CHINA: DEFENSE MODERNIZATION STRATEGY FOR THE 1980S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000100050003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Strategy for the 1980s
China:
Defense Modernization
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
EA 83-10165C
September 1983
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Directorate of Secret
China:
Defense Modernization
Strategy for the 1980s
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared b Office
of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be_ directed to the Chief, Defense
Issues Branch, OEA
Secret
EA 83-10165C
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Secret
China:
Defense Modernization
Strategy for the 1980s
Key Judgments Beijing is making significant progress in its defense modernization pro-
Information available gram, a long-term effort aimed at making the People's Liberation Army
as of 30 August 1983 (PLA) an increasingly competent force. Military professionalism is being
was used in this report.
reinstituted, but it is still encountering obstacles. China's defense industries
are developing more advanced weapons for deployment over the next
decade. These systems, although at best comparable to weapons widely
deployed today with Western and Soviet forces, will add markedly to
Beijing's defenses.
Beijing is unlikely to make any major modifications in its defense strategy
but is working to improve the integration of air, ground, and naval forces in
joint military operations and to enhance the coordination of armor,
artillery, and infantry in combined arms operations. China will continue
for at least the next decade to rely on a combination of terrain, manpower,
and defense in depth for its conventional defense and to base its nuclear de-
fense on a small, but-in Beijing's view-survivable, nuclear deterrent.
The size of the PLA should remain relatively stable for the next decade fol-
lowing the successful streamlining of the force over the past three years
The Soviet military buildup in the Far East underlies Beijing's defense
modernization program. In response to Soviet ground, air, strategic missile,
and naval deployments in the region, we believe Beijing is setting the
following agenda for improving its military capabilities:
? Nuclear forces. To improve the Chinese deterrent to an aggressor's first
strike, Beijing is deploying additional ICBMs, building a small fleet of
ballistic missile submarines, and by the late 1980s probably will begin
initial deployment of a solid-propellant, intermediate-range ballistic
missile. Work on a new solid-propellant ICBM could begin soon and the
system probably will be ready for deployment in the mid-1990s.
? Ground and air forces. To augment China's conventional capabilities to
defend its national borders, Beijing is beginning widespread deployment
of new antitank missiles, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, and
armored personnel carriers for mechanized infantry. By the late 1980s,
Beijing will have widely deployed a tactical air defense missile and a new
self-propelled gun. In the early- to mid-1990s, China will begin produc-
tion of an advanced generation of fighter aircraft, helicopters equipped
with antitank guided missiles, its first infantry fighting vehicle, and a
new tank with improved armor protection and a modern main gun.
iii Secret
EA 83-10165C
September I
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? Naval forces. Seeking to become a regional Pacific naval power, Beijing
will deploy at least three more nuclear attack submarines and begin
production of a new class of high-speed frigate equipped for antisubma-
rine warfare and air defense roles by the early 1990s.
China's military establishment is in general agreement on the moderniza-
tion strategy, but there are divergent views as to priorities and the role of
imports in weapons modernization. China's top civilian and military
leaders have placed stringent restrictions on the purchase of Western
weapons and are seeking primarily the import of production technology.
Others, notably senior commanders of the Air Force and Navy, argue for
the procurement of some advanced weapons from abroad to fill major gaps
in defense capabilities quickly. Highlighting the ongoing debate, Defense
Minister Zhang Aiping recently vetoed a Navy contract to buy British Sea
Dart naval missiles and canceled Air Force negotiations with the French
for Mirage fighters. We believe a policy of extremely selective weapons
buys will prevail, although pressure from the various service arms for faster
improvements will probably continue.
China's success in meeting its military modernization objectives over the
next decade will depend largely on the following factors:
? Success in higher priority programs to modernize agriculture, industry,
and science and technology.
? The allocation of sufficient funds to finance the production of new
weapons.
? The ability of the defense industries to modernize and to assimilate
effectively foreign technology.
? The maintenance of domestic political stability.
Beijing's improvements to its defense posture are unlikely to alter signifi-
cantly the overall balance of forces in East Asia. By the end of the 1980s,
new defensive weapons-if fielded in sufficient numbers-will considera-
bly enhance China's capability to inflict heavy losses on any Soviet
conventional invasion. The Soviets, however, will continue to improve their
forces stationed along China's northern border and to hold an overwhelm-
ing advantage in offensive power
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China's expanding nuclear capabilities will not represent a markedly
increased threat to the United States in the early 1990s, because Beijing
will have deployed only 10 to 20 full-range intercontinental missiles by
then. China will continue to seek assistance from the United States and
other advanced nations in improving its conventional arsenal and many of
the anticipated weapons developments depend heavily on the ac uisition of
advanced technology from the West.
Although China is improving its amphibious assault capabilities through
training, we detect no attempts to build the 70 to 100 tank landing ships we
estimate are required for Beijing to pose a real invasion threat to Taiwan.
A program to build large numbers of landing ships for this purpose is
unlikely as it would divert scarce resources from higher priority programs.
