AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR IN THE CITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000300010005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Afghanistan:
The War in the Cities
secer
NESA 84-10021
February 1984
377
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Directorate of Secret
Afghanistan:'
The War in the Cities
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared byl I Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.) 25X1
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 84-10021
February 1984
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Afghanistan:
The War in the Cities
Key Judgments Fighting in Afghanistan's cities increased substantially in 1983 and caused
Information available growing concern among Soviet and Afghan officials.
Qf 28 December 1983 growing insurgent capabilities and the difficulties facing the Soviet and
was used in this report.
Afghan Government forces leads us to believe that the level of urban
insurgency will continue to increase at least in the near term.
Soviet and regime sweeps through the major cities have not established
security:
? The insurgents' interfactional cooperation has been improving in attacks
on urban centers.
? The insurgents' operations typically consist of assassinations, kidnapings,
mining of routes rarely traveled by civilian vehicles, bombings, and
rocket and mortar attacks on government vehicles and installations.
? The insurgents avail themselves of the cover of darkness, urban layout,
and terrain to avoid retaliatory strikes by superior Soviet and Afghan
forces.
? The insurgents' decentralized leadership and careful planning and intelli-
gence hinder regime counterefforts.
Afghanistan's cities are essential to long-term Communist control over the
country:
? The cities are important to the military effort as links in the supply,
transportation, and communications networks.
? Some observers believe the Soviets are trying to force more people into
the cities, where government control is stronger, and thus diminish
insurgent activity in the countryside.
? Secured cities could provide a better conscription base and improve
regime opportunities for indoctrination of the populace.
? Tight, long-term security-especially in Kabul-would limit internation-
al observation of resistance activity, lend credence to the regime's claim
of legitimacy, and thus diminish international criticism of the regime and
of the Soviet presence.
Urban civilians have provided the insurgents with essential support for
operations in their cities and are likely to continue to do so:
? At times outwardly compliant, they generally maintain a resilient
hostility toward the Soviets and the Afghan regime.
? They provide insurgents with important intelligence and enable the
insurgents to operate their own intelligence networks.
? They often provide food, shelter, and other support to insurgents.
Chronic problems such as the Afghan Army's low morale and high
desertion rates, along with Communist Party factionalism, abet insurgent
operations, including those in the cities.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10021
February 1984
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The insurgents cannot maintain an open presence in any urban center for
more than a brief period and are unlikely to establish long-term control
over major cities:
? The Communists' extensive daytime security forces and superior firepow-
er ensure the functioning of the central-though not always the local-
government.
? Soviet and regime intelligence networks hamper insurgent operations.
? The insurgents' lack of expertise with explosives and periodic shortages of
appropriate weaponry and ammunition limit the scope and effectiveness
of their operations.
? Political, religious, and ethnic differences inhibit cooperation among
insurgent groups. _
Urban insurgents probably will gradually increase the level of small-scale
attacks, bombings, kidnapings, and assassinations in the near term.
Civilian support for the urban insurgency is likely to grow despite the
potential for war weariness, since the Babrak regime has little prospect of
gaining popular approval. The Soviets are likely to require at least small in-
creases in troop strength in the cities in the months ahead.
The high visibility of the urban insurgency-as opposed to the rural-
keeps international attention on the Afghan conflict. Major increases in the
fighting in Kabul, however, will result in greater Soviet and regime
pressure on the US Embassy, which publicizes the conflict. Increased
pressure may result in the Embassy's closure.
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Afghanistan:
The War in the Cities
Afghanistan's cities are essential to long-term Com-
munist control over the country. The cities are impor-
tant links in the maintenance and development of the
nation's supply, transportation, and communications
networks and are basic to the economy and the Soviet
and regime military effort. Cities provide bases for
conscription and tax revenue, for building party mem-
bership, and for advancing regime social programs
and ideology, thus furthering the process of Sovietiza-
tion. Thorough Soviet and regime domination of the
urban populace, in our view, would limit the insur-
gents' urban operations and civilian support for the
insurgency. Although the war in the countryside
would continue even if the cities were under tight
regime control, such control would hamper the insur-
gents' ability to obtain manpower, supplies, and intel-
ligence and would free Soviet and regime military
forces for operations against the insurgents.
