CHILE: THE OPPOSITION MOVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200030005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of cwt
Intelligence
Chile:
The Opposition Movement
Mect r
ALA 83-10184
December 1983 25X1
Copy 2 9 8
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Chile:
The Opposition Movement
of African and Latin American Analysis, and
This paper was prepared by
Office of Central Reference. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America Division, ALA,
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Secret
ALA 83-10184
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Chile:
The Opposition Movement
Key Judgments The economic recession that began in Chile in late 1981 gave impetus to
Information available the most serious political challenge the Pinochet government has faced
as of 14 November 1983 during its 10-year rule. The opposition movement is widespread and cuts
was used in this report.
across political ideologies, class lines, and age groups-but it is therefore
amorphous and has multiple leaders and varied goals. As such, it is likely
to undergo further realignments over the next several months.
The leading groups in the opposition movement are:
? The most active coalition, the Democratic Alliance, demands accelerated
democratic transition to civilian rule and has avoided close cooperation
with extremist elements. The Alliance's success stems from the leader-
ship of the Christian Democratic Party, Chile's most significant opposi-
tion political force.
? The traditionally fractured Socialists have operated largely at the
periphery of the present opposition movement. Most factions nominally
affiliate with the Democratic Alliance, but one major group works with
the violence-prone left.
? The Popular Democratic Movement, which favors violent opposition, is a
coalition of radical leftist groups led by the Communist Party. It seeks
greater legitimacy-so far with limited success-through cooperation
with the Democratic Alliance.
? Most conservative groups, such as the National Party, have ceased 25X1
criticizing the regime in response to the government's tentative political
opening but are rebuilding long-dormant political organizations.
Given historically high voter participation, a recent poll, and logical
assumptions, we believe most Chileans favor a quick return to civilian rule.
Indeed, the single unifying factor in the fractured movement has been the
consensus in favor of shortening Pinochet's term, which formally ends in
1989.
Some popular distrust of politicians persists from the chaotic Allende
years, however, and hinders opposition efforts to rebuild popular support
and channel antigovernment sentiment. Opposition quarreling and indeci-
siveness have especially complicated the effort to harness discontent among
the middle class, the group with the greatest capacity to pressure the
iii Secret
ALA 83-10184
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z5ecrec
government and the military. Although the Christian Democrats and the
Communists have been relatively more successful in capitalizing on links
with labor and youth, no major opposition group has a well-developed base
among the marginal groups-the poor, the chronically unemployed, and
shanty dwellers-most active in the violent protests.
Because of these disagreements and organizational problems, we believe
there is only a small chance opposition forces will form a unified movement
during the next year. Even without significant progress toward formal
unification, however, opposition groups could find themselves all marching
in essentially the same direction-toward a confrontation-because of the
force of events. The US Embassy reports that, with the dialogue stalled,
democratic opposition leaders are pessimistic about the chances for further
progress. Many of them believe that only by increasing pressure on
Pinochet can he be stopped from delaying the transition. Concern over
losing credibility among their supporters will also help move democratic
leaders toward increased political action.
Since the 1973 coup, Chilean opposition groups-based primarily in
Madrid, Mexico City, and Rome-have obtained limited financial, politi-
cal, and diplomatic backing from foreign governments, international
groups, and political parties:
? West European and Latin American countries have voted for the
continuation of the UN special rapporteur on Chilean human rights,
mounted some trade and arms sales boycotts during the 1970s, and
sponsored anti-Pinochet resolutions in international forums.
? International labor confederations, the Christian Democratic Interna-
tional, and the Socialist International have occasionally provided funds to
Chilean unions and political groups.
? Most of the Chilean left's international financial backing and training
have come from the Soviet Union and Cuba, with incidental aid from
Libya, some Eastern Bloc countries, and the Palestine Liberation
Organization.
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Concrete assistance, such as funds for opposition parties or arms for
terrorists, has not been sufficient to improve significantly the opposition's
prospects for success. We believe, however, that such support is likely to in-
crease if political agitation in Chile grows. In such an atmosphere, the
popular appeal and influence of the radical left could increase, even though
we believe it would remain too narrowly based to permit the left to seize
control of the opposition movement. Moscow and Havana have pledged to
increase assistance for the radical left if it shows greater unity and
potential. At a minimum, we believe the radical left will continue to
promote violence in order to undermine the democratic opening.
Persistent socioeconomic ills, the fading of the dialogue, the opposition's
gravitation toward renewed protests, and Pinochet's hardline proclivities
leave considerable leeway for dangerous miscalculation and overreaction.
On the basis of the pattern of events of the past year, we expect that, after
a lull during the traditional Chilean summer vacations, democratic leaders
will mount protests beginning at a moderate level in March and intensify-
ing during mid-1984. Because the economic crisis is in the process of being
superseded and overshadowed by political events, we believe the modest
economic improvement likely next year will not seriously undercut the
protests and could even prompt them to focus more quickly and sharply on
the question of Pinochet's tenure.
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Composition and Nature of the Opposition Movement
1
Components of the Opposition
1
Domestic Bases of Support
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Foreign Links
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The Opposition Perspective: Assets and Obstacles
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Factors Affecting Opposition Prospects .