Weapons enhancements will enable Beijing to improve its capabilities
against weapons currently in Taiwan's and Vietnam's inventories. New
fighters, frigates, and armored vehicles, if deployed in strength in the
1990s, will give China a qualitative advantage over its southern adversar-
ies. Vietnam, in particular, may find its recently augmented northern
border defenses jeopardized.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Streamlining
Phasing Out the Old
Bringing in the New
4
Returning to the Barracks
4
Reestablishing Ranks
5
Revitalizing the Reserves
6
Using Existing Weapons Effectively
6
New Capabilities
Strategic Forces
7
Land- and Sea-Based Missiles
8
Research and Development Programs
8
Ground and Air Forces
9
Antitank and Air Defense Weapons
9
Armor and Artillery
9
Advanced Aircraft
10
Improved Offensive Punch
10
Naval Forces
12
Regional Pacific Power
12
Nuclear Attack Submarines and High-Speed Frigates
12
Helicopter Carriers
12
Short-Term Improvements
12
. Tools for Military Modernization
13
Debate Over Weapons Acquisitions
13
Foreign Technology Acquisition
14
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It is not realistic or possible for us to buy national
defense modernization from abroad.... Depending
on modeling one's weaponry on others is not a way
(either).... At the outset it is necessary to obtain
some technology that can 5e imported and model
some weaponry on that of others. However, if we are
content with copying, we will only be crawling behind
others.... The fundamental way is to rely on
ourselves.
Defense Minister Zhang Aiping, March 1983
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China:
Defense Modernization
Strategy for the 1980s
A recent assessment of China's conventional forces
concludes that the Chinese People's Liberation Army
has begun procuring a new generation of conventional
military weapons and equipment.'
These improvements in weaponry represent a signifi-
cant step forward; one long-awaited by the Chinese
military. This assessment examines China's military
modernization strategy for the next decade. We be-
lieve China's military planners have marked out a
comprehensive and pragmatic course for military
improvements in the 1980s and, within the limits of
China's technological and economic capabilities, are
making progress in gearing the PLA for modern
warfare.
Underlying Beijing's defense modernization program
is its concern about the Soviet military buildup in the
Far East. Beijing is well aware that Moscow has
substantially augmented both its strategic and con-
ventional military power opposite China by:
? More than tripling since 1965 the number of com-
bat divisions deployed along the Sino-Soviet border.
? Expanding the Pacific Fleet until it has become the
largest in the Soviet Navy.
? Upgrading airpower in the Soviet Far East by
introducing the newest tactical aircraft and combat
assault helicopters in the Soviet inventory.
? Expanding its large nuclear strike force by deploy-
ing Backfire bombers and the highly mobile SS-20
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Far East.
? Gaining access to Vietnamese air and naval bases
and providing large quantities of sophisticated
weapons to Hanoi.
Beijing has monitored the Soviet buildup but has had
little recourse beyond increasing the number of com-
bat divisions-equipped with vintage 1950s weap-
ons-stationed opposite the Soviet Union and Viet-
nam. Political turmoil kept Beijing from addressing
the problems of China's deteriorating military posi-
tion until Deng Xiaoping's consolidation of power in
the late 1970s. As Chief of Staff of the PLA, Deng in
July 1975 delivered a blistering attack on the state of
the armed forces to a session of the Military Commis-
sion of China's Communist Party. He condemned the
PLA's five sins of "laziness, bloatedness, factionalism,
arrogance, and extravagance." Deng outlined in a
central directive a blueprint for strengthening the
military, but his master plan was interrupted when he
was purged for a second time in 1976 by the Gang of
Four. Deng returned to power in July 1977 and,
resuming the position of PLA chief of staff, began to
implement the needed reforms
Deng's program is described by the Chinese as a
process of building the PLA into a modern armed
force by gradual improvement. The first step is to
transform the PLA from a highly politicized and
militarily deficient force into a professional military
organization. The second and more costly step is the
overall updating of the PLA's weapons
Given the damage done over the last 20 years, Deng
and his allies have already made remarkable progress
in reinstituting professionalism in the PLA. The re-
formers are using as their template the military
program of the 1950s. Many of the military leaders of
that era were rehabilitated between 1973 and 1975 to
help reshape the PLA and steer it away from the
leftist egalitarianism imposed on the military from
the late 1950s and especially during the Cultural
Revolution
Since 1978, the reformers have streamlined the PLA,
consolidated commands, and reopened military acade-
mies. Examinations and diplomas from military acad-
emies have replaced knowledge of Maoist doctrine
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and peasant backgrounds as the criteria for recruit-
ment and promotion. In addition, the PLA has in
recent years begun the politically sensitive task of
replacing the old guard with a younger generation of
better educated cadre (officers). Beijing is also experi-
menting with new tactical military concepts designed
to make more effective use of existing weapons and
anticipated new arms.
Streamlining
The most sweeping and successful facet of profession-
alization is the program to trim the size of the armed
forces. We estimate that since 1980 the Chinese,
without deactivating any main combat units, have
through demobilizations reduced the size of the PLA
by approximately 1 million men.'
