NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 31 MARCH 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010108-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: March 31, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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CO NID 82-075JX
cony 252
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
31 March 1982
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Top Secret
Central America: Rightist Maneuvering in EZ Salvador . . . i
USSR: Senior Leader Reported IZZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Y USSR-Chad: Possible Military Assistance . . . . . . . . . 3
1 USSR: Grain Crop for 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Ir Poland: Coal Exports Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
to Bolivia: Labor Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Special Analysis
Iraq-Iran: Implications of the Iranian Victory . . . . . . 8
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I CENTRAL AMERICA: Rightist Maneuvering in El Salvador
Negotiations continue among the five rightist parties in
ZWWO EZ Salvador to form a coalition. The guerrillas, meanwhile, are
t-; -1- 7, t k
t
Z
d
stability.
con -nuzrcg eZr a
ac s 2n eastern E
Sava
or. In I CO, c2vzZ-
ian officials are beginning to show concern that turmoil following
the coup in, Guatemala might eventually threaten Mexico's political
The rightist parties announced yesterday that they
are engaging in discussions aimed at establishing a
working coalition and have issued a communique declaring
~f their intention to try to form a government of national
unity.
The US Embassy in San Salvador believes that, if
the most recent election percentages do not change, the
Christian Democrats--despite their strong plurality--
will control only 24 of the 60 seats in the constituent
Y assembly. Roberto D'Aubuisson's party would receive
seats and the National Conciliation Party 14.
Comment: If the current negotiations succeed, the
rightist parties could dominate the constituent assembly.
Based on the latest projections, the Christian Democratic
margin for assembly deputies is smaller than previous
estimates. The Christian Democrats would have to pick
up some support from both the rightist National Concilia-
tion Party and the Democratic Action party--who are run-
ning third and fourth, respectively--in order to gain
control of the assembly.
Insurgents Still Active
The guerrillas, despite their failure to disrupt
the elections elsewhere, yesterday continued to attack
the two major cities in, the east where they prevented
much of,the balloting.
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Comment: The insurgents hope that success in eastern
El Salvador will preserve their military credibility and
gain them some bargaining leverage should the new govern-
ment be willing to negotiate. Nevertheless, government
reinforcements are now free to go to the area, and they
are likely to turn the tide, although fighting will be
L
Mexican Concern Over Guatemalan Instability
A Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative
emphasized to a US Embassy official that serious political
turmoil in Guatemala, in the wake of the recent coup,
would be worse than anywhere else in Central America.
Other officials in the Ministry--an institution which
'j has long advocated cultivating Central American insur-
gents--reportedly_also are worried by Guatemalan develop-
the border, improve communications with the Guatemalan
military, and clamp down on some insurgent activity in
Comment: Because Mexico shares a border with
Guatemala, even leftists in the government have been
more timid in promoting the cause of leftist forces
there than in El Salvador. Anxiety among Mexican mili-
tary leaders over this potential threat to domestic sta-
bility has spurred efforts to increase security along
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USSR: Senior Leader Reported Ill
Top Secret
The rumor mill in Moscow is active with reports that one or
53 more senior leaders are seriously ill.
Comment: Brezhnev's history of cardiovascular
problems makes him constantly vulnerable to a stroke,
3 but there is no additional evidence that his health has
suffered a major setback at this time.
The Soviet President. almost certainly is exhausted
because of his recent heavy schedule, and he appeared
tired during his visit to Tashkent last week. There was
no live television coverage of his return to Moscow on
3 Friday, possibly because he did not look well. The post-
ponement on Sunday of the visit to Moscow by South Yemen's
President, apparently at Soviet initiative, further sug-
gests that Brezhnev is indisposed.
Brezhnev's personal physician reportedly has canceled
a trip to the UK. The Soviet President in the past has
entered the hospital to rest, and he may well have done
so on this occasion. In the current politicized atmos-
phere in Moscow such a development could lead to rumors
that h
i
i
e
s ser
ously ill
.
Kirilenko's health in recent years appears to have
been better than that of most other senior Soviet leaders.
