AFRICA AND FRANCE: AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000100090004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
DIA review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
Africa and France:
An Enduring Relationship
Secret
ALA 83-10162
EUR 83-10247
October 1983
Copy 491
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m Intelligence
Africa and France:
An Enduring Relationship
Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and
Office of European Analvsi9.F---1
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on 25X1
Secret
ALA 83-10162
EUR 83-10247
October 1983
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Africa and France:
An Enduring Relationship
Key Judgments President Mitterrand's decision in August to send troops, aircraft, and
Information available other military equipment to Chad to counter Libyan intervention there
as of 15 October 1983 indicates that Paris intends to preserve France's traditional role as the most
was used in this report.
important Western actor in Africa. The move contrasted with Mitterrand's
rhetoric during his election campaign in 1981, when he heralded a lower
French profile in the region. It also marked a trend toward again
centralizing control of African policy in the President's hands, following an
attempt to decentralize it that was responsible for much of the hesitation in
French policy. 25X1
African pressure on Mitterrand to intervene in Chad highlights the
dependence of West African states on the French security umbrella to
protect them from Libyan and other threats to their survival. Moderate
African leaders like Senegal's Diouf and Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny
have made it clear that they regard anything less than wholehearted
French security support as a clear invitation to Libyan expansion through-
out the region. Paris now appears persuaded that failure to act would
undermine French credibility and influence in Africa. Indeed, the Socialist
government wants to reassure worried African leaders-including those
previously criticized by the Socialists-that France will honor its obliga-
tion 25X1
Mitterrand is keenly aware of the need to preserve extensive French
economic interests in Africa, especially in its former colonies. Of particular
concern are French participation in much of the commercial activity in
West Africa and access to strategic minerals in such places as Niger,
Nigeria, Zaire, and South Africa. The Mitterrand government does not
want to jeopardize efforts to develop financially profitable relations with
African countries outside the French community. Total French trade with
Nigeria and South Africa, for example, now exceeds the volume of trade
with all of Paris's former African colonies. 25X1
Continued problems in the French economy could force Paris to cut back
on its financial and military assistance to Africa. France probably will not
be able to meet the growing needs of its African clients indefinitely. This
will be particularly worrisome for French-speaking West African Govern-
ments that depend on French budgetary support and technical assistance to
keep their economies afloat. 25X1
iii Secret
ALA 83-10162
EUR 83-10247
October 1983
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We anticipate that Mitterrand, as well as moderate African leaders, will be
looking to the United States to make up any shortfalls in French assistance.
All parties probably will emphasize the importance to the United States of
maintaining economic well-being in the region and minimizing opportuni-
ties for Libyan or Soviet Bloc adventurism.
We anticipate that Mitterrand, to elicit a favorable US response on greater
financial support to Africa, probably will prove willing to continue, and in
some cases to improve, quiet cooperation with the United States in areas of
common interest in Africa. Such cooperation will be limited, however, by
his desire to preserve French interests and to enhance his standing with
Third World leaders. Paris also would become more intransigent if it
believed US firms were making unacceptable inroads on the financially
lucrative positions of French companies.
Any reduction in French economic and military support-if not offset by
increased US aid-would almost certainly prompt renewed efforts by
Tripoli and Moscow to extend their influence in Africa. A sudden
economic downturn and resultant decline in living standards, for example,
could prompt urban unrest that Libya might use to exploit the fragile
regimes in the area, especially those with sizable Muslim populations. We
believe that the Soviets will continue to offer military equipment and
training but will not try to replace levels of economic assistance now
provided by France. Moscow also is likely to cite any African economic
hardships resulting from a French pullback as a failure of French and US
policies in Africa
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Changes in the Policymaking Apparatus
3
The African View of Mitterrand's Leadership
5
The French Presence in Africa: Plus Ca Change ...
6
Changing Relations Between Non-Francophone Africa and France
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Africa and France:
An Enduring Relationship
The early indications that President Mitterrand's
Socialist government would abandon the activist, in-
terventionist role of previous French administrations
raised serious concerns among Francophone African
leaders and others about Paris's willingness to honor
its longstanding commitments in Africa. ' France's
large-if somewhat tardy-response to the Libyan
intervention in Chad has allayed some of these fears.
The French had deployed almost 2,000 ground troops
and 16 combat aircraft to Chad by the end of August
1983 and had halted, at least for the moment, the
Libyan forces and those of Chadian factional leader
Goukouni Oueddei
In addition to demonstrating once again France's
capability to intervene effectively in Africa, the Chad-
ian crisis also underscored that the first impulse of
most Francophone African leaders who feel threat-
ened is to look to the former colonial metropole for
protection and support. Indeed, the deployment of
French forces was preceded by repeated appeals for
French action by many Francophone leaders. None-
theless, the French response in Chad has not fully
eased African concerns about Paris's resolve to stay
the course.
Whether the French retain the will and capability to
act as a guarantor of regional stability in Africa and
whether the Africans still want them to play this role
are questions of considerable significance for the
United States. If the answer to either is no, the United
States will remain as the only Western power capable
of deterring direct or indirect threats against the weak
and unstable regimes of the region.
' In this paper the term "Francophone Africa" includes the former
colonies of Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Upper Volta. Zaire,
Rwanda, and Burundi, though French speaking because they were
Belgium's colonies, are considered separately from the French
community
To answer these questions, this paper looks at the
implications of French intervention in Chad in terms
of broader French interests throughout black Africa.
The paper delineates the French role in the political,
economic, and cultural life of the Francophone states
and outlines the vigorous extension of French com-
mercial activity developing in other regions of Africa
as well. Trends now developing that could jeopardize
Franco-African ties are discussed as are possible
alternatives if the French presence should falter.
Although France's African policy was not a major
issue in the presidential campaign in 1981, the Social-
ists' campaign rhetoric indicated that their victory
would prompt major adjustments in French strategy
in the region. In an interview with a leading African
publication, for example, Mitterrand charged that
President Giscard, by relying on the use of French
intervention forces in Africa, had failed to resist
effectively Soviet and Libyan expansionism and had
allowed the United States to make inroads in Africa
through health and rural development programs. The
Socialist leader advocated deep cutbacks in French
commercial dealings with South Africa, political and
economic support to southern African "liberation
movements," and a strong emphasis on human rights.
A Socialist Party document released in April 1981,
shortly before Mitterrand's election, went even fur-
ther by calling for renegotiation-implying a reduc-
tion-of French defense commitments to African
states.
Following Mitterrand's victory at the polls in May,
the new government initially moved to place its own
Socialist stamp on African policy. French officials
announced, for example, that relations with Africa
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The French stake in Sub-Saharan Africa is substan-
tial and wide ranging:
? France relies on Africa as an important supplier of
strategic minerals-petroleum, uranium, manga-
nese, copper, and cobalt.
? French interests own all or part of over three-
fourths of all commercial firms in Francophone
Africa. The largest, the West Africa Company
(CFAO), has more than 60 subsidiaries in Africa,
employs about 16,000 people, and had a turnover in
1981-the latest year for which data are avail-
able-of more than $1.5 billion.
