SUDANESE FOREIGN POLICY: THE SEARCH FOR ASSISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000100110002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
Sudanese Foreign Policy:.
The Search for Assistance,
An Intelligence Assessment
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Secret
NESA 83-10249
October 1983
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Sudanese Foreign Policy:
The Search for Assistance
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
This paper was prepared b Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Branch, NEST
Secret
NESA 83-10249
October 1983
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Sudanese Foreign Policy:
The Search for Assistance
as of 7 September 1983 subversion from Libya and Ethiopia, and to attempt to weaken Soviet
was used in this report.
influence in the region. During the past several years, Khartoum has come
to depend increasingly on Saudi Arabia for economic assistance, Egypt for
Key Judgments Sudan's key foreign policy objectives are to obtain increased aid from
Information available virtually all potential donors except the Soviet Union, to counter threats of
military aid, and the United States for both.
Sudan repays its more important benefactors with political support and
access to its military facilities. Sudan was one of only three Arab League
states that did not sever ties with Cairo following the signing of the Camp
David accords in 1978, and Khartoum has urged other Arabs to restore
links with Egypt. Sudan recently concluded an agreement permitting the
United States to pre-position military equipment in Port Sudan. Sudan
serves Saudi Arabia as a barrier to the expansion of the Soviet role in
northeast Africa and a conduit for aid to Eritrean groups fighting against
the Ethiopian Government.
Sudan's relations with the Soviet Union have been cool since Sudanese
Communists attempted to overthrow President Nimeiri in 1971. An
apparent discreet diplomatic feeler by Moscow in late 1982 to improve
bilateral relations was quickly squelched by Sudan's Foreign Minister. We
believe a fundamental realignment toward the Soviet camp is unlikely as
long as Nimeiri remains in power.
Sudanese leaders believe that the Soviet Union is encouraging Libya and
Ethiopia to subvert the Nimeiri regime. both 25X1
countries support Sudanese dissident groups that are dedicated to the
overthrow of the current government and that constitute the principal
external threat to the regime.
As long as the Nimeiri regime remains in power, Sudan is likely to
maintain a favorable stance toward the United States. Relations could
suffer, however, if:
? US aid is cut significantly.
? The Sudanese come to believe that the United States is pressing
multilateral organizations to impose tough economic austerity measures
on Khartoum.
? The Sudanese conclude that the United States is not doing enough to
counter Libyan and Soviet moves in the Middle East and Africa.
iii Secret
NESA 83-10249
October 1983
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Even if moderate tensions develop in bilateral relations, we doubt Nimeiri.
would curtail US military access to Sudanese facilities. In our judgment,
Khartoum would continue to welcome such activities as the pre-positioning
of US military equipment and the periodic deployment of AWACs as
beneficial to its own security.
Nimeiri's most likely successors in an orderly transfer of power-those now
at the top levels of the Army or the government-would probably continue
his pro-US policies. If the regime were forced from office in an atmosphere
of failure, however, US-Sudanese relations would probably suffer, at least
in the short run.
In the less likely event that a government controlled by leftist parties,
exiled dissidents, or radical junior officers came to power, we believe
bilateral ties would worsen. Sudanese leftists have been critical of the
United States, and most exiled dissident groups have links with Libya.
Junior officers in the Army are a diverse group, but some have openly
criticized Nimeiri's policies.
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Secret
Sudanese Foreign Policy:
The Search for Assistance
Sudanese foreign policy reflects the moderate person-
al beliefs of President Gaafar Nimeiri. We believe the
President's views have been molded in large part by
the nature of the external threats facing Sudan. For
the first two years after Nimeiri came to power in
1969, Sudan's foreign policy was guided by vague
ideological preconceptions modeled on Arab socialism
as espoused by Egyptian President Nasir. Major
foreign policy positions included hostility toward the
United States as a supporter of Israel, a tendency to
align with the Soviet Bloc, and a desire to strengthen
ties with Egypt, Libya, and Syria
A nearly successful Communist coup attempt in 1971
led to a 180-degree turn in Sudanese foreign policy.
