NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 28 APRIL 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000200010206-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 206
• Publication Date: April 28, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Top Seeret
CPAS NID 82-099JX
p28~TY82
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
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Top Secret
Speical Analyses
Tunisia-US: Prime Minister MzaZi's Visit . . . . . . . . . 12
28 April 1982
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Iq
Next 13 Page(s) In Document Denied
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Prime Minister since April 1980-age 55-
studied philosophy and letters at
Sorbonne-taught at secondary and
university level in Tunis in 1950s-
former Minister of Education-former
head of Tunisian radio and television-
served as Minister of Public Health and
Secretary of State for National Defense-
able administrator with no independent
political base-straightforward though
somewhat formal-married, with six
children.
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TUNISIA-US: Prime Minister Mzali's Visit
Prime Minister MzaZi, who is President Bourguiba's designated
successor, will attempt during his visit to Washington this week to
expand Tunisia's security relationship with the US while preserving
its Arab credentials. MzaZi's first priority is to obtain more US
military aid. He will also seek additional commitments of economic
aid and relaxation of US import restrictions on Tunisian products.
Mzali is seeking help to deter a potential Libyan
military threat and to avoid heavy dependence on Algeria
for security support. Tunisia is embarked on an ambi-
tious modernization of its defenses, and Mzali wants to
conclude a foreign military sales agreement with the US
during this trip. He probably will request larger credits
for next year because Saudi aid for the country's mili-
tary modernization program has not been delivered as
promised.
To preserve Tunisia's reputation with the Arab
states, Mzali may feel compelled to criticize US support
for Israel. The Prime Minister, nonetheless, probably
would be willing to explain the US position on regional
issues to other Arabs. He may ask for broader Tunisian
participation in US planning for North Africa and the
Middle East, in view of tensions between the US and Libya
and the closer US-Moroccan relationship.
Mzali is likely to proceed cautiously, however, in
order to protect his position until Bourguiba departs.
Although age and health problems prevent Bourguiba from
exercising tight control over the government, he limits
Mzali's freedom of action and occasionally reverses his
decisions. Mzali also faces opposition from Bourguiba's
wife and her favorites, including the Foreign Minister.
12 28 April 1982
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Political and Economic Pressures
Politically, the government is occupied with its
liberalization program, tension between the government
and labor unions, and growing public demand for Tunisia
to improve its standing with other Arabs. In addition,
',,-Islamic fundamentalist activity, dampened last summer by
~I government arrests and trials, reappeared last month when
fundamentalist students and leftist students confronted
each other on university campuses.
The economy has made impressive gains over the past
decade, but the new five-year development plan will be
disrupted by rising rates of unemployment, inflation,
and population growth. The government's use of substan-
tial wage increases and commodity subsidies to avert social
,,unrest is contributing to a reduction in domestic invest-
'V
ment.
The drought in 1981 and slack private investment
has slowed the growth of agricultural production. Tunisia
probably will become a net oil importer by the end of
~- the decade and have more difficulty financing economic
million in 1982--and trade concessions. He would like
to expand Tunisia's share of the US market in textiles
and agricultural products to replace sales that will be
H Mzali will ask the US for greater economic aid--
Tunisia is scheduled to receive PL 480 aid totaling $12.6
development.
lost when Spain and Portugal join the EC.
;' Regional Relations
Tunisia's small size, population, and resource base
make it vulnerable to external threats and subversion.
~
/
It is particularly wary of Algeria and Libya.
Relations with Algeria warmed considerabl after
~l President RPnd!Pdid gained newer in Algiers
Although Tunisia wan s
relations with Algeria in order to discourage
--continued
Top Secret
28 April 1982
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meddling in Tunisian politics, it opposed the seating
of the Algerian-backed Polisario Front at the OAU meeting
in Addis Ababa in February.
The recent rapprochement with Libya remains un-
dependable despite economic and political cooperation
agreements concluded during Libyan,leader Oadhafi's
After Bourguiba
As president, Mzali probably would pursue a more
"nonaligned," pro-Arab foreign policy, but he would
avoid close ties with the USSR. Tunisia would continue
to rely on the US and Western Europe for military support,
economic aid, and investment. At home, Mzali probably
would encourage some political liberalization and relax
restrictions on Islamic fundamentalists in hypes of
mollifying latent discontent.
28 April 19-8-2-
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To Secret
Top Secret
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