? The African franc zone organization, while commit-
ting Paris to underwrite a stable, convertible cur-
rency in Francophone Africa, also controls a part of
member countries'foreign reserves and has used
these funds on occasion to support the French
currency.
? France provides African countries with more than
$1 billion annually in economic and military aid,
an amount that constitutes nearly 60 percent of all
UNCODED7sistance worldwide.
? Paris also underwrites the salaries of more than
10,000 expatriate teachers, technicians, and advis-
25X1 ers in Sub-Saharan Africa, many of whom hold key
positions in Francophone African governments.
This information was drawn from US Embassy reports, the press,
and "Foreign Military Activity in Sub-Saharan Africa" (D/A).F-
would be conducted on a strictly government-to-
government basis in keeping with the sovereign equal-
ity of all nations-a pointed rejection of France's
traditional paternalistic approach and of Giscard's
personal relations with such leaders as Mobutu of
Zaire, Bongo of Gabon, and former Central African
ruler Bokassa. The Socialist government also:
? Declared it intended to increase African participa-
tion in planning and implementing development
projects and to shift French aid away from direct
budgetary support.
? Condemned South African racial policies and stated
that the UN ban on arms transfers to South Africa,
which the Giscard government had adopted in 1977,
would henceforth be strictly enforced.
? Announced that France would press for an early
settlement in Namibia based on UN resolution 435,
which calls for South African withdrawal from the
territory followed by UN-supervised elections.
Mitterrand
and his top advisers came into office firmly wedded to
the notion that Soviet and Cuban gains in Africa over
recent years could be halted or even reversed by subtle
diplomacy, economic support, and judicious military
assistance to what it viewed as "progressive" regimes.
Mitterrand's personal role in weaning African nation-
alists like Houphouet-Boigny from the French Com-
munists in the early 1950s, combined with his success
in reducing the Communist vote at home, probably
led him to believe that France's Socialist government
could outmaneuver Moscow and Havana in Africa.
In addition to Mitterrand's long-term objective of
reducing Soviet and Cuban influence in Africa-
thereby easing potential threats to French interests
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there-we believe the President probably sees several
tactical advantages to improving relations with "pro-
gressive" regimes. These include:
? Demonstrating French "independence" from the
United States in the Third World when Paris is
widely perceived to be drawing closer to Washing-
ton on East-West security issues.
? Deflecting criticism from within Mitterrand's So-
cialist Party-and from the Communist Party
which has a role in the government-of the govern-
ment's accommodating approach to key Franco-
phone partners with which it has important econom-
ic and political ties.
? Moderating opposition in Africa and among some
frontline African states to continuing commercial
ties between France and South Africa
During Mitterrand's first two years, Paris took several
steps to broaden its contacts and influence among the
"progressive" regimes. The French have been most
active-and, in our judgment, most successful-in
countries where some French influence remained de-
spite an evolution during the 1960s or 1970s toward
more radical politics. According to US Embassy
reports, for example, the Mitterrand government be-
gan in mid-1981 to seek improved ties with Benin in
response to President Kerekou's apparent dissatisfac-
tion with Soviet and Libyan assistance.
French officials also thought they saw signs in early
1982 that Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso want-
ed to loosen his country's close ties with the Soviets,
according to the US Embassy in Paris. Mitterrand
visited the Congo in October 1982 and has used
summit diplomacy and security assistance to try to
regain ground lost to the Soviets.
Mitterrand also has sought to improve long troubled
relations with Guinea, despite his party's protests
against President Sekou Toure's poor human rights
record. He invited the Guinean leader to Paris in
September 1982 as part of an effort to encourage a
recent drift away from the Soviets. According to the
US Embassy in Conakry, Franco-Guinean relations
are slowly warming, especially in the economic area.
The French also have attempted to use their Socialist
credentials to try to wean "progressive" regimes like
Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia from Soviet and
Cuban influence. They have offered aid and increased
trade, but have had no great success.
The willingness of the present French Government to
assume the role played in Africa by previous govern-
ments was put to the test most clearly by the Libyan
intervention in Chad. Libyan military assistance en-
abled former Chadian President Goukouni Oueddei-
who had been forced from power by Hissan Habre in
June 1982-to seize the northern oasis town of Faya
Largeau and establish himself in the north following
an offensive that began in June 1983.
French material support enabled Habre to retake
Faya Largeau in July, but this success did not
compensate for the impact on frightened Francophone
Africans of France's refusal to respond to Habre's
appeals for direct French intervention. The Mitter-
rand government's insistence that it was not bound by
the mutual assistance pact of 1976 to do more than
provide instructors and logistic assistance was legally
correct but only added to African concern about the
adequacy of French security guarantees
The French intervened directly only after massive
intervention of Libyan air and armored units forced
Chadian Government troops out of Faya Largeau
once again on 10 August. By the end of August,
almost 2,000 French ground troops supported by
combat aircraft had drawn a "red line" across Chad
at roughly the 15th parallel beyond which the French
say they will not allow the Libyan-backed Chadian
dissidents to advance. This brought the Libyan-
Goukouni forces to a halt and resulted in an uneasy
military standoff, but it left open the question of how
the Libyans and rebels were to be compelled to
withdraw and a de facto partition of the country
avoided. 25X1
Changes in the Policymaking Apparatus
Divisions among French policymakers lay behind
France's hesitant reaction to the situation in Chad.
Early in its administration, the Mitterrand govern-
ment sought to restructure the apparatus responsible
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for French African policy. Mitterrand's initial moves
in this direction included naming his longtime confi-
dant Guy Penne to the Elysee African affairs adviser
post-in spite of Penne's admitted lack of experience
in African matters-and reaffirming the primacy of
the Foreign Ministry in formulating and executing
African policy. Although the President took care
publicly to emphasize his special interest in African
matters, he apparently left his key ministers-Foreign
Minister Cheysson and Cooperation Minister Cot-
relatively free to explore new diplomatic and econom-
ic initiatives with African leaders
The decentralization of the policy process touched off
serious infighting within the government on policy
toward Africa that pitted the advocates of a forceful
defense of French national interests against those who
oppose French involvement in African "tribal quar-
rels." Widely published reports indicate, for example,
that Foreign Minister Cheysson took the latter posi-
tion in regard to policy toward Chad, while Defense
Minister Hernu and Cooperation Minister Nucci both
argued for a strong response.
One clear result of the periodic infighting over policy
toward Africa has been a drift toward the recentral-
ization of policy control in the hands of the President.
There are many signs of this trend:
? The forced resignation of Cooperation Minister Cot
in late 1982 and his replacement with Mitterrand
loyalist Christian Nucci.
? Elysee adviser Penne, assisted since 1982 by Jean-
Christophe Mitterrand (the President's son), has
emerged as a key policy adviser, according to US
Embassy reporting. Penne and the young Mitter-
rand visit African capitals frequently-where local
French Ambassadors apparently are not always
kept fully informed of their high-level meetings-
25X1 and their Elysee office maintains direct telephone
contact with important African leaders.