Nimeiri became distrustful of Moscow's intentions
and gradually phased out Soviet assistance. To re-
place the Soviets, Nimeiri turned to Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and in 1976 the United States for aid.
Socialist Union-the sole legal political party-has
any constitutional checks on his decisionmaking au-
thority.'
Nimeiri's decision to send a brigade of troops to Iraq
in late 1982 typifies his determination to proceed with
decisions despite widespread opposition from his ad-
visers. The'deployment of soldiers to Iraq was unpopu-
lar in both civilian and military circles,
Characteristically, Nimeiri went ahead with the de-
ployment despite this resistance. Comments Nimeiri
made to US diplomats last November suggest that he
had hoped the Iraqis would cease their support for
Sudanese dissidents in response to his action and
apparently was willing to accept the risks involved.
We believe that Nimeiri is particularly sensitive about
potential military and subversive threats from Ethio-
pia and Libya because of Sudan's lengthy borders and
the weakness of its armed forces. In public statements
and conversations with US diplomats, he has ex-
pressed deep concern about Libyan and Ethiopian
support for Sudanese dissidents. The Sudanese Presi-
dent's near paranoia about Soviet hostility causes
him, in our judgment, to ascribe Libyan and Ethiopi-
an actions largely to Moscow's influence
Political Decision Making
Sudanese President Nimeiri makes all major decisions
on Sudanese policy-foreign and domestic. We be-
lieve that he listens to advice from trusted aides but in
the end does what he believes best, even in the face of
unanimous opposition by his lieutenants. No one in
the government, Peoples' Assembly, or Sudanese
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Nimeiri, in our judgment, considers the views of
significant domestic groups when formulating policy,
but no civilian faction is powerful enough to move the
' According to reports from US Defense Department sources,
Sudan's National Security Council is made up of eight key officials.
Chaired by the President, its other members include the 1st Vice
President, Chief of State Security, Minister of Defense, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Minister of Presidential Affairs, Inspector General
of Police, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. Of these, we
believe 1st Vice President and State Security Chief Umar Tayyib
and Minister of Presidential Affairs Baha al-Din Idris wield the
most influence with Nimeiri. Although not a full member of the
NSC, Director of Military Intelligence Muhammad Ahmad al-Sir
is also reported to have influence with Nimeiri on foreign policy
matters. Whatever weight these men have primarily reflects the
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Red
Sea
Region names and international boundary
representation are not necessarily authoritati
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
Administrative
Boundary,,,/
SIAUDI
ARABIA
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Secret
President from a strongly held position. Despite oppo-
sition from the leader of Sudan's Ansar Muslim sect,
for example, Nimeiri supported the Camp David
accords in 1978. According to our analysis, many of
Sudan's non-Muslim southerners oppose closer ties to
Egypt, but last year Nimeiri concluded an integration
agreement with Cairo. In our view, the Sudanese
military is the only group that has the power to
convince Nimeiri to alter his views on foreign policy
issues. The armed forces, however, have remained
largely aloof from the decisionmaking process even in
instances when they opposed a government decision,
such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq
Major Benefactors
Sudan's need for economic and military assistance is a
major determinant of its foreign policy. During the
past several years, Khartoum has come to rely in-
creasingly on Saudi Arabia for economic assistance,
Egypt for military aid, and the United States for both.
Egypt. Egypt is Sudan's closest ally and de facto
protector. The two countries have deep geographic,
economic, social, and cultural ties. Successive Egyp-
tian leaders have said publicly that Egypt views a
stable and friendly government in Sudan as a vital
safeguard of the main tributaries of the Nile River.
We believe that Cairo's main concern is that a regime
sympathetic to its interests rule Sudan. The Egyptian
Government is not strongly committed to the personal
survival of Nimeiri. If a coup were launched by
Sudanese whom Cairo believed were friendly toward
Egypt, it might stay neutral. For the time being,
however, the Egyptians probably see no feasible alter-
native to Nimeiri.
The Sudanese Government usually turns to Egypt
first when security threats arise. We believe Nimeiri
places considerable value on the mutual defense pact
signed with Egypt in July 1976 in the aftermath of a
Libyan-backed coup attempt.
