CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURES ACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000100010016-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: September 17, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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96TH CONGRESS
i HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES J
REPT. 96-
2d Session
f t
831, Part 2
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CRIMINAL TRIAL
PROCEDURES ACT
SEPTEMBER 17, 1980.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed ',
Mr. EDWARDS of California, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
'SUPPLEMEN'TAL-VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 4736 which on July 11, 1979, was referred jointly to
the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 4736) to establish certain pretrial and trial procedures for the
use of-classified information in connection with Federal criminal cases,
and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended
do pass.
The amendment strikes out all after the enacting clause of the bill
and inserts a new text which appears in boldface roman type in the
reported bill.
BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
In recent years, there have been a number of highly publicized
criminal cases in which the disclosure of sensitive classified informa-
tion has been an issue. Such cases include but are not limited to tradi-
tional espionage trials,' as well as cases involving alleged wrongdoing
by government O icials.2
1 U.S. v. Berrellea, (D.D.C. Crim. No. 78-120) ; U.S. v. Humphrey and Truong (E.D.
Va. Crim. No. 78-25-A) ; U.S. v. Hampiles (N.D. Ind. Crim. No. HCR 78-77).
2 U.S. v. L. Patrick Gray III, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller (D.D.C. Crim. No.
78-000179).
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In the course of these prosecutions, both the defense and the govern-
ment may seek to introduce classified information as an important part
of their respective cases. Under present procedures, decisions regard-
ing the relevance and admissibility of evidence are normally made as
they arise during the course of trial.
Arguments on both sides of the relevance question could take place
in open court. Obviously, during such an exchange, sensitive informa-
tion could be disclosed, even if the ultimate determination is made that
the evidence is neither relevant nor admissible.
The government, which has the dual responsibility of prosecuting
violations of federal criminal laws and protecting national security
secrets, must often guess, in advance of trial, whether the defendant
will seek to disclose certain classified information and whether it will
be found admissible. It must also speculate on how much will be dis-
closed and thus how much harm may be done to the national security
before a ruling on the use of the information can be obtained.
the costs ... go beyond the failure to redress particular
instances of illegal conduct. Such determinations foster the
perception that government officials and private persons with
access to military or technical secrets have a broad de facto
immunity from prosecution.... This perception not only
undermines the public's confidence in the fair administration
of criminal justice but it also promotes concern that there is
no effective check against improper conduct by members of
our intelligence agencies.'
Perhaps even more damaging than the decision not to prosecute in
the first place may be the government's decision to dismiss a case in
mid-trial, when confronted either with the unanticipated introduction
of sensitive material or with potentially inadequate mechanisms for
minimizing disclosure.5
. General Philip Heymann
8 See testimony of Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heyymann, U.S. Department of
Justice, before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Righs of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, Apr. 24, 1980.
* Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann, Graymail legislation : Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Legislation of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
ggence, 96th Congress, 1st Session, Aug. 7 and Sept. 20, 1979, p. 5. (hereinafter Graymail
legislation : Hearings before.... )
See e.g. U.B. v. Berrellez, supra, The government sought and was granted permission to
dismiss the indictment in this espionage case in the midst of pre-trial proceedings. The
district judge had denied the government's motion for a protective order establishing a
prospective procedure requiring advance notice and a pre-disclosure determination of
relevance. Subsequently, newspapers articles appeared in major U.S. newspapers suggest-
ing that because the, reason for the dismissal was that the information was embarrass
rather than vital to he national security. (See e.g. Charles Mohr, New York Times, p. A
Feb. 9, 1979).
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Where the government expects to disclose some classified material
in presenting its own case, the same assessment must be made. Thus, all
of the sensitive materials that might be disclosed at trial must be
weighed in deciding whether to proceed with the prosecution.
Depending on the nature of the information at issue and the extent
to which it may already have been compromised, the government may
be confronted with the dilemma of accepting the disclosure of the sensi-
tive information or dismissing the prosecution.
In the past, the government has foregone prosecution of some cases
in order to avoid compromising national security information.3 The
costs of such decisions are great. In the words of Assistant Attorney
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While these problems arise in the context of a relatively small num-
ber of cases, the cases are often highly visible and of considerable
public importance.6 Experience has led to the conclusion that the
creation of uniform procedures for resolving issues regarding classi-
fied information would be useful in establishing a balance between
the public interest in vigorous enforcement of our criminal laws on the
one hand and the constitutional right to a fair trial on the other.
