GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE ACT OF 1979 A REPORT TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 24

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00003R000200020009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 11, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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96TH CONGRESS j HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES R>1Poirr
18t Session' f No. 96-425
SEPTEMBER 11, 1979.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on Government Operations,
submitted the following
REPORT
[To accompany H.R. 24]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Government Operations, to whom was referred
the bill (H.R. 24) to improve budget management and expenditure
control by revising certain provisions relating to the Comptroller
General and the Inspectors General of the Departments of Energy
and Health, Education, and Welfare, and for other purposes, having
considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment
and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment strikes out all after the enacting clause of the in-
troduced bill and inserts a new text which appears in italic type in
the reported bill.
SUMMARY AND PURPOSE
This legislation is intended to strengthen the General Accounting
Office's ability to discharge its functions as an investigative and audit-
ing arm of the Congress. The GAO, headed by the Comptroller Gen-
eral, is a principal means by which the legislative branch conducts
oversight of executive branch programs and expenditures. Congress
relies both on the GAO and on the Comptroller General to insure that
(1) funds are used for their intended purposes, (2) agency resources
are managed efficiently and economically, and (3) programs are achiev-
ing the objectives set forth by the law.
H.R. 24 is designed to improve GAO's effectiveness in carrying out
these responsibilities. First, it provides GAO with authority to audit
most unvouchered expenditures, those expenditures which are author-
ized by law to be accounted for solely on the signature of the Presi-
dent or other designated officials. Second, it strengthens GAO's exist-
ing authority to enforce its statutory right of access to records of Fed-
eral agencies as well as non-Federal entities such as government con-
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tractors and grantees. Third, it makes changes in GAO's report
issuance procedure in order to improve the timeliness and accuracy of
such reports. Fourth, H.R. 24 provides a formal mechanism for Con-
gressional input in the appointment of future Comptrollers General
and their Deputies. It would establish a commission of named Con-
gressional leaders to submit to the President their recommendations
for potential nominees to those offices. Finally, H.R. 24 amends the
auditing authority of the Inspectors General of the Departments of
Health, Education, and Welfare and Energy to conform to the audit-
ing authority provided in the Inspector General Act of 1978.
A similar bill, H.R. 12171, was introduced in the 95th Congress. It
was unanimously approved by the Subcommittee on Legislation and
National Security and the full Committee on Government Operations
and it, passed the House by voice vote. However, it, failed to gain Senate
consideration prior to adjournment. H.R. 24 incorporates many of the
provisions of last year's bill and contains several new provisions.
COMMITME VolT
11.11. 24 was reported by a unanimous 33 to zero roll call vote with a
quorum present.
HEARINGS
Tlearings on H.R. 24 were held by the Subcommittee on Legislation
and National Security on Time, 19, 1979. Testimony was received from
the Comptroller General of the United States and the Director of time
Office of Management and Budget.
I)ISCF SSION
BACKGROUND
With the growth in the number of Federal programs and agencies.
the Congress has by necessity become more dependent on GAO assist-
ance in fulfilling Congressional oversight and legislative responsibil-
ities. In performing this mandate, the GAO not only provides Congress
with essential information about Federal programs, but, uniquely.
exercises statutory authority to participate directly in the oversight
process as an independent Congressional entity. In effect, it represents
the Congress by carrying out important oversight responsibilities for
it. The broad spectrum of emerging problems and the complex issues
of economic, social, military and political significance facing the Con-
gress, has led to a refocusing of GAO's attention from the traditional
finance and accounting activities to assessments of the economy, efi-ci-
ency and effectiveness of agency and program management and opera-
tion.
While hundreds of statutory provisions form the basis for GAO's
authority to perform this increasing responsibility, the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 provides sufficiently broad and comprehensive
authority to investigate ". . . all matters relating to the receipt, dis-
bursement, and application of public funds. ." This authority ex-
tends not only to accounting and financial auditing but also to related
aspects of administration, operations and program evaluation. Suc-
ceeding legislation affecting GAO's authority generally hm's served to
make mandatory, explicit and emphatic the requirement for GAO to
assess the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of program operation
by the executive branch. These legislative efforts are represented by
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the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, The Legislative
Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970, and the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Congress has moved in recent years to assume greater leadership in
establishing national policy and has found it necessary to increase its
direction and control over executive branch expenditures as a means
of promoting a sound Federal budget and a healthy economy. This
cannot be done effectively without increased oversight by the Congress
with the assistance of the GAO. It is essential that GAO in carrying
out these responsibilities be given the proper support and direction to
ensure its responsiveness to the Congress.
The following provisions of H.R. 24 are designed to achieve this
objective.
Generally, GAO's audit authority extends to all expenditures of the
various departments and establishments. However, exceptions are pro-
vided by law, including a fairly substantial numbers of "unvouchered"
or confidential funds which are accounted for solely by the President or
head of the department or establishment involved. Section 101 of H.R.
24 grants the Comptroller General the authority to audit such ex-
penditures. Appendix A contains a listing of examples of agencies
with unvouchered accounts.
Certain of these unvouchered fund authorizations already have been
the subject of Congressional scrutiny. Public Law 95-570, the White
House Authorization Act, allows the Comptroller General to inspect
all necessary books, documents, papers, and records relating to expendi-
tures in certificate accounts for the care and maintenance expenses
of the Executive Mansion and the official entertainment expenses of the
President. This GAO inspection is solely for the purpose of verifying
to Congress that the funds were legitimately expended and to report
any expenses that cannot be verified. This bill, like Public Law 95-570,
contains provisions designed to safeguard information obtained by
GAO in its audits of such expenditures.
The Office of Management and Budget expressed concern over the
provisions in section 101 of H.R. 24. While the OMB basically agrees
that the Comptroller General should audit virtually every account.
they feel that exemptions are needed to protect sensitive information.
These exemptions include expenditures by and for (1) Domestic Law
Enforcement matters, (2) protective activities of the hnited States
Secret Service, (3) the State Department pertaining to the settlement
of unspecified expenses of intercourse with foreign nations, and (4)
the Treasury Department for unspecified transactions with foreign
governments and certain unspecified Exchange Stabilization Fund
transactions.
Since H.R. 24 was introduced earlier this year, many discussions
have taken place with officials from the GAO and OMB about these
expenditures. From these discussions it was agreed that there was a
need to establish procedures to guard against unnecessary disclosure
of sensitive information such as the financial transactions of the Ex-
change Stabilization Fund and expenditures made in the course of
a confidential or sensitive law enforcement investigation. As a result,
H.R. 24 was amended to include the provision in section 101 which
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prohibits the GAO from releasing information it obtains from its
audit of unvouchered expenditures to anyone except the President or
the head of the agency concerned or, in the case of unresolved discrep-
ancies. to a duly established committee or subcommittee of Congress.
In addition, section 101 contains provisions which permit the Presi-
(lent to exempt certain transactions which relate to foreign intelligence
or counter-intelligence activities and provides for certain transactions
to be reviewed by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. This language
was not. contained in the original version of last year's bill, but a sub-
sequent amendment at the suggestion of the House Select Committee
on Intelligence incorporated these provisions. At the time this lan-
guage was inserted, Chairman Boland stated that this amendment
"fully satisfies the security concerns of the Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence and of the intelligence community as to expend-
itures which go to the heart of our most sensitive intelligence efforts."
In summary, H.R. 24 provides the flexibility needed to ensure that
selected categories of sensitive information are properly safeguarded.
It is the Committee's belief that these safeguards adequately address
the concerns raised by the aforementioned Departments while at the
same time providing for much needed Congressional oversight of these
activities.
A principal duty of GAO is to make independent audits of agency
operations and programs and to report to the Congress on the manner
in which Federal departments and agencies carry out their respon-
ribilties. In establishing GAO, Congress recognized that the Office
would require complete access to the records of the Federal agencies.
The intent of GAO's enacting legislation is clear on this point. It
provides:
All departments and establishments shall furnish to the
Comptroller General such information regarding the powers,
duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and
methods of business of their respective offices as he may from
time to time require of them; and the Comptroller General,
or any of his assistants or employees, when duly authorized
by him, shall, for the purpose of securing such information,
have access to and the right to examine any books, documents,
papers, or records of any such department or establish-
ment * * *
Despite this clear statutory authority, the GAO has encountered
difficulty in obtaining information from executive branch agencies
and other organizations in which it has the right of access by law or
agreement. This has effectively delayed or made impossible GAO's
responsiveness to the Congress in those instances.
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National
Security, Comptroller General Staats provided an overview of the type
of access problems GAO has encountered. Appendix B contains a
summary of these problems. At the Federal agency level he indicated
that GAO has encountered access problems which were impossible
to resolve. More frequently, however, after long and arduous nego-
tiations, a compromise is reached in which GAO is granted some
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form of limited access. The length of time such efforts have de-
manded-at times exceeding five years-has tended to make the efforts
of marginal value to the Congress and has resulted in needless and
costly expenditures of scarce GAO resources.
For example, the Department of Defense and the service branches
continue to resist GAO's full and open access to DOD records. On
several occasions DOD has denied GAO access to information which
is critical to a GAO investigation even though the Department has
never been able to cite any statutory basis for its refusal to grant such
access. These denials are more often based on sweeping and general
grounds, such as the reports are "internal working papers." On more
than one occasion the Air Force has refused to give the GAO copies
of certain briefing documents that were prepared in connection with
fiscal year budget projections. Such was the case in a recent investi-
gation of a $4 billion Air Force computer acquisition being conducted
by the GAO at the request of this Committee. The Air Force's delay
in giving GAO this critical documentation has prevented the Com-
mittee from completing its investigation in time for the Committee
to inform the House of its findings prior to consideration of the DOD
Appropriations bill.
Another instance, cited to us by the Honorable Lee Hamilton,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, concerned an experience the GAO
had while attempting to acquire information for the Chairman of
the Subcommittee from the State Department. Chairman Hamilton's
correspondence appears in Appendix C. The State Department took
the official position that GAO has unlimited access to records only in
the course of narrow financial audits. Based on this position, the
Department refused to provide GAO with relevant data they had
requested to complete their on-going investigation. In a memorandum
prepared for Mr. Hamilton's Subcommittee by the American Law
Division of the Congressional Research Service, also in appendix C,
it was stated that GAO's statutory powers of access to State Depart-
ment records do not differentiate between factual information and
materials related to policy formulation and implementation. The
memorandum also states that while such materials may be internal
policy memoranda, this fact does not automatically disqualify them
from coverage. The memorandum indicates that Congress has long
viewed the Comptroller General's access authority in the broadest
context, allowing him access to information not directly concerned
with the expenditure of funds. The CRS memorandum concludes that
GAO's ". . . various review and oversight powers are sufficient; what
is needed is a way to enforce them."
The GAO has testified that these are not merely ad hoc denials
made by lower level officials, but reflect formal agency policy guide-
lines which serve to undermine GAO's ability to be responsive to the
Congress. Unfortunately, this situation will continue to exist until
GAO is given an effective remedy to enforce its legal right to access.
Section 102 of H.R. 24 authorizes the Comptroller General to insti-
tute judicial enforcement actions to compel production of documents
in cases where an executive department or establishment fails to com-
ply with a request for information, books, documents, papers, or rec-
ords within 20 days following a formal demand. After an additional
20 days notice to the Attorney General, the Comptroller General is
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authorized to seek an order in the Federal District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia and obtain a judicial order compelling any Federal
department or establishment to furnish GAO with the requested mate-
rial. Further, the Comptroller General is authorized to issue and
enforce subpoenas on non-Federal entities, such as contractors, sub-
contractors, grantees or other recipients of Federal assistance, for
materials and documents to which it now has a legal right of access.
This section permits the Comptroller General to be represented by
attorneys of his own selection in any action brought under this section.
The purpose of this provision is to remedy the potential conflict of
interest caused by the Attorney General representing both respondents
in a judicial action involving the GAO and a Federal agency. Finally,
Section 102 provides that any failure to obey an order of the court
tinder this provision shall be treated by the court as a contempt
thereof.
The GAO, while supporting the 20 day "cooling off period" for
notice to the Attorney General prior to initiating legal action, sug-
gested that, as a matter of courtesy, the agency head and the Director
of OA1B also be notified simultaneously with the Attorney General.
The Committee has no objection to this suggestion so long as it does
not impede GAO's ability to obtain the information it desires in a
timely manner.
