NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 25 OCTOBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010182-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 182
• Publication Date: October 25, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review
completed
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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Poland: Food Shortages Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Spain: Basque Election Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Western Europe: Position on CSCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cuba: Meeting on Debt Rescheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
France: Third World Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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POLAND: Food Shortages Ahead
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The regime probably will be able to maintain food supplies at
current ZeveZs for the rest of this year, but some shortages of meat,
grain products, and vegetable oil are ZikeZy early next year.
The above-average grain harvest of 21 million tons
this year is about 4 million tons below anticipated re-
quirements for 1983. The regime does not have the money
or credit to fill the gap with Western imports as it has
in the past, and it has thus far procured from farmers
only about 46 percent of the 5 million tons planned to
be available for human consumption.
Production of other food and fodder crops has been
poor. The harvest of potatoes--an important livestock
feed--is 25 percent below last year. The sugar beet
crop is about 15 percent lower.
Comment: The poor fodder harvest and the high cost
of feedgrain in private markets has led to distress
slaughtering--including breeding stock and young animals--
which will cause greater meat shortages by early 1983.
Shortages of grain products also seem likely, because
the Poles probably will import only about 2-2.5 million
tons of grain. This will include about 500,000 tons
from other East European countries and the USSR.
The Poles are trying to arrange barter deals. They
will use some of the short-term credits to be provided
as part of the bank rescheduling agreement in 1982 to
buy grain in the US. The food shortages, combined with
higher prices and lower quality, will increase consumer
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GREECE: Local Elections End
Socialist-backed candidates won most of the run-off elections
yesterday, but their poor showing in major urban areas in prelimi-
nary balloting last week nevertheless indicates some dissatisfaction
.
'
s government
with the performance of Prime Minister Papandreou
Run-off elections were held in more than half the
country's cities, and in numerous towns and villages.
Socialist-backed candidates won in Athens, Salonika, and
most other major cities. The Socialists also improved
on the already substantial gains they made last week in
the traditionally conservative countryside.
//Socialist and Communist parties worked together
in many cases on the local level to defeat conservative
candidates. In several cities where the two parties
faced each other, however, Socialist candidates were
defeated unexpectedly by Communist opponents.//
Comment: The Socialists have claimed an impressive
overall victory in the elections, but they almost cer-
tainly are worried privately. Their losses on both the
left and right in the major cities last: week doubtless
reflect public unease over the sluggish economy, and the
F__ I
outlook for next year is not promising.
Nevertheless, the elections will have little impact
on Papandreou's domestic policies or on his pragmatic
foreign policy. Despite a probable increase in pressure
from an emboldened Communist party, the Prime Minister
recognizes that the majority of Greeks---including the
military and President Karamanlis--w ou:Ld oppose any
drastic changes in foreign policy.
The conservative New Democracy party, heartened by
the vote last week in the urban areas, was unable to
gain the necessary support yesterday for a final victory.
Losses in the countryside were probably the result of
poor party management and lack of strong grass-roots
organization.
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SPAIN: Basque Election Outlook
Moderate regional forces are likely to do well in the three
Basque provinces, which will improve prospects both for a solution
to the dispute over autonomy and for more effective antiterrorist
measures.
Comment: Press reports claim that moderate region-
alists--already in control of the Basque autonomous
government--will expand their parliamen-:ary representa-
tion in Madrid in the general election this week. Left-
wing regionalist parties probably will not improve their
minority status, and the national center-right parties
may win only token parliamentary representation. According
to the US Embassy, the Socialists are likely at best to
pick up one additional deputy in the region.
An improvement in the position of the moderate re- 25X1
gionalists could enhance chances for a compromise on the
potentially explosive issues related to autonomy. The
moderates have initiated the protest against limiting
autonomy, a stance that stems in part from a fear of los- 25X1
ing support to radical regionalists. A strong electoral
showing would put the moderates in a better position
compromise with Madrid on the pending legislation.
In addition, relations between the moderate re-
gionalists and the Socialists in Madrid recently have
bb
orn
improved. The moderates would adopt a more stu
stance toward Madrid only in the unlikely event
radical regionalists make significant gains.