Reaffirming Old Ties
French actions in Chad demonstrate that French
Socialists want to reassure worried Francophone Afri-
can presidents-including those previously criticized
by the Socialists as dictatorial-that France would
honor its military, political, and economic obligations.
According to diplomatic and press reporting, the
Socialists, like their conservative predecessors, believe
that France's ability to play a prominent role in world
affairs would be seriously weakened by a fragmenta-
tion of the pro-French states in Africa. The Socialists
also are convinced that maintaining and expanding
French commercial relations in Africa is necessary for
domestic economic recovery, particularly at a time of
high domestic unemployment.
The fact that a Socialist government that took office
pledged to a renunciation of military intervention in
African affairs now finds itself directly involved in the
Chadian conflict is an indicator of the evolution in its
policies and attitudes. The government now appears to
recognize that, despite its misgivings about authori-
tarian African rulers, the realities of French interests
and the ambitions of other powers require some
compromise of its ideals. This conclusion is supported
by recent public opinion polls in France indicating
popular approval of Mitterrand's Chadian policy.
Nonetheless, the weak French economy will hinder an
activist policy in Africa. The Mitterrand govern-
ment's initial policies had seriously weakened the
French economy by the end of its first year in office in
June 1982. Although Mitterrand is now carrying out
an austerity program designed to restore balance to
the economy, the process will take time. Thus, despite
France's obvious economic and political interest in
key African states and the ideological emphasis given
to foreign aid by the French Socialist Party, aid
programs are likely to be affected in some measure by
budgetary cutbacks accompanying austerity
25X1
The African View of Mitterrand's Leadership 25X1
Among some Sub-Saharan African states, President
Mitterrand's election was seen as an opportunity to
get greater French aid and reduce dependence on
Soviet political and military support. Generally these
were the states-such as Mali, Benin, and Congo-
that sought to break away from French influence in
the 1960s and 1970s. Although ideologically they still
line up with the Soviet Bloc and receive the bulk of
their military support from it, they have maintained
economic and cultural ties and a measure of military
cooperation with France. Congolese President Sassou-
Nguesso, according to US Embassy sources, wel-
comed the Mitterrand victory as one of the left that
would make Brazzaville's already close economic ties
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to France more palatable to influential hardline Con-
golese Marxists. For the Marxist regime in Benin,
Mitterrand's visit in January 1983 marked a reconcil-
iation with Paris after a decade of cool relations
highlighted by a mercenary invasion in 1977 that
many Beninois thought was French inspired. French
economic assistance to Benin rose 25 percent in 1982.
Benin, increasingly dissatisfied with the amount and
quality of Soviet assistance, hopes that the Mitterrand
visit will translate into an even greater increase in
French aid.
Moderate stalwarts such as Senegal and Cameroon,
on the other hand, viewed a Socialist presidency as a
threat to their long-established and privileged rela-
tionship with France, according to press and US
Embassy reporting. They were particularly concerned
about demands by French Socialist Party leaders for a
substantial reduction in France's military establish-
ment in Africa, for the development of a broader
French economic role in areas outside its former
colonies, and Mitterrand's coolness toward a number
of African heads of state-such as Mobutu of Zaire
and Bongo of Gabon-whose autocratic methods of
governing violated Socialist positions on human
rights. Malian President Traore feared that he also
was in disfavor with the Socialists because of poor
relations with them after he ousted a leftist govern-
ment in 1968.
African concerns about Mitterrand gradually dimin-
ished in the period before the onset of the Chadian
crisis. Many African leaders had come to see a basic
continuity in French policy despite some changes in
style and emphasis. Press and Embassy reporting
indicates African leaders applaud French support for:
? African demands for international agreements to
minimize fluctuations in prices of agricultural com-
modities that dominate African export receipts.
? African pressure on the IMF to increase uncondi-
tional loans for balance-of-payments financing.
? The African position that Western arms expendi-
tures divert funds from essential development proj-
ects in the Third World.
? Criticism of South African military activities in
Angola and Namibia
Press and US Embassy reports from the region indi-
cate that the Mitterrand administration has used
exchanges of visits with African governments to
strengthen official and personal ties. We believe that
visits by Mitterrand and his principal advisers psycho-
logically bolster the political stature of the host
African governments and are a valuable adjunct to
French development and military assistance. This
increased interaction between Francophone Africa
and Paris has led to closer cooperation on political
matters. In the last year, Senegalese President Diouf
has initiated discussions between the Francophone
heads of state and French Government officials con-
cerning the formation of a political organization that
would be a counterpart to the Francophone economic
unions established at independence. It would include
all French-speaking African countries and provide a
forum for them to discuss international political con-
cerns and to convey their opinions to pertinent foreign
governments and institutions. So far, however, the
proposal has not advanced beyond the talking stage.
The French Presence in Africa: Plus Ca Change ...
The Mitterrand government's increasing inclination
in its African policy to follow the precedent estab-
lished by conservative French governments is in large
part a response to the pressures exerted by its African
clients. According to US Embassy reporting, many
governments in Sub-Saharan Africa still look first to
Paris for assistance in heading off continuing threats
of destabilization and a deepening economic crisis.
For many African governments, French financial
assistance is crucial to sustaining their fragile econo-
mies, and French troops are protecting their ruling
elites from dissidents or neighboring governments.
Most of those seeking French help are former colonies
whose government structures, security organizations,
linguistic, educational, and cultural norms, and com-
merce, trade, and industry bear an unmistakable
French stamp, even after 20 years of independence.
An Economic Lifeline
The French derive substantial benefit from their
complex cluster of economic ties with the French-
speaking African states. Commercial distribution
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The West African Monetary Union (UMOA) and the
Bank of Central Africa (BEAC)-headquartered
since 1972 in Dakar, Senegal, and Douala, Camer-
oon, respectively-were set up to continue the mone-
tary arrangements between France and the newly
independent Francophone states. UMOA's members
are Benin, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and
Upper Volta. BEAC membership consists of Camer-
oon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and
Gabon. Belonging to these unions requires the African
members to relinquish significant control over their
monetary policies. They cannot print money, restrict
the flow of capital among member countries, or
independently revalue their common currency, the
African Financial Community Franc (CFAF), which
is convertible with the French franc at the fixed rate
of 50 to 1. Expansion of domestic credit necessitates
the agreement of France and all members of the
union and can total no more than 20 percent of each
country's tax revenues for the previous year.
Franc zone members must deposit their foreign assets
in one of the zone's two Central Banks. The banks, in
turn, place at least 65 percent of the pooled assets in
an operations account in the French treasury.
Through the mid-1970s, this account was in continu-
ous surplus, in effect providing a loan to the French
treasury. During the past several years, however, the
account has been running increasingly large deficits,
reflecting the persistent balance-of-payments prob-
lems of two of the zone's more important members,
Senegal and Ivory Coast.
Along with the monetary unions, African franc zone
members and Paris agreed to establish two customs
unions, the West African Economic Community
(CEAO) and the Central African Customs and Eco-
nomic Union (UDEAC). CEAO membership is the
same as that of the UMOA, and the UDEAC's
membership is identical with that of the BEAC. They
have facilitated free trade in certain commodities,
free movement of labor, and a shared external tariff.