The Committee emphasizes that the enforcement provisions of H.R.
24 do not expand GAO's existing rights of access concerning either
Federal agencies or non-Federal entities. As mentioned earlier, the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 assigns GAO the right to ex-
amine any books, documents, papers, or records of any department
or establishment, GAO access to contractor records is also provided
by statute. For example, 10 U.S.C. 2313 (Department of Defense
negotiated contracts) and 41 U.S.C. 254 (negotiated contracts covered
by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949)
provide access to contractor records. Access to grantee records is pro
vided by numerous statutes such as the Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Education Act and the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970.
Concerning non-Federal entities, the GAO has testified that while its
existing access rights generally afford it adequate legal basis to accom-
plish its legislative mandate, it has experienced access problems similar
to those encountered with Federal agencies. The need as stated is for
a prompt judicial remedy to ensure that those entities with whom GAO
deals comply with their statutory or contractual obligations.
At the present there are more than 50 departments and agencies
with authority to subpoena records. (See appendix D for a list of
agencies having subpoena authority.) On the other hand, subpoena
authority has been granted to GAO in only the following areas:
Verification examinations of energy information (42 U.S.C.
6382),
Monitoring and evaluating all Department of Energy func
tions (Public Law 95-91, section 207; Public Law 93-275, section
12), and
Audits of Social Security Act programs (Public Law 95-142,
section 6).
The GAO has reported, that in those areas where it has been given
subpoena authority, it has been able to satisfactorily complete its work
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without appreciable delays caused by access problems. One of the ex-
amples cited by the GAO as an illustration of the success of this
approach, is its experience under Title V of the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act. Title V grants GAO subpoena authority in the con-
duct of verification examinations of energy information. Since the
enactment of the statute in 1975, GAO has successfully conducted au-
dits of the books and records of 32 energy companies without the need
to issue a single subpoena.
The Committee believes that the availability of judicial enforcement
provided by H.R. 24 will greatly reduce instances where executive
agencies and non-Federal entities refuse GAO access to information
thereby enhancing the completeness and timeliness of GAO's work. It
is anticipated that such judicial remedy would be used only in those
situations where it becomes difficult or impossible otherwise to obtain
information from any Federal establishment or non-Federal entity
whose records are currently subject to GAO review. As a practical
matter, the very existence of such authority should minimize and, over
time, virtually eliminate the current conflicts over GAO's access to in-
formation. GAO's experience in those areas where it curreptly has sub-
poena authority supports this view.
The Departments of Defense and Justice, and the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget oppose Congress' granting authority to the Comp-
troller General to enforce requests for information for Federal agen-
cies through judicial process. DOD argues that there is no need for
this section because the law clearly authorizes the Comptroller Gen-
eral to obtain necessary information and court decisions have upheld
that right. In additon, it is argued that Federal agencies generally
cooperate with the Comptroller General in making information avail-
able and that disputes can be worked out between them. While this
may be true in many cases, GAO has cited numerous examples includ-
ing those from DOD in which it has encountered flat refusals by
agencies to provide access to records as required by statute. In addi-
tion to these cases, GAO has testified that agencies frequently permit
only limited access to certain data or have imposed restrictions or
conditions on the use of the information. This limited access precludes
GAO from arriving at unqualified findings, conclusions and recom-
mendations and has forced Congress on many occasions to make deci-
sions on critical issues with less than a complete set of facts and
analyses.
The Justice Department's opposition is more nebulous. That agency
appears to base its opposition to section 102 on the ground that Con-
gress cannot grant the Comptroller General the authority to have in-
formation requests enforced in the courts because that would constitute
"execution of the law" which neither the Congress nor the GAO as
legislative bodies have the authority to perform. The Department rec-
ommends that in "light of this unsettled constitutional question and
given the unchartered dimensions of this proposed GAO power," a
non-judicial apparatus, such as one recently proposed by OMB, should
be established to review and resolve disputes with respect to the pro-
duction of documents.
The Department's constitutional reservations concerning section 102
are not persuasive. The courts have consistently upheld Congress'
right to issue subpoenas in support of its constitutional responsibili-
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ties and to have such subpoenas supported in the courts, either through
its own efforts or those of others (e.g. the Justice Department) acting
as agents of the Congress. Since the General Accounting Office is the
investigating arm of the Congress, conferring authority on it under
section 102 to subpoena or otherwise seek judicial enforcement of re-
quests for information, merely vests it with the power possessed by
Congress. The position taken by the Department itself eventually cpn-
cedes that a court would probably uphold the constitutionality of such
a grant of authority to the Comptroller General provided that such
action is in aid of the legislation function of the Congress.
The Committee also finds no merit to the Justice Department's con-
cern over what it refers to as the "unchartered dimensions of this
purposed GAO power." As pointed out earlier in this report, section
102 merely provides judicial remedies to assure compliance with
GAO's existing rights of access to information and in no way expands
or otherwise affects its access rights. Thus, in order to obtain judi-
cial enforcement, GAO would first have to establish a right of access.
The agency or other partly would be free to litigate whether the GAO
was within the scope of its access authority as well as any other de-
fenses it may wish to asert. Finally, with regard to the Justice Depart-
ment's preference for OMB's non-judicial remedy, the preponderance
of evidence accumulated over the years showing a continuing lack of
full cooperation by executive agencies with the GAO weighs heavily
against this "solution." In a recent letter to this Committee the Comp-
troller General addressed this issue in a most poignant manner. He
states:
We do not see how any approach short of a judicial remedy
can be expected to succeed. As you know, each of the OMB
nonjudicial "remedies" would retain the present result that
GAO's access rights are ultimately determined by the execu-
tive branch. Apart from their failure to provide any true
remedy, the OMB alternatives would drastically curtail
GAO's existing statutory access rights.
From our viewpoint, it is extremely unlikely that enact-
ment of section 102 would result in frequent litigation. Our
overriding concern is to obtain the information necessary for
our audit work as quickly and painlessly as possible. We are
certainly no more anxious than the executive branch to engage
in litigation except as a last resort. If section 102 is enacted,
we would continue the approach of seeking informal resolu-
tion in the first instance. However, the complexion of the
negotiations should change considerably. The availability of
a judicial formul would provide a much needed incentive for
the agencies to arrive at their positions much more expediti-
ously and, we hope, to give more objective consideration to the
issues. Thus we are confident that resort to the courts will be
the exception rather than the rule. If informal resolution is
not possible, each side would have the opportunity to seek vin-
dication of its position and, whatever the result, put the mat-
ter to rest.
The executive agencies contend that the current rather neb-
ulous approach to dealing with GAO access problems has
worked well in the past and submit that any problems can be
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dealt with by some reconstituted version of the status quo.
Our actual experience, as documented throughout your Com-
mittee's consideration of H.R. 24 and prior legislation, demon-
strates that this is not the case. We are also convinced that en-
actment of a judicial remedy would ultimately promote,
rather than hinder, better rlaetions between the executive and
legislative branches. It would put GAO and the Congress on
an equal footing with the executive branch for purposes of in-
formal efforts to resolve access issues. In the case of those
access issues that cannot be informally resolved, it would al-
low resort to the only means for objectively determining such
issues between the legislative and executive branches-the
courts. We are perfectly willing to take our chances with the
courts, and we fail to understand the reluctance of the Justice
Department to do so.
The OMB, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Legislation
and National Security, voiced concerns similar to those raised by
DOD, Treasury, and Justice. The Office goes much further, however,
in questioning GAO's basic authorities to review agency operations
and programs. By inference they suggest that GAO was assigned
authority to audit financial transactions by the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 and that any expansion beyond that authority should be
subject to the approval of the head of the agency being audited. This,
of course, conflicts with the clear and succinct wording in GAO's en-
acting legislation as well as subsequent legislation which not only fur-
ther defined or reinforced this broad authority, but gave GAO addi-
tional authorities and responsibilities as well. It is disturbing to the
Committee that OMB as a representative of the President and a bene-
factor of many GAO reports on agency programs should take such a
restrictive and narrow sighted viewpoint. Since H.R. 24 was introduced
early this year, the Committee has held extensive discussions with
officials of the OMB in hopes of resolving the major objections to the
bill. While resolution was reached on several issues, OMB steadfastly
maintained this not so subtle attempt to limit congressional over-
siglit of the executive branch. OMB's position in this respect represents
by far the best argument for the need for Congress to strengthen
GAO's strict oversight of the executive branch.
AVAILABILITY OF DRAFT REPORTS
In June, 1978, the Select Committee on Congressional Operations
issued a report on the "General Accounting Office Services to Con-
gress-An Assessment" (Report No. 95-1317). The findings of the
report stress that considerable concern is evident in the lack of timeli-
ness in providing services to the Congress. This was attributable to (1)
executive agencies' lack of responsiveness in providing GAO with
data about their operations, and (2) GAO's time required to complete
the preparation and review of draft reports, including the time al-
lowed executive agencies to submit comments. The Select. Committee
report recommended that GAO should make every effort to reduce sub-
stantially the delays caused by these factors.
H.Rept. 96-425 --- 2
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As described earlier in this report, section 102 of 11.R. 24 would
chow GAO to seek judicial remedy in the courts in those cases where
it encountered agency refusal or resistance to provide GAO with data
about their operations. The Committee believes that this provision will
serve to remedy the first point raised by the Select Committee's review.
Concerning the second point, this Committee has for some time been
concerned about GAO's draft report processing procedures. The Com-
nrittee has voiced concerns in the past that GAO's reliance on formal
agency comments has contributed greatly to the lack of timeliness of
many of GAO's reports. Further, the Committee is concerned that
substantial portions of GAO's draft reports are changed as a result of
agency comments without explanation to the Congress on ~yhy such
changes were made. In fact, in most cases these changes are made in
such a fashion that the Congress, in viewing the final product, does
not know that they have been made.
The Committee has discovered through its oversight work that a
good deal more can be accomplished when Congressional committees
sued GAO work together rather than go their separate ways. We ac-
knowledge and appreciate GAO's recent efforts to synchronize its
reviews with special needs of the Congress. A recent case is illustra-
tive of the way GAO can assist the Congress in a timely and construc-
tive manner. During the Committee's consideration of legislation to
reauthorize the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), GAO
supplied extensive background and important insights on OFPP's
performance before the Committee held hearings, analyzed the issues,
and deliberated our position. As a result of GAO's assistance, this
Committee was able to introduce legislation which substantially re-
directed OFPP's resources toward the much needed reform of the
Government's procurement process envisioned in that Agency's ori-
ginal legislation.
Two factors played an important part in GAO's success in support-
ing the Committee in this effort. First, the Committee was provided
an advance copy of a study of OFPP's performance and the status
of the recommendations of the Commission on Government Procure-
ment. This study was a draft and had not yet been released by the
GAO. Second, GAO completed the report in time to assist Committee
deliberations on the bill including comprehensive testimony by the
Comptroller General. This timely action could not have been com-
pleted had it not been for the fact that GAO requested only informal
comments from the executive agency involved. This is a welcome de-
parture from GAO's more traditional methods of obtaining formalized
agency positions and losing several months in the process.
The above example is an "exception to the rule" because GAO nor-
mally relies heavily on agency comments to put the final "lacquer" on
their reports. This is of great concern to the Committee for the follow-
ing reasons :
(1) There is an increasing danger, as GAO reports grow more con-
torversial, of premature disclosure by the agency either to preempt
the Congress or for other self-serving reasons.
(2) GAO and the executive agencies can reach agreements on cura-
tive actions and give Congress a fait accompli in the form of a final
report. This preempts the full and free exercise of Congress's policy
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and oversight responsibilities. Then the Congress must, if it chooses to
do so, disagree with the Comptroller General as well as the agency.
(3) There is a danger that GAO's management may rely on agen-
cies to tell it whether GAO audit teams are doing a good job as opposed
to the management unit finding out for itself or insisting that audit
teams check their facts out as they go.
(4) The process of getting formal comments on GAO reports is
undoubtedly an expensive and time consuming endeavor. While not
documented, it is certain that considerable resources are devoted by
the agencies to respond to draft reports by the GAO. The number in
DOD alone must be staggering.
Section 103 of H.R. 24 seeks to improve the timeliness and accuracy
of GAO reports by revising procedures governing the release of draft
reports and processing of comments made by executive agencies. First,
it prohibits submission of draft reports to Federal agencies for periods
longer than 30 days unless the Comptroller General makes an excep-
tion for specified reasons. Second, it requires that congressionally
initiated draft reports be submitted to appropriate Members or com-
mittees, if desired, when they are submitted to agencies for comments.