The program singled out for retirement the old,
feeble, illiterate, or politically unreliable. The ground
forces, the largest combat arm of the PLA, have
undergone the bulk of the personnel reductions both
in combat and combat support units. Deng Xiaoping
encountered some opposition to the program but,
according to Permanent Vice-Chairman of the Party
Military Commission Yang Shangkun, Deng success-
fully defended the reductions.
Phasing Out the Old
As Beijing completes the trimming of the PLA, it is
turning its attention to rejuvenating the officer corps.
Cadre transfer campaigns-a program of discharging
officers from the military and placing them in civilian
governmental positions-have rid the PLA of its
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Following improvements in the level of modern weap-
ons, equipment and the command system, it is entire-
ly possible to appropriately reduce the number of
soldiers. Just as Comrade Deng Xiaoping said: A
reduction and not an increase in manpower is a sign
of modernization. It can thus be seen that practicing
the policy of better troops is not a negative or
stagnant policy but a positive and advanced one.
Military Commission Secretary General Yang
Shangkun, August 1982
unwanted, overaged junior-grade officers. But the
task of removing senior officers who are too old for
effective service has proved far more difficult.
Many senior officers entered the army before 1930
and are respected veterans of the "long march."
Beijing has moved cautiously to entice rather than
require their retirements and is offering them lucra-
tive benefits such as full salary, free housing, trans-
portation, and medical care. As face-saving measures,
some old commanders are being given the title of
"adviser." In a recent visit to units in the northeast,
Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi called on these old soldiers
to retire but also to help the new officers by "mount-
ing their horses and riding part of the way with
them."
Nonetheless, there are signs that continuing resist-
ance to retirement from aged officers is impeding the
progress of rejuvenation. One military region com-
mander who gave up his post in 1982, Wu Kehua of
Guangzhou, told a subcommittee session of the 12th
National Congress that aged officers continued to
fear that younger men were incompetent and that
retirement would mean both a loss of political status
and a lower standard of living. Yang Shangkun
appeared to confirm that Beijing is encountering some
resistance when he told a military audience in Febru-
ary that it would take three to five years to complete
the program of making the officer corps younger in
Pronouncements.in the Chinese media indicate that
Beijing's efforts to retire the old guard did begin
registering notable successes last fall. At the national
level, there were several key military personnel
changes, including the appointment of a new Minister
of National Defense and a new Director of the
General Political Department of the PLA. In addi-
tion, four out of the 11 military region commanders
were replaced. Yang Dezhi announced at the Sixth
National People's Congress in June 1983, that the
average age of commanders was now close to 50 for
army-level officers, 45 for division-level officers, and
below 40 for regimental-level officers. Although Yang
may have exaggerated his successes, provincial press
pronouncements show that China's 36 military dis-
tricts are currently being revamped. At last count, 19
military districts had announced the selection of new,
younger, and better educated commanders and politi-
Easing out older officers is allowing China's military
leaders to consolidate the command structures at all
levels. Deng correctly charged in 1975 that the com-
mand levels were "bloated." This occurred because
the PLA created new positions in commands for the
average age.
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original fighters of the revolution rather than force
anyone to step aside. Analysis of leadership appear-
ances indicates that the PLA's operation arm-the
General Staff Department-has halved the number of
subordinate service arm commands and shows a drop
from as many as 10 to five active deputy chiefs of
staff.
The military region commands were also consolidated
last fall. The staff of the Guangzhou commander,
identified in Chinese media accounts as the model,
dropped from 12 deputy commanders and political
commissars to six. At the military districts, the same
cuts are occurring with one district noting a 40-
percent reduction in the size of headquarters staff.
Bringing in the New
China is creating a new, senior-level officer corps by
filling vacated positions with those officers trained in
the military academies before the Cultural Revolu-
tion. These new military commanders have had a
markedly different experience in the military than
their predecessors. The new army and division com-
manders were recruited during or after the civil war
and their most prominent experience with warfighting
was the Korean War, the Sino-Indian border conflict,
or the 1979 clash with Vietnam. They entered the
PLA as it first acquired tanks, aircraft, and other
weapons of modern combat, and from the beginning
of their careers the PLA was a regular army. In
addition, many of the new guard are college educated
and most have attended professional military acade-
mies at various points in their careers. They are, in
general, more professional and probably more capable
than the old guard of learning and adapting new
warfighting weapons and techniques
Beijing has also made dramatic changes in recruit-
ment policies for junior-grade officers. Before 1978,
military academies had been closed for 10 years and
the PLA had no alternative but to continue its
traditional practice of promoting soldiers through the
ranks into the officer corps. Today, Beijing has abol-
ished direct promotions and is sending promising
soldiers to the military academies before promotion
and inducting high school and college graduates as
officer candidates. For 1983, Beijing has announced
the following steps:
? 12,850 soldiers from the ranks, the highest number
ever, have been selected to attend 30 army colleges
this fall as officer candidates.
