NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 15 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010047-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORT

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-rn Director of I oD Secret
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
CO 1VmDC 82-0120
15 January 1982
Copy 419
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West Africa - Ghana: Reactions to the Coup. . . . . . . . 1
Yugoslavia: Government Changes Forecast . . . . . . . . . 2
Sudan: Demonstrations in Khartoum Subside . . . . . . . . 3
China-US: Comments on Taiwan Arms Decision. . . . . . . . 4
Philippines: Urban Terrorism Threat . . . . . . . . . . . 4
France : Economic Decrees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Special Analysis
USSR - Nordic States: Soviet Interference . . . . . . . . 6
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Top Secret
WEST AFRICA - GHANA: Reactions to the Coup
The recent coup in Ghana underscores the potential for up-
heavals in other West African countries plagued by significant
economic disparities and pressures for social change.
Most West African governments have adopted a wait-
and-see attitude toward the new regime in Accra. Many
leaders in the region recognize, however, that the
events in Ghana could create unrest in their own coun-
tries. Liberian Head of State Doe, who hopes to accom-
plish a return to civilian rule by 1985 or sooner, is
Political developments in Nigeria, which also faces
long-term socioeconomic problems, often tend to follow
events in Ghana. President Shagari's government also
fears that Ghana could provide Libya with another foot-
hold in West Africa. Lagos, however, has made no move to
cut off oil deliveries to Ghana as it did in 1979.
Leaders of Togo, Niger, and other moderate but weak
states suspect Libyan involvement in the coup. They are
increasingly concerned that Tripoli will attempt to
Comment: Ghana's rapid resumption of diplomatic
ties with Libya. is likely to lead to at least some Libyan
economic and security assistance. Coup leader Rawlings,
however, is not a Libyan tool and Ghana's lack of a
sizable Islamic population should impede efforts by
Tripoli to gain influence.
The Libyans probably will maintain a low profile
for now in Ghana to avoid increasing the apprehensions
of neighboring governments. Libyan leader Qadhafi,
moreover, does not want to risk jeopardizing his role
this summer as host of the OAU summit and chairman of
the group later this year. In addition, the Libyans'
ability to make political inroads in Ghana and elsewhere
in West Africa will be mitigated by their poor record
of providing significant economic assistance.
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Top Secret
YUGOSLAVIA: Government Changes Forecast
Planned government changes announced yesterday indicate
that the Leadership is placing a premium on expertise in the
Foreign Affairs, Internal Security, and Defense Ministries, but
that nomination of a lackluster party functionary as the new head
of government may impede the search for economic reforms.
Croatian Party leader Milka Planinc, the only
woman holding a top-level regime position, is to be the
next Premier. Other nominations include Lazar Mojsov,
a Macedonian and former Party Presidium President, as
Foreign Minister; Stane Dolanc, a Slovene who was Party
Secretary until 1979, as Interior Minister; and Admiral
Branko Mamula, a Serb from Croatia now serving as Chief
of Staff, as Defense Minister. Formal selections to
these four-year posts will occur in May before the 12th
Party Congress in June.
Comment: The ministerial candidates are certain
to be confirmed. They are longtime leaders with impres-
sive records.
Mojsov and Dolanc have held top party positions
and have achieved international recognition. Mojsov
served as Ambassador to Moscow and President of the UN
General Assembly from 1977 to 1978.
Dolanc, a capable administrator, will have the
difficult task of assisting in maintaining order in the
strife-torn province of Kosovo as well as dealing with
vigorous dissident movements. He is a strong advocate
of vigilance against Soviet meddling in Yugoslavia.
Planinc has been unimpressive as leader of the
Croatian Party and will bring little economic experience
to her new post. The current Premier has worked hard
to reduce inflation and the hard currency debt. By
appointing Planinc, the leadership seems to be de-
emphasizina the Premier's role in making policy initia-
tives.
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//Demonstrations protesting the recent increase in
the price of sugar appear to be ending in Khartoum.
Demonstrations are continuing, however, in several pro-
vincial towns, and early this week three students were
killed. The number of deaths resulting from the pro-
tests now stands at 21.//
Comment: //President Nimeiri's decision to raise
sugar prices and his handling of the protests has pro-
duced outspoken criticism in the leadership of the
Socialist Union, Sudan's only legal political organiza-
tion. Dissatisfaction over the regime's inability to
solve economic problems has been increasingly widespread,
but complaints by the Socialist Union are unusual.//
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CHINA-US: Comments on Taiwan Arms Decision
Beijing's first official press statement yesterday
on the US decision on arms sales to Taiwan denounced the
"unilateral" character of the move but contained no
threat of retaliation. The statement was especially
critical of the public handling of the issue by US
spokesmen and media.
