(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00928R000200070003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seere;-
Intelligence
Japan:
Controlling Technology
Leakage to the USSR
_-secrer-
EA 83-10246
December.1983
Copy 3 31 ; 2
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Intelligence
Japan:
Controlling Technology
Leakage to the USSR
This paper was prepared by
Japan Branch, Office of East Asian Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA,
Secret
EA 83-10246
December 1983
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secret
Japan:
Controlling Technology
Leakage to the USSR
Key Judgments In a major shift in policy, Japan has taken well-publicized steps to limit So-
Information available
as of 15 November 1983
was used in this report.
viet and East European access to advanced technologies and equipment. A
series of events over the past year
have created a receptive environment for the new measures.
Equally important has been the backing of Prime Minister Nakasone,
whose emphasis on a greater international role for Japan has encouraged
Japanese participation in the general Western crackdown on technology
leakage.
some nonembargoed goods.
more cooperative during COCOM list review sessions, and MITI has
shown a greater willingness to limit exports of COCOM-controlled and
US pressure has been the major element driving the new policy, however,
and the Foreign Ministry has taken the lead. The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, whose support is essential, was initially a reluctant
participant, but, over the past several months, it has become increasingly
involved. Tokyo's tough line has taken several forms:
? Two Soviets were expelled for industrial espionage in June.
? The Foreign Ministry has tightened restrictions on entrance visas and
travel for Soviet and East European scientific and commercial
delegations.
? MITI has taken the first step toward limiting unauthorized reexports of
technology by requiring end-user certificates.
? Japanese Coordinating Committee (COCOM) delegations have been
Most large corporations are abiding by the government's stricter policy on
export controls, and many have canceled sales and technical exchanges.
The firms and MITI-their major spokesman in the government-are
keeping a close watch on Allied performance, however. Tokyo will find it
difficult to carry on the policy if firms perceive that the new controls have
damaged Japanese competitiveness in world markets.
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Secret
EA 83-10246
December 1983
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Secret
Japan:
Controlling Technology
Leakage to the USSR'
Over the past year Tokyo has moved to curb illegal
acquisition of Western technology by the Soviet
Union and East European countries:
? Soviet officials have been expelled for trying to
acquire technology illegally.
? The Foreign Ministry has placed tighter restrictions
on Soviet visitors to Japan.
? Tokyo has increased manpower and funds for en-
forcement of export controls.
? Coordination among all agencies concerned with
export control has been substantially improved, and
Tokyo is reviewing export license applications more
closely.
Tokyo's Motives
Although illegal technology transfers will probably
continue-the Japanese are second only to West
Germany as a source of high technology for the
Soviets-the enforcement measures represent a dra-
matic shift in policy. This new campaign is largely the
result of concern among Japanese bureaucrats that
crackdowns now under way in the United States and
Western Europe would leave Japan open to criticism
that it was not doing its part.
government officials fear failure to
follow the US and West European examples would
Japan's efforts to curb technology loss come at a time
when Tokyo has shown diminishing interest in great-
er involvement in the Soviet economy, partly because
recession and structural changes in the economy have
reduced Japan's raw material and energy require-
ments. Japanese businessmen have shown little inter-
est in new Siberian resource development projects-
once a major component of Japanese-Soviet trade
and technology sales.
The new measures to restrict high-technology sales
are unlikely to damage Japanese export trade sign~fl-
cantly. Trade with the Soviet Union is growing but is
still relatively unimportant to the Japanese economy,
accounting for only about 2 percent of the value of
Japan's total foreign trade in 1982 and 1983. The
Soviet share in any given year has never exceeded 3
percent. In 1982 the total trade between the two
countries rose by 16 percent in yen terms and 6.7
percent in US dollars, to $5.3 billion. This overall
growth was not maintained in 1983, when imports
rose slightly while exports declined.
In addition, government officials believe that
failure to act could result in unfavorable provisions in
the new US Export Administration Act, such as
restrictions on Japanese science and technology ex-
changes with US firms, expanded extraterritorial
controls on US technology sales to Japan, and contin-
ued restrictions on exports of Alaskan crude oil.