? 20 military schools will admit senior middle school
graduates, for the first time, for a four-year educa-
tion as officer candidates.
? 7,700 college and university graduates will be com-
missioned as officers upon completing a short course
at military schools.
The PLA's ultimate goal is to reduce the number of
junior officers trained at colleges outside of the PLA
and eventually have every officer enter the unit with a
college education. According to military attache re-
ports, only 20 percent of the junior officers are
graduates of military academies, and the PLA hopes
to increase the number to 80 percent by 1990. For the
time being, however, the small numbers of academies
and instructors means the PLA must rely on recruit-
ment of officers trained in nonmilitary schools.
Returning to the Barracks
In addition to streamlining the regular PLA, Beijing
is removing the army from public security and con-
struction duties. The PLA has been the last bastion
against civil disorder and in the turmoil of the
Cultural Revolution army units assumed responsibil-
ity for internal order throughout China.
In 1982, the PLA began handing over police functions
to the People's Armed Police Force, a reconstituted
internal security organization subordinate to the
Public Security Bureau. The People's Armed Police
was first formed out of the PLA in 1955 when an
estimated 170,000 PLA troops were transferred to the
Ministry of Public Security. During the Cultural
Revolution, the People's Armed Police was absorbed
Beijing announced in April the formation of
national headquarters for the People's Armed Police
and said the new force would maintain internal
security, suppress sabotage, maintain social order,
safeguard life and property, and cooperate with the
PLA on border defense.
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The PLA is also withdrawing from capital construc-
tion activities. In the mid-1960s, Mao Zedong mobi-
lized military forces to undertake large capital
construction projects. At its peak during the mid-
1970s, the Capital Construction Engineering Corps
comprised almost 500,000 men in 50 division-level
units. The CCEC is currently being turned over to
Reestablishing Ranks
Another emerging facet of a professional PLA is the
reestablishment of ranks.
The rank
structure was abolished in 1965 and since then the
PLA has used position to identify command authority.
Reestablishment of ranks is a particularly vexing
issue for the military. Some PLA voices argue that
ranks will destroy the egalitarian spirit of the army
and cause unnecessary competition for promotions.
Some are also concerned that strict "up or out" rules
will be applied to all officers. Ranks will certainly
force the high command to set up army-wide evalua-
tion procedures and promotion boards as well as
bestow in one massive undertaking ranks on all
officers by delaying the 25X1
introduction of ranks till 1985, the Chinese high
command buys itself time to complete the task of
reorganizing commands, rid the officer corps of un-
wanted people, and formulate promotion procedures.
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China's military leaders have admitted to foreign
attaches that Chinese uniforms lack a professional
appearance and recognize that improvements in mili-
tary dress would instill greater pride. Beijing is 25X1
experimenting with uniforms and insignia. At a pa-
rade in 1981 paratroops, for the first time since the 25X1
Cultural Revolution, wore uniforms with patches
bearing the Airborne Corps insignia. On Army Day, 25X1
1 August 1983, the People's Daily, published photo-
graphs of a new uniform with epaulets and insignia on
the collar tabs indicating branch of service. Wide-
spread use of new uniforms is apparently being held
up, however, by delays in the reintroduction of ranks
and by the costly process of outfitting an army of over
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4 million men. Embassy officials in Beijing were told
in August that the new uniforms would be phased in
over the next two years
Revitalizing the Reserves
An aspect of PLA professionalism that has not yet
been fully revitalized is the reserve system. Prior to
the Cultural Revolution, demobilized soldiers served
as members of a militia unit for five years. Officers,
depending on age, either returned to their old unit or
actively trained with a militia unit for one month each
year. During the Cultural Revolution, demobilized .
soldiers and officers were simply given letters stating
that they should return to their units during a national
recall. The militia was politicized as the leftists
attempted to build it into their own military force that
reportedly included 250 million people with virtually
no regularized training.
Today, the Chinese Chief of General Staff has set as
major goals the creation of a reserve system and the
trimming and revitalization of the militia. A mid-
March radiobroadcast noted that militia reforms were
intended to make the militia an integral part of the
PLA reserve system. Presumably, demobilized sol-
diers will once again join militia units which undergo
serious and rigorous training, and a reserve officer
system will reemerge to keep a body of trained
officers ready to reenter military service in times of
wartime mobilization.
Using Existing Weapons Effectively
Largely as a result of lessons learned during its 1979
border war with Vietnam, the PLA is looking at ways
to use existing weapons more effectively. Chinese
officers have repeatedly bemoaned the poor coordina-
tion of infantry, armor, and artillery units during that
conflict. A 1980 article in the army newspaper,
Liberation Army Daily, pointedly advised officers
that infantry assaults using hand-to-hand combat
techniques are unlikely to succeed against highly
mechanized Soviet divisions possessing substantial
firepower. The author noted that the PLA did best in
Vietnam when infantry commanders remembered
that the PLA had artillery and called in long-range
fire support before mounting infantry assaults against
defensive positions.