Comment: The commentary reinforces private
representations in Beijing that public statements at
this time pose sensitive problems for China. The
Chinese want to use their consultations with the US on
arms sales in part to reaffirm that the US recognizes
their sovereignty over Taiwan. Although the statement
calls for an "immediate solution" of the issue, its
overall tone indicates a desire to preserve room to
maneuver.
PHILIPPINES: Urban Terrorism Threat
Two anti-Marcos terrorist groups have warned several
foreign embassies not to participate in the International
Film Festival that begins on Monday because of plans to
bomb the International Film Palace. One group, the
radical April 6th Liberation Movement, was responsible
for a series of bombings in manila in 1980, including
an attack at the meeting of the American Society of
Travel Agents. That bombing also was preceded by advance
warning. The Movement has been linked to US-based
opposition.
Comment: The Movement may be targeting interests
associated with the Marcos family. The construction of
the International Film Palace and the holding of the
festival are pet projects of Mrs. Marcos.
//The President reportedly has not yet called for
any extraordinary security precautions, possibly because
he is confident that the Movement was effectively quashed
by the end of 1980.// Moreover, the group has not fol-
lowed through on other threats against visiting digni-
taries.
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The government has issued two decrees that shorten
the workweek from 40 to 39 hours, lengthen the standard
paid vacation from four to five weeks, and reduce social
security charges for firms that hire additional workers
by September 1983. President Mitterrand secured limited
authority from the Socialist-dominated National Assembly
last November to act unilaterally on urgent social meas-
ures. The decrees are aimed at stemming growing leftist
concern that Paris is moving too slowly in implementing
promised social and economic policies.
Comment: Although Paris hopes that the new meas-
ures will create between 50,000 and 100,000 new jobs,
the government would need to create another 150,000 jobs
merely to prevent unemployment from rising above the
current 8-percent level. Economic growth is likely to
be closer to 2 percent than the 3-percent target set by
Paris for,this year, and unemployment is widely expected
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//Recent Soviet actions in the Nordic States have damaged
Moscow's credibility, but Soviet efforts to shape the outcome of
the presidential election in Finland probably will continue even
if this intensifies anti-Soviet sentiments.//
//The grounding in Swedish waters of an intelligence
collection submarine, which probably was armed with
nuclear torpedoes, has adversely affected a broad range
of Soviet interests in Northern Europe. Swedish deter-
mination to preserve its armed neutrality has been
strengthened, and domestic opposition in Denmark and
Norway to plans for increasing defense spending may
have been diminished.//
//The submarine incident also has raised doubts about
the USSR's commitment to arms control. The Nordic States
are concluding that Moscow has a lower threshold for
using nuclear weapons on its submarines in the Baltic
than previously believed.//
//In addition, the incident has undermined the credi-
bility of Soviet pledges not to use nuclear weapons
against states that renounce them. Moscow's call for a
Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone probably will be less
effective, and Scandinavians are likely to become more
insistent on including Soviet nuclear weapons ink
around the Baltic and on the Kola Peninsula.//
The activity of Soviet officials stationed in the
region also has damaged Moscow's image. Soviet involve-
ment in local peace movements has led to the expulsion
of a Soviet diplomat from Denmark and to recent Norwegian
press reports of the imminent expulsion of Soviet offi-
cials. The USSR received adverse publicity earlier
from the expulsion of a Soviet official from Norway in
April.
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//Moscow probably will try to restore its credibility
among Nordic audiences by diverting attention to US-Soviet
INF negotiations and to its allegations of a US and NATO
threat to European stability. The Soviets are likely to
revive charges that US cruise missiles in Europe would
violate Nordic airspace en route to Soviet targets and
thereby risk involving Northern Europe in a US-Soviet
nuclear exchange. The Kremlin also may charge that
stockpiling NATO weapons at Danish sites could draw
Denmark into a nuclear conflict.//
//Obvious Soviet efforts to shape the outcome of the
Finnish presidential election being held in stages this
month are increasing apprehension about Soviet intentions
in Northern Europe. Moscow nevertheless will continue
to encourage the election of a successor to President
Kekkonen who is likely to keep Helsinki's foreign policy
carefully attuned to Soviet interests. Greater emphasis
on defense throughout the Nordic States and stronger
conservative showings in recent Norwegian and Danish
elections probably have led the Soviets to take an even
greater interest in the outcome of this election.//
The Soviet Ambassador to Finland and the KGB's Fin-
nish affairs expert in Helsinki were summoned to Moscow
in late November, apparently to devise a more effective
strategy for influencing the balloting for the first
round of the presidential election on Sunday and Monday
and the electoral college's deliberations on 26 January.
Although Pravda's praise of Center Party candidate
Karjalainen failed to help him gain that party's presiden-
tial nomination, Moscow remains hopeful that Karjalainen
will emerge as a compromise candidate in the event of a
deadlock in the electoral college. Soviet officials
continue to emphasize Karjalainen's extensive experience
in bilateral trade negotiations and to warn against the
strong anti-Kekkonen sentiment that has developed in the
former President's own party.
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