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Prime Minister Nakasone and his Chief Cabinet
Secretary have encouraged the bureaucracy to act on
technology transfer. Both have publicly expressed
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greater concern than their predecessors over security
issues, and they have been receptive to US approaches
detailing the strategic implications of unregulated
technology transfer to the USSR.
The expulsions also emphasized to Japanese business
the extent of Soviet industrial espionage activity, and
firms in regular contact with Soviet foreign trade
representatives became more cautious.
the involvement of an official
Foreign Ministry was able to use
disclosures as a springboard for a publicity campaign
aimed at increasing public awareness of the strategic
significance of technology sales to the Soviets, the
extent and effectiveness of the USSR's collection
effort in Japan, and the implications for Japan's
national security. Press briefings by the Ministry were
designed to convince Japanese traders, manufactur-
ers, and colleges to exercise greater care in inviting
Soviet visitors to view advanced production or re-
search facilities. In leaks to the media, directed both
at an initially skeptical public and a business commu-
nity reluctant to curb trade, the Ministry noted that
Tokyo's efforts to check technology loss were in
accord with established international commitments
and that Japan was acting in concert with its Western
allies. Nihon Keizai, among others, billed Tokyo's
new measures as efforts to enhance the effectiveness
of COCOM.
The expulsion of two Soviet diplomats in June was a
landmark in the Foreign Ministry's attempts to un-
dercut bureaucratic opposition to tighter controls. The
expulsions-the first in postwar Japan-came as a
shock to officials in the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI). The Ministry had not
been notified of the police investigation of the two
Soviets, which was conducted in close cooperation
with the Foreign Ministry's Soviet Division]
from the Soviet State Committee for Science and
Technology (GKNT) alarmed officials in Japanese
companies because many had friendship and trade
promotion agreements with the GKNT and allowed
GKNT officials to work in their offices. Before the
expulsions the business community had felt relatively
immune from the Soviet intelligence threat. Had a
Soviet military attache-who would have been ex-
pected to be involved in espionage-been expelled, the
reaction from the business community would not have
been as strong.
The Bureaucracy
The Foreign Ministry-and its Soviet Division in
particular-is the most active proponent of the new
policy on high-technology exports. It has used repeat-
ed US demarches to elevate the technology loss issue
from a trade matter strictly in the hands of MITI to a
broader foreign policy concern in which it can exert
considerably more influence
institute tighter controls.
The Foreign Ministry made the first move in late
1982, when it began to crack down on visas for Soviet
science and technology delegations. As of mid-1983 it
had denied at least 15 visas because of the possibility
of technology loss. In a public address covered widely
in the press, Foreign Minister Abe in June 1983
reaffirmed Tokyo's commitment to reducing the ille-
gal flow of technology and equipment to the USSR
and Eastern Europe. Using the bluntest public lan-
guage yet on the issue, he acknowledged the contribu-
tions that Western technology has made to Soviet
military programs. Although not mentioning specific
actions that Tokyo should take, Abe reaffirmed Ja-
pan's obligation as a member of the free world to
The Foreign Ministry's ability to control technology
leakage rests with its almost complete authority over
visas and travel itineraries for foreign delegations. By
restricting visas and travel, the Ministry has been able
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The Visa Squeeze
The Foreign Ministry has almost complete autonomy
over visas and travel itineraries for foreign delega-
tions visiting Japan:
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? The Ministry is not required by law to announce a
reason for denying a visa.
? Granting visas is a discretionary power given to the
Foreign Minister and cannot be challenged in the
Japanese courts. The latitude afforded the Ministry
in its reasons for denial allows it to broaden control
over Soviet access to technologies not available for
export or to dual-use items considered sensitive by
the United States or other Allies but not controlled
by COCOM or contained on Japan's export control
order.