H.R. 4736 establishes those procedures. For the most part, the bill
describes techniques already available to the courts and often utilized
in the past. It is not intended to infringe on a defendant's right to
a fair trial or to change the existing rules of evidence and criminal
procedure. Rather it is intended to provide uniformity, rationality
and consistency to the present system. It is intended in so far as pos-
sible to eliminate guesswork and speculation from the government's
decision making process. It will enable the government, the defendant
and the court to locus on the merits of the case rather than on pro-
cedural problems that now consume vast amounts of time and
resources.?
The disclose or dismiss dilemma can never be eliminated entirely.
Inherent in every espionage trial for example, is the principle set out
in innumerable court decisions 8 that when the government chooses
to prosecute an individual for a crime it cannot deny to him the right
to meet the case against him by introducing relevant documents, even
those otherwise privileged. The government must decide whether the
public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater than
the disclosure of those state secrets which might be relevant to the
defense. Such disclosures include evidence the prosecution may wish to
introduce against an accused as well as the accused's right to put in
evidence on his own behalf.9
Thus in virtually every criminal prosecution involving classified
information the government must make this choice. However, the
elements of surprise and uncertainty can be eliminated from the out-
set by requiring advance notice of the defendant's intention to intro-
duce classified information. Hearings on admissibility can be held
in camera so that classified information that is not admissible need
not be dislcosed ' publicly. Once admissibility has been determined,
alternatives can be. fashioned to minimize the possible harm result-
ing from disclosure.
H.R. 4736 is designed to accomplish these goals. It is the Com-
mittee's judgment that this legislation is worthwhile in that it ex-
presses a clear congressional intent that the courts must give these
cases and the issues they raise careful and methodical treatment in
accordance with a clearly defined process.
0 See e.g. U.B. v. Berreliez, supra, raising questions regarding CIA involvement in the
internal political affairs of Chile and U.B. V. Felt, Gray, Miller, supra, alleging unlawful
conduct on the part of former high-ranking FBI officials.
' See testimony of Michael E. Tigar, Esq., before the Subcommittee on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 13 1980.
e See, e.g. U.B. v. Andoischek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 19) ; U.e. v. Oopion, 185 F.2d
629 ((2d Clr. 1950).
U.B. v. Ooplon, 185 F.2d at 288.
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HISTORY OF THE BILL
H.R. 4736 was introduced on July 11, 1979, by members of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Although the
bill was the product of hearings and deliberation of that Commit-
tee, the bill was referred jointly to the House Judiciary Committee
because of the bill's potential Impact on the rules of evidence and
criminal procedure which fall within the Judiciary Committee's
jurisdiction, as well as the bill's implications for the guarantees of
the 6th Amendment to the Constitution."
On February 12, 1980 after several hearings and intensive delibera-
tion between the Intelligence Committee, the Justice Department,
the defense bar and other interested individuals and groups, the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence favorably re-
ported H.R. 4736, as amended. The bill was ordered reported by
unanimous voice vote of the Committee.'
The bill, as reported by the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, was the subject of separate hearings in the Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee
on the Judiciary on April 24 and May 13, 1980. Testimony was heard
from the Justice Department, the intelligence community, civil lib-
erties groups and the defense bar. All of the witnesses expressed
support for the legislation. In addition, the Subcommittee received
the views of other interested individuals and organizations such as
the American Bar Association and the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts again expressing support for the principal provisions
of the legislation.
Based on this record, as well as on the work of the House Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights met on June 13, 1980 to consider H.R. 4736.
The vehicle for mark-up was H.R. 4736, as reported by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. By a unanimous voice
vote, the bill was ordered reported to the full committee.
On July 22, 1980, the Committee met to consider H.R. 4736, as
amended, made further amendment thereto and, a quorum being
present, ordered the bill, as amended, reported to the House by
unanimous voice vote.
EXPLANATION OF AMENDMENT
The Committee adopted a single amendment to the Intelligence
Committee's amendment in the nature of a substitute. The amendment
adds the House and Senate Judiciary Committees to the Committees
to whom the Attorney General must report regarding the effect and
operation of the legislation under section 202 of the bill. The bill as
reported by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
required such reporting only to the House and Senate on Intelligence
w The Sixth Amendment reads as follows : "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district.shall have been pre-
viously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion ; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor,'^and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
11 For a more detailed description of the evolution and history of the bill, see Report
No. 96-831, Part 1.
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Committees. Because the bill involves important issues of criminal
procedure and constitutional law, which are the special province and
responsibility of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Com-
mittee felt that it should maintain an active role in overseeing the
impact of the legislation. The Committee's amendment helps the
Committee accomplish that result. The amendment was adopted by
voice vote, with one dissenting voice.
SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION AND DISCUSSION OF OOMMrrm
CONSIDERATION
A detailed section-by-section analysis . appears elsewhere in this
report.12 The Judiciary Committee's endorsement of H.R. 4736 reflects
its judgment that the Intelligence Committee weighed carefully the
competing interests at stake in this legislation and achieved the proper
balance between them. The Committee felt no need to independently
scrutinize every provision of the bill. However, during the Commit-
tee's consideration of the bill, several provisions emerged as deserv-
ing of the Committee's closer attention. In one case a separate com-
mittee amendment was judged to be necessary.
REPORTING REQUIREMENT
Section 202 of the bill, as reported by the Intelligence Committee
contained a requirement that the Attorney General report to the
House and Senate Committees on Intelligence on an annual basis
regarding "the operation and effectiveness of this bill." The reports
are to include summaries of those cases not prosecuted because of the
possibility that classified information would be disclosed. Because
this bill has a criminal justice dimension equal in importance to its
national security dimension, requiring its referral to the Committee
on the Judiciary in the first place, the Committee is convinced that
its responsibility for the legislation should go beyond its initial con-
sideration. The Committee believes it should share equally in the bur-
den of oversight with the Intelligence Committee. Because the Com-
mittee felt it had an important role to play in the continued and sys-
tematic congressional monitoring of the effectiveness of the legisla-
tion, it was the Committee's judgment that it should be added to the
Committees to which the Attorney General must report.
The Executive Branch has stressed its need for this legislation on
the basis that certain kinds of criminal prosecutions were not being
brought because of lack of adequate procedures for protecting national
security information.]-' This bill attempts to provide those procedures.
It is the Committee's view in adopting the Committee amendment
that the relevant oversight Committees be in a position to know if the
legislation is working to achieve the goals it was designed to achieve.
It is not the Committee's intent to interfere with prosecutorial dis-
cretion. As in the case of prior notice to the Intelligence Committees
concerning covert operations, it is not the Committee's purpose that
12 See Report 96-831, Part 1 Classified Information Criminal Trial Procedures Act, to
accompany H.R. 4736, Mar. 18. 1980. pp. 12-32.
18 Testimony of Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann before the Subcommittee
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 24, 1980.
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the Executive Branch seek the approval or disapproval of the Legis-
lative Branch in adhering to a reporting requirement. The purpose of
the requirement is merely to enable the Committee to learn on a regu-
lar, systematic basis the information necessary to conduct its oversight
function.
Nor is it the Committee's intent to increase the potential for disclo-
sure of classified information by emphasizing its role in the oversight
process. Indeed the Committee does not believe such reports necessarily
require the inclusion of classified information at all. The Attorney
General has in the past prepared reports for general public release
which the Committee cites gas examples of the type of reports which
may satisfy the section 202 requirement without risking exposure of
classified information.14
The Committee emphasizes that this provision of the bill is designed
merely to facilitate the, oversight process, not to be an exclusion expres-
sion of or substitute for it. Given the small number of cases apt to be
involved,15 the Committee does not believe that this requirement unduly
burdens the Attorney General.
ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR DISCLOSURE
Another important aspect of the bill which came under scrutiny is
the section 103 provision permitting, under certain circumstances= the
substitution of summaries or admissions for the specific classified
information at issue, once the information has been held relevant and
admissible. During the Subcommittee hearings on the bill, two con-
cerns regarding this provision were expressed. The first was that
permitting any use of summaries- works a hardship on the defense.
The argument was made that if evidence is relevant and admissible,
the jury ought to hear it just as it hears any other relevant and admis-
sible evidence, in its totality.16 To do otherwise might adversely affect
the defendant's case.
The Committee recognizes the risk inherent in even a discretionary
use of summaries as in section 103. By ratifying this provision of the
bill, the Committee does not mean to suggest that any hardship to the
defense should be permitted. Indeed the language of this section
makes it clear that the court is to grant the government's motion for a
substitution only "if it finds that the statement or summary will pro-
vide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his
defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information." It
is the Committee's intent that there be no impairment of either the
defendant's ability to present his case or his right to a fair trial as a
result of the operation of this section.
