NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 26 OCTOBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010186-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 186
• Publication Date: October 26, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret 25X1
Central
Intelligence
A/ %
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
26 October 1982
State Dept. review completed
25X1
Top Secret
26 October 1982
Copy
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Top Secret
USSR: Hard Currency Position Improves . . . . . . . . . 1
Libya-China: Qadhafi's Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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USSR: Hard Currency Position Improves
Top Secret
Strenuous efforts by the USSR since late 1981 to correct its
hard currency balance of payments are succeeding, but at substantial
cost to the Soviet economy and to some economies in Eastern Europe.
By increasing oil exports and closely managing im-
ports, Moscow reduced its hard currency trade deficit
during the first six months of this year to $2.2 billion,
compared with the $6 billion deficit during the first
half of 1981. Soviet data indicate that hard currency
export earnings increased by $4 billion over the compa-
rable period in 1981, with more than half the rise result-
ing from a 50-percent increase in the amount of oil sold.
Accelerated sales of machinery and equipment to Iraq
The volume of grain imports climbed by 4.5 million
tons in the first half of 1982, compared with the first
half of 1981, but the grain bill was unchanged because
of lower grain prices. Western trade data suggest that
the volume of chemical and steel imports--other than
pipe--dropped, and there was almost no increase in im-
ports of capital goods.
Comment: Moscow has paid a substantial price for the
improvement in its hard currency trade position. The in-
crease in oil exports for hard currency was achieved only
by cutting back exports to Eastern Europe and by reducing
domestic allocations to industry, transportation, and
electric power. The USSR did not buy some of the Western
materials and equipment it needed to ease industrial
bottlenecks and stimulate productivity.
The USSR will have difficulty maintaining the recent
improvement in its hard currency trade position during the
oil continue to rise in the USSR and in Eastern Europe.
next few years. It will have to maintain oil exports to
the West at the recent high level, but oil production has
stayed about the same for two years, and requirements for,
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Iq
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LIBYA-CHINA: Qadhafi's Visit
Libyan leader Qadhafi arrived in Beijing yesterday
on his first visit to China. Relations between Libya
and China were established in 1978. The Secretary of
Libya's General People's Committee--the equivalent of
prime minister--visited China in August.
Comment: Qadhafi evidently wants to demonstrate his
"nonalignment" to the Third World and to counterbalance
his isolation in Arab and African circles. He probably
also intends to use the visit as a sign of his unhappi-
ness about the USSR's lack of effective support for the
Palestinians in recent months. Chinese officials are
likely to believe that too close a relationship with
Libya would jeopardize their ties with moderate Arab
states. At the same time, they may hope to encourage
Tripoli to turn away from Moscow by broadening bilateral
relations.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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