THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA: ORGANIZATION STRATEGY AND COMMUNIST TIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000100100003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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I f_ Directorate of Secret
The African National Congress
of South Africa:
Organization, Strategy,
and Communist Ties
State Dept. review
completed
Secret
ALA 83-10164
November 1983
Copy 2 3 8
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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Communist Ties
The African National Congress
of South Africa:
Organization, Strategy,
ALA
This paper was prepared byl of the
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
Secret
ALA 83-10164
November 1983
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Secret
and Communist Ties
The African National Congress
of South Africa:
Organization, Strategy,
Key Judgments The African National Congress, the principal anti-South African insurgent
Information available group, has a long history of ties to the South African Communist Party
as of 10 October 1983 (SACP). Pro-Soviet Communists, including some whites, today are well
was used in this report.
represented in the ANC's leadership and exert considerable influence,
especially over military strategy. The ANC's heavy dependence on Soviet
25X1 Bloc military aid is an important source of leverage for the SACP.
In the last four years, the ANC military wing-operating primarily from
bases outside South Africa-has conducted more than 110 attacks against
economic and security targets and government administration facilities.
Until the car bombing of South African Air Force Headquarters at Pretoria
on 20 May 1983, which resulted in heavy civilian casualties, the ANC
generally avoided inflicting casualties on civilians during its operations. In
the near term, we judge that the ANC is unlikely to engage in indiscriminate
terrorism but probably will strike government targets-especially security-
related facilities and security personnel-more frequently than in the past.
In addition, its efforts to avoid civilian casualties during some of its major
operations probably will be less stringent, or-as in the car bombing
incident-nonexistent.
The ANC is not a cohesive group. Both the Communists and non-Com-
munist black veterans in the ANC leadership have restrained for years a
large group of young, black, militant nationalists in the lower ranks, who
resent the influential roles of Communists and whites in the organization
and are eager to begin a terrorist campaign directed against white civilians.
The leadership has refused to sanction such a campaign, but disgruntled
black renegades in the ANC could initiate attacks against whites at any
time. We believe, however, that the car bombing-which was directed
against a military target but caused heavy casualties-may have been the
result of an internal compromise between the militant and cautious factions
and has helped to reduce tensions within the organization.
The ANC's military campaign is unlikely to pose a major threat to the white
regime in the foreseeable future. South African security forces have numer-
ous informers in the ANC and are able to thwart many of the group's
operations in their early stages. Moreover, support from black African
governments is vital to the ANC's ability to sustain a military campaign,
and Pretoria has used its military strength and economic leverage to coerce
Secret
ALA 83-10164
November 1983
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several key states into cracking down on the ANC, especially since the car
bombing. As a result, the ANC is increasingly becoming a political hot
potato in the region, and nervous host states are circumscribing the group's
activities.
Within South Africa, the ANC remains the most popular opposition group
among blacks, and support for it has grown since it launched a military
campaign in 1980. We believe that Moscow and the SACP realize that
Pretoria's capable security apparatus limits the prospects of the ANC's
military campaign. In our view, they see more potential in using the ANC's
appeal among blacks to gain control of the growing black labor movement in
South Africa
The ANC's increased propaganda attacks against the United States-and
particularly against the policy of constructive engagement toward Pre-
toria-could damage US relations with South Africa's black community in
the long term. Moreover, the ANC recently has threatened to attack foreign
firms in South Africa that it claims have become "militarized" as a result of
extensive security measures. If the ANC launches a bloodier campaign,
South Africa is likely to step up cross-border operations, thereby complicat-
ing US efforts to promote stability in southern Africa. We judge that a
greater number of casualties would also steel opposition among whites,
especially Afrikaners, to any political reforms that would fundamentally
alter the apartheid system.
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Longstanding Ties
Present Dynamics of ANC-SACP Relations 2
An Armed Propaganda Campaign
Focusing on Black Unions
Impediments to the Military Campaign
25X1
Implications for the United States
A. A Chronology of Ties Between the ANC and the
South African Communist Party
2. African National Congress (ANC) Attacks, 1981 Through
10 October 1983
African National Congress in Southern Africa
25X1
i
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The African National Congress
of South Africa:
Organization, Strategy,
and Communist Ties
The car bomb the African National Congress set off
in front of South African Air Force Headquarters in
Pretoria on 20 May 1983 represented a major depar-
ture from the group's policy of avoiding civilian
casualties. The incident has raised new concerns
about the strategy of the ANC and the extent of its
ties with Communist regimes and organizations
This paper assesses the scope and nature of the
ANC's Communist ties and the internal tensions they
have fostered, reviews ANC military operations in
recent years, and discusses the implications of the
group's probable future strategy on US interests in
the area. Appendixes provide a detailed chronology of
important events in the history of the ANC and the
South African Communist Party (SACP), as well as a
survey of prominent ANC and SACP personalities.