Khartoum has never had to invoke the defense pact
with Egypt, but a host of lesser Egyptian actions have
helped bolster Sudan's security in recent years. Egypt
sold 20 armored personnel carriers to Sudan in 1981,
according to US Defense Department reports, and
more are on order. Grant aid from Egypt has included
a small number of T-54 and T-55 tanks, BM-21
rocket launchers, Swingfire antitank missiles, and
122-mm multiple rocket launchers, according to De-
fense Department publications and reports from 'the
US Embassy and defense attache in Khartoum.
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tion, Egypt trains some Sudanese officers in Egypt,
and approximately 200 Egyptian military instructors
and technicians are stationed in Sudan. To the best of 25X1
our knowledge, no Egyptian combat troops are sta-
tioned permanently in Sudan, despite claims to the
contrary by opponents of the Nimeiri regime.
Egypt and Sudan conduct periodic joint military
exercises under the terms of their mutual defense pact
and a protocol signed in December 1981. Such ma-
neuvers have been used to warn potential foes of the
Nimeiri regime. When Addis Ababa increased its
support for Libyan-trained Sudanese dissidents in
early 1982, Egypt scheduled a joint paratroop exercise
near Sudan's border with Ethiopia
The timing and location of
the maneuvers constituted, in our judgment, an obvi-
ous message,to Addis Ababa that Egypt would not
tolerate a serious threat to Sudan's security.
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We believe that Egypt would go to considerable
lengths to protect the Nimeiri regime from outside
aggression. Nonetheless, the Sudanese President and
his top military advisers are concerned that the
Mubarak government might not respond to future
requests for security assistance as quickly or forceful-
ly as they would like,
A senior Sudanese military official
complained to representatives of the US defense
attache's office last spring that the Egyptians seemed
reluctant to become involved in final plans to counter
a possible Libyan attack on Khartoum in February
have concluded from this that they cannot depend
fully on the Egyptians.
The ambitious Egyptian-Sudanese integration agree-
ment signed in 1982 has focused in large part on
economic questions. The most tangible results of
integration to date have been the lifting of restrictions
on the movement of goods and people between the two
countries. A joint development fund has been created
within the integration framework, but we believe
there is little the two financially strapped countries
can do to aid each other economically.
There are those in both countries who, in our estima-
tion, oppose integration on economic grounds. Many
in Egypt believe that the unification agreement binds
them to a country whose economic problems are even
worse than their own. Some Sudanese fear that
integration will harm their relations with those Arab
benefactors who still boycott Egypt but are favorably
disposed toward Khartoum.
Saudi Arabia. Our analysis suggests that the Saudi
regime values the role that Nimeiri plays in limiting
the expansion of Soviet influence in the Red Sea
region and fears that he might be replaced by a
radical, pro-Soviet regime. If Sudan were ruled by a
leftist government, the Saudis would face a pro-Soviet
arc stretching from Libya through Sudan and Ethio-
pia to South Yemen.
The Saudis also see Sudan as a valuable conduit for
assistance to Eritrean groups fighting against the
Ethiopian Government. Riyadh and Khartoum have
tried to unify rival Eritrean factions
Saudi Arabia is one of Sudan's largest single sources
of financial aid. Our calculations indicate that aid
disbursements from 1974 to 1980 totaled approxi-
mately $2 billion, including $1 billion in economic aid
and some $900 million in military assistance. Riyadh
has committed another $90 million in grants for 1983,
according to the US Embassy in Jidda. The US
Embassy in Khartoum has reported that, in a thinly
disguised form of aid, Saudi Arabia agreed last year
to purchase significant quantities of Sudanese sor-
ghum at prices above world-market levels.
We believe that Saudi Arabia, like Egypt, is deter-
mined that a moderate and sympathetic government
rule Sudan but is not completely happy with Nimeiri.