Finally, the draft report provisions require that the Comptroller
General include in the final version of a GAO report a statement of
changes made in its preparation as a result of agency comments and
the reason for such changes. While this section does not prohibit the
release of formal draft reports for agency comment, it is expected
that such procedures would be used very sparingly.
On June 8, 1979, the Comptroller General informed the Committee
by letter that he had instituted administrative changes to GAO's
prescribed reporting procedures to provide for (1) weekly submissions
to the Committee of a list of draft reports sent to agencies for com-
ment, and (2) discussion in final reports of any significant changes
from the conclusions and recommendations that were contained in the
draft reports submitted to agencies. The Comptroller General believes
that these administrative changes, coupled with his recent order limit-
ing the time for agencies to respond to draft reports to 60 days, ade-
quately meet the concerns of the Committee and that there is no reason
for legislatively requiring these actions.
The Committee appreciates the Comptroller General's effort to ex-
peditiously meet the Committee's concerns by implementing the above
administrative order. However, such administrative actions can be
reversed by future management changes at the GAO. Further, these
procedural changes do not fully address the concerns raised earlier
in this report regarding GAO's excessive reliance on formal agency
comments.
As stated earlier, the tendency today in GAO continues to be one of
having to justify not obtaining written positions from the agency on
draft reports. Further, the agencies themselves have come to expect
this privilege and assume it is their right. The Committee believes this
situation should be reversed. That is, formal agency comments should
be the exception and obtained only when important information can-
not be obtained in any other way and such information is deemed to
be worth several months delay.
One of the reasons changing this GAO practice will be difficult is
simply that it is very convenient for GAO reviewing officials to have
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an agency letter to look at in order to check the authenticity of a draft
report. But, experience has proven over the last 20 years that too
much time is lost first in obtaining the agency's comments and then
in answering these comments in the GAO report.
The GAO has matured sufficiently as an audit and investigative
agency of the Congress to shed itself of the cumbersome and debilitat-
ing formal draft report processing procedures. Further, the Commit-
tee believes that GAO personnel possess sufficient expertise and profes-
sionalism to conduct independent audits of executive agency opera-
tions without having to rely on agency personnel to "correct" their
errors. The GAO may need the views of an agency's top level manage-
ment in order to get a more comprehensive picture of any particular
issue. However, these views can be obtained through informal reviews
of draft material and face to face meetings with agency operating and
policy officials.
In this respect, the Committee fully supports the Comptroller Gen-
eral's newly instituted system for managing jobs (Project Planning
and Management Approach) in which he is directing GAO review
teams to invest more time in the front end (scoping and planning) of
jobs including earlier discussions of issues with agency and congres-
sional officials. This improved management of fobs together with
checking out facts during the job and informal reviews of draft mate-
rial near the end should suffice in achieving a comprehensive under-
standing of the issues and factual accuracy. GAO still has the oppor-
tunity to sit down with agency management officials and outside ex-
perts and get directly from them additional perspectives as well as the
agency's position on a particular issue. During this kind of informal
and free exchange, GAO can learn much more than from a written
letter submitted through formal channels.
The agencies, of course, have an opportunity to present their views
to the Congress through submission of their response to a GAO report
to appropriate committees of the House and the Senate required by
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. This statutory procedure
is sufficient to ensure that the views of all parties are considered prior
to decisionmaking by the Congress. GAO's adherence to this principle
will not only improve the timeliness of their reports but support the
concept of Congress being the final decision maker in these matters.
APPOINTMENT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL AND THE DEPUTY
COMPTROLLER GENERAL
Section 302 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as amended,
now provides for the appointment of the Comptroller General and
Deputy Comptroller General by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Section 303 of the act provides 15-year terms for
both officials, and specifies the grounds for their removal from office.
Section 104 of H.R. 24 would amend these provisions by establish-
ing a new procedure relating to the appointment of the Comptroller
General or Deputy Comptroller General.
In view of the relationship between the Comptroller General and
the Congress, the Committee believes it is appropriate that both Houses
be given a formal role in the selection. To this end, the bill provides
that a Commission, composed of key Congressional officials, develop a
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list of not less than five potential nominees to be submitted to the
President. The President, within his discretion, may request that ad-
ditional names be submitted. The Commission would consist of:
The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
pro tempore of the Senate,
The majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate,
and
The Chairman and ranking minority members of the House
Committee on Government Operations and the Senate Committee
on Governmental Affairs.
The existing provisions of law for appointment of the Comptroller
General by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
would be preserved.
Although H.R. 24's appointment procedure is somewhat unusual, it
is not unprecedented : numerous other statutes place restrictions on the
President's power of appointment, in order to advance legislative
goals. At the request of the committee, the Congressional Research
Service has compiled a list of some of these statutes. Most common are
those which require that the President appoint to a position an indi-
vidual with specified personal or professional qualifications :
Public Law 93-633, the Independent Safety Board Act of
1974, requires that no more than three of the five members of
the National Transportation Safety Board be of the same
political party, and that at least two be "individuals who have
been appointed in the field of accident reconstruction, safety
engineering, or transportation safety."
Under Public Law 95-164, the Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977, the President must appoint to the Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission members who by reason of train-
ing, education, or experience are qualified to carry out the
Commission's functions under the Act.
Public Law 95-140 specifies that the President's appointees
as Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and for Research
and Engineering shall be civilians, and that a person may not
be appointed within 10 years after relief from active duty as
a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed
force.
Other appointment statutes, like section 104 of H.R. 24, provide for
the President to select his nominee form a list compiled from another
group:
Public Law 92-181, establishing the Federal Farm Credit
Board, directs the President, in making appointments to the
board, to take into consideration lists of individuals prepared
by each voting group in the district in which the vacancy
occurs.
Section 7 of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, Public
Law 93-445, provides that one member of the Railroad Retire-
ment Board must be appointed by the President from recom-
mendations made by representatives of the employees, and
one member must be appointed from recommendations of the
employers.
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In short, section 104 of H.R. 24 enables Congress to provide input
into the selection of the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller
General, reflecting Congress' justifiable interest in the choice of an
individual who functions mainly as an agent of Congress. At the same
time, the bill's appointment procedure avoids the constitutional objec-
tions to legislative participation in the appointment process that have
been raised by the executive branch. The President retains the sole
authority of nomination, and the Senate retains the role of advice
and consent. Inasmuch as the President may request additional names
if lie finds the Commission's original submissions unacceptable, no ab-
solute limitation is placed on his freedom of choice.
CONFORMING AMENDMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE INSPECTORS GENERAL
OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF ENERGY AND HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE
Section 201 of H.R. 24 amends the statutes which created Inspec-
tors General for the Departments of Energy and Health, Education,
and Welfare.
When the Inspector General Act of 1978 was passed creating In-
spectors General in twelve other Departments and Agencies, it con-
tained the provision specifying that the audit activities of the Inspec-
tors General, created under the Act, should conform to GAO standards.
The previous legislation creating the Inspectors General for HEW
(Public Law 94-505) and Energy (Public Law 95-91) did not con-
tain this provision.
Section 201 of H.R. 24 would extend this provision of the Inspector
General Act to the Inspectors General of the Departments of Energy
and Health, Education, and Welfare.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
A detailed study of the necessity for the legislation was made by the
Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security and hearings were
held. In addition, the Committee has held a number of hearings in
which questions relating to GAO's failure to receive needed informa-
tion and inability to review unvouchered expenditures have been
raised. These. issues were explored particularly by the Legislation and
National Security Subcommittee in a hearing held on December 10,
1975, entitled "Review of the Powers, Procedures and Policies of the
General Accounting Office."
COST ESTIMATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
The cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office in
the following letter :
U.S. CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
Washington, D.C., July 24, 1979.
Hon. JACK BROOKS,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives, Rayburn House Ogee Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Pursuant to Section 403 of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, the Congressional Budget Office has reviewed
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H.R. 24, the General Accounting Office Act of 1979, as ordered re-
ported by the House Committee on Government Operations, July 24,
1979.
The bill authorizes the Comptroller General to have access to any
information needed to audit all federal expenditures. The bill also
amends the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to require the Presi-
dent to appoint the Comptroller General from a list of at least five
names submitted by a commission of congressional leadership repre-
sentatives established for the purpose of compiling such list.
Based on this review, it is expected that no significant cost to the
Government would be incurred as a result of enactment of this bill.
Sincerely,
ALICE M. RIVLIN, Director.
COMMITTEE ESTIMATE OF COSTS
The Committee accepts the estimate of the CBO that no additional
cost to the Government would be incurred as a result of enactment of
this bill.
NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES
No new budget authority or tax expenditures are required by this
legislation.
INFLATIONARY IMPACT
It is the opinion of this committee that the enactment of this bill
will have no inflationary impact on prices or costs in the operation of
the national economy.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
TITLE I-GAO PROVISIONS
Section 101-Unvouehered expenditures
Section 101 adds a new subsection (f) to section 117 of the Account-
ing and Auditing Act of 1950 to provide GAO with limited authority
to audit expenditures accounted for solely on the approval or certifi-
cate of the President or an agency official.
Subsection 117 (f) (1) affords the Comptroller General access to rec-
ords and information concerning expenditures permitted to be ac-
counted for solely on approval, authorization, or certificate of the
President or an official of a department or establishment,' to the ex-
tent necessary for the Comptroller General to determine whether the
expenditure was actually made and whether it was authorized by law.
This access authority would apply notwithstanding any prior statutory
provision permitting expenditures to be accounted for solely by certifi-
cate, and could be superseded by a subsequent law only in the case of
specific repeal or modification.
Subsection 117(f) (2) prohibits any officer or employee of the GAO
from disclosing the findings of an audit, or any records or information
concerning the audited expenditure, except to the President or head
i By the term "establishment" the committee means all organizational entities in the
executive branch of the Federal Government.
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of the agency concerned or, in the case of unresolved discrepancies, to
a duly established committee or subcommittee of the Congress.
Subsection 117 (f) (3) (a) provides that nothing in this subsection be
construed as affecting the authority contained in section 8(b) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended.
Subsection 117(f) (3) (b) allows for the President to exempt from
the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection 117 financial transac-
tions relative to sensitive foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities.
Subsection 117(f) (3) (c) provides that information concerning fi-
nancial transactions taken pursuant to section 8 (b) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended, and information con-
cerning financial transactions exempted from the provisions of para-
graph (1) shall be reviewable by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Section 102-Enforcement of access to records
Section 102 amends section 313 of the Budget and Accounting Act
of 1921, to provide the Comptroller General necessary authority to
enforce GAO rights of access to Federal and non-Federal records.
The existing paragraph has been designated as subsection (a) and
new subsections (b), (c) (1) and (2) have been added to accomplish
the following :
Subsection 313(b) provides a procedural remedy to enforce already
existing rights by law or agreement of the Comptroller Generel of
access to information, books, documents, papers or records, in Gov-
ernment departments or establishments. The subsection permits the
Comptroller General to institute a suit after 20 calendar days notice
to the Attorney General in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia to compel the production of the material, and authorizes
him to be represented by attorneys of his own selection. In addition,
it authorizes the Attorney General to represent the defendant official
in such actions. Any failure to obey a court order under this subsection
shall be treated by the court as a contempt thereof.
Subsection (c) (1) authorizes the Comptroller General to sign and
issue subpoenas requiring the production of negotiated contract and
subcontract records and records of other non-Federal persons or orga-
nizations to which he has a right of access by law or agreement. This
authority includes books, accounts, and other records of contractors
or subcontractors having negotiated Government contracts and of
various other non-Federal persons or organizations, most of which
have received Federal grants or other financial assistance.
Subsection (c) (2) provides that in case of failure to obey a sub-
poena, the Comptroller General is authorized to invoke the aid of the
appropriate United States district court, through attorneys of his
own selection. The district court may issue an order requiring com-
pliance with the subpoena, and any failure to obey such order shall be
treated by the court as a contempt thereof.
Section 103-Availability of draft reports
Section 103 adds a new subsection (f) to section 312 of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1p21 to provide for better timeliness and ac-
curacy of draft GAO reports.