In 1982 the Ministry denied 21 visas to Soviet
visitors, including 13 that used the possibility of
technology losses to the USSR as the principal reason
for denial. During the first four months of 1983, the
Ministry denied nine visa requests, two specifically
for activities related to S&T collection:
? Six Soviets were denied entry to Ishikawajima
Harima, a major industrial firm, because the Min-
istry believed that they might try to collect infor-
mation on an oil drilling rig the firm is building for
the United States.
? A Soviet delegation was denied entry to a Japan
Airlines maintenance facility usingfiberscopes to
to show some immediate progress in limiting technol-
ogy loss. The Foreign Ministry is also responsible for
formulating and presenting Japan's COCOM policy,
but it usually does not become involved in COCOM
implementation or trade administration matters. As a
result, it cannot, on its own, restrict exports by adding
new categories of technologies and equipment to
Japan's export control order. Instead, it must depend
on cooperation from MITI, which is responsible for
denying export licenses and recommending to Japa-
nese business that care be taken in export of sensitive
? A delegation from the Soviet Ministry of Transport
Construction was denied entry to study Japanese
railway technology.
In addition, Tokyo has informally turned aside in-
quiries from firms on several proposed visits. Now
that the Ministry's stricter position on granting visas
is well known, firms have become more selective in
their requests for visas.
In the few instances in which a denial has been
appealed to a higher level in the government, the
Ministry has generally taken a strong stance in
defending its decision. When pressure from political
authorities is brought into play-in most cases be-
cause the firm argues that the action will result in a
significant loss of business-the Ministry has been
able to work out a compromise under which the visit
is allowed, but the Soviets' travel itinerary or access
to specific technologies is severely restricted.
The Role of MITI
MITI took a major step toward limiting technology
leakage last summer, when it instituted Tokyo's first
controls over unauthorized reexports by requiring a
"certificate of usage" stating the ultimate end user of
a specific product. The Ministry broadened the crack-
down on unauthorized reexports in November by
placing extraterritorial restrictions on exports of ro-
bots from a Bulgarian joint venture with the Japanese
technologies.
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robot maker, Fanuc. The new restrictions require
Fanuc to ensure that no more than 20 percent of the
robots produced by the joint venture are sold outside
of Bulgaria and that the Bulgarian plant be open to
inspection at any time. In addition, Fanuc must
supply MITI with complete end-user and customer
lists every three months.
? Spearheading the creation of a working-level inter-
agency commission comprising MITI, the Ministry
of Finance (Customs), the National Police Agency,
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to supervise
strengthening of export controls and developing
effective ways to limit the reexport of controlled
technologies from third countries to the USSR.
? Expanding its COCOM-related staff from eight to
nine in 1983, with a projected increase to 10 in
1984. An additional 150 employees from other
sections in MITI periodically are drawn into
COCOM affairs.
? Increasing its COCOM-related budget by nearly 75
percent by the 1984 Japanese fiscal year.
? Creating a new trade policy planning section in the
export division to handle some COCOM policy
matters previously administered solely by the For-
eign Ministry.
? Reviewing all S&T exchange and cooperation
agreements with the Soviet State Committee for
Science and Technology and other Soviet organiza-
tions to ensure they do not include potential
COCOM violations or unauthorized transfers of
The Ministry has supplemented its informal guidance
with a stepped-up disapproval rate for exports of
specific technologies or equipment. In May, for exam-
ple, MITI turned down a $4 million integrated circuit
packaging plant sale by Kyocera, a leading Japanese
manufacturer of microelectronics packages and high-
performance ceramics. As a result of the disapproval
and MITI's overall strenghtening of restrictions, the
firm has decided to discontinue all plant sales to the
USSR, a business worth nearly $40 million over the
past eight years.
MITI's cooperation is essential to Tokyo's effort to
deny the Soviets access to high technology because
the Ministry is responsible for the implementation,
coordination, and enforcement of Japanese trade reg-
ulations and export controls. It is the sole authority
issuing export licenses, including approvals for
COCOM-controlled goods. It is also Tokyo's principal
channel for guidance to the business community on
the technology transfer or any other trade-related
issues
The Security Services
The National Police Agency and the Public Security
Investigation Agency are not directly involved in
formulating or implementing export controls, but they
have played a key support role. Both services have
expanded their operations against the Soviets and
have publicized their findings through appropriate
channels in the government and media.
technology.