The CEAO also has assumed the role of counterbal-
ancing the influence of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), a group of 16
French- and English-speaking, and two Portuguese-
speaking, members established by Nigeria in the mid-
1970s as a means of integrating the economies of all
West African countries. Although CEAO members
belong to ECOWAS, their primary identification has
been with the Francophone group and Paris, and the
Francophone states view ECOWAS-correctly in our
opinion-as an attempt by Lagos to erode French
influence in the region. 25X1
Some of the Francophone states belong to one of the
customs unions but not to the monetary organization.
Mali, for example, which left the franc zone in 1962,
has enjoyed since 1968 an open line of credit with the
French treasury, which has been used to cover
Bamako's persistent annual budget and trade defi-
cits. The French, however, are now eager to end this
increasingly costly connection and have encouraged
Mali's membership in the UMOA. In support of the
application, Paris has offered to forgive over $200
million of Mali's debts. Mali's application for re-
newed membership, however, has been blocked by
Upper Volta, which has been involved in a longstand-
ing border dispute with Bamako. 25X1
The Comoros also has a unique financial relationship
with Paris. The former French Overseas Territory
did not join the franc zone at independence in 1975,
but negotiated an agreement with Paris the following
year giving it its own currency-with the same value
as the CFAF-and setting up the Comoros Central
Bank with the same functions as the zone's other
Central Banks in Douala and Dakar.
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channels, sources of financing, product standards, and
long-established personal ties impel economic and
commercial relationships along a well-defined track.
Frenchmen in senior positions in many Francophone
governments use their influence to assist French firms
in obtaining contracts. French companies frequently
have as partners senior African government officials
to ensure that their interests are protected. French
import-export firms, shipping companies, and finan-
cial institutions all work together. French investors
receive substantial support from Paris in the form of
government guarantees by the French Insurance
Company for Foreign Trade (COFACE) and access to
substantial amounts of concessional money. About
half of all official French aid goes to African subsid-
iaries of French firms.
French economic influence is most fully realized in
the institutions of the franc zone-one of the few
relatively successful experiments in international
monetary and economic integration and the primary
factor behind the favorable economic performance of
Francophone states relative to their neighbors. The
zone provides a common monetary system for its
members, overseen by French personnel and guided
by French expertise through direct links with the
French Central Bank and treasury. The monetary
system is administered jointly by two African mone-
tary unions-the West African Monetary Union
(UMOA) and the Bank of Central Africa (BEAC).
They share a currency-the African Financial Com-
munity Franc (CFAF)-that is fully convertible with
the French franc (FF) and guaranteed by the French
Government at a fixed rate of 50 CFAF to 1 FF.
Members of the franc zone can borrow from the
French Central Bank at favorable rates and may draw
on an unlimited line of credit at a token 1-percent
interest. The convertibility of the franc zone currency
facilitates international trade and foreign private in-
vestment.
These benefits have prompted other African states to
consider joining the zone. Madagascar and Zaire
currently are debating the value of membership, while
' The principal institutions disbursing French assistance are the
Central Fund for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) and the Aid and
Cooperation Fund (FAC). The CCCE offers subsidized loans with
interest rates as low as 1.8 percent and repayment periods of 30
years after a 10-year grace period. The FAC is the instrument for
The Gambia is considering entry as part of its nascent
federation with Senegal. Gabon and Cameroon are
sponsoring the former Spanish colony of Equatorial
Guinea, which hopes to facilitate trade with its
French-speaking neighbors and reduce political insta-
bility. Mali and Mauritania, which left the CFAF
zone many years ago, have since reentered the cus-
toms union, and Mali is seeking to rejoin the mone-
tary union as well.
Nevertheless, the attraction of the zone for both
France and some of the African members is beginning
to fade. Its foreign exchange account with the French
treasury is a substantial financial drain for Paris
because of heavy borrowing by African members to
cover their international payments needs. At the same
time the Africans complain that they have to suffer
for France's economic ills because their currencies are
tied to the unstable French franc, yet they have no
influence on the decisionmaking process involved in
such economic adjustments as devaluation. De facto
devaluation-the value of the French franc relative to
the dollar has declined by more than 50 percent in the
past two years-has increased the balance-of-pay-
ments strain on African franc zone governments
saddled with substantial debt service payments and oil
bills denominated in dollars. Although it provides
some stimulus to exports, it also entails price rises for
imported food and other staples supplied by non-
French sources.
Another area of concern for franc zone members is
the prevailing high interest rates in France and the
freedom to transfer capital reserves within the zone.
The Africans claim they are losing sizable amounts of
money to French banks that otherwise could be
available for local investment. This is particularly
worrisome in the larger African economies, such as
Ivory Coast, where companies borrow the maximum
locally and invest it in French money markets. The
Senegalese press reports resentment over what the
Africans perceive as support for the faltering French
economy at a time when their own economies are
deteriorating. The same sources also indicate that
Senegal is planning to incorporate a clause in all its
trade agreements within the zone forbidding specula-
tive transfers.
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The deteriorating economic positions of franc zone
countries are prompting a major reassessment of
membership by all parties. According to US Embassy
reporting, the Africans want to shift some of the
burden of regional development from Francophone
community institutions to other Western and Arab
countries. They also are looking into the possibilities
of amalgamating their monetary and customs organi-
zations with ECOWAS, which has indicated during
the past year that it would be receptive to such a
move. Togo, Ivory Coast, and Senegal already rely on
the IMF for the sort of balance-of-payments support
that France previously provided. French press reports
indicate that Paris also would like to shift some of the
financial cost of supporting the franc zone to the IMF
and other multilateral organizations such as the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the World Bank.
The French Military Relationship
Both the French and the Africans have benefited from
a continuing French military presence in the region.
The French security umbrella has protected ruling
African elites and extensive French commercial inter-
ests from both domestic dissidents and the ambitions
of neighboring governments. ' Although the Mitter-
rand government has curtailed some security assist-
ance programs in Africa-Paris is providing fewer
personal bodyguards for conservative African leaders,
for example-the overall military cooperation pro-
gram is largely untouched.
' French forces have intervened in Africa far more often than those
of any other outside power-at least 18 times in the last 25 years,
These interventions usually have
occurred in areas of economic or strategic interest to the French.
The French have been called in by host governments to help repel
invasions from neighboring countries (as in Zaire in 1978); to
protect Western nationals and business interests (in Chad); to
mount air operations against insurgents (in Mauritania and Chad);
to provide a government with security protection at the time of
independence (in Djibouti in 1977). In at least one instance,
however, Paris acted on its own initiative, engineering the over-
throw of Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Empire in 1979.