The Chinese clearly are emphasizing improved com-
bined arms operations. A Hong Kong magazine,
quoting a Chinese military source, reported in April
that the Military Commission recently directed the
formation of "combined arms armies" with artillery
and armor divisions added to the standard three
The PLA is also holding increasingly sophisticated
combined arms, joint-service, and intraservice train-
ing exercises. In the fall of 1981, Beijing conducted its
largest military exercise ever, involving more than
50,000 troops and 500 combat aircraft. The combined
ground and air force operation, northwest of Beijing,
was designed to test joint operations to counter a
Soviet attack. Since that time we have noted other
important advanced exercises:
? The Chinese media in June announced that the
Chinese airborne forces had staged their largest
exercise ever in Wuhan Military Region.
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The modernization of China's vast but obsolescent
military arsenal is an enormously expensive and com-
plex proposition. Faced with budgetary constraints,
technological limitations, and a multitude of compet-
ing priorities, the PLA is pursuing a variety of
weapons programs designed to achieve the goal of
developing the capabilities to fight a modern war.
Although we do not know the exact form that weap-
ons modernization will take, we are able-using a
combination of information about weapons programs
and statements by military leaders-to piece together
a fairly comprehensive picture of Beijing's objectives
for strategic, ground, air force, and naval forces
weapons modernization over the course of the next
decade
Liberation Army Pictorial
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Strategic Forces
Beijing's highest priority is to improve its ability to
deter an aggressor's first strike. Unlike other areas of
defense modernization, nuclear weapons development
and deployment continued at a slow but uninterrupted
pace throughout the turmoil of the 1960s and early
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Land- and Sea-Based Missiles. We believe that for
the rest of this decade China's nuclear program will
concentrate on deploying additional limited-range
CSS-3 and full-range CSS-4 ICBMs.
that a second Xia is under construction and that
China plans to build six additional Xias. We estimate
that up to five SSBNs could be operational by the
early 1990s.
Research and Development Programs. Beijing is fund-
ing important research and development programs for
China, with a larger future deployment. We estimate that, while continu-
ICBM force, will increase its chances of penetrating ing to deploy more SSBNs and CSS-4s, the Chinese
Moscow's ABM defenses and widen its options will begin fielding the following weapons late in the
against both Soviet and US targets. 1980s and in the 1990s:
China will also bring to operational status its first
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
by the mid-1980s.
We believe the
first Xia will be operational with a 2,400-kilometer-
range missile by the mid-1980s. The editor of Jane's
Fighting Ships was told in July by Chinese officials
? A new solid-propellant IRBM that could be carried
on a large prime mover, giving China its first fully
mobile strategic missile and offsetting somewhat
Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) deployments in the Far East.
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? A large solid-propellant ICBM that would improve
the reliability and responsiveness of the ICBM
force.
Ground and Air Forces
Improved defense of its land borders is an objective of
high priority for Beijing, particularly because of the
massive buildup of Soviet forces in the Far East. The
Soviet threat includes over 15,000 tanks, 1,200 heli-
copters, and 1,100 advanced combat aircraft in the
eastern USSR opposite China. China has noted the
Soviet improvements and has taken important steps to
augment its forces in the Northeast.' Beijing's pro-
gram, however, has only been a limited one, employ-
ing stopgap measures to increase the strength of its
garrison and main force units deployed well back
ployed in quantity along China's borders. 25X1
destroy Soviet T-54, T-55, and T-62 tanks now de-
notably improve the capability of infantry forces to, 25X1
with antitank missiles by the mid-1990s.
The Chinese have shown a
marked interest in Western helicopters equipped with
antitank missiles and, given the Soviet tank threat, we
believe the Chinese will deploy helicopters equipped
China's need for tactical systems for air defense of
maneuvering combat forces is great. The Chinese are
producing a copy of the Soviet SA-7 shoulder-fired
low altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) and are
testing a mobile low-to-medium altitude tactical
SAM. Large-scale deployment of these weapons
would considerably improve the air defense cover
afforded maneuver divisions, particularly against So-
viet combat helicopters. We expect the Chinese to
produce and deploy both air defense systems over the
next decade and improve them, giving the weapons a
higher kill probability against high-performance air-
craft.
from the borders.
China's conventional weapons production program
shows a clear priority given to weapons that will
bolster the capabilities of Chinese units to counter the
Antitank and Air Defense Weapons. New antitank
systems are among the priority research and develop-
ment projects. China recently began production of a
copy of the Soviet Sagger wire-guided antitank mis-
sile and a new antitank rocket launcher. Wholesale
deployment of these weapons during the 1980s will
Armor and Artillery. Aside from equipping ground
forces with air defense and antitank weapons, the
Chinese are intent on adding tanks and mechanized
vehicles-similar to those fielded with Soviet tank
and motorized rifle divisions-to PLA combat divi-
sions. China is equipping infantry regiments in re-
gions opposite the Soviet Union with a 1960s-vintage
armored personnel carrier and tracked multiple rocket
launchers, but developmental work at China's re-
search centers suggests that a more ambitious pro-
gram is in the offing. We believe that China will begin
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production of a new self-propelled gun in the next
three years and is likely to produce a new tank-with
improved armor and tank gun-and an infantry fight-
ing vehicle by the beginning of the next decade:
Advanced Aircraft. Essential to a more aggressive
defense of China's land borders is the development of
a new generation of fighter aircraft able to counter
Soviet warplanes on bombing missions and to provide
air cover for ground forces.
