INDIA: THE OPPOSITION'S SEARCH FOR UNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000200060003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Search for Unity
India: The Opposition's
NESA 83-10326
December 1983
Copy 2 9 8
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
India: The Opposition's
Search for Unity
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution from Office
of Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South
Asia Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 83-10326
December 1983
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India: The Opposition's
Search for Unity
Key Judgments A united coalition of opposition parties probably would have a better than
Information available even chance of achieving a majority or at least denying one to Prime
as of 15 November 1983 Minister Gandhi in the next parliamentary election to be held by January
was used in this report.
1985. Even so, a winning coalition would have to include the entire
spectrum of national and regional non-Communist parties, and formidable
obstacles threaten to keep the opposition divided. No opposition leader has
Gandhi's stature or popularity, and no single party can challenge the
Congress Party in national elections. 25X1
The opposition's shared view that the Prime Minister's popularity has
diminished is helping to unify it:
? Opposition parties across the political spectrum are meeting to discuss
the need for more regional government autonomy and to explore other is-
sues that could unite them.
? Two groupings of rightist and leftist national parties-encouraged by the
declared support of India's two major Communist parties-have recently
emerged to confront Gandhi, and we believe that efforts to bring
important regional parties into formal opposition to Congress will
succeed, especially if the Prime Minister appears vulnerable.
Before rejecting Gandhi at the polls, the increasingly informed and
impatient Indian electorate will demand convincing assurances that an
opposition alternative will be durable and can manage India's enormous
ethnic and cultural diversity. In our view, the opposition will try to gain
credibility by basing its platform on popular general issues that can be
endorsed by all participating coalition parties. We believe that a victorious,
cohesive opposition coalition government initially would be stable, but as in
the past, unresolved differences among opposition parties within a year or
two probably would endanger a coalition government. 25X1
Prospects for a durable coalition to oppose Gandhi are still problematic
because of several difficulties:
? An older generation of quarrelsome opposition leaders is reluctant to cede
leadership to younger and more flexible junior officials.
? Opposition parties represent a plethora of seemingly incompatible ideolo-
gies, personalities, and constituencies.
? Factionalism within opposition parties-particularly between the nation-
al leadership and state units-may prevent party leaders from striking
meaningful deals with other parties.
Secret
NESA 83-10326
December 1983
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? Gandhi may return to her familiar strategy of gaining support from one
or more regional parties with promises of autonomy or more central aid.
She may seek Indian Communist Party support should the regional
parties reject her and an opposition coalition appears threatening. 25X1
We believe the Soviets prefer Gandhi-who generally supports Soviet
foreign policy objectives-to an opposition coalition that might include
conservative, anti-Communist parties. 25X1
25X1
25X1
As domestic politics heat up before the elections, we believe Gandhi will
look for scapegoats to divert domestic criticism and to demonstrate the
tough leadership she believes appeals to Indian voters. To undercut the
appeal of the opposition parties, the Prime Minister may increase her leftist
rhetoric and intensify her attacks against "outside forces" that she alleges
threaten India's national security. Opposition gains would encoura e
Gandhi to criticize more actively US policy in world trouble spots 25X1
US interests and policy in South Asia are likely to come under sharp
criticism from Gandhi and her party as India's parliamentary elections
approach. She has already implied US interference in state assembly
elections earlier this year and raised the foreign hand bogey more recently
in strategically sensitive Kashmir. Gandhi's recurrent charges of Pakistan's
involvement in civil disorders in the Indian state of Punjab are chiefly an
effort ilize domestic political support and preempt the opposition. 25X1
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India: The Opposition's
Search for Unity
The organized opposition to Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi and her Congress Party is divided, but the
shared perception among the major opposition parties
that Gandhi is vulnerable is promoting opposition
unity (see table 1). In our view, opposition parties are
groping for an issue and a leader to provide a credible
alternative to the Prime Minister. Despite the opposi-
tion's potential to successfully unite against the Con-
gress Party, in our analysis Indian voters will demand
firm evidence that the opposition can provide an
effective and durable government before rejecting the
Congress Party at the polls.
The prospect of national parliamentary elections be-
fore the January 1985 deadline adds urgency to
opposition plans to challenge Gandhi with a coalition
of national and regional parties.