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Subsection 312(f) (1) provides that no portion of any draft report
prepared by the GAO shall be submitted to any agency for comment
for a period in excess of thirty days unless the Comptroller General
determines that a longer period will result in improvement in the ac-
curacy of the report.
Subsection 312(f) (2) states that failure of any agency to comply
with subsection (f) (1) shall not result in the delayed delivery of any
report.
Subsection 312(f) (3) (a) provides that whenever an agency is re-
quested to comment on a draft report, the Comptroller General shall,
in the case of any reports initiated pursuant to subsection (b) of Sec-
tion 312, or at the request of either House of Congress or any Commit-
tee or member, make the draft report available upon request to such
House, Committee, or member. Section (f) (3) (b) requires the Comp-
troller General, in the case of any other report, to make the. report
available, upon request, to he Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and to the House Committee on Government Operations.
Section 312(f) (4) requires the Comptroller General, upon issuance
of the final version of a report, to prepare and issue a statement of any
significant changes in the findings, conclusions, and recommendations
which were based on an agency's comments of the draft report, and the
reasons for such changes.
Section 104-Appointment of the Comptroller General and the Deputy
Comptroller General
Section 104 amends sections 302 and 303 of the Budget and Account-
ing Act of 1921, to establish a commission to recommend individuals
to the President for appointment to the Office of Comptroller General
and Deputy Comptroller General. The President, at his discretion, may
request additional names. The new subsection 302(a) also provides
that the Deputy Comptroller General acts as Comptroller General
during the absence or incapacity of the Comptroller General or during
(and for the duration of) a vacancy in that office.
Subsection 302(b) provides for the Commission, referred to above,
to submit to the President the names of not less than five persons for
the Office of Comptroller General and for the Office of Deputy Comp-
troller General. The Commission will consist of: The, Speaker of the
House and President pro tempore of the Senate, the 'majority and
minority leaders of each House, and the chairmen and ranking minor-
ity members of the House Government Operations Committee and the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and, in the case- of a vacancy
in the Office of Deputy Comptroller General, the Comptroller General
of the United States.
The first paragraph of section 303 of the Budget and Accounting
Act, which governs the terms of office and removal of the Comptroller
General and Deputy Comptroller General, is amended by deleting the
references to the Deputy Comptroller General.
Subsection 4(c) of the bill gives prospective effect to the amend-
ments to sections 302 and 303 of the Act. Such amendments do not ap-
ply to the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General hold-
ing office on the date of enactment.
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TITLE II-CONFOH_MING AMENDMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE INSPECTORS
GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCA^.ION, AND WELFARE
Sections 201 and 202 amend the statutes which created the Inspector
General for the Department of Energy and the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare.
The Inspector General Act of 1978 specified that audit activities of
Inspectors General created under the Act should conform to GAO
standards. The Office of Inspector General in the Departments of En-
ergy and Health, Education, and Welfare were created prior to the
1978 Act. Therefore, this bill extends the requirements of the Inspec-
tor General Act of 1978 dealing with complying with GAO audit
standards to the Inspectors General of the Departments of Energy and
Health, Education, and Welfare.
Section 201 amends section 203(b,) of Public Law 94-505 in the fol-
lowing manner: Section 203(b) (1) requires the Inspector General of
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to comply with
standards established by the Comptroller General for audits of Fed-
eral establishments, programs, activities, etc. 203(b) (2) requires the
Inspector General to establish guidelines for determining when to
use non-Federal auditors, and 203(b) (3) requires the Inspector Gen-
eral to ensure that work performed by non-Federal auditors complies
with standards described in paragraph (1).
Section 202 amends section 208 of Public Law 95-91 by inserting
new subsections (h) (1), (h) (2), (h) (3) and (i) and (j). Subsections
(h) (1), (h) (2), and (h) (3) require the Inspector General of the
Department of Energy to comply with the provisions described above
for the Inspector General of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. Subsection (i) encourages coordination and cooperation
in the activities of the Inspector General and the Comptroller General.
Subsection (j) requires the Inspector General to report to the Attor-
ney General whenever reasonable grounds have been established to
believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, As REPORTED
In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, as re-
ported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is
enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, existing law
in which no change is proposed is shown in roman) :
SECTION 117 OF THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ACT OF 1950
SEC. 117. (a)
(f) (1) Notwithstanding any provision of law heretofore enacted
permitting an expenditure to be accounted for solely on the approval,
authorization, or certificate of the President of the United States or an
official of an executive agency, the Comptroller General shall have
access to such books, documents, papers, records, and other informa-
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tion relating to such expenditure as may be necessary to enable him
to determine whether the expenditurre was, in fact, actually made and
whether such expenditure was authorized by law. The provisions of
this paragraph shall not be superseded except by a provision of law
enacted after the date of enactment of this paragraph and specifically
repealing or modifying the provisions of this paragraph. In the case
of an expenditure under section 102, 103, 105(d) (1), (3), or (5), or
106(b) (2) or (3), of title 3, United States Code, the provisions of
sections 102, 103, 105(d), and 106(b) of such title shall govern the
examination Of such expenditures by the Comptroller General in lieu
of the provisions of this subsection.
(2) With respect to any expenditure accounted for solely on the
approval, authorization, or certificate of the President of the United
States or an official of a department or establishment and notwith-
standing any previously enacted provision of law, no officer or
employee of the General Accounting Office may release the findings
Of its audit of such expenditure or disclose any books, documents,
papers, records,'or other information concerning such expenditure to
anyone not an officer or employee of the General Accounting Office,
except to the President or the head of the agency concerned or, in the
case of unresolved discrepancies, to a duly established committee or
subcommittee of the Congress.
(3) (A) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as affecting
the authority contained in section 8(b) of the 'Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as amended.
(B) The President may exempt from the provisions of paragraph
(1) of this subsection financial transactions which, relate to sensitive
foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence activities; such an
exemption may be given for a class or category of financial trans-
actions.
(C) Information concerning financial transactions taken pursuant
to section 8(b) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as
amended, and information concerning financial transactions exempted
from the provisions of paragraph (1) shall be reviewable by the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa-
tives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT, 1921
TITLE III-GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
[SEC. 302. There shall be in the General Accounting Office a Comp-
troller General of the United States and an Assistant Comptroller
General of the United States, who shall be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate and shall receive salaries
of $42,500 and $40,000 a year respectively. The Assistant Comptroller
General shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him by the
Comptroller General, and during the absence or incapacity of the
Comptroller General, or during a vacancy in the Office, shall act as
Comptroller General.]
SEC. 302. (a) There shall be in the General Accounting Office a
Comptroller General of the United States and a Deputy Comptroller
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General of the United States who shall be appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Deputy Comp-
troller General shall perform such duties as may be assigned to him
by the Comptroller General. During the absence or incapacity of the
Comptroller General, or during a vacancy in that office, the Deputy
Comptroller General shall act as Comptroller General.
(b) Whenever, after the date of enactment of this subsection, a
vacancy occurs in the O ffiee of Comptroller General, there is established
a commission to recommend individuals to the President for appoint-
ment to the Office of Comptroller General and whenever, after such
date, a vacancy occurs in the Oece of Deputy Comptroller General,
there is established a commission to recommend individuals to the
President for appointment to the Office of Deputy Comptroller Gen-
eral. Such commission shall in either case consist of-
(1) the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
(2) the President pro tempore of the Senate,
(3) the majority and minority leaders of the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate,
(4) the chairman and ranking minority member of the Com-
mittee on Government Operations of the House of Representa-
tives and of the Committee on Government Affairs of the Senate,
and
(5) in the case of a vacancy in the office of Deputy Comptroller
General, the Comptroller General of the United States.
Such commission shall submit to the President for consideration the
names of not less than five persons for the o ffiee of Comptroller Gen-
eral. The President, within his discretion, may request that additional
names be submitted.
SEC. 303. [Except as hereinafter provided in this section, the Comp-
troller General and the Assistant Comptroller General shall hold office
for fifteen years.] Except as otherwise provided in this section, the
Comptroller General shall hold office for fifteen years and the Deputy
Comptroller General shall hold office from the date of appointment
until the date on which an individual is appointed to fill a vacancy in
the Office of Comptroller General. The Deputy Comptroller General
may continue to serve until his successor is appointed. The Comptrol-
ler general shall not be eligible for reappointment. The Comptroller
General or the Assistant Comptroller General may be removed at any
time by joint resolution of Congress after notice and hearing, when,
in the judgment of Congress, the Comptroller General or Assistant
Comptroller General has become permanently incapacitated or has
been inefficient, or guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in
office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for
no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment. Any
Comptroller General or Assistant Comptroller General removed in
the manner herein provided shall be ineligible for reappointment to
that office. When a Comptroller General or Assistant Comptroller
General attains the age of seventy years, he shall be retired from his
office.
SEC. 312. (a) The Comptroller General shall investigate, at the
seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt,
disbursement, and application of public funds, and shall make to the
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President when requested by him, and to Congress at the beginning of
each regular session, a report in writing of the work of the General
Accounting Office, containing recommendations concerning the leg-
islation he may deem necessary to facilitate the prompt and accurate
rendition and settlement of accounts and concerning such other matters
relating to the receipt, disbursement and application of public funds
as he may think advisable. In such regular report, or in special reports
at any time when Congress is in session, he shall make recommenda-
tions looking to greater economy or efficiency in public expenditures.
(b) He shall make such investigations and reports as shall be or-
dered by either House of Congress or by any committees of either
House having jurisdiction over revenue, appropriations, or expend-
itures. The Comptroller General shall also. at the request of any
such committee, direct assistants from his office to furnish the com-
mittee such aid and information as it may request.
(c) The Comptroller General shall specially report to Congress
every expenditure or contract made by any department or establish-
ment in any year in violation of law.
(d) He shall submit to Congress reports upon the adequacy and
effectiveness of the administrative examination of accounts and claims
in the respective departments and establishments and upon the ade-
quacy and effectiveness of departmental inspection of the offices and
accounts of fiscal officers.
(e) He shall furnish such information relating to expenditures and
accounting to the Bureau of the Budget as it may request from time to
time.
(f) (1) No portion of any draft report prepared by the General
Accounting Office shall be submitted to any agency for comment there-
on for a period in excess of thirty days unless the Comptroller General
determines, upon a showing by such agency, that a longer period is
necessary and is likely to result in improvement in the accuracy of such
report.
(2) Failure of an agency to return comments by the conclusion of
the comment period established under paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion shall not result in the delayed delivery of any such report.
(3) Whenever an agency is requested to comment on a draft report,
the Comptroller General shall-
(A) in the case of any report initiated, pursuant to subsection
(b) of this section or otfierunse, at the request of either House of
Congress or by any committee or member thereof, make such draft
report available on request to such House, committee, or member;
or
(B) in the case of any other report, make such draft report
available on request to the Committee on Governmental Affairs
of the Senate and to the Committee on Government Operations
of the House.
(4) The Comptroller General shall prepare and issue with the final
version of any report of the General Accounting Office a statement of
(A) any significant changes, from anry prior drafts of such report, in
the findings, conclusions, or recommendations which were based on an
agency's comments on such a draft, and (B) the reasons for making
such changes.
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Sic. 313. (a) All departments and establishments shall furnish to
the Comptroller General such information regarding the powers,
duties, activities, organization, financial transactions, and methods o f
business of their respective ofces as he may from time to time require
of them: and the Comptroller General, or any of his assistants or
employees, when duly authorized by him, shall, for the purposes of
securing such information, have access to and the right to examine
any books, documents, papers, or records of any such department or
establishment. The authority contained in this section shall not be
applicable to expenditures made under the provisions of section 291
of the Revised Statutes.
(b) If any information, books, documents, papers, or records re-
quested under subsection (a) or any other provision of law or agree-
ment granting the Comptroller General a right o f access from any
department or establishment have not been made available to the
General Accounting 0#?ce within a period of twenty calendar days
after the request has been delivered to the office of the head of the
department or establishment involved, the Comptroller General,
through any attorney designated by him, may, after twenty calendar
days notice to the Attorney General, apply to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia for an order requiring the
production of such material by the head of the department or estab-
lishment. The Attorney General is authorized to represent the defend-
ant official in such proceedings. Any failure to obey an order of the
court under this subsection shall be treated by the court as a contempt
thereof.
