NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 30 JULY 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000400010005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 30, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
30 July 1982
Top Secret
Top Secret
CPAS NIDC 82-177
uy
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Iran-Iraq: Fighting Continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Israel-Lebanon: Negotiations Under Way . . . . . . . . . 2
Spain: Suarez To Form New Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Panama: Regional Security Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bolivia: ViZdoso Under Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Grenada-USSR: Closer Ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Ecuador: Pressure on the President . . . . . . . . . . 10
Yugoslavia: Troubles in the Party Leadership . . . . . to
Special Analysis
Lebanon: A Bashir Jumayyil Presidency . . . . . . . . . 11
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Top Secret
IRAN-IRAQ: Fighting Continues
(Information as of 2300 EDT)
//Iran's forces continue to attack Iraqi defenses along the
central portion of the Al Basrah front.//
Iran claims its forces overran the first line of
Iraqi defenses and crossed a wide minefield to penetrate
an additional 12 kilometers inside Iraq. The objective
of the attack is to reach one of the two main highways
between Al Basrah and Baghdad, according to an Iranian
communique.
Iraq claims to have contained the Iranian attack.
Comment: //Iran is again attacking the central
portion of the Al Basrah front, where Iraqi physical
defenses are strongest. The planned second prong of the
attack along the Shatt al Arab probably will not be
carried out unless Iran is able to sustain a breakthrough.
Token Aid to Iraq
After government prodding, several Kuwaiti commer-
cial banks agreed last month to lend Iraq $38 million,
Comment: The Kuwaitis probably consider the small
loan a holding action to placate Iraq. The government
has transferred $6 billion in aid to Iraq since the war
began but turned down an Iraqi request in April for an
additional $3 billion. Kuwait's leaders may want to avoid
major new direct assistance until they are more confident
of which way the war is going.
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Negotiations Under Way
(Information as of 2300 EDT)
Top Secret
The cease-fire is holding. Palestinian guerrillas reportedly
have attacked Israeli forces in the Bekaa Valley. The PLO reportedly
has submitted a plan providing for its withdrawal from Beirut. The
Arab League committee on Lebanon yesterday issued a conditional call
for a -PLO withdrawal. The Soviets have criticized President Reagan's
There were only minor incidents of firing between
Palestinians and Israelis yesterday.
described the pre-cease-fire
she ing by Israeli forces on Wednesday as a "blitz"
against most of West Beirut. The 90-minute barrage
appeared to be indiscriminate and evidently was intended
to weaken PLO morale and destroy PLO equipment.
The Israeli military reported yesterday that an
Israeli patrol routed guerrillas after they infiltrated
Israeli lines in the central Bekaa Valley. The report
said the incident was a "grave" violation of the cease-
Comment: There have been few if any PLO raids in
the Bekaa Valley since Israel's attacks on Syrian posi-
tions in the valley last week. The Israeli announcement
probably is intended as a warning that the Israelis are
prepared to retaliate for any raid resulting in the
death of Israeli soldiers.
According to press reports, Arafat met yesterday
with Prime Minister Wazzan and former Prime Minister
Saib Salam, the two principle intermediaries with the
PLO. He reportedly outlined a plan providing for a
withdrawal of PLO forces to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and
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Comment: The reports provided no details of the
plan, but it apparently restates many previous PLO posi-
tions that the Israelis and Lebanese have said are
unacceptable. Arafat's apparent willingness to talk
about possible destinations, however, suggests he is
establishing a tough bargaining position in anticipation
that the negotiations will continue.
Arab League Meeting
The six-member Arab League ministerial committee on
Lebanon yesterday said it was committed to the objective
of getting the PLO to announce a decision to withdraw
from Beirut. The committee, after two days of talks in
Jidda, said the details of a departure should be worked
out between the PLO and the Lebanese Government. The
committee, which includes a PLO representative, also
called for a lifting of the seige of Beirut and for
implementation of UN resolutions calling for Israeli
withdrawal.
Comment: The committee's statement commits its
Arab members--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, and
Algeria--more firmly than previously to the concept of
a PLO withdrawal from Beirut. The Arabs are also being
careful, however, to maintain solidarity with the PLO.
Soviet Commentary
The Soviets lost little time criticizing President
Reagan's remarks on Lebanon on Wednesday. TASS yesterday
charged the comments reflect an interest in establishing
a "pro-US regime" in Beirut. TASS also attacked Ambas-
sador Habib's mediation effort and denounced alleged US
attempts to prevent the UN from playing a role in settling
Comment: This sharper criticism of US mediation
efforts presumably reflects Moscow's continued frustra-
tion at its exclusion from attempts to resolve the crisis.
Ambassador Habib's discussions with Syrian President
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Assad and other Arab leaders may have especially rankled
the Soviets. They may want to signal Syria and the PLO
that the USSR opposes a US-sponsored settlement that would
include a US military presence in Beirut.