Despite these concerns, we believe the Saudis have
concluded that the Nimeiri regime is the lesser of
several evils
the turmoil resulting from a
change of government in Khartoum would involve
significant risks to Saudi interests.
the kingdom will continue to aid the
Nimeiri regime. The Saudis, however, appear to be
providing Sudan only the minimum necessary to keep
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Table 1
Official Aid Disbursements to Sudan,
Projected 1983
Million US $ Table 2
US Economic and Military Assistance
to Sudan, FY 1981-84
800
553
Italy
Japan
Saudi Arabia
178
Spain
5
Switzerland
5
United Kingdom
35
United States
140
Multilateral
247
African Development Bank
10
Arab Fund
16
Arab Monetary Fund
50
European Community
41
International Fund for Agricultural
Development
OPEC Fund
Saudi Fund
IBRD/IDA
the regime afloat. By disbursing their aid in a mea-
sured fashion, Riyadh, in our view, hopes that Khar-
toum will remain sensitive to its concerns on various
regional issues and be more amenable to economic
adjustment measures that the Saudis support
We believe that the Saudis would prefer that Sudan
be ruled by someone like Sadiq al-Mahdi, a leader of
Sudan's fundamentalist Ansar Muslim sect, or Hasan
al-Turabi, the head of the Sudanese Muslim Brother-
hood. In our judgment, however, they are aware that
157.3
276.2
261.5
329.5
75.0
125.0
135.0
148.0
32.3
51.2
44.3
61.5
MAP
1.7
0
43.0
60.0
FMS (credit)
30.0
50.0
0
0
IMET
0.6
1.2
1.3
1.5
50.0
100.0
82.2
120.0
a Actual disbursements.
b Proposed commitments.
neither of these men has broad enough political
support to win power. In any event, Riyadh has
abstained from serious meddling in Sudanese internal
politics.
The United States. Sudanese-US relations have
grown close during the last several years, and US aid
to Sudan increased significantly between 1975 and
1982. President Nimeiri has been one of the most
open and vocal supporters of US foreign policy in the
Arab world. In March 1981 he publicly offered the
use of Sudan's military facilities to the United States.
The Sudanese Government this year formally agreed
to the pre-positioning of US equipment in Port Sudan
for the Central Command. Last year President Ni-
meiri publicly approved the US Middle East peace
initiative. Sudan also yielded in 1982 to US entreaties
to accept some PLO combatants being evacuated
from Beirut, despite apprehension that the guerrillas
might create additional internal security problems for
the government. In addition, Sudan has voted with the
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Presidents Nimeiri and Reagan
meet in Washington in Novem-
United States at the United Nations on many issues
of major concern to Washington. During the 37th
General Assembly, Sudan ranked among the African
states that most often supported the United States on
key issues
In addition to its direct assistance, the United States
took a leading role in 1982 and 1983 in marshaling
international economic support for Sudan. The US.
Government made demarches to Sudan's Western
donors to secure the aid and debt relief measures
necessary to narrow-Sudan's balance-of-payments
America's role in encouraging multilateral financial
assistance for Khartoum ironically became a source of
some tension between the United States and Sudan.
According to Embassy reporting, many Sudanese in
and out of government were convinced that the
United States actively urged the IMF to seek tough
conditions for a new standby loan a reement for
Sudan.
The generous aid and debt-rescheduling
packages subsequently arranged for the Sudanese
eased but probably did not eliminate uncertainty in
Khartoum about the extent of US support for Sudan.
Sudanese officials also were disappointed by the drop
in US aid to Sudan in 1983. Even before the magni-
tude of the cuts in military assistance became known,
Foreign Minister Mirghani Mubarak complained in a
published interview that the United States "isn't
giving us military aid equivalent to the role Sudan is
playing in Africa." We believe any further declines in
aid levels will add to Sudanese disappointment.
China. China has become an increasingly important
secondary source of military equipment for Sudan in
the last several years. We believe Beijing sees in
Sudan an opportunity to maintain a presence in a part
of Africa dominated by US and Soviet military
assistance programs.
Over the last several years, the Chinese have provided
12 F-6 (MIG-19 variant) aircraft, 15 F-5s (MIG-17
variant), 95 tanks, field artillery, and other vehicles,
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The
Sudanese, in our judgment, are pleased to receive
equipment from China, partly because Beijing has
been patient about their tardiness in repaying the
loans that financed the items. The US defense attache
in Khartoum, moreover, has speculated that the Chi-
nese charge Sudan below-market prices for military
China also has a modest economic assistance program
in Sudan. According to US Embassy reports, project
aid for the construction of a highway, clothing fac-
tory, and vocational training center will be repaid in
Sudanese goods.
