KAMPUCHEA: THE IMPASSE CONTINUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000200020005-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Kampuchea:
The Impasse Continues
EA 81-102
December 1983
Copy 3 0 5
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Kampuchea:
The Impasse Continues
Southeast Asia Division, OEA,
East Asia Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Secret
EA 83-10238C
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Kampuchea:
The Impasse Continues 25X1
Key Judgments More than five years after the Vietnamese overthrew the Pol Pot regime,
Information available Hanoi is still struggling to consolidate its control over Kampuchea.
as of 1 December 1983 Vietnamese troops have conducted aggressive, successful military cam-
was used in this report.
paigns over the past two years that have kept the resistance mostly on the
defensive, but, even if they were to commit some of the elite forces now tied
down along the border with China, they would be unlikely to eliminate the
resistance. The guerrillas, for their part, have avoided heavy casualties and 25X1
continue to make incremental improvements in troop strength and opera-
tions but still are not able to seriously challenge Vietnamese control. F
Vietnam is now gearing up for another dry season-when its forces regain
the tactical advantage-and we expect renewed attacks on major resist-
ance bases after the first of the year. But because we also expect the resist-
ance to avoid major casualties, we look for an indefinite military standoff.
Nor do we see much progress on the diplomatic front. ASEAN has won
most of the political victories over the past year, and international support
for the resistance coalition appears strong. Despite efforts by both ASEAN
and Hanoi to appear flexible, however, there has been no real movement on
fundamental issues. Third-party mediation efforts have produced no
positive results, and none is likely in the near future.
As the conflict drags on, sentiment within ASEAN for a more assertive US
role will probably grow. These feelings will lead to intensified pressure on
Washington to provide arms to the resistance as well as to increase
economic or military aid to the ASEAN countries.
Secret
EA 83-10238C
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Figure 1
Vietnamese Dry Season Military Activity
77 Sisophbn-'
,,,Phnom Melai
Democratic Kampuchean
stronghold
~O Bok /
s~(
-% D9stroyed Siemreab-Otdar
Non Chan 1 ) Mcanchey
Batddmbfinp
l
Gulf
of
Thailand
Tonle
Sap
Vietnamese attack
Democratic Kampuchean
(DK) base
Khmer People's National
Liberation Front
(KPNLF) base
Sihanoukist (ANS) base
Province boundary
Railroad
Road
Boundary representation P
not necessarily authoritatt
Prey
Vdng
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Kampuchea:
The Impasse Continues
Five years after its invasion of Kampuchea, Vietnam
is still battling to eliminate the resistance forces
operating largely along the Thai border. With its best
forces tied down in northern Vietnam opposite China,
Hanoi has been unable to deal the resistance a
decisive defeat. Communist Democratic Kampuchea
(DK) guerrilla forces, operating with generous
amounts of Chinese supplies funneled through Thai-
land, have waged a generally well-disciplined and
well-coordinated guerrilla campaign in many lightly
populated areas. And ASEAN has nurtured the de-
velopment of two non-Communist resistance factions
to increase pressure on Vietnam to agree to a political
compromise. In June 1982 ASEAN engineered the
formation of a tripartite resistance coalition under the
nominal leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk,
although the three factions operate almost entirely
independently of one another.
The conflict has worn on inconclusively, with Viet-
nam's more mobile forces holding the initiative during
the November-May dry seasons and the guerrillas'
responding with increased operations during the
May-November rainy periods. Although the non-
Communists have improved their capabilities in some
respects, Vietnam and the DK remain the key players
in the conflict.
The Military Pendulum
Vietnamese military actions during the November
1982-May 1983 dry season were the most focused,
best planned, and most destructive of any operations
since the invasion of Kampuchea in 1978 (see appen-
dix). Between December and April the Vietnamese
rolled back Khmer People's National Liberation
Front (KPNLF) tactical advances in northwestern
Batdambang Province and overran the Front's base at
Nong Chan, the main Sihanoukist camp at Sihanouk-
buri, a Democratic Kampuchean forward headquar-
ters, and the large DK base at Phnom Chat. About
100,000 refugees were displaced. Although resistance
casualties were not high, guerrilla activity was con-
strained by the need to plan for the defense or
Immediately upon completion of Vietnam's large-
scale dry season operations in April, however, DK
guerrillas mounted one of their most effective rainy
season campaigns of the five-year-old conflict. Ex-
ploiting the normal rainy season retrenchment of
Vietnamese forces to rear base areas, guerrilla forces,
conducted wide- 25X1
spread operations in at least 10 of Kampuchea's 19
provinces. Guerrillas kept steady pressure on primary
transportation arteries, such as routes 5 and 6 and the
rail line, and harassed shipping on the Tonle Sap.