MITI remains reluctant, however, to issue extensive
formal administrative guidance on the export of ad-
vanced technology items not covered by existing
COCOM regulations (see the appendix). It prefers to
counsel Japanese firms informally on the advisability
of a particular export. Consultation with the Japanese
Industrial Robot Association and Komatsu, Ltd., for
example, enabled MITI to accede to US pressures to
establish COCOM control on robots and to restrict
some sales until final COCOM guidelines have been
We believe that the police have selectively publicized
information on cases in unattributed press articles in
order to raise public awareness of the technology loss
problem, spur action by the bureaucracy, and demon-
strate their own competence. In May, for example,
Nihon Keizai carried an article about Japanese fisher-
men exchanging microelectronics chips with Soviet
border police for fishing rights off Sakhalin. The "fish
established
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for chips" activity has been under investigation by the
police for several years
The Public Security Investigation Agency has also
expanded its coverage of the technology loss issue,
maintaining extensive files on the activities and back-
grounds of Soviet visitors. It does not enjoy as close a
working relationship with the Foreign Ministry as do
the police but has nonetheless taken steps to publicize
its efforts and demonstrate its competence in address-
ing,technology leakage. In June 1983 the Agency
published an unattributed 128-page book on Soviet
intelligence activities in Japan. It contained sections
dealing specifically with KGB and GRU S&T collec-
? The trading firm Matsushita has rejected requests
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enter into a technical exchange agreement with the
Soviet State Committee for Science and
Technology.
? Tokyo Boeki, a trading firm]
tion activities.
The Ministry of Finance
The Finance Ministry plays only a tangential role in
administrating export controls. Its chief influence lies
in its customs authority, through which it can play a
major part in identifying and interdicting illegal
shipments of high-technology goods. In response to
Foreign Ministry disclosures in September that Cu-
ban trade delegations had purchased high-technology
equipment for the Soviets, the Finance Ministry has
expressed a greater willingness to support Customs
Service seizures of shipments containing restricted as
well as other sensitive technologies bound for Cuba
recently refused Soviet requests for an optical fiber
technology and magnetic tape memory equipment,
both embargoed by COCOM.
? A Japanese industrial firm refused to sell a large
hydraulic crane to the Soviets through a Japanese
trading company because there was no guarantee
the crane would not be used for military construc-
Some business leaders have consistently supported the
new restrictions, in part to avoid provoking even
stronger measures and closer MITI supervision. Oth-
ers have not been fully cooperative. Ishikawajima
Harima initially decided to terminate or at least
downgrade its technical cooperation agreement with
the GKNT after the expulsions in June.
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Business Plays Along
In response to the government program, most major
trading firms and manufacturers have curtailed some
sales of high-technology items to the USSR and have
reduced the number and visibility of exchanges and
cooperation agreements with the Soviets:
? Several Japanese electronics manufacturers have
refused to provide the Soviets with video tape
recorder technology.
Japanese businessmen are still trying hard to promote
sales of nonstrategic technology and equipment to the
USSR. Businessmen are also keeping a close watch on
US and Allied performance under both established
COCOM regulations and new unilateral controls and
are careful to maintain parity with them:
? Some firms continue to complain of bias in treat-
ment of Japanese COCOM cases. In one instance,
Japanese companies protested after the United
States approved a British computer sale to the
USSR that they believed would not have been
allowed had it been Japanese.
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? A Japanese delegation to the Science 83 exhibit in
Moscow recently complained that a US firm had
displayed a microcomputer similar to one Tokyo
Attitudes Toward COCOM
Tokyo's new attitude toward technology leakage has
worked to US advantage in the current round of
COCOM discussions. The Japanese delegation has
made serious efforts to reach agreement on the 13
high-priority items identified for special concern dur-
ing last year's COCOM high-level meeting. The
Japanese have come to Paris with latitude in their
negotiating position-unusual for a Japanese delega-
tion-and have even proposed alternate wording on
some issues, a substantial departure from their per-
formance during the last list review.