There have been some South African Communists in
the ANC during most of the last 60 years. The ANC
was formed in 1912 as a black reformist group made
up mainly of tribal chiefs and educated elite. The
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), which was
founded in 1921 and joined the Comintern the same
year, began recruiting black members and infiltrating
black organizations in the mid-1920s after the govern-
ment enacted a series of racially discriminatory laws.
By 1928, 1,600 of the CPSA's 1,750 members were
black, many of them members of the ANC
The CPSA's initial success in gaining influence within
the ANC came to an abrupt halt in 1930. After a visit
to Moscow in 1927, ANC President Josiah Gumede
triggered a conservative backlash within the organiza-
tion by advocating a program of civil disobedience.
Gumede was replaced in 1930, and the ANC resumed
its slow-moving reformist campaign. At the same
time, internal dissension over political strategy and a
purge of socialists by pro-Moscow radicals almost
caused the demise of the CPSA; its membership
dropped from 3,000 in 1929 to 150 in 1931, and the
party was moribund for more than a decade.
The CPSA experienced a revival in the 1940s, when
some of its members rose to prominent positions in
other organizations. J. B. Marks, a Colored CPSA
member in the ANC hierarchy and president of the
African Mine Workers' Union, led a strike by 74,000
black miners in 1946. Strong efforts by Marks and
other CPSA members on behalf of blacks tightened
the links between the ANC and the CPSA and gained
the latter new recruits.
Following the outlawing of the CPSA in 1950, black
Communists who had not previously done so joined
the ANC, while Communists of other races infiltrated
existing labor and opposition groups and established
new front organizations. Former CPSA members
secretly reorganized the party in 1953 and renamed it
the South African Communist Party (SACP). They
also achieved domination over the Congress of Demo-
crats (COD)-a parallel, legal organization of some
400 leftist whites-that had been formed a year
earlier. The SACP and the COD gained control over
a coalition of ethnically based groups-including the
ANC-known as the Congress Alliance, by taking
over joint working committees.
A major split in the ANC in the late 1950s reflected
in part the growing influence of the Communists
within the organization. Blacks with militant and
nationalist attitudes broke with the ANC and formed
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 1958-59. The
PAC argued that non-African-especially white
Communist-domination of the Congress Alliance
was reinforcing black African servitude.
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The South African Government banned both the
ANC and the PAC shortly after the Sharpeville
incident of 1960.' Forced underground, the ANC lost
its ability to raise funds inside South Africa and
began to turn more directly to the SACP. A former
SACP official claimed the SACP responded immedi-
value or kind of assistance provided by the Soviets,
but we believe it was mainly financial, although some
small arms probably were provided as well. In any
event, we believe the aid came at a critical time for
the ANC and was instrumental in tying the ANC to
the SACP.
A high command-comprised of leading ANC and
SACP members-directed the military wing, which
launched a campaign of sabotage bombings in 1961.
Police terminated the short-lived campaign with a
series of arrests of ANC and SACP leaders in 1963-
65. Those members of the ANC and SACP hierar-
chies who escaped the dragnet went into exile to
rebuild their organizations. The SACP was able to
expand its influence on the ANC during this period
largely because the SACP had more international
contacts than the ANC and was more experienced in
operating underground. In 1966, a Congress Consul-
tative Committee was established in London to coor-
dinate activities within the Congress Alliance.
In turn, most ANC leaders were Communists by
The ANC officially opened its membership to
nonblacks in 1969, but influential white Communists
who joined apparently chose initially to maintain low
profiles and work through black SACP members in
The ANC attempted to attract greater levels of
external support in the early 1970s, but was largely
unsuccessful until the Soweto riots in 1976. Thou-
sands of young blacks fled South Africa in the wake
of the riots and joined the ANC. Moscow, probably
believing that the riots signaled an extended phase of
violent unrest in South Africa, increased its military
In March 1977, Soviet President Podgorny met with
ANC Acting President Tambo in Zambia and
pledged increased military training and arms to the
ANC. Six months later, Tambo traveled to Havana
where he obtained a Cuban agreement to provide
training for ANC military personnel in Angola and
Cuba.
Bolstered by the new aid and recruits, the ANC
strengthened its infrastructure in southern Africa and
in the late 1970s conducted a small number of
sabotage bombings and haphazard attacks on police
stations. In 1980, it launched a more earnest and
organized campaign that has continued to the present.
Today, the ANC and the SACP maintain separate
organizational structures. This helps to play down the
image of a Communist and Soviet-controlled ANC,
but the two organizations openly describe their rela-
tionship as an "alliance.'
Connecting Links
The SACP is a pro-Soviet, semisecret party based in
London which remains well represented in the ANC's
leadership.