Their strongest effort was in Batdambang Province
where guerrilla units, sometimes operating in groups
as large as 300, overran and held temporarily several
Vietnamese and People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) outposts. The DK also established logistic
corridors in north-central Kampuchea to support ex-
panded operations in Kampong Thum, Kampong 25X1
Cham, and Kracheh Provinces. DK forces, however,
did not seriously threaten strategic areas of the
country or compel Vietnam to undertake drastic
countermeasures. 25X1
Vietnamese forces began reasserting
control over guerrilla logistic areas in late July and
Vietnamese Forces: Their Strengths ...
Vietnam's success during the dry season is in large
part attributable to its increasingly effective use of
combined-arms operations. Multiregimental attacks
on major resistance bases were preceded by reinforce-
ment from neighboring divisions, extensive combat
rehearsals, and logistic buildups. Artillery fire, F_
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was particularly effec- 25X1
tive in forcing KPNLF forces to evacuate 0 Bok in
evacuation of remaining bases
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late January and in the destruction of Nong Chan
shortly afterward. Guerrillas were unable to counter
Vietnamese armor, either because of the poor quality
of their antitank weapons or, more likely, lack of skill
in using them.
Fundamental organizational improvements in the past
three years have strengthened Vietnam's capabilities
to sustain a long-term military effort in Kampuchea.
A streamlined command structure implemented in
1981 replaced the inefficient apparatus hastily set up
in 1979. Control over local tactical matters previously
exercised by regional military authorities in Vietnam
was turned over to new, permanent front organiza-
tions with clearly delineated responsibilities and re-
porting channels to senior authorities in Phnom Penh
and Hanoi.
... and Their Weaknesses
The Vietnamese are nevertheless plagued by funda-
mental shortcomings that not only prevent achieve-
ment of a decisive military solution but often result in
erratic battlefield performances. Three separate Viet-
namese operations in December 1982 and January
1983 against DK bases on the mountainous northern
frontier were repulsed, and a preliminary probe
against Phnom Chat in February had to be aban-
doned when DK minefields claimed heavy casualties.
During the rainy season, the Vietnamese were unable
to prevent frequent interdiction of several strategic
50,000 guerrillas concentrated in border areas0 25X1
At least part of the problem is the low number and
poor quality of troops Vietnam has committed to
Kampuchea. Of the 150,000 to 170,000 Vietnamese 25X1
troops, only 50,000 to 60,000 face the 40,000 to 25X1
many of the southern Vietnamese 25X1
The Vietnamese also have progressively improved
their logistic structure throughout Kampuchea. They
have built and improved roads to facilitate operations
in forward areas. Since the construction in 1979 of
port facilities on the northern shore of the Tonle Sap,
inland waterways have been used extensively during
the rainy season to move supplies to forward areas.
Finally, the Vietnamese have benefited from im-
proved training and increased equipment deliveries.
Soviet advisers have helped the Vietnamese plan a
series of large nationwide combined-arms exercises
stepped up deliveries of small arms, artillery, trucks,
and other items to replace aging equipment.
conscripts filling the ranks in Kampuchea have seri-
ous morale problems traceable to resentment toward
northern officers, apathy toward the war effort, and
widespread malaria. Although defectors report a
growing proportion of more reliable northern troops
are being assigned to Kampuchea, most of Vietnam's
elite forces remain committed to the defense of north-
heavily mined, mountainous jungle terrain.