(c) (1) To assist in carrying out his functions, the Comptroller
General may sign and issue subpenas requiring the production of con-
tractor and subcontractor records pertaining to negotiated contracts
and records of other non-Federal. persons or organizations to which
he has a right of access bu any law or agreement. Service of a subpena
issued under this subsection may he made by anyone authorized by the
Comptroller General (A) by delivering a copy thereof to the person
named therein, or (B) by mailing a copy thereof by certified or regis-
tered mail, return, receipt requested, addressed to such person at his
residence or principal place of business. A verified return by the per-
son so serving the subpena setting forth the manner of service or. in
the case of service by certified or registered mail, the return post o,fjice
receipt signed by the person so served. shall he proof of service.
(2) In case of failure to obey a subpena issued under paragraph
(1), the Comptroller General, through any attorney designated by
him. may invoke the aid of any district court of the United States in
reauiring the production of the records involved. Any district court
of the United States n+ithin whose .jurisdiction the contractor, subcon;
tractor. or other non-Federal person or organization is found or resides
or in which the contractor, subcontractor, or other non-Federal person,
or organization transacts business. may, in case of refusal to obey a
subpena issued under this section. issue an order requiring compliance
therewith: and anti failure to obey such order of the court shall be
treated by the court as a contempt thereof.
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SECTION 203 OF THE ACT OF OCTOBER 15, 1976
AN ACT To authorize conveyance of the interests of the United States in cer-
tain lands in Salt Lake County, Utah, to Shriners' Hospitals for Crippled
Children, a Colorado corporation.
TITLE II-OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
* * * * * * *
Sec. 203. (a)
* * *
,[(b) In carrying out the responsibilities specified in subsection (a)
(1), the Inspector General shall have authority to approve or disap-
prove the use of outside auditors or to take other appropriate steps
to insure the competence and independence of such auditors.]
(b) In carrying out the responsibilities specified in subsection (a)
(1), the Inspector General shall-
(1) comply with standards established by the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States for audits of Federal establishments, or-
ganizations, programs, activities, and functions;
(2) establish guidelines for determining when it shall be ap-
propriate to use non-Federal auditors; and
(3) take appropriate steps to assure that any work preformed by
non-Federal auditors complies with the standards established by
the Comptroller General as described in paragraph (1).
* * * * *
SECTION 208 OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ORGANIZATION ACT
TITLE II-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT
SEC. 208. (a) (1) * * *
* * * * *
(h) In carrying out the responsibilities specified in subsection (b)
(1), the Inspector General shall-
(1) comply with standards established by the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States for audits of Federal establishments, or-
ganizations, programs, activities and functions;
(2) establish guidelines for determining when it shall be ap-
propriated to use non-Federal auditors; and
(3) take appropriate steps to assure that any work performed
by non-Federal auditors complies with the standards established
by the Comptroller General as described in paragraph (1).
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(i) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities established under
this seotion, the Inspector General shall give particular regard to the
activities of the Comptroller General with a view toward avoiding
duplication and insuring effective coordination and cooperation.
(j) In carrying out the duties and responsibilities established under
this section, the Inspector General shall report expeditiously to the At-
torney General whenever the Inspector General has reasonable grounds
to believe there has been a violation of Federal criminal law.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A.-EXAMPLES OF AGENCIES WITH UNVOUCHERED
ACCOUNTS
Defense (Public Law 94-419) ----- Contingencies, defense_____________________ 10 U.S.C. 140 ......... $2,500,000
Do ------------------------ Operations and maintenance, Army .......... 10 U.S.C. 140_________ 2,929,000
Do_______________________ Operations and maintenance, Navy__________ 10 U.S.C. 140_________ 4,462,000
Do________________________ Operations and maintenance, AirForce ------ 10 U.S.C. 140_________ 2,393,000
Do__________________ Operations and maintenance, Defense_______ 10 U.S.C. 140_________ 8,384,000
District of Columbia (Public Law General operating expenses (Mayor)--------- Public Law 93-140 ----- 2,500
94-446).
Do________________________ General operating expenses (Chairman, Dis- Public Law 93-1402,500
trict of Columbia Council).
Do________________________ Public safety (Chief of Police)_______________ Public Law93-140_200,000
Do________________________ Education (Superintendent of schools)------- Public Law93-140.1,000
Do________________________ Education (president, Federal City College)--- Public Law93-140_1,000
Do________________________ Education (president, Washington Technical Public Law93-1401,000
Institute).
Do________________________ Education (president, District of Columbia Public Law93-140________________
Teachers College).
Foreign assistance r------------- President's special authority ---------------- 22 U.S.C.2364(c)------ 50,00(1,000
Do________________________ Confidential expenses______________________ 22 U.S.C.239966((a 8)_50,000
Do------------------------ Inspector General, Foreign Assistance ------- _ 22 U.S.C.2384(d 1)_2,000
Do------------------------ Peace Corps------------------------------ 22 U.S.C. 251~4((d 7) --- 5,000
HUD, Space, Science (Public Law National Aeronautics and Space Administra- Public Law 94-3 _____ 35, 000
94-378). tion, research and program management.
Do______________________ National Science Foundation________________ Public Law 94-4715,000
Legislative branch (Public -Law- Contingent expenses of the House, allowances 22 U.S.C.276b-------- Unspecified.
94-440). and expenses (American Group of the I nter-
parliamentary Union).
Do________________________ Contingent expenses of the House allowances 22 U.S.C.276g-------- Unspecified.
and expenses (Canada-United Mates Inter-
parliamentary Group,).
State, Justice (Public Law 94-362)_ Emergencies in the diplomatic and consular 31 U.S.C. 107_________ 2,100,000
services (State).
Do________________________ Salaries and expenses, general legal activities ---------------------- 30,000
(Justice).
Do________________________ Federal Bureau of Investigation, salaries and 28 U.S.C. 537_________ 70,000
expenses.
Do________________________ Immigration and Naturalization Service, sal- 8 U.S.C. 1555_________ 50,000
aries and expenses.
Do________________________ Drug Enforcement Administration, salaries ---------------------- 70,000
and expenses.
Treasury (Public Law W363) .... Treasury DepartmentOfficeoftheSecretary - ______________________ 100,000
salaries and expenses.
Do________________________ Compensation of the President______________ 3 U.S.C. 102__________ 50,000
Do________________________ White House Office, salaries and expenses ---------------------- 100,000
(travel funds).
I The 4 items for foreign assistance derive from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; they do not require
specific appropriations each year.
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TABLE 2.-UNVOUCHERED EXPENDITURE FUNDS REQUESTED, FISCAL YEAR 1978
Appropriation account Authority
Amount
Compensation of the President________________________________ 3 U.S.C. 102 ----------
$50,000
The White House Office, salaries and expenses________________________________________
100,000
Executive residence, operating expenses ---------------------------------------------
(')
Operation and maintenance, Army____________________________ 10 U.S.C. 140 ---------
3,219.
Operation and maintenance, Navy_____________________________ 10 U.S.C. 140 ---------
1,507,000
Operation and maintenance, Air Force_________________________ 10 U.S.C. 140 ---------
2,538,000
Operation and maintenance, Defense agencies__________________ 10 U.S.C. 140 ---------
3,743,000
Contingencies, Defense______________________________________ 10 U.S.C. 140_________
5,000,000
Salaries and expenses, general legal activities (Justice Depart-
ment)------------------------------------------------------------
30,000
Federal Bureau of Investigation, salaries and expenses ---------- 28 U.S.C. ------
70,000
Immigration and Naturalization, salaires and expenses___________ 8 U.S.C. 1555_________
50,000
Drug Enforcement Administration, salaries and expenses_______________________________
70,000
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service (State De- 31 U.S.C. 107_________
2,600,000
Page reference
in budget
appendix
55
55
55
228
229
231
232
237
485
489
481
493
522
partment).
Office of the Secretary [of the Treasury], salaries and expenses_________________________ 100, 000 589
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, research and (2)__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 35, 000 660
program management.
National Science Foundation, salaries and expenses_____________ (2) 50,000 775
President's special authority in foreign assistance s__________ __ 22 U.S.C.2364(c)______ 50,000,000 --------------
Foreign assistance, confidential expenses3--------------------- 22 U.S.C.2396(aX8)50,000 --------------
Foreign assistance, Inspector Generals_________________________ 22 U.S.C.2384(dX7)___ 2,000 --------------
P
eaca Corps3----------------------------------------------- 22 U.S.C. 2514(dX7). - 5,000 --------------
District of Columbia, general operating expenses (Mayor)4_______ Public Law 93-140 ----- 2,500 --------------
District of Columbia general operating expenses (Chairman,Dis- Public Law93-140_2,500 --------------
trict of Columbia ?ouncd)4.
District of Columbia, public safety (chief of police) 4------------- Public Law 93-140 ----- 200,000 --------------
District of Columbia, education (superintendent of schools) 4------ Public Law 93-140 ----- 1,000 --------------
District of Columbia, education (president, Federal City College) 4_ Public Law 93-140__.__ 1,000 --------------
District of Columbia, education (president, Washington Technical Public Law 93-140----- 1,000 --------------
I nstitute) 4
Contingent expenses of the- House of Representatives, allowances
22 U.S.C.276b--------
(5) 12
and expenses (American Group of the Interparliamentary union).
Contingent expenses of the House of Representatives, allowances
22 U.S.C. 276g --------
(5) 12
and expenses (Canada-United States interparliamentary Group).
r Request for entire account is $2,157,000 part of which is for "official entertainment expenses of the President to be
accounted for solely in his certificate."
P Authority is renewed each year in substantive legislation handled by authorization committees.
3 Derives from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Does not require specific appropriations each year. The
$50,000,000 authority is available over a number of years until exhausted.
4 Information on the fiscal 1978 budget is not yet available. These confidential funds were included in the fiscal 1977
budget for the District of Columbia.
5 Request for the entire account is $54,682,800, part of which may be spent with certificates in accordance with the au-
thorities contained in title 22 of the U.S. Code, see. 276b and 276g. On the basis of discussions with House and Senate
disbursing offices, it appears that these expenditures, in practice, are vouchered.
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On a number of occasions over the years the General Accounting
Office has encountered difficulty in obtaining from Executive branch
agencies and other organizations records to which we have a right of
access by law or agreement. The following recent examples serve to il-
lustrate this problem.
1. Within the past year, we encountered serious access to records
difficulties at the White House in connection with two audits requested
by congressional sources. In one case the Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Energy and Power of the House Commerce Committee had
asked us to review Federal planning efforts in relation to the mid-
winter coal strike that occurred during 1977-78. The development and
evaluation of unemployment estimates by the Council of Economic
Advisers (CEA) was a key aspect of the audit. The White House re-
fused our request for specific CEA records on this matter and we were
forced to issue our report without the information. The refusal was
said to be based on a Justice Department memorandum challenging
our access rights. In fact, the Justice Department memorandum merely
suggested that additional study might well provide a basis for the
President's invoking "executive privilege" in response to our request.
"Executive privilege" was never invoked. Following issuance of our
report and on the day before a Subcommittee hearing on the matter,
CEA provided most of the records that had previously been denied to
us.
The second case invioved a request by Congressman Eldon Rudd
that we review whether United States Metric Board members were
appointed from segments of the concerned communities as required
by statute. Despite repeated followup inquiries, we received no re-
sponse to our request for access to the necessary records for several
months. Finally the White House denied this request on the basis of
the same Justice Department memorandum. Thus we were unable to
perform the audit. Again the Justice Department suggested a claim of
"executive privilege" but, to the best of our knowledge, it was never
invoked.
These cases illustrate the full range of our access problems. We en-
countered long delays in obtaining any response to our access requests.
When the responses finally arrived in the form of denial, the legal basis
was not articulated. In the Metric Board matter, the response alluded
to areas of concern which might have been accommodated, but no ser-
ious effort was made to seek an accommodation. In the CEA matter,
most of the information was provided after issuance of the report with
no explanation as to why it could not have been furnished months
earlier.
(27)
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2. Pursuant to the requests of over 30 Members of Congress we
initiated a review of the circumstances surrounding a grant by the
Department of Labor to the United Farmworkers of America. Our
initial requests for access to agency documents in connection with this
review were denied. At one point, we were told that the grant in ques-
tion had not been awarded. Later we were told, after the actual selec-
tion of the United Farmworkers had been made, that GAO access to
all grant-related materials was being denied in order to maintain the
confidentiality of the negotiations. A week later our request for access
was once again denied by the Director, Office of National Programs
of the Employment and Training Administration, and a representa-
tive of the DOL Solicitor's Office. To break this impasse, we finally
had to write to the Secretary of Labor setting forth our difficulties and
views on the matter. It was not until five weeks later that the Secretary
responded and gave us full access. As a result of this impasse our
work was delaysd about two months.