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Chile:
The Opposition Movement
In the past year a diverse opposition movement has
presented the Pinochet government with the most
serious political challenge in its 10-year rule. While
some antiregime elements initiated activities as early
as the last quarter of 1982, the movement began to
gain momentum only in May 1983. Protests steadily
gained popular backing and increased in violence,
reaching a peak on 11 August when 27 people were
killed. Since then, government concessions, the initia-
tion of a dialogue with the moderate opposition, and
diminished public acceptance of continued turmoil
have reduced the size of protests and moderated their
tone. Nevertheless, the atmosphere remains tense as
the government and the opposition plan for subse-
quent rounds in what is likely to be a continuing
political contest. At stake are the length of President
Pinochet's term of office-currently set to end in
1989, with the option of seeking another eight-year
term-and the type of government that will follow.F_
The crippling recession that struck Chile in late 1981
was a major impetus for the political unrest. After a
six-year boom (1976-81), Chile's economy suffered a
serious reversal; GDP growth plummeted from 6.3
percent in 1981 to -14.1 percent in 1982, unemploy-
ment rose from 12.4 percent in 1981 to 23.7 percent in
1982, real wages dropped, and hundreds of businesses
failed. The regime's refusal to adjust policies as the
world economy declined and initial mismanagement
of a liquidity crunch induced by the drying up of
foreign credit aggravated the crisis.
The economic crisis that launched the opposition
movement still contributes some weight to antigovern-
ment attitudes, but it has been superseded in part by a
political dynamic centering on the call for a demo-
cratic opening. Although there is currently no sense of
impending popular rebellion, different segments of
Chilean society, especially the hard-hit lower class,
have been forced to make painful adjustments and
have responded by participating in protest demonstra-
tions. Various political groups-Communists, Social-
ists, democrats-have attempted to channel and
control antigovernment sentiment. But the opposition
movement cuts across political ideologies, class lines,
and age groups, and thus remains an amorphous
movement with multiple leadership and varied goals.
This paper analyzes the opposition's composition and
bases of support and explores the dynamics among
opposition groups and between them and the govern-
ment, with prospects, in our opinion, for the next year.
Composition and Nature of the Opposition Movement
During the latter half of 1982 labor unions, small
business groups, farmers, and other sectors of Chilean
society which had previously supported Pinochet be-
gan to express their dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment and its economic policies. Opposition political
leaders, pleased to see cracks in the government's base
of support, began to organize in late 1982 to exploit
this discontent. Since then, a number of political and
labor groups ranging from the moderate right to the
far left have formed coalitions; at present, the compo-
sition of the multiparty fronts remains fluid. We
believe that realignments in makeup and leadership
are likely as the political dialogue between the govern-
ment and the democratic opposition proceeds.
The coalitions, like their member organizations, have
been hampered by philosophical differences, leader-
ship rivalries, weak internal discipline, inadequate
financing, and the government ban on party activities.
The major difficulty facing the opposition forces,
however, has been their inability to harness and
channel widespread antigovernment sentiment.=
Components-of the Opposition
The National Development Project (PRODEN) was
founded in December 1982 by several aggressive
Christian Democrats, conservatives, and trade union-
ists who believed their own organizations were too
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Democratic Alliance Leaders
(left to right): Luis Bossay
Leiva, Ramon Silva Ulloa, Ga-
briel Valdes Subercaseaux, En-
rique Silva Cimma, and Hugo
Zepeda BarriosF___1
reluctant to attack government economic policies. Led
by Jorge Lavandero, an ambitious member of the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), PRODEN issued
a statement in February 1983 demanding congres-
sional elections within six months and a complete
transition to democracy within two years. The evolu-
tion of other more broad-based fronts, however-in
particular the Democratic Alliance, which incorpo-
rates some of the same groups-has eroded
PRODEN's influence in the opposition movement.
Although Lavandero maintains a high public profile,
the Christian Democrats have restricted their mem-
bers' participation in PRODEN. As a result,
PRODEN was incorporated in September into anoth-
er protest coordinating group-the United Democrat-
ic Command-headed by Lavandero but influenced
by leftist parties.
Democratic Alliance. The most prominent and active
opposition coalition, the Democratic Alliance (AD)
was formed in March 1983 as the Multipartidaria
(Multiparty). It represents the most successful at-
tempt to date to assemble a broad base of support
within one coalition, but it is far short of becoming a
single opposition front. Led by Christian Democratic
Party President Gabriel Valdes, it includes the
conservative Republican Party, the center-left Chris-
tian Democratic and Social Democratic Parties, the
leftist Radical Party, and factions of the leftist Social-
ist Party. The front excludes the terrorist Movement
of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), the Communist
Party of Chile (PCCh), and other radical leftist groups
that advocate violence.
The primary reason for the AD's success thus far has
been the active involvement of the PDC, Chile's most
important opposition political force. The majority of
the PDC supported Allende's ouster in 1973, but, in
reaction to military repression and extensive political
demobilization under Pinochet, quickly joined the
opposition. Although placed "in recess" by govern-
ment decree in 1977, the PDC has maintained a
reasonably effective organizational structure. The
death of former President Eduardo Frei in 1982,
however, left the party without a figure of sufficient
stature to mediate internal conflicts.
Under the PDC's leadership, the Democratic Alliance
favors election of a constituent assembly to draft a
new constitution, legalization of political party activi-
ties, more liberal economic policies, restoration of civil
liberties, and the return of exiles. Although AD leader
and Christian Democratic President Gabriel Valdes
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initially called for Pinochet's resignation, the more
moderate coalition members rescinded this demand to
concentrate on more obtainable concessions.
By mobilizing monthly days of protest through the
summer, the Alliance leadership pressured Pinochet
into appointing a new Interior Minister, Sergio Jarpa,
who initiated talks with the AD. This step, however,
forced Alliance members to reach some consensus on
controversial issues, reconcile dialogue with continu-
ing protest demonstrations, avoid being victimized by
Pinochet, and deflect charges of sellout from the left.
These strains have led to the current suspension of the
dialogue and may have ended it altogether.
Another source of strain within the AD has been the
exclusion of the Communist Party, the MIR, and the
pro-Soviet Almeyda faction of the Socialist Party.