Poor health could account for his absence from public view
2 during March, but his absence may be due solely to the
3 political problems that have beset him since Politburo
member Suslov's death two months ago.
The rumors about health problems within the leader-
ship may be politically motivated. At a minimum, these
and other recent rumors testify to the high degree of
uncertainty about the state of the leadership since
Suslov's death. Their existence, moreover, is a re-
minder of the frailty of the diminishing circle of men
who have ruled the Soviet Union for the past 17 years.
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Top Secret
USSR-CHAD: Possible Military Assistance
ry The USSR may supply Chadian President Goukouni with military
Since the Libyans withdrew from Chad late last year,
the Soviets have strengthened ties with Goukouni. Foreign
Minister Gromyko himself received a low-level envoy from
Chad in December, and candidate Politburo member Kuznetsov
subsequently met with its new Ambassador to the USSR.
In public and private comments, the Soviets have
expressed concern that alleged US support for the Habre
forces may portend a resurgence of Western influence in
Chad. They also have criticized the OAU peacekeeping
force there, charging that its failure to restrain Habre
is serving US and French interests.
(Moscow s interest in trying to prevent Goukouni's
feeble nonaligned coalition from being toppled by insur-
gent leader Habre's superior forces. The Soviets, how-
ever, probably want to play an indirect and limited role
in order to avoid charges by other African countries of
meddling in Chadian affairs. Consequently, the USSR may
encourage other countries to increase their military
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USSR: Grain Crop for 1981
date.
put the crop at 158 million tons, and the other cited
150 to 165 million tons. An official of an economic
institute in Moscow repeated the figure of 158 million
Economic lecturers in Murmansk and Leningrad have
indicated for the first time that the grain crop for
1981 may have fallen below 160 million tons. One lecturer
Comment: Such lecturers were among the first spokes-
men to provide accurate figures for the disastrous
grain harvests in 1975 and 1979. A crop of 158 million
tons would have fallen about 80 million tons short of
plan. Record grain imports will not fill so large a
gap, and the Soviets probably will import about 45 mil-
lion tons during the year ending 30 June. The USSR so
far has bought 43.7 million tons for delivery by that
OLAND: Coal Exports Increase
The partial recovery of Poland's coal industry
under martial law has led to increased exports to the
West. The imposition of a six-day workweek and strict
discipline in the mines caused production in January
and February to rise 14 percent over that of a year ago.
Exports amounted to 2.8 million tons, more than triple
the same period in 1981. Warsaw's aggressive campaign
to regain lost markets is having some success, with
Spain purchasing more Polish coal in January than in
all of 1981, and Italy, France, and Belgium considering
increased p77rcha-P_S_
debt obligations.
Comment: Poland's reemergence as a major factor
in the West European coal market--largely at the expense
of US producers--may partly reflect Warsaw's willingness
to offer attractive prices. It also may stem from a
desire in Western Europe to diversify sources of supply
and to help Poland earn hard currency. The Poles probably
are using some of the proceeds from coal sales to help pay
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Military leaders are urging President Torrelio to
end civil unrest by declaring a state of siege and
reorganizing the cabinet. Workers held a successful
two-day general strike this week to protest economic
austerity measures, and the outlawed Bolivian Workers
Central reportedly intends to stage new demonstrations.
unrest were to increase substantially.
bear the onus for the austerity measures imposed to
meet IMF demands, but they might try to replace him if
Comment: The protests could play into the hands
of the country's perennial coup plotters, some of whom
are high-ranking military officers. Torrelio so far
appears confident that the key military commanders are
not eager for a coup and. that the plotters will not want
to jeopardize the IMF economic assistance Bolivia is to
receive. The plotters probably prefer to let Torrelio
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IRAQ-IRAN: Implications of the Iranian Victory
Iraq's defeat by Iran in the recent heavy fighting has left
President Saddam Hussein, the personal architect of the war, in
dire straits. He has no prospect of improving Iraqi military for-
tunes or of persuading Iran to negotiate. Saddam probably is
considering withdrawing completely from Iran, while taking steps
to shore up his weakened position at home. Any earlier Iranian
interest in negotiations is likely to evaporate as expectations
of Saddam's downfall increase. Moderate Arab states are increas-
ingZy apprehensive about the threat from a victorious Iran.
