NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 17 NOVEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000600010071-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 71
• Publication Date: November 17, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP84T00301 8000600010071-3
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/16 :CIA-RDP84T00301 8000600010071-3
 USSR-China: Foreign Ministers' Meeting
E1 Salvador - Honduras: Combined Operation
1
2
Hungary: Dissident Activity
Italy: Fanfani Takes Soundings
4
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International: UN Resolution on START and INF
5
USSR-Cuba: Possible Naval Visit
7
USSR-Argentina: Defense Ministers Meet
7
Special Analyses
USSR - Eastern Europe: Problems in CEMA
8
Nicaragua-Honduras: Insurgent Threat to the Sandinistas
11
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 Moseom and Beijing used their highest ZeveZ bilateral meeting
since 1969 to emphasize a mutual interest in improving relations.
According to TASS, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
yesterday told his Chinese counterpart, Huang Hua, that
the USSR will continue to strive for normal relations.
Huang Hua responded that China hopes relations will be
gradually normalized "by joint efforts."
TASS also said it was agreed during the short meet-
ing that the political dialogue should continue. Chinese
media reported that the foreign ministers exchanged views
on eliminating "obstacles" to improved relations in a
"candid but peaceful atmosphere."
On Monday, General Secretary Andropov singled out
Huang Hua at Brezhnev's funeral reception for his longest
conversation with any foreign delegation leader. In ad-
dition, the Soviets included the Chinese on the list
Comment: Although both countries have used the
occasion of Brezhnev's death to give new impetus to the
search for better relations, neither side has indicated
it is ready to make important concessions. By its cool
characterization of the talks and by mentioning "ob-
stacles," Beijing is implying it is still waiting for
a response to its demands on such key issues as
Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and the Soviet military pres-
Before the next round of talks, which probably will
occur early next year, the new leadership in Moscow will
have to review its options in light of the exploratory
discussions in Beijing. Although General Secretary Andro-
pov has been deeply involved in setting Soviet policy
toward China for 25 years, he is likely to try to exploit
the current positive atmospherics. He may make some
conciliator esture toward China before talks resume.
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 //More than 5,000 government troops in EZ Salvador, supported
by 1,500 troops from Honduras deployed along the border, are making
//Salvadoran Government forces have engaged some of
the estimated 600 armed guerrillas at least 14 times
since the offensive began last week. The government
claims to have killed 127 guerrillas thus far, compared
with losses of three dead and 45 wounded as of Sunda .
No Honduran losses have been reported.//
//The US defense attache says the planning and coor-
dination of this campaign have been better than for
previous counterinsurgency efforts. The Salvadoran
forces' use of secure voice radios is limiting the guer-
rillas' ability to anticipate government tactics. The
Honduran Air Force is providing forward control support
for Salvadoran airstrikes against insurgent positions.//
//Some military officials in both countries estimate
that operations in Chalatenango can be terminated by the
end of the week, although they admit that the main guer-
rilla force has yet to be engaged. They are redeploying
units to block escape routes. In the past, the insurgents
have demonstrated an ability to put up stiff resistance
Comment: The defeat of a large insurgent force in
Chalatenango would further encourage the Salvadoran and
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 A Hungarian dissident plans to attend the Lutheran
Church's 10-day peace festival now under way in East
Germany. He is trying to organize an independent peace
movement in Budapest, but without religious sponsorship
and in a way so as not to antagonize the regime.
Comment: The Hungarian appears to be the only repre-
sentative from another East European country to attend
what could be the most important gathering thus far of
the unofficial East German peace movement. The attempt
to establish an unofficial Hungarian peace group--which
would be only the second such movement in Eastern Europe--
reflects the recently increased activity among dissident
intellectuals in Hungary. The regime is keeping an eye
on such activities, which it probably fears could harm
its chances of gaining favorable economic treatment from
 To Secret
//President Pertini has designated Senate President
Fanfani to begin discussions to form a new government.
Fanfani, who is 74, has been prime minister four times.
