NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 11 AUGUST 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000400010142-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: August 11, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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 China-us: Textile Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Special Analyses
Panama: Implications of the Shakeup . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Liberia-US: Head of State Doe's Visit . . . . . . . . . . 15
 Approved For Release 2008/08/25: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000400010142-6 25X1
Top Secret
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Evacuation Plan Unfolding
(Information as of 2300 EDT)
//Israeli aircraft bombed Palestinian targets in Beirut again
yesterday. In TeZ Aviv the cabinet agreed "in principle" to Ambas-
sador Habib's plan for the evacuation of the PLO and S ria announced
that it will take PLO fighters from ei
Israeli aircraft yesterday attacked Palestinian
refugee camps in southwestern Beirut as well as the
Fakhani district, where the PLO command headauarters is
located.
The Israelis have sent additional units north of 25X1
Beirut. On Monday, the US defense attache in Beirut
saw a convoy of 100 Israeli military vehicles on the
road to Juniyah, and another US Embassy official reported
Israeli tanks and artillery itioned in the hills above
Ad Dubayyah. 25X1
to the plant from Palestinian artillery.
The director of the nearby water treatment plant,
which purifies water for all of Beirut, has expressed
concern that the Israeli deployment there risks damage
Israel continues extensive resupply of its forces
in Lebanon and is moving additional fresh troops there.
During a trip through northern Israel yesterday, the US
defense attache saw 135 trucks with ammunition and sup-
plies, 25 armored personnel carriers, and ten buses
headed north. the Israelis probably
are increasing their troop strength to press the Pales- 25X1
tinians or for ssible all-out assault on West Beirut.
 The Israeli cabinet yesterday agreed "in principle"
to Ambassador Habib's plan for PLO evacuation, but
attached a number of amendments. According to Israeli
radio, the cabinet insisted that only the Lebanese Army
be allowed to enter West Beirut on the day the evacuation
starts and that French, Italian, and US troops of the
proposed multinational force deploy only after the
evacuation was well under way. The cabinet also rejected
the presence of UN observers, maintained that all Syrian
troops in Beirut must leave along with the PLO, and
demanded that the PLO return a captured Israeli pilot
and the bodies of some Israelis killed during the recent 25X1
fighting.
Comment: //The PLO probably will accept Lebanese
Army deployment during the initial evacuation, but many
Muslim Lebanese political figures believe that the
Lebanese Army is little more than a Phalange front and
may balk at the Israeli demand.// 25X1
Syrian Agreement To Accept PLO
According to Damascus radio, Syria's ruling Ba'th
Party agreed yesterday to take all PLO fighters who wish
to come to Syria. Sudan, Tunisia, North and South Yemen,
and Iraq also said that they would be willing to take
//Former Lebanese Prime Minister Salam, who has
been serving as a link to the PLO, said that the Syrians
would take fighters from three radical groups close to
Damascus, members of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa group,
and other Palestinians who come from Syria. The Syrians
later confirmed to the US Ambassador in Damascus their
willingness to accept 2,600 PLO fighters plus another
Comment: //In an effort to blunt possible domestic
criticism of the move, the Syrian announcement stressed
that the decision to accept Palestinian fighters was
taken only after Damascus received a PLO request for
 sanctuary. Syria's sudden reversal of position may
result in part from fear of being outflanked by its
longtime rival Iraq, which yesterday said that it would
//The Israelis are likely to view the Syrian decision
with suspicion. They fear that Damascus will allow the
PLO to operate behind Syrian lines in the Bekaa Valley
jJV111.1t.a J. ~lVJl{.1V11 111 LCLQ11V11.I f
//The Jordanians will also be upset by the announce-
ment. They suspect that Damascus intends to use the PLO 25X1
to mount terrorist operations against moderate Arab
 EASTERN EUROPE: Grain Harvest Prospects
//Grain production in Eastern Europe in 1982 probably will
total about 94 million tons, slightly above the harvest last year
of 92 million tons and near the 93.7-million-ton average of the past
Comment: Good crop prospects in Poland, Hungary,
and Yugoslavia will largely be offset by problems in
Romania and Czechoslovakia. Crop conditions in East
Germany and Bulgaria point toward an average grain harvest.