Other Benefactors. Western Europe, Japan, the small-
er Persian Gulf states, Yugoslavia, and Romania have
also given moderate levels of economic or military
assistance to Sudan, according to US Embassy re-
ports. We believe that the Western and Arabian
Peninsula countries appreciate Sudan's role as a
barrier to the spread of Soviet expansion in the
Middle East and Africa. Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates are Sudan's biggest donors in the Gulf after
Saudi Arabia. West Germany, France, Italy, Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom, and Japan all have
significant aid programs in Sudan
According to our analysis, Sudan's best relations
among the East European states are with Yugoslavia
and Romania. Khartoum is willing to maintain good
ties with these Communist countries, in our judgment,
because it views Yugoslavia as independent and Ro-
mania as having a greater degree of independence in
foreign policy than other East European nations.
Yugoslavia fulfills an especially important role by
supplying parts and maintaining Sudan's aging
Soviet-built military equipment.
Nimeiri's Rogues' Gallery
President Nimeiri's public statements have made
clear that he considers the expansion of Soviet influ-
ence in the Middle East and northeast Africa to be a
threat to regional stability and to his own survival.
The Sudanese have long believed that Moscow en-
courages Libya and Ethiopia to support Sudanese
dissidents who want to overthrow Nimeiri.
Soviet Union. Relations with the Soviet Union have
been poor since Sudanese Communists tried to over-
throw Nimeiri in 1971. Statements Nimeiri has made
to US officials and the press display his conviction
that the Soviets seek to remove him as a step toward
their goal of dominating the Persian Gulf/Red Sea
area. We believe the Soviets would like to see a less
pro-US government in Sudan, but we have no evi-
dence to confirm Sudanese suspicions that the USSR
was directly involved in the 1971 coup attempt or the
Libyan-backed attempt in 1976. We do not have any
evidence that the Soviet Union is now directly in-
volved in Libyan- and Ethiopian-supported efforts to
destabilize the Sudanese Government, although the
Soviets undoubtedly are sympathetic to this goal as it
would further overall Soviet objectives in the region.
We believe that as long as Nimeiri is in power, there
is little chance that Sudan's relations with the Soviet
Union will improve dramatically.
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Libya and Ethiopia. We believe Libyan and Ethiopi-
an support for Sudanese dissident groups constitutes
the most serious external threat to the Nimeiri re-
gime.'
Qadhafi's hostility to
Nimeiri; originally a reflection of his desire to strike
at Egypt through its weaker neighbor, has developed
into a strong personal antipathy, in our judgment.
Qadhafi supported coup attempts against Nimeiri in
1975 and 1976 and redoubled his efforts after Nimeiri
endorsed the Camp David accords in 1978. Since
1981, our analysis suggests, Qadhafi's hatred of the
Sudanese ruler has been aggravated by direct Suda-
nese support for exiled Libyan opposition groups.
Sudan's recent role in allowing US aircraft into
Sudan to monitor Libyan-backed antigovernment ac-
tivity in Chad probably has further intensified Qadha-
fi's desire to overthrow Nimeiri.
Sudanese officials are particularly worried about the
potential expansion of Libyan influence in Chad.
a Chadian Government sympathet-
ic to Libyan demands would allow Libyan forces or
Sudanese dissidents to use eastern Chad as a staging
ground for attacks into western Sudan. A contingent
of at least 450 Sudanese dissidents fought alongside
Chadian rebels attempting to overthrow the Habre
government last summer.
Ethiopia intensified its support for Sudanese dissi-
dents after it joined the Aden Pact with Libya and
South Yemen in 1981 J
share Qadhafi's intense hatred of Nimeiri. Nonethe-
less, they are convinced that Sudan is aiding Eritrean
and Tigrean insurgents,
Over the years, Sudan and Ethiopia have attempted to
persuade each other to cease aid to each other's
opponents, according to press
reports. If Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu perceived a
decrease in Sudanese support for Eritrean and Ti-
grean rebels, or if Libya were to renege on aid
commitments made to Ethiopia as part of the Aden
Pact, Mengistu might curb the activities of Sudanese
dissidents based in his country. We believe that the
Ethiopians would not stop the anti-Nimeiri dissident
activity altogether, however, because they view the
rebels as an important bargaining card against the
Sudanese.