the skillful use of guerrilla tactics by DK forces in 25X1
ern Vietnam. Finally, overall advantages in manpow-
er, mobility, and firepower are frequently negated by
Vietnamese troops have gotten little support from 25X1
PRK military forces. Although the PRK Army has
grown from about 20,000 troops in 1981 to approxi-
mately 30,000 today, the increase has been entirely in
provincial and local forces. The four main-force units,
despite their elevation from brigade to division status 25X1
in the past two years, have not increased their overall
manpower strength from the 12,500 Hanoi assembled
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Military Forces in Kampuchea
Comments
from malaria
Organization
Estimated
Military
Armed
Leadership
Strength
Democratic
30,000
Pol Pot,
Kampuchea
Son San,
(DK)
Ta Mok
Khmer Peo- 12,000 Sak Sutsak-
ple's National han,
Liberation Thach Reng,
Front Chea Chhut,
(KPNLF) Prum Vith
for its invasion in 1978. According to defectors, PRK
units do well to preserve existing manpower levels in
light of extremely high desertion rates and deaths
with their Vietnamese mentors, but they remain
Two PRK divisions are stationed in forward areas
where they conduct occasional joint sweep operations
Most effective of generally unreliable and ineffective.
groups. Conducts toward the Vietnamese runs high and their loyalty is
operations in several
interior areas. Re- frequently suspect. According to the US Embassy in
tains dedicated core Bangkok, Vietnamese troops arrested over 100 offi-
of revolutionaries
and receives ample cers and troops of the PRK 286th Division in late
material support May for suspected collaboration with resistance
from China. forces. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co
The leading non- Thach stated in November that building a Kampu-
Communist group. chean Army would take at least five more years, a
i
material
R
ves
ece
support from Singa- projection we consider highly optimistic.
pore and Malaysia,
plus limited aid
from China. Has
made organizational
improvements, but
many of its troops
are tied down de-
fending large civil-
ian camps and have
had only minor im-
pact on military
situation.
Sihanoukist 4,000 In Tam, The weakest of the
National Tiep Ben resistance groups. Is
Army (ANS) disorganized, fac-
tion ridden. Has
performed poorly in
combat, losing main
base at Sihanouk-
buri. Receives limit-
ed support from
China, Singapore,
and Malaysia.
Vietnam 150,000 to Lt. Gen. Has gained military
170,000 Hoang Cam initiative since
1981. Effectively
containing most re-
sistance activity but
cannot achieve out-
right military
victory.
People's Re-
30,000
Unknown
public of
Kampuchea
(PRK)
Weak, poorly moti-
vated. Getting some
frontline experience,
but will remain
heavily dependent
on Vietnamese for
at least several
years.
Democratic Kampuchea: Hanging Tough
The DK's 30,000 guerrillas remain by far the stron-
gest and most active opposition to Vietnam's occupa-
tion force. They receive a continuous flow of arms,
supplies, and money from China that permits them to
carry out guerrilla operations in widespread areas.
They hold a virtual monopoly on the most defensible
border terrain and, through acquisition of bulldozers
and about 100 trucks, have improved their ability to
support sustained operations in the interior.
The DK has also had some success in submerging its
past record of barbarity through a united front strate-
gy featuring appeals to nationalist sentiment and close
identity with Prince Sihanouk. The US Embassy in
Bangkok reports that more tolerant popular attitudes
toward the DK may be developing with the passage of
time, aided by increased popular resentment of Viet-
namese repressive actions. These conditions apparent-
ly have improved the DK's ability to operate among
the people and attract recruits.
the Chinese shipped 20,000 AK-47 rifles to
Thailand in late September that the DK claims will
be used to arm a new militia force in Kampuchea.
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However, the DK faces important obstacles to rapid
progress. Logistic improvements notwithstanding, the
DK still cannot support large numbers of guerrillas
deep in the countryside for extended periods, and it
lacks the manpower to take and hold more heavily
populated areas. Although there has been a decline in
defector reports of morale and disciplinary problems
within the DK over the past year, we believe such
problems, stemming in part from regional jealousies,
discipline broke down totally during the March Viet-
namese attack on Phnom Chat, with most troops
ignoring appeals by their commanders to regroup and
continue fighting.
The DK also remains vulnerable to the political
appeal of the non-Communist factions. Several hun-
dred DK troops deserted to Prince Sihanouk's forces
when Sihanouk assumed leadership of the resistance
coalition in mid-1982. And increased DK attacks
against the two non-Communist factions this year
reflect the DK's concern that any non-Communist
gains will be at DK expense. Finally, despite some
erosion in popular revulsion toward its past, willing-
ness to support or join the DK still does not appear to
The Non-Communist Resistance: Serious Weaknesses
The non-Communists have made steady progress in
building their armed strength over the past year. The
KPNLF now has approximately 12,000 armed men
and 5,000 to 6,000 more who are trained but not yet
armed. The Sihanoukist National Army (ANS) cur-
rently has over 4,000 men under arms and a similar
number unarmed. the two
groups have slowly extended some of their operating
areas deeper inside Kampuchea.
