
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Gunrunning to South Africa
Despite official denials, South Africa continues to
obtain foreign arms, even from Communist countries.
A few examples demonstrate how South African
ingenuity and international connections have foiled
the UN arms embargo.
West European press reports during the first half of
1983 detailed the case of a Danish shipping firm that
arranged 19 illegal shipments of arms from several
West and East European ports to South Africa
between 1978 and 1980. South African nationals
based in Liberia and the South African Embassy in
Paris dealt with the Danes in arranging the transpor-
tation, using false end-user certificates. Armscor used
an international "businessman" and a front company
with a London address to handle a part of the
transaction that involved the acquisition of Bulgarian
arms for Jonas Savimbi's guerrillas in Angola. Arms-
cor officials denied knowledge of the operation, but
the Danes involved were convicted of arms smuggling
by the Danish Government.
Requirements and R&D
The SADF and Armscor work closely in establishing
requirements for weapons and their production. The
SADF draws up the requirements and Armscor writes
the technical specifications. The government's De-
fense Planning Committee then reconciles weapons
requirements with military policy and technical and
financial capability. According to the US defense
attache, the Planning Committee includes the Chief
of Staff and several ranking officers of the SADF and
Armscor's two top managers. Armscor relies princi-
pally on organizations such as the Council for Scien-
tific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 2 and South
African universities for assistance on research and
development on weapons and components.
'The US Embassy in Pretoria describes the CSIR as a statutory
body controlled by the government. It performs civilian scientific,
industrial, and engineering research as well as covert, defense-
In early 1983, Danish press accounts described an
attempt to send an undetermined number of pistols to
South Africa aboard civilian aircraft. The shipment,
which allegedly originated in Austria and was clearly
marked `pistols, " was intercepted at the airport in
Copenhagen. Both sender and receiver denied any
knowledge of the weapons, insisting they were trading
rotor blades for a furniture machine. Two earlier
incidents of gunrunning this year through Copenha-
gen were traced to a sender in Italy.
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Figure 2
South Africa's Procurement System
South African requirements ARMSCOR
Defense Force
contracts
Research ~- Subsidiaries
services components
South African
Defense Force
acceptance and
storage
Table 3
Armscor Subsidiaries
Atlas Aircraft Cor-
poration
Aircraft production and maintenance
Eloptro
Electro-optical devices, night vision equip-
ment
Kentron
Missiles, rockets, and guided weapons
Lyttleton Engineer-
ing Works (LEW)
Small arms and artillery
Musgrave Manufac-
turers and Distribu-
tors
Small arms and ammunition
Naschem
Mines, bombs, and large caliber
ammunition
Pretoria Metal
Pressings, Ltd.,
(PMP)
Somchem Rockets, propellants, and explosives
Swartklip Grenades and pyrotechnics munitions
Telcast High-technology castings for Atlas Air-
craft Corporation
Infoplan Computer support
Krygmed Medical services
Kryspen Pension plan
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Armsco
r produces several mod-
neguns, and ammuni-
t quantities. Pretoria's
under license-of Bel-
e 5.56-mm assault rifle
addition, Armscor
renade launchers that,
produces rifle grenades and g
and light machinegun curren
copies of the Israeli Galil. In
gian 7.62-mm FAL rifles. Th
when manufacturing began-
first attempt at producing rifl
tion, although not in sufficien
els of handguns, rifles, machi
models (see figure 4).
Because of Armscor, South Africa has the largest
weapons production capability in Africa and the
SADF is the best equipped force south of the Sahara.
Armscor achieved this, as stated earlier, largely by
acquiring and modifying foreign systems to fit the
country's own needs. Only a few types of equipment
have been completely designed and built in South
Africa. With some exceptions, Armscor's. products do
not exhibit state-of-the-art technology (see figure 3).
Although Armscor is taking steps to increase output,
its limited capacity for the production of certain
weapons leaves gaps that are met by purchases from
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Ground Systems
South Africa has made the greatest strides toward
self-sufficiency in the manufacture of ground weap-
ons. Armscor now produces a variety of small arms
and ammunition, various types of armored vehicles,
and several large-caliber artillery systems.