Because of these considerations, some Western ob-
servers believe it is Soviet policy to drive the populace
from the countryside to the cities, where the regime
has a better chance of exerting control. As the urban
population increases, the urban insurgency will take
on even greater importance as a means for frustrating
the Sovietization of Afghanistan (see table).
We judge that fully securing the cities would also
provide an important international benefit to the
Soviets and the Afghan regime. Fighting in the cities,
especially in the capital, is more likely to be observed
by foreigners than is fighting in the countryside and
cism of the regime and of the Soviet presence.
Sovfoto
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more likely to draw international attention to the
Afghan conflict. Tight, long-term security-especial-
ly in Kabul-would limit international observation of
resistance activity and lend credence to the regime's
claim of legitimacy, diminishing international criti-
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Although our assessment is that Soviet and Afghan
forces are sufficient to control the most important
areas in Afghanistan-the capital and major military
installations-Soviet and regime sweeps have not
brought continuing security. The Soviets cannot spare
men to establish a sufficiently strong, permanent
presence throughout the cities. Since the Soviet inva-
sion in December 1979, a pattern has emerged in
which Soviet and regime forces conduct periodic
urban clearing operations but then insurgents gradu-
ally reassert themselves.
The level of urban insurgency increased markedly
during 1983, in our judgment, although the degree of
regime control and insurgent presence varies from city
to city and according to the season (see inset and
the insurgents have demonstrated improved
cooperation and planning in intensified attacks on
Kabul and have maintained strong pressure on Soviet
and regime forces especially in Herat and Qandahar.
Soviet and Afghan officials have shown increasing
concern over the level of urban insurgency. In August
1983 Afghan party officials expressed fear that Kabul
would be the scene of a "bloodbath" in the coming
months, Some
party members believe that the regime is losing
appendix).
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necrei
Population Trends in Afghan Cities Thousands Conditions in the Cities
1979 Census
Population
1983 CIA
Estimate
Kabul
913
1,803 a
Qandahar
178
117
Herat
140
110
Mazar-e Sharif
103
105
Jalalabad
53
50
Konduz
53
55
Baghlan
39
40
38
40
Pol-e Khomri
31
33
Ghazni
30
27
Kholm
28
30
Khanabad
26
28
a Kabul's population has increased from an estimated 1.3 million in
1980 to an estimated 1.8 million in 1983 primarily because of the
flight of rural residents to escape military operations in the
countryside. Although the population in other urban areas such as
Qandahar and Herat has decreased, the influx into Kabul has
raised the urban share of the country's population from about 10
percent in 1979 to almost 20 percent in early 1983.
Much of the population fluctuation in the cities depends on the
number of rural residents to seek safety in the city. Similarly, heavy
fighting in a city drives people out-often to Kabul or out of the
country. Moreover, many insurgents winter in the cities to avoid
harsh conditions in the countryside.
control not only of the countryside but of the major
cities as well, and the
Central Committee has considered that urban war-
fare may assume primary importance.
worsen the security situation,
(Soviet military
experts are concerned over how to defeat the insur-
gents without destroying the cities. Afghan Ministry
of Defense officials believe that the assignment of
additional Soviet units to the Kabul area would only
probably because greater local resentment
could result from higher Soviet visibility.
Political, economic, and social conditions in Afghani-
stan's cities vary not only from city to city but also
from month to month. The cities have several condi-
tions in common. According to US Embassy sources
? Educational services provided by the regime are in
a shambles. Higher education has in effect ceased,
and schools are usually attended only by small
numbers of party members' children.
? Medicines are in short supply, and health care is
minimal.
? Food and fuel, even when in adequate supply, are
costly, and their prices have continued to rise.