China will rely on upgraded F-7s and a limited
number of F-8s during the rest of this decade, while
developing an advanced generation of fighter and
bomber aircraft for deployment in the 1990s.
Improved Offensive Punch
The weapons being developed to augment China's
border defenses also offer new capabilities for offen-
sive operations. The new armored vehicles under
development, for example, will give Chinese combat
forces an enhanced ability to fight "head-to-head" in
a counteroffensive against a Soviet ground assault. F
The Chinese also are concerned about having the
appropriate forces for limited action against other
neighboring states. China, for example, does not rule
out the possibility of a second border war against
Vietnam. Soviet military assistance has markedly
improved the military strength of Vietnamese forces
opposite China. Beijing, in order to maintain its
military options, needs new weapons capable of de-
feating Vietnam's modern fighter aircraft, tanks, and
artillery. We believe that Beijing will augment the
forces of its strategic reserve in Wuhan Military
Region and selected units along its border with Viet-
nam.
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Chinese marines conducting an
amphibious assault exercise.
Recent maneuvers involving amphibious landing oper-
ations indicate that Beijing is continuing to develop an
amphibious assault capability. Beijing presumably is
leaving open the option of an assault to gain control
over the contested Spratly Islands. We have detected
no effort to produce the 70 to 100 tank landing ships
required for Beijing to pose a real invasion threat to
Taiwan. Limited but revealing evidence, however,
shows that the Chinese consider improved amphibious
capabilities important:
? PLA Pictorial, the military's monthly magazine, in
April carried an article highlighting the creation of
a fledgling Marine Corps within the Chinese Navy.
Combat troops wearing naval uniforms were pic-
tured landing with tanks and amphibious APCs to
establish a beachhead on an "enemy" occupied
island.
? US attaches in Beijing report that a group of
attaches were invited last December to witness an
amphibious training exercise near Guangzhou. The
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Naval Forces
China's Navy remains predominantly a coastal de-
fense force, but improvements made in the 1970s give
the force capabilities to venture farther from China's
coast. New guided-missile frigates, destroyers, and
underway-replenishment oilers were built and added
to each of China's three fleets. In May 1980 the Navy
demonstrated its new capability for extended opera-
tions with the deployment of an 18-ship task force to
an impact area near the Fiji Islands in support of an
ICBM test.
Advances over the past decade do not, however, allow
the Chinese Navy to conduct open-ocean operations
during wartime. The Navy depends heavily on land-
based aircraft for its air defense and on the shallow
waters of the continental shelf for protection against
submarine attack
Regional Pacific Power. We believe that Beijing does
envision a navy that by the year 2000 will have
extended its coastal defense and prepared for naval
engagements beyond the continental shelf. China has
no pretension of being a naval power approaching the
order of the United States or the Soviet Union, but
does wish to extend its area of naval operations in
order to advance claims to disputed territories-such
as the Spratly Islands-and in a limited manner
assert its authority as a regional, Pacific naval power.
In a conversation with US defense attaches in July, a
high-level Chinese naval officer stated that the Navy
plans to increase the frequency of blue water opera-
tions and intends to operate in the Sea of Japan. In his
words, "If the Russians can do it, so can we."
Nuclear Attack Submarines and High-Speed
Frigates. Foremost among Beijing's programs to im-
prove its naval power is the construction of Han-class
nuclear attack submarines. Two were built in the
1970s
The Hans could provide an
oceangoing task force with an added offensive weapon
against other surface combatants and a greater de-
fense against enemy submarine attacks.
Although the Navy built a number of new surface
combatants in the 1970s, all were of 1950s design.
Beijing is reportedly planning to construct a new
series of combatants during the next decade. Military
attaches earlier this year reported that China plans to
build 10 to 20 newly designed 1,900-ton frigates using
US gas turbine and West German diesel engines. We
believe that at least some of these modern frigates will
be outfitted for antisubmarine warfare-because of
their quiet-running turbine engines-while others will
be equipped for an air defense role.
Helicopter Carriers. Beijing is also contemplating the
development of a light helicopter carrier. Eventual
procurement of a light carrier would be an important
step toward becoming a regional naval power and add
considerably to the air defense and antisubmarine
warfare capabilities of any task force. Beijing, in the
past, discussed the purchase of a foreign-built light
carrier with British and French officials but no
contracts were signed. More recently the Chinese
have been considering building their own carrier,
procure a light carrier but would not expect deploy-
ment before the mid-1990s
Short-Term Improvements. In the short run, the Navy
will probably field several systems which will improve
fleet air defense, antiship, antisubmarine warfare, and
submarine warfare capabilities without requiring the
procurement of capital ships. These improvements
include:
? Hoku-class missile patrol boats modified to carry
new solid-propellant antiship missiles.