While some Alliance members believe that coopera-
tion with the Communists would strengthen the
protest movement, we doubt that the Christian Demo-
crats will agree to any formal collaboration. Most
PDC leaders recognize that Pinochet's most serious
criticism of their party over the years has been the
charge that they paved the way for Allende's election
The Socialists. The dozen or so factions of the
Socialist Party-which elected Salvador Allende in
1970-have been in a continuous state of flux. Some
have joined the Democratic Alliance-though refus-
ing to participate in its dialogue with the govern-
ment-others have oscillated between the Alliance
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and the radical left, and at least one major group is
allied with the violence-prone leftist coalition. The
Socialists have suffered four major schisms since their
founding in 1933, and the election of Allende at the
head of a leftist coalition provided only short-lived
unity. Moderates clashed repeatedly with radicals
until the 1973 coup drove most Socialists into exile.
Another major rupture in 1979 left Carlos Altamir-
ano's Social Democratic-oriented wing at odds with
Clodomiro Almeyda's militant wing, which aligned
with the Communist Party.
Over the past two years, Socialists inside and outside
the country have attempted to unite the nonviolent
left, but ideological differences and personal rivalries
have led to repeated failure. The growing prominence
of the Christian Democrats and other centrist opposi-
tion groups during 1983, however, forced the splint-
ered nonviolent left to define its role and composition,
according to the US Embassy. Thus, in April several
groups formed the Socialist Convergence and its
associated Committee for Political Unity (CPU),
whose objective was to formulate a coordinated So-
cialist program and work toward permanent reunifi-
cation of the party.
in early September
seven Socialist factions and five Christian Socialist
groups-including the Socialist Convergence-
formed a "Socialist Bloc." Their objective also was to
reunify the party as a moderate left opposition front,
recognizing that the only solution to the current crisis
was a political settlement.
Despite such apparent agreement, however, the So-
cialist Bloc is a loose coalition at best. For example,
the bloc is formally a participant in the Democratic
Alliance, but several Socialist factions dispute Alli-
ance positions and disclaim membership in AD. An-
other point of friction has been the unsuccessful
attempts by some Socialist leaders to have the Com-
munist Party included in the Alliance.
Socialist efforts to reunify and work within the demo-
cratic opposition have been significant in establishing
them at least temporarily as an independent political
force and in strengthening democratic tendencies in
the Socialist movement. Continued progress could
provide the Socialists with the foundation for a broad-
ly based party in a post-Pinochet Chile. We and the
US Embassy believe, however, that it is more likely
the Socialists will fail to achieve effective unification,
particularly since many differences are unresolved
and one of the larger groups-the Almeyda faction-
is loath to renounce its longstanding commitment to
violence.
Violence-Prone Leftist Groups. The exclusion of far
left groups from the partly reunited Socialist Party
and from the Democratic Alliance led radicals in
September to form their own pro-Soviet front-the
Popular Democratic Movement (MDP)-composed of
the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh), the Almeyda
faction of the Socialist Party, and other small leftist
splinter groups. The terrorist Movement of the Revo-
lutionary Left (MIR) has not officially joined the
MDP.
The Communist Party, which was founded in 1922, is
the best organized and most effective radical leftist
group in the MDP. Although banned and severely
repressed since 1973, the party has used its well-
developed clandestine infrastructure to survive rea-
sonably well. The party, which traditionally follows
Moscow's line and which in 1982 claimed member-
ship of 25,000, has generally eschewed armed struggle
in favor of political activity and coalition building and
played a leading role in forming the Allende Front in
1969. Under Allende, the Communists moderated
some of their approaches and attempted to restrain
the terrorist MIR organization. After the coup, how-
ever, most leaders went into exile, where they began
to promote armed struggle and close links with the
Soviets. Those leaders who remained in Chile, on the
other hand, concentrated on attempts to forge politi-
cal alliances with the PDC and the Socialists, con-
struct clandestine political nets among students and
labor, and pursue other nonviolent activities that
would not provoke the government.
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The Movement of the Revolutionary Left is the most
violent leftist group. Founded in 1965, the MIR has
consistently followed a Castroite revolutionary line.
During Allende's government, the MIR promoted
armed struggle and attempted to radicalize Allende's
reforms through violent actions. During and after the
1973 coup, the military concentrated on eliminating
the MIR, reducing membership from 10,000 to a few
hundred militants. Nevertheless, the group continues
to carry out isolated terrorist activities aimed at
preventing a political settlement.
Although the MDP coalition has not formally an-
nounced its goals, we believe its members still favor
violent opposition to the government. Until this policy
is declared publicly, however, we agree with the US
Embassy that the possibility of some cooperation with
the Democratic Alliance remains open. This is still a
goal of some MDP leaders and accounts for their
public support of some AD demands and their empha-
sis that MDP's position is distinct from but not
Labor. Reflecting the significance of economic griev-
ances in the genesis of the protest movement, two
major labor coalitions were formed during the spring
of 1983 to organize the first national days of protest
and subsequent strikes. One of these, the National
Workers Command (CNT), is a front of trade union-
ists from the five largest labor confederations orga-
nized by Copperworkers' Union Chief Rodolfo Seguel.
The effectiveness of labor opposition was demonstrat-
ed when a transport strike in late June led the
government to open a dialogue with labor leaders
concerning the extension of debt relief and modifica-
tions to the 1979 labor plan.