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SPAIN: Suarez To Form New Party
Former Prime Minister Suarez's resignation from the govern-
ing Center Democratic Union and his intention to form a new party
make it doubtful that the Center Democrats will remain the chief
Suarez's defection damages party President Lavilla's
attempts to hold the party together by making changes
in its secretariat and streamlining Prime Minister Calvo
Sotelo's cabinet. So far, Lavilla is having little
Some Suarez loyalists have indicated they are pre-
pared to follow the former Prime Minister, and other party
dissidents have already helped to form two new center-
right parties, one liberal and the other Christian Demo-
cratic.
Comment: The Center Democratic Union has lost nearly
one-fifth of its parliamentary delegation since 1979,
and its losses could increase if Suarez's venture pros-
pers. Suarez probably will receive more support when
the new party is formally organized. ~
Although both liberal and Christian Democratic
dissidents have promised to support the Center Democrats
in the legislature, the government has been clearly
weakened by this series of defections. Elections this
fall appear more likely than ever.
//The weak position of the liberals and Suarez's
associates in the new party secretariat may prompt more
defections. Many of Lavilla's natural allies in the
party have already bolted. A small Center Democratic
Union caught between an alliance of center-right parties
and a center-left grouping led by Suarez would have
little to offer voters.//
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PANAMA: Regional Security Plan
President Royo is promoting an inter-American security system,
parallel with the OAS, that presumably would exclude the US, but it
has not gained wide hemispheric backing.
The proposal by Royo--a strong critic of the US
position in the Falklands conflict--was first outlined
in his speech to the UN General Assembly's special session
on disarmament last month. He repeated it this week during
his visit to Venezuela, when he also disclosed plans for
a meeting of foreign ministers next December in Panama to
include Cuba but not the US.
Royo's initial proposal for a new security system
was endorsed by Venezuela and Nicaragua. Other countries
have put forward a number of alternatives, including Peru's
suggestion that any new hemispheric organization should
include both the US and Cuba. Opposition to a new system
has come principally from Chile, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay,
Costa Rica, and El Salvador.
Comment: Despite some public support for Royo's
initiative immediately after the fighting in the Falklands,
the lack of wider acceptance within the Latin American
community may force Royo to reconsider his scheme.
Most Latin American governments are likely to be
interested in seeking a redefinition of inter-American
relations that would help them strengthen their bilateral
and multilateral bargaining positions with the US. They
probably would not oppose a conference that emphasizes
general consultations on Latin American political and
security-related matters.
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The shaky base of the new government under President Vzldoso
is prompting early challenges from military and civilian leaders.
//Vildoso has been unable to remove hardline mili-
tary officers associated with the discredited Garcia Meza
regime, and some have been given new assignments.
also had to install a weak compromise choice as Army
Chief of Staff.//
The press is reporting the political parties, trade
unions, and business community have rejected the govern-
ment's call for elections next April. They are said to
favor either elections before the end of this year or
reconvening the congress elected in 1980 to name a civil-
ian president. Vildoso, who has been in power only nine
days, has already received two resignations from the
The President is being criticized for failing to
start action to alleviate the worsening economic situa-
Comment: The lack of support for Vildoso makes it
unlikely that he can consolidate his hold on power. Fail-
ure to allay military and civilian discontent could para-
lyze the new government and lead to Vildoso's ouster by
yet another ambitious military officer.
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Prime Minister Bishop, leading a delegation on his
first official trip to Moscow, has tightened relations
with the Soviets, who until now have deferred to the
Cubans in aiding the three-year-old Marxist government.
Bishop and Soviet leaders signed several agreements,
including a pact on party-to-party cooperation and a
five-year trade agreement. According to press reports,
Grenada received a pledge of $1.4 million to purchase
steel, flour, and other goods and a $7.7 million credit
to buy unspecified equipment.
Comment: Although Bishop's visit comes amid signs
of growing Soviet interest in encouraging Caribbean
radicals, Moscow was silent on his expression of concern
about "imperialist threats" and avoided any public commit-
ment to the security of his regime. The presence of key
military and security officials among Bishop's entourage,
however, indicates possible talks on military assistance
did occur. Grenada already has received training and a
variety of older Soviet weapons from Cuba.
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Top Secret
ECUADOR: Pressure on the President
either strikes or civil disturbances--appears to be
increasingly likely and that President Hurtado's ability
to form an effective coalition in the congressional ses-
sion opening on 10 August is questionable.//
popular unrest--
Comment: Any outbreak of unrest could give the
military plotters a pretext for attempting a coup. The
economy will constrain wage hikes, and the unruly congress
probably will not pass legislation needed for economic
progress.