Japan's flexibility was particularly evident during
negotiations to embargo sales of electronics-grade
silicon. The Japanese initially found the US proposal
for a total embargo unacceptable because they feared
losing millions of dollars in sales. They agreed to a
compromise, however, in which Japan accepted the
US position on silicon sales to the USSR as long as it
could recoup some of the lost sales in the Chinese
market.
Reaction From Moscow
According to Japanese officials, Moscow has reacted
moderately to the new measures. Soviet protests
against the expulsions of the two officials were mild-
suggesting no reprisals of any significance unless
Tokyo continued to publicize the case. Although
Moscow is clearly irritated by the Foreign Ministry's
visa controls, it has not allowed the matter to escalate
into a visa war. To date, the Soviets have refused only
one low-level Japanese official's entry into the USSR.
Moscow has continued to stress the need for improved
relations but has also continued to criticize sharply
Japan's stand on foreign policy and defense issues.
If Moscow steps up the pressure, we do not expect
Tokyo to cave in. Tougher Soviet positions in business
negotiations have had limited influence on most major
Japanese firms, for which Soviet trade is welcome but
relatively unimportant. Although the steel and ma-
chinery industries do have important stakes in Soviet
trade, we expect that, with few exceptions such as
large-diameter pipe, the importance of the USSR as
an export market will drop as worldwide recession
eases and markets improve elsewhere. Increased bel-
ligerence from Moscow could, in fact, make it easier
for Tokyo to enforce current controls and implement
new ones. In a recent example, Sumitomo expelled a
Soviet participant in a long-term technical exchange
program after the KAL shootdown, in which a com-
pany employee and his entire family were killed.
We do not expect Moscow to cut back its overall
efforts to acquire high technology, and it probably
will continue trying to persuade Japanese firms-
especially those specializing in trade with the
USSR-to circumvent the COCOM restrictions.
There is some evidence, however, that the USSR has
recently assumed a less aggressive stance in its at-
tempts to recruit agents for S&T collection. For
example, some Soviets reportedly have temporarily
suspended meetings with their Japanese contacts be-
cause of the possibility of discovery by Japanese
authorities. They have cited the publicity given to the
Levchencko testimony and the expulsions as reasons
for the temporary break off.
Future Action
Over the next few months Tokyo plans to take
additional steps to tighten controls on high-technology
exports. he Foreign
Ministry will intensify its review of visa applications
and requests for factory tours by Cuban purchasing
also plans to limit the Cubans' stay in Japan, mini-
mize the number of free days, and require a detailed
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list of all business and leisure activities. The Ministry
will probably apply similar restrictions on purchasing
missions from East European countries.
MITI is planning a training program for its export
control officers and a new trade administration office
to process COCOM cases. It also will require firms to
appoint an official to take charge of the security
aspects of high technology, limit the number of
employees handling sensitive information, and pre-
pare a detailed plan for coordinating control proce-
dures with government agencies.
During the current round of COCOM negotiations,
we believe Tokyo will be receptive to establishing a
monitoring system for emerging technology of poten-
tial military significance. Several Japanese officials
have indicated, however, that Tokyo probably will not
agree to a US proposal for adding equipment and
technology related to the oil and gas industry to the
COCOM lists. Japan views the proposal as covering
too many nonstrategic items and potentially hindering
legitimate trade.
Outlook
The intensity with which the new measures will be
pursued over the long term is uncertain. Tokyo does
not view the security threat posed by technology
transfer to the USSR with the same urgency the
United States does. It has been spurred to action
largely by the apparent importance of the issue to US-
Japanese relations and by international pressure.
Events in the last year-the Levchenko case, the
expulsion of two Soviet industrial spies, the KAL
shootdown, and Nakasone's election-have created
ideal circumstances for Tokyo's new program. The
beneficial effects of most of these may be short lived.