Other Neighbors. None of Sudan's other neighbors-
Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, the Central African Republic,
or Chad-are hostile toward Khartoum. Several of
these states, however, are ruled by unstable govern-
ments. Sudanese officials, therefore, are concerned
that these countries might become havens for Suda-
nese dissidents or sources of refugees fleeing strife in
Outlook
In our view, the prospects are good that with sus-
tained effort Sudan will continue to garner the foreign
support it needs to survive. We believe, for example,
that, despite aid cutbacks to other African states
necessitated by falling oil revenues, Saudi assistance
to Sudan will not drop significantly, because the
geographic proximity of the two countries makes
Sudan more important to the Saudis. Other friendly
states will probably provide modest levels of aid.
Egyptian policymakers at the highest levels continue
to reaffirm their determination to defend Sudan from
external attack both in public and, according to
sources of the US defense attache in Cairo, in private.
Although Sudan's foreign relations are driven by the
pursuit of foreign assistance, we believe Nimeiri
aspires to play a larger, more statesmanlike role in
both the Middle East and Africa. A committed
moderate, Nimeiri is often among the first to suggest
meetings of the Arab League or OAU to solve
regional problems. Sudan's influence in these forums
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is limited, however, because of its economic and
military weakness, its internal instability, and its
location on the fringes of both the Arab world and
with Nimeiri, they might temper their pro-Western
inclinations to bolster, Sudan's standing among non-
aligned countries and mollify those Sudanese critical
of Nimeiri's close association with Washington.
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Implications for the United States
We believe the Nimeiri regime is unlikely to change
its pro-US stance. Nimeiri, in our view, would proba-
bly welcome US AWACS back to Khartoum in the
event of Libyan-backed adventurism in northeast
Africa, especially in Chad. We believe the Nimeiri
government will continue to agree with US positions
on many other regional issues
There are several potential developments that could
damage the currently warm Sudanese-US bilateral
relationship. Significant cuts in US aid would deeply
upset Sudanese officials. Drastic reductions in assist-
ance might convince the government to reverse its
policy of refusing economic aid from the Soviet
Union. We believe the Sudanese would also be an-
noyed if they became convinced that the United
States was trying to impose tough economic austerity
measures on Sudan through the IMF. Sudanese confi-
dence in Washington also would be shaken if they
came to believe that the United States was not doing
enough to combat what they perceive as Soviet and
Libyan adventurism in the Middle East and Africa.
Even if moderate strains develop in US-Sudanese
relations, however, we do not believe the Nimeiri
regime would significantly reduce US military access
to Sudanese facilities. The Sudanese, in our judgment,
see such American involvement as bolstering their
own security and therefore would continue to welcome
If Nimeiri were to turn power over to a handpicked
successor, we believe bilateral relations would remain
largely unaffected. The most likely candidates, those
now serving at the highest levels of the military or the
government, in our judgment share Nimeiri's pro-US
orientation.
If Nimeiri were forced from office involuntarily, his
successors might be less favorably inclined toward the
United States. Even if normally pro-US senior Army
officers were to seize power because of dissatisfaction
In the less likely event that a government controlled
by leftist parties, exiled dissidents, or radical junior
officers came to power, we believe that US-Sudanese
relations would worsen. The Sudanese Communist
Party and other smaller leftist groups have propagan-
dized heavily against US activities in Sudan. Most
exiled dissident factions have links to Libya and, in
our view, would probably align themselves with Tripo-
li in the unlikely event they succeeded in ousting
Nimeiri. The US defense attache's office in Khar-
toum reported last year that some junior officers had
become openly critical of the Nimeiri regime. If a
group of these younger officers overthrew the Presi-
dent, we believe the new government might be less
supportive of the United States and could turn to
Libya and the Soviet Union for aid.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/11: CIA-RDP84SO0927R000100110002-0