NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 28 JANUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010090-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 90
• Content Type: REPORT

Top Secret
CO NIDC 82-023C
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Top Secret
Contents
El Salvador: Aircraft Destroyed . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
1
Nicaragua: Campaign of Repression . . . . . . . . . . .
.
3
EC: Actions on Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
4
Syria-Jordan: Increased Tension . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
7
Ireland: Government Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
8
Sudan : Nimeiri Buys Some Time . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
9
USSR: Speedup of US Gr
ain Deliveries . . . . . . . . .
.
9
Brazil-Cuba: Trade Pro
spects . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
10
Colombia-Israel: Inter
est in KFIR Aircraft . . . . . .
.
11
Liberia: Student Prote
sts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
12
Special Analysis
Japan: Next Step in De
fense Planning . . . . . . . . .
.
13
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EL SALVADOR: Aircraft Destroyed
Top Secret
//The sabotage of military aircraft--apparently by
guerrilla infiltrators or sympathizers serving on Air
Force maintenance crews--critically weakens the govern-
ment's already limited capacity to airlift supplies and
troops, react to guerrilla thrusts, and provide air cov-
erage to ground troops. Six of 14 UH-1H helicopters
reportedly have been destroyed or severely damaged; most
of the remaining eight are grounded awaiting repairs.
El Salvador's 15 other helicopters are primarily light
observation craft, unsuitable for airlifting troops.
Five of 11 Ouragan aircraft are totally destroyed, elim-
inating one-third of the government's fleet of aging jet
fighters. Three of eight all-purpose C-47 transport
planes also have been damaged or destroyed.//
Comment: The guerrillas have been planning wide-
spread but localized campaigns aimed at disrupting the
electoral process, seizing international headlines, and
shaking the government's confidence. Having crippled
the Air Force, at least temporarily, the insurgents may
now undertake more ambitious offensive operations. Any
general offensive is unlikely to develop momentum, how-
ever, given the apparent absence of guerrilla prepara-
tions and their continuing materiel shortages.
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NICARAGUA: Campaign of Repression
The Sandinistas have declared the eastern half of the country
a restricted military zone in an effort to conceal the extreme meas-
ures they are taking to suppress antiregime activity there.
//The government has begun a campaign of repression
against Indians in the area.
the Army has attacked Indian communities,
killing and arresting many, and is now occupying some
villages.//
//Entire communities apparently have been moved
away from the Nicaraguan-Honduran border and the vacated
villages burned. This has caused many of the Indians
to flee to Honduras. Travel to the area is being tightly
restricted and news reporting is blacked out.//
Comment: //These actions indicate extreme Sandinista
concern over raids by guerrilla forces and the increased
number of government casualties. Over the longer term,
this repression could swell the ranks of the anti-
Sandinista forces operating from Honduras as well as
aggravate the separatist sentiment and hostility of the
Indians who remain. It also could damage Nicaragua's
current effort to gain a seat on the UN Commission for
Human Rights.//
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//EC members hope that their decision to take a few limited
measures against Warsaw and Moscow will lessen US and European
public pressure to adopt tougher restrictions.//
//With the exception of the Greek representative,
EC Foreign Ministers on Monday approved the EC Commis-
sion's cancellation last week of subsidized food sales
to the Polish Government. Eight of the ministers agreed
to propose that the OECD slightly increase minimum
interest rates charged the USSR under the export-credit
consensus.//
//France deferred approval of the action after
Finance Ministry officials questioned whether the matter
fell under the competence of the EC. Paris is on record,
however, as favoring the rate hike.//
//The Foreign Ministers also considered monitoring
imports of Soviet luxury items and told the Commission to
investigate future economic measures the EC could imple-
ment. They left open the possibility of asking the Com-
mission to examine the importance and effectiveness of
recent US actions against Poland and the USSR.//
//In addition, the ministers agreed that Western
CSCE participants should assail Polish and Soviet policy
when the meeting reopens in Madrid on 9 February. They
rejected, however, the US position that the meeting
should adjourn immediately after the debate on Poland.//
Comment: //The EC remains anxious to avoid the
possible economic and political consequences of more
stringent restrictions. The EC members believe that the
measures implemented by the US so far have required little
sacrifice and have been primarily symbolic.//
//EC members want to use the CSCE meeting to empha-
size Western determination to end martial law in Poland
and to camouflage their reluctance to go beyond rhetoric.