He recently said he would try to form a five-party gov-
ernment that would be open to a "constructive relation-
ship" with the Communists.//
Comment: //Fanfani's attempt to advance a similar
proposal last year was rebuffed by the prospective
coalition partners. He hoped to induce the Communists
to go along with his program and perhaps even abstain
during his government's vote of confidence by including
"nonpolitical" technicians in the cabinet. Fanfani
probably opposes a more extensive arrangement with the
Communists, but he would like to avoid a serious conflict
with them. Nevertheless, this gesture may be calculated
primarily to convince the Socialists--who fear that a
deal between the Christian Democrats and the Communists
would undermine their political leverage--to be more
Mexico has proposed a UN resolution calling on
the US and the USSR to reveal to the General Assembly
during the current session their official negotiating
positions on START and INF. The Soviet Ambassador to
the Committee on Disarmament has indicated that Moscow
is unhappy with the resolution and has suggested that.
separate US and Soviet consultations with the Mexicans
Comment: The Soviets would be inclined to abstain
on the existing resolution but could vote for a revision
if they can isolate the US from its NATO Allies and from
nonaligned states. Most West European Allies would
prefer to continue the current arrangement, under which
the US and the USSR are invited to make general progress
reports. They would be reluctant, however, to vote
against a resolution calling for public disclosure of
START and INF positions. Many nonaligned states will
support the resolution, because they are irritated by
the lack of progress made by the superpowers toward
 The two Soviet warships that recently left the
Mediterranean are south of the Azores and proceeding
Comment: The ships may soon by joined by an oiler
and a submarine. They may remain near the Azores for
several days to monitor US ships scheduled to transit
to and from the Mediterranean and then sail for the
Caribbean and visit Cuba late next week. It has been
The Soviet press says that Defense Minister Ustinov
has met with Argentine Defense Minister Vivot, who at-
tended Brezhnev's funeral. TASS described the talks
as friendly and useful and said that matters of mutual
interest were discussed. ~~
Comment: This is the first meeting between the
top defense officials of the two countries. Ustinov
almost certainly used the occasion to affirm the USSR's
support for Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands
and to restate Moscow's desire for expanded bilateral
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 The accession of Yuriy Andropov in the USSR will further
strengthen Soviet activism in the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance. Increasingly serious economic problems and Soviet
concern over implications of events in Poland are forcing the USSR
and Eastern Europe to address Zong-unresolved issues in their eco-
nomic relations. The inability of the heads of government to make
much progress at their annual CEMA Council sessions has Zed to
calls for a special sunmiit meeting of party leaders. At the same
time, fundamental differences--and perhaps uncertainty about the
Soviet succession--have hampered preparations. The USSR hopes to
reduce the need to aid the East Europeans but wants to limit their
dependence on the West. It is proposing major changes in CEMA,
including accelerated integration of planning and production. The
East Europeans, however, are ZikeZy to resist urther erosion of
their economic and political autonomy.
Romania first proposed a summit of party leaders at
the CEMA Council session in June 1980. Moscow initially
was cool to the idea, but President Brezhnev endorsed it
at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981. Pravda last
month claimed the proposed meeting as a Soviet initiative,
probably in an effort to control the agenda.
Several East European sources say that the meeting
is tentatively scheduled for next spring in Moscow.
Warsaw Pact leaders are likely to discuss re arations
next month when they gather in Prague.
Moscow has long sought to revise CEMA pricing arrange-
ments whereby the USSR sometimes pays world prices for
inferior goods from East European countries while selling
them oil and other raw materials at preferential prices.
The Soviets may insist on payment in hard currency or
goods that can be sold for hard currency for a larger
portion of their exports to Eastern Europe.
The Soviets, having reduced oil exports to several
East European countries, argue that greater integration
would aid conservation and the development of energy
sources, particularly nuclear power. An influential
 Soviet economist contends that more efficient use of
energy ultimately will require reorganizing the national
economies of the CEMA countries. Moscow considers closer
Developments in Poland and subsequent Western sanc-
tions have intensified Soviet concern over the risks
entailed in close economic ties with the West. While
affirming the continued need for such links--on "equal"
terms--Moscow advocates closer integration to reduce
vulnerability to Western pressure.
The Soviets have long proposed expanding links across
national lines among ministries, associations, and enter-
prises, establishing joint firms, and using party control
mechanisms to enforce contracts within CEMA. Their most
controversial new proposals aim at increasing the USSR's
role in the national planning processes of CEMA members.