' Police opened fire on a crowd of blacks in Sharpeville during a
demonstration sponsored by the PAC to protest legislation aimed at
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Leninism, especially its doctrine of atheism.
with Communists but do not fully embrace Marxism-
The SACP-which claims that 90 percent of its
members are blacks-is solidly entrenched in the
ranks of the ANC
rank and file is comprised of three categories of
blacks: nonideologues, anti-Communist nationalists,
and moderate socialists who are comfortable working
SACP influence on the ANC's activities outside of
South Africa is more difficult to discern. These 25X1
activities are run by the ANC's so-called political
wing, which works primarily out of Lusaka and
London and has representatives in more than 30 25X1
countries. The political wing is responsible for produc-
ing radio propaganda, distributing propaganda litera-
ture, raising funds, and organizing political protests
abroad. In its official pronouncements, the political
wing frequently supports the foreign policy of the
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Soviet Union, but lists only moderate socialist aims
for the ANC rather than strictly adhering to a
Marxist-Leninist line.2
2 Since its inception, the ANC has avoided officially adopting a
specific ideology, presumably to broaden its internal and interna-
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25X1
Communist Assistance to the ANC
The ANC's heavy dependence on the Soviet Bloc for
military aid is an important source of leverage for the
SACP. The Soviet Union, East Germany, and Cuba
are virtually the only suppliers of military training
and arms to the ANC today.' Most of the ANC's
military training is conducted by Cuban and East
German military advisers at several camps in Angola.
The Soviet Union and various East European states
also provide some 200 scholarships a year to the ANC
China may become another source of military aid.
Tambo met with Chinese Premier Zhao in Tanzania
in January and traveled in May to Beijing. China,
which has provided materiel support to the PAC but
not to the ANC in recent years, is considering
supplying arms to the ANC, according to a Chinese
Foreign Ministry official. The Chinese previously had
offered assistance to the ANC during Tambo's visit in
for nonmilitary courses in the Soviet Bloc,
Promising ANC members
25X1 study general academics in the USSR for up to five
years, or trade unionism for up to three years.
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Tambo, 66, is a 40-year veteran of the ANC who
since 1967 has ruled in the shadow of imprisoned and
legendary ANC President Nelson Mandela. Tambo is
reportedly a non-Communist, but black nationalists
within the ANC emphasize his close ties with the
SACP. In our view, Tambo is a realist who acts in
accordance with the ANC's dependence on Commu-
nist sources of aid, but who sometimes resents having
his authority undercut by Communists. He heads the
ANC's National Executive Committee and is also a
member of the World Peace Council. He resides in
Lusaka, Zambia, but travels frequently.
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An Armed Propaganda Campaign
ANC operations in the last four years generally have
conformed to a set pattern. The categories of targets,
their locations, and the timing and methods involved
in these attacks strongly suggest that political and
propaganda objectives dominate ANC operational
planning. The ANC leadership, in our view, realizes
that its organization is not yet capable of conducting a
viable insurgency. It carries out operations primarily
to attract greater support among South African
blacks and to focus international attention on their
grievances.
Since 1980, the ANC has conducted some 112 attacks
against energy and transportation targets, government
buildings, and security personnel and facilities. Most
of the government buildings bombed were involved in
some aspect of black administration, especially the
system of pass laws designed to restrict the movement
of blacks in the country. Many of the attacks on
transportation facilities were aimed at disrupting the
flow of workers from the black townships to white
urban centers. Almost all of the attacks on police
stations occurred in the homelands or black town-
ships. These operations were designed to intimidate
black security personnel, whom the ANC accuses of
being apartheid collaborators.
The majority of operations have been conducted in the
most populated urban areas. Of the 78 attacks carried
out by the ANC in 1981-82, 51 occurred in the cities
of Johannesburg, Durban, East London, Cape Town,
Port Elizabeth, and their adjoining townships. The
remainder were scattered throughout more isolated
areas of South Africa and in the black homelands.F-
Some 60 of the incidents during 1981 and 1982 were
bombings and about 85 percent of these occurred at
night, primarily in unoccupied buildings or on isolated
railways. Daylight bombings, on the other hand, often
occurred only minutes before a crowd was expected or
after a train had passed. The pattern of these close
calls suggests that they were intentional and designed
to increase media coverage.
The ANC chose most of the dates for its attacks to
enhance their political impact. In 1981 and 1982, two-
thirds of the operations were conducted just prior to or
on an ANC historical anniversary or a white holiday,
or in response to events in South Africa with political
implications for blacks:
? Twenty-five incidents occurred in the months of
May and June. Important dates in these months
include: 31 May-Republic Day (anniversary of the
founding of the Republic of South Africa); 16
June-anniversary of the Soweto riots; 26 June-
anniversary of the establishment of the ANC's
Freedom Charter (the ANC's political manifesto).