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The tendency of labor to focus on parochial interests,
however, opened the way in midsummer for political
party coalitions to take over leadership of the opposi-
tion movement. Nevertheless, labor groups continue
to play a role, concentrating their efforts on economic,
social, and labor issues. In mid-September, for exam-
ple, the AFL-CIO-supported Union of Democratic
Workers (UDT) presented Interior Minister Jarpa
with an 11-point petition dealing mainly with labor
issues. On the other hand, the Christian Democratic-
led-but Communist-influenced-National Labor
Coordinator (CNS) has rejected any dialogue with the
government and is working to rebuild waning protest
Discontent on the Right. The economic crisis and the
government's erratic response also caused consider-
able discontent among Pinochet's previously firm
conservative backers, resulting in some movement
toward formation of a conservative coalition. No
single umbrella organization on the right emerged,
but some elements began to move beyond criticism of
the regime's economic program to press for an accel-
erated transition. In December 1982 various conserva-
tive business, labor, and farm groups organized dem-
onstrations urging economic policy readjustments.
When the government arrested several participants
and temporarily expelled one prominent figure, the
conservative parties and press intensified their criti-
cism. Only a few conservatives have backed the
monthly days of protests, but many have continued to
voice disenchantment and push for measures to ame-
liorate economic and political tensions.
Since the initiation of the political opening in mid-
August, many conservative and far-right elements
have gravitated back toward the government. These
groups have increasingly criticized the opposition for
promoting violent protests and making unrealistic
political demands. At the same time, groups ranging
from the old center-right National Party to the far-
right Nationalists have responded to the opening by
organizing and formulating plans for transition. In
September, for example, the Gremialistas-a group of
rightwing but prodemocratic intellectuals and busi-
nessmen closely associated with the Pinochet re-
gime-established a political party, the Independent
Democratic Union. The US Embassy reports that
Interior Minister Jarpa is also organizing a center-
right party designed to support the transition process.
Domestic Bases of Support
In view of historically high voter participation in
Chile, a recent poll showing that 68 percent of those
questioned want a return to civilian rule within two
years, and logical assumptions, we believe most Chil-
eans favor the opposition's call for an accelerated
transition to democracy. However, opposition groups
have faced significant obstacles in attempting to tap
and organize this sentiment.
Traditionally, Chile's political parties and labor orga-
nizations have had strong popular roots, and, in the
two decades prior to the 1973 coup, popular mobiliza-
tion was increasing. Ten years of military rule and a
ban on political party activity, however, have done
much to undermine these bases.
A lingering unfavorable popular perception of politi-
cians is one element hindering the opposition's re-
building effort. For a decade Pinochet has successful-
ly depicted politicians of all ideological stripes as
indirectly or directly responsible for the chaos of the
Allende years. US Embassy reports indicate that this
popular distrust of politicians has diminished some-
what, but still remains a factor in Pinochet's favor.F
The Christian Democratic Party has made the most
progress in rebuilding its grassroots structures, ac-
cording to most observers.
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in weathering the political moratorium.
The democratic forces' primary base of support is the
middle class, even though Communists enjoy backing
from intellectuals and professionals. Middle-class sup-
port for protests during the summer was a key factor
in prompting Pinochet to grant concessions and un-
dertake a dialogue. Conversely, middle-class concern
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over the prospects for violence coupled with a willing-
ness to give Jarpa's dialogue a chance probably
diluted popular backing for protests in October. The
US Embassy notes that the democratic opposition's.
inability to channel the protests into attainable goals,
in contrast to Jarpa's energetic postulation of a limit-
ed political plan, appears to have hurt the AD's image
the democratic opposition leaders' indecisiveness,
squabbling, and waffling on the question of coopera-
tion with the far left, which the youth generally
oppose. Nevertheless, PDC youth have been involved
among the middle class.
Historically, the political parties also have had strong
ties to organized labor. The influence of the Socialist
and Communist Parties in the labor movement-
which exceeded that of the Christian Democrats and
moderates-aided Allende's election in 1970. Since
1973 Pinochet has deliberately used the government's
authority to manipulate labor regulations and control
wages to try to break those links. The belief of union
leaders that security officials murdered prominent
labor leader Tucapel Jimenez in February 1982 un-
doubtedly also has had an intimidating effect. During
this year of protests, the government has skillfully
combined talks and limited concessions on collective
bargaining and job reinstatement for strike organizers
with tough measures against labor protests.
Despite these efforts, both moderate and leftist parties
retain substantial ties to organized labor. Following
resumption of union elections in 1978, a survey noted
that 60 percent of newly elected union officials held
ties to the Communists or various socialist groups,
while 35 percent had Christian Democratic affili-
ation. In April 1983 before the opposition movement
gathered steam, the US Embassy estimated that
about 40 percent of organized labor was Christian
Democrat oriented; 30 percent was linked to the
Communist, Socialist, and other leftist parties; 20
percent was progovernment; and 10 percent was inde-
pendent.
The main youth groups in Chile traditionally have
been linked to the political parties. For some time, the
progovernment Gremialistas have had a growing
youth movement, but, among the present opposition
forces, the Christian Democrats and the Communists
have the only significant organized youth groups.
According to the US Embassy, the PDC youth leader-
ship has stepped up recruiting efforts and expanded
its provincial infrastructure. This group has criticized
in Democratic Alliance activities and antigovernment 25X1
The Communists, the MIR, and other far-left groups 25X1
have made some gains in improving their longstanding
influence among students
MIR is renewing efforts to bolster its military appara-
tus among two university groups. The Communist 25X1
Party youth group began to organize protest rallies in
late 1982.
US Embassy reporting indicates that none of the 25X1
major opposition groups presently has a well-devel-
oped infrastructure among the marginal groups-the
poor, chronically unemployed, and shanty dwellers.
