NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 11 FEBRUARY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010136-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 136
• Publication Date: February 11, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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0' Director of ~1
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
rn N1nf R2-O IC
11 February 19 2
Copy
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Top Secret
Poland: Military Impatience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
International: Oil Market Developments . . . . . . . . . 3
France-USSR: Possible Grain Deal . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Western Sahara: OAU Committee Meeting . . . . . . . . . . 6 25X1
Afghanistan: Increasing Insurgent Cooperation . . . . . . 7
Syria: Fighting Continues in Hamah . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Libya-Tunisia: Closer Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
25X1
USSR: Winter Grain Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Japan-US: Reaction to Defense Report . . . . . . . . . . l0
South Africa: Work Stoppage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Iraq: Spending Cutbacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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Top Secret
POLAND: Military Impatience
//Military officers are dissatisfied with the performance of
civilian bureaucrats. The regime is planning some show trials.//
25X1
//Poland's military leadership is dissatisfied with
the slow and inconsistent pace of personnel changes in
the civilian bureaucracy and the failure of civilian
organizations to take the initiative in solving problems.
Last week, senior members of the Ministry of National De-
fense proposed that party and government officials adopt
organizational and personnel policies that the Ministry 25X1
has developed over the past decade.//
hold their jobs because of their connections.//
tends to remove corrupt and incompetent officials who
//A Foreign Ministry official subsequently commented
that the military program calls for greater competition
in filling positions and stringent controls on the number
of government employees. He added that the military in- 25X1
if some loyal party members lose their jobs.
bring them into conflict with party stalwarts, especially
Comment: These plans reflect Premier Jaruzelski's
desire to make the bureaucracy more responsive and ef-
ficient. The slow progress has probably already con-
vinced some in the military that they will have to retain
considerable power for a long time. Such perceptions will
Miroslaw Krupinski, one of Lech Walesa's deputies, 25X1
went on trial yesterday for organizing a national strike
committee in Gdansk shortly after the imposition of martial
law. His trial comes on the heels of the stiff sentences
handed out to lower level activists and coincides with a
highly publicized "spy" trial. The regime also announced
that it has completed preparations for a tribunal to try
former party chief Gierek and other former leaders for
corruption. 25X1
forgive the prosecution of Solidarity activists.
be pleased to see Gierek and others punished, few will
Comment: Walesa will be even less likely to negotiate
with authorities, now that they have started to prosecute
individuals that he wants to participate in any talks with
the regime. Moreover, show trials will not intimidate 25X1
either dissidents or staunch union activists, who will
view the defendants as martyrs. Although some Poles will
25X1
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INTERNATIONAL: Oil Market Developments
//OPEC is under increasing pressure to cut come official
prices and,reduce output because of continued weakness in the oil
market.//
Oil consumption in France, West Germany, and the US
dropped by 10 percent in December from levels in the same
period in 1980. Weak demand has led to a drop in spot
prices for crude oil and placed growing pressure on
official prices. Spot prices for Saudi
crude oils have fallen nearly $2 to $3
and African
below officia
l
levels.
25X1
Several oil producers recently have attempted to
increase their share of the market by lowering official
prices. Iran cut crude prices by $1 per barrel, off-
setting the cost disadvantage buyers incur in paying
war-risk insurance premiums. Iraq has given Japan dis-
counts amounting to about $1 per barrel, while the
British National Oil Corporation has cut prices by
$1.50 per barrel.