? Seven operations were conducted on 25 May
1981-the highest number of ANC operations on a 25X1
single day. The ANC had called for a work boycott
on that date to counter white celebrations planned
for the 20th Anniversary of the Republic on 31
May.
Most ANC attacks are carried out by personnel based
outside of South Africa who infiltrate from Mozam-
ANC teams normally are involved in the operations:
the first identifies targets and provides information on
them; the second caches arms and explosives it has
smuggled into South Africa; the third carries out the
approved mission and usually exfiltrates immediately
Other evidence suggests that some ANC operational
teams remain within the black townships and possibly
within the homelands for months at a time. A press
report in January 1982 stated that South African
police had found an underground ANC facility north
of Pretoria containing weapons, explosives, food, med- 25X1
icines, and other supplies. Moreover, a steady stream
of ANC bombings in Durban in 1981 ended in
December of that year following the arrests of a group
of suspected ANC guerrillas in Durban. The group
was implicated in seven Durban bombings that oc-
curred over a nine-month period in 1981. The round-
up was followed by a five-month hiatus on bombings
in the Durban area.
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Figure 2
African National Congress (ANC) Attacks, 1981 Through 10 October 1983
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ANC attack (approximate location)
0 1983 (24 total)
? 1982 (31 total)
* 1981 (47 total)
Note: Number represents more than one attack
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The ANC in the last four years has conducted numerous operations,
including some "spectaculars, " near or on the following dates:
8 January
21 March
6 April
Solomon Mahlangu Day. Commemorates the death by hanging in 1979 of an
ANC guerrilla arrested in South Africa for participation in an incident that
resulted in two white fatalities.
Republic Day. Anniversary of the founding of the Republic of South Africa in
1961. The ANC resents that blacks were not allowed to participate in the political
processes, such as the national referendum, that resulted in the founding of the
Republic.
26 June Anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter-the political manifesto of
the ANC-in 1955.
30 July
12 September
26 October
Anniversary of the establishment of the Communist Party in South Africa in
1921.
Anniversary of the death in detention in 1977 of South African black activist
Steve Biko.
Anniversary of the Transkei's independence in 1976. Three other homelands have
accepted "independence" since 1976, but none have been recognized by any
government other than South Africa. The ANC has labeled the leaders of the
independent homelands as "collaborators who have furthered the grand apartheid
scheme of the white regime."
Heroes' Day; anniversary of the creation of the ANC's military wing-"Umk-
honto we Sizwe" (Spear of the Nation)-in 1961. The date coincides with the
Afrikaner holiday, the "Day of the Covenant, " the anniversary of the Battle of
Blood River in 1838 in which a greatly outnumbered group of Afrikaner
"trekkers" defeated Zulu warriors.
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The following attacks by the ANC gained extensive media coverage:
1 June 1980 Bombs explode at two synthetic oil plants and a large oil refinery in the Transvaal
resulting in $8 million in damages and lost oil.
Defense Force facility.
Six 122-mm rockets are fired at Voortrekkerhoogte military base near Pretoria.
Most miss the target or do not explode. There is little damage and only one black
civilian is injured. The incident marks the first ANC attack on a South African
Bomb explodes underneath a train carrying 350 passengers-mostly blacks-in
the eastern Transvaal, just before a river crossing. Major disaster is averted as
train does not derail. An ANC attorney claims that the operational team used an
outdated timetable and was horrified when a passenger train-instead of an
expected freight train-detonated the bomb.
view, with full commercial operation not expected until mid-1984.
Four bombs explode over a 12-hour period at the Koeberg nuclear power plant
near Cape Town. Attack occurs less than a week before scheduled fuel loading.
Damage is extensive and plant opening is delayed for about nine months, in our
Bombing of Bantu Administration Board building in Bloemfontein kills one and
20 May 1983 Car bomb detonates during rush hour in downtown Pretoria in front of South Af-
rican Air Force Headquarters. Some 200 are injured and 19 killed; more than
half of the casualties are civilians.
We believe that the ANC's armed propaganda cam-
paign reflected the leadership's concern that the
organization might not survive a series of determined
South African counterattacks against ANC personnel
in neighboring countries. The low rate of casualties in
1981 and 1982 supported the ANC's claims at the
time that it planned its attacks to avoid harm to
civilians: 28 civilians were injured and five were
killed 5 during 78 operations (seven security personnel
were killed and 14 injured in the same period).
Moreover, long time intervals-ranging from several
Two of the deaths were by assassination -a former ANC member,
who was labeled a traitor, and his wife. A third victim who died in a
bombing may have been the ANC member planting the device.
months to over a year-have separated the ANC's
most damaging attacks. The cautious attitudes of
veterans and Communists in the ANC may be a result
of lessons learned in the early 1960s, when a concert-
ed effort by the government almost wiped out both the
SACP and the ANC.