Nonetheless, the two non-Communist groups have
had only minimal impact on the military situation.
Plagued by chronic ammunition and supply shortages,
they were unable to exploit the tactical advantages
afforded by the rainy season and conducted only
minor military actions. In fact, the preponderance of
their military effort remains passive and focused on
defense of the large, vulnerable civilian bases colo-
cated with their military forces. The KPNLF's most
ambitious military effort to date-the seizure of
several villages in December 1982-ultimately back-
fired when the Vietnamese destroyed its nearby base
at Nong Chan. That action illustrated a central
dilemma for both the KPNLF and Sihanoukist forces.
On the one hand, the non-Communist groups must
demonstrate increased military capabilities in order to 25X1
attract and retain external support. By the same
token, however, actions large enough to attract suffi-
cient publicity invite retaliation by the Vietnamese, 25X1
who fear a growth in non-Communist military stature
would enhance the domestic appeal of the resistance.
Thai military officers responsible for support to the
resistance believe that poor performance by non-
Communist military forces has been caused by inade-
quate training, factionalism, and the troops' unwill-
ingness to make greater use of guerrilla warfare
tactics. To overcome these deficiencies, Thailand,
along with Singapore and Malaysia, has been pressing
the two factions to increase cooperation. The KPNLF
leadership has been reluctant to cooperate with the
less competent Sihanoukists, claiming their own ac-
complishments would be undermined. Under heavy
pressure from ASEAN, however, KPNLF leader Son
Sann reluctantly agreed in September to begin joint
radiobroadcasts with the Sihanoukists and open addi-
tional joint information offices abroad.
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The Thai have been less successful in their effort to
improve training. the 25X1
KPNLF began training some 800 troops in guerrilla
warfare tactics in May at a new training site near
O Bok, but large numbers deserted because of inade-
quate logistic support from Front headquarters. Sub-
sequently, approximately 1,000 family members
moved to the base, necessitating deployment of 200 to
300 troops to provide security. The Front's weak
infrastructure and the insistence of its troops on
having their families nearby illustrate the institutional
obstacles it faces in developing an effective guerrilla
warfare capability.
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Diplomatic Stalemate Continues
Although the military situation remains heavily
weighted in Vietnam's favor, the political victories
over the past year have largely been won by ASEAN.
For the fifth straight year, the UN General Assembly
in late October overwhelmingly approved an ASEAN
resolution calling on Vietnam to withdraw its troops
and permit free elections in Kampuchea. And, for the
first time, Vietnam decided not to challenge seating of
Democratic Kampuchea in the UN General Assem-
bly. Neither side, however, is any closer to negotia-
tions. Both ASEAN and Vietnam have attempted
tactical maneuvers to gain the diplomatic initiative,
but there has been no real movement on the funda-
mental issues. Third-party efforts to mediate the
conflict or stimulate a dialogue have met with a
similar lack of success.
Vietnamese Initiatives. Hanoi intensified its diplo-
matic activities following the conclusion of its major
military operations in early April. Its partial troop
withdrawal in May was heavily publicized and ob-
served in the early stages by numerous foreign corre-
spondents. A longstanding offer to Thai Foreign
Minister Siddhi to visit Hanoi was renewed, and
Vietnam indicated for a time a willingness to consider
a proposal by Siddhi that Vietnamese troops pull back
30 kilometers from the Thai border. Vietnam's For-
eign Minister Nguyen Co Thach visited Manila and
Bangkok in June for talks on Kampuchea and re-
ceived a special representative of the UN Secretary
General, who was exploring ways of getting negotia-
tions under way. In the past several months, the
Vietnamese have also held talks on Kampuchea with
Belgian emissaries, French Foreign Minister Cheys-
son, and Australian Foreign Minister Hayden. Hanoi
also has endorsed the Nonaligned Movement's call for
negotiations between the Indochinese and ASEAN
countries, while playing down the resolution's call for
withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea.
In the summer and fall of 1983 Hanoi claimed to have
established a dialogue with ASEAN and other coun-
tries, emphasizing that they should avoid derailing the
process with confrontational actions. The strategy
seeks to depict Vietnam as the "reasonable" party,
and, as a specific objective, it tried to undermine
support for ASEAN's UN resolution. This is consis-
tent with past Vietnamese efforts to "regionalize" the
Kampuchean issue and thus reduce its international
visibility, particularly in the UN.