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The Chinese People's Liberation Army is continuing
to build itself into a modern armed force with high
capability for combined operation and quick reaction
in modern warfare.... We have shifted the stress of
training from anti-infantry to antitank warfare, from
single services to combined units, and from soldiers
to officers.... The number offield exercises has been
increased following a successful exercise using
ground and Air Force forces and airborne troops in
the autumn of 1981 in North China.... 1982 was a
record year because more army units than ever before
were plunged into military training.
Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi, June 1983
? A seaborne surface-to-air missile for frigates and
? Helicopters equipped for detection of submarines.
Tools for Military Modernization
Although general agreement appears to exist within
the armed forces on the modernization strategy, there
are clearly divergent views as to the priorities, pace,
and role of weapons imports in reequipping the PLA.
Lucrative arms export contracts offer a new source of
funding for modernization but may create unreason-
able expectations of rapid weapons improvements.7
stantially.
post was director of weapons research and develop-
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"unrealistic" and exhorted Chinese industry to be
self-sufficient in the production of needed weapons.
As former administrator of China's nuclear weapons
program, Zhang noted with obvious pride China's
achievements in building a nuclear arsenal, and we
suspect that under his leadership the research and 25X1
development budget for the PLA will increase sub-
Supported by the civilian leadership, the Defense
Minister has battled in recent months with the Air
Force and Navy, which wish to improve capabilities
rapidly through weapons purchases. Last fall, the
Navy signed a tentative contract to purchase the
British Sea Dart naval defense missile for its destroy-
ers. US attaches report that Defense Minister Zhang,
using the newly formed National Defense Science and
Technology Industrial Commission (NDSTIC),
blocked the purchase and also canceled Air Force
negotiations with the French for Mirage fighters.
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Debate Over Weapons Acquisitions
China's top military and civilian leaders view China's
military industrial base as the foundation from which
to build the military modernization program. For
example, Defense Minister Zhang Aiping-whose last
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The attitudes the Defense Minister represents are
viewed by some military officers as extremely
conservative and backward. Some PLA voices charge
that the high command favors the ground forces and
prefers to see indigenous, albeit inferior, weapons put
into service rather than press for funds for expensive
but superior equipment from abroad.
Foreign Technology Acquisition
The PLA high command, although opposing whole-
sale weapons imports, is aggressively pursuing select-
ed foreign assistance, particularly in critical programs
where imported technology can markedly improve
China is also hiring Western consultants to overcome
technical problems in weapons development. Techni-
cians from Britain's tank engine manufacturer, Rolls-
Royce, were reported by US attaches in Datong in
1982 assisting the Chinese with tank improvement
projects. British technicians are also being hired to
work on developing more modern air-to-air missiles
for China's Air Force. Finally, a US firm is in the
final stages of contract negotiations to offer assistance
in upgrading China's Yun-8 military transport air-
craft.
the profits.
Arms Sales
Arms sales to foreign customers offer Beijing a
method of procuring military technology and hiring
consultants without placing additional requirements
on the state budget. China's three-year-old drive to
sell weapons on the international arms market has
resulted in contracts for more than $4 billion in
military exports. These sales may help pay for new
PLA weapons as profits run as high as 100 percent on
some items. According to attache reports from Beij-
ing, China sells F-7s (MIG-21s) to Egypt for about $2
million each, but we estimate the Chinese produce the
fighter for only about $1 million a copy. With orders
from Egypt and Iraq for over 100 F-7s, China could
afford to build some 100 F-7s for its own forces with
The Chinese leadership may also be more willing to
allocate funds to modernize defense industries, believ-
ing that advanced hardware can then be used to earn
foreign exchange as well as serving to reequip and
modernize the PLA. China, according to a US De-
fense attache source, recently offered to sell the SA-7
to foreign customers even before the weapon is widely
deployed with Chinese combat units. Other examples
of arms sales before widespread deployment include
the type 69 tank and a new armored recovery vehicle.
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Aside from earning foreign exchange, China benefits
from occasional technology transfers from foreign
customers. Through its sales to Pakistan, China has
obtained access to Western air-to-air and surface-to-
air missiles. Three years ago, China reduced the price
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For the Sino-Soviet Balance
By the end of the decade, new defensive weapons-if
fielded in sufficient numbers-will considerably en-
hance China's capability to inflict heavy losses on any
Soviet conventional invasion. Widely deployed anti-
tank missiles will, for the first time, provide the
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Even if we can have 10 or 20 years to modernize our
armedforces, our weapons and equipment will re-
main inferior to those of our enemies. For this reason,
if war should break out, we must continue to defeat
the strong with the weak. It has always been our
experience to defeat a superior enemy with inferior
equipment, for we wage a righteous war and a
people's war. In this, we must have full confidence.