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Figure 3
Evolution of ARMSCOR Plants and Products
ARMSCOR subsidiary
ARMSCOR contractor
Weapon system
Atlas
Impala
10 Kudu/AM-3/
Falcon/Ranger
No=
Durban shipyard
Minister-class patrol boat
Namacurra-class
harbor patrol boat
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Figure 4. South African iit/an-
trymen equipped with domesti-
cally produced rifles and mor-
Artillery. South Africa manufactures few artillery
systems, although it recently developed and began to
produce the towed and self-propelled versions of a
long-range, 155-mm howitzer-the G-5 and G-6,
respectively (see figure 5)
the impetus to develop the G-5 came during
South Africa's intervention in the Angolan civil war
in 1975, when artillery used by the SADF was unable
to match the range of Soviet artillery used by the
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Figure 5. Top: A South Afri-
can-produced Samil artillery
prime mover towing the G-5,
the 155-mm howitzer into posi-
tion. Bottom: The G-6, the self-
propelled version of the South
African-produced 155-mm
Armscor also developed a 127-mm multiple rocket Tanks. Armscor's tank production has consisted most-
launcher after South Africa's incursion into Angola in
1975 (see figure 6). The system-which reached pro-
duction in 1980-is patterned on the Soviet BM-21
rocket launcher, which the South Africans encoun-
tered in Angola. Armscor also produces mortar
rounds based on British designs and 60-mm and
81-mm mortars of French design
ly of modifying and upgrading British Centurions,
have an indigenous replacement
dubbed the Olifant-will satisfy South Africa's re-
quirements until the 1990s, when Armscor hopes to
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We believe that South Africa has the capability to
produce the Olifant domestically. South Africa has
produced diesel engines since 1978-although they
are primarily for trucks and tractors-and transmis-
sions since the mid-1970s. Almost any of the South
African shipyards or heavy fabrication plants have the
capability to manufacture hulls and turrets.
Light Armored Vehicles. Armored vehicles were the
first major pieces of equipment to be produced in
South Africa by private industry. In the early 1960s
South Africa started assembling the Eland, a version
of the French Panhard AML-245 reconnaissance
Figure 6. The 127-mm multiple
rocket launcher produced by
Armscor and designated the
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Figure 8. One version of the
Eland armored vehicle with a
90-mm gun.
vehicle, using imported machinery and components
(see figure 8). By 1979, according to press reports, all
parts for the Eland were produced domestically under
license
South Africa has relied entirely on domestic design
and manufacture for all other armored vehicles. In
1976 the Ratel Infantry Fighting Vehicle was intro-
duced by Armscor after about four years of develop-
ment. The Ratel has become one of the most heavily
used vehicles of the SADF (see figure 9). We estimate
that Ratels are now produced at the rate of 100 to 150
a year
In 1982 an armored logistic support vehicle that
would allow mechanized infantry to operate for up to
seven days and 1,000 km from their main logistic
support system was introduced as a backup to the
Ratel (see figure 10). South Africa has also modified
its extensive fleet of SAMIL, all-terrain military
trucks that originally were based on West German
design and components. They have been converted
into armored, mine-resistant vehicles and armored
personnel carriers. Among these is the Buffel, intro-
duced in 1973, which has seen extensive service in the
counterinsurgency war in Namibia and Angola (see
figure 11).
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Figure 10. The armored logis-
tic support vehicle recently in-
Kingdom and France, after the arms embargo. Even
though the South African Navy believes, according to
its own accounts, that it has made a "remarkable
achievement" in its shipbuilding program, the manu-
facture of large ships' and submarines-a stated
goal-remains unattainable at the present time.
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Patrol Boats. Armscor is building the Minister- or
MoD-class guided-missile patrol boat under an Israeli
license (see figure 12). Domestic production started in 25X1
1977-78, and by September 1982 the fifth boat built
Figure 9. Two Versions of the
South African-Designed and
Manufactured Ratel Infantry
Fighting Vehicle. Top: The Ra-
tel 60 with a 60-mm mortar.