Debate Over Tactics
The growing tension within the ANC between SACP
members and black nationalist factions has been
reflected most strongly in clashes over military tac-
tics. The Communists reportedly have joined with
25X1 ,
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25X1
cautious veterans in the ANC leadership in restrain-
ing young black nationalists from engaging in random
terrorism against white civilians.
The car bombing by the ANC on 20 May 1983 in
downtown Pretoria was a major departure from the
group's policy of avoiding civilian casualties. The car
bomb-designed to inflict casualties rather than dam-
age buildings-was detonated during rush hour out-
side of Air Force Headquarters. More than half of the
217 injured and 19 killed were civilians, many of them
whites.
The incident may have been the result of an internal
compromise. The South African raid on Maseru,
Lesotho, last December, in which about 30 ANC
personnel were killed, could have prompted such a
departure from previous policy.
We believe that the Communists and veterans in the
ANC's leadership may have viewed the Maseru raid
as the last straw and subsequently yielded to the black
militants' longstanding demand for greater violence,
indicated in press statements, however, that the ANC
intends to intensify its attacks against security person-
nel, and that some civilians may be unavoidably
harmed during these attacks.
Although the ANC has inflicted only a few apparent-
ly unintentional injuries in 11 operations conducted
since the car bombing, we judge that at least one of
these operations was designed to kill security person-
nel. The ANC blew up 10 oil tanks near a small resort
town north of Pretoria on 10 October. Police subse-
quently found two explosive devices-set to detonate
one hour after the oil tanks exploded-at a nearby
civil defense headquarters. A Cabinet official publicly
accused the ANC of planting the devices to kill
security officials who met at the headquarters after
the oil tank blasts to assess the damage and do
emergency planning.
Growing Popularity
The ANC is the most popular opposition group among
blacks in South Africa, and support for the group is
on the rise, according to polls by academic researchers
and the press. Surveys conducted in 1982 indicated
that 40 percent of urban blacks support the ANC and
some of whom were known ANC members.
Nelson Mandela, the imprisoned ANC President, as 25X1
the most widely recognized and important black
leader. During the past year, the ANC's colors, flag,
and songs were evident at numerous demonstrations
and at funerals for deceased white and black activists,
would vote for ANC candidates for Parliament if
blacks and the ANC were allowed to participate in
elections. The majority of blacks consistently choose
According to polls, the ANC's growth in popularity
can be attributed to its military campaign, and grow-
ing anger and militancy among urban blacks. In
January 1982, a close adviser to Chief Buthelezi,
leader of the Zulu-based Inkatha movement, admitted25X1
that his ANC rivals had made massive gains in
developing grass-roots support in Natal Province. He
attributed the gains to the numerous attacks-some
17-by the ANC in Natal in 1981 and added that
blacks generally were elated by the attacks. Most
blacks interviewed by the press after the car bombing
in downtown Pretoria expressed approval of the act.
They generally shared the view that the white regime
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had forced the ANC to resort to more violent tactics
by conducting cross-border attacks and by refusing to
share political power with blacks.
Focusing on Black Unions
The ANC, in our view, has had little success in
transforming its popularity into active support. The
US Embassy reports that, although there probably is
an ANC network within South Africa, most of its
components are likely to have atrophied due to inac-
tivity and an inability to communicate frequently with
the external command.
We believe that ANC and SACP leaders alike fully
recognize that the military wing of the ANC is a long
way from posing a real threat to white control of
South Africa. Both organizations have shown remark-
able resilience, patience, and determination to stay
with a long campaign. As the two look for other ways
to promote their goals, they seem to have focused
increasingly on the growing black labor movement in
South Africa.
We believe that the Soviets also have doubts about the
long-term prospects of the ANC's military campaign
because of Pretoria's capable security apparatus. In
our view, they see more potential in using the ANC's
appeal among blacks to gain control of the black labor
movement.
ANC Acting President Tambo told the press in June
1983 that political action, notably among the half
million black members of the trade unions, is the
On balance, however, we believe that neither the
ANC nor the SACP has had any substantial success
so far in achieving direct influence in the black trade
unions. Union leaders, for their part, are highly
sensitive to the dangers that explicit connections of
this sort would pose to the survival of individual
unions.
Impediments to the Military Campaign
Regional Constraints
South Africa in recent years has used its dominant
military strength and economic leverage to pressure
its neighbors to crack down on the ANC.' The ANC
operates today under growing constraints as a result
of its deteriorating relations with several key states
that have been targets of South African pressure
tactics. Angola is the only state in the region that
presently allows a permanent, large-scale ANC mili-
tary presence; the group has military headquarters
and several training camps in northern Angola.
Botswana. Botswana has actively discouraged the
ANC from using its territory to stage operations
against South Africa.
have openly endorsed the ANC's political aims.