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WESTERN EUROPE: Position on CSCE
//EC members are united in support of continuing the CSCE
process despite the situation in Poland, but they are divided over
//Community members agreed last week that the next
session of the talks should review CSCE implementation
and include criticism of Poland's martial law regime.
Belgium's Special Ambassador on East-West issues reports,
however, that the Allies--under French and West German
pressure--will work toward a balanced concluding document
that is acceptable to all participants and includes a
mandate for a European disarmament conference. At the
same time, the Belgian official claims that most other
EC members will not pursue such an agreement with much
determination because they believe attempts to reach a
compromise with the Eastern bloc are doomed by the Polish
specific tactics to adopt at Madrid.//
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CUBA: Meeting on Debt Rescheduling
//Representatives from Cuba's principal creditor
nations--Spain, France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden--are
to meet in Havana late this week to establish ground
rules for talks on rescheduling later this year. The
US Embassy in Paris reports that the group will
additional economic information from Cuba.//
Comment: //The creditor nations probably have not
yet determined their final positions for the formal talks.
They presumably are dissatisfied with the report by the
'
s initial re-
Cuban National Bank that contains Havana
scheduling proposal and blames the US and the EC for
Cuba's current problems. The creditors are not lik
to negotiate until they get enough information.//
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FRANCE: Third World Policies
//French leaders, in their recent comments to Third World
audiences, have been highly critical of US policies toward Zess-
developed countries. These statements probably have been motivated
in part by a need to take positions popular with leftist voters
disillusioned by the turn to conservative economic policies and by
perceptions of the US as a rival for influence in Africa. Never-
theless, France and the US have a mutual interest in keeping Soviet
influence in the Third World to a minimum, and Paris continues to
give diplomatic support to US
other Third World areas. // olicies in so Africa and most
//Prime Minister Mauroy took the lead in criticizing
US policies in his speech to the UN General Assembly on
30 September. He indirectly blamed the US--and the USSR--
for1the political and economic problems of the Thrid
//President Mitterrand, at the recent Franco-African
summit in Kinshasa, repeated the charge that US policy
is partly responsible for the Third World's economic
ills. He specifically cited the rise of the dollar and
US aid cuts, and he drew an implicit contrast with French
willingness to extend political and economic support to
African countries. He voiced the same themes in earlier
stops in Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi.//
//Foreign Minister Cheysson later claimed during a
speech in Dar es Salaam on 13 October that US insistance
on linking a settlement in Namibia to a withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angola was the only thing impending
an agreement. He added he saw no justification for any
such request. The previous day in Nairobi, Cheysson had
suggested that the USSR and the US were united in their
hostility to African unity and intended to split the
WATT / /
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Disclaimers and motives
//French officials have denied that these statements
reflect a decision to be openly critical of US policies
and actions. One presidential adviser noted that the
comments made by Mauroy and Cheysson had. not been cleared
with Paris. He also said Mitterrand's remarks were a
reiteration of long-held views.//
//Mitterrand and other politicians of the left and
right have often complained about US exploitation of
the dollar's strength. In addition, Cheysson has earned
a reputation for intemperate off-the-cuff remarks.
Nevertheless, the willingness of the three leaders to
ublic distinctions between US and French policy in 25X1
draw
p
the Third World suggests that their comments cannon
attributed entirely to lack of coordination.//
//A more likely explanation lies in the mix of domes-
tic political pressures and foreign policy ambitions and
interests that influence French leaders.. The search
for political advantage probably is a major factor and
is likely to intensify as municipal elections in March 25X1
approach.//
//To some extent, French leaders may hope their
stronger rhetoric on favorite leftist foreign policy
themes will compensate for the government's move toward
conservative economic policies. Mitterrand is convinced
the failure of earlier Socialist leaders to maintain
their credentials as spokesmen for the left was responsible
for their decline and for longtime Communist domination
of the left.//
//The inclination of some Socialist leaders and
diplomats to view the US as a rival in French-speaking
Africa probably has contributed to the sniping. Their
irritation with US economic sanctions on the pipeline
issue also may have contributed to their remarks.//
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