Bottom: The Ratel 90 with a
90-mm gun. F__1
According to Jane's Fighting Ships, the South Afri-
cans have also produced torpedo recovery vessels since
1969, the Namacurra-type harbor patrol vessel since
at least 1981, and a large patrol craft that, according
to the US defense attache, is a copy of the British
Ford-class patrol boat (see figure 13). A South Afri-
can Navy officer announced last April that Armscor
is building a prototype of a miniaturized mine hunter
Naval Systems
South Africa's private shipbuilding industry, which
up until the early 1960s had concentrated on ship
repair, has been unable so far to take the place of
Pretoria's principal military ship suppliers, the United
which will require a low investment.
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Figure 11. Various Models of the Samil Trucks
Made in South Africa. Top left: The Bt(fel
armored personnel carrier. Top right: A mobile
Large Ships. Since the mid-1970s, the Navy has
repeatedly referred to a corvette building program
that would provide it with the capability to extend the
range of patrols beyond coastal waters
Ithe pro-
gram is still in the planning stage and at least a
decade away. According to US defense attache re-
ports, the South Africans already have blueprints for
the corvettes-delivered by France in anticipation of
the South African purchase of such French ships-
while British firms are believed to be providing the
technology for the engines and the communication
under way and that the Navy expects to adhere to a
timetable consistent with the need to replace the
submarines in 10 to 12 years.
Even though the Navy believes it has the technology
and materials and that skilled foreign workers could
be recruited for the production of large ships, none of
the shipyards in South Africa, in our view, has the
specialized equipment and engineering facilities to
construct modern submarines or craft larger than the
and electronics systems.
South Africa is also looking to replace the three
Daphne-class submarines acquired from France in the
early 1970s. Although as of 1982 no specific design
had been approved by the Navy, the US defense
attache has estimated, after talking with knowledge-
able South African officers, that preliminary work is
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Figure 12. The Israeli-designed Minister-class
guided-missile patrol boat built in South Africa
Air Systems
The establishment of an aircraft industry was one of
South Africa's priorities as early as the 1960s. The
industry was started with assistance from the French
and Italians, who helped in the design and organiza-
tion of an aircraft production plant and sold licenses
to South Africa for the production of aircraft
Fixed Wing Aircraft. In 1964 the Atlas Aircraft
Corporation, an Armscor subsidiary, purchased a
license from the Italian firm Aermacchi to produce
Impala MK1 jet trainers. In 1974 Atlas began to
assemble the Impala MK2 light ground attack air-
craft, as production of the MKI tapered off. Initially,
both versions of the Impala were assembled from
imported parts but later were almost totally manufac-
tured in South Africa (see figure 14).
Also in 1974, Atlas started assembling-under super-
vision of French technicians-French Mirage multi-
purpose fighter and attack aircraft from imported
parts. This was part of a $480 million agreement
signed in 1971 that allowed South Africa to purchase
15 Mirage Ills and assemble 48 F-Is only.
Figure 13. Other naval ships of
South African manufacture are
a torpedo recovery vessel
(above) and the Namacurra-
class harbor patrol craft (be-
Other aircraft production in the 1970s included four
propeller aircraft: C4M-Kudu, a light transport devel-
oped by Atlas based on an Aermacchi model; the
RSA/200 Falcon jet transport assembled under Brit-
ish license; and the AM-3 Bosbok and S.205 Ranger 25X1
military utility planes, assembled under Italian li-
censes (see figure 15).
At present the only aircraft being produced are the
Kudu and the Impala MK2. Armscor announced in
August that production of the Impala will end in the
near future. The South Africans have several projects
under way at home and abroad to modify and improve
their Mirage aircraft
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Figure 14. Impala jet aircraft
under production at the Atlas
aircraft plant.
Figure 15. The C4M Kudu, one
of the two aircraft currently
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Helicopters. All of the helicopters in the South
African inventory are of foreign manufacture. Puma
medium-size transport helicopters and Alouette III
general purpose helicopters were purchased from
DArmscor has not made public any details
about the helicopter it plans to produce.