Saddam announced yesterday "a reorganization of
Iraqi defenses to the rear." He noted that Iraqi units
in the Dezful salient had withdrawn to new positions
closer to the border. Despite forewarning and an over-
whelming advantage in conventional firepower, the over-
riding cause of Iraq's defeat again appears to have been
an unwillingness to commit sufficient infantry to the
The Iraqis probably will establish new defensive
positions west of the Doveyrij River, leaving some units
Despite suffering substantial losses, the Iranian
Army appears strong enough to continue prosecuting
the war. Tehran probably is contemplating another major
9 offensive later this spring. It might launch a diver-
sionary attack in the north to threaten the strategic
fight tenaciously to defend Iraqi territory.
X vaat_y CL # W tr11U1LICLCLS lnslae Iran. Although some Iraqi
units were badly mauled, they appear to have extracted
most of their heavy equipment, and the Army is likely to
Iran's primary effort, however, is likely to be
aimed at recovering the area between Ahvaz and Khorram-
shahr. This is the largest piece of territory still
held by Iraq, but Iraqi forces holding it are thinly
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Saddam's Vulnerability
The Iraqi leader's total identification with the
war has increased the possibility that his rule will
be challenged. The military failure will heighten other
longstanding--but suppressed--grievances, including
Saddam's "personality cult," his deemphasis of the Ba'th
Party's status, and his refusal to share power with his
colleagues. These differences are over style more than
policy.
A palace coup involving both Ba'th Party and mili-
tary figures is the most serious threat. Party and
military leaders probably are concerned that opposition
to "Saddam's war" could engulf the entire regime. Polit-
ical change in Baghdad might improve prospects for a
negotiated settlement with Iran, but Tehran would still
remain opposed to any lasting accommodation with a secu-
lar Ba'thist regime.
A post-Saddam regime initially would be collegial.
Dramatic foreign policy changes are unlikely. Contacts
with both the West and the USSR would be maintained to
facilitate rebuilding the economy and the military, and
to avoid _political _isolation in the face of collaboration
The government has attempted to cover up the mag-
nitude of the defeat and threatened severe punishment
for "seditious" rumormongers.
5
Saddam's defensive remarks yesterday will add to public
anxiety.
Arab Reactions
Regardless of the effects of the war on Saddam's
personal fortunes, Tehran's success has other Arab lead-
ers seriously concerned.
leaders also will want to shore up Iraq's Sunni Arab
regime in order to prevent a more militant Ba'thist or
a pro-Iranian Shia regime from gaining power.
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Arab leaders in the region will look to the US,
and probably to Egypt, for leadership and security as-
// sistance. They may allow greater visibility for the US
naval presence in the area.
Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders in recent weeks have
urged the US to help end the war. Kuwait, however, also
/./may renew its bid for improved relations between the
'
' Persian Gulf states and the USSR.
At the same time, Arab leaders are likely to seek
opportunities to reduce Iranian hostility. They may
~i offer Iran financial assistance in the hope of placating
its clerical leaders. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the
United Arab Emirates already have hinted that they might
contribute to a reparations fund for Tehran.
Egypt will seek to exploit Baghdad's setback to
ease its isolation in the Arab world. Cairo will reiter-
ate its public offers to help defend the Persian Gulf,
take a more explicit pro-Iraqi stance, and increase arms
sales to Baghdad. The Egyptians also may offer to send
military training teams to the Persian Gulf states to
help them improve their defensive capabilities.
Jordan's King Hussein, who is now in Baghdad, be-
lieves all moderate Arab regimes are threatened by the
prospect of a victorious Iran. He also fears the emer-
gence of a pro-Soviet government in Baghdad.
The King has sent some 2,000 Jordanian "volunteers"
to Iraq but will be reluctant to send regular Army units
because of opposition from his military leaders, who
""fear attack from Syria. Although Hussein has in the
/past adhered to the ban on transfer of US-origin equip-
`" ment to Baghdad, he might provide such equipment clandes-
tinely if he believed that it would enable Saddam to
survive.
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