This year's monsoon is described by most
experts on the Indian economy as one of the best in
recent years, and many political observers argue that
the Prime Minister may take advantage of that by
calling for early elections. Nonetheless, bickering and
longstanding rivalries continue to hamper rapid pro-
gress toward a united opposition
The Divided Opposition
The opposition in India has long been divided into
many small parties. Chronic opposition disunity re-
flects various regional interests and wide ideological
differences. Since independence the opposition has
produced only one popular leader-the late
J. P. Narayan-capable of challenging the Nehru
family dynasty and arbitrating the often petty quar-
rels among politicians outside the Congress Party.
State and regional parties often led by locally popular
figures have periodically wrested control from Con-
gress in their home areas, but the Congress Party has
won six of seven nationwide elections and is the only
party with an effective or anization in all of India's
22 states (see figure 1).
Figure 1
Congress Party Results in Parliamentary
Elections, 1952-80
25X1
25X1
25X1
Since independence in 1947, many opposition parties
have emerged, most of them transient or highly 25X1
localized. Many were formed around leaders of par-
ticular castes or ethnic communities, and others repre-
sented various ideologies. On the right, several parties
emerged representing the landed Hindu farmers of
the northern states as well as primarily urban, educat-
ed Hindus advocating a free enterprise economic
system (see foldout at end of text). On the left, various
Socialists and Communists fought for the allegiance
of landless laborers, the underprivileged, and the
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Table 1
Goals and Constituencies of Major
Non-Communist National Parties a
Formally committed to a general policy of "democratic
socialism," a secular state, and nonalignment. Policies
are pragmatic and mandated by Gandhi rather than
developed through intraparty debate.
A pivotal party in any united opposition, party president
Chandra Shekhar wants to make the party more respon-
sive to the rural electorate. A left-of-center party of
former Congress Party members. Janata has recently
gained support from leftist defectors from the Democrat-
ic Socialist Party and the Lok Dal and leads the United
Front coalition.
To foster cooperation between independent farmers,
small businessmen, and the self-employed. Agricultural
development is seen as essential to industrial develop-
ment, which the party believes should be small-scale and
based on self-reliance. Party wishes to see rejuvenation
of the village and enhancement of peasant proprietors.
Led by former Prime Minister Charan Singh, the con-
servative Lok Dal formed the National Democratic
Alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party in August
1983.
Bharatiya Janata Although the BJP is trying to project an image of a
Party (BJP) secular, national party, a substantial element seeks to
protect Hindu society, advance Indian domination of the
subcontinent, and promote Hindi as the national lan-
guage. The BJP split from the Janata Party coalition in
1980. Many members attracted from the erstwhile Jan
Sangh Party, the political arm of the militant Hindu
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS is a
cultural organization dedicated to the preservation and
renaissance of Hindu culture. Led by former Janata
Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee, the BJP formed the
National Democratic Alliance with the Lok Dal Party in
August 1983.
Democratic Socialist The creation of party president H. N. Bahuguna, a
Party former outspoken Cabinet minister and general secretary
of the Congress Party, the Democratic Socialist Party
hopes to unite all left-of-center parties against Indira
Gandhi. The party joined the United Front coalition in
September 1983. Bahuguna rejects an opposition front
with the BJP and would like to include the Communists
under his leadership. The Indian press has noted his
strong advocacy of closer Indo-Soviet ties while a mem-
ber of Gandhi's government in the mid-1970s. Both
journalists and political observers speculate that Bahu-
guna received Soviet financial support during his suc-
cessful parliamentary campaign in 1982. We believe
Gandhi fears Bahuguna because of his close ties with
Congress politicians and his strong political base in the
Prime Minister's home state of Uttar Pradesh. From his
public statements and participation in organizing opposi-
tion leader meetings, Bahuguna is clearly trying to lead
efforts to unify the opposition.
National following, but serious erosion occurred in
south and outside the Hindi-speaking belt. Embraces
broad spectrum of support overlapping parties of left
and right.
Wide geographical base but support largely drawn
from urban and higher educated groups in Hindi-
speaking states. Has concentrations of strength in
Karnataka-where it formed a state government in
January 1983-Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Bihar.