South Africa remains dependent on foreign supplies
of technology, components, and spare parts for nearly
all of its aircraft. Since the United Kingdom stopped
supplying aircraft to South Africa in 1963 in accord-
ance with the UN voluntary arms embargo, France
stepped in to fill the gap. The French stopped supply-
ing fighters and helicopters in 1978, when they decid-
ed to abide by the mandatory UN embargo, although
they continued to honor contracts for spare parts.
Since the late 1970s, Israeli assistance to the aircraft
industry has replaced that of France. One form of
Israeli aid came to light in June 1983 when the
Mozambicans shot down a reconnaissance drone re-
ported to be of Israeli design.
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drone may be in the hands of the private sector;
according to Jane's All the World's Aircraft, a facili-
ty in Durban had produced two prototypes of drones
in early 1982 (see figure 16).
Figure 16. Prototype of a South Janes's All the World's Aircraft 1982-83
African-built remotely piloted
vehicle. Among its potential
missions are reconnaissance,
surveillance, and photographic
Future Aircraft Systems. South Africa so far lacks the
capability to produce high-performance aircraft to
replace its fleet of Mirages. It also has a need for
in-flight refueling tankers and various types of recon-
naissance aircraft, including replacements for its ag-
ing maritime surveillance and rescue aircraft. For the
latter, Armscor has expressed a preference for US
civilian aircraft that could be modified, F_
trate on domestic production of a fighter
This could be accomplished by modifying
and upgrading its Mirages or by designing and build-
ing an aircraft with foreign assistance. We expect that
South Africa will emphasize production of helicopters
to add mobility to its counterinsurgency forces.
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Figure 17. The Cactus missile was developed jointly by France and
South Africa in the 1960s. It is currently in the South African
CSIR estab-
lished the National Institute for Defense Research
(NIDR) in 1963 to develop and produce missiles, and
in 1968 CSIR set up a missile test range in Natal
Province. In 1978 Armscor announced the establish-
ment of Kentron, a subsidiary responsible for missile
development because of the many missile-related
projects that were under way.
Surface-to-Air Missiles. South Africa's first attempt
at missile production was a joint venture with the
French firm Thompon-CSF during the mid-1960s.
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Figure 18. The Kukri V-3 mis-
sile is now in service with the
South African Air Force on
Air-to-Air Missiles. The principal air-to-air missiles
domestically produced AAM, the Whiplash or V-1, purchased it from Israel. Moreover, the Skorpion
which was a modification of the US Sidewinder, a missile system is installed on the Israeli-designed
missile acquired from the United States in the early Minister-class guided missile patrol boat (see figure
(AAM) in the SADF inventory are the French Matra class guided-missile patrol boat.
R-530 and R-550 and the Kukri, which is made in
South Africa. In 1979 Armscor introduced its first
1960s. The modifications included upgraded propel- 19).
lants and motors, improvements to the guidance
system, and an optical sight built into the pilot's Antitank Missiles. Armscor has not yet produced its
helmet for a "look and shoot" capability. According own antitank missile.
to DIA analysis, the Kukri or V-3 is a more advanced
version of the V-1 and includes some features of the
Matra. Armscor unveiled the Kukri at the Athens
International Arms Exposition in October 1982 (see
figure 18).
Africa expected, in vain, that France would sunnly
naval surface-to-surface missiles (SSM).
indigenously designed and produced. However, both
the container-launcher and the missile are similar to
the Israeli Gabriel system. Doubting the existence of
a local capability for the manufacture of this missile,
the US defense attache speculated that South Africa
naval missile, the Skorpion, which it claimed was
Air-to-Surface Missiles. A program for an air-to-
surface missile seems to have been shelved in recent
years
Recent press reports that South Africa is
manufacturing a missile similar to the French
Exocet-with the assistance of an unidentified coun-
try in the Far East-remain unconfirmed
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Figure 20. A night-vision tele-
scope mounted on an R-/ rifle,
both ofSouth African manu-
Other Materiel
Electronics, Radars, and Air Control Systems. Ac-
complishments by Armscor over the last decade, and
its industrial expansion, lead us to believe that it has
the capability to produce at least some of the electron-
ics and optical systems, gyroscopes, and other compo-
nents of the guidance and control package as well as
propellants, rocket motors, and fuselages for their
missile systems. In 1980 Armscor announced the
establishment of a naval radar manufacturing indus-
try in South Africa.