Hardest hit by the recession, these groups have been 25X1
the most active participants in violent protests. De-
spite government claims of Communist orchestration,
much of the violence in poor neighborhoods has been 25X1
spontaneous action by idle, unemployed, frustrated
Foreign Links
General Foreign Support. Since the 1973 coup Chil-
ean opposition groups-based primarily in Madrid, 25X1
Mexico City, and Rome-have been able to gain
some international support by playing on widespread
distaste for Pinochet's authoritarian practices. This
support has been limited principally to political and
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diplomatic backing from a number of foreign govern-
ments, international groups, and political parties.
Concrete assistance, however, such as financial aid to
opposition parties or arms for terrorists, has not been
sufficient to improve significantly the opposition's
prospects for success.
In recent months, the European Community, Pope
John Paul II, and numerous foreign political parties
have publicly called for an end to Chile's domestic
violence and a return to democratic rule. The Socialist
International recently issued a declaration renewing
its solidarity with the democratic forces in Chile.
Protests in Madrid led by the Spanish Socialist Party
and the peaceful occupation of the Chilean consulate
in Antwerp are recent examples of European senti-
ment and support for Chilean opposition forces. Other
specific cases include:
? The US Embassy in Madrid reported in August
1983 that Spanish media and public opinion were
exerting pressure on the socialist government to take
a more active role in the developments in Chile.
The International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) has reacted sharply to recent devel-
opments in Chile by sending telegrams to Pinochet
and issuing a resolution condemning antiunion meas-.
ures. In late July a five-member ICFTU delegation
visited Chile and met with labor and political opposi-
The Left's Foreign Connections. The Chilean left's
international support has traditionally come from the
Soviet Union and Cuba, with incidental aid from
Libya, some Eastern Bloc countries, and the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Moscow and Havana have a
particular stake in the ouster of Pinochet because of
his responsibility for Allende's fall.
issue of providing support for armed struggle.
Italy is presently sponsoring a UN resolution calling
for a return to political, economic, civil, and union
rights in Chile.
? The EC ambassadors in Santiago boycotted the
10th anniversary celebrations of Pinochet's rule in
September 1983.
General in Leningrad, the Soviets are recruiting
Chilean exiles living primarily in Europe and Mexico
for training. The number of Chilean students at
Patrice Lumumba University steadily declined, how-
ever, from 200 in 1972 to 45 in 1982. The US
Embassy in Santiago, moreover, has identified no
Soviet active measures and assesses the risk of such
attempts as low. We concur in this judgment, primari-
ly because Moscow has no representation-and thus
little capability or opportunity to take such actions-
inside Chile.
Within the Western Hemisphere, Mexico and Vene-
zuela, both of which have large Chilean exile
populations, have traditionally supported the Chilean
opposition. In mid-October, for example, Gabriel Val-
des traveled to Venezuela, where his well-publicized
meetings with top government officials and opposition
leaders demonstrated that country's political support
for the Chilean PDC.
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In our view, opposition forces, both democratic and
nondemocratic, believe that present conditions in
Chile provide them the best opportunity they have
had to hasten President Pinochet's departure. At the
same time they realize that his determination, politi-
cal acumen, and remaining-though eroded-power
base make him a formidable adversary. Few if any
opposition leaders believe he will step down, except
under intense opposition pressure and a complete loss
of military backing. Even then, they have no doubts
that he would attempt a comeback. Thus, in our view,
the opposition groups do not believe Pinochet is
offering a democratic opening in good faith, but is
using dialogue as a delaying tactic.
ment forces off balance and divided.
We believe that opposition leaders recognize, how-
ever, the existence of different factions in the govern-
ment with varying views of democratization. Interior
Minister Jarpa, as the chief architect of the political
opening, is the most important figure, but democratic
politicians are uncertain how to gauge him. Some
centrists and conservatives probably view him as an
old politician with whom they can negotiate. Most
Socialists focus on his rightist antecedents, distrust
him, and thus have refused to hold talks with him.
Jarpa's practice of alternating between conciliatory
remarks and public censure of the opposition move-
ment-viewed against the backdrop of Pinochet's
persistent hardline stance-has added to the uncer-
tainty over whether the Interior Minister is serious
about negotiating or attempting to keep antigovern-
report that opposition leaders are not sure that 25X1
Jarpa has or can develop sufficient leverage to keep
Pinochet from sabotaging any transition arrangement.
Pinochet. The US Embassy
In general, democratic politicians also have serious 25X1
doubts about Jarpa's authority and relationship to
The radical left, dominated primarily by the Commu-
nist Party, is more unified in its view of the govern- 25X1
ment. It recognizes the existence of contending
factions and philosophies in the government, but
believes that the differences count for little. In con-
trast to elements of the democratic opposition, who
are encouraged by the ameliorative influence of mod-
erates in the administration, the radical left distrusts
the moderates and considers their actions to be ma-
nipulative. To date the radical left probably credits
Jarpa with at least temporarily sidetracking the
mounting mass mobilization effort, which it believes
is the only way to effect a return to civilian rule. F__]
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Divisions and Dilemmas
The single unifying factor in what is a very diverse
and fractured opposition movement has been the
consensus in favor of shortening Pinochet's term in
office. For most opposition groups, this goal calls for a
strategy of mobilizing middle-class protest on such a
scale that the armed forces feel compelled to remove
Pinochet. Attempts to devise tactics toward this end,
however, have run consistently afoul of differing views
on the use of violence, parochial interests, and animos-
ities, the schism between exiled and domestic factions,
and government countermeasures. Opposition ele-
ments have cooperated intermittently, coordinated
some activities, and coincidentally carried out parallel
actions, but a broad opposition front has not devel-
oped.