Small landowners and independent farmers of the Jat
caste in the northern Hindi-speaking states-particu-
larly Uttar Pradesh and Haryana-with some sup-
port in Bihar and Orissa.
Has strong, well-organized grass-roots support
among north Indian landowners, civil servants, Hin-
du traders, and shopkeepers. Strongest in the Hindi-
speaking states of Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pra-
desh, and Rajasthan, with strength also in Bihar,
Uttar Pradesh, and Gujarat. The BJP has tried to
broaden its support outside Hindi areas with only
marginal success.
Core areas of Uttar Pradesh-where Bahuguna was
once state chief minister-and a modest following in
other Hindi-speaking states. Bahuguna also has sup-
port among nominal Congress Party members who
favor more pro-Soviet policies and has friends in the
Communist parties.
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Table 1
Goals and Constituencies of Major
Non-Communist National Parties a (continued)
Congress (S) A left-of-center "Gandhian socialist" breakaway from
Gandhi's Congress, the Congress (S) (for socialist) favors
mobilization of all leftist parties and has worked with the
Communists. Party identity is maintained only by its
national leadership under former Maharashtra chief
minister, Sharad Pawar. The West Bengal and Kerala
units of the party have rejoined Congress over the past
year. Congress (S) joined the United Front coalition in
September.
ter-in-law, Maneka, the party wants to establish a
socialist, secular state with a centrist foreign policy.
Hopes to galvanize youth and unemployed and rid
government of corruption.
a Some 22 political parties are represented in the two houses of
Parliament, but only six of these qualify as "all-India parties,"
defined in the Constitution as those obtaining 4 percent of the vote
in Lok Sabha elections or in elections to at least four state
assemblies. All-India parties are the Congress, Congress (S), Bhara-
tiya Janata Party, Janata Party, Lok Dal, and Communist Party of
India (Marxist). We consider the additional dozen or so nonregional
parties not included relatively insignificant and likely to merge into
the Congress or major opposition parties at election time.
newly enfranchised (see figure 2). The Congress Party
itself split in 1969. The larger splinter faction fol-
lowed Gandhi after she won control of the party from
regional party bosses. Her chief rival, Morarji Desai,
led the minor, more conservative faction.
The opposition defeated Congress in 1977, we believe
chiefly because Gandhi underestimated deep dissatis-
faction with her regime in the northern Hindi-speak-
ing states (see figure 3) and because two years of
authoritarian emergency rule unified the disparate
opposition parties. J. P. Narayan, a disciple of
Mahatma Gandhi, led a nonviolent civil disobedience
campaign that mobilized Muslims and untouch-
ables-the bedrock of Congress Party support-
.against the Prime Minister. Narayan rejected person-
al participation in the new Janata government, but
scholars agree that through his inspiration and en-
couragement opposition party leaders temporarily put
aside their differences under the leadership of Morarji
Indian and American scholars have documented the
factional and ideological disputes and disruptive per-
sonality clashes that soon emerged. Scholars point to
Janata's failure to draft and implement a coherent
national program as an important factor leading to
the fall of the Janata Party coalition. Gandhi returned
to power in January 1980 with a fresh mandate to
provide a "government that works."
Disaffected Youth Congress activists and close asso-
ciates of the late Sanjay Gandhi. Maneka has at-
tracted some support from women's groups. The
party has pockets of strong support in Uttar Pradesh
and has recently established a number of state
organizations, but membership is probably far below
party claims of 800,000.
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Figure 2
Evolution of India's Communist Parties
Communist Party of
India
1925
1980
Communist Party of
India (CPI)
C. Rajeshwar Rao
Indrajit Gupta
H. Mukherjee
AH India Communist Communist Party of
Party India-Marxist (CPM)
S. A. Dange E. M. S. Namboodiripad
Roza Deshpande Jyoti Basu
E. K. Nayanar
Communist Party of India
(Marxist-Leninist)
S. N. Singh group
C. P. Reddy group
Anti-Lin Biao group
Romesh Chandra
Nripen Chakravarty
B. T. Ranadive
Pro-Lin Biao group
People's War group
P. Ramamurti
Central Reorganizing
Committee
Unity Center of the
Communist
Revolutionaries of India
Several current opposition party leaders presided over
the disintegration of Janata in 1979. Each of the old
party leaders comes from separate and mutually
antagonistic social groups. Morarji Desai-officially
retired but still influential among some elements of
the Janata Party-is an urban Brahmin with a con-
servative economic and political perspective. Charan
Singh is a spokesman for relatively well-off rural
landholders, and Jagjivan Ram for years has repre-
sented the interests of untouchables in northern India.