They oppose US efforts to recess the session shortly
after it resumes on grounds that continuing the talks
will allow the West to keep pressure on Moscow.//
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//Although EC members do not believe progress toward
a post-Madrid security conference is possible now, they
do not want to take responsibility for killing the idea.
Most believe that CSCE security concerns are more impor-
tant than human rights issues Poland notwithstanding.//
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The intensified propaganda attacks that Syria and Jordan are
exchanging reflect their continuing disagreement over regional
Jordan has accused Syria of masterminding a minor
bombing in Amman on 11 January. Syria has countered by
charging that the Jordanians allowed an armed band to
cross the Syrian-Jordanian border and attack a Syrian
Army patrol on 21 January.
Jordan also is at odds with Syria over the latter's
military role in Lebanon, its support of Iran in the war,
and its opposition to the Fahd peace plan.
Syria has long charged that Jordan has provided
financial and material support to Muslim Brotherhood
terrorists operating in Syria. In November 1980, Syria
sent troops to the Jordanian border in an attempt to in-
timidate Jordan and disrupt an Arab summit in Amman.
Moreover, the Syrians suspect that Jordan has formed an
anti-Syrian alliance with Iraq and Saudi Arabia to iso-
late Syria in the region and exclude it from the peace
process.
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//The unexpected defeat of Prime Minister Fitzgerald's minority
government on the budget vote yesterday will Zead to new elections
within the next month.//
//The defeat was brought about by the defection of
several independents who switched to the opposition. At
issue were proposed tax increases aimed at reducing the
country's $2 billion deficit.//
//The government's previous austerity budget, passed
last summer, has not held down inflation or unemployment,
and recent polls point to substantial disenchantment with
its economic policies. The polls also show the ruling
Fine Gael-Labor coalition slightly ahead of the opposi-
tion Fianna Fail.//
Comment: //The government may attempt to use the
defeat to get a majority in new elections. Fitzgerald
almost certainly will claim that there is no alternative
to his policy and will hope that his prospects will be
better before new austerity measures take effect. He
will also try to take advantage of recent internal
problems within the Fianna Fail by charging that it has
not offered its own economic program.//
//Northern Ireland is unlikely to become a major cam-
paign issue, although Fitzgerald's opponents will attack
his proposals for constitutional changes to make the
Republic more attractive to Ulster Protestants. The
election also will be the first major test for the new
tactic of the Provisional Sinn Fein--the political arm
of the Provisional Irish Republican Army--to contest
parliamentary elections.//
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SUDAN: Nimeiri Buys Some Time
Khartoum remains calm, and there is no indication
that the recently purged senior Army officers or any
other elements are preparing to ainst President
Nimeiri. move a Nimeiri's removal
of First Vice President Khalil has at least for now de-
prived the opposition of a rallying point.
Comment: Nimeiri's trip to Aswan for a brief meet-
ing with Egyptian President Mubarak yesterday reflects
his confidence that his hold on power is secure. His
actions this week, however, have intensified his isola-
tion.
USSR: Speedup of US Grain Deliveries
//The USSR has asked US grain firms to accelerate
shipments of about 2 million tons of US grain bought
during the fourth quarter of 1981 and originally sche-
duled for delivery through March. The grain is now to
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be shipped b
late February
or
early March.
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Moscow's fear
of
another grain em
argo 25X1
prompted the
request.//
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Comment: //The accelerated deliveries will add to
the current congestion at Soviet grain ports. The USSR
probably will not return to the US market until March,
after all of the 12.5 million tons of US grain bought so
far has been delivered. At that time, they are likely
to insist on immediate delivery of any additional US
grain they buy. They may try to purchase another 5 mil-
lion or 6 million tons by 30 June, the end of the market-
ing year.//
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BRAZIL-CUBA: Trade Prospects
A private Brazilian commercial delegation visited
Cuba recently to talk to senior Cuban trade officials
about sales opportunities for a wide range of Brazilian
products. President Castro expressed a desire to re-
establish economic ties, which were severed in 1964, and
offered preferential treatment for Brazilian exports.
Brazilian official spokesmen were aware of the trip, but
denied authorizing the discussions. Diplomatic relations
remain suspended and Brazil continues to prohibit direct
exports to Cuba.