The main vehicle for SACP entry into the black labor
movement is the South African Congress of Trade
Unions (SACTU), based in Lusaka, Zambia. Founded
in 1954, SACTU today operates in self-imposed exile
and acts, in our view, as the labor arm of the SACP.
The president of SACTU, Stephen Dlamini, is an
SACP member, and SACP literature in recent years
Despite numerous arrests in Botswana of armed ANC
members, the group still has been able to mount some
covert operations from there. As a result, Pretoria is
skeptical about Gaborone's official policy that prohib-
its the ANC in Botswana from bearing arms and
has vigorously promoted SACTU as a key organiza-
tion in the black labor movement.
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Figure 3
African National Congress in Southern Africa
Angola
Cabinda)
LUANDA, 4NC
Mi/ tary
Hezidgi,irters
Zambia
LUSAKA
ANC Poldreal /~-
Headquarters
*
Zimbabwe
~~
1/-
South
Africa
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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using facilities and personnel to stage operations
against South Africa. The US Embassy reported that,
at a meeting in Johannesburg in April, the South
African Foreign Minister gave his Botswana counter-
part a list of 38 ANC activists operating in Botswana
and claimed that the Soviet Embassy there had
regular contact with some of these ANC members.
We believe Gaborone is likely to impose further
restrictions on the ANC in Botswana.
Lesotho. Until recently, Lesotho turned a blind eye
toward ANC activities. In August, however, Lesotho
announced that, in compliance with Pretoria's de-
mand, it planned to expel South African refugees
connected with the ANC and other groups banned in
South Africa.' The announcement followed South
African moves in the wake of the car bombing in
Pretoria to institute strict border controls and to
refuse to release foreign arms shipments seized several
months earlier while en route to Maseru.
The ANC's recruitment and operational activities in
Lesotho are likely to be reduced greatly if the govern-
ment carries out the expulsion. Nonetheless, the group
probably will be able to regain a small clandestine
presence in Lesotho because of that country's limited
security resources.
Mozambique. Pretoria's two cross-border operations
against the ANC in Mozambique in the last two
years-combined with South African support for
Mozambican insurgents-probably have weakened
Maputo's traditionally firm ties with the ANC. Mo-
zambique eventually may reach an agreement with
Pretoria that works against the ANC.
Because of the ANC's threatened position within
other states bordering South Africa, continued access
to Mozambican territory is critical if the ANC is to
maintain a military cam ai n.
the group pres-
ently has transit facilities in and around Maputo-
which remains the planning and staging center for
' Pretoria in mid-August presented Lesotho with a list of 68
refugees allegedly associated with the ANC whom Pretoria wanted
expelled. Lesotho claimed it would not single out the ANC but
would expel all refugees connected with groups banned in South
most ANC operations-and other Mozambican towns
near the South African border. A reliable source told
the US Embassy in August that the Machel govern-
ment generally keeps a tight rein on ANC personnel
in Mozambique and does not provide military training
for the group. The same source reported, however,
that Mozambique has not made a determined effort to
prevent the ANC from using Mozambique to infil-
trate South Africa.
The restrained response of the Machel government to
the airstrike South Africa conducted against alleged
ANC facilities near Maputo three days after the car
bombing in Pretoria' does not augur well for the
ANC. The Mozambican Foreign Minister told a US
diplomat in August that the airstrike had shocked and
angered Mozambique, but had not altered his govern-
ment's desire for more normal relations with Pretoria.
Swaziland. With a healthy respect for the wrath of its
larger neighbor, Swaziland has cracked down on the
ANC presence in the country. In the last two years,
Swazi police have worked vigorously to apprehend
ANC guerrillas transiting Swaziland. ANC members
convicted in Swaziland of possessing arms or planning
terrorist operations against South Africa are fined
and deported to Mozambique.
South African security officials report that Swaziland
is still the main infiltration route for ANC guerrillas
traveling from Maputo to South Africa. Pretoria,
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however, has praised Swazi security officials for
trying to stop the ANC from using Swaziland as a
springboard for attacks against South Africa.
Tanzania also allows hundreds of ANC recruits to
receive nonmilitary training at the ANC-run Solomon
Mahlangu College at Morogoro. In addition, the
ANC operates a large refugee camp near Morogoro.
Zambia. The ANC has its political headquarters in
Lusaka, but the Zambian Government closely moni-
tors the group's military personnel.
bian Government moved ANC military personnel in
Lusaka to two small camps on the outskirts of the
city, according to the US Embassy. The government
relocated the guerrillas to protect urban civilians in
the event of a South African attack against the ANC.
