SOVIET USE OF OVERSEAS NAVAL FACILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84T00926R000200050004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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f6~ Direct rate of Top Seeret
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So Viet Use of Overseas
Naval Facilities
yepsecret
SOV 83-10202JX
IA 83-10129JX
December 1983
Cony 17 A
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InrPDrnrarP AT '1'-.. t........4
Soviet Use of Overseas
Naval Facilities
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by
Sovidt Analysis, and
Office of Imagery A
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief. Theater Forces Division,
SOVAA
Top Secret
SOV 83-10202JX
December l
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 June 1983
was used in this report.
Soviet Use of Overseas
Naval Facilities
auxiliary ships and minimizes dependence on overseas facilities.
The Soviet Navy uses port and air facilities abroad to ease the burden of
sustaining peacetime deployments to distant areas. Such facilities also have
some potential value in wartime or during regional conflicts. However, the
Soviets' operating philosophy-reinforced by their expulsion from facilities
in Egypt and Somalia-incorporates heavy reliance on large numbers of
improvements that may later be available to Soviet ships.
Many of the ports to which the Soviets have access-particularly in the
Third World-have such rudimentary repair or resupply facilities that they
are little more than protected areas in which Soviet naval auxiliaries
provide logistic services. Nonetheless, such ports offer advantages over
anchorages in international waters because supplies and personnel can be
transported to them, stable communications can be established ashore, and
more extensive upkeep can be performed. Further, expanding access to
individual facilities offers long-term possibilities of Soviet-sponsored port
One of the more valuable functions of overseas facilities is their contribu-
tion to surveillance or reconnaissance, the major peacetime missions of
Soviet naval forces abroad. In the Caribbean, for example, intelligence
collection platforms-Bear aircraft and specially configured ships
(AGIs}-comprise most of the Soviets' marginal naval presence. Access to
regional facilities is essential for the operation of the aircraft and can
extend the endurance of AGIs, thereby reducing the burden on the Navy's
logistic system.
tial improvements or short-term improvisation.
Acquisition of naval privileges diversifies Moscow's options to influence
regional developments.' By helping to sustain regional deployments, such
facilities improve Moscow's ability to use naval forces for rapid crisis
response. None of the facilities to which the Soviets have extensive access,
however, is suitable to house a regional contingency force without substan-
' Politically, Moscow views such privileges as a means of highlighting its role as an
international power, underscoring its interest in a region, or enhancing its relations with a
host government
iii Top Secret
SOV 88-10202JX
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Despite their operating philosophy and past experiences, the Soviets will
continue to seize opportunities for naval privileges-particularly for recon-
naissance aircraft-at overseas facilities. We do not expect their search to
be more aggressive unless their requirements to support naval forces
abroad expand so dramatically as to exceed the capabilities of the current
mixture of afloat and land-based logistics. Neither production trends nor
deployment patterns indicate such a change. Further, because much of the
Soviet peacetime naval presence serves political ends, overseas facilities
will continue to be located where they can contribute to Soviet regional
goals.
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Contents
Summary
Introduction
Sovidt Use of Overseas Facilities
Logistic Support Facilities
Contingency Response
Characteristics of Overseas Facilities Used by the Soviet Navy
Mediterranean Sea
Naval Facilities in Syria
Naval Facilities in Algeria
Soviet Use of Commercial Facilities in the Mediterranean
Areas of Potential Support
Naval Facilities in South Yemen
Naval Facilities in Ethiopia
Anchorages in International Waters
Naval Facilities in Vietnam
Soviet Use of Singapore's Commercial Facilities
An Area of Potential Support-Kampuchea
Anchorages in International Waters
West i African Waters
Naval Facilities in Angola
Naval Facilities in Guinea
Areas of Potential Support
Carilbe na Sea
Areas of Potential Support
Overseas Facilities Formerly Available to the Soviet Navy
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Soviet Use of Overseas
Naval Facilities
Soviet naval operations in distant areas have expand-
ed dramatically since the mid-1960s. Data provided
by the Naval Operations Intelligence Center (NOIC)
show that the rapid growth in out-of-area deployment
stabilized in the mid-1970s but turned upward again
in 1980 with the reinforcement of the Indian Ocean
Squadron (see figur 1). The Soviet presence in for-
eign waters has dec~ined somewhat from the 1980
record total but renPains above the level of the mid-
The Soviets maintain squadrons in the Mediterranean
Sea and Indian Ocoan, have contingents of ships
operating off West Erica and in the South China
Sea, and periodical) deploy task groups to the Carib-
bean. Soviet naval aircraft fly reconnaissance or
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrols from South
Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam.