Annual inflation appears to be running near 100
percent.
? Highways have deteriorated from heavy military
traffic, lack of maintenance, resistance destruction
of bridges, and the detritus of convoy ambushes.
Those factors and regime checkpoints have inhibit-
ed the flow of goods and people between cities. 25X1
L11DA"I
? Energy shortages have caused periodic blackouts,
restricted production, and idled fruit and cotton
processing factories in several cities.
? More Communist-country goods have been appear-
ing in shops as the economy has grown increasingly
oriented toward the USSR and its allies.
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? Prostitution, alcoholism, and drug abuse linked
with large-scale black marketing have developed 25X1
widely since the Soviet occupation.
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? The educated elite and nearly all of the middle
class have fled the country. 25X1
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? In some cities, resistance organizations have estab-
lished skeletal civil administration functions such
as judicial systems and tax collection.
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Insurgent Attacks in Kabul
Blue Wazir Akbar
Mosque Khan Area
US Embassy,
Prime Minister's
I- Office
Kabul TV*
Tower
Gazi
School
Karta-i-Seh
Kabul `1/ '??"`?0
Hotel Pushtunistan
*Soviet Embassy
o t
Kilometers
Char Chatta Jeshyn Ground
Bazar
\ (Aka "Chaman")
*Bala Hisser
Fort
Insurgent Cooperation
Our assessment is that the insurgents have gradually
In our view, Afghan insurgents have demonstrated shown increasing cooperation with each other in
effective urban guerrilla tactics, threatening regime carrying out attacks in cities.
security and hampering the development of Soviet many urban operations are carried out by
control. groups based in the countryside who infiltrate into the
g` )) Industries
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cities, assisted by intelligence from groups based in
the cities. In November 1982 US Embassy sources in
Kabul indicated that the record of insurgent coopera-
tion in the Kabul area was mixed but that the various
resistance groups were becoming better organized
internally and were cooperating more closely with
each other. Evidence of improved cooperation ap-
peared in May 1983, when, according to US Embassy
reports, three separate insurgent groups jointly at-
tacked the Pol-e Charkhi generating plant in Kabul,
destroying or damaging a number of armored vehi-
cles, killing as many as 50 regime troops, and wound-
ing many more. Even more dramatic evidence of
cooperation appeared in Kabul three months later
with coordinated attacks on the Bala Hissar Fortress,
the Microrayon housing complex for Soviet and Af-
ghan officials, and Radio Afghanistan, according to
for their own safety or that of the populace have
concentrated on targets on the cities' outskirts.F
US Embassy reports (see map).
cooperation among
groups includes exchange of information, supplying of
ammunition and joint
attacks. The cooperation has extended to cities other
than Kabul. In Ghazni, for example,
five different organizations ex-
change intelligence and sometimes carry out joint
attacks.
Insurgent Tactics, Weaponry
In our judgment, much of the insurgents' success in
threatening urban security has arisen from their use
of brief, limited attacks. Unlike insurgents in the
countryside, the urban guerrillas have not attempted
to seize and hold particular areas or to establish
strongholds such as those in the Panjsher Valley, the
Shomali Plain, and Paktia and Paktika Provinces. The
insurgents have been able to avoid devastating retalia-
tory attacks by superior Soviet and regime forces.
typical insurgent opera-
tions in cities have consisted of assassinations; kidnap-
ings; mining of routes rarely traveled by civilian
vehicles; bombings; and rocket and mortar attacks on
government vehicles, police posts, government build-
ings, and restaurants frequented by regime personnel.