Pretoria has long threatened to take action against the
25X1 ANC in Zambia. After the car bombing in Pretoria,
Zambia-and other states in southern Africa-
Zimbabwe. To avoid provoking Pretoria, the Mugabe
government has not allowed ANC members in Zim-
babwe to carry weapons or use Zimbabwe to infiltrate
South Africa; the group, however, has been newly
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We believe that the Mugabe government will continue 25X1
to employ measures aimed at restraining the ANC in
Zimbabwe, and that the ANC eventually may wear 25X1
out its welcome in Zimbabwe. Following the two
aborted ANC missions staged from Zimbabwe this
year, some Zimbabwean officials speculated that the 25X1
ANC may be deliberately trying to spark a confronta-
tion between Pretoria and Harare. 25X1
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The ANC and the SACP will almost certainly contin-
ue their symbiotic relationship if only because the
alliance facilitates the ANC's access to Soviet Bloc
We expect non-Communist ANC leaders, however, to
continue to seek alternative sources of military aid to
offset the influence of the pro-Soviet faction. The
SACP, for its part, recognizes the value of its ties to
the ANC-the most popular opposition group among
South African blacks-and is unlikely to end the
relationship.
We believe that, in the short term, the ANC will
increase its attacks against state targets, primarily
security-related facilities in urban areas. The total
number of casualties in the next year-especially
among white security personnel-probably will ex-
ceed previous annual rates, but we expect the majority
of ANC operations in 1984 to return to the familiar
pattern of past years. We believe that the ANC's
efforts to avoid civilian casualties during some major
attacks will be less stringent in the future, or-as in
the car bombing incident-nonexistent. Black mili-
tants dissatisfied with the leadership's cautious strate-
gy could begin at any time a renegade campaign of
killing white civilians.
The long-term impact on the ANC of the large influx
of black militants that followed the Soweto riots is
uncertain. Many from the "Class of `76" eventually
may replace the aging black moderates in the ANC
leadership. The disdain many black militants show for
the SACP, however, may reduce their chances of
moving upward within the ANC, especially in view of
the extensive influence of Communists within the
ANC hierarchy. Moreover, as the young militants
gain more experience, their views on tactics may be
tempered by an appreciation of the capabilities of the
South African security forces. These factors may
result in a new generation of leaders who pursue a
campaign similar to the one now in progress. None-
theless, it is equally as likely that the ANC-or a
militant faction within the ANC-under the influ-
ence of a more youthful and antiwhite leadership will
pursue a more violent campaign, despite the over-
whelming hazards involved
We believe the ANC will continue to enjoy wide-
spread and increasing popular support, especially if
Pretoria allows internal groups informally associated
with the ANC to expand their activities and member-
ships. The largest of these was formed this year: the
United Democratic Front-made up of some 400
mostly nonwhite religious, sports, student, labor, and
civic groups. It claims to have a membership of 1
million, which would make it the largest opposition
group in South Africa
Although established primarily to oppose Prime Min-
ister Botha's constitutional reform proposals which
would grant limited political rights to Coloreds and
Indians, the Front, in our view, probably will address
a wider range of issues as its membership grows. The
Front already has taken the lead in a new campaign to
gain Nelson Mandela's release from prison. The
leadership of the Front is composed largely of blacks
with strong connections to the ANC, according to the
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US Embassy. Many groups in the Front are known to
give allegiance to the ANC and its multiracial, mildly
socialist, political manifesto-the Freedom Charter.
The ANC increasingly has directed its propaganda
attacks against the United States and its policy of
constructive engagement with Pretoria. Because of
the group's popularity among South African blacks,
these attacks could damage US relations with South
Africa's black community in the long term
After the car bombing in Pretoria, Tambo publicly
warned foreign firms in South Africa that the ANC
might attack them. Referring to independent security
measures taken by many of these firms, Tambo said
that "foreign firms have become militarized" and
"foreign capital is now part of South Africa's military
might." We believe that the ANC may initiate at-
tacks against foreign businesses in the next few years
in an attempt to drive away foreign capital and
further isolate the white regime.
The cycle of ANC attacks and South African "pre-
emptive" and retaliatory raids already has complicat-
ed US efforts to encourage a normalization of South
Africa's relations with other states in the region. If
the ANC launches a bloodier campaign, the likely
South African response probably would be a setback
for US-sponsored peace initiatives in the region.
Although the ANC appears incapable of mounting a
regime-threatening military campaign in the near
future, the group's operations could affect the rate of
political reform in South Africa. We believe that
greater numbers of casualties, for example, would
only steel opposition among whites, especially
Afrikaners, to reforms that would fundamentally alter
the apartheid system
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Appendix A
A Chronology of Ties Between the ANC and
the South African Communist Party
1912 South African Native National Congress is established and later renamed the
African National Congress.
1915 Leftists split with South African Labor Party and form International Socialist
League (ISL).