The second concern, related to first,' is that government-triggered
proceeding under section 102(c) could result in the admission of sum-
14 See, e.g. Report of the Department of Justice Concerning Its Investigation and Prose-
cutorial Decisions with Respect to Ceneral Intelligence Agency Mail Opening Activities
in the United States, Jan. 14, 1977, reprinted in Report No. 96-280, Justice Department
Handling of Cases Involving Classified Data and Claims of National Security, Second Report
by the Committee on Government Operations (June 18, 1979). (See also Press Conference
of the Honorable Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States, and the Honorable
Benjamin R. Civiletti, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division with members of the
Press, Washington, D.C. Nov.. 1, 1977, regarding Justice Department Investigation of CIA
Director Richard Helms.)
18 Testimony of Philip B. Heymann before the Subcommittee on Civil,and Constitutional
Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 24, 1980.
1e Testimony of Michael E. Tiger, Esq., before the Subcommittee on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 13, 1980.
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maries or substitutions of materials the defense in fact never had
complete access to.
It was suggested at the Subcommittee's hearing that this could
happen if the government referred to the classified information at
issue only by generic category, as is permitted under section 102(c),
and then moved to substitute a summary for the classified informa-
tion under section 103. This possibility prompted considerable dis-
cussion at the Subcommittee hearings 17 and resulted in an inquiry 18
to the Intelligence Committee as to that Committee's understanding
of the exact meaning of section 103 as the principal drafters of that
provision. The Intelligence Committee's response, with which the
Judiciary Committee concurs, was that "it is not the intent of the . .
Committee to authorize, nor . . . would the bill permit" 1s the result
suggested during the Subcommittee hearings.
The purpose of a proceeding under section 102 is to determine prior
to trial the admissibility, at trial, of classified information already in
the possession of the defendant. This is the case, whether the proceed-
ing is triggered by the defendant's giving notice to the government of
its intent to- use classified information, or by the government's own
initiation of a proceeding. The information in the possession of the
defendant may have been supplied to the defendant by the govern-
ment pursuant to a pre-trial discovery request, or it may have been
acquired by the defendant from some other source.
To facilitate the arguments as to the admissibility of such informa-
tion, section 102(e) requires the government to give notice, prior to
? the proceeding, of the classified information at issue. If the classified
information the defendant possesses was given to him by the govern-
ment, the government will have already confirmed its sensitivity;
therefore, the required notice can be specific, as is mandated by section
102(e). However, if the sensitive information at issue was obtained by
the defendant from a non-government source, then the government is
not required to confirm its accuracy or to expand the defendant's,
knowledge of classified information, and the required notice can by
generic category. This is all that is contemplated by section 102(e).
The purpose of a section 103 proceeding is to determine if the evi-
dence found to be admissible at a section 102 hearing may be intro-
duced in a summary form. Since the evidence at issue in section 102 is
necessarily material already in the possession of the defendant, in no
case does the legislation encompass classified information to which the
defense has not had access.
Considerable attention was devoted to this provision. No infringe-
ment on the defendant's, ability to make his case is intended. Indeed,
it is the Committee's intent that all hearings conducted under section
102 and 103 of the bill will be fully adversary and will be concerned
only with information to which the defendant has had complete access.
17 See testimony of Michael E. Tiger, Esq., and Morton Halperin, Director, Center for
National Security Studies, before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, May 13, 1980.
Is Letter dated June 12, 1980 from the Honorable Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcom-
mittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary, to the,
Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
's Letter dated June 12, 1980 from the Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman, House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to the Honorable Don Edwards, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional tights, House Committee on the Judiciary.
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ililllo
RULES ON ACCESS AND SECURITY
Section 110 requires the Chief Justice of the United States, in con-
sultation with the Attorney General and the Director of Central In-
telligence, to establish security procedures for classified information
in the custody of the. courts as a result of proceedings under this leg-
islation. Concern was expressed during the Committee's consideration
of H.R. 4736 that, this procedure represented a significant departure
from the normal method of proposing rules and procedures for the
U.S. district courts.20 Normally, such rules are proposed by the Su-
preme Court and submitted to Congress. It was suggested that for
the Attorney General and the CIA Director to have a role in this
process was inappropriate, as was the exclusion from the process of the
other justices of the Supreme Court. The Committee would have se-
rious reservations about departing from the procedure routinely fol-
lowed if. it understood the rules at issue to be of a substantive nature,
as for example, the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the Com-
mittee understands the rules contemplated in section 110 to be house-
keeping rules : where safes are to be located, who is to have the
combinations, how many court employees can have access to the doc-
uments, and the like. The physical security of documents is the focus
of this section and, on that basis, the Committee has no reservation
about placing the responsibility for assuring that security in the three
individuals named in section 110.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., July 28, 1980.
