NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 5 APRIL 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010125-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 125
• Publication Date: April 5, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of I OD Secret
Central
Intelligence
Nat om Intelligence Deily
Top Secret
ASNID 9JX
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Copy
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a Central America: Slow Salvadoran Political Progress . . . 5
Special Analyses
9 Vietnam-Kampuchea: Hanoi's Revised Strategy . . . . . . . 12
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CENTRAL AMERICA: Slow Salvadoran Political Progress
Disagreement within the National Conciliation Party over how
to exploit its position as power broker is hampering efforts to
construct a coalition "government of national unity." The Guate-
maZan junta is adopting some policies that will increase its already
wide public support, but political figures and junior and senior
military officers seeking to further their own, sometimes conflict-
ing, interests could still: force leadership changes.
Meanwhile, D'Aubuisson reportedly may be seeking
support among junior military officers. The armed forces
positive atmosphere created by the election.
are concerned that political infighting could poison the
Nevertheless, most reports indicate that D'Aubuisson's
presumed objectives have little support in the armed
forces. Members of the high command claim to have
warned rightists that they will not be permitted to
turn back the clock b -annulling reforms or excluding the
Christian Democrats.
fetched assumption in El Salvador--rather than a guerrilla
target, the efforts to form a coalition could be seriously
hindered.
If the National Republican Alliance
delegate-elect who was shot on Saturday is perceived to
have been a victim of the political rivalry--not a far-
5 April 1982
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Guatemalan Political Maneuvering
The coup two weeks ago received wide public support,
and the junta has added to that by permitting some
religious workers to return to Guatemala, arresting some
allegedly corrupt former government officials, and re-
ducing official violence and human rights abuses, par-
ticularly by the police.
Comment: The leaders of the National Liberation
Movement are less interested in the junta's reforms than
an early return to constitutional rule. They evidently
believe they won a plurality in the presidential election
and would like to force the junta to schedule a new vote
J soon--at least within a year--to capitalize on their
shakeup or a countercoup.
The junta's reforms should relieve it of some pres-
sure from junior officers, while its command assignments
probably will placate the senior military leadership.
Nevertheless, the continuing difficulty of satisfying
both groups will keep alive the possibility of a junta
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) VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Hanoi's Revised Strategy
in Kampuchea.
Over the past several months, Vietnam has adopted a new strategy
designed to discourage ASEAN support for the Kampuchean resistance
and to erode international opposition to its occupation of Kampuchea.
The success thus far of this approach, which combines an aggressive
military campaign along the Thai-Kampuchean border with increased
diplomatic contacts will reinforce Hanoi's determination to remain
to strengthen Vietnam's puppet regime in Phnom Penh.
During the last dry season from November 1980 to
May 1981, Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea concentrated
on extending Vietnam's administrative control of the
country. Much of this effort was devoted to supporting
the national elections in April 1981 that were intended
and improve their organization.
With the exception of one unsuccessful assault
against a Democratic Kampuchea base, there were no large-
scale Vietnamese military sweeps through contested areas.
As a result, Democratic Kampuchean forces were able to
extend their areas of operation, build up their strength,
constituted a major defeat.
The Vietnamese also lost ground on the international
political front during 1981. They failed in their bid
at the UN last fall to unseat Democratic Kampuchea as
the legitimate government of Kampuchea. Two key resolu-
tions passed at the International Conference on Kampuchea
in July, which called for the withdrawal of foreign forces
from Kampuchea and the holding of UN-supervised elections,
New Approaches
These setbacks apparently persuaded Hanoi to alter
its strategy. During the current dry season the Viet-
$ namese have launched the most aggressive military campaign
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Vietnamese troops have forced the guerrillas out of
Z several important bases. The Vietnamese are strengthening
their positions in newly gained areas, where they evi-
dently intend to remain in the rainy season.
The Vietnamese also have increased diplomatic activ-
ities aimed at portraying a conciliatory image. Commu-
niques from the Indochina Foreign Ministers' Conference
in February, for example, reaffirmed Hanoi's willingness
to participate in a regional conference on Kampuchea and
to establish a demilitarized zone along the Thai-Kamnuchean
j/ border.
In addition, Hanoi. has used the recent visits of
French, Indian, and UN officials to display a readiness
to hold bilateral discussions with Thailand on the Kampu-
chean issue. Opportunities to continue this diplomatic
effort will occur later this month, when Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Thach visits several West European
countries to discuss economic aid.
The Vietnamese hope that this diplomatic and military
activity will create dissension in ASEAN, and they have
some reason to be encouraged. Indonesia and Malaysia
have already voiced misgivings over the long-term viability
of ASEAN's hardline policy, and Indonesia has been pessi-
mistic about the effectiveness of any aid provided to the
By increasing contacts with West European countries,
Hanoi also appears to be trying to take advantage of
recent breaches of Western support for ASEAN's approach.
These include the renewal of French economic aid and the
granting of EC humanitarian assistance to Vietnam.
Prospects
Hanoi's strategy is unlikely to produce an immediate
change in ASEAN policy, although Vietnam's strong position
in Kampuchea limits the organization's options. Moreover,
the belief of most ASEAN members that Vietnam's invasion
of Kampuchea and the growing Soviet presence in Southeast
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to adopt a more conciliatory approach.
Asia are serious threats to regional stability has so
far outweighed arguments--particularly from Indonesia--
Vietnam's other goals will be equally difficult to
achieve quickly. West European officials are unlikely
/ to grant large amounts of aid, and they may use Thach's
already strained logistic system.
It remains an open question, moreover, whether
Vietnam will ever be able to break the back of the re-
sistance. There are less than six weeks remaining in
the dry season, and the insurgents will regain some of
their strength when the rains begin to bog down Vietnam's
Nevertheless, Hanoi probably believes that its
/ strategy will eventually pay off. Continuing military
successes over the next several dry seasons would further
discredit the insurgents and weaken the willingness of
their domestic and foreign supporters to provide aid.
Moreover, if Hanoi could confine the resistance to remote
areas of Kampuchea, the regime in Phnom Penh might be
able to strengthen its political position and expand
economic development.
These developments would enable the Vietnamese to
make a token withdrawal of troops. The Vietnamese prob-
ably believe that such a move, coupled with even small
offers of additional aid, would in turn reduce interna-
tional opposition to their occupation of Kampuchea. It
also could compel ASEAN to make its peace with Vietnam.
5 April 1982
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