According to US Embassy reports, the Soviet Embas-
sy and Soviet military headquarters have been repeat-
edly attacked. when
regime security in a city has been heavy, insurgents
The insurgents carry out most of their operations at
night and avail themselves of the concealment offered
by the older, poorer areas of the cities. Night opera-
tions, provide the
insurgents an advantage in that police posts and
government installations are less well manned then. In
our view, the Soviet and regime desire to avoid
inflicting damage on government facilities and on
their own personnel has often made them reluctant to
employ airpower and artillery in the cities. A response
with heavy weaponry at night increases the chances of
unwanted destruction. The Soviets at times, however,
have used heavy weaponry against cities with a strong
insurgent presence, as in Qandahar in early 1982.1
In Kabul the Soviets have on rare occasions attempted 25X1
to use additional searchlights and helicopters at night
to stem resistance attacks, but to little avail, accord- 25X1 {1
ing to US Embassy reports. US Embassy reports also
indicate that insurgents are highly active in the older,
poorer sections of Kabul, where the narrow and
winding streets, the high population density, and the
warrenlike housing provide ready concealment.
the impoverished sections
of Kabul, in particular, have a high proportion of
refugees from all over Afghanistan who are generally
sympathetic to the resistance.
Mountainous terrain near major cities provides an
advantage to the insurgents. Near Kabul the terrain
has frequently permitted insurgent groups to attack
and then withdraw to safety,
Our assessment is that in such terrain Soviet
and regime heavy weaponry is less effective, and
airborne forces have more difficulty locating and
retaliating against insurgents.
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The urban insurgents, in our view, have displayed
technical expertise and ingenuity in adapting to local
conditions in 25X1
Kabul some insurgents with sufficient technical skill
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have wired explosives to the ignition systems of Soviet
military vehicles. In Ghazni,
insurgents have used homemade, battery-
Civilian Support
We believe civilian support for the insurgency has
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powered landmines. The mines are made with locally
available oil cans, shrapnel, TNT obtained from
unexploded Soviet bombs, and blasting caps. The
insurgents occasionally have dressed in Soviet or
regime military uniforms during attacks on weapons
depots, US Embassy reports indicate. In Qandahar
insurgents masquerading as soldiers on conscription
patrols caught and killed more than a dozen party
members and KHAD agents after checking identity
cards, according to US Embassy
Decentralization, Careful Planning
We judge that insurgent success also has arisen from
its decentralized leadership, compartmentalization,
and careful intelligence and planning. In our view, the
decentralization of the insurgent movement prevents
the regime from neutralizing it.
scores of bands representing all ethnic groups
usually operate in small units. The capture of one
insurgent does not usually lead to the capture of, or
intelligence on, many others. Even if an important
insurgent leader is captured or defects, other bands
can continue their independent operations. One insur-
gent organization in Kabul,
maintains a network that assassinates offi-
cials and raids government buildings. The network is
composed of three-man cells whose operatives are
shopkeepers, taxi drivers, mullahs, bureaucrats, and
professionals.
Careful planning has also lent success to some insur-
gent operations. One organization, after surveillance
of an assassination target,
forms an assassination squad typically con-
sisting of five women and one man, who will actually
fire the weapon. Four of the women walk together two
abreast with the gunman directly behind them. As the
group approaches the target, the two lines of women
separate, permitting the gunman to shoot through the
opening. After the shooting, the women again bunch
together, shielding both the gunman and the last
woman, who carries away the weapon. Attacks inside
residences or public buildings are normally carried
out only if a member has obtained a job inside the
building or has some other plausible reason for being
been essential for the war in the cities.
civilians provide intelligence, aid
insurgent infiltration, serve as a source of recruits,
and often provide food and shelter.
`civilian" and "insurgent" are often
synonymous because most civilians at least passively
support the resistance and many fighters also work in
the civilian economy much of the year.
Civilian Attitudes. Fear of Soviet and regime retalia-
tion frequently keeps urban populaces from openly
supporting the insurgency, but high tension often
exists just below an outwardly compliant surface,
according to various observers. In Kabul, particularly,
the populace is volatile. In one instance, according to
US Embassy sources, a Soviet soldier killed an un-
armed Afghan student and had to be rescued from a
crowd that gathered, calling for death to the Soviets
and President Babrak. Heavy troop reinforcements
arrived to maintain order, and the area remained
tense for hours.