3. On a number of occasions we have been denied access to records
of military departments on sweeping and general grounds, such as
the records are "internal working papers" that should not be released
to the GAO or are not "official" agency documents. In one instance
(February 1978) the Air Force refused to give us copies of certain
briefing documents. The denial was based on the fact that the docu-
ments were prepared in connection with the Fiscal Year 1980 budget
which had not gone to Congress.
These are not merely ad hoc denials made by lower level officials,
but reflect formal agency policy guidelines which can serve to engender
a negative approach to GAO access. For example, Air Force regula-
tion 11-8 (10 February 1978) acknowledges GAO's statutory right
of access but then prescribes detailed procedures for handling requests
for sensitive information or denials of GAO requests. Concerning
Air Force regulation 11-8, we have repeatedly contacted Air Force
to share with them our concern over its unjustified restrictions on
GAO access. We recently received from Air Force a draft of the new
regulation. Our initial reaction to the draft is that Air Force is finally
considering modifications to the regulation to accommodate our statu-
tory rights and legitimate working needs, and to foster a positive
working relationship between GAO and Air Force.
4. Even more recently (November 13, 1978) we were distressed to
learn that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Housing) issued guidelines sharply restricting access by non-
Defense personnel to records regarding base closures. This instruction
states that prior clearance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
will have to be obtained before giving materials to GAO staff. Like
Air Force regulation 11-8, this instruction engenders a negative view
of GAO records requests and could well serve to delay our ultimate
receipt of requested documents.
5. Air Force regulation 11-8, referred to above, adversely impacted
on our review of the EF-111A Tactical Jamming System. In that
review we encountered serious delays and, in some cases, outright
denials of our requests for access to records, based upon the regulation.
In this instance, the Air Force refused to provide us with daily flight
reports on the basis that the records were preliminary test reports
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insulated from disclosure pursuant to paragraph 18k of regulation
11-8, and should not be released outside of DOD. Thus, while we
visited EF-111A test sites, development and operational test officials
would not give us any test results or even discuss them.
6. In connection with our review of the World Wide Military Com-
mand Control System (WWMCCS) we have experienced three types of
access to records difficulties : outright denials of access to records;
delayed access to records; and denial of access to principal responsible
officials. The goal of this congressionally requested review is to access
the ability of the WWMCCS system to satisfy military command and
control requirements during a time of crisis. We began our task in
early September 1978 when initial contact was made with the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In response to repeated written re-
quests for access, JCS wrote that there were problems in releasing the
requested information to GAO-in fact, that certain information was
possibly not disclosable at all.
In summary, we have encountered outright denials of access as
well as delays in getting documents. For example, one set of materials
was not received until 36 days after our request; another records
request took 44 days before we received the documents. And, in one
case, over 100 days have elapsed and we still have yet to receive re-
quested materials. Other documents have been denied on the basis they
are "draft" documents since they were yet to be approved by JCS.
The Command and Control Technical Center approved the "draft"
on August 21,1978, and the document is available to other U.S. Govern-
ment agencies upon request.
We also have been flatly denied access to the comments of command
participants during exercises. We sought these materials to see how
the WWMCCS data processing systems supports the needs of the
decision makers. On December 20, 1978, JCS told us the request was
denied because the comments are considered internal documents and
represent the opinion of the participants.
7. An access problem with NASA arose in July of 1978. Initially
NASA would not grant us full access to the records of the NASA
Council which we need to effectively perform two assignments. One
of these assignments is a survey of NASA's planning and selection of
projects to meet national needs. The other is to respond to a request
from the Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Spending Practices and
Open Government, Committee on Governmental Affairs, to review
civil agencies' progress in implementing OMB Circular A-109. NASA
officials stated that they were reluctant to grant us full access to the
records because they did not want to prematurely expose "pre-deci-
sional material," and because of the need to preserve uninhibited free-
dom of expression by NASA personnel. In recognition of NASA's
concerns we agreed to attempt performing our assignments with less
than ftill access to needed records. We found that our restricted access
to records was not satisfactory. In his letter of November 9. 1978, the
NASA Administrator proposed a solution to GAO's problem under
which NASA would (1) screen material prior to its release to GAO,
and (2) withhold "informal" materials such as that prepared by
"working-level" personnel if release of such would damage mechanisms
for the internal communication of candid personal viewpoints.
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By letter of December 12, 1978, we informed the NASA Admin-
istrator that his November 9 proposal was unacceptable. Our letter
(1) reaffirmed GAO's right to examine planning and budgetary data,
(2) explained GAO's policy of judicious handling of such data, and
(3) rejected NASA's proposal that GAO accept information which
had been screened. The letter also asked for a prompt resolution of all
data requests made by GAO on the two assignments. We received a
response by letter from the Administrator dated January 18, 1979, in-
dicating that the requested documents would be provided. Although
we ultimately obtained the materials in March 1979, we encountered
a delay of about 9 months between our initial request and actual
receipt of the materials.
Perhaps the most frequent delay situations we encounter, and the
most difficult to deal with, are those in which it is unclear whether
a real access problem even exists. We may get no specific response to
a request for access within a reasonable time. Follow-up inquiries
may elicit that the request is being processed through various channels
within the agency or there may be vague allusions to "possible prob-
lems" which are under consideration. Unlike situations in which the
agency at least articulates specific objections or concerns, we have
nothing to respond to here in terms of attempting a resolution. In all
probability the records will be provided eventually ; but in the mean-
time assignments have been set back for unclear reasons or, perhaps,
for no reason other than indifference or foot-dragging.
We anticipate that the existence of a judicial enforcement remedy
would have a very substantial and beneficial impact on each type of
delay discussed above. The deterrent effect alone should instill in
agencies a greater sensitivity to the need for prompt responses to our
access requests, thereby generally speeding up the process. It should
also encourage agencies to quickly focus upon and articulate any real
problems which do exist, so that they can at least be approached in a
constructive manner.
We recognize that agencies may have sincere and legitimate con-
cerns for the protection of sensitive information. We have always re-
spected these concerns, and we have not hesitated to seek accommoda-
tions which afford maximum protection to the agency's information
while assuring that our audit responsibilities are carried out effective-
ly. Enactment of the judicial enforcement remedy would not change
this fundamental approach. It would, however, effect more subtle
changes by placing us on an equal footing with the agencies for pur-
poses of negotiation. While this will probably result in some differ-
ences from current practice in the substance of access arrangements,
we anticipate that the most significant effect will be to reduce sub-
stantially the time required for the negotiation process.
The previous discussion centers on our access experiences with Fed-
eral agencies and the anticipated effects of a judicial enforcement
remedy. Generally, this discussion applies as well to access problems
involving non-Federal organizations, such as contractors and grantees,
and to the proposed subpoena authority which would provide the
remedy here.
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While cooperation is quite good as a general rule, access problems do
arise in the form of challenges to GAO's legal authority, delays due to
the informal resolution of stated issues, and delays involving uncer-
tain factors. One possible difference in approach is that non-Federal
organizations tend to be less familiar with GAO's functions and au-
thorities. Issues are more likely to arise concerning the basis and scope
of our legal access rights, and, in effect, our access rights are more
varied than at the Federal level. Also, State laws and procedures may
come into play.
As a result, we have encountered delays caused merely by the need
to provide organizations-particularly grantees-with detailed state-
ments of our authority. For example, the grantee (or its attorneys)
may be entirely willing to cooperate, but may still insist on a formal
statement of authority for its own protection in releasing informa-
tion to us. Thus in a non-Federal context, the presence of a subpoena
power on the statute books should be most useful as a means of avoid-
ing access delays at the outset, particularly where the potential prob-
lem is lack of familiarity with GAO rather than a desire to resist.
At the risk of stating the obvious, our overriding interest in dealing
with non-Federal organizations (as it is, of course, with Federal agen-
cies) is to obtain the access necessary to accomplish our functions as
promptly as possible. This can best be achieved by approaching such
organizations in a nonadversary manner, but with the necessary legal
remedies to support our access authority and evidence our ability to
pursue access.
Our experience under title V of the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, 42 U.S.C. ?? 6381 et seq., illustrates the success of this approach.
Title V grants GAO subpoena authority in the conduct of verification
examinations of energy information. Since the statute was enacted in
December 1975, we have obtained company information under title
V from 68 different energy companies and conducted on-site audits of
certain books and records of 32 companies. All of this has been accom-
plished without the need to issue a single subpoena. Some companies
have been defensive about our involvement and sensitive about com-
plying with our requests for information, especially where we sought
proprietary or competitive data. Nevertheless, voluntary compliance
has enabled its to obtain the necessary information to complete our re-
views. We are convinced that the existence of our title V subpoena
authority is, in large measure, responsible for these results.
Two title V reviews in particular illustrates the importance of hav-
ing subpoena power. One involved a review of coal operators' books
and records supporting coal reserve estimates on public lands. This
review involved the top 20 leaseholders of Federal coal and required
access to information which was of a very confidential and proprie-
tary nature. Our requests initially drew resistance from several of the
companies. Officials of several companies acknowledged that the only
reason they would give its the information is because they knew that
through our enforcement powers we would, in all likelihood, obtain
it in the long run. In another instance, we requested access to manage-
ment and financial information regarding the construction of the
trans-Alaskan pipeline. Although Alyeska-the service company rep-
resenting several major petroleum companies-never acknowledged
our rights under title V, they did give us the information we requested.
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Again, it appears, this was because of our enforcement powers and the
company's interest in avoiding a court battle.
GAO was also given subpoena power relating to social security pro-
grams by the Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments,
42 U.S.C. ? 1320a-4. We have not developed as much experience under
this subpoena provision. We believe that it will prove to be equally
useful. Likewise, we are confident that affirmative results could be ob-
tained if GAO is provided general subpoena power to enforce its
existing access rights by law or agreement to records of non-Federal
organizations.
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APPENDIX C
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., August 8,1979.
Hon. JACK BROOKS,
Chairman, Committee on Government Operations,
Rayburn Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR JACK: I write concerning H.R. 24, which has just been re-
ported out of the Committee on Government Operations. I hope that
this legislation will prove useful and serve the purpose of improving
the General Accounting Office's (GAO) access to executive branch
documents.
I would like to bring to the attention of your committee a recent
experience I have had with a GAO investigation. In May 1978, I re-
quested the GAO to prepare a study on the foreign military sales
decisionmaking process. During the course of its inquiry, GAO ex-
perienced a series of problems in obtaining access to relevant infor-
mation from the executive branch. According to the GAO, the State
Department was reluctant to discuss, or give GAO access to, any
memoranda or documents which revealed internal positions, policy
options and other information relating to the decisionmakin process.
In hearings and correspondence with the Department of State over
the past six months, the State Department has persisted in its claim
that the statutes governing GAO access to Department records do no
provide for unqualified access to records and papers related to policy
formulation and implementation and that such unqualified access is
limited only to records relating to the expenditure of funds and re-
quested in the course of GAO financial audits.
An attached memorandum prepared for the Subcommittee on
Europe and the Middle East by the American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service, states that 31 USC 54 does not dif-
ferentiate between factual information and materials related to policy
formulation and implementation. The memorandum also states that
while such materials may be internal policy memoranda this fact does
not automatically disqualify them from coverage under that pro-
vision. The memorandum indicates that Congress has long viewed the
Comptroller General's access authority in the broadest context, allow-
ing him access to information not directly concerned with the expendi-
tures of funds.
As you know, the problem of GAO access to executive branch infor-
mation is long-standing. While there may be no need to modify 31
USC 54, more effective enforcement mechanisms may be appropriate
to insure that GAO can fulfill its investigative responsibilities for the
Congress. The CRS memorandum states that
the general access provisions of 31 USC 54 or the access implicit
in the statutes granting GAO various review and oversight
powers are sufficient; what is needed is a way to enforce them.
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H.R. 24 addresses the crucial need for an enforcement mechanism
by granting the Comptroller General the right to enforce his right to
access to records through the courts.
I would appreciate your making my concerns, as expressed in this
letter, and the CRS memorandum, part of the committee's record or
report on the bill. If appropriate, I am prepared to provide specific
report language or any other material that the committee desires.