Despite its show of flexibility, however, Hanoi has not
retreated from its long-stated position that China, not
Vietnam, is the principal cause of instability in South-
east Asia, and that Vietnamese troops cannot be
totally withdrawn from Kampuchea as long as the
Chinese-supported DK Army exists. Moreover, Viet-
nam has categorically rejected the legitimacy of UN
action as long as it seats Democratic Kampuchea. The
outcome of this year's UN deliberations appears to
have strengthened Hanoi's view that a political settle-
ment under UN auspices is not possible.
ASEAN Response. Like Vietnam, the ASEAN states
have tried to appear flexible while reaffirming their
basic goals: withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from
Kampuchea and self-determination for the Kampu-
chean people. During the annual ASEAN Foreign
Ministers meeting in Bangkok in June, Thai Foreign
Minister Siddhi stressed the continuing need to apply
strong political, economic, and moral pressures on
Vietnam. He called on Western countries to press
Moscow into ending its support to Vietnam's occupa-
tion of Kampuchea. But the communique was moder-
ately worded, and it invited Hanoi to consider the
"elements" of the International Conference on Kam-
puchea declaration, implying that ASEAN would not
necessarily insist on strict adherence to the entire
declaration.
Hardline ASEAN states-Thailand, Singapore, and
Malaysia-at the same time have continued to pro-
vide military aid to the non-Communist resistance.
Thailand has served as overall coordinator of ASEAN
military aid and the smaller quantities provided by
China to the non-Communists
ASEAN's immediate objective in building up the
non-Communist military apparatus is to increase
pressure on Hanoi to agree to a settlement of the
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Kampuchean problem. A parallel, but longer term
objective, is to permit the non-Communist factions to
reach a position of parity with the Chinese-supported
Democratic Kampuchean forces that would allow
them to compete for political power in a postoccupa-
Pressure for Greater US Role
The lack of progress toward a settlement has stirred
some sentiment within ASEAN for a more assertive
US role. Senior ASEAN intelligence officials at a
meeting in May agreed that the unwillingness of
Western powers and Japan to accept a larger role in
resolving the conflict encouraged Vietnamese intran-
sigence. They recommended acceleration of US mili-
tary and economic assistance to ASEAN to counter
Soviet assistance to Vietnam. Secondly, they called
for "more tangible" assistance-arms or money co-
vertly funneled through ASEAN
tot the non- om- 25X1
munist Kampuchean resistance groups. 25X1
25X1
tion Kampuchea.
Third-Party Efforts. The impasse on Kampuchea has
prompted a variety of unsuccessful attempts by third
parties to bring about a solution. Late in 1982 both
France and Belgium surfaced plans for a settlement
that featured a leading role for Prince Sihanouk.
Belgian efforts apparently stemmed from Vietnamese
requests for assistance in arranging a meeting with
Sihanouk. ASEAN's lukewarm reaction and Hanoi's
annoyance over Belgium's later criticism of Vietnam-
ese military operations, however, appear to have
eliminated Belgium as a possible mediator. Also in
1982, Romanian President Ceausescu proposed a
four-party Kampuchean coalition to include the Heng
Samrin regime. Sihanouk also floated the idea but
subsequently backed off, saying he had spoken only
for himself and not his coalition partners.
The most recent third-party initiative has come from
the Labor government in Australia. Foreign Minister
Hayden, in offering Australian help as a "facilitator,"
advanced a proposal in April calling for a Vietnam-
ese-ASEAN accommodation on Kampuchea involv-
ing a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops,
Kampuchean self-determination, and Western partic-
ipation in the rehabilitation of Kampuchea. Because
the Australian approach assumes that Vietnamese
domination of Kampuchea is irreversible and that
China must share the blame for instability in South-
east Asia, Hayden received a cool response during his
visits to ASEAN capitals last spring. Hayden visited
Hanoi in June and Beijing in August, with no signifi-
cant results. He subsequently irritated ASEAN lead-
ers by failing to condemn Vietnamese occupation of
Kampuchea during his UN address and refusing
Australian cosponsorship of ASEAN's resolution.