In our view, civilian hostility to the regime and Soviet
forces has shown great resilience. Following heavy
bombing of Qandahar in January and March 1982,
the populace asked the resistance to limit its activities
in the city, according to US Embassy sources. In
March 1983, however, the popular attitude changed,
according to US Embassy reports, following a cordon-
and-sweep operation for conscripts and weapons. Qan-
daharis complained bitterly of underaged and over-
aged relatives being conscripted, and resistance
activity in the city quickened markedly. US Embassy
sources report that insurgents attacked the telephone
exchange and KHAD headquarters and kidnaped
businessmen who were sympathetic to the regime. In
April 1983 air bombardment of districts in Herat
suspected of providing safehaven to insurgents result-
ed in high civilian casualties and great property
damage, according to the US Embassy. The city,
nevertheless, remained the scene of intense resistance
activity throughout the summer
there.
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In Kabul, where Soviet and regime control is stron-
gest, the civilians have even dared to show contempt
for the regime at government-organized demonstra-
tions, according to US Embassy reports. At a demon-
stration in front of the US Embassy in March 1983,
the crowd ignored the speakers, just as they had
during previous demonstrations. Most chatted among
themselves, waved amiably at the Embassy, or tried to
find ways to avoid the watchful eyes of regime guards
and steal away. As orators called to the crowd to
shout Marg, Marg, Marg (Death, Death, Death)
following calls for President Reagan's death, some of
the crowd substituted Barq, Barq, Barq (Electricity,
Electricity, Electricity), mocking the regime's inabil-
ity to prevent insurgent sabotage of powerlines. I
Intelligence. Urban civilians, in our view, not only
have provided insurgents with important intelligence
but have enabled the insurgents to operate their own
networks. most
major insurgent groups have small bands of insur-
gents within the cities to gather information and
maintain contacts with informants from the govern-
ment camp. In Kabul,
selected for assassination. A second group,
tion on Soviets and party members who may be
one insurgent group maintains informants in the
Ministries of Interior and Defense to provide informa-
has infiltrated the Afghan civil
insurgent group members. In Mazar-e Sharif,
and military administration and encourages employ-
ees to procure passes allowing unhindered travel for
the insurgent network
includes regime civil servants as well as members of
Afghan border guard units.
civilian residents.
In some cities where the insurgents themselves have
no intelligence networks, they depend totally on civil-
ian sympathizers. in
three northern cities-Andkhvoy, Sheberghan, and
Maymanah-insurgent squads infiltrate from outly-
ing villages to attack targets identified by sympathetic
Other Support. The civilians provide food, shelter,
and other assistance that is often essential to the
insurgents' urban operations. In Mazar-e Sharif,C
civilians provide food
to insurgents, free when supplies are ample.
insurgents' families remain in the
city, where they help earn money to support the
resistance by selling fruit and other farm products to
Soviet troops. In the same city, insurgent bands
sometimes sleep in the houses of sympathizers prior to
carrying out an attack,
~In Qandahar various insurgent groups draw
support through a taxation system,
In July 1 3,
aris actively supported insur-
gent infiltration into the city, facilitated by normal
population flow during the harvest season, when
manpower is needed from neighboring areas for work
in the surrounding fields.
Other Favorable Factors
Afghan Army Problems. We believe that chronic
problems in the Afghan military impede government
attempts to maintain urban security.
the Afghan Army is poorly
trained , equippe ,and motivated. Units are usually
under strength, and a high desertion rate has been a
continuous problem for the regime. The most notable
recent case of high desertions is that of most members
of the garrison at Khowst. According to US Embassy
reports, the desertions aided the insurgent siege of
that city that began in September 1983. In our view,
the Afghan Army's unreliability forced the Soviets to
use more of their own troops to tighten security in
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Kabul in autumn 1983, and these troops were thus not
available for operations in the countryside. Other
evidence of Afghan troops' lack of dedication is that
in several cities, Afghan
troops openly to erate an
certain hours of the day.