An editorial in Pravda asserts that mere coordination of
plans is no longer sufficient, and a Soviet diplomat says
the USSR seeks to become an "active partner" in economic
The USSR also may try to get CEMA to drop the princi-
ple of unanimity in favor of majority decisions. A Soviet
scholar suggested this last summer, and a subsequent pro-
posal in September for such a change in CEMA'S bylaws
Moscow's partners have reacted with suspicion to
the Soviet initiatives. The East Europeans generally
have opposed increased authority for CEMA, fearing it
would be an instrument for greater Soviet control. The
Romanians and Hungarians in particular are likely to
oppose Soviet moves to give CEMA more authority or to
East European interests are more immediate and
more specific, focusing on maintaining or increasing
Soviet deliveries of fuel and other raw materials and
 I I
on prices. The East Europeans are negotiating bilater-
ally to overcome their differences and develop a more
Romania has been the most truculent member of CEMA,
obstructing ambitious efforts at integration in the 1960s
and 1970s. More recently, hard currency financial problems
have led Bucharest to seek a closer economic relationship
with CEMA. Bucharest wants to get substantial amounts of
Soviet oil in exchange for investing in Soviet energy pro-
In contrast to previous years, when Hungary was a
vocal proponent of currency convertibility and price
reform in CEMA trade, Budapest now is concentrating on
maintaining its trade relations with the West to prevent
any drive to make the CEMA group economically self-
sufficient. The Hungarians also may fear that greater
control at the CEMA level would threaten Budapest's
Czechoslovakia's views probably are closest to those
of the USSR. The Czechs are anxious for an early start
on CEMA plan coordination for the 1986-90 period. Prague's
complaint that other CEMA countries are not fulfilling
existing agreements, however, has led it to emphasize
this issue rather than propose new cooperation.
Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria have not spoken
out much on CEMA issues. All three are interested in at
least maintaining current levels of Soviet deliveries
The Soviets and East Europeans are far apart on how
extensive CEMA's authority should be and on the direction
and scope of economic integration. The difficulty in
agreeing on the timing and agenda for the economic summit
suggests that major changes in CEMA will come slowly and
that only a beginning will be made at the summit. Over
the longer term, however, continuing economic problems
may force the East Europeans to moderate their tradi-
tional concerns about loss of economic autonomy and
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 The Sandinistas' recent declaration of a military emergency
along Nicaragua's northern border reflects their growing concern
about the increasing capabilities of insurgents based in Honduras.
Sandinista military and security forces are the largest in Central
America, however, and can counter any near-term challenge. Mean-
while, renewed efforts toward greater cooperation among the various
insurgent factions have failed to make significant progress.
After a lull in September, insurgent attacks from
Honduras occurred almost daily during October. Most
strikes were small harassment operations against
Sandinista border posts and isolated patrols. Some
recent attacks may have been diversions to infiltrate
insurgent units from Honduras and establish base camps
The insurgents also have conducted sabotage opera-
tions, and the destruction of several key bridges
earlier this year indicates that they can disrupt the
country's road network. In addition, an attack in
August on a road construction camp caused an estimated
$1.2 million in damage.
The personnel costs to the Nicaraguans have been
high. The government has admitted losing 109 killed in
the last three months, and the total thus far this year
may be over 600. Several Cubans also have been killed.
The attacks from Honduras are being carried out
primarily by the Nicaraguan Democratic Front, the only
insurgent group that has demonstrated a sustained
military capability. It is led largely by former
members of the Nicaraguan National Guard and includes
disaffected Sandinistas, Miskito Indians, and other
Nicaraguan dissidents. The Front now has an estimated
2,000 to 2,500 full-time, armed personnel, and it con-
 The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, which is
based in Costa Rica, is the other major anti-Sandinista
organization. It is a loose federation led by rev-
olutionary hero Eden Pastora and former Nicaraguan
junta member Alfonso Robelo. The Alliance is trying to
build a military capability while continuing propaganda
aimed at undermining Western economic support for Managua.
//A combination of Pastora's popular support in
Nicaragua and the military strength of the Front would
increase the threat to the Sandinistas. Efforts to
coordinate the activities of the two organizations,
however, are currently stalled. Pastora probably fears
that cooperation with the Front would reinforce Sandi=
nista charges that he has sold out to the former members
of the National Guard.//
//The Sandinistas have reacted to the insurgent
threat from Honduras by continuing to strengthen their
forces in the northern border area.
The
scope o coun erinsurgency opera ions a so appears to
//In addition, Managua recently extended a nationwide
state of emergency. It sus ended most civil liberties
for another six months.//
 The Sandinistas' mounting fears are reflected in
their increasing allegations of an imminent invasion
from Honduras. They apparently are using the allegations
to rally popular support, to deflect international criti-
cism of their repressive policies, and to justify their
continuing military buildup. Managua also recently issued
a white paper alleging more than 400 incidents on the
Honduran border during the past three years.
//The insurgents probably realize that their hopes
of overthrowing the Sandinistas hinge on massive popular
support for an uprising and on defections from the Army.
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the regime,
mostly among the middle class. There is little evidence
at this time, however, that popular support and Army
The Sandinistas, not wanting to appear the ag-
gressors, have refrained thus far from major attacks on
insurgent bases in Honduras. Nicaragua's recent election
to the UN Security Council, however, may have reduced con-
straints on such actions. Moreover, if the insurgents
become more unified and their threat continues to grow,
Nicaragua is likely to ask Cuba for greatly expanded
military support.