One opposition leader describes Gandhi's party as a
movement that united all Indians briefly to win
independence from the British but has since not
satisfied an increasingly impatient electorate. Accord-
ing to US Embassy reports, opposition politicians
believe that the Congress Party has weakened consid-
erably since 1980.
In our analysis, the image and credibility of the
Congress Party have been tarnished as it has lost
ground to the opposition. Five major states with a
combined population of 200 million-Jammu and
Opposition Opportunities
We believe that Prime Minister Gandhi is susceptible
to a unified opposition despite the two-thirds majority
that Congress now enjoys in Parliament (see figure 4).
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Figure 3
Himachal
Pradesh
;handigarh Ir
r
?`t"a snn
New Delhi
"
? Uttar
Rajasthan a;~>_ .I -n-
I( ~ Bihar
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
AhmadBbeq)
INDIA
Hindi-speaking heartland
Non-Congress-Party-governed
state
Bay of ~-?- . -~
300 Kilometers
300 Miles
Bengal
Andaman
and
Nicobar
Islands
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regional parties.
Kashmir, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
and Tamil Nadu-are governed by opposition parties
that have strengthened their hold over the past year.
We believe the legitimacy of Congress governments in
Assam and Punjab is challenged by violence and civil
disturbances. Political commentators point out that
Congress-led governments in Kerala, Haryana, and
Himachal Pradesh share power only through the
tenuous support of independents and unreliable coali-
tion partners. In our view, returns from numerous
state assembly elections and parliamentary byelec-
tions held since 1980 suggest that state organizations
of the Congress Party have deteriorated badly, and
few have met the special demands of India's various
linguistic and ethnic groups, which are now turning to
We believe regional parties-which appeal to particu-
lar linguistic, cultural, or ethnic groups-have grown
stronger and more assertive at Congress's expense. Of
the six states now governed by non-Congress parties,
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Figure 4
Party Strength in Parliament, June 1983
Lok Sabha (Lower House)
Total number of seats: 543
Rajya Sabha (Upper House)
Total number of seats: 244
Janata 23 (9%)
21 (9%)
Regional/minor
parties 54 (22%)
three-Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Jammu
and Kashmir-are controlled by regional parties.
Journalists and political observers note that regional
parties provide strong opposition to shaky Congress
governments in other regions including the strategi-
cally sensitive northeastern states and Punjab, which
borders on Pakistan. In other major Congress-con-
trolled states-notably Gujarat, Kerala, and Orissa-
regional parties are gaining strength
In our judgment, many in the lower castes and
minority communities have deserted the Prime Minis-
ter for regional parties. Political observers attribute
regional party gains in the south earlier this year to
the defection of Muslims, untouchables, women vot-
ers, and youth activists. According to US diplomats,
increasing communal violence is causing fewer Mus-
lims to regard Congress as their principal patron and
protector, and many are seriously considering regional
25X1 party alternatives.
Maneuvering Toward an Opposition Front
Despite periodic bickering among major opposition
leaders, national and regional parties over the past
year have managed to arrange local and state elector-
al alliances to challenge successfully Gandhi's weak-
ened Congress Party. The Embassy has identified four
general opposition groupings:
? A "left and democratic front" centered on the
CPM, CPI, and small leftist parties.
? A mainly socialist combine of the Janata Party,
Congress (S), and occasional participation by Demo-
cratic Socialist Party leader H. N. Bahuguna.
? A rightist alliance linking the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) and the landed farmer-oriented Lok
Dal.
? Regional parties allied with one or more national
opposition parties.F____1 25X1
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We believe the first tentative movement toward na-
tional opposition unity began at a conclave including
16 non-Communist and Communist opposition parties
sponsored by Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister and
Telugu Desam leader N. T. Rama Rao in May 1983.