Party Factionalism. We believe factionalism in the
Afghan Communist Party is also heavily responsible
for undermining security in several cities, especially
Kabul. Regime leaders have described as "frighten-
ing" the number of Parchamis assassinated in the
capital, An
Interior Ministry official stated that intraparty feud-
ing is responsible for more political assassinations in
Kabul than can be blamed on insurgents, the same
source reports. In our view, political assassinations,
along with continual factional tension between the
Interior Ministry and KHAD, create rivalries that
insurgents often exploit to gather intelligence for
selecting targets and planning operations. In winter
1983,
Parchamis' eagerness to recruit members to their
faction resulted in allowing fundamentalist insurgents
to infiltrate their ranks and thereby carry out assassi-
nations and the bombing of a government building. In
June 1983 KHAD arrested a group of Afghan mili-
tary officers in Kabul, presumably Khalqis, for assas-
sinating several Parchamis,
Regime Security
In our view, the Communists' extensive daytime
security forces in most cities have ensured the func-
tioning of the central-though not always the local-
government and discouraged insurgent activity. Local
governments in some cities periodically cease to func-
tion because of the insurgents' presence, but the
central government maintains adequate control of the
capital and can function with only nominal or periodic
control of other Afghan cities. The insurgents lack the
organization and firepower necessary to stop sweeps,
clearing operations, and press-ganging.
Kabul is one of few Afghan cities where insurgents
cannot circulate openly during daytime hours, and the
authorities can organize major political gatherings as
well as halt counterdemonstrations. In February
1983, on the third anniversary of Kabul's biggest
demonstrations against Soviet occupation, insurgents
evoked little popular response after they circulated
throughout the city at night and tacked handbills on
people's doors exhorting them to take to their roofs to
shout Allahu Akbar (God is great). In 1980 there had
been a massive response to that appeal, and regime
forces reacted with an extensive show of force. In
1983 the insurgents did not call on shopkeepers to
close their businesses on the anniversary, probably to
avoid having the doors smashed open by troops as
occurred on a previous occasion.
The threat of air and artillery retaliation on civilians
prevents the guerrillas from firing persistently from
any neighborhood in a city,
In Ghazni insurgent firing positions from
residences were identified by Soviet and regime
troops, who later destroyed the homes,
Soviet and Regime Intelligence
Soviet and regime surveillance networks and inform-
ers hamper urban insurgents. In spring 1983 regime
authorities in Herat used an insurgent defector to
identify guerrillas and resistance supporters among
captured civilians, according to US Embassy sources.
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services operating within the city.
insurgents from Mazar-e Sharif have only brief,
occasional visits with their families for fear that they
will be captured by Soviet and regime intelligence
lance network.
Urban insurgents and their sympathizers are also
subject to being identified through a regime surveil-
groups based in the countryside
phanage.
often must send boys or old men into the cities to
gather information or procure supplies, fearing that
men of other ages will be identified or conscripted. In
Kabul, according to US Embassy sources, KHAD
maintains a system of informants comprised of street
urchins recruited and trained at the regime-run or-
the police and are killed. As a solution,
KHAD finds it difficult to maintain surveillance in
the older, poorer sections of Kabul, particularly where
there are mazes of dark alle s and interconnecting
houses. people in these areas
tend to be very religious, and thus anti-Soviet, and to
have extensive contacts with the insurgents. Strangers
are immediately assumed to be working for KHAD or
to monitor.
in the capital
KHAD has been tightening its control over a "block
system" in which a coordinator-formerly used to
monitor such matters as cleanliness and mainte-
nance-has come to be increasingly responsive to the
intelligence service. US Embassy reports, neverthe-
less, regularly note explosions and assassinations in
the principal new housing area, the Microrayon com-
plex, which probably has the easiest layout in the city
its surveillance effort but is havin difficulty.