With best regard.
Sincerely yours,
LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe
and the Middle! East.
APRIL 25, 1979.
To: House Foreign Affairs Committee.
From : American Law Division.
Subject : GAO Access to State Department Records.
Enclosed please find a report on GAO access to executive branch
information.
The report was prepared in response to your request for an analysis
of the scope of 31 U.S.C. 53, an access-to-records provision, and the
State Department's reliance on that statute as authority to deny
access to GAO. The precise nature of the documents sought and the
particular investigative interest of the GAO was not discussed. The
report thus speaks in general terms regarding the scope of GAO access
to information. If further analysis is desired, please contact us.
RICHARD EHLKE,
Legislative Attorney.
GAO ACCESS TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFORMATION
The General Accounting Office has been denied access by the State
Department to documents relating to arms sales. In response to a ques-
tion from a member of Security and Scientific Affairs, a department,
representative supplied the following authority for denying informa-
tion to GAO :
The statutes governing GAO access to departmental
records (31 U.S.C. sec. 54) extend only to provide unquali-
fied access to records relating to the expenditure of govern-
ment funds in the course of financial audits conducted by the
GAO. The history and context of section 54 make clear that
it was not intended to provide such unqualified access to rec-
ords and papers related solely to policy formulation and
implementation. Thus, while the Department's firm policy
is to cooperate as fully as possible with the GAO surveys and
studies of United States Government policies and their exe-
cution, it is our policy to safeguard appropriately access to
internal memoranda reflecting individual, bureau, and agency
views and recommendations leading to final policy decisions.
31 U.S.C. 54, part of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, pro-
vides that
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All departments and establishments shall furnish to the
Comptroller General such information regarding the pow-
ers, duties, activities, organization, financial transactions,
and methods of business of their respective offices as he may
from time to time require of them; and the Comptroller Gen-
eral, or any of his assistants or employees when duly author-
ized by him, shall, for the purpose of securing such informa-
tion, have access to and the right to examine any books, docu-
ments, papers, or records of any such department or estab-
lishment. The authority contained in this section shall not
be applicable to expenditures made under the provisions of
section 107 of this title.
On its face, the provision's language is not limited to "records
relating to the expenditure of government funds in the course of
financial audits" but embraces records regarding the "power, duties,
activities, [and] organization" of the various departments and estab-
lishments of the executive branch. The term "activities" arguably en-
visions more comprehensive review of agency records by GAO than
would normally be encompassed within a traditional financial audit.'
Furthermore, the provision does not differentiate between factual in-
formation and "records and papers related solely to policy formula-
tion and implementation". Thus, even if 31 U.S.C. 54 is limited to
records relating to the expenditure of government funds sought in
the course of a financial audit, the fact that the records are internal
policy memoranda does not automatically disqualify them from cov-
erage if relevant to the purpose of the access provision.
It is true that 31 U.S.C. 54 was part of the original 1921 Budget and
Accognting Act, enacted at a time when GAO's and the Comptroller
General's functions were conceived to be narrower than they are today.2
However, legislation enacted in the supervening 50 years has greatly
expanded the role of GAO. The Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, 31 U.S.C. 60, authorizes the Comptroller General to "make an
expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the
Government (including Government Corporations), which, in the
opinion of the Comptroller General, will enable Congress to determine
whether public funds have been economically and efficiently adminis-
tered and expended." The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
added duties to GAO which solidified its position as an arm of the
Congress in matters extending beyond financial auditing. Pursuant to
31 U.S.C. 1154, the Comptroller General is to "review and evaluate the
results of Government programs and activities carried on under exist-
ing law . . . " GAO was thus to be "the principal supplementary staff for
assistance to committees in their analysis of existing agencies and ac-
I See, Morgan, The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to Regain Parity
of Power With the President, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1279, 1353 (1973). Morgan cites floor debates
on the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 indicating that the Dower of the Comptroller
General to "investigate . . all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and applica-
tion of public funds . ." (31 U.S.C. 53. Emphasis supplied.) was intended to permit GAO
review of agency efficiency as well as financial integrity. 51 N.C.L. Rev, at 1353 n. 273,
citing, 58 Cong. Rec. 7292-3 (1919).
2 But see, note 1, supra. The evolution of the GAO from an agency doing "desk audits"
to one engaged in more comprehensive auditing and review activities is described by the
Acting Comptroller General in hearings on the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.
Hearings on the Organization of Congress Before the Joint Committee on the Organization
of the Congress, 89th Cong., 1st Bess. 1363, 1304-1369 (1965).
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tivities" and was envisioned as "an arm of the Congress in examining
and analyzing the activities of existing Federal programs and in the
budget evaluation process generally." 3 The 1974 Congressional Budget
Act expanded GAO's role in assisting committees with their program
evaluation and oversight function.4
Thus, GAO not only performs traditional fiscal audits, but conducts
so-called management audits and program evaluation and analysis. It
defines the term "audit" as including more than just verification of ac-
counts, transactions, and financial statements but as a concept which
also embraces "[c]hecking for compliance with applicable laws and
regulations ; examining the efficiency and economy of Government op-
erations; and determining the extent to which the desired results have
been achieved." 5 This description of GAO's functions comports with
its statutory mandates and is reffeated in the tasks assigned to it by
committees of Congress.
While the duties and responsibilities of the GAO have been expand-
ing, the access-to-records provision, 31 U.S.C. 54, has remained un-
touched. Periodic controversies-similar to the one in question-have
arisen over the sufficiency of the authority in 3.1 U.S.C. 54 to procure
records and information from agencies in the course of the GAO's ex-
panded review and evaluative responsibilities. However, several argu-
ments can be made that the GAO does have broad authority, under 31
U.S.C. 54 or other statutes, to gain access to agency records. As dis-
cussed above, the language of the access provision can be interpreted
to encompass more than merely factual financial information needed
for a fiscal audit. In addition, the Comptroller General argues that ac-
cess necessary to achieve the statutory directive is implicit in the new
authorities vested in the GAO .6 Congress has not felt the need to revise
31 U.S.C. 54 or provide new access authority every time it has given
the GAO new oversight responsibilities or when disclosure problems
have arisen.7
The consistent interpretation by the Comptroller General of the
breadth of the access provision is entitled to great weight as an admin-
istrative interpretation, particularly when such interpretation has
been voiced before Congress which has chosen not to revise it.s The
Comptroller General has frequently aired his problems in getting ac-
cess to agency records before congressional committees. The response
has not been calls to amend 31 U.S.C. 54 to cover the records sought,
but to provide effective enforcement mechanisms to enable GAO to
3 H. Rept. No. 91-1215, Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 91st Cong., 2d seas.
18, 81 (1970).
4 See, S. Rept. No. 93-924, 93d Cong., 2d seas. 72 (1974).
5 Hearing on Review of the Powers. Procedures, and Policies of the General Accounting
Office Before a Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, 94th Cong.,
1st seas. 5 (1975) (testimony of Comptroller General Stoats).
3 See, Hearings on Defense Production Act Amendments of 1972 Before the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d sess. 52 (1972) (Memorandum
on Right of the Comptroller General and the General Accounting Office to Have Access to
the Records of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board).
7 Where rights to access to non-government records are involved, GAO access has fre-
quently been spelled out since the general authority of 31 U.S.C. 54 extends only to depart-
ments and establishments of the executive branch. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 771 (energy informa-
tion). There are numerous statutory provisions specifically giving the GAO access to records
of recipients of various types of Federal financial assistance. See, 42 U.S.C. 1857 ; 19 U.S.C.
1918; 42 U.S.C. 4592; 45 U.S.C. 722. Specific GAO access authority may also he spelled out
with respect to independent establishments. See, 7 U.S.C. 12-3 (Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission). See also. Hearings supra note 6 at 56.
8 See, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Stoats, 574 F. 2d 904 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 362 (1978).
The case involved GAO access to the records of government contractors pursuant to special
access provisions and contract clauses. While 31 U.S.C. 54 was not in issue, the court justi-
fied GAO access on the basis of not only the terms of the particular access provisions in
question but also the broad investigatory powers of the Comptroller General to "investi-
gate . . . all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public
funds . . ." contained in 31 U.S.C. 53. 574 F. 2d at 910.
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effectuate its access rights. The assumption has been that the general
access provisions of 31 U.S.C. 54 or the access implicit in the statutes
granting GAO various review and oversight powers are sufficient ;
what is needed is a way to enforce them.
For example, the Comptroller General's memorandum outlining his
legal authority to gain access to the records of the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Board was submitted before the Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee in 1972. Problems of GAO access to
foreign affairs and military information were aired extensively in
Congress in 1973. In response to the documentation of denials of access
to GAO, provisions to cut off funds if access was not provided were
attached State Department and United States Information Agency
appropriations authorization bills.s The focus of concern was not
whether existing law provided sufficient authority to gain access to
the records being sought by GAO, but what enforcement mechanism
was appropriate. The fund cut-off provision of the State Department
bill was not enacted, largely on procedural grounds.10 The USIA pro-
vision, however, was passed, but the President vetoed it and he was
sustained in the Senate."'
A bill to revise and restate certain functions of the Comptroller
General was also introduced in 1973.12 It would have amended 31
U.S.C. 54, not to provide additional access authority, but to clarify
current statutory language.13 The bill would have deleted the modifier
"financial" to the word "transactions" and the term "methods of
business". 31 U.S.C. 54 would then have provided access to "informa-
tion regarding the powers, duties, organization, transactions, opera-
tions, and activities . . ." 14
Senator Percy, a cosponsor, emphasized his view of the clarifying
nature of the proposed amendment:
[The amendment], I am assured by GAO counsel, does not
provide the GAO with additional access authority. It largely
restates [31 U.S.C. 54]. A comparison of the new language
versus the old is attached. If anything the new language, by
striking the term "financial" . . would appear to have a
weakening effect. In fact, it is to escape the excessively
restrictive construction of "financial transactions" by Federal
agencies that the word "financial" is deleted.15
9 See, 119 Cong. Rec. 19627 (June 14, 1973). A report on GAO Access to Records Prob-
lems Encountered in Making Audits of Foreign Operations and Assistance Programs ap-
pears in 119 Cong, Rec. 19631-19637. Internal memoranda and working papers were fre-
quently the subject of controversy. Id. at 19630.
10 See, 119 Cong. Rec. 29235, 33577-8 (1973).
11 119 Cong. Rec. 33579, 35071, 35428-33.
12 S. 2049. 93d Cong., 1st sess.
13 See, 119 Cong. Rec. 20656, 20662 (June 21, 1973).
14 119 Cong. Rec. 20659.
15 Hearing on Improving Congressional Control of the Budget Before the Subcomm. on
Budgeting. Management, and Expenditures of the Senate Government Operations Com-
mittee, 93d Congress, 1st session, pt. 3 at 7 (1973). The Comptroller General also viewed
the amendment as essentially restating present law. Id., 40. See also, Id., 27-33 for
a description of GAO access problems in a variety of situations.
S. 2049 was not reported from committee. Senator Percy proposed to offer the access
amendment as a provision of the Congressional Budget Act. It did not appear in the
reported versions of the 1974 Act.
Amendments to 31 U.S.C. 54 were also proposed in 1976 and 1977 to deal with a
specific problem of GAO access to FBI records. The sponsors emphasized their belief that
GAO already possessed the access authority, but felt that clarifying legislation was
necessary in the face of repeated challenges by the Attorney General. The bills would
have added to the end of 31 U.S.C. 54 the declaration that with respect to the Department
of Justice and its divisions, the access provision is applicable to audits, reviews and
examinations conducted by GAO pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 65-7 and 31 U.S.C. 1154 and
extends to all records and not only those pertaining to receipt, disbursement, or applica-
tion of public funds. See. 122 Cong. Rec. H2280 (daily ed., Mar. 23, 1976) ; 123 Cong.
Rec. E3146 (daily ed., May 19, 1977).