Hon. PETER W. RODINO, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed
H.R. 4736, the Classified Information Criminal Trial Procedures Act,
as ordered reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, July 22,
1980.
The bill establishes new court procedures for Federal criminal cases
involving classified information. It requires a defendant to notify the
court and the attorney for the United States of any intention to dis-
close classified information, whereupon the United States is authorized
to request the court to conduct a proceeding (which may be held
privately) with the right of appeal to discuss the use, relevance and/
or admissibility of the information in question. The bill provides for
alternatives to full disclosure, such as a summary or statement of facts,
if the value of the information to the defense is not substantially
altered. If the court denies a motion regarding the use of these alterna-
tives, the Attorney General may object with explanation by filing an
affidavit certifying that full disclosure would cause identifiable dam,
10 See testimony of Michael E. Tigar, Esq. and Morton Halperin before the Subcom-
mlttee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
May 13, 1980. See also letter dated June 2, 1980, from William E. Foley, Executive Direc
tor, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to Congressman Don Edwards.
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is
of enactment of this bill.
Sincerely,
age to the national security of the United States. The court is then
required to order the defendant not to disclose the information and
dismiss the case or testimony or part of the case or testimony, depend-
ing on the situation. The Attorney General is required to report an-
nually on the operation and effectiveness of the Act.
The provisions of this bill are not expected to add significantly to
the burdens of the judicial system and thus it is expected that no sig-
nificant additional cost to the Government will be incurred as a result
and thoroughly.
ALICE M. RIVLIN, Director.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
Pursuant to clause 2(1) (3) (A) of Rule XI of the Rules of the
House, the Committee makes no oversight findings at this time. The
Committee approached its inquiry into H.R. 4736 primarily as a legis-
lative inquiry. Once enacted, however, this legislation will create new
oversight responsibilities for the Committee in the criminal justice
area. The Committee plans to exercise that responsibility carefully
The Committee has not received any cost estimates from the Execu-
tive Branch and is therefore unable to compare the Executive Branch
costs to its own estimate pursuant to clause 7(a) (2) of Rule XIII of
the Rules of the House.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
Pursuant to clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House the
Committee notes that the bill makes no changes to existing. law.
FIVE YEAR COST PROJECTION
Pursuant to clause 7(a) (1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House,
the Committee has determined that no additional costs will be incurred
by the Government in the administration of H.R. 4736.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT
Pursuant to clause 2(1) (3) (B), the Committee notes that this leg-
islation does not provide for new budget authority or tax expenditures.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
The Committee had not received a report from the Committee on
Government Operations pursuant to clase 2(1) (3) (D) of Rule XI of
the Rules of the House as of the time of the filing of this report.
INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 2(1) (4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House,
the Committee has examined H.R. 4736 to determine if it will have
inflationary impact on the national economy. Consistent with the Com-
mittee's determinations as to the cost of H.R. 4736, the Committee
finds that enactment of H.R. 4736 will have no effect on the national
economy.
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SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF HON.. M. CALDWELL
BUTLER TO H.R. 4736
Section 202 of this bill requires that the Attorney General annually
report on the progress of cases brought under this Act to both the
Permanent Select Committees of the House and Senate and the
Judiciary Committees on both bodies. It seems to us that recent
years have seen too much movement toward the issuance of reports
to Congressional committees. They are rarely used, cost the taxpayer
immense sums of money, and, we fear, inhibit the flexibility of
Executive departments and agencies in carrying out their responsi-
bilities. The reporting requirements contained in this legislation are
symptomatic of the problem.
H.R. 4736 was drafter for the purpose of processing extremely im-
portant and sensitive confidential, classified information through the
court system. Under its provisions, a federal judge will be empowered
to review classified information subpoenaed for trial and determine,
in camera, whether that material should or should not be disclosed to
the public. Any decision to reveal the classified information will be
subject to an interlocutory appeal by the government.
Having said that, we create additional language which requires
the Department of Justice to report to four committees of the Con-
gress relative to the "operation and effectiveness of this Act." Since
Rule XLVIII of the House governs the composition of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and requires that its membership
include at least one Member from the Judiciary Committee (there
are now three), we are inclined to believe the interests of the Com-
mittee and of the American people are satisfactorily represented and
that further public discussion of classified issues is absolutely un-
necessary.
We see no reason for another set of reports to people who already
have access to the information in question and will urge rejection of
the amendment which requires special reports to members of our
Committee.
M. CALDWELL BUTLER.
ROBERT MCCLORY.
JOHN M. AsaBROOK.
HENRY J. HYDE.
THoMAs N. KINDNESS.
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