To support the operation of their warships deployed to
distant areas, the S~viets rely on a combination of
afloat logistics and ~ccess to local facilities. Together,
these provide such gssential services as crew rest and
rotation, maintenanrre, repair, and resupply of provi-
sions and munitionsf In wartime, the role of local
naval and air facilities would be restricted by their
vulnerability, their l~imited equipment, and the wari-
ness of host governn~tents about becoming involved.[
Soviet Use of Overseas Facilities
In each region where the Soviets routinely station
naval forces, access to at least one regional facility
generally supplements the logistic support provided by
naval auxiliaries or merchant tankers under naval
contract. The terms of Soviet access z and the support
provided at these facilities vary widely.
Figure 1
Soviet Naval Deployments in
Distant Waters, by Region,1974-82
Caribbean Sea
West African watersa
Atlantic Ocean
30,000 1
~h~h~I i~ ICI '
0 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
a West African ship-days for 1974-75 are
included in Atlantic Ocean data for those years.
' Limited access, hat the Soviets have
had in Annaba, Algeria, exempts a specified number of ships from
normal port requirements. It may include priority for Soviet ships
at berth and bunkering of repair facilities. Unrestricted access,
which Soviet ships appear{ to have in Luanda, Angola, permits ships
to operate almost as though they were in a home port, observing
local regulations only for '`health, safety, and sanitation~_~
Mediterranean Sea
Indian Ocean
Pacific Occan
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Logistic Support Facilities
Indian Ocean. The major land-based support areas
for the Indian Ocean Squadron are at Aden, South
Yemen, and Dahlak Island, Ethiopia. Soviet ships
have called at Aden since 1969 and have used the port
as a logistic center since Moscow's expulsion from
Berbera, Somalia in 1977. Moscow does not have a
formal basing agreement with South Yemen and
makes only limited use of the port's potential. Aden's
main contribution is its plentiful supply of fresh
water. The Soviets do not appear to use the port's
small repair yard or the local petroleum, oil, and
lubricants (POL) supply, but do keep a support ship
and a small oiler there. Their combatants often refuel
prior to entering the harbor for reprovisioning, crew
rest or rotation, and mail call.
At Dahlak Island
the Soviets have installed floating piers, POL storage,
and maintenance and barracks buildings. They keep a
drydock for small combatants and diesel submarines,
a stores barge, and a repair ship at the island. Most
combatants serving in the Indian Ocean call at Dah-
lak Island at least once during their deployments.
. Dahlak's potential for expanded
logistic support is limited by its lack of fresh water
and its vulnerable location inside the Red Sea. It
could easily be cut off from sources of supply on the
mainland or in Aden.
Western Pacific Ocean. Soviet ships deployed to
distant areas of the Pacific use Cam Rahn Bay,
Vietnam, extensively as a transit stop and to support
their operations in the South China Sea. The Soviets
have refurbished the two piers that originally served
the US supply facility at Cam Ranh and added three
floating piers. According to US Navy data, they keep
about seven auxiliary ships in the area, including a
small repair ship and a drydock for small combatants.
Normally, combatants are replenished by oilers ac-
companying them; there are no bunkering or POL
storage facilities.
Syria, for maintenance of its diesel-powered subma-
rines. The monthly upkeep cycle in Tartus extends the
deployment time of the submarines that transit to the
Mediterranean Sea from the Northern Fleet. In addi-
tion, the Soviets keep a stores barge in Tartus and
rotate other auxiliaries-such as the Squadron's wa-
ter tender-through the port. Soviet combatants do
not use Syrian facilities such as the oil terminal.
West African Waters. The main port used by the
small contingent of ships serving off West Africa is
Luanda, Angola, where Soviet combatants generally
moor at the small naval base across from the commer-
cial port. A small repair ship services Soviet warships
and Angolan patrol craft, and the oiler serving with
the West African patrol normally operates from
Luanda. Other support ships traveling with combat-
ants transferring between fleets or en route to the
Indian Ocean use Luanda as a sheltered harbor for
maintenance?