Even though the participants acknowledged that poli-
cy differences still blocked formation of an opposition
front, US diplomats reported a consensus on several
broad demands relating to states rights. The Embassy
also noted creation of an informal council in which
leaders of national and regional parties will periodi-
cally assess the political situation and formulate alter-
natives to national issues. Followup conclaves met in
July and October 1983, and the Indian press reports
that opposition leaders have planned additional meet-
ings before the end of the year.
The Bharatiya Janata Party, led by former Foreign
Minister and current BJP President A. B. Vajpayee,
in August 1983 forged the first national opposition
coalition since 1977 by photo joining a right-of-center
"National Democratic Alliance" with the Lok Dal.
This alliance reflects an effort, according to Embassy
reports, to consolidate opposition forces in the Hindi-
speaking heartland of northern India, an area that
most analysts agree will be crucial for Gandhi in the
next elections. In a joint public statement, BJP and
Lok Dal officials announced that a steering commit-
tee will coordinate the activities of all alliance mem-
ber parties in Parliament and in the state legislatures.
The agreement specifies that member parties of the
alliance will not run candidates against each other in
the national parliamentary election.
Another national grouping of opposition parties, in-
cluding the left-of-center Janata, Congress (S), the
Democratic Socialist Party, and the regional Rash-
triya Congress, emerged as the "United Front" in
September 1983. Like the National Democratic Alli-
ance, the United Front also plans coordinated action
inside and outside Parliament, according to Embassy
reports and the Indian press, and each party will
maintain its independence. Indian political commen-
tators report that the United Front's strategy is based
on the ability of each party to mobilize support in the
states and districts where it is strongest. In a press
statement announcing formation of the front, member
parties pledged to pursue alliances with other opposi-
We believe these opposition alliances by themselves
will not pose serious electoral threats to the Congress
Party. The BJP has been unimpressive in recent
elections, while the Lok Dal is seriously troubled by
factionalism. The parties comprising the United Front
are plagued by weak organization. According to
Embassy reports, the national leadership of the par-
ties in the United Front and National Democratic
Alliance may have trouble convincing their state units
to cooperate in fielding joint slates.
Regional Parties: Keys to Opposition Unity
We expect most principal regional parties will eventu-
ally join or cooperate with one of the two major
opposition alliances, particularly should a Congress
Party defeat appear possible. In our analysis, regional
party leaders-who believe more regional autonomy is
inevitable and necessary to preserve India's unity-
perceive Gandhi as perhaps the strongest proponent of
centralization in Indian politics. They view Gandhi,
therefore, as a greater obstacle to increased regional
autonomy than a possible opposition coalition govern-
ment dependent upon regional party support.
tion parties.
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elections approach.
The increasingly important regional parties so far
have remained aloof from formal opposition alliances,
but we believe they have shown a convincing interest
in opposition unity efforts. The Indian press reports
that strong regional party leaders such as N. T. Rama
Rao (referred to as NTR), Kashmir Chief Minister
Farooq Abdullah, and Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.
G. Ramachandran (known as MGR) are talking about
cooperating in a coalition. Recent press statements
from these regional party leaders suggest that Rama
Rao and perhaps Farooq Abdullah want the lead in an
opposition front. US diplomats and Indian journalists
report that Rama Rao already projects himself as a
national political force rather than merely a regional
party leader. The Embassy believes Rama Rao may
bide his time until he can play a more important role
in the opposition, probably as a unifying force as
In our judgment, the more parochial and local orien-
tation of the regional parties limits their appeal and
makes them susceptible to Gandhi's promises of more
state autonomy or central government aid. The Em-
bassy reports that the Prime Minister maintains
contact with regional party leaders and periodically
25X6 ,
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Table 2
Major Regional Parties
Tamils, and US diplomats believe AIADMK and
DMK demands on Gandhi to support the cause of Sri
Lankan Tamils carry added weight because Tamil
Nadu is the one southern state where she hopes for
some support in the next parliamentary election.
25X1
AIADMK
Tamil Nadu
M. G. Ramachandran
DMK
Tamil Nadu
M. Karunanidhi
National
Conference
Jammu and.
Kashmir
Farooq Abdullah
tests for possible future alliances. She and Rama Rao
have had several lengthy discussions in New Delhi,
and the Indian press speculates that the Prime.