Nonetheless, South Africa continues to be heavily
dependent on foreign sources for electronics, radars,
and air control systems.
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Fuses, Bombs, and Mines.
Figure 21. South African sol-
diers operating the manpack
version of South Africa's
newest frequency-hopping ra-
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South
Africa now has developed its own capability to pro-
duce various types of fuses, bombs, and mines. During
the 1970s, Israeli and possibly West German and
Belgian firms provided proximity fuses, as well as
equipment and technology for making fuses for small-
and medium-caliber artillery and mortars.
Bomb design and production have developed at a
faster rate than those of fuses even though there has
been relatively little foreign help
The US defense
attache in Pretoria estimates that the technology in
use now by Armscor in manufacturing mines is
advanced by Western standards.
Communications Equipment. South Africa claims
self-sufficiency in communications equipment. There
is little information to verify this claim, but recent
South African advances in the field reveal the extent
of its capabilities. In October 1982 Armscor
introduced at an international arms exhibit a new
frequency-hopping radio. According to the descriptive
literature, the radio as well as a mobile VHF radio-
telephone tactical command system are produced by a
private South African contractor for Armscor (see
figure 21).
In the most recent South African White Paper on
Defense, published in 1982, the list of accomplish-
ments of the domestic arms industry included self-
sufficiency in artillery guns and rockets; fire-control
equipment; short-range guided missiles; minicomput-
ers; mine detectors and detonators; mine resistant and
armored vehicles; tactical telecommunications equip-
ment; antipersonnel and antivehicle ground mines;
and small arms and ammunition. Notably absent
electro-optics, and electronic warfare equipment.
from this list are high-technology and costly equip-
ment such as aircraft, naval ships and systems, radars,
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With a few exceptions, we believe this list is accurate. 25X1
Overall, the South African arms industry has been
successful in supplying the SADF-in particular the
ground forces-with most of the equipment it has
needed, although at a higher cost than imports. The
industry has expanded to address most requirements
arising out of gaps in the inventory as well as to plan 25X1
ahead for equipment to improve military capabilities.
Nevertheless, the industry seems to be at its best when
it modifies, copies, or repairs existing equipment.
In spite of the industry's achievements, some compo-
nents have been unable to produce some arms in
sufficient quantities and quickly enough to replenish
and build up inventories. This was particularly true
after the Angolan incursion in 1975, when the SADF
expended large quantities of ammunition; at that time
South Africa turned to the European market. This
constraint particularly affects some ground weapons
systems and high-technology items which have com-
ponents of foreign manufacture and whose production
requires long leadtimes. This would impair South
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Africa's ability to fight a protracted conventional war
and, in our judgment, prevent Pretoria from assuming
the role of a reliable arms supplier in a third-party
conflict.
As South Africa moves to modernize its arms inven-
tory, it faces both old and new problems. Armscor has
suffered consistently from a lack of skilled personnel
at all levels. It has tried to overcome this by providing
training programs, sending its own personnel abroad,
and recruiting foreign personnel. We believe that
Armscor has made progress in this area, but it will
continue to be dependent on foreign technicians for
the development of future weapons systems.
Perhaps the most crucial problem afflicting Armscor
today is insufficient capital, which stems from the
continuing recession and budget deficits. The Navy,
for example, has been unable to begin a large ship
construction program because of a lack of funds.
Armscor announced in 1982 an arms export drive that
it hopes will help alleviate its financial problems.
While exports will probably rise from their current
low levels, we doubt that they will increase sufficient-
ly to enable Armscor to meet its financial objectives.
Barring a major change in the regional military
equation or in South Africa's internal security situa-
tion, we believe that Armscor will continue to ade-
quately fulfill the country's armaments requirements.