The move probably was provoked as much by Bokassa's flirtation
25X1 with the Libyans as by the savagery of his rule-the French
Government's official reason for intervention
The Mitterrand government has steadi-
ly increased military aid to black Africa, in absolute
terms and as a proportion of Paris's total foreign
assistance budget. 25X1
The extensive network of personal contacts between
African and French military personnel developed
during the postindependence period continues, solidi-
fied by regular training and joint maneuvers held at
regular intervals in the African states. In Ivory Coast,
for example, the US Embassy reports that a strong
French military tradition has developed within the
armed forces; most senior and middle-grade officers
began their careers in the French military, and pro-
spective officers and many enlisted personnel usually
undergo training in France during their careers.
The presence of French troops is welcomed by many
influential members of African military establish-
ments as a deterrent to security threats and support to
the local military command. US Embassy reporting
indicates that Niger is counting on French military
support to counter any invasion by dissidents backed
by neighboring Libya, which has made no secret of its
designs on the uranium-rich country.
According to French Government statistics, the mili-
tary support budget now accounts for about 20 per- 25X1
cent of total French aid to Sub-Saharan AfriUNCODED
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Even before the Chadian crisis, the Mitterrand gov-
ernment demonstrated that it is prepared under cer-
tain circumstances to use its military power to protect
its interests and support its friends:
? In May 1982, Defense Minister Hernu, according to
the US Embassy in Abidjan, promised that France
would increase its military assistance and publicly
indicated that French guarantees to defend Ivory
Coast from external aggression could be invoked in
the event of external support for Ivorian dissidents.
? According to US Embassy reporting, the French
similarly have reaffirmed their intention to provide
military training and assistance for Niger. They also
have indicated to US and Nigerien officials that
France would intervene directly to defend Niger
against overt Libyan aggression, despite the lack of
a formal defense agreement between Paris and
Niamey.
? The Mitterrand government has responded to
Djiboutian concerns that France would reduce its
dominant military, political, and economic assist-
ance role there. Visits by Cooperation Minister Cot
and Prime Minister Mauroy in December 1982
resulted in commitments by France to maintain its
military presence (about 3,500 personnel) and eco-
nomic aid.
? Even in Gabon, whose authoritarian President
Bongo continues to cause resentment among French
Socialist leaders, the Mitterrand government has
signaled its intention to maintain close security
relations by increasing French participation in the
joint military maneuvers of June 1983.
? The French have maintained their military advisory
presence in Zaire; French officers continue to exer-
cise command responsibilities in the elite 31st Bri-
gade. In discussions with US officials, the French
repeatedly have emphasized that, although they are
unhappy with Mobutu's dictatorial style and toler-
ance of corruption, they see no practical alternative
French actions in Chad offer the best evidence of the
Mitterrand government's willingness to resort to mili-
tary means to protect the interests of France and its
allies. The almost 2,000 French troops now in Chad
represent the largest single contingency force sent to
Africa since the Algerian conflict. Moreover, these
troops have been deployed in forward positions, and
Mitterrand has publicly pledged that they will resist
any Libyan or dissident efforts to move south of the
15th parallel. We believe the French Government
realizes that it could renege on this commitment only
at the risk of enormous damage to its prestige and
interests in Africa.
Still, the US Embassy reports that France's initial
reluctance to send troops to aid the Habre government
has made Africans uneasy about the Socialist govern-
ment's willingness to respond decisively in a military
crisis. Such concerns, for example, have been ex-
pressed by Senegal
Cameroon also doubts that the French would provide
assistance quickly enough to handle an emergency
like the border crisis with Nigeria in 1981. As a
result, the Yaounde government is planning to in-
crease its weapons purchases and expand its military
capabilities so it can better meet military emergencies
on its own. More recently, US Embassy reports from
various African capitals and public documentary evi-
dence indicate that senior African officials are critical
of the timing and restricted nature of French military
support for the Habre government during the fighting
in August around Faya Largeau. Some are convinced
that a more decisive French intervention-possibly
just a few airstrikes at Faya Largeau-would have
prevented Goukouni's advance to the "red line" in
August. 25X1
The Fruits of Assimilation
One of the pillars of French influence in black Africa
has been France's cultural relationship with the area.
During the colonial period, the French undertook a
massive program to indoctrinate the African elite with
French culture. In Cameroon, for example, the Presi-
dent and Prime Minister, as well as a large percentage
to supporting his government
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of mid- to upper-level officials in many ministries
were educated in France. US Embassies in several
former French colonies report that the French still
donate crates of old school texts that begin with an
account of "our ancestors" the Gauls and provide a
highly negative image of the United States.
Since independence, the cultural assimilation process
has been taken over by Francophone African govern-
ments. They view the use of the French language and
cultural patterns as a way to unify their ethnically
divided states and give local institutions some interna-
tional validity.' Education at all levels is in French
with a French curriculum, and schools are heavily
staffed with French teachers. As a result, we believe
that a French mind-set-with its affinity for French
institutions and cultural achievements and its nega-
tive image of many aspects of US cultural, political,
and commercial activities-has developed within the
political and military establishments of many French-
speaking African states. These perceptions are rein-
forced by Francophone leaders' continuing close
personal contacts with members of the French Gov-
ernment and military.
French influence also is preeminent in newspapers,
radio, and television. US Embassies report that, al-
though all Francophone African governments except
Djibouti have established editorial control of the
media, they must rely on the French for technical
assistance and training. More importantly, they also
depend on the official French news agency for their
international news coverage, with the result that the
local audience hears the French Government's inter-
pretation of current events. With the expansion in
Africa of media facilities in recent years, French
editorial opinions more directly reach a wider African
audience than in the past. For example, the Gabon-
based Radio Africa No. 1, whose senior management
is drawn from the French Government-owned news
agency SOFIRAD, dominates Gabonese domestic
broadcasting and is a primary source of news report-
25X1 ing in much of the rest of Francophone Africa.
The very intensity of Francophone Africa's cultural
identification with France, however, has provoked a
reaction among younger elites. As a result, a number
of Francophone countries are seeking to diminish
French involvement in their educational systems and
the media. Niger, for example, is reducing the num-
ber of French teachers in its schools and has raised
the percentage of broadcasts in local languages from
10 to 70 percent over the last few years. Backlash
from a sense of "overassimilation" could cut sharply
into the French cultural presence in Africa in the
future and accelerate the process of Africanization.
The Role of French Expatriates
More than 200,000 French citizens 5-a fifth of all
those living abroad-live in Sub-Saharan Africa, with
the largest concentrations in Ivory Coast (40,000) and
Gabon (27,000). In our judgment, the cumulative day-
to-day influence of the French communities, particu-
larly in the economic sector, probably has an even
greater influence on African government policies than
do exchanges between African and French officials at
the highest levels. The closely knit group of French
officials and expatriates living in Gabon, for example,
is bitterly opposed to the Socialist regime in Paris and
is urging Libreville to distance itself from the Mitter-
rand government. In Ivory Coast, according to press
reports, a similar coalition is working behind the
scenes with senior Ivorian political figures to ensure a
pro-French successor to aging President Houphouet.