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Oversight hearings in 1975 portrayed GAO in broad terms. Access
problems were not the focus of the hearings, but the Chairman of the
House Government Operations Committee described GAO as "far
more than just an auditor. It serves as a vital resource of the Con-
gress by obtaining, analyzing, and presenting through its audit, review,
and reporting activities, information necessary to enable the Con-
gress to legislate more effectively." 18 The same committee reported
a bill in 1978 which would have granted the Comptroller General the
right to enforce his right to access to records in court.17 In its report,
the Committee emphasized its view that GAO was entitled to all
records necessary to perform its various functions: 's
A principal duty of GAO is to make independent audits of
agency operations and programs and to report to the Congress
on the manner in which Federal departments and agencies
carry out their responsibilities. In establishing GAO, Con-
gress recognized that the Office would require complete access
to the records of the Federal agencies. This need would not
be fulfilled if GAO's access to records, information, and docu-
ments pertaining to the subject matter of audit or review is
limited. The intent of the various laws assigning authority
and responsibility to the GAO is clear on this point.
Elsewhere, the Committee confronted the recurring argument that
GAO access does not extend to opinions as opposed to factual informa-
tion :19
Other sources have raised the concern that tying section 3
to 31 U.S.C. 54 could have the effect of restricting the Con-
troller General's authority to obtain data from Federal agen-
cies through court enforcement. The Comptroller General
relies upon section 54 as his principal authority to support re-
quests for information from Federal agencies. It is couched
in terms of the agencies' obligation to furnish "information"
to the Comptroller General. Some agencies have attempted to
withhold material from him on the basis that "information"
means "factual information only" and does not include opin-
ions, conclusions, conjectures, recommendations, and similar
matter. Such an interpretation is clearly erroneous. Section
54 gives the Comptroller General the right to examine the
"books, documents, papers, or records" of an agency. Section
54 should be given the broadest meaning possible in order that
the Comptroller General will have the right of access to all
those records he needs to fulfill the GAO's statutory respon-
sibilities. The same breadth of coverage also is intended to
apply to the right of court-enforced access to information con-
ferred under section 3. This position is reinforced by the fact
that Section 3 speaks in terms of 31 U.S.C. 54 or "any other
19 Hearing on Review of the Powers. Procedures, and Policies of the General Account-
ing Office Before a Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, 94th
Congress, 1st session 2 (1975).
17 H. Rept. 95-1586, 95th Congress, 2d session (1978).
18 Id. 5.
'Old . 8. The bill passed the House on Oct. 3. 1978. 124 Cong. Rec. H11360 (daily ed.).
See, Hearings on strengthening Comptroller General's Access to Records Before a 'Sub-
committee of the House Government Operations Committee, 95th Congress, 2d session
(1978).
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provisions of law or agreement granting the Comptroller
General a right to access" to material in the possession of a
Federal agency.
Thus, the problems of GAO access to executive agency records and
the arguments surrounding the scope of its authority to obtain infor-
mation have been before the Congress several times in recent years. The
position that GAO is limited to financial auditing of executive agen-
cies and that its access to information is restricted to factual, fiscal,
data has not been embraced by Congress. When informed of access
difficulties, the focus of congressional debate has not been on the, un-
derlying authority of the GAO or the propriety of its requests but on
the need for mechanisms to enforce the right of access. This long-
standing congressional acceptance of the broad interpretation given his
access authority by the Comptroller General, combined with the literal
scope of not only 31 IT.S.C. 54 itself, but the other statutory directives
to GAO, would seem to refute the argument that policy-making in-
formation not directly concerned with expenditure of funds is outside
the. Comptroller General's access authority.
With respect to the instant controversy, the State Department ap-
pears to be basing its refusal to provide information to GAO on its
interpretation of the statutory language and context of 31 IT.S.C. 54.
Excutive privilege has not been asserted and this report does not ad-
dress the question of GAO access in the face of a claim by the execu-
tive branch of executive privilege.
RICHARD EIILRE,
Legislative Attorney.
Federal Department, Agcvries, Offices, Commissions, and Independent
Establishments with authority to issue and, sign subpoenas
Agency activity :
Agriculture (Department of) : U.S. Code
Pesticides and environmental pesticide control----- 7 U.S.C.
? 136d
Packers and stockyards-------------------------- 7 U.S.C.
? 222
Perishable agricultural commodities-------------- 7 U.S.C.
? 449m
Tobacco inspection------------------------------- 7 U.S.C.
? 511n
Seed inspection---------------------------------- 7 U.S.C.
? 1603
Cotton research and promotion------------------- 7 U.S.C.
? 2115
Potato research and promotion-------------------- 7 U.S.C.
? 2622
American Indian Policy Review Commission--_ - 25 U.S.C.
? 1 74
note
Civi
l Aeronautics Board-----------------------------
49 U.S.C.
? 1484
Civil
Rights Commission----------------------------
42 U.S.C.
??1975
1975d
Civi
l Service Commission:
Political activities of State and local employees-----
5 U.S.C. ? 1507
Enforcement of voting Rights Act of 1965 ---------
42 U.S.C. ? 1973g
Com
merce (Department of) :
Weather modification---------------------------- 15 U.S.C. ?330c
Flammability standards-------------------------- 15 U.S.C. ? 1193
Interstate land sales----------------------------- 15 U.S.C. 1714
(c)
Shrimp fisheries log books----------------------- 16 U.S.C. ?11001-5
Port safety-------------------------------------- 33 U.S.C. ?1223
Shipping --------------------------------------- 46 U.S.C. ? 1124
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe----- 22 U.S.C. ? 3004
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Federal Department, Agencies, Commissions, and Independent Establishments
with authority to issue and sign subpoenas-Continued
Consumer Products Safety Commission : U.S. Code
Hazardous substances---------------------------- 15 U.S.C. ? 1262
note
General ---------------------------------------- 15 U.S.C. ? 2076
Council on Wage and Price Stability----------------- 12 U.S.C. ? 1904
note
Detention Review Board_____________________________ 50 U.S.C. ? 819
Energy (Department of) :
General ---------------------------------------- Pub. L. No. 95-91,
Powers of Secretary (formerly powers of Federal title VI. ? 645
Energy Administration)________________________ 15 U.S.C. ? 772
Administration of Atomic Energy Act (formerly 42 U.S.C. ? 5814
Energy Research and Development Agency) ----- (42 U.S.C. ? 2201
Consumer Products (formerly Federal Energy (c) )
Administration) ------------------------------ 42 U.S.C. ? 6299
Environmental Protection Agency :
General ---------------------------------------- 33 U.S.C. ? 1369
Noise Control Act____________________________________ 42 U.S.C. ? 4915
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ---------- 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-9
Federal Communications Commission------------------ 47 U.S.C. ? 409
Federal Home Loan Bank Board_____________________ 12 U. S.C. ? 1464 (d)
(9)
Federal Maritime Commission________________________
46 U.S.C. ?
1124
Federal Metal and Non-Metallic Mine Safety Board____
30 U.S.C. ?
729(1)
Federal Paperwork Commission_______________________
Federal Power Commission :
44 U.S.C.
note
?3501
Natural gas comps..nies---------------------------
15 U.S.C.
? 717m
Water power------------------------------------
16 U.S.C.
? 825f
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation------
12 U.S.C.
? 1730a
(h)
Federal Trade Commission :
General ----------------------------------------
15 U.S.C. ??45,49
Consumer products_______________________________
42 U.S.C. ? 6302
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission :
Foreign claims___________________________________
22 U.S.C. ? 1623
War Claims Settlement___________________________
50 U.S.C. (App.)
?2001
General:
Secretary of Department for which Coast Guard is
operating (investigations of safety and environ-
mental quality of ports, harbors, and navigable
waters) -------------------------------------- 33 U.S.C. ? 1223
Secretary of Department administering Export Reg-
ulation Act------------------------------------ 50 U.S.C. (App.)
? 2406
General Accounting Office:
Department of Energy Organization Act and Federal
Energy Administration Act of 1974 (upon the
adoption of a resolution by the appropriate con-
gressional committee) -------------------------- Pub. L. 95-91, title
II, ? 207, 91 Stat.
565, 574,; 15
U.S.C. ? 7
Energy Policy and Conservation Act-------------- 42 U.S.C. ??6382,
6384
Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amend-
ments ---------------------------------------- 42 U.S.C. 1320A-1
Health, Education, and Welfare (Department of) :
Old-age survivors and disability insurance benefits_- 42 U.S.C. ? 405(d)
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Federal Department, Agencie8, Comm4scions, and Independent E8tabhshment8
with authority to i88ue and eign 8ubpoena8-Continued
Housing and Urban Development (Department of) : U.S. Code
Interstate land sales_____________________________ 15 U.S.C. ? 1714
Discriminatory housing practices__________________ 42 U.S.C. ? 3611
Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Immigration ------------------------------------ 8 U.S.C. ? 1225
Naturalization ---------------------------------- 8 U.S.C. ?1446(b
Indian Claims Commission___________________________ 25 U.S.C. ? 70q
Interior (Department of) :
Coal mines-------------------------------------- 30 U.S.C. ? 813
Public lands_____________________________________ 43 U.S.C. ?102
Internal Revenue Service_____________________________ 26 U.S.C. ??7602-
7603
Interstate Commerce Commission____________________
Explosives transport ------------------------------ 18 U.S.C. ? 835
Common carriers________________________________ 49 U.S.C. ?? 12, 46
Motor vehicles__________________________________ 49 U.S.C. ?305(d)
Joint Federal-State Land Use 43 U.S.C. ? 1619
Planning Commission for Alaska____________________ (d)
Labor (Department of) :
Workmen's compensation_________________________ 5 U.S.C. ? 8126
Farm labor contractors___________________________ 7 U.S.C. ? 2046
Fair labor standards____________________________ 29 U.S.C. ? 209
Longshoremen ---------------------------------- 33 U.S.C. ? 927
Government contracts___________________________ 41 U.S.C. ? 39
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration--------- 42 U.S.C. ? 3754
National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers____ 12 U.S.C. ? 2404
(d)
National Credit Union Administration :________________
Examination of insured credit unions____________ 12 U.S.C. ? 1784
National Labor Relations Board :
Determination of bargaining units ; investigations
into the fairness of elections ; and unfair labor
practices ------------------------------------- 29 U.S.C. ? 161
National Mediation Board :
Mediating disputes between carriers and their
employees ------------------------------------ 45 U.S.C. ? 157
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation_________________ 29 U.S.C. ? 1303
President:
Enforcement of Defense Production Act ----------- 50 U.S.C. (App.)
? 2155
Railroad Retirement Board :
Railroad unemployment insurance claims--------- 45 U.S.C. ? 362
Securities and Exchange Commission :
Security Exchange Act__________________________ 15 U.S.C. ?78u
Public utility holding companies__________________ 15 U.S.C. ? 79r
Investment companies___________________________ 15 U.S.C. ? 80a-41
Small Business Administration :
Assistance recipients____________________________ 15 U.S.C. ? 634
Investment company licensing____________________ 15 U.S.C. ?? 687a,
687b
Tariff Commission___________________________________ 19 U.S.C. ? 1333
Technology Assessment Board________________________ 2 U.S.C. ? 473
Transportation (Department of) :
Safety standards________________________________ 15 U.S.C.?1401
Tolls in navigable waters________________________ 33 U.S.C.?506
Transportation Safety Board_________________________ 49 U.S.C. ? 1903 (b)
Treasury (Department of) :
Marijuana investigations_________________________ 21 U.S.C. ?? 198a,
198b, 198c
Enforcement of narcotics laws____________________ 31 U.S.C. ? 1034
U.S. Railway Association_____________________________ 45 U.S.C. ? 713
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 Approved For Release 2008/09/11: CIA-RDP85-00003R000200020009-5
Federal Department, Agencies, Commissions, and Independent Establishments
with authority to issue and sign subpoenas--Continued
War Production Board : U.'S. Code
Audits of defense contractors--------------------- 50 U.S.C. (App.)
? 643a
Procurement and repair of naval vessels ---------- 50 U.S.C. (App.)
? 1152
Commission on Consumer Finance--------------------
15 U.S.C. ? 1601
note
Commission on Food Marketing----------------------
Commission on the Organization of the Government for
7 U.S.C. ? 1621
note
the Conduct of Foreign Policy----------------------
Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws
22 U.S.C. ? 2824
Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance__
18 U.S.C. ? 2510
note
Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward
Gambling ---------------------------------------- 18 U.S.C. ? 1955
note
Public Land Law Review Commission---------------- 43 U.S.C. ? 1398
Subversive Activities Control Board :
Investigations on communist-action-front groups or
infiltrated organizations3---------------------- 50 U.S.C.?792
Transportation (auto insurance investigation)------_- 49 U.S.C. ? 1653
note
O
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