YUGOSLAVIA: Troubles in the Party Leadership
the final day of the 12th
Party Congress held late last month was marred by a
display of regional rivalries. Delegations from Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Croatia, Kosovo and Vojvodina tried unsuc-
cessfully to block the election of the 23-member Presidium
of Dragoslav Markovic, an agressive Serbian leader.
Markovic's efforts to restore Serbia's control over
Vojvodina and Kosovo Provinces have provoked many non-
Serbs, who see his actions as threatening renewed Serbian
hegemony in Yugolsavia.
Comment: This was the first major dispute among
party leaders since Tito's death in May 1980. Any exten-
sion of regional rivalries into other policy deliberations,
particularly on ways to strenghten the troubled econonmy,
could cause serious problems.
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LEBANON: A Bashir Jumayyil Presidency
Top Secret
//Phalange militia leader Bashir JumayyiZ is the frontrunner
in the contest for the presidency in Lebanon. His opponents are
trying to force a stalemate by preventing a quorum of 62 legislators
from assembling. JumayyiZ is calling for a new order in Lebanon,
free of factionalism and guaranteeing security and equality to all.
His past record suggests, however, his real preoccupation would be
with ridding Lebanon of the PLO and Syrian presence and eradicating
the country's armed militias. His goal of restoring Maronite Chris-
tian dominance could lead to the creation of a one-party state.//
//Jumayyil probably believes the US and Israel share
his goals, including the establishment of Maronite Chris-
tian hegemony in Lebanon. This is important to him because
he knows that only through US and Israeli leverage can the
PLO and Syrians be evicted. Since the end of the Lebanese
civil war in 1976, Jumayyil has seemed to look forward to
a crisis that would produce that effect.//
//After assuming the presidency, Jumayyil would move
quickly to legitimize his militia--the strongest indigenous
military force--by "merging" it with the Lebanese armed
//While seeking to avoid committing his army to the
Palestinian solution, Jumayyil would use it to accelerate
the process already under way of taking over areas under
Israeli control and consolidating the Phalange presence.
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//In Maronite Christian areas, Jumayyil presides
over a well-established parallel administration with a
system of taxation, military training, and public services.
This mechanism has functioned throughout the destruction
and disruption brought about by the fighting. As presi-
dent, Jumayyil would use the authority of the government
to expand this system throughout the rest of Lebanon.//
//Day-to-day administration in non-Christian areas
would continue to be carried out by local officials.
Consultation with the Phalange, however, would be neces-
sary in all major decisionmaking. The greater education
and experience of the Christian population ensures that
most top civil and administrative posts would be in the
hands of Christians.//
Jumayyil has intimated his proposed new order will
involve some type of constitutional revision. He has
declined to elaborate on this, however, until strong
central authority has been reestablished in every part
Dealing With Other Factions
//Jumayyil would prefer a political accommodation
in which Lebanon's factions would acquiesce in a system
of Christian dominance. This will be difficult to
achieve.//
//Toward this end, Jumayyil has been building
bridges to some groups, particularly the Shia, which is
the largest and potentially strongest Muslim community.
He also is aware the legitimacy of his administration
could be challenged if he fails to obtain at least grudg-
ing cooperation from the Sunni community.//
//Suspicion of Jumayyil runs deep, however, particu-
larly among Sunni Muslims, Druze, and leftist factions.
In addition, many of his coreligionists question his
motives.//
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//Jumayyil is regarded as a tough military leader
rather than a politician or statesman. He is surrounded,
moreover, by uncompromising Maronites. Older, tradition-
oriented Christians see Jumayyil as an upstart. They
know he is disdainful of the clan politics of his father's
generation and believe correctly he will work to break
the grip of the remaining family political bosses.//
//Continued Israeli backing of the Christian renegade
officer Major Haddad in the south presents particular
problems for Jumayyil. The Israelis would insist he
reach, some sort of understanding with Haddad, which could
allow Haddad to play a spoiler role in Jumayyil's plans.//
//Rival Christians in the north would be less of a
problem. Once the Syrians have been neutralized, Jumayyil
would be likely to settle scores with former President
Franjiyah.//
//Jumayyil's moves against Christian rivals would
be an extension of the ruthless campaign he has waged in
recent years to consolidate his control. In 1978, in an
effort to establish Phalange domination over other Maronite
groups, Jumayyil's militia attacked the Franjiyah home in
the north, killing Franjiyah's son, daughter-in-law, and
three-year-old granddaughter. In 1980, Jumayyil displayed
the same coldbloodedness in neutralizing the militias of
the rival Shamun clan.//
Prospects
//Jumayyil would face heavy odds in attempting to
forge a unified and stable Lebanon. The task would
require tempering firmness with a degree of patience and
flexibility not characteristic of his past performance.
If he were to resort to the violent tactics of the past,
he could propel the country toward further fragmentation
and another round of civil war.//
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