French businessmen in Francophone Africa are con-
cerned by what they call an economic "invasion" of
the area by the United States, a concern echoed by
senior officials in Paris as well as by Mitterrand
himself. 6 Elf-Aquitaine, the largest French oil pro-
ducer in Africa, is deeply involved in Francophone
African politics and is an important instrument of the
French policy to keep out US and other foreign
commercial competitors. A major factor behind the
company's aggressive posture is its reliance on black
Africa for over 80 percent of its total production of
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Paris has refined its use of political and military
influence and its targeting of economic aid and
technical assistance to a higher degree in Gabon than
anywhere else in the region. The effort focuses on
what will benefit French commercial interestsr--]
Gabon is an important French trade partner, supply-
ing petroleum, manganese, uranium, and lumber.
According to US Embassy reporting, large-scale
French investment in the development of these re-
sources has led to intertwining relationships through-
out the trade, manufacturing, and foreign aid sectors,
and to French control of the Gabonese economy. This
network of economic relationships has spread into the
political sphere, with close ties developing between
French business interests and the Gabonese and
French Governments. The French Government-owned
oil company Elf-Aquitaine, for example, organized
and finances the Gabonese Presidential Guard, which
is responsible for the personal safety of President
Bongo.
ease among high levels in the Gabonese Government,
French commercial houses, and the French Govern-
ment and advises President Bongo on political and
The "Clan, " as well as most French army and air
force officers stationed at Libreville, is rigidly con-
servative in its politics and opposes Mitterrand's
Socialist government. They have consistently used
their influence to ensure that French conservative
political interests are not damaged by Gabonese-or
French policies and that Libreville channels French
economic assistance to the benefit of French firms.
US Embassy sources report that Paris recently in-
structed the French Ambassador to ensure that
French technical advisers direct all Gabonese Gov-
ernment contracts to French companies, with the
threat of a quick transfer to a less desirable post for
noncompliance. 25X1
The Gabonese Government, according to the US
Embassy, welcomes the stability that results from the
pervasive French military and security presence,
which includes regular units of French troops sta-
tioned near Libreville, a large contingent of official
advisers, a motley group of French mercenaries, 25X1
and a num-
ber of former members of a now-disbanded Gaullist
paramilitary group. In addition, former members of
the French Foreign Legion who control the Presiden-
tial Guard and the "Corsican Mafia "-French police
officers directing internal security for the govern-
ment-are powerful elements in Gabon's security
organization. 25X1
security matters.
485,000 barrels of oil per day. The company main-
tains close links with Francophone African leaders,
particularly with Presidents Bongo of Gabon and
25X1 Sassou-Nguesso of Congo, according to press reports.
In addition to the businessmen, there are some 10,000
French technical advisers in Africa, many holding
positions that give them access to information and the
means to exert influence on behalf of French interests.
In Ivory Coast, for example, US Embassy sources
report that French advisers are placed in nearly every
Ivorian ministry. They occupy a number of senior
ministerial positions and are responsible for much of
the staffwork and planning. They have the ear of the
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In 1982 over 80 percent of the production of Elf-
Aquitaine, the French state oil group, was in Africa,
and the company is the leading oil prospector in the
region. Four countries account for most of the activi-
ty-Nigeria, Congo, Gabon, and Cameroon. Industry
sources claim that within the next 10 years Elf's
holdings in Angola will rank second only to those it
has in Nigeria and will be capable of producing as
much as 200,000 barrels per day.
The French Government is the company's principal
shareholder, and press sources claim that President
Mitterrand, like his predecessors, is usually involved
in the company's major policy decisions. He regards
the company as an instrument of French foreign
policy and a major source of government revenue.
Elf's policies closely affect local politics in those
Francophone African countries where the company
dominates the oil industry-Gabon, Congo, and
Cameroon. Earlier this year, a dispute between the
company and the Congolese Government over Brazza-
ville's share in company profits prompted Elf to
retaliate by cutting back on output and exploration
activities in the country. The conflict has since been
resolved by an agreement to adjust prices and tax
revenues on a sliding scale to reflect trends on the
international oil market. This situation was reminis-
cent of a production slowdown by Elfin the 1970s in
reaction to Congo's demand for higher profits. Then
the move almost suffocated the Congolese economy
and spurred political unrest that resulted in the
25X1 assassination of President Ngouabi
A similar imbroglio has broken out between Elf-
Gabon and Gabonese President Bongo. The govern-
ment wants to raise its share in the company from 25
percent to 34 or 40 percent by the end of 1983.
Although Elf has been holding back on production, it
has, at the same time, made relatively little effort to
find and develop new resources, a policy that has led
to a serious depletion of Gabon's known reserves. In
turn, the shortfall in oil revenues forced Gabonese
economic planners to extend the 1980-82 interim
economic plan for a year and a half and hold off on
the new five-year development plan until 1984.
Elf's managers are worried by the increasing competi-
tion from Western oil groups in developing oil poten-
tial in various Francophone African countries. In
Ivory Coast, for example, American companies have
made significant discoveries in areas that Elf had
earlier abandoned as noncommercial deposits. In
Cameroon, Elf lost its position as the sole oil produc-
er when the Cameroonian Government invited US
companies to share in the growing Cameroonian oil
sector. Even Gabonese President Bongo, a longtime
supporter of Elf, is using the company's investment
slowdown as a pretext for inviting non-French firms
to develop some of Gabon's oiii'clds. This has al-
ready led to one major find offshore last year by an
American firm.
According to press accounts, because of Elf's close
ties with the French Government and its economic
importance, chiefs of state of Francophone oil-pro-
ducing countries in Africa closely followed the selec-
tion this past summer of a new chief executive for Elf.
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minister and frequently are involved directly in the
decisionmaking process. In Gabon, French advisers
are using their government positions to screen non-
Despite the role of French expatriates in maintaining
French overseas interests, the Mitterrand government
is looking for ways to reduce the influence of the
predominantly conservative French communities in
Africa on the policymaking apparatus of the govern-
ment in Paris. President Mitterrand, for example, has
reorganized the once-powerful French security orga-
nization (DGSE) with its network of conservative
Gaullist agents and contacts throughout Francophone
Africa and removed its Paris-based core of old Africa
hands. According to press reports, the Mitterrand
government believes that information supplied by
these agents was responsible for many of its initial
problems of distrust and mutual misunderstanding in
Francophone Africa. In the Central African Republic,
for example, press sources report that news of the
transfer of power from then President Dacko to
Kolingba in September 1981 was withheld temporar-
ily from Paris by French overseas intelligence agents
in order to deny Patasse a role in the Bangui govern-
ment
Changing Relations Between Non-Francophone Africa
and France
In addition to strengthening ties with Francophone
Africa, the Mitterrand regime is building on previous
French efforts to develop financially profitable rela-
tions with other areas of the continent. To those areas
outside the French community, Paris is an attractive
source of trade and investment because of France's
willingness to extend credit on lenient terms to Afri-
can business partners, as well as its long experience in
African markets. Within the last decade, Nigeria and
South Africa have become France's most important
trade partners in Sub-Saharan Africa, thanks to
Nigeria's high-quality oil and Pretoria's role as a
supplier of strategic minerals, particularly manga-
nese, titanium, coal, uranium, and chrome. French
firms also are active in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Mozam-
bique, and Angola, and are partners with Paris in
expanding French access to the mineral wealth of
Zaire. 25X1
To obtain African support for this increased involve-
ment, Presidents Shagari of Nigeria, Nyerere of
Tanzania, Stevens of Sierra Leone, and Moi of Kenya
were among the first African leaders invited to visit
Paris after Mitterrand's election. In addition, Paris
worked hard to expand attendance at the annual
Franco-African summit, with the results that last
year's meeting in Kinshasa was the best attended
ever. More than two-thirds of Africa's 51 states sent
representatives, including over a third from outside
the community of former French colonial possessions.