ISL members, many of whom had a special interest in the black labor movement,
and other leftists form the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The CPSA
joins the Comintern and complies with Soviet orders to concentrate on gaining
control of white trade unions.
Mine owners, trying to offset declining gold prices, precipitate a violent strike by
announcing plans to lay off more highly paid white employees and replace them
with blacks. The CPSA initially supports the miners' campaign, over which it has
little direct control, but becomes disaffected after white miners attack black
workers who remain on the job.
Pact by the Labor and Nationalist Parties gains them an electoral victory. New
government enacts a series of discriminatory laws, some of which entrench white
labor privilege. CPSA subsequently shifts its attention to recruiting black
members and infiltrating black organizations. Main target is the Industrial and
Commercial Workers Union of Africa (ICU). Begun as a trade union of black dock
workers in 1919, the ICU grows in the 1920s and becomes a mass political
movement with well over 100,000 members, eclipsing the ANC during this period.
CPSA's four members on the ICU's National Executive Committee lead the left
wing of the ICU in calls for a more militant program. The remainder of the ICU
leadership responds by expelling all CPSA members from the ICU. CPSA focuses
on the ANC as a result.
ANC President Josiah Gumede attends the Brussels Conference of the League
against Imperialism and visits the USSR. Upon his return, he unsuccessfully
lobbies for a new ANC strategy of demonstrations, strikes, tax boycotts, pass
burnings, and close ties with the Soviets.
New directive from Comintern states that, in response to the "united white front
arrayed against the nonwhites," the CPSA must work toward establishing "an
independent Native Republic-with full guarantees for minority groups-as a
stage towards a workers' and peasants' government." Many in the CPSA
(especially former ISL members) object to the Soviet line because they prefer to re-
gard blacks as an "exploited class of workers" rather than as a "persecuted race."
A pro-Moscow group of ultraleftists, however, eventually gains control and purges
the CPSA of black members and whites with ties to trade unions. The purge is
sparked by a Comintern directive which accuses all socialists of not being "true
revolutionaries."
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CPSA is virtually moribund despite abandonment of its ultraleft line; ANC
continues to follow a slow-moving reformist campaign after Gumede loses
reelection bid in 1930.
CPSA membership increases after Hitler invades the Soviet Union. Black
Communists gain new footholds in the ANC.
A group of young black nationalists-disgusted with the lack of progress resulting
from the ANC's moderate tactics-form the ANC Youth League. Most Youth
Leaguers are initially anti-Communist and believe that there is no role for whites
in the struggle for black rights.
J. B. Marks, a Colored Communist in the ANC, leads a major strike by the
African Mineworkers' Union.
Afrikaner-based National Party comes to power.
Youth Leaguers dominate ANC National Conference and push through a new
"Program of Action" that calls for civil disobedience, strikes, and boycotts.
Suppression of Communism Act bans the CPSA and also gives the government
wide powers to counter extraparliamentary opposition groups. CPSA announces its
dissolution one month prior to passage of the act. Portions of the organization
continue to operate underground; three years later the South African Communist
Party (SACP) is formed.
The ANC and the Communist-led South African Indian Congress (SAIC) join in a
Defiance Campaign of passive resistance, which reflects the growing influence of
Communists and Youth Leaguers in the ANC. Defiance Campaign is aimed at
changing six "unjust" laws, including the Suppression of Communism Act.
Congress Alliance is formed between the ANC, the South African Colored
Peoples Organization, the SAIC, the Congress of Democrats, and the South
African Congress of Trade Unions. A Congress of the People is held in 1955 and a
Freedom Charter is adopted that lists the basic aims of the movement. Later that
year, the government arrests 156 Congress Alliance leaders on treason charges.
The defendants eventually gain acquittals, but the six-year trial consumes the
energy of the Congress Alliance, which loses its momentum.
Black nationalists, angered by the influence of white Communists on the ANC,
split with the ANC and form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).
The government bans both the ANC and the PAC after the Sharpeville incident.
The ANC forms a military wing-Spear of the Nation-and launches a campaign
of sabotage bombings.
The SACP draws up a new Party Program and adopts as short-term objectives the
goals listed in the Congress Alliance's Freedom Charter.
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A series of mass arrests cripples the ANC and weakens the SACP. Among those
captured and sentenced to life imprisonment are ANC President Nelson Mandela
and SACP Chairman Bram Fischer. ANC and SACP leaders who escape the
dragnet go into exile to rebuild their organizations.
1969 ANC opens its membership to nonblacks at a conference in Morogoro, Tanzania.
ANC recruits thousands of young blacks fleeing South Africa in the wake of the
Soweto riots and trains them for service in the military wing.
The reinvigorated military wing of the ANC renews its "armed propaganda"
campaign by attacking government buildings, and security personnel and facilities,
and by sabotaging power and transportation equipment and facilities.
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