The production of small grains--rye, barley, and
oats--is likely to be above average. On the other hand,
the condition of the corn crop--about one-third of total
East European grain production--suggests only an average
harvest. Weather during the next several weeks will
still play a role in determining production, because the
//A near-average grain harvest will only marginally
improve food supplies in Eastern Europe. Most regimes,
faced with hard currency constraints, have already planned
cutbacks in grain imports this year. Grain imports in
the marketing year ending 30 June 1983 will decline
moderately from the 13.4 million tons imported in market-
The grain shortages will lead to further declines
in livestock herds. The resulting reductions in meat
supplies, especially in Poland, Romania, East Germany,
and Czechoslovakia, will increase public dissatisfaction.
 //Delegates to the UN-sponsored conference on the exploration 25X1
and peaceful uses of outer space now under way in Vienna face a
number of difficult problems.//
//The conference's final report will have to deal
with the legal status and use of the geostationary
orbit--at some 22,000 miles altitude over the Equator--
and the future role of the UN in space developments.
Controversial sovereignty issues certain to provoke dis-
cussion include the call to delimit the lower boundary
of outer space, the rights of less developed countries
to access to satellite-derived analysis of their natural
resources, and the regulation by individual states of
foreign satellite broadcasts. The less developed coun-
tries have already met to plan ways to introduce their
theories of global wealth distribution into forums on nc~^
Comment: //Since consensus rules prevail, efforts
by less developed countries to include wealth redistri-
bution language in the final report probably will not
succeed. These countries have less leverage to attain
their wealth redistribution objectives in space forums
than in other meetings. Nonetheless, they will argue
for the creation of some mechanism that would give them
a measure of control over remote-sensing satellites and
their products and access to satellite technology and
the geostationary orbit.//
//The Soviets are likely to use the conference for
propaganda purposes. They may allege again that the US
is militarizing space with its shuttle and blame the US 25X1
for holding back Third World aspirations.//
//At the same time, however, Moscow shares US con-
cerns about regulation of space development by the UN or
any other international entity. The USSR will thus avoid
firm commitments to the developing countries in order to
 Difficult talks on renewing the Sino-US agreement
on textile and apparel trade are being held this week
in Beijing. The Chinese are objecting to restrictions
on their rapidly growing exports of textile products to
the US, arguing that the value of US sales of similar
goods to China is larger. Chinese officials also have
threatened a progressive reduction in purchases of US
fibers, particularly cotton, and have implied the textile
issue also might affect China's purchases of other goods.
Comment: The US imported $680 million in textile
products from China in 1981 and is China's third-largest
market after Japan and Hong Kong. The Chinese may try to
use the negotiations to air grievances over US policy on
Taiwan, but they are likely to accept US trade proposals
because world demand is softening and restrictions on
textile trade are tightening. The Chinese are anxious
to maintain active commercial relations with the US
 The resignation of President Royo has firmly established
National Guard Commander Paredes as the strongest political leader
in Panama, ensuring continued movement to the right and offering
hope for improved relations with the US. Vice President de Za
Espriella's succession to the presidency brings an experienced and
in increased stability and growth for the weakened economy.
The National Guard has held Royo in disdain since
he was selected to be President by strongman Torrijos
in 1978. De la Espriella--also close to Torrijos but
politically to the right of Royo--was the Guard's pre-
ferred candidate. He reportedly enjoys good relations
Paredes's replacement in March of former Guard Com-
mander Florez contributed to the growing rift between
Royo and Paredes. The key issues were Panama's economic
problems, a lengthy teachers' strike, and charges of
government corruption. Paredes feared these problems
were beginning to discredit the government, thereby
undermining the political system in which he intends
run as the official presidential candidate in 1984.
De la Espriella--closely guided by Paredes--has
already begun initiating the Guard Commander's publicly
detailed "recommendations." The monthlong teachers'
strike was settled during de la Espriella's first full
day in office after Paredes--who had been publicly sympa-
thetic to the teachers--called for both sides to reach
an understanding. The US Embassy reports a member of the
Guard's General Staff was present during the negotiations.