25X1
Nigeria
Nigeria provides an outstanding example of Paris's
ability to woo non-Francophone Africans. The French
pushed their way into the Nigerian market in the late
1970s at the peak of Lagos's unhappiness with Brit-
ain's handling of the transition to majority rule in
Rhodesia. Nigeria is now the principal site of new
French investment in black Africa, and in 1980-81,
according to press sources, Lagos awarded French
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companies over $3.7 billion in new contracts. The
French have been doing well in the construction sector
and also are active in transport, retailing, and manu-
facturing. Peugeot, for example, has the largest auto-
mobile assembly plant in Nigeria and produced nearly
60 thousand vehicles for the local market last year.
Nigeria's improving economic relations with France
generally have not been reflected in their political
dealings, however. Lagos has not forgotten de
Gaulle's support of the Biafran secessionists and still
sees Paris as its primary rival for regional leadership.
Other contentious issues are French military sales to
South Africa, Paris's reluctance to press South Africa
on a timetable for Namibian independence, and
France's military presence in West and Central Afri-
ca. Nigeria sent its foreign minister to attend the
Franco-African summit at Kinshasa in 1982, but the
US Embassy in Lagos reported that Nigerian govern-
ment officials viewed the meeting as a manifestation
of the alarming extent of French influence in Africa.
Southern Africa
In southern Africa, contrary to widespread expecta-
tions, the Mitterrand government, in our judgment,
has been wary about fulfilling Socialist campaign
pledges to pursue an activist policy on behalf of
liberation movements. Some policy changes have tak-
en place, but Paris's actions generally have failed to
25X1 match its rhetoric.
The continuity of French policy toward South Africa
has been particularly striking. Despite shrill criticism
by French officials of South African racial policies,
Paris has carefully sought to insulate substantial
French-South African commercial ties from the polit-
ical fallout-with some success so far. The Mitter-
rand government, for example, has defended the
participation of French companies in the controversial
Koeberg nuclear reactor construction project, agreed
to fabricate nuclear fuel rods necessary for its eventu-
al operation, and approved large purchases of South
African coal and uranium by state-owned companies
to meet French energy needs. Moreover, according to
the US Embassy in Pretoria, French officials have
privately acknowledged that, despite their govern-
ment's adamant public stand on enforcing French
compliance with the mandatory UN arms embargo,
the South African defense force has been able to
obtain spare parts for its Mirage fighters and French-
built helicopters on the international market
At the same time, the Mitterrand government has
pursued efforts (begun under Giscard) to enhance
French influence elsewhere in the region. High-level
French envoys have visited nearly all of the region's
capitals, and several of its prominent leaders-includ-
ing Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe and Zam-
bian President Kaunda-have been received in Paris.
US Embassy reporting indicates the French have not
significantly expanded economic assistance to the
region, but modest military assistance has been given
to Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Burundi-countries
where French officials claim to see possibilities for
According to US Embassy officials in Paris, the
Mitterrand government's primary political objective
in the region has been to achieve a rapid settlement in
Namibia to reduce the risks of a prolonged-and
possibly enlarged-Soviet and Cuban influence. We
believe, however, that French officials are divided
over the best approach to achieving a settlement, and
especially over the issue of linking Namibian
independence to a withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola
Some foreign ministry officials,
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Cubans to leave only after Namibian independence is
guaranteed and the threat of South African interven-
tion against Angola is reduced. Cheysson publicly has
distanced France from any efforts to link a Namibian
settlement to a Cuban withdrawal, arguing that such
efforts constitute external interference in Angolan
affairs and give South Africa a pretext for remaining
in Namibia.
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25X1
Other foreign ministry officials and Elysee adviser
Penne, however, apparently believe that, although
France should not publicly support linking the two
issues, some linkage will be necessary to achieve a
settlement. We believe, based on discussions between
French and US officials, that Penne may be less
susceptible than Cheysson to pressures from the So-
cialist Party on Namibia. Penne, in our view, is more
committed than Cheysson to France's participation in
the Western Contact Group, at least in part because
concerned Frontline states-especially Angola-have
asked that France use its influence within the Contact
Group to facilitate a settlement.
Zaire
In contrast to Nigeria and South Africa, Zaire has
found its association with France useful politically as
well as economically. Mobutu's relationship with
French President Giscard d'Estaing was a key ele-
ment in the Zairian President's foreign policies.
France's financial support enabled Mobutu to reduce
his economic dependence on Belgium-the former
colonial power-and Paris's military support was an
important factor in maintaining the stability of his
regime. Mobutu's initial shock over the Socialist
victory in Paris-he had been on poor terms with the
party for years-has eased substantially. Mitterrand
has increased French military assistance, maintained
a large cultural program, and retained France's posi-
tion as one of Zaire's major foreign creditors. French
political support also has continued, as illustrated by
Mitterrand's willingness to hold the Franco-African
summit in Zaire at a time when Mobutu's standing
with other African leaders was at a low point follow-
ing his recognition of Israel.
The relationship between black Africa and France has
endured the crises of decolonization, the vicissitudes
of the African states' economic decline, continuing
threats to their political stability, and the Socialist
victory in Paris. In our judgment, the Francophone
states for the foreseeable future-whatever the out-
come in Chad-will continue to look to Paris as their
most reliable source of security and economic support:
? For the poorer Francophone countries such as Ni-
ger, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta,
and Djibouti, French financial aid is vital to govern-
ment survival. French funds provide food and other
essential goods for politically sensitive urban areas.
French personnel, needed to keep many of the
African economies and governments working, de-
pend on Paris to pay their salaries. There is no other
Western donor at present willing to step in and
assume France's role in propping up some of the
world's poorest countries.
? For wealthier Francophone states, such as Ivory
Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon, we believe the need
for a substantial French military and economic
presence will remain strong. Ruling elites, still
heavily influenced by French education and military
training, are concerned over the Libyan threat to
the region's stability and feel particularly vulnerable
to efforts by Qadhafi to exploit popular unhappiness
with the economic situation and declining urban
living standards within their countries. We antici-
pate that they will oppose any efforts by Paris to
reduce the presence of French troops, whom the
Africans view as an important deterrent to local
unrest. French involvement in these more sophisti- 25X1
cated economies is essential because of the lack of
adequate African capital or skilled personnel.
Nevertheless, there are a number of trends developing
that could, over the long term, jeopardize these ties:
? Governments in West Africa will be counting on
Paris to blunt Qadhafi's adventurism in the region.