//Some OPEC members still are attempting to schedule
an extraordinary meeting in the next few weeks. Saudi
Oil. Minister Yamani claims no meeting will be held and
continues to support the $34 benchmark, at least pub- 1)GV4
Comment: //OPEC may hold a special ministerial con-
ference in March before the beginning of second-quarter
price negotiations. Such a meeting would be likely to
result in further price reductions around the Saudi
benchmark price, with Riyadh allowing production to de-
cline in response to market pressures. Any Saudi cuts,
however, probably would be insufficient in themselves
to stem the decline in spot prices over the next several
weeks.//
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//France and the USSR may conclude a long-term agreement provid-
ing for French wheat sales of between 2 and 3 million metric tons
annually.// 25X1
//The French Agriculture Ministry reportedly favors
an early agreement, but the Foreign Ministry apparently
is still considering the matter. An agreement with
Paris would raise the amount of grain Moscow imports
under long-term contracts with the major grain-exporting
countries to about 13 million metric tons per year,
roughly 40 percent of its expected minimum import needs
over the next several years. The Soviets will use the
imports to help rebuild stocks and support the livestock
ram / / 25X1
ro
p
g
Comment: //The Mitterrand government probably sees
a wheat deal with the Soviets as a way to reduce its
substantial trade deficit with the USSR and to demon-
strate its willingness to defend French agricultural
interests. The deal also would reflect Paris's belief
that expanding what it considers nonstrategic trade with
the USSR helps to decrease East-West tension and to
//If the deal goes through, France would be likely
to point out that its grain sales to the USSR are modest
compared to those of the US. EC members probably would
give tacit approval to the French action, because it
would alleviate the Community's growing grain surplus.//
//The Soviets would attempt to extract political
mileage from an agreement. They would contend that it
confirms that trade with the French and other West
Europeans could continue and expand, despite disagree-
ments over Poland.//
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WESTERN SAHARA: OAU Committee Meeting
The proposed cease-fire agreement and referendum agreement 25X1
worked out by the OAU special committee on Western Sahara reportedZ
is opposed by Morocco and by the PoZisario guerrillas.
The Moroccans object to changes made by the commit-
tee to the proposal drafted last summer, especially
the increased status accorded the Polisario and the
supervisory authority over the proposed referendum
delegated to the UN or OAU. The Polisario Front demands
that there be direct negotiations between the guerriT1_as
and Morocco, a position unacceptable to King Hassan.
Comment: The committee has now shifted responsi-
bility for finding common ground between the disputants
to OAU President Moi and apparently has skirted key
issues dealing with voter registration and interim ad-
ministration of the territory. Moi will have only until
late spring, when his chairmanship of the OAU draws to
an end, to implement a settlement.
//The attitude of Algiers may be critical in the
months ahead because of its ability to put pressure on
the guerrillas to moderate their demands. Morocco's
acquisition of new, advanced military equipment probably
has magnified Algeria's fears that Rabat will proceed
with a military solution if it cannot arrange a settle-
ment that legitimizes its control over the territory.
In addition, King Hassan's decision not to attend the
recent OAU session probably has reinforced skepticism
of Moroccan motives in Al eria and in other OAU states.//
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AFGHANISTAN: Increasing Insurgent Cooperation
Cooperation among most insurgent groups in Afghanistan is
growing, although one is still using force in an attempt to establish
its preeminence.
organization.// Similar organizations have appeared
The need to coordinate operations against the Soviets
has encouraged greater cooperation among the hundreds of
insurgent groups, //and most insurgents in the Kabul area
and the nearby Panjsher Valley now belong to a single
elsewhere in the country
Nonetheless, followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar--a
fundamentalist who aspires to leadership of the entire
resistance--have clashed several times in recent weeks
with other insurgent bands. Gulbuddin embarked on an
effort last spring to eliminate rival resistance groups,
but his action only fostered greater cooperation among
the targeted organizations.
sonal rivalries among many Afghans virtually ensures
continued frictions and occasional clashes, the Soviets
generally have not been able to exploit such differences.
Comment: The increase in insurgent cooperation is
contributing to the Soviets' increasing problems in
Afghanistan. Although the intensity of ethnic and per-
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SYRIA: Fighting Continues in Hamah
Japanese technicians evacuated from the Hamah on
Tuesday confirm that the fighting there was intense but
say that government forces have regained control of
portions of the city. According to the US Embassy in
Damascus, the Japanese said damage in the city was ex-
tensive. The Embassy also learned yesterday that some
soldiers in Hamah, who had joined the dissidents, had
opened up armories and passed out weapons. Embassy
sources indicate that fighting has not spread to poten-
tial trouble spots in the north.