 Charges of corruption centering on the embezzlement
of large sums of social security funds also were quickly
addressed. Paredes gave Social Security Board members
72 hours in which to resign, and arrested several high
officials of the fund, and a new director and deputy
To broaden his political base, Paredes has called
for raises for lower ranking government employees, the
resignation of high-level controversial officials, and a
revision of the labor code. In advocating the pay raises,
Paredes is anticipating a reaction to the increase granted
Paredes's push for sweeping changes in the government
apparently is an effort to make his leadership more visible
than during the cabinet shifts he helped institute last
April. The new appointees are mostly apolitical moderates
or conservatives who represent traditional interest
All these actions--like Guard and cabinet shifts
earlier in the year--presumably resulted from joint
decisions by Paredes, Intelligence Chief Noriega, and
other general staff officers. Noriega appears content
to wait his turn as Guard Commander, which probably will
come within a year or so after Paredes resigns to run
The most controversial sidelight to Royo's removal
was Paredes's shutdown of Panama's newspapers. This move
probably was aimed at heading off opposition criticism
and at enabling the Guard to muzzle its chief critic,
La Prensa. Even the secretary general of the progovern-
Most restrictions have now been lifted, but some of
the opposition press may challenge possible new censorship
rules. Paredes's formation of a "Council for the Morali-
zation of Information"--ostensibly to establish a code
of ethics for the press--could create serious problems
 The suspension of the press also has aroused new
concern over the democratization process, which is sched-
uled to culminate in legislative and presidential elec-
tions in late 1984. Paredes favors changes in the
constitution that would allow for the direct election of
the legislature as well as mayors and, presumably,
provincial governors and other key officials. Paredes
and de la Espriella also have reaffirmed support for the
Meanwhile, Paredes has tried to win support among
opposition parties by seeking revision of the electoral
law and reconstituting the Electoral Tribunal to include 25X1
representatives from the opposition--a move possibly aimed
The Guard has generally been willing to leave most
foreign policy matters to the civilians. Paredes and
the Guard's General Staff, however, apparently disagreed
with Royo's recent call for the inclusion of Cuba in a
new Latin American security arrangement that would ex-
clude the US. De la Espriella has already publicly dis- 25X1
No significant or immediate shifts in other foreign
policy areas are likely, but the tactic of calculated
public confrontation with the US--which was used often
by Torrijos and continued by Royo and Foreign Minister
Illueca--probably will be abandoned. This could result
in greater cooperation with US policy in Central America
and support for the Caribbean Basin Initiative. Paredes
is likely to use his visit to Washin ton later this month
to forge closer ties. 25X1
By making Illueca vice president, Paredes probably
hopes to lessen his influence in the foreign policy area
while placating his leftist backers. The appointment
still has to be confirmed by the National Assembly.
 Paredes's heavyhanded style, particularly the sus-
pension of the press, has already hurt the new government's
image. Unless Paredes makes a greater effort to camou-
flage his role, he risks alienating influential civilians
in the government and in the opposition.
Both the Guard and civilian leadership probably will
continue to support the democratization process, although
some modification of electoral laws and government-press
relations may occur. If Paredes suspects his presidential
tions or arrange de la Espriella's removal.
Meanwhile, Paredes will continue to guide the Presi-
dent closely, turning Panama's attention inward. De la
Espriella's conservative political views, coupled with
financial expertise, will go far in establishing a more
compatible working relationship with the Guard. They
also offer a solid chance for solving many of the country's
 Head of State Doe hopes his visit to Washington next Tuesday
will result in assurances of the continued US support he needs to
shore up his shaky regime. Doe's leadership is critical to the
maintenance of Liberia's fragile stability, but his position remains
vulnerable. The economy is in poor condition, and there are serious
Public disenchantment with military rule has risen
with continued economic stagnation, although the prospect
of eventual civilian rule has helped to mute active op-
position. Doe, however, has faced a near constant
undercurrent of military plotting. He has alienated
some officers by consolidating power at their expense,
trying'to curb their corruption, and moving toward civil-
Other problems range from inadequate housing and
equipment to low morale, poor administration, and unful-
filled desires for advanced weapons that Liberia does not
need. In the event of civil disturbances, poorly dis-
ciplined enlisted men could refuse to back the government.
Weak world demand for Liberia's exports of iron ore
and rubber, coupled with poor government fiscal manage-
ment, have resulted in no real improvement in the economy.
The regime continues to rely on last-minute maneuvering--
with substantial US Embassy assistance--to coordinate
US and other international aid disbursements. It depends
on international borrowing to avoid default and meet
--continued
Top Secret
 Chronic budget problems have given rise to a belief
in Monrovia that Washington should do more to ease the
government's financial burden. US Embassy reporting
suggests Doe's frustrations with the economy pose the
most serious potential irritant to Liberian-US relations.
During his visit, Doe will request additional US
budgetary and military assistance--now $75 million
annually--despite an already ninefold increase in US aid
A severe worsening of the economic situation might
prompt the regime to adopt a less pro-Western foreign
policy in a bid to obtain more US aid. Doe, however, is
strongly suspicious of Libyan and Soviet intentions in
Last year the Liberian leader expelled the Libyan
mission and reduced the size of the Soviet Embassy be-
cause of his fear of subversion. He is likely to voice 25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/25: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000400010142-6
Top Secret