Events in Chad and the French response to Libyan
military activities there, in our judgment, will shape
the attitude of other African governments toward
the French military presence in Africa. If budgetary
constraints make Paris reluctant to meet what
neighboring African countries believe to be their
security needs, this will cause many of those coun-
tries now depending on French support to have
second thoughts on how far they can depend on the
French security umbrella.
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? The Africans will be looking to France to be more
supportive of their positions on issues they deem
vital. West African Governments, for example, are
increasingly resentful of Paris's continued refusal to
cut off dealings with Qadhafi, particularly sales of
military spare parts. Another contentious issue is
French participation in South Africa's nuclear pro-
gram. If French business interests build another
nuclear plant in South Africa, it will almost certain-
ly prompt a storm of criticism from the Africans.
The Nigerian press already is sounding warnings on
this subject, and public pressure could force Lagos
to take some retaliatory measures against French
firms operating in Nigeria.
? French Socialist support of African opposition
movements, particularly those in single-party
Francophone states with publicized human rights
violations, will continue, in our view, to aggravate
relations between these governments and Paris.
African regimes in Guinea, Cameroon, and the
Central African Republic, for example, continue to
suspect French Government collusion with dissi-
dents harbored in France.
? African uneasiness over too great a dependence on
France is certain to increase as the present genera-
tion of leaders committed to a French role in Africa
passes away in the near future and is replaced by a
more nationalistic elite. A desire to reduce the
French hold on Francophone Africa could eventual-
ly receive a significant boost if popular resentment
continues to grow over the French overseas commu-
nities' ability to weather African economic problems
and maintain their affluent lifestyles while Africans
cope with financial pressures and declining living
standards.
? The rapidly rising costs of Paris's traditional kinds
of financial assistance-covering budgetary and ex-
ternal deficits and paying salaries of essential
French technicians-will be more difficult for the
French Government to sustain as it copes with
France's own economic slowdown. Paris also will
have to back away from funding costly prestige
development projects, such as the Kribi liquefied
natural gas project in Cameroon and the Konkoure
hydroelectric project in Guinea because of uncer-
tainty over their long-term economic payoff.
? A French decision to go ahead with reported
proposals to overhaul or revise existing franc zone
arrangements to secure an economic advantage for
metropolitan France would cause great concern
among African members over Paris's resolve to
maintain economic stability in their countries. At
the same time, African members could threaten to
pull out of the community if Paris is forced to
continue lowering the international value of the
French franc, resulting in increased cost for African
members' debt payments and essential imports such
as oil. In addition, the Africans are likely to urge
Paris to curb the sizable flow of capital from Africa
to France.
French willingness to accept the military and econom-
ic risks of a possible confrontation with Libya in Chad
suggests that the Mitterrand government, like its
predecessors, has come to regard the French presence
in Africa as an essential element in preserving French
prestige and influence on the world stage. At the same
time, Paris's acute awareness of its own inability to
continue to fund this presence alone has led it, in
Chad and in some other instances, to look to the
United States for assistance.
In recent months, for example, French officials have
suggested that the United States increase economic
assistance to Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Djibouti-
three of France's most important African outposts-
and have sought to obtain US financing for French
arms sales to Niger. In discussions with US officials,
the French also have sought US backing for their
attempts to wean African "progressives"-including
Congo, Benin, and Madagascar-from Soviet influ-
ence and to encourage Guinean leader Sekou Toure's
u `??-n toward less repressive domestic policies.
In our view, the Mitterrand government is likely to
continue to see both tactical and long-term advan-
tages in cooperating with the United States in Africa,
but such cooperation will have its limits. France will
probably look at each situation on a case-by-case basis
and always with a view toward preserving the primacy
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of French interests-particularly in the Francophone
countries-and projecting an image of French inde-
pendence in relations with the Third World. For
example:
? We believe that the French probably will continue
to favor close cooperation with the United States on
Chad, in part as a means of easing the strain on its
own resources. At the same time, Paris probably
will try to avoid open conflict with Libya, fearing
this could mire France in prolonged hostilities in
Chad. They will not want to do anything that would
provoke new activities by Libyan leader Qadhafi in
Francophone Africa, enhance his prestige among
Third World states, and perhaps push him closer to
the Soviets.
? We also believe Paris will continue to distance itself
from any efforts explicitly to link a Namibian
settlement to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.
At the same time, US Embassy reporting indicates
that some French officials recognize that some
agreement on the Cuban troop issue may be neces-
sary to reach a settlement on Namibia and are
willing to work privately with the United States to
reach a compromise among the interested parties.
Nevertheless, we believe French attitudes toward the
United States remain ambivalent and the government
is likely to keep a wary eye on US activities in Africa.
It is fearful of what it sees as a US predilection to
convert African quarrels into East-West confronta-
tions and suspicious that Washington intends to sup-
plant French influence in Africa. Although these
aspects of French thinking will continue to make
France an often prickly and difficult ally, they also
are likely to have the more positive effect of reinforc-
ing France's willingness to maintain its military and
economic commitments to Africa. The French suspect
that any slackening of their commitment would drive
the Africans to look elsewhere-and particularly to
the United States-for support
French concerns about US objectives in Africa also
will be influenced by French commercial and business
circles. They see the United States as a dangerous
competitor in "their" African markets, and we antici-
pate that they will use what clout they have in Paris
and in African capitals to keep US businesses out and
to make life difficult for those already in place. F_
From the African point of view, any decision by Paris
to ease its own economic straits by cutting back on its
financial and military commitments in black Africa
would prompt an intensive campaign, particularly by
Francophone leaders, to find substitute partners. High
on their list will be Washington. At a minimum, we
anticipate requests for a substantial increase in US
economic aid. In addition, Washington would be
approached about stepping up its military role in the
region-as indicated by urgent appeals this summer
by Houphouet and others for US military intervention
in Chad. The Africans probably would try to enlist
US help in persuading the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank to increase their assistance
programs and soften their terms. 25X1
African leaders will view Washington's reaction to
their requests as a sign of the importance to the
United States of its African relationships. A favorable
response would be well publicized by the Africans,
who probably would respond by being more supportive
of the United States on North-South and other
international issues. They also could lessen their
public criticism of US policies in southern Africa.
Failure to satisfy African expectations, however, 25X1
could provoke criticism of US policy, create a more
difficult climate for US businesses, and could prompt
threats to turn to the Soviets, the Libyans, or even the
Iranians for help. Such conditions also could prompt
the Libyans and the Soviets to take the initiative.
Politically and economically weak countries in the
region-especially those with sizable Muslim popula-
tions-would be especially susceptible to Libyan blan-
dishments or pressure. Moscow-which has long
viewed France as a competitor for influence in Africa,
particularly in training and arming the military forces
of Francophone countries-also probably would try to
take advantage of any slackening of Paris's interest in
aiding Sub-Saharan nations. Soviet efforts probably
would continue to concentrate on extending long-term
credits for the purchase of weapons and military
training, rather than trying to match the level of
economic aid now given by France. In addition,
Moscow would use the opportunity to blame African
economic hardships on the failure of both Washington
and Paris to step in with financial aid.
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