Use of these overseas facilities as sheltered areas for
maintenance and resupply extends peacetime deploy-
ment periods and permits the Navy to allocate its
resources more effectively. In a prewar period, over-
seas logistic services could enhance the combat readi-
ness of naval forces. Without substantial upgrading,
however, none of these facilities could provide logistic
support for sustained combat operations in a major
war. Their repair capabilities are inadequate to cope
with the extensive damage that warships would be
likely to sustain. The Soviets do not have naval
munitions stored ashore at these facilities, have not
tested their ability to resupply combatants, and do not
rehearse cargo transfers to warships even in ports
regularly used for arms deliveries. They do not have
fuel depots ashore or supply lines to these facilities for
fuel and other supplies to supplement the limited
stocks carried by auxiliary ships. These ports could
provide improvised wartime logistic services while
improvements were being made.
Mediterranean Sea. After Moscow was expelled from
its facilities in Alexandria, Egypt, the Mediterranean
Squadron began to use a depot ship moored in Tartus,
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Figure 2
Distant Deployments of Soviet
Naval Aircraft i
F ASW patrol aircraft in Vietnam, and at least two
Bear D's in Cuba. They also periodically deploy Bear
D's to Angola, Bear F's to Cuba, and Mays to Libya.
1
SYria, 11-38 May apd
TU-16 Badger
Lihya, IL-38 May
Ethiopia, IL-38 Maiv
South Yemen. IL-3i Mav
Aircraltdays in country
5,000
11
El
Reconnaissance Aircraft
The Soviet Navy's use of maritime reconnaissance
and ASW patrol aircraft stationed abroad has in-
creased more than fi'efold since 1979 (see figure 2).
The Soviets now keel a pair of medium-range IL-38
May ASW patrol ai>craft in Ethiopia and in South
Yemen, a pair of long-range TU-95 Bear D reconnais-
sance aircraft and a pair of long-range TU-142 Bear
Vietnam, R' -142 Bear F
Vietnam, It-95 Bear 1)
Angola, It'-95 Bear 1)
Cuba, TU-95 Bear 1)
In using regional airfields, Moscow keeps its require-
ments to a minimum and relies on transport flights
from the USSR or a small group of technicians on site
to support the aircraft. Initially, transport aircraft will
remain with the reconnaissance aircraft throughout
the deployment, as in Libya. As the Soviets develop
more extensive ground-based support, as they have in
Cuba, transport flights may be irregular and eventu-
ally be discontinued. The Soviets prefer to secure an
area of the airfield for their own use and to have their
own POL storage, but will forgo these conveniences in
the interest of maintaining a low profile.
In Cuba and South Yemen, the Soviets have moved
their air operations to upgraded military airfields,
probably because of heightened security. They have
improved the airfield that they use in Vietnam but
Aircraft using foreign facilities can monitor naval
movements in areas of high Soviet interest, but there
are gaps in coverage, such as the southern Indian
Ocean (see figure 3).
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the aircraft make a major
contribution to Soviet surveillance efforts because of
their ability to provide accurate information, cover
large areas, and respond quickly. During hostilities, 25X1
reconnaissance aircraft could furnish locating data
and target information for missile-equipped combat-
ants so long as regional airfields remained operation-
al. Given the size of their inventory, we do not expect
the Soviets would deploy additional ASW aircraft
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overseas in wartime. The small number of these
aircraft already at foreign bases is insufficient to
conduct effective wartime ASW operations, and the
Soviets would be likely to use them primarily for
reconnaissance.i
During regional conflicts, the Soviets could use air-
craft deployed abroad to monitor ground forces activi-
ty or to provide security intelligence to the host
government. In addition, airfields now used by Soviet
naval aircraft, as well as those elsewhere, could be
used for demonstrations of Soviet support for the host
government, similar to Soviet deployment of naval
aircraft to Syria for a joint exercise in 1981
Contingency Response
To the extent that overseas facilities contribute to the
Soviets' ability to maintain standing naval forces in a
region, they also make it possible for Moscow to move
forces rapidly to nearby crisis areas or to reinforce
existing contingents. Ships lingering in Cam Ranh
Bay, for example, can patrol the South China Sea and
be available for emergency transit to the Indian
Ocean. In 1980 reinforcement of the Indian Ocean
Squadron involved a delay of at least 12 days while
units transited from Vladivostok
Contingency response may eventually involve the use
of overseas facilities to base tactical aircraft and to
pre-position supplies and personnel. Currently, the
Soviets' power projection capability is modest, but the
ongoing upgrading of amphibious forces and other
improvements in the Navy will ultimately provide
Moscow the option of using naval force against any
but the most well-armed regional powers or substan-
tial Western opposition. None of the facilities that the
Soviet Navy now routinely uses is suitable to support
a contingency response force larger than that routine-
ly deployed overseas on LSTs,F -1
Potential for Expanded Use of Overseas Facilities
Moscow is predisposed against reliance on overseas
facilities. We believe that Soviet planners regard the
wartime use of foreign naval facilities as questionable
because of their high vulnerability and because the
most crucial naval missions in wartime will be close to
Soviet home waters.' In peacetime, the Soviet Navy's
system of afloat logistics and low-activity level during
distant deployments minimize its need for land-based
support. Moreover, their expulsion from both Egypt
and Somalia has made the Soviets wary of substantial
investments in naval facilities where their access is
subject to unstable political agreements and has rein-
forced Moscow's view that local facilities are a sup-
plement to, rather than a replacement for, afloat
logistics
The problems associated with securing and maintain-
ing access to foreign facilities reinforce the USSR's
predisposition. These include Moscow's desire to avoid
the "neocolonialist" label often associated with for-
eign "bases," reluctance to trade hard currency re-
serves for naval privileges as some Third World
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Figure 3
Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces
France
Portugal
Mediterranea j- .
