NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 23 FEBRUARY 1982
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010173-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 28, 2008
Sequence Number:
173
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 23, 1982
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP84T00301R000100010173-5.pdf | 977.18 KB |
Body:
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Director of I up Secret
Central
23 February 19822
Top Secret
CO NIDC82-044r~
e ruary I M2
Copy e!
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Cuba - Central America: Promoting Revolution . . . . . . . 1
Zimbabwe: Reactions to Nkomo's Ouster . . . . . . . . . . 3
China-France: Contacts With French Communists . . . . . . 4
Poland: Food Supplies Improve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR-China: Note on Border Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Western Sahara: Polisario Seated at OAU Meeting . . . . . 7
India-USSR-Afghanistan: Prisoner Internment . . . . . . . 7
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Top Secret
CUBA - CENTRAL AMERICA: Promoting Revolution
The Castro regime, sensing a reluctance in Washington to send
US military units to EZ Salvador, appears determined to pursue
aggressive policy of promoting revolution in Central America.
President Castro last week told a Western diplomat
that he believed US policymakers were still vacillating
on what to do about Cuba, and that Havana will not alter
its policies.
In addition, Cuban media were quick to hail the
announcement earlier this month of a coalition among four
Guatemalan insurgent groups, stressing the familiar theme
that "unity is a key factor for victory." On 11 February,
the Cuban press quoted a Salvadoran guerrilla spokesman
in Havana as saying that "Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras will have their hour of liberation and the
Sandinista Revolution was the first flame in that process."
Comment: Havana believes that US military support
to E1. Salvador precludes a guerrilla victory for now,
but the Castro regime intends to continue aiding the
insurgents in the expectation that international public
opinion will eventually force the US to withdraw and
thereby open the way for a guerrilla victory. To that
end, the Cubans will supplement their arms shipments with
an intensified worldwide propaganda effort.
At the same time, Havana is raising the ante in
Guatemala, counting on increased bloodshed there to sour
public opinion, particularly in the US, and to undermine
The Cubans do not believe that Honduras is ready for
insurgency, but the willingness of the tightly controlled
Cuban media to quote the Salvadoran guerrilla on Honduras
indicates that Havana intends eventually to spread revo-
international support for the government.
lution to that country.
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from the cabinet.
Tension remains high over the recent ouster of Joshua Nkomo
British military advisers in Zimbabwe report that
the Army is calm. Nonetheless, Nkomo's return over the 25X1
weekend to Bulawayo in southwestern Zimbabwe, where
most of his followers live, could be a catalyst for
Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union is divided
over how to respond to Mugabe's actions. ZAPU's vice
president, who was removed last week as Minister of
Transport, has decided to work with Mugabe in establish-
ing a one-party state. One of the remaining four senior
members of ZAPU in the government has decided to stay.
Comment: Although ZAPU may not be able to organize
any active opposition to the government over the next
few weeks, the long-term potential for clashes between
Mugabe's and Nkomo's supporters will remain high. The
country's worsening economic prospects will add to the
frustrations of Nkomo's supporters, who may link their
lack of economic progress to their underrepresentation
in the government.
offer covert assistance to Mugabe's opponents.
South Africa will cite Zimbabwe's instability as
another reason for demanding outside guarantees in a
settlement on Namibia. Over the long term, Pretoria--
as it has done in Mozambique and Angola--probably will
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CHINA-FRANCE: Contracts With French Communists
China's recent decision to reopen direct channels with the
French Communist Party by inviting a delegation to Beijing in April
suggests a desire to increase its role in the Communist movement
and reflects a more active and self-reliant foreign policy.
The low-level French delegation reportedly will
arrange a visit to China by party chief Marchais in
September. China had largely ignored the pro-Soviet
French Communist Party until early this month, when the
Chinese Ambassador to France attended the French party
congress as an observer--the highest level Chinese
representation at a congress and the first publicized
attendance by the Chinese since 1964.
French Communist officials last visited China in
the early 1960s. Shortly thereafter, the French party's
support for Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute ruptured
relations with the Chinese.
Comment: Until this month, Beijing had concentrated
its attention in Western Europe on developing ties with
independent-minded parties, including the Italian and
Spanish Communist Parties, which share views critical of
Moscow. In dealing with the French, the Chinese may now
want to portray themselves as sufficiently flexible to
discuss party-to-party contacts with a close Soviet ally.
Such a shift would jibe with China's generally more
assertive foreign policy over the past year.
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Top Secret
POLAND: Food Supplies Improve
costs almost the daily average wage.
Food supplies in the Warsaw area have generally
improved since prices increased on 1 February, according
to the US Embassy. Supplies of meat are adequate to
satisfy rationing requirements, and amounts of dairy
products and vegetables seem to be in sufficient supply
to meet consumer demand. Some food supplies have in-
creased because many consumers cannot afford to pay
higher prices. A kilogram of cheese, for example, now
Comment: The regime apparently also is flooding
the market with food in order to gain consumer acceptance
for the increases. Adequate supplies of eggs, poultry,
and many other foods, however, will not continue because
of shortages and ineffective procurement from private
farmers.
Diplomatic sources in Beijing report that the
Soviets have delivered another note to the Chinese urging
a resumption of the Sino-Soviet border talks. The note--
a response to the Chinese message in late December that
agreed "in principle" to a resumption of the talks but
stressed the need for "serious preparations"--reportedly
stated that the Soviets are ready to start negotiations
in Moscow.
Comment: The note points up the USSR's growing
impatience with the Chinese, who continue to insist that
relations have no prospects for improving. The Soviets
may hope that the publicity will put more pressure on
the Chinese to respond positively and that it will
convey the impression that relations are improving.
The Chinese may hope to discourage the Soviets for now
from continuing to push the issue, while reminding the
US again of Moscow's interest in improved Sino-Soviet
ties.
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WESTERN SAHARA: Polisario Seated at OAU Meeting
Polisario Front representatives were formally seated
at the OAU ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa yesterday,
marking the first time the guerrilla organization has
been accorded such status. The Moroccans left in pro-
test, but the proceedinas c-nntinued after going into
Comment: The Polisario probably will be granted
official status for only this meeting. Nonetheless, the
guerrilla movement is likely to exploit this precedent
to seek admission at the OAU summit next summer. Its
prospects for success, however, will depend heavily on
Morocco's willingness to cooperate with OAU mediation
INDIA-USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Prisoner Internment
India has agreed to a proposal by the International
Committee for the Red Cross that Soviet prisoners of the
Afghan insurgents be interned in India in accordance with
the Geneva Convention.
doing little damage to its nonaligned image, because
operation of the plan would rest with the Red Cross.
Comment: Most Afghans would assume the prisoners
would end up in the USSR after transfer, but some groups
may cooperate, hoping this will give them belligerent
status. Acceptance by even some insurgents would serve
both Soviet and Indian interests. The desire of the
Soviets to repatriate the dozen or so captives in insur-
gent hands and to set up a means for recovering future
prisoners evidently now outweighs their reluctance to
permit any step tending to give the insurgents official
status. India's cooperation will please the USSR while
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