Comment: Brazil's economic pragmatism, which has
already led to increased trade with the Soviets and East
Europeans, probably is the primary motivation behind the
recent contacts. Trial sales are likely--perhaps through
a third country such as Panama--to reopen commercial ties
without breaking Brazilian law. Weak sugar prices, how-
ever, will curb Cuba's ability to pay for imports. The
Brazilian prohibition against direct trade precludes use
of government commercial insurance and export financing
facilities. The limited opportunity for trade over the
near term probably will reinforce the strong opposition
in Brazil to resuming trade or diplomatic relations with
Cuba.
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//The Colombian Air Force is considering buying at
least eight Kfir fighter aircraft from Israel in a pack-
age deal that would include spare parts and training.
It still hopes, however, to receive more attractive bids
from US or French manufacturers.//
Comment: //The purchase of KFIRs would be a signifi-
cant departure from the government's priority of mainly
buying equipment used in counterinsurgency operations
and of staying within the military budget. Reports of
MIG aircraft going to Nicaragua and the proposed sale of
US F-16 fighters to Venezuela, however, have heightened
Colombian security concerns. Although Bogota and Caracas
are engaged in a border dispute over oil rights in the
Gulf of Venezuela, Colombian leaders are more concerned
now about possible threats from Nicaragua and Cuba. The
Castro regime has supplied arms to leftist guerrillas in
Colombia, and relations with Nicaragua have been strained
over Bogota's support for El Salvador's government.//
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Security forces yesterday dispersed several hundred
student protestors, the first such incident since Head
of State Doe took power in 1980. The demonstrators, who
apparently had planned to march to the US Embassy, were
protesting the regime's arrest and trial last week of
six leftist student leaders accused of criticizing and
violating the ban on politics.
Comment: Doe is determined that student activists
respect the ban, and he is unlikely to back down. Addi-
tional demonstrations or an overreaction to them by secu-
rity forces could further weaken Doe's position, however.
especially if slum dwellers were to become involved.
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JAPAN: Next Step in Defense Planning
The defense planning process getting under way in Tokyo will
have an important influence on Japan's military capabilities by the
end of the decade. There are signs that party leaders disagree on
how to proceed.
//Now that the cabinet has approved the defense
budget for this year, the government is turning its
attention to establishing goals for the FY 1983-87 period.
The relatively large increase for FY 1982 resulted pri-
marily from the leadership's concern about an adverse US
reaction if Tokyo failed to honor the pledge Prime Min-
ister Suzuki made last May to President Reagan that Japan
would make greater efforts in defense.//
//The Japanese still see their armed forces less as
a deterrent against Soviet aggression than as a means of
placating the US. Tokyo's reading of the intensity of
Washington's interest thus will be a key factor in for-
mulating the five-year plan.//
The Midterm Operations Estimate
The estimate will specify the kinds and amounts of
military equipment to be acquired over the next five
years. This month the three services are scheduled to
submit their individual plans to the Defense Agency,
which will present a combined proposal to the cabinet's
National Defense Council in March. This probably will
be the most ambitious version of the plan because subse-
quent negotiations with other ministries are likely to
lower equipment targets and spending estimates.
Suzuki and other party leaders are likely to approve
the final version in July. The estimate will remain in
effect until the next defense planning exercise in 1985.
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Although the Prime Minister's fiscal austerity pro-
gram is coming under fire, he is still pursuing it and
would prefer that the estimate entail only a moderate
increase in defense spending. He also has suggested to
the Defense Agency that defense expenditures should be
kept under 1 percent of GNP.
The 1 percent ceiling was established in 1976 to
head off protests from opposition parties against the
government's allegedly "limitless" rearmament program
and has since become an important political restraint
on defense spending. Even a moderate acceleration in
defense spending increases probably would exceed the
ceiling by 1986.
//Although it is still politically risky for a Japa-
nese politician to advocate a dramatic increase in the
defense effort, there are a few signs that public oppo-
sition to an incremental military buildup is beginning
to erode. Despite heavy press criticism of the defense
budget for this year, ruling Liberal Democrats at their
annual convention last week passed a resolution that
declared that a defense budget limited to 1 percent of
GNP was "undeniably inadequate."//
//This contradiction of Suzuki's personal preference
indicates that party pressure was instrumental in deter-
mining defense spending for 1982 and that Suzuki is a
follower rather than a leader on the issue in his own
party. The resolution also may presage a significant
debate among party leaders over the pace of defense
spending. Even the cautious Suzuki recently noted that
Japan may not be able to adhere to the 1-percent ceiling
much beyond 1987.//
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