Minister has made special efforts to cultivate
M. G. Ramachandran in the past few months.
According to our analysis, in the south Gandhi has
long played off regional Dravidian parties against
each other. Embassy officials report that although
Congress has not formally offered to stand with the
ruling All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
Party (AIADMK) in the next election, high-level
election talks were held in April. The Indian press
notes that Ramachandran has instructed party mem-
bers not to criticize the Prime Minister's government,
and some commentators speculate that an AIADMK
deal with the Congress has already been agreed to in
principle. The press indicates that most opposition
leaders discount possible AIADMK participation in
an opposition coalition, but Tamil Nadu state officials
insist that Ramachandran will avoid an electoral
arrangement with Gandhi because of the decline of
Congress in the state and because of general dissen-
sion within Gandhi's party throughout India.
We believe the recent religious violence in Sri Lanka
has enabled Gandhi to score propaganda points with
Ramachandran's ruling AIADMK by seeking to pro-
tect Tamil interests in Sri Lanka. Both the AIADMK
and the state opposition Dravida Munnetra Kazha-
gam (DMK) vie to be the champion of Sri Lankan
Role of the Communist Parties
Although the more independent Communist Party of
India-Marxist (CPM) and the traditionally Moscow-
backed Communist Party of India (CPI) have sent
representatives to some opposition conclaves, the Indi-
an press and knowledgeable political observers note
that mutual antipathy and distrust virtually rule out
alliances between the Communists and the conserva-
tive BJP and Lok Dal parties. Despite the Communist
parties' public support for the United Front, press
reports suggest that many non-Communist opposition
leaders believe that Communist participation in oppo-
sition planning is counterproductive because they
judge the CPI and CPM are untrustworthy and could
defect to Gandhi. 25X1
The CPI-allied with Gandhi from the late 1960s
until 1977-appears to be moving toward greater
support for opposition unity efforts, but eventual
Indian Communist support for Gandhi cannot be
ruled out. The US Embassy reports that the CPI
recently hardened its anti-Gandhi stance by censorin
a pro-Gandhi party official.
We believe that Gandhi might again court the Com-
munist parties and ask the Soviets to press them to
support her, particularly if most regional parties reject
cooperation with the Congress Party. The Indian
press notes that Gandhi appealed to the Soviets to
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curb Indian Communist criticism during her visit to
Moscow last year. Gandhi has publicly acknowledged
having asked the Soviet Communist Party in Septem-
ber 1983 to encourage CPI support of her govern-
25X1 ment.
We believe the Soviets prefer Gandhi-who generally
supports Soviet foreign policy objectives-to an oppo-
sition coalition that might include conservative parties
such as the BJP and Lok Dal. For more than a year
the Soviets have been trying to protect their relations
with Gandhi by quietly encouraging the CPI to
Muslim League-disciplined Hindu communal chau-
vinists in the BJP stridently oppose party president
Vajpayee's goal of an opposition front.
We believe opposition unity efforts are bound to be
influenced by Gandhi. The Prime Minister, as in the
past, will seek to divide the opposition groups. Given
the number of personal conflicts among the opposition
leaders and the almost unlimited resources at the
Congress Party's disposal, the likelihood of successful
mischief is high. Gandhi also controls the election
machinery, and she alone determines the timing of
elections.
In our view, however, Soviet officials may have
reservations about trying to mobilize support for
Gandhi among Indian Communist parties. Indian
commentators note that the CPM is maintaining
adamant opposition to the Prime Minister even as it
develops closer ties to Moscow and cooperates more
closely with its longtime rival CPI. The Soviets may,
calculate that pressures on the Indian Communist
parties to back Gandhi could ruin the potential Com-
munist unity in India that we believe the Soviets want
in place when the Nehru dynasty leaves the political
stage.
Outlook
In our view, major problems still obstruct formation
of an effective and unified opposition coalition. The
leaders responsible for the collapse of the Janata
government are still on the scene and sometimes seem
unwilling to ignore personal differences. Several oppo-
sition parties object to any alliance with the BJP.