KHAD, in our view, is continually seeking to improve
KHAD is pushing for the destruction
to undertake on a large scale.
of the older sections of the city and their replacement
by new apartment blocks. Such urban renewal proj-
ects, in our view, are too expensive for the government
Although Ithe insur-
gents are gradually improving their weapons skills
and are better supplied than in the past, our assess-
ment is that the insurgents' capacity to undermine
urban security is often hampered by lack of expertise
with explosives as well as by periodic shortages of
Limited Training and Weaponry
appropriate weaponry and ammunition. Most insur-
gents have little technical knowledge of explosives,
and do not use such 25X1
potentially effective materials as plastique. Despite
improved supplies in recent months, some groups
suffer from unequal distribution of weaponry and
ammunition. Insurgents have frequently experienced
a shortage of remote control activators of explosives,
We judge that weapons
that are effective in the countryside are often imprac-
tical for urban guerrilla warfare. Mining a busy city
street could result in destruction of civilian vehicles
2.5X1
25X1
25X1
rather than those of the Soviets or the regime.
~~ 75X1
25X1
25X1
Insurgent Disunity
We believe cooperation among insurgent groups has
improved over the past two years, but political, reli- 25X1
gious, and ethnic differences periodically result in 25X1
botched operations or in clashes. In an operation in
Mazar-e Sharif two bands, unaware of each other's
plans, attacked different sections of the city on the
same day, The dual 25X1
attack force one group to abandon its primary
objective. Differences between the fundamentalists
and other groups have sometimes resulted in pitched
battles near cities. 25X1
25X1
Our assessment is that in the near term the insurgents 25X1
probably will continue to increase costs for the Soviets
as they attempt to establish improved urban security.
The insurgents are likely to increase small-scale at-
tacks, bombings, kidnapings, and assassinations. Ci-
vilian support for the urban insurgency is likely to 25X1
grow. Judging from the way citizens in Qandahar and
Herat rebounded following massive bombings of their
cities, war weariness is not likely to develop into a
significant problem for the urban insurgents in the 25X1
short term, though it may become an important
deterrent over a period of several years.
We believe that even in the cities, where the govern-
ment exerts some control, the Babrak regime has little
prospect of gaining the legitimacy that derives from
25X1
25X1
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consent of the governed. Further alienation of the
populace is likely to result from deteriorating stand-
ards of living, ruinous inflation, inadequate physical
security, and forcible conscription. Above all, we
believe the insurgents and their civilian supporters
will continue to be motivated by their historical
hatred of foreign domination-especially by non-
Muslims-and the visibility of Soviet troops in urban
centers.
The urban insurgents, in our view, will not be able to
dislodge Soviet and regime forces. Fear of reprisals
against civilians along with Soviet and regime security
measures will prevent the insurgents from greatly
expanding urban operations. Soviet and regime forces
will continue to control-though tenuously at times-
the city centers and to conduct periodic sweeps and
house-to-house searches. We believe Moscow would
bring in reinforcements from the Soviet Union to
maintain control of Kabul and other major cities if
needed.
We believe that the war in the cities will continue to
frustrate Soviet attempts to consolidate power in
Afghanistan. The Soviets are likely to require at least
small increases in troop strength in the cities in the
months ahead, not only because increased insurgent
attacks are likely but also because the population of
several cities, especially Kabul, is continuing to grow.
Implications for the United States
The urban insurgency increases the military and
economic costs to Moscow of enforcing security-
tying down forces that could otherwise be used to
maintain supply lines, protect airfields and other
installations, and combat insurgents in the country-
side. The high visibility of the urban insurgency-as
opposed to the rural-keeps international attention on
the Afghan conflict and thus increases the political
costs to the Soviet Union. We believe major increases
in the fighting in Kabul, however, will result in
greater Soviet and regime pressure on the US Embas-
sy, which publicizes the conflict. Increased pressure
may result in the Embassy's closure.
