NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 10 NOVEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000600010052-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: November 10, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000600010052-4
Y RIVV
E~ Central
n Intelligence
Top Secret
oco/cC
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
CPAS NJDC 82-263C
ovem er
COPY 402
 China: Military Leadership Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Poland: More Security Precautions . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Lebanon: Vote of Confidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cameroon: Biya Takes Charge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Special Analysis
USSR: Possible Controversy Over Defense spending . . . . . 8
25X1
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 CHINA: Military Leadership Changes
Evidence accumulating since the end of the 12th Party Congress
in September indicates that the Army is in the midst of the most
extensive reassignment of Zeaders in more than a decade.
Leadership changes disclosed in the public media
include the appointment of new commanders in three mili-
tary regions and the naming of three senior officers as
deputy secretaries general of the party's powerful Mili-
tary Commission. The replacements of the director of the
General Political Department, the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and the entire leadership of the Defense Ministry's
Foreign Affairs Bureau also have been announced.
Comment: Older and largely conservative senior
officers have impeded Beijing's plans for military
rejuvenation and reorganization. Deng Xiaoping and his
political allies view these elder soldier-politicians as
the main opponents of the reformists' program and their
succession arrangements. The new changes represent a
significant gain for Deng and his political heir, party
General Secretary Hu Yaobang, whose ability to lead has
been questioned by military critics.
Changes in command probably will extend to all 11
military regions, resulting in senior staffs that are
politically more responsive to Beijing. Three other
regional commanders--who were not appointed to the party's
Central Committee in September--presumably will be
replaced. Further changes, including a new defense min-
ister, are likely to be announced by early next month at
the National People's Congress, and Beijing will continue
to urge older officers to retire.
 The government has taken additional measures to
ensure its ability to control any strikes or demonstra-
tions today and tomorrow. The US Consul in Krakow says
more senior Solidarity activists have been arrested there,
and Western newsmen report police in Warsaw and Wroclaw
have destroyed an underground Radio Solidarity transmitter
and printing equipment. Riot police have increased patrols
at key points in Warsaw, Wroclaw, and other cities.
Comment: Even if the government maintains control
today, it will retain its increased security precautions
through tomorrow in anticipation of large crowds gather-
ing to commemorate Poland's prewar independence day.
The regime officially observed this holiday for the
first time in 1981 but has given no sign that it is
Top Secret
 Prime Minister Wazzan's cabinet cleared a major
hurdle yesterday by winning parliamentary approval both
for its policy program and for its request for sweeping
powers to rule by decree for six months. The vote of
58 to 1 came after several days of acrimonious debate
on the request for extraordinary powers. The government
agreed to fewer special powers than originally requested
Comment: Wazzan was anxious to have the vote out
of the way before the government begins negotiations
for the withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian, and PLO forces.
Many deputies were unhappy about the extensive powers
requested--originally for a period of eight months and
covering areas beyond security--and the consequent reduc-
tion of the Assembly's role in some areas. The reluctance
of the government and the deputies to appear to be working
at cross-purposes on the eve of the withdrawal negotia-
 The US Embassy reports newly inaugurated President
Biya has moved swiftly and adroitly to consolidate his
position while promising to continue the moderate do-
mestic and foreign policies of former President Ahidjo.
He has appointed a tribally balanced cabinet and selected
a Muslim northerner with close ties to Ahidjo as his
Prime Minister and constitutional successor. Although
the US Embassy reports Ahidjo may have lung cancer or
heart trouble, he will remain head of the only le le al
political party, with Biya its vice-chairman.
Comment: Biya's reputation as an honest, intelli-
gent, and well-educated administrator should help him
establish his credibility. Ahidjo probably will remain
influential behind the scenes if his health permits.
Despite the lack of popular reaction to the change in
leadership, Cameroonians will look to the US and France
 Top Secret
USSR: Possible Controversy Over Defense Spending
The speech by President Brezhnev on 27 October and the one on
29 October by his close Politburo associate, Konstantin Chernenko,
concerning defense policy and relations with Washington have prompted
divergent interpretations in the West of their real message.