A related quandary for democratic opposition ele-
ments is the relationship between the dialogue and
protests. The leaders realize that the concessions they
have extracted so far from the government are a
direct result of protest activity, which must be contin-
ued to maintain opposition leverage. Continuing
protests, however, could jeopardize some moderate
support by making the opposition appear unwilling to
reciprocate government concessions, which could help
Pinochet justify renewed repression. At the same
time, if the democratic opposition cannot control the
protests, it runs the risk of losing the initiative to
violence-prone radicals.
Reduced participation in the protests since September
has only compounded the dilemma. Deeply divided
over whether to participate in the largely leftist-
organized demonstrations and apparently cognizant of
declining public interest in antigovernment activities,
the democratic forces opted out of national protests in
October. This enabled the Democratic Alliance to
avoid the embarrassment of the poor turnout and to
disassociate itself from the violence, but it also bol-
stered Pinochet's confidence.
The diverse ideological composition of the democratic
elements contributes to their indecisiveness and tenu-
ous unity. For example, old-line conservatives, only
recently estranged from the Pinochet government, vie
for influence in the democratic opposition with nonvi-
olent Socialist and Radical Party members, who
The most divisive issue among democratic elements
concerns relations with the violent left. Leftist fac-
tions in the AD believe that the Communists and
other radical left groups are too influential to be
excluded from the opposition movement. Center-right
organizations and parties, however, vigorously oppose
the inclusion of the Communists. The dominant
Christian Democratic Party has maintained that it
will not undertake formal commitments with the
Communists, but it will cooperate informally for
specific purposes.
The existence of large exile communities causes other
tensions, as exiles generally have taken more militant
positions on strategy and tactics than their domestic
counterparts. In addition, personal conflicts over con-
trol of parties and organizations have occurred. F_
The radical left suffers from many similar divisions:
the conflict between exiled and domestic leadership, a
generational problem, the issue of cooperating with
the democratic opposition, and the strategy of armed
revolution. Low turnout in recent protests and severe
losses inflicted on the MIR by security forces have
caused bitter arguments between and within radical
left parties.
Factors Affecting Opposition Prospects
Pinochet's Role. Economic recession, popular alien-
ation, and opposition activities have diluted Pinochet's
power base, but he retains considerable capacity to
manipulate the system to his advantage and thus
affect the prospects for opposition forces. Dialogue
and concessions have improved the government's, if
not the President's, image and enabled the adminis-
tration to regain some initiative and breathing space.
Paradoxically, a continued conciliatory attitude on
the President's part would present both advantages
and potential pitfalls for moderate opposition forces.
served in the Allende government.
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Substantial government concessions would permit the
democratic opposition to bargain, strengthen its image
as an effective representative of popular interests, and
weaken the appeal of the far left. At the same time,
hard bargaining would strain the unity of the demo-
cratic coalition by forcing it to articulate specific
positions and reconcile its membership's disparate
interests. On the other hand, by attempting to abort
or slow liberalization, Pinochet would resuscitate po-
litical tensions, undercut the efforts of moderates, and
strengthen the far left's argument in favor of armed
struggle.
The Military Factor. Given the traditional cohesion,
discipline, and insularity of the armed forces, opposi-
tion forces cannot exert much direct influence on the
military. The US Embassy and the defense attache
indicate that the top military leadership-most im-
portantly in the Army-still backs the Constitution of
1980 and Pinochet's continuation as President. Most
officers still share Pinochet's distrust and dislike of
politicians.
Despite this, the high command has shown a willing-
ness to moderate Pinochet's hardline instincts and has
developed a budding commitment to liberalization.
This change probably stemmed from concern over the
magnitude of antigovernment sentiment demonstrated
during the summer months and the fear that the
armed forces might be called upon to quell civil
disorders on a regular basis. The large turnout at the
progovernment rally on 9 September does not seem to
have significantly altered the belief in military circles
that the transition should be accelerated,
We believe that democratic opposition elements are
attempting to devise a strategy of protests that will
maintain pressure on the regime without provoking
the military. They hope, in our view, to establish
contacts in the military that can be used to reinforce
sympathy for democratization, calm deep-seated mili-
tary fears that civilian rule would open the door to
leftist subversion, and allay concerns about possible
future "witch hunts" for military human rights viola-
tors. To date the democratic opposition appears to
have few such channels of communication.
The Economy. Economic dislocation launched the
political protest movement, but, since then, economic
and political issues have developed a complex cyclical
relationship. Economic deterioration fuels political
turmoil, which adversely affects economic develop-
ment by reducing productivity and investor and credi-
tor confidence, and this in turn augments political
discontent.
We believe that Chile's economic prospects will im-
prove in 1984. We expect the IMF to accede to
Santiago's request for looser fiscal restrictions. In-
creased public spending and a slow recovery in copper
prices should set the stage for a gradual economic
rebound of 2 to 5 percent. Even with this growth rate,
however, unemployment will decline only slowly to-
ward 12 percent and inflation will most likely acceler-
ate beyond 30 percent. Under these circumstances the
opposition will still be able to draw on substantial,
economically driven public dissatisfaction.
governments could increase regional support.
Foreign Support. We believe that, if political agita-
tion grows, foreign support for opposition forces will
increase. In varying degrees, both West and East
European countries are likely to step up their finan-
cial aid to opposition parties and increase pressure on
the Pinochet regime in international forums. A crack-
down by Pinochet would elicit a stronger reaction, in
our view, perhaps in the form of economic or arms
boycotts by some European Community nations. The
recent return of exiles with international connec-
tions-for example, Andres Zaldivar, President of the
Christian Democratic International-may also en-
hance the level of foreign backing. In addition, the
trend in South America toward a return to democratic
We also expect that Moscow and Havana would be
greatly tempted by a surge in protest activity and
radicalization of the movement. We believe that
Moscow may augment support for the radical left if it
believes the Popular Democratic Movement is devel-
oping into a popular coalition. In our view, the
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Cubans probably are holding out more substantial
assistance to the MIR and PCCh-arms and financial
backing-as an incentive to the quarreling radical
leftist groups to unify.