To the degree that the Japanese perception of the
Soviet threat increases, however-in particular, pub-
lic awareness of SS-20 deployment in Asia and con-
ventional military buildup on the Northern Territo-
ries-Tokyo's resolve to limit technology leakage to
the USSR will strengthen. Prime Minister Naka-
sone's role as an advocate for the new measures will
continue, but his influence may be diminished as he
devotes more attention to domestic issues in the wake
of the ruling party's setbacks in the late December
1983 lower house elections.
For now, the Foreign Ministry remains the most
committed to the new program, but even MITI
believes it politically expedient to support tighter
controls. These and other relevant ministries have
overcome bureaucratic differences to establish an
institutional framework capable of enhancing Tokyo's
ability to enforce stricter export controls. Continued
emphasis on the importance of technology transfer
issues during US-Japanese consultations will help
keep the new program on course, as will both an
international climate that supports stricter export
controls and the perception that Allied enforcement is
being applied equitably.
MITI is the ministry most likely to challenge and
even break with the tighter controls. The Ministry
took action only after it had seen the Foreign Ministry
threatening to diminish its authority over export
control policy. Despite the measures it has taken,
MITI disagrees with the Fore' n Ministry on the
extent of export controls.
restrict items that are sensitive but not currently on
the COCOM list could weaken. MITI may insist that,
in return for continued cooperation on export controls,
the Foreign Ministry respond to future US demarches
on the technology loss issue by raising concerns over
unfair treatment
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Uncertainties will persist in evaluating the effective-
ness of the new measures because of the inherent
difficulties in identifying and tabulating illegal tech-
nology transfers. There will be indicators, however, of
Tokyo's commitment to continued enforcement of
established controls and of an expanded effort,
including:
? A greater willingness to restrict exports of sensitive
technologies not currently embargoed by COCOM,
particularly in the areas of microelectronics produc-
tion and testing, advanced telecommunications, pre-
cision manufacturing, and oil and gas.
? Stricter controls on reexports of sensitive and con-
trolled items through third countries.
? Increased willingness of Japanese firms to deny ad
hoc Soviet requests to view restricted facilities and
obtain technical data and specifications during plant
tours and contract negotiations.
? Maintenance of a high public profile by publicizing
Soviet collection efforts, strategic implications of
certain technology exports, and seizures of illegal
shipments.
? Improved means of identifying and preventing ex-
ports to end users engaged in military production.
? Continued or growing reluctance of firms with
records of illegal sales to entertain new requests for
illegal shipments.
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Appendix
The following is a list of commodity categories generally regarded by the United
States as constituting "high technology." The export of individual items contained
in these categories is regulated by the US Export Control Procedures. High-
technology exports from Japan are regulated by the Export Control Ordinance,
which closely parallels the list of items selected for control by COCOM. The
COCOM regulations restrict exports of technologies having strategic value and in
general cover a more selective range of items in each of these categories than do
71142 Jet and gas turbines for aircraft
7117 Nuclear reactors
7142 Calculating machines (including electronic computers)
7143 Statistical machines (punchcard or tape)
71492 Parts of office machinery (including computer parts)
7151 Machine tools for metal
71852 Glass-working machinery
7192 Pumps and centrifuges
71954 Parts and accessories for machine tools
7197 Ball, roller, or needle-roller bearings
71992 Cocks, valves, and so forth
7249 Telecommunications equipment (excluding TV and radio receivers)
726.2 X-ray apparatus
7293 Tubes, transistors, photocells, and so forth
72952 Electrical measuring and control instruments
7297 Electron and proton accelerators
7299 Electrical machinery, not elsewhere specified (including electromagnets, traffic control
equipment, signaling apparatus)
7341 Aircraft, heavier than air
73492 Aircraft parts
7351 Warships
73592 Special purpose craft (including submersible ships)
8611 Optical elements
8613 Optical instruments
86161 Image projectors (might include holograph projectors)
8619 Measuring and control instruments, n.e.s.
862.4
891.1(1)
Photographic film
Gramophones, tape recorders (videorecorders)
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