Comment: The defection of soldiers--presumably
Sunnis who refused to fire on their coreligionists--must
concern President Assad's minority Alawite regime. Assad
probably will keep largely Sunni Army units away from the
heaviest fighting, relying instead on the elite units pre-
dominantly manned by Alawites to overwhelm the dissidents.
Following a meeting on Tuesday between President
Bourguiba and a visiting Libyan official, Tunisia's
official press announced that Bourguiba had invited
Libyan leader Qadhafi to Tunis. The invitation reaffirms
one extended to Qadhafi by Prime Minister Mzali during
Qadhafi's stopover in Tunisia last month.
Comment: Bourguiba's invitation, his meeting with
the Libyan official, and the favorable media attention
given both events suggest that Tunis is moving toward
normalizing relations with Libya. The Tunisians have
no illusions about Qadhafi but evidently have decided
that a facade of friendly relations may prove their best
safeguard against Libyan designs. Ties between the two
countries were broken after the Libyan-backed raid on
Qafsah, Tunisia, in January 1980.
Top Secret
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USSR: Winter Grain Prospects
//The outlook for the Soviet winter grain crop for
1982 is largely favorable. Plantings of winter grains
last fall were 4 percent above levels of 1980, and pre-
winter crop development generally appeared good. Above-
average precipitation in the late fall alleviated many
of the lingering effects of the prolonged drought of
last summer.//
Comment: It is too early to project the size of
the winter grain harvest this year. Winter grain pro-
duction accounts for nearly one-third of the total grain
output, and a bumper harvest will be essential if there
is to be a major recovery from the crop failures of the
past three years.
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JAPAN-US: Reaction to Defense Report
//Japanese reactions to Secretary of Defense
Weinberger's annual report have been favorable. Prime
Minister Suzuki told opposition members of the Diet
that, although Japan would continue to set its own
defense policy, US concern about Japan's security was
"natural" in view of the sacrifices the US was prepared
to make for its defense budget and obligations under
the Mutual Security Treaty. Foreign Ministry officials
were impressed by the report's focus on strengthening
ties with allies to deter Soviet military force and by
the greater emphasis it placed on the Pacific region.//
Comment: //The favorable official reaction reflects
appreciation of advance notice of the report and a basic
belief that the US is headed in the right direction.
Tokyo expects US requests for greater efforts in defense
and aid and is preparing to head off further queries
from the opposition by stressing the independent nature
of Japan's defense policy.//
SOUTH AFRICA: Work Stoppage
Black and white trade union leaders have banded
together in an unprecedented call for a brief nationwide
work stoppage today. The unions, representing over
250,000 workers, are protesting the death in a Johannes-
burg jail last week of a white leader of a black trade
union. Black union members also are still angry over
the detentions last November of some of their most
politically active leaders.
Comment: The work stoppage culminates a week of
condemnation by groups from all races of the government's
security practices. It will be the first nationwide pro-
test involving the more than 70 black trade unions which
were legalized in 1979 and could involve some violence.
25X1
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IRAQ: Spending Cutbacks
reduce foreign aid to less developed countries.
its prices to assure the sale of that volume. The gov-
ernment recently indicated that it also will temporarily
Iraq is being forced to cut back its ambitious do-
mestic spending programs for this year because of reduced
revenues as a result of the continuing world oil surplus,
the mounting cost of the war, and reluctance to draw down
foreign exchange reserves. Although contracts call for
oil exports of nearly 1.2 million barrels per day--a 20-
percent rise over last year--Baghdad has had to lower 25X1
Comment: Iraq probably will not be able to export
more than about 1.5 million barrels per day of crude on
a sustained basis as long as the war continues. Even if
hostilities were to end and Iraq's terminals on the
Persian Gulf were repaired rapidly, it could not sell
much more than 2 million barrels per day under current
market conditions unless it were willing to risk a price
war with other producers. The government probably will
not reduce financing for existing domestic projects to
avoid jeopardizing its popular support, much of which
has rested on its success so far in insulating the
economy from the war.
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