The Church. The Roman Catholic Church has the
capacity to play an important role in the opposition's
prospects for success. With its moral authority, exten-
sive grassroots structure, and political party con-
tacts-especially in the PDC-the Church can affect
the level of protests, facilitate a consensus among the
opposition, and mediate an agreement with the gov-
ernment on democratization. Moreover, as the US
Embassy points out, the Church could be an especial-
ly significant actor in mobilizing broad support for an
eventual transition plan that may fall short of popular
expectations.
It is most likely, however, that the Church will
maintain its fairly neutral stance. Archbishop of
Santiago Juan Fresno, the key church official, is
conservative and critical of church involvement in
politics. Fresno has been instrumental in improving
Church-state relations, while promoting the dialogue
and serving as mediator. He has recently become
discouraged over the prospects for dialogue, but we
believe he will continue to give advice, direct criticism
at both sides equally, and stand ready to mediate.F_
The potential impact of Fresno's predecessor, Cardi-
nal Silva, and the lower clergy are unpredictable but
potentially disruptive. Silva's longstanding reputation
as an opponent of authoritarian rule and an implaca-
ble foe of Pinochet gives him some capacity to
catalyze protest activity. He has been silent, however,
since retiring in early 1983. The lower clergy also may
not necessarily follow Fresno's moderation. As else-
where in Latin America, Chile's lower clergy has
occasionally promoted political and social action and
sometimes confrontation, regardless of the wishes of
the hierarchy.
Opposition Efforts for Unity. Any progress toward
the formation of a broad opposition front drawn from
the center right to the far left would improve pros-
pects for the anti-Pinochet movement. Under present
circumstances, this seems unlikely. The Pinochet re-
gime has at least temporarily regained enough initia-
tive to use transition issues to drive wedges between
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the right might be Sergio Fernandez, a charismatic
Gremialista leader who was Interior Minister under
Pinochet from 1978 to 1982.
The unity of the far left would most likely be
jeopardized by real progress toward a transition. We
expect that the internal conflict over armed'struggle
would intensify, as more moderate Communist lead-
ers became increasingly fearful of being excluded
from any political arrangement and more radical
members proposed violence to undermine the transi-
tion.
Role of Individual Leaders. The emergence of one or
two charismatic opposition figures around whom most
opposition forces could rally would significantly en-
hance the opposition's prospects by centralizing tacti-
cal planning and improving chances for resolution of
policy disputes. Most aspirants to such a role come
from the ranks of the Christian Democratic Party. F
Gabriel Valdes, party president, is the most prominent
opposition leader at present, but his arrogance has
alienated many in his own party, and his leftist
leanings have aroused the suspicions of centrist and
conservative opposition groups. Andres Zaldivar, on
the other hand, is a stronger possibility to play such a
role because of his moderate political beliefs, his
international reputation, and the military's favorable
view of him. When Zaldivar returned from exile in
October 1983, some observers expected him to chal-
lenge Valdes immediately for leadership of the PDC.
Rather than risk splitting the party, however, we
believe Zaldivar is waiting until the political picture
clears and PDC moderates, other AD politicians, and
the public at large become discouraged with Valdes.
Jorge Lavandero, PDC maverick and PRODEN lead-
er, has national recognition but is probably regarded
by most moderate opposition figures as too impetuous.
Most other major political leaders are either too far to
the left, too far to the right, or too old to rally a broad
front of opposition forces. One possible exception on
None of the most prominent labor leaders have
sufficiently broad appeal to rally labor forces, much
less a broad political following. Moreover, they prefer
to maintain their independence from the political
parties. Labor's emphasis on social, economic, and
labor issues rather than on political concerns further
removes them from serious consideration.
Expansion of Domestic Support. As noted, in the long
term, the opposition's hope for success depends on
mobilizing the support of the middle class because
middle-class sentiment has a greater impact on the
military than that of any other group. Government
concessions, middle-class fear of violence-particular-
ly at the fringes of society-and probably simple
weariness with the protest effort have reduced middle-
class support for opposition activities. Failure to re-
verse this process will deal opposition prospects a
serious blow. To some extent this depends on the
democratic opposition's ability to pull itself together,
but, even if this occurs, the government would retain
some capability to fray the edges of the opposition's
middle-class base through political concessions and
spending measures to alleviate unemployment.
transition.
The opposition movement's ability to control and
expand its base among youth elements is problematic
and may depend on the willingness of the present
leadership to take a more aggressive stance or on the
emergence of new leaders. As the US Embassy
reports, the present democratic leadership inspires
little confidence among youth activists, who may be
tempted to splinter off and organize their own move-
ment. Indeed, according to the Embassy, Christian
Democratic youth leaders recently organized a youth
alliance composed primarily of centrist and conserva-
tive elements dedicated to pushing forward with the
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.The radical left's traditional activism, on the other
hand, is likely to attract increasing youth support.