Military Commission Chairman Deng Xiaoping,
December 1977
Chinese infantry a credible capability to defeat all
models of Soviet tanks, with the possible exception of
the few T-72s, now deployed in the Far East. We
expect the Soviets will improve their forces stationed
along China's northern border and continue to hold an
overwhelming advantage in offensive power
China's growing nuclear arsenal will ensure that the
Soviets pay an even higher price for any first strike
against China in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, with
nuclear ballistic missile submarines continuously on
station, the Chinese will notably enhance the viability
of their nuclear deterrent.
For the United States
China's expanding nuclear arsenal will not represent a
significantly increased threat to the United States in
the early 1990s. We estimate that China will deploy a
force of 10 to 20 full-range intercontinental missiles
which will give Beijing the capability to mount only
limited retaliatory strikes against soft targets in the
United States.
Many of the anticipated weapons improvements for
China's conventional forces depend heavily on the
acquisition of advanced technology and production
know-how from the West. Beijing considers American
technology to be superior and will continue to seek
assistance from the United States to upgrade its
military capabilities. Former Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Wu Xiuquan, told a visiting delega-
tion of academics last October that, although China
will use its own technological abilities, it desires US
assistance-provided it is offered on favorable
terms-in such areas as modern attack helicopters
and fighter aircraft.
For Taiwan and Vietnam
Although China is improving its amphibious assault
capabilities through training, we detect no attempts to
build the large numbers of landing ships that are
required for Beijing to pose a real invasion threat to
Taiwan. Such a program is unlikely as it would divert
resources from higher priority areas. We believe
Beijing's intention is to create a small Marine Corps
over the next decade for defense of its offshore islands
and to improve its chances of success in an amphibi-
ous assault against islands such as the Spratlies.
Weapons enhancements will enable Beijing to im-
prove its capabilities against weapons currently in
Taiwan's and Vietnam's inventories. New Chinese
fighters, frigates, and armored vehicles, if deployed in
strength in the 1990s, will give the Chinese a qualita-
tive advantage over its southern adversaries. Vietnam,
in particular, will find its recently augmented
northern border defenses jeopardized. We anticipate,
however, that both Taiwan and Vietnam will seek
assistance from abroad in order to keep pace with the
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We believe China's military modernization objectives
for the next decade are both reasonable and achiev-
able. However, China's technological limitations are
many and defense modernization continues to have a
lower priority than programs to modernize agricul-
ture, industry, and science and technology. The na-
tional economy must continue to improve if the PLA's
goals are to be fulfilled.
Defense industries in China, even though improving,
still experience considerable delays in moving weap-
ons from development to deployment, and as they
begin production of advanced weapons they are cer-
tain to encounter numerous difficulties. Technology
imports will help but-as in the case of China's ill-
fated experience in the 1970s with the British Spey
fighter engine-they are no guarantee of success.
Funding for defense modernization remains an unre-
solved issue. The PLA can expand its nuclear arsenal
and procure low-cost antitank and air defense weap-
ons within the current limits of defense spending. But
substantially increased defense outlays are needed to
fund the production of expensive major weapons
systems (such as self-propelled artillery, armored per-
sonnel carriers, aircraft, and frigates) currently under
development. Limited procurement of these weapons
will not meet Beijing's defense needs, and statements
by PLA spokesmen indicate that the military does not
expect higher defense outlays before 1986. If funding
is not available, the military will be forced to make
hard choices between weapons programs.
Success also depends on continued domestic stability
and civilian support of military modernization. Deng
Xiaoping, as the primary architect, will undoubtedly
continue to guide and support defense modernization.
The relationship between the professional military
and Deng's chosen successors remains hazy, however,
and the military could find itself with diminished
support after Deng's death.
China's military industrial complex. The limitations
of China's defense industries are substantial, but
success in the past few years at acquiring selected
Western technology leads us to believe China will
make significant progress in weapons improvements.
The professionalization of the PLA is off to an
impressive start and Beijing appears to be preparing
well for the future. The retirement of aged officers
and the promotion of educated younger men is a
positive signal of renewal. Fresh thinking in tactics
and training are likely from the new guard and
already there are signs of innovations in the use of
existing weapons. According to attache reports, the
Chinese recently proposed to the British an Air Force
officer exchange program in which Chinese fighter
pilots would receive flight training in the United
Kingdom. Programs of this nature will guarantee the
introduction of new fi htin tactics into the PLA.
Beijing's improvements to its defense posture are
unlikely to alter significantly the overall balance of
forces in East Asia. Improvements to the Soviet
military position will continue, and the best Beijing
can hope for is to narrow the gap in weapons quality
from the current 20-year lag behind those of the
Soviets to perhaps 10. Beijing will, however, have
maintained and strengthened its strategic deterrent
and new ground force weapons-if deployed in quan-
tity-will increase the capabilities of the conventional
forces to mount a credible defense along the Soviet
We are, nonetheless, impressed with the array of
weapons development programs now under way and
the recent successes Beijing has had in adding to its
nuclear arsenal attests to the growing capabilities of
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