We believe the leadership in recent weeks has made
some particularly difficult resource allocation decisions,
and that, whatever the specific nature of those decisions,
they have left the military dissatisfied--sufficiently
so that the political leadership saw a need to meet
directly with and reassure the entire military hierarchy.
We do not know whether the military has been told that it
must trim spending somewhat or whether its requests for
additional resources beyond those already planned--probably
rationalized on the basis of new US programs--have not
been satisfied. The latter case seems much more likely
to us than absolute cuts or even a reduction in the
Our assessment that defense resource issues have
become controversial is based on the following considera-
tions:
--A party plenum and Supreme Soviet session will
take place next week to review economic goals
for the third year of the current Five-Year
Plan (1981-85). In view of the poor perform-
ance during the past two years, it seems quite
plausible that a substantial revision of planned
--Those favoring an increased defense effort or
an internal reallocation of priorities, and
any who seek to trim it, would regard the pre-
plenum period as the best opportunity to make
 --The circumstances of the Brezhnev speech are
very unusual and suggest military concern.
The last conclave of this sort to be announced
publicly was in 1972, when US bombing of
Haiphong put in question then President Nixon's
scheduled visit to Moscow to conclude the
SALT I accords. Brezhnev apparently called
that meeting to reassure the defense establish-
ment of the wisdom of party policy decisions.
Brezhnev's appearance at the most recent gather-
ing would not seem necessary unless there was
again significant military concern with policy
--Broader national security questions may also
be at issue. The hopeful emphasis placed by
both Brezhnev and Chernenko on relations with
Beijing, for example, may be a prelude to dis-
cussion with China of force levels along the
border. Circumstantial evidence, such as a
recent press article responding to unnamed
critics of Brezhnev's announced policy of non-
first-use of nuclear weapons, indicates that
elements of the regime's national security
policy also may have come under question.
--The fact that all senior defense officials and
all the Politburo members believed to have
national security responsibilities appeared
with Brezhnev--including both leading contenders
for Brezhnev's job--almost certainly was intended
to portray the leadership's unanimity on what-
ever decisions have been taken; again, decisions
reassuring to the military would not seem to
require this kind of turnout.
--Finally, another highly unusual aspect of the
speech was Brezhnev's accent on his own leading
position in decisionmaking on military matters,
his close contacts with Defense Minister Ustinov
and his familiarity with the details about the
state of the armed forces, and the party's
 --Brezhnev seems to have been saying to the
military--with whom he has curried favor through
the 18 years of his rule--that he is aware of
their problems but that the Politburo, includ-
ing the Defense Minister, has had to make un-
Despite the show of political unanimity, there are
undoubtedly those in the party leadership, as well as in
the military hierarchy, who will continue to urge greater
resources for defense. One thing, therefore, seems
certain--the level of military spending has become a
contentious issue and will play a part in succession
politics.
DIA believes that the above interpretation overem-
phasizes military discontent with resource allocation
decisions. Brezhnev's address was a forceful reaffirma-
tion of the Soviet leadership's strong commitment to
military strength. The decision to broadcast the text
in both English and Russian is a clear indication the
message was intended for both foreign and internal con-
sumption. Brezhnev's remarks combined harsh accusations
against the US for seeking "military superiority" with
signals of continued determination to support defense.
He pledged to military officials that the party leader-
ship would meet "all your needs." He also implied party
commitment to continue current rates of defense spending
growth--which are estimated at 3 to 4 percent per year--
noting "we should tirelessly strengthen the defenses of
our country." These themes were echoed by Politburo
members Chernenko and Grishin on 29 October and 5 November,
respectively. Brezhnev also made several brief references
to Soviet economic difficulties, suggesting military
leaders must make more efficient use of the resources
In sum, the speech seemed designed to warn the
US that Moscow will not accept any basic change in the
"correlation of forces" and to reassure military leaders
they will get their due. While Brezhnev implied the
military should be more cost effective, there is little
in this particular speech to indicate the defense budget
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000600010052-4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16: CIA-RDP84T00301 R000600010052-4