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Appendix
Conditions in Six Major Afghan Cities
The Kabul populace is generally obedient to regime control, though most
residents at least passively support the resistance, according to US
Embassy reports. US Embassy sources 25X1
indicate assassinations of party members and suspected KHAD informants
are common, and there have been periodic night attacks with rockets and
mortars on Soviet and regime installations. 25X1
Supplies of food and consumer goods are adequate, but the war has caused
a sharp reduction in the flow of commodities from the countryside, making
the people heavily dependent on imports from Communist countries,
according to US Embassy reports. Frequent energy shortages cause
blackouts and restrict industrial production, according to
US Embassy sources. Hoarding is common, and there is a
flourishing black market. Minimal public services are available, though
health care is very poor.
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Probably the least secure of Afghan cities, according to US Embassy
reports, Ghazni is frequently the scene of insurgent attacks. Most Ghazni
residents actively aid the insurgents.
regime troops usually retreat to their barracks by midafter-
noon, w en armed insurgents come in to purchase provisions; the insur-
gents usually leave by sunset, though many have legitimate jobs in the city
and commute from surrounding areas.
factories have been idled by energy
shortages. Most available meat is dried; fuel, gasoline, and kerosene have
been expensive and in short supply. The only medicines available are of So-
vi-et manufacture and in short supply; many residents are unfamiliar with
Soviet medicines and do not know how to use them. By November 1982
much of the population had fled. Prior to the Soviet invasion, the school
population was about 6,000; in November 1982 it was about 200-all were
children of party members.
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Qandahar
Bombed into submissiveness in 1982, Qandaharis resumed active support
for the resistance following a government conscription drive in 1983 that
left them embittered, according to US Embassy sources. Party members
who venture into residential areas or outlying bazaars are often assassinat-
ed. According to US Embassy reports the vast 25X1
majority of residents are insurgents or insurgent sympathizers. US Embas-
sy reports indicate insurgents have used bullhorns at night to taunt regime
personnel to come out of their garrisons and fight, and insurgents
periodically attack military posts in the city center. 25X1
According to US Embassy reports fighting and energy
shortages have left factories at a standstill and the economy in a shambles,
but essentials are available because of smuggling from Karachi via Spin
Buldak. Food prices have risen markedly but remain lower than in Kabul.
The grape harvest in 1983 was barely half its normal size, mainly because
fighting made it difficult to hire laborers to harvest along the roads west of
the city. Public services have been almost nonexistent. Only one school has
been open, attended exclusively by children of regime and party officials.
Insurgent groups maintain a taxation system.
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The regime controls the heart of the city by day, though armored escorts
for officials are common, according to US Embassy reports. Fighting in
and around the city has occurred almost nightly for the past several
months. Most people with money have left the city for Kabul or Iran, as
have many men faced with conscription; those remaining tend to be poor.
Energy shortages are severe and have left factories idle. Food, though
usually available, is high priced. The school systems are paralyzed.
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Jalalabad
One of the most secure cities, Jalalabad is usually quiet, though insurgents
frequently attack outlying military posts and eriodicall rocket the
airport, according to US Embassy reports The 25X1
heavy Soviet troop presence and the practice of many insurgents to winter
in the city and thus to keep the city peaceful have probably contributed
heavily to Jalalabad's calm. In winter 1983, however, a massive bombing
by insurgents destroyed part of one of the bazaars. In contrast to Kabul,
the Soviets have not tried to remain unobtrusive, and Soviet soldiers can of-
ten be seen shopping in the bazaars. Public services are available at about
the same level as in Kabul. Jalalabad's university, the only one in
Afghanistan other than that in Kabul, no longer functions. 25X1
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According to US Embassy reports I (local residents
heavily abet the insurgents, and there have been a large number of
assassinations of regime personnel and suspected sympathizers. The streets
are usually empty by dusk. In early spring 1983 a massive Soviet and
regime offensive against nearby resistance strongholds permitted regime
officials to move freely in the city for several weeks. Supplies of food and
other essentials are usually adequate.
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OCCrC6
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