NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 28 SEPTEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010090-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: September 28, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

`~ Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
DIA review
completed.
Top Secret
CFAS NID 82-227JX
September
27,6 Copy 2 6
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'l'op secret
I
Japan-US: Security Discussions . . . . . . . . .
France: Decline in Defense Spending . . . .
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USSR-Afghanistan: Moscow's Balance Sheet . . . . . . 12
28 September 1982
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Top Secret
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JAPAN-US: Security Discussions
Soichiro Ito, Director General of the Japan Defense Agency,
will have ZittZe positive to offer in talks in Washington this week.
Recent
press reports indicate Prime Minister Suzuki is willing
to exempt the US from the arms export ban, except when
the US is directly involved in hostilities.
Comment: Ito is likely to argue that the 7.3-percent
increase in the defense budget for 1983, tentatively ap-
proved last month, is the best possible, given the govern-
ment's difficult financial situation and-weak public
support for more defense spending,
Ito probably will be permitted to commit Japan to
a study of joint sea-lane defense but not to agree to
anything that could be interpreted by the Japanese public
as a collective security arrangement. Such an arrangement
would be contrary to Japan's constitution.
Suzuki is preoccupied with his bid for reelection
next month as president of the Liberal Democratic Party,
and he is unlikely to give Ito any room to negotiate on
politically sensitive defense issues. Ito's report on
his visit will be scrutinized carefully for any sign
that a breach with the US is developing. Although Ito
has little influence with top Japanese policymakers, his
briefing might nudge Suzuki toward a slightly more forth-
coming approach to bilateral defense problems.
28 September 1982
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French Defense Spending
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Real growth in
defense expenditures a
5.2
2.4
3.5
4.3
4.0
Defense expenditures
as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product
3.63
3.62
3.67
3.85
3.89 b
a Non-US NATO average for 1978-82 was about 2 percent.
b Non-US NATO average is about 3.3 percent.
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FRANCE: Decline in Defense Spending
French defense spending will not keep up with inflation next
year as the government imposes austerity measures.
Comment: The defense budget proposal for 1983
calls for an increase of about 8.5 percent before in-
flation, roughly equal to the anticipated inflation
rate. Even if this rate is met, the higher cost of
defense acquisitions virtually guarantees that defense
spending will suffer a real decline for the first time
in 14 years.
Attache and press accounts indicate that the mili-
tary will get the smallest share of the government budget
in decades and that the nominal. increase in defense
spending will be about 3 percentage points lower than
for government spending as awhole. Slowdowns in equip-
/ ment acquisitions are likely
and Paris re
t
dl
i
,
por
e
y
s
even considering cutting 50,000 personnel from its armed
forces and disbanding two infantry divisions.
Although France is not officially committed to
NATO's goal of a 3-percent real increase in defense
spending, it is the only major West European country to
have exceeded that goal over the last five years. France's
defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic
product also have surpassed the non-US NATO average over
The austerity measures for 1983 probably also will
be reflected in the new five-year defense program being
IV, developed for 1984-89. Minister of Defense Hernu says
7a ,reduction in defense spending will not affect the
t t
t
t
i
s
ra
eg
c nuclear deterrent especiall th blliti
,yeasc
a
~ missile submari ne fl ,
e
With unemployment an increasing problem, the Socialist
government is not likely to reduce the personnel strength
of the armed forces significantly. Conventional equipment
modernization programs, especially for the Army, probably
will be hardest hit by the austerity measures.
28 September 1982
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Top Secret
SPECIAL ANALYSIS
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Moscow's Balance Sheet
The USSR's third year of military campaigning in Afghanistan
is drawing to a close with no appreciable progress having been made
in expanding the control of the Afghan Government. The next few
months should bring more adjustments in the way the Soviets conduct
the war, possibly accompanied by limited troop augmentations. Moscow,
however, is unlikely to undertake a large-scale reinforcement or
The USSR has started to train a new generation of
Afghan leaders and to reshape the country's political,
social, and economic institutions along Soviet lines. The
training effort will pay dividends only over the long term,
however, and institutional reforms cannot be put into
effect until the security situation improves.
Moscow's View
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There are still no signs
that the Soviets believe withdrawal or substantially
increasing their commitment is necessary.
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Public statements suggest Soviet leaders believe
enough progress is being made to continue the gradual
approach toward turning Afghanistan into a client state.
The involvement in Afghanistan has not been a major
drain on Soviet resources. The estimated direct military
costs of the war in 1981 were $2.5 billion, slightly
more than 1 percent of estimated Soviet defense spend-
ing. About one-half of this amount are costs that would
have been incurred even if the Soviets had not invaded
Afghanistan.
The value of Soviet equipment lost last year is
estimated at an additional $500 million.
the leadership cannot be
happy about the impact of the prolonged conflict on
Soviet military prestige.
Indirect economic costs are harder to quantify. The
insurgency interrupted many Soviet economic development
projects in the Afghan countryside and impeded internal
commerce and forced the USSR to increase commodity aid.
The estimated value of Soviet grant aid deliveries
to Afghanistan last year--mostly grain--was at least
$200 million. Estimated military aid amounted to an
additional $160 million. The cost of other Soviet
assistance, including petroleum products, is paid for
by Afghan deliveries of natural gas--worth $268 million
There is virtually no coverage by the
Soviet media of the USSR's combat role in Afghanistan.
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In terms of political implications, several Soviet
officials have stated they believe the conflict provides
useful arguments to US proponents of an increase in US
military power. In this connection, they have cited the
resumption of US-Pakistani military ties; the damage done
to Soviet relations with Iran, other Islamic states, and
India; and condemnations from the Nonaligned Movement,
the Islamic Conference, and the UN.
Moscow has put its prestige on the line, however,
and withdrawal does not now appear to be an acceptable
option. Many statements by Soviet
leaders attest to their belief t at the intervention was
necessary to keep Afghanistan in the USSR's sphere of
influence, to "prevent another Chile," and to check the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
Despite the Soviets' apparent confidence that they
cannot be militarily forced out of Afghanistan, the in-
creased casualty rates and lack of progress this summer
toward achieving military objectives have to be causing
,y concern in Moscow.
One recommendation may be for an augmentation in
Soviet airpower, particularly helicopters.
Another recommendation may be to increase
troop levels in problem areas.
On the political front, the Soviets will continue
trying to weed out incompetent or disloyal Afghan Commu-
nists in the government. Continuing positive Soviet
media treatment of President Babrak, however, casts
doubts on the recent rumors that he would be ousted for
political reasons.
The Soviets also will try to mask any intensified
counterinsurgency effort by continuing to profess interest
in a political settlement. The recent Soviet-Pakistani
talks on Afghanistan were unproductive.
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