Although South Africa's needs for more advanced
technology will continue to increase steadily, the
industry has shown considerable flexibility in develop-
ing and adapting weapons-both notably with foreign
assistance-and probably will continue to do so. We
believe that, as in the past, South Africa will acquire
foreign technology, personnel, and materiel that it
needs despite its pariah status and international arms
embargoes. Achievements in the production of high-
technology weapons systems will, however, require
long leadtimes, even with foreign help.
A major escalation of hostilities between South Africa
and its Communist-backed neighbors, the breakdown
of internal security, or a combination of increased
external and internal security threats could, however,
result in armaments requirements significantly in
excess of Armscor's capabilities. A major broadening
of the Namibian conflict stemming from a direct
involvement of Cuban forces, for example, would
probably result in the irreplaceable loss of South
African jet fighters and helicopters. Already Pretoria
protects its inventory of Mirage jets by avoiding high
risk missions over southern Angola. Likewise, prose-
cution by the SADF of a "two front war" such as
might result from a continuation of the Namibian
conflict at current levels coupled with the eruption of
large-scale clashes along the Mozambique border,
would stretch the SADF-and Armscor-thin. In a
prolonged conflict of this nature, shortages would
appear across the board, first in aircraft and before
long in other categories of arms.
South Africa's achievements in armaments produc-
tion have allowed Pretoria to pursue aggressive re-
gional military policies without being pinched by
dependency on foreign suppliers of weapons. We
believe that improvements in weapons production will
help to reinforce South Africa's sense of its ability to
control future developments in southern Africa. This,
in our view, will make South Africa more resistant to
US and Western pressure to modify both its domestic
and regional policies.
South African officials, however, have frequently
expressed a preference for US military equipment,
especially high-technology items. Continued acquisi-
tion by Armscor of US military technology-either
through international arms dealers or through the
cooperation of close US allies such as Israel-will
create periodic problems for the United States. The
Soviets can be expected, for example, to cite South
Africa's ease in circumventing the UN arms embargo
to bolster their claims that Washington is colluding
with Pretoria against black Africa.
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Armscor's Export Drive
The principal reason for Armscor's aggressive effort
to expand and diversify its foreign sales is economic.
In addition to foreign exchange earnings, South
Africa looks to an expanded overseas market to
absorb its excess arms production capacity and to
reduce the unit cost of its products.
Current Export Campaign
In 1982 Armscor and its subsidiary for international
marketing, Nimrod Promotions, Ltd., began an
aggressive campaign to expand foreign sales. An-
nouncing publicly that exports had become the "new
priority, " Armscor began to organize teams to
market weapons overseas. It announced a goal of
increasing yearly export sales from approximately $9
million to $130 million in the near future and
expressed its willingness to sell arms to any country
that was neither Communist nor hostile to South
Africa.
We do not know how many transactions have been
concluded by Armscor since it began its drive to sell
abroad, nor is it clear whether the interested coun-
tries would keep the equipment or act as intermediar-
South Africa's Latin American market has received
the most publicity so far. During the Falklands
conflict, there were press allegations that South
Africa was supplying the Argentines with ammuni-
tions and missiles.
Nevertheless, the willingness of Armscor to sell arms
to Argentina probably improved its ima
tial supplier, at least to Latin America.
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More profound consequences for the United States
would follow should South Africa's external or inter-
nal security situation lead to military requirements
that outstrip Armscor's capabilities. A serious dilem-
ma for the United States could result from major
hostilities between South Africa and its Communist-
backed neighbors, particularly in the event of
increased Cuban and Soviet involvement. In such
circumstances, Pretoria would seek to increase its
covert purchases of Western military materiel and
might also request direct US and Western military
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Figure 22
Armaments Production and Testing Facilities
SOUTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Orange
Free State
KI
SOUTH AI
Cape
IN
IA
Richard's Bay
Durban
1 Aircraft
Artillery
Missiles
A.. Naval craft
Small arms and ammunition
Tanks and armored vehicles
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