These actions have dimmed what Canberra conceded
at the outset were poor prospects for achieving any
major breakthroughs.
a senior Malaysian official in late
May recommended that Washington put unspecified
pressure on Moscow and Beijing to help pave the way
for a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea.
Looking Ahead: More of the Same
Hanoi is well aware that an outright military victory
25X1
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is beyond its reach even if it were to commit addition- 25X1
al divisions and risk provoking Chinese retaliation by
sending forces into Thailand to attack resistance
sanctuaries. With these limitations in mind, the Viet-
namese apparently have settled into a "containment"
strategy aimed at preventing major military inroads
by DK forces and preventing substantial growth by
the two non-Communist factions. This strategy offers
no near-term hope for eliminating the resistance.
Nonetheless, there is little evidence that the political
and economic costs of its Kampuchean policy will
become great enough to force Hanoi to compromise
its basic aim of controlling Indochina or, on the other
hand, drive it to seek an early, decisive military
victory.F____1 25X1
believe the DK's active rainy season campaign may
prompt Hanoi to attack important DK bases on the
Thai border. At the same time, the large non-Com-
munist resistance bases remain both attractive and
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vulnerable targets to any Vietnamese strategy empha-
sizing deflation of the political appeal of the resist-
ance. We believe the Vietnamese will be prepared
logistically for large-scale o erations by January.
hey have moved
large amounts of supplies and heavy equipment via
inland waterways to rear bases in western Kampuchea
and have increased their fuel storage capacity at Siem
Although heavy monsoon rains have delayed
resupply of combat units in forward areas near the
Thai border, the heavy stockpiling in rear areas will
allow rapid deliveries when the ground dries.
DK forces will probably yield the tactical initiative in
many areas as Vietnam's mobility and firepower
advantages increasingly come into play during the dry
season. They probably will reduce their operations
deep in the interior and focus on interdiction of major
Vietnamese supply routes and harassment of Viet-
namese positions in border areas in hopes of prevent-
ing large-scale attacks on their bases.
Activities this dry season (November-May) will help
determine whether the DK's rainy season perform-
ance marks an enduring improvement in its capabili-
ties or a short-term exploitation of advantages
accruing to guerrilla forces during the monsoon peri-
od. There is no substantial evidence at this stage to
corroborate DK claims that it has developed a militia,
and we cannot substantiate recent reports of marked
growth in overall DK manpower over the past year.
Although we expect the DK to remain the principal
obstacle to Vietnamese consolidation of control in
Kampuchea, we do not look for any fundamental
shifts in the military balance soon.
The resistance coalition will continue to be buffeted
by Son Sann's occasional threats to resign, Sihanouk's
unilateral policy statements, and the DK's military
assaults against its non-Communist partners.
ASEAN's control over the delivery of aid to the
resistance groups, however, gives it the leverage to
force the factions to maintain at least outward unity,
and we expect the coalition to remain intact over the
near term. In any case, because the formation of the
coalition so far has resulted in no change in the
conduct of the guerrilla campaign, we believe the
collapse of the coalition would have little or no
immediate effect on the military situation.
The diplomatic picture also seems unlikely to change
dramatically over the next several months. Hanoi will
probably continue to stress its "flexibility" and en-
courage development of an ASEAN-Indochinese dia-
logue outside the United Nations. ASEAN will also
avoid strong rhetoric as long as Vietnamese military
actions are not overly provocative and will keep
channels open to Hanoi. We see no signs, however,
that either side will yield on fundamental issues.
Moreover, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese-who
are providing most of the arms to the combatants-
are likely to change their policies. The Soviets have
remained firm in backing Vietnam, and they signed a
new long-term economic cooperation agreement with
Hanoi in October. China, for its part, remains firmly
committed to pressing Vietnam militarily in
Kampuchea through aid to the resistance, and Beijing
periodically increases military pressure on Vietnam's
northern border to keep Hanoi's elite forces tied
down. Beijing, moreover, has remained uncompromis-
ing on the diplomatic front, making progress on
Kampuchea one of its three preconditions for a funda-
mental improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.
Over the longer term, pressure within ASEAN for a
diplomatic solution will grow. Indonesia is concerned
that prolonged conflict will keep Vietnam in the
Soviet camp and contribute to Chinese expansionism
Nonetheless, although a split between
hardliners and accommodationists could result in a
collapse of ASEAN unity, we believe continuing
modifications of ASEAN policy will be a more likely
scenario.
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