Although the BJP leadership is formally committed to
opposition unity-minus the Communists and the
In our view, opposition leaders have already discount-
ed the possibility of a single united party in favor of a
loose confederation in which opposition parties will
agree on a single candidate to oppose the Congress
Party in each constituency. The Janata Party's frag- 25X1
mentation in 1979 seems to have taught the opposition
that a loose coalition of separate parties is more
manageable and certainly more practical than a single
opposition party containing inflexible personalities
and diverse factions. We expect opposition unity
efforts to proceed on the principle that each potential
coalition partner will maintain its own identity and
agree on a minimal platform-greater state autono-
my, less government corruption, and a central govern-
ment more responsive to the electorate's rising
expectations.
In any case, an opposition coalition of most major
national and regional parties, however loose, would be
a formidable threat to Gandhi, and a determined
united front of rightist and leftist opposition parties
would probably beat her. Even without a coherent
opposition front we believe the Congress Party faces a
reduced majority in Parliament, and some political
observers argue that a mere plurality for the Congress
Party is possible. Congress accordingly would be
forced into a coalition government with at least one
party. We believe a motivated, well-coordinated oppo-
sition coalition could even defeat Congress, but oppo-
sition efforts would require more progress than they
have made.
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25X1
Gandhi will seek scapegoats for her domestic troubles.
Implications for the United States
Gandhi-watchful for indicators of a resurgent oppo-
sition-will weigh all major political decisions in the
coming months as to their probable effect on her
election chances. Should opposition efforts to build a
coalition appear to be gaining momentum, in our view
To draw attention to the threat to national unity, we
believe Gandhi will intensify her attacks against
"outside forces." The Prime Minister probably
believes a firm foreign policy toward India's neigh-
bors-especially Pakistan-will contribute to her im-
age as the only politician able to provide strong
national leadership. US diplomats in New Delhi and
other political observers attribute her public condem-
nation of the Zia regime for its handling of unrest in
Sind Province as an attempt by Gandhi to placate
Hindu nationalists in India's Hindi-speaking heart-
The United States could become a major target of
Gandhi's frustrations, in our judgment. During her
campaigns in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, Gan-
dhi accused "outside forces" of abetting efforts to
undermine the political system and national unity. US
diplomats reported soon afterwards that some Indian
officials in the Prime Minister's office suspected US
involvement in the Congress Party's subsequent state
assembly losses in January. Gandhi herself failed to
rule out possible US involvement in election violence
in Assam the following month, according to press
reports.
principally campaign rhetoric.
Gandhi's advisers have assured US diplomats, how-
ever, that her recent references to a foreign hand are
The Prime Minister raised the foreign hand bogey
more recently during the Jammu and Kashmir assem-
bly election campaign in June 1983-which her party
lost-and again several weeks later when she claimed
publicly that the only base for the Khalistan separat-
ist movement in Punjab is in the United States. Her
son Rajiv repeated the allegation several weeks later.
In our judgment, Gandhi's determination to undercut
the more leftist elements of the opposition could also
lead to more frequent criticism of the United States.
Gandhi and her Congress Party may decide that they
cannot allow themselves to be outflanked on the left
and could therefore seek to seize the initiative by
condemning US policy in troubled areas of the world.
Equally possible would be gestures to the left by the
Prime Minister in economic policy, but we see little
likelihood of major Indian policy changes.F__ 25X1
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Figure 5
Evolution of India's National Political Parties
(Non-Communist)
Indian National
Congress
Swatantra
1959
Praja Socialist Party Jana Sangh
1952 1951
885
1
1967
Bharatiya Bharatiya
Socialist Pa
rty of
Kranti Dal Lok Dal
India
1975
1971
1977
Congress for
Democracy
Congress (U)
I
I
Congress (I) Rashtriya
Indira Gandhi Manch
Rajiv Gandhi Maneka G
-
Sanjay Congress (S) Congress (J) Janata Lok Da
Sharad Pawar Jagjivan Ram Chandra Shekhar Charan
andhi Morarji Desai
l Democratic Bharatiya
Singh Socialist Party Janata Party
H. N. Bahuguna A. B. Vajpayee
P. V. Narasimha Rao
Karpuri Thakur
L. K. Advani
R. Venkataraman
Raj Narain
Pranab Mukherjee
Kamlapati Tripathi
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Secret
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