According to the Embassy
the radical left has better contacts than other political
sectors among youths in the poor urban areas and is
working to improve them. The government retains
some influence on the youth front as well. This is
largely confined to university groups established by
the riglitwing Gremialistas, which are well-organized
and aggressive.
delaying the transition and undercutting Jarpa's posi-
tion. Concern over losing credibility among their
supporters will also help move democratic leaders
toward increased political action. Some are already
studying methods to increase such action at the
municipal level. In addition, we believe the radical left
will continue to promote violence in order to ensure
that the dialogue does not succeed. Thus, once
again-following the pattern of the past year-we
expect that, after a lull during the traditional Chilean
summer vacations after the New Year, the protests
are likely to begin at a moderate level in March and
Labor remains another difficult area for the opposi-
tion, because, as noted earlier, the government proba-
bly retains more leverage over labor than over any
other sector. Despite this, we expect tensions among
workers to remain high, because we believe the rate of
economic recovery will be modest at best over the next
year. A serious economic setback or evidence of
government responsibility in the murder of labor
official Jimenez in 1982 could have a catalyzing effect
on the labor movement. For the most part, however,
we believe that labor leaders will continue to allow
politicians to take the initiative.
Current circumstances militate against the formation
of a unified opposition front in the short term. As is
clear, however, the opposition does not completely
control its own destiny. Past experience shows that
political crises in developing countries often develop a
momentum that overrides the inadequacies of antire-
gime forces. In Chile, government actions, the pace of
economic recovery, public attitudes, and other factors
outside the opposition's control will have a major
impact on opposition prospects. Thus, even without
significant progress toward unification, opposition
groups could find themselves all marching in essen-
tially the same direction because of the force of
events.
We believe that direction is likely to lead increasingly
toward confrontation. The US Embassy reports that,
with the dialogue stalled, democratic opposition lead-
ers are pessimistic about the chances for further
progress. Many of them believe that only by increas-
ing pressure on Pinochet can he be stopped from
intensify by mid-1984.
Renewed political activity will probably find a favor-
able audience among Chileans. As reflected in the
earlier mentioned poll, the opening, although limited
to date, has awakened a desire in the general populace
for steady progress toward restoration of civilian rule,
an impulse that Pinochet almost certainly will try to
retard. Nevertheless, we believe that, by utilizing a
more confrontational approach, the opposition proba-
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ratization to force more concessions from Pinochet
during the next year. Moreover, we expect that the
democratic transition in Argentina will have a persist-
ent impact in Chile.
We expect the potential for radicalisation and polar-
ization to remain relatively high. Despite the expected
modest economic upturn, socioeconomic ills will fuel
political tensions, particularly in the poor neighbor-
hoods. In addition, the fading of the dialogue, the
opposition's likely gravitation toward renewed protests
next year, and Pinochet's hardline proclivities leave
considerable leeway for dangerous miscalculation and
overreaction. In such an atmosphere, the popular
appeal and influence of the radical left would grow,
even though we doubt it would be able to seize control
of the opposition movement. The radical left's rela-
tively small size and its discredited performance
during the Allende years still have a strong hold on
public attitudes.
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Figure 1
Spectrum of Political Parties
Movement of the Communist Party Socialist Party Movement of
Revolutionary of Chile (PCCh) of Chile-Almeyda Unitary Popular
Left (MIR) faction (PSCh/AIm) Action (MAPU)
Popular Democratic Movement (MDP)
Leaders: Manuel Almeyda Medina
Jaime lnsunza
Socialist Bloc
Increasing violence, radical left
Movement of Unitary Socialist Party of Christian Lefl
Radical Party Social Democratic
Popular Action- Chile-Altamirano (IC) (PR) Party (PSD)
workers and peasants faction (PSCh/Alt)
(MAPU?OC)
Democratic Alliance (AD)
(formally aligned with the AD) (leadership rotates monthly among the heads of the individual parties)
MIR PCCh PSCh/Alm MAPU
MAPU?OC
Andres Pascal Luis Corvalan Lepea Clodomiro Almeydaa
Allda
ene
a In exile.
Figure 2
Other Opposition Groups
United Democratic Command (CUD)
Leader: Jorge Lavandero
Manuel Almeyda
Medina
Formed in September 1983, CUD is a social grouping of 300 labor
organizations and other groups. It is dominated by the PCCh and
has close ties with the MDP. The group has no articulated political
purpose other than to coordinate the national days of protests.
301258 11-83
Blas Tomic
Oscar Garreton
Purcell
Socialist convergence Committee for IC Elements of the PR
and other small Political Unity (CPU) Socialist Party of
socialist groups Chile (PSCh)
Luis Maira Enrique Silva
Six socialist factions Ramon Silva Ulloa
Julio Stuardo
National Workers Command (CNT)
Leader: Rodolfo Seguel
Founded in April 1983, CNT includes trade unionists from the
country's five largest labor confederations.
National Labor Confederation of
Coordinator (CNS) Copper Workers
(CTC)
Manuel Bustos
Miguel Vega
Cimma
Youth Groups
PSD
Rightist Groups
(currently there are no alliances between these groups)
PDC Republican Independent National Unity Movement of
Right Democratic Movement (MUN) National Action
Union (UDI) (MAN)
Luis Bossay Gabriel Valdez Hugo Zepeda
Andres Zaldivar Julio Sergio Fernandez Andres Allamand Federico Willoughby
Subercasseaux Javier Leturia Pablo Rodriguez
Jaime Guzman.
PCCh PDC Gremialistas
Increasing authoritarianism
Christian Democratic Republican Right Independent National Unity Movement of
Party (PDC) Democratic Union Movement (MUN) National Action
(UDI) (MAN)
Various leaders
Private Employees United Workers Union of Democratic
Confederation Front (FUT) Workers (UDT)
(CEPCH)
Roberto Corvalan
Sergio Vergara Ernesto Vogel
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Miguel Salazar Andres Chadwick
In November 1983, the PDC formed a youth alliance with the
Federation of Socialist Youth and the Republians.
Note: Colors in Figure 2 correspond with those
used in the spectrum in Figure 1.
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