NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE) 23 DECEMBER 1982

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00301R000600010190-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 190
• Publication Date: December 23, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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 Israel-Egypt: Public Recriminations 3
West Germany - US - France: Helicopter Procurement 7
Special Analysis
Suriname: Threats to Bouterse's Rule 8
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 and Defense Minister Mejia believe the insurgency will be
eradicated during the coming year. The government claims
that more than 800 guerrillas were killed since March,
but its forces suffered losses of 680 men during the same
period.//
//The Army contends it has reestablished control in
the Western Hi hlands althou h small ockets of resist-
ance remain. military leaders
are still concerned over increasing guerrilla activity
in Peten Department and combined operations by insurgent
//Militar o erations are continuin alon the border
with Mexico.
//Rios Montt, meanwhile, has announced the second
phase of the government's national reconstruction program.
The plan, which includes increased housing, employment,
and social programs, will focus on areas most affected
by the insurgency.//
Comment: //Although the military has reestablished
control over much of the Western Highlands, the insur-
gency is not likely to be eliminated in 1983. As the
guerrillas regroup, they will continue to use hit-and-
run tactics against the Army.//
//The announcement of the new aid plan probably will
strengthen Rios Montt's public standing temporarily, but
the plan's effectiveness may depend on assistance from
international organizations. The program also is likely
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 Israel and Egypt have intensified public attacks on one
another with more formal charges and countercharges of violations
and nonimpZementation of the peace treaty.
//Bilateral relations were severely strained by
Israeli actions in Lebanon and the subsequent recall
of Egypt's Ambassador to Tel Aviv. The Israelis, in
a recent memorandum circulated in the US, accused the
Egyptians of condoning anti-Israel comments in the
press, freezing diplomatic and consular relations, and
not fully carrying out trade agreements. According to
list of Israeli treaty violations.//
Comment: //Although Israel recognizes that its in-
vasion of Lebanon has caused regional problems for Egypt,
Tel Aviv rejects linking the normalization process with
the situation in Lebanon. Israeli officials argue that
relations with Egypt should not be affected by either
inter-Arab or Arab-Israeli developments. They fear that
//Egypt maintains that its relationship with Israel
should not be treated as a special case. In Cairo's view,
Tel Aviv's recent actions were contrary to the spirit
of the peace treaty and cannot be ignored.//
//Egypt and Israel are looking to the US to use its
influence with the other to get the relationship back
 To Secret
The US Embassy in Moscow reports that an apparent
slight in Soviet press coverage of the meeting this week
between General Secretary Andropov and President Zhivkov
may reflect displeasure with the Bulgarian leader. Pravda
stated that an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality"
and "full unity of views" prevailed during the meeting.
At the sametime, it failed to highlight either leader's
name or to claim "full mutual understanding," as was done
with the party chiefs from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
East Germany.
Comment: The diminished coverage may be further
evidence of Moscow's reported unhappiness with what it
views as an emerging trend toward nationalism in Bulgaria.
Andropov's sensitivity to Western press speculation that
he was involved with the alleged Bulgarian plot to
assassinate the Pope also may have led him to play down
his personal contact with Zhivkov. In the West, however,
Moscow will continue its firm denials of any Bulgarian
A fire this week at Kenya's major oil depot, which
resulted in a loss of $4 million worth of gasoline, will
accelerate the country's economic decline. The fire
also destroyed electrical equipment for the national
pipeline, requiring shipments of petroleum products to
Kenya and neighboring countries to be transported by
truck or train. According to press reports, President
Moi claims that sabotage could be involved.
Comment: The fire and the shutdown of the pipeline
will cause severe gasoline shortages over the holiday
period. Even before the incident, Nairobi and most
other cities were suffering from shortages of diesel
fuel and kerosene. The security forces probably can
contain any disorders. Moi may try to deflect criticism
by blaming Uganda and Tanzania for the fire, and he is
likely to ask the US for emer enc help to restore the
depot and pipeline.
 in procuring the Bell Co ra AH-1 as its next-generation
antitank helicopter. Previous plans to develop an anti-
tank helicopter with the French have languished because
of disagreement over the principal mission of the air-
Comment: Selection of the Cobra is consistent with
earlier reporting that Chancellor Kohl hopes to strike
a balance between US and West European countries on copro-
duction. Continued progress on the Bell proposal may
incline the West Germans to choose US over West European
firms for the future production of a tactical fighter
and a surface-to-air missile system. Bonn probably will
not make a public statement on the helicopter project
soon to avoid damaging relations with Paris in the early
months of the government under Chancellor Kohl.
 Army corrmiander Bouterse has strengthened his control of the
country as a result of the executions of his most prominent critics,
but he faces several potential challenges to his authority. Beneath
the surface calm, there is widespread public revulsion against his
use of brutal measures. Bouterse's perception of threats to his
life and position mill be a key factor in any decision to seek
security assistance from Cuba. Havana, homever, probably mould be
reluctant to become involved in Surincane on a large scale.
//The executions probably reflected Bouterse's fear
that a recurrence of strikes would intensif the o o-
sition to him.
This coterie of Army sergeants--known as the "Group
of 16"--apparently assisted in the executions. It is
//The killings also raise the possibility of retalia-
tion by relatives or friends of the victims.
 To Secret
Without a strong leader, the digruntled members of
the military will be reluctant to oppose Bouterse. They
probably will adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Further
provocative actions by Bouterse or a deterioration in
The cutoff of aid from the Netherlands, which has
provided almost all of Suriname's foreign assistance,
will force Paramaribo into a difficult search for alter-
native sources. Without a quick infusion of funds,
spending cuts in the bloated public-sector employment
rolls would be likely. To augment its revenues, the
government could place additional levies on businesses.
//The regime also could nationalize Dutch assets.
Such a move, however, would lead to the withdrawal of
other foreign investment and to the further emigration
Suriname and Cuba established diplomatic relations
in 1979. Bouterse initially was cool to Cuban efforts
to forge closer ties, but relations gradually warmed
after December 1980. Following an abortive coup attempt
in March 1982, open and clandestine dealings among
Bouterse, various pro-Cuban Surinamese, and the Cubans
//There is no indication of direct Cuban involvement
in the executions. Bouterse probably had no plans to
deal with the consequences of his actions, however, and
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 To Secret
To provide protection against retaliation, Bouterse
probably asked for some Cuban intelligence and security
advisers. His concern about creating divisions among
members of his clique--some of whom are strong anti-
Communists--would be likely to preclude a re uest for a
larger Cuban presence at this time.
Nevertheless, if Bouterse's life is threatened or
his political dominance is challenged he might look to
Havana for more help. A 100-man Cuban contingent prob-
ably would be enough to consolidate Bouterse's position
and forestall most threats to his continued rule--short
As they have done elsewhere, the Cubans could offer
intelligence or security units to help Bouterse monitor
the activities of potential opponents. They also could
assign teams of military advisers to the Surinamese
armed forces. Such advisers could assist Bouterse in
forming a loyal military organization.
In addition, a team of Cuban bodyguards and security
personnel could be provided to Bouterse and other key
members of his regime. Cuba also could send more
military supplies and ammunition to Suriname, possibly
Even so, Havana probably would avoid any large-scale
involvement in Suriname. The Castro regime would be warv
of becoming bogged down in a prolonged struggle.
A highly visible intervention, moreover, would have
strong negative repercussions in Brazil, Venezuela, and
elsewhere in Latin America--thereby endangering Havana's
recent diplomatic gains in the region. In addition,
Moscow probably is already uncertain about Bouterse's
long-term prospects and would be uneasy about a sizable
Cuban troop presence in a region where the Soviets are
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