7 General purpose submarines '
9 Surface combatants
1 Mine warfare shy-amphibious ship
23 Auxiliaries
3-4 Research shjps
Spain
Alpesk faft$cw4c(
.. Ter Alboren
Basin
Morocco
Algeria
Sod
Kilometers
Libya
CAIRO*
Egypt
Atlantic
8 SS8Ns
10 General purpose submarines
2 Surface combatants
1 Mine warfare ship
8-9 Auxiliaries
8 Research ships
HAVANA
y+? ,Cienfuegos
Muriel
Cuba Antilla
Iraq
fl-V
Kuwait
BaN rain
Saudi Arabia
Tuntsia
Austria
Hungary
Rijeka
~: ,Yugoslavia
Spilt
Italy
Dubrovnik
~e~aTlvat
Roman a
Bulgaria
NapleiS,_. Taranto, tiAlb.
Cape Passero
Malte'?/Hu,d Bank
Kithira
cT?.
GBe
Soviet Union
Turkey
vCapefspoataleaitne a3el"y~atakia Syria
(Cape Aedreyaf ?~Li
East Crete
r
South Lebanon
Cyprus
TRIPOLI
Iran
Oman
Qatar'
'7lormuz
Oman
Sudan
Y.A.R.
Mitsa (North PORT.
-Smartt G Yemen) (South
J y..Al Hudaydah VemerO
Dehalak'
Onset
(Dalhleli LI -eb
Aseb
OjibouN
Ethiopia
2-83
Swite.
Banc t.e Sac
~L~LGIERS 'T' Bizerte
Annaba TDNISW AI Namman
y DEN
?Berberu
Somalia
' Caseyr .aer
!Cape Guardalmr
0 500
Kilometers
Caribbean
1 Auxiliary
1 Research ship
Israel
Jordan
sort Said
Cape Verde
western
Sahara
Dakhla,
The United States Government hen not recognized
the incorporation of Eetonin. Latvia, nod Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary reprenentatbn
is not necessarily authoritative.
See inset
Guinea"Blsseu Guinea
CONAKRY* Benin
Support/repair facility
Port of call
MoScow
See Inset
Soviet Union
COLOMBO*
Kampuchea
Kampdng SaBme
Sri Lanka
.Da Nang
Vietnam
Cam Renh
l~
SINGAPORE
Chagos
.r. W
e
4 YICTORIA1 -Diego Archipelago
Seychelles '` '-Dio Garcia
Eoefivy I. (fortune Bank)
?Nacala
,JL..
Beira
.r1..
Mozambique
}MAPUTO
'PORT LOUIS
Mauritlus
Anchorage
Airfield
Naval corrfrnuriications station
Note Tabulations show average daily deployment of Soviet naval forces ,n 7982
Indian Ocean
2-3 General purpose submarines
2-3 Major surface combatants
1 Mine warfare ship or patrol craft
1-2 Amphibious ships
15 Auxiliaries
4 Research ships
Viadicootoly
Pacific
4 SSBNs
6 General purpose submarines
3 Surface combatants
1 Mine warfare ship or amphibious